Americans attribute to Chinese "dangerous ambiguity" of nuclear strategy


In the widely known publication Popular Science the other day an article was published: "The Chinese ambiguous nuclear strategy is very risky." Honestly, despite a number of sensible thoughts, the conclusions of the authors can be called controversial.


Non-strategic dual-use potential


According to the authors, over the past couple of decades, China has allocated “huge” resources for the PLA for the development of missile systems with both the ability to carry nuclear weapons and conventional ones. The resources, of course, have been rather big, including because the Chinese, as usual, create 2-3 systems where one is enough, and duplicate systems are often adopted. But it’s probably impossible to call them huge: the Chinese are nevertheless closer to us in this matter, and not to the Americans, who spend hundreds of billions of dollars on the creation and production of weapons systems that are superior or close to their counterparts at times costing Russia ten times cheaper. And Washington is very fond of talking about the "unprecedented growth" of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, but it is shamelessly lying: the nuclear arsenal of the Celestial Empire has almost no upward trend and is at a level slightly lower than the French one with an incomparable number of potential carriers. Although in the coming years it should not be ruled out that it will grow, but not at times, but again by interest.

The authors of the article in the Popular Science believe that the Chinese are acquiring this arsenal in order to be able to attack the bases, objects and cities and areas of the territory of the “adversaries” in the region - India, Japan, the USA. In particular, we are talking about medium-range ballistic missiles (BMDs) DF-26, DF-21 of various options (DF-21, recall the very system that is advertised as an "anti-ship missile system", but, in fact, it is rather , "anti-base"), ballistic missiles of shorter range (BRMD) DF-16 and, possibly, in the BRMD with the "hypersonic glider wing wing" DF-17 (the authors took at face value what the Chinese showed at a recent parade, and in vain: they in this case have so far been shown layouts).

The PLA's rationale for implementing this strategy in the field of conventional and nuclear weapons, as the authors of the article in the American edition appear, is "a combination of cost savings that represents weapon dual purpose, and the belief that what is known as “strategic uncertainty” improves China’s ability to deter an adversary from striking at his non-nuclear missile forces. "The authors suggest that the Chinese assume: any adversary considering an attack on conventional forces China in times of crisis or conflict, will fear that they might inadvertently strike a nuclear weapon and thereby catastrophically aggravate the situation.

Does dual-tasking pose a risk?


The authors of Popular Science believe that the risk associated with this strategy is that such ambiguity significantly increases the risk of an accidental exchange of nuclear strikes due to erroneous assumptions. They refer to the famous, but recently too biased researcher of strategic stability issues from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Hans Christensen, who believes that if China launched a missile with a conventional warhead, of those that could carry a special charge, the target country would not be able to distinguish whether its payload is nuclear or conventional, and it may erroneously assume that it is under nuclear attack and respond with a nuclear strike against China.

Likewise, a scenario may come true in which an adversary may intend to strike at what he considers PLA non-nuclear missiles, but unintentionally strike his nuclear forces. Then this could lead China to believe that its actual nuclear deterrence potential is its intended purpose.

However, to date, the general assumption has been that although this practice potentially destabilizes the situation, the PLA at least divided its nuclear and conventional forces into separate and geographically distinct missile brigades. This gave some hope that other countries could still distinguish between China's nuclear and conventional forces, the authors write. But in 2017, in the West, in their opinion, they "discovered" how the new Chinese DF-26 infantry-carrier system is deployed.

Chinese dual-purpose officialdom


The DF-26 is capable of covering about 4000 kilometers and carries warheads weighing about 1200 kg, either conventional or special thermonuclear. The authors of Popular Science did not fail to notice that "the USA and Russia did not have such weapons for the past three decades under the INF Treaty, until Russia violated it, and then the Trump administration withdrew from it in 2019." Well, yes, it was Russia that violated the INF Treaty, and the United States, of course, is sinless, white and fluffy, and it is not easy to notice a log in your eye! The DF-26 missile can be integrated into Chinese missile forces in two ways, and it is not yet clear which approach China uses. One option would be to maintain the existing structure of the missile forces and the creation of separate conventional and nuclear brigades DF-26. However, data from open sources indicate that, at least in the case of one PLARF brigade (PLA missile forces) this is not so, and it has both types of charges. A 2017 CCTV article on the PLA leader rocket brigade at the new complex (646th brigade) reports that it is equipped with a "new type of BRRS" (this was the DF-26). The article also clarifies that this brigade “simultaneously has both nuclear and conventional strike potential”. The Brigadier Political Commissioner Zhou Lusheng says in the same place: "Our task is two types of deterrence [reference to both nuclear and conventional potential] ... a nuclear and conventional dual-use brigade must be trained to simultaneously possess two different operational positions ... that is the staff of such a team has a higher workload. ”

And the commander of the division’s brigade, Zhang Lei, echoed this idea: “We must study both nuclear and conventional weapons, that is, one person must own two questions.” The article describes the exercises in which the brigade works out firing with “high-precision” missiles, and then quickly moving to a nuclear position to carry out a counter-offensive mission, thereby “showing that this new type of brigade really has both nuclear and conventional potential.” Given that the DF-26 is designed to defeat areas like the American Guam (in They call him “Guam Express” in China), some clarity about its payload and its intended effect should ideally be a priority for Chinese staff members who want to convey to their potential adversary their differentiation between conventional and nuclear missile forces. Instead, numerous statements and reports indicate that the PLA missile forces are moving in the opposite direction, the authors lament: the confusion of its nuclear and conventional forces within the same brigade.

In light of the ongoing PLARF plans, significantly increasing the size of the DF-26 fleet, this strategy is incredibly risky, the authors believe. By mixing nuclear and non-nuclear carriers, China can hope to help its deterrence forces, creating uncertainty for the adversary. But it also increases the likelihood of miscalculation in a crisis or even in an ordinary conflict leading to an exchange of nuclear strikes. In short, according to the Popular Science, China deliberately increases the risk of confusion and error exactly where the so-called “fog of war” would be most dangerous.

Counterarguments


What would I like to note from this point of view? Yes, of course, there is such a risk. But, on the other hand, not only the Chinese have it. For example, if we take the non-strategic nuclear forces of Russia, then practically any carrier has both developed variations of conventional warheads and various types (or one type) of nuclear / thermonuclear warheads. Examples are not numbers - these are the Iskander-M missile brigades (M1), Caliber carriers, and carriers of coastal and naval anti-ship missiles of operational purpose (Onyx, Granite, Volcano, and others) and much, much another. And the fact that in normal times the nuclear charges to them are stored in the arsenals of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation does not mean anything: in a crisis situation, and even before it, everything will be different. But for some reason, articles in American publications do not write about this. In addition, there is such an opportunity to "confuse" with the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation - heavy strategic long-range bombers aviation They carry both conventional and thermonuclear weapons and other types of weapons. And even such a new type as the Avangard ICBM has (or will have) a non-nuclear type of equipment, although it is non-nuclear only by the principle of operation, and the destruction itself will be comparable to nuclear munitions, say, of especially low power.

The United States used to have, when they still had developed non-strategic nuclear forces, now degrading to several hundred B61 bombs, it was exactly the same thing, which was also perceived normally. And not only them. Apparently, the idea of ​​“slightly striking” one of the two superpowers, with the expectation that even a massive conventional strike doesn’t get a lot of “light and heat,” does not even occur to overseas authors - they understand the consequences.

What is wrong with China? Yes, the Chinese have a lot of BRMD and even BRRS, which do not have any nuclear warheads at all - this is a feature of the Chinese missile forces. But this is not a reason to try to destroy them in the hope of the absence of a nuclear response. Perhaps the fact that even strategic carriers in China do not carry combat duty with special combat units due to the peculiarities of their doctrine gives rise to various unnecessary hopes, especially against the background of a clear aggravation of relations between the United States and China. This very concept of "separate storage" of nuclear warheads, of course, carries a much greater risk for China itself, because there may be a desire to quickly "solve the Chinese question" (if Russia weren’t nearby, which might not understand this approach, the desire would be much stronger), especially if the United States is aware of the Chinese’s problems with strategic nuclear forces and reliable delivery because the Chinese do not test their missiles at real intercontinental ranges. Apparently, that’s why PR is creating the appropriate one, with the requirements of “clearly separating” nuclear and non-nuclear carriers, that there are hopes for “only non-nuclear limited escalation”. With Russia, some of these hopes overseas are also not eliminated, and in vain. Hence all these hopes that in response to the launch of a single Trident-2 from a submarine with a nuclear charge of especially low power, Russia will not follow a massive response by nuclear forces, and other illusions. But our potential is incomparable with the Chinese and, including both strategic and tactical arsenals, is incomparable with the American. Because the Americans are afraid of us, but China, obviously, is not very.

As for the creation of a "fog of war" and "uncertainty" with the answer and with what kind of ammunition is placed on the media, this is the legitimate right of a nuclear power. Russia, too, verbally declares certain clear criteria for the use of nuclear weapons, but in reality, Western experts say that the Russian approach comes down to creating uncertainty about the minimum "bar", followed by a nuclear response in each case, and to using the principle of "limited escalation "(" escalation to and for de-escalation ") and generally a flexible approach to the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the practice of combat training of troops. And this, in general, is correct: they will know less and there will be less desire to check to what extent the Russian bear can be pulled by the ears. But the Russian bear is big, unpredictable, strong and bloodthirsty. And the Chinese panda is a funny bear, eats bamboo, and is completely harmless, as they probably think in the USA. What if a Chinese vegan bear suddenly changes faith and goes to a carnivore camp?
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  1. Mavrikiy 16 May 2020 05: 20 New
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    The authors of the article in the Popular Science believe that the Chinese are acquiring this arsenal in order to be able to attack the bases, objects and cities and areas of the territory of the “adversaries” in the region - India, Japan, the USA. In particular, we are talking about medium-range ballistic missiles (BRRS)
    Rather, India, Japan, Russia. angry
    1. Ilya-spb 16 May 2020 05: 43 New
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      Chinese copy rockets will be worse than the originals from which they were copied.
      1. Mavrikiy 16 May 2020 06: 03 New
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        Quote: Ilya-spb
        Chinese copy rockets will be worse than the originals from which they were copied.

        For you personally, is there a big difference in dying in a nuclear explosion or from a savage club? Fly massively and smells, this is important. request
      2. Vladimir_2U 16 May 2020 06: 53 New
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        And from what samples are these copies?
  2. Dmitry from Voronezh 16 May 2020 05: 54 New
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    The Americans would very much like to force China to sign some kind of rocket-disadvantageous agreement for it, such as the INF Treaty or strategic offensive arms. But China will not do this and will do it right. Hence the Americans are nitpicking and would be happy to bite, but they cannot.
  3. nikvic46 16 May 2020 06: 16 New
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    Americans measure everything by their standards. They still hold the opinion that the western hemisphere belongs to them. China has not yet confirmed the intentions that the United States ascribes to them.
  4. Free wind 16 May 2020 08: 38 New
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    China will never climb to the United States, nor will the United States climb to China, there are too many links between them, a huge number of Chinese live in America, and America has invested huge capital in China. China does not crash in Japan either, there is a US base there, which is what to embed in America. In India, why do they need crap territories and a crowd of ragged people? They have plenty of their own, which have nowhere to go. But where to put them? Option one, NORTH !!!! And the more they die, the better. And do not think that the Chinese associate themselves with a fluffy panda, for them the symbol is a dragon.
    1. 16329 16 May 2020 23: 27 New
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      There are forces in the United States very interested in the conflict with China, and they do not care that another group has invested there.
    2. Cyril G ... 17 May 2020 10: 17 New
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      This is not the case, and the main marker here is the ongoing drying up of the PRC ground forces and the explosive growth of the Navy. And the Navy is expensive, no, unbearably expensive. And look for an interesting map of the location and population density of China.

      China has devoted all its efforts to building a fleet and fighter aircraft in preparation for a confrontation with the United States in the Pacific. In 2019, the Chinese army underwent a reduction in ground forces and increased the number of marines.
  5. rotmistr60 16 May 2020 09: 23 New
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    article "Chinese ambiguous nuclear strategy is very risky"
    One might think that American scribblers do not know (do not guess) how much ambiguity is in American strategies, and there is no need to talk about dual-use, “dual-tasking”. The only thing they write directly is when they list their enemies - Russia, China, Iran ... Therefore, figuratively we can say that before you call someone a freak, you should look at yourself in the mirror.
  6. depressant 16 May 2020 10: 24 New
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    My opinion is this.
    Transnational corporations and ordinary companies do not want to leave China. They have been seized there for a long time. And Trump made a lot of efforts, hoping that at least American entrepreneurs would return the enterprises to their country, which would objectively weaken the Chinese economy and strengthen the US economy - the States do not want to give up economic leadership. It doesn’t matter where the companies being withdrawn will pay taxes in the future - in the USA or other countries. But that did not happen. Trump's plan did not work or worked weakly. Therefore, it is necessary to unleash a "small" war with China, which will force foreign entrepreneurs to flee from this country - at least in the USA, at least where. Just to stay in China. And you also need to take into account the appetites of the US military industry and the military themselves.
    The author describes the scenarios according to which even a small local conflict can accidentally develop into a nuclear one. Arms systems - an excuse. Trump is clearly running up. This is very bad for us. After all, China and I are neighbors, and allies or not allies - it does not matter! With any development of the US military conflict with China, either a direct attack on our country will be organized, so that we don’t have to help China, we would be living ourselves. Or with the same effect, a sharp increase in border tension. And the United States organized and armed the chain dogs around our borders in abundance. Throws anyone lowered by the owner from the chain. But formally - on their own initiative. As a layman, any scenario bothers me.
  7. sgapich 16 May 2020 11: 48 New
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    And why in the article describing the opinion of the American popular science magazine about Chinese missile strategy, a photograph of the Lotus Temple in Delhi? hi
    PS For those interested, the original article on the Popular Science website:
    https://www.popsci.com/story/blog-network/eastern-arsenal/china-nuclear-conventional-missiles/
  8. iouris 16 May 2020 11: 52 New
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    States that have the audacity to have their military doctrines are required to certify their military doctrines in the State Department with a view to ensuring US security!
  9. knn54 16 May 2020 13: 13 New
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    The military doctrine of both the PRC and the Russian Federation provides for ONLY a retaliatory strike. The Yankees believe that they have the right to the so-called pre-emptive strike, including nuclear.
    Only scribblers, including Russian liberals, persistently circumvent this moment.
    And secondly, do the West not think about the dangers of the so-called uninhabited platforms.
    An inadequate programmer is more difficult to control than an operator.
    1. Boa kaa 16 May 2020 17: 54 New
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      Quote: knn54
      RF provides ONLY a retaliatory strike.

      Colleague, we only guaranteed that we would not use nuclear weapons against countries that did not have such weapons on their territory. Therefore, Germany (the Bundesrat) is seriously concerned about the presence of US arsenals on its territory. And first of all, the arsenal in Büchel ... (up to 20 atomic bombs at the Büchel Air Force Base in the federal state of Rhineland-Palatinate.)
      And as for the "first" - this is. It’s applicable if our country, or our allies, will be threatened with the loss of sovereignty when using DBs with conventional (conventional) weapons ... Or do you seriously believe that we will calmly watch how the Bundeswehr’s division’s detonation tear Belarus and the NATO Allied Forces storm our KOR (Kaliningrad special area)?
      Therefore, one should not confuse politics with strategy and its derivatives.
      AHA.
      1. Cyril G ... 17 May 2020 10: 24 New
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        we only guaranteed that we would not use nuclear weapons against countries that did not have such weapons on their territory.


        I don’t see this already in the military doctrine, and this is good and right ...

        27. The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened. The decision on the use of nuclear weapons is made by the President of the Russian Federation.
  10. Old26 16 May 2020 13: 23 New
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    And Washington is very fond of talking about the "unprecedented growth" of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, but it is shamelessly lying: the nuclear arsenal of the Celestial Empire has almost no upward trend and is at a level slightly lower than the French one with an incomparable number of potential carriers. Although in the coming years it should not be ruled out that it will grow, but not at times, but again by interest.

    Well, the Americans, as always, in their repertoire. They were talking about "unprecedented growth" and, accordingly, the United States lagging behind in the missile field relative to USSR missiles, or about lagging behind in strategic bombers. Now we got to the Chinese nuclear arsenal. Although in one, the Americans are certainly right. It is unlikely that the Chinese nuclear arsenal has such a number of warheads (290), given their missile forces and open materials on the production of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium.

    Quote: Ilya-spb
    Chinese copy rockets will be worse than the originals from which they were copied.

    And they copied from something? Now a stereotype speaks in you - since it’s Chinese, it means copied and worse than the original
  11. Axon 16 May 2020 20: 53 New
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    In the photo, India, the lotus temple in Delhi, was there.
  12. Motorist 16 May 2020 22: 09 New
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    our potential is incomparable with the Chinese and, including both strategic and tactical arsenals, is incomparable with the American

    I wonder how many nuclear weapons we have, and what capacities? For wise men: in Google (Yandex) did not banned, I am interested in experts.
  13. PavelT 17 May 2020 02: 52 New
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    Dear authors!
    Your article contains unsubstantiated information (which, incidentally, is not in the original article):
    ... and Washington is very fond of talking about the "unprecedented growth" of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, but it is unscrupulously lying: the nuclear arsenal of the Celestial Empire has almost no upward trend and is slightly below French with an incomparable number of potential carriers. Although in the coming years it should not be ruled out that it will grow, but not at times, but again by interest.

    In fact, the situation with China’s nuclear potential is as follows: leadership of the PRC, Chinese officials NEVER did not name the size of their nuclear arsenal (neither the number of nuclear warheads, nor the number of strategic missiles, nor the number of other carriers) - you can verify this fact yourself.
    From this fact we must first of all proceed.
    All the numerical estimates of the number of China’s nuclear warheads are just a fortune-telling, an attempt from various indirect data to roughly assess China’s ability to produce nuclear warheads. Nothing more, since espionage in China is very, very difficult, especially in the nuclear military sphere.

    Where does this bike come from that China allegedly has nuclear warheads smaller than France and the UK? It comes with the filing of one (only one!) American, supposedly non-governmental organization, called FAS (Federation of American Scientists) - the Federation of American Scientists.
    If you look carefully at who in the FAS makes these assessments, it turns out a strange fact: the Chinese nuclear arsenal estimates one self-taught expert who does not have a higher education (!), never a scientist or an American. This is Hans Christensen - a Danish functionary from Greenpeace, with a very muddy biography: born in Denmark in 1961, lives in the United States since 1991, no academic degree, no scientific qualification, there is a certificate from a regular Danish gymnasium (college) from 1981 (mathematics, biology). In 1982-86 he was the coordinator from Denmark for the disarmament company. Then, in 1991, he coordinated Greenpeace projects, first in Britain, then throughout Scandinavia (region coordinator). In 1991, he became a researcher at the military information department at Greenpeace International, Washington, DC. In 1997 he was back in Denmark, but already a special adviser to the defense commission in the Danish Ministry of Defense (!). From 1998 to 2002, a researcher at the supposedly muddy non-governmental institute "Nautilus" in Berkeley, USA. How can such a “frame” evaluate something in the nuclear military sphere ??
    The FAS has much more advanced American scientists, nuclear scientists and military personnel who served as officers in the US Navy, including on nuclear submarines with ICBMs (for example: Charles D. Ferguson). Why don't they make assessments of Chinese nuclear potential instead of the under-education of Hans Christensen? Because they were reluctant to get dirty and give out to the public, in the media, this political order: obviously underestimated estimates of the number of China's warheads. Indeed, until the 1990s, the Chinese nuclear forces openly evaluated other US state military structures: DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency (Defense Intelligence Agency - an analogue of our GRU) and NSC - National Security Council (National Security Council). Then their assessments from the media suddenly disappeared and one FAS reigned there. Moreover, the FAS itself estimated the Chinese nuclear arsenal in 1991–1994 at 434 warheads (why not at 433 or 435 - their spies ran around China’s nuclear warehouses and counted up all the warheads to one ???), and then sharply at 230– 235 warheads from 2000 to 2006.

    How do our professionals evaluate China’s nuclear arsenal?
    Here is an article by retired colonel general Viktor Yesin, former chief of the General Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces, professor at the Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation, "Third after the United States and Russia: On China's Nuclear Potential without Understatement or Exaggeration", Published in the weekly Military Industrial Courier on May 2, 2012:
    [html] https://vpk-news.ru/articles/8838 [/ html]
    In it, he modestly assesses the 2012 nuclear arsenal of China in 1600-1800 nuclear warheads.

    Eight years have passed since that assessment, so having 2000 nuclear warheads for the second economy in the world has no problem. I ask everyone to note that Colonel General Viktor Yesin is not a simple expert, but a professional in the defense of our country from potential nuclear adversaries, because his opinion weighs much more than the opinion of amateur "experts" like Hans Christensen.
    I would like to urge all authors to think critically, not to succumb to underestimated Chinese nuclear potential that is pleasant to our and American vanity - we and Americans do not need this, it's just an ideological and psychological hint supported by the media. Due to the advantage for the Chinese leadership of such uncertainty with the nuclear arsenal of China and the stupid ideological demands of the American administration in the 90s, this assessment began to be pushed into the media around the world and gradually became "generally accepted". You probably remember what kind of experts and journalists we had in our country in the 90s - they looked into the mouth of Western media and repeated all their ideas and assessments. 20 years have passed since then, but Christensen's fictitious assessments continue to go around in the media of the whole world and are not critical, they are accepted on faith by our media. I can give a bunch of arguments about the fraud of these estimates (including retroactively correcting them: in the 2000s Christensen quietly corrected his estimates for the 1990s), but it's easier to read my detailed article here: https: //www.sovsekretno .ru / articles / yadernye-sekrety-podnebesnoy /
    Even with the advent of Trump to power in the United States, they were afraid to disavow the FAS bluff with underestimated China’s nuclear arsenal, although Trump's criticism of Chinese nuclear weapons success is growing and already exceeds Russian criticism in this area. We are witnessing how the ideological chimera invented in the USA about the backwardness of China in the field of nuclear weapons hinders the creators of this chimera themselves. And to use it further is dangerous and to admit its creation is also dumb ...
    Of course, intelligence from both the United States and Russia put both Trump and Putin on the tables with much more realistic assessments. Only for some reason we are not supposed to know this. For some reason, we need to listen and believe in the estimates of some half-educated Hans Christensen ...
  14. cniza 17 May 2020 17: 26 New
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    The authors of the article in the Popular Science believe that the Chinese are acquiring this arsenal in order to be able to attack the bases, objects and cities and areas of the territory of the “adversaries” in the region - India, Japan, the USA.


    Why is this for China?
  15. Old26 18 May 2020 17: 09 New
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    Quote: PavelT
    Dear authors!

    Dear Pavel! I read your article earlier. The article is interesting, like any article about China. In the vast majority of the article I agree, although I disagree with some phrases.
    In particular, you write
    Soviet experts also helped China with the development of rocket technology. The USSR handed over to the Chinese two P2 missiles (based on the V-2) and a full set of documentation, and then the documentation for the R-12 missile, which allowed the PRC to create the Dongfeng-1 medium-range missile, adopted in 1970. The basis of China's strategic aviation is the N-6 bombers, based on the Tu-16, originally from the USSR

    I do not quite agree with this remark. In fact, in 1957 we handed over the Chinese documentation for the 8A11 missile systems with the R-1 missile, 8Zh38 with the R-2 missile and the D-1 with the R-11FM missile (8A61FM).
    I did not see any materials that the Chinese built and deployed the R-1 and R-11FM missiles, but the R-2 rocket was built in a small series and was intended mainly for testing production technologies and training calculations. The EMNIP program was called "1059". This rocket did not even get its index in the west, as is usually the case. She is so in Western sources and remained under the designation SS-2. Almost at the same time, China began work on the creation of a ballistic missile system with characteristics close to the Soviet R-5M missile. To the dissatisfaction of the Chinese, the USSR refused to provide materials on the R-12 (8K63) missile, because relations have already begun to deteriorate. The Chinese themselves were forced to develop a program with a missile, which received the designation Dong Feng-1 in China. But the problems that arose did not allow them to quickly launch this rocket into production, so the designation of the missiles changed. The R-2 missile received the designation DF-1 in China, the missile with the TTX of our P-5M received the designation DF-2 (western designation CSS-1). And the program for creating a missile with a TTX close to that of our R-12 received the designation DF-3 in the PRC (the designation "Dong Feng-1 was changed to Dong Feng-3). It was, by the way, the first Chinese missile created by the Chinese themselves. in the west, it received the designation CSS-2. Now, by the way, the western designations have changed, and now Chinese ballistic missiles according to the western classification are not designated CSS-xx, but CH-SS-xx

    Regarding the storyteller of Hans Christian Anderson laughing , sorry Hans Christiansen, his materials have always sinned with inaccuracies. If we compare the data from the same Military Balance 2020 reference book and its data, the discrepancies are very noticeable. Although, I must say, he is the most cited source in our country. But his materials, as well as the materials of our "analysts," must be approached critically. Let's just say that its data can only be used as initially obtained data, requiring clarification in the future ..
    As for the quantity of YaBZ in China, then of course the figure is 290 units. nuclear charges are not true. In order not to infinitely increase the size of the post, I will not provide digital data on the Chinese strategic nuclear forces. I can only say that if we consider exclusively ballistic missiles of the army and navy, while at the minimum configuration, then the number of charges required to equip these missiles with at least monoblocks will be slightly more than 200, given the fact that the presence of RGMs from the same DF-5B is reliably known not to mention the presence of RGM in DF-5C, DF-31, DF-41, the possible presence of RGM in SLB JL-2, and the presence of nuclear warheads on CJ-10 cruise missiles of various modifications, including and aviation. I don’t remember about the nuclear warheads of the Chinese aviation ... So, with such a minimum scenario, the number of nuclear warheads required will be about 220. It is not very likely that the remaining two boats of Project 094 will not carry nuclear warheads, even in a single-block version. The unknown number of DF-31AG missiles is also not taken into account. In short, I agree that the number of Chinese nuclear warheads is underestimated, but the upper estimates also differ ... And how many of them in reality are unknown