Military Review

Legends and myths of the Great Patriotic War. The tragedy of June 30, 1941

162

Immediately: this is not a myth. This is the most история, in which the crews of Soviet bombers flew in their skies in the sky above the Berezina River at the very beginning of World War II. This is a legend.


Probably, many readers remember this episode, which Konstantin Simonov described in his book (and then in the film), “The Living and the Dead”.

When the main character Sintsov goes to Bobruisk and finds out that the crossing across the Berezina is busy, three TB-3s fly over him. Then they bomb the crossing, bomb explosions are heard, the bombers fly back, and they are shot down by German fighters.

The picked up pilot, who escaped with a parachute, angrily says that they were sent in the afternoon for bombing without escort of fighters.

This story happened on June 30, 1941. That's just it was not about three or even six TB-3s. Everything was much more tragic.


Konstantin Simonov, a former witness, was not a specialist. The front-line correspondent is excusable. But he saw that they shot down not only TB-3, but also aircraft of other models. The pilots who were picked up by the truck in which Simonov was traveling were from the DB-3 crew.

Just writing about such a rout as the Germans arranged in the sky above Bobruisk would hardly have raised a hand even at Simonov. After all, in black for bomber aviation On June 30, 52 crews of long-range and heavy bombers were shot down in the Berezina area.

This is without taking into account the lost front-line SB, Yak-4 and Su-2, which also took part in the raids on the crossings.

In fact, three regiments of bombers were lost 80%. And then the question arises: who is to blame for what happened?

In general, any state of emergency has a full name. This is an axiom, unless it comes to natural phenomena.

To begin with about TB-3. It is clear and understandable to anyone who is not even very knowledgeable in aviation matters that only an incompetent fool or a traitor can send these vehicles to bomb during the day and without fighter cover.

Or you can remove “or”, because this man was a traitor to the pilots.

I present to you the commander of the Western Front - Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General Dmitry Pavlov.

Legends and myths of the Great Patriotic War. The tragedy of June 30, 1941

On July 22, 1941, he was sentenced by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR “for cowardice, unauthorized abandonment of strategic points without the permission of the high command, collapse of command and control, inaction of the authorities” to capital punishment and executed. He was buried at the NKVD training ground near Moscow. In 1957, he was posthumously rehabilitated and reinstated in a military rank.

I will not comment on these details, I gave it only for understanding the big picture.

It was the front commander Pavlov who gave (by the way, through the head of the commander of the 3rd air corps Skripko and the commander of the 52nd long-range bomber division Tupikov) the order to the commanders of 3 dbap Zaryansky and 212 dbap Golovanov to strike at the crossings on the Berezina River.

The Zaryansky’s regiment already had a plan of missions for bombing at night, but Pavlov canceled it by his order. There was nothing to do, and Zaryansky sent six TB-3 aircraft in the afternoon.


The question immediately arises: why was there no fighter cover?

Three reasons.

First one. In the troops, and aviation is no exception, on the sixth day of the war there was a complete mess in terms of control. Telephone communications were constantly disrupted due to the actions of both German aviation bombing airfields and sabotage groups that clearly violated the communication lines.

The second one. This flight was not agreed with the commanders of the fighter units and formations. As our generals commanded in those days, we generally have an idea. “At any cost” and stuff like that. It is possible that tank general General Pavlov did not bother with issues such as fighter cover for bombers, so fighter commanders might not have been given such an order.

The third. Even if the order was given, it is necessary that the fighters urgently have at their disposal refueling, loaded planes and pilots ready to fly out for escort. Also a tricky question.

Since the 3rd dbap was planning a night flight, the planes, of course, were ready. Like the crews.

I don’t know with what stone in the heart Zaryansky sent his crews during the day, I don’t know with what thoughts the pilots got into the cabs of their cars, but six TB-3s flew to the target.

Necessary retreat.

TB-3. The maximum speed with M-17F engines at an altitude of 3000 m was 200 km / h, and even less at the ground - 170 km / h. The maximum rate of climb is 75 meters per minute. Turn - 139 seconds.


Armament. 8 machine guns DA caliber 7,62 mm. Twin open installation in the nose, two Tur-5 turrets rolling from side to side behind the trailing edge of the wing, also with coaxial machine guns YES and two retractable B-2 towers under the wing, each of which had one YES on the kingpin. On early-release aircraft, single YES were at all points. Power machine guns from disks of 63 rounds. All paired units had a stock of 24 disks, wing arrays - of 14 disks.








It is clear that against the possessed Messerschmitt armor with cannons and machine guns with tape power it was like a Mosin rifle against MG-34.

TB-3 flew out at 16:15 and crawled to the crossing by 18:00. They bombed, and then German fighters returned, who had torn apart DB-3 from 212 dbap two hours earlier, which had also been bombed without fighter cover.

Another retreat.

DB-3. The maximum speed at an altitude of 439 km / h, at the ground 345 km / h. Defensive armament - three machine guns ShKAS 7,62 mm.


Plus 200 km / h and ShKAS instead of completely useless rattles Degtyarev. But even this did not save the crews that were shot down by the Messerschmitts.

But the TB-3 had no chance at all.

Six TB-3s, which were led by the crews, took part in the departure:
- Captain George Prygunov;
- Captain Mikhail Krasiev;
- Senior Lieutenant Mikhail Glagolev;
- Senior Lieutenant Tikhon Pozhidaev;
- Lieutenant Arsen Khachaturov;
- Lieutenant Alexander Tyrin.

These people did everything they could. We got to the crossing. Despite the air defense fire, they made TWO approaches to the target, dropping bombs. And they went back. It was at the departure that they were intercepted by German fighters.

I already gave the picture, you can only estimate that you can make an arrow with a Degtyarev machine gun and disks against an airplane flying at a speed of 300 km / h more and firing two MG-17s, each of which has 1000 rounds in the ribbon. And no need to recharge. I’m not even talking about MG-FF.


In 4 minutes, four of the six TB-3s were set on fire. The ships of Pozhidaev, Tyrin and Khachaturov were shot down, some of the crews escaped by parachute. Prygunov was able to bring TB-3 to the territory where the Soviet troops were, and then went on an emergency landing. TB-3 Krasieva suffered numerous injuries, but reached his aerodrome, but didn’t get any damage to TB-3 Glagolev and calmly sat down at his airfield. Lucky.

However, you should not assume that such a mess reigned everywhere. No, on the contrary. Where the big bosses did not meddle with their incompetent orders, everything was completely different. Yes, in some places the losses were huge. But most of them were due to the fact that people and equipment were thrown into the battle thoughtlessly, for outright death. If the use occurred wisely, then there were no such catastrophic losses.

An example is the combat report of the commander 3 Tbap from 1.07.1941/30.06/01.07. It reports that in total on the night of 55 to 29 3 flights were made by forces of 23 TB-4 regiments. 2 aircraft returned to their airfield, 3 - shot down, XNUMX - boarded an emergency landing. That is, those who were used correctly did not suffer such losses. At night, the slow-moving TB-XNUMX proved to be quite suitable for work.


But on June 30, 1941, something incomprehensible and tragic was happening in the sky of the Western Front. In addition to the already mentioned 212 and 3 heavy bombardment regiments, Baltic aviation was also thrown into an air meat grinder fleet.

Again it was time to show the next "hero."

Commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral Vladimir Filippovich Tributs. He was not subjected to reprisals, he lived to old age, as a whole, life was a success.


But on June 30, Admiral Tributs sent three regiments of naval aviation to the Dvinsk / Daugavpils region (330 km north of Bobruisk) with an unbroken hand.

- 1st mine torpedo regiment;
- 57th bomber aviation regiment;
- 73 bomber regiment.


The crews of these regiments were supposed to bomb two bridges across the Zapadnaya Dvina River, captured by operational Mr. Manstein. Who at the headquarters of the fleet remembered the sea regiments that were engaged in the laying of mines, which had almost no losses, is now impossible to say. But the show has begun. Tributs gave the order.

A very interesting situation developed: the KBF Air Force headquarters were in Tallinn, the 73rd BAP in Pärnu, the 57th BAP, 1 mtap and the headquarters of the 8th Brigade, which included all these regiments - near Leningrad.

At the brigade headquarters there was a telephone connection with the 73rd regiment, and with the 1st and 57th there was no. There was no connection even between the headquarters of the KBF Air Force and the command of the 8th Naval Aviation Brigade. According to the memoirs, orders from the headquarters of the Air Force were transferred to where they could be received (for example, to the headquarters of the 61st air brigade), and from there they were transferred by messenger to the 8th air brigade.

And it was expected that instead of a coordinated strike by forces of more than 100 bombers, separate strikes of three regiments were obtained. Which, quite expectedly, the German fighters beat as they wanted.

The most unpleasant thing is that the bombers again flew unaccompanied. Yes, KBF fighters could not provide cover on a range, but in the area of ​​Daugavpils fighter aircraft of the Western front operated. However, according to reports, the issue of fighter cover was not raised at all.

As a result, bombers were thrown at targets located at different distances from the aerodromes of air regiments: 300 km for the 73rd regiment and about 450 km for the 1st and 57th regiments.

So, the crews of naval regiments flew to bomb the bridges on the Western Dvina without cover, scattered forces of individual squadrons.

The excellent organization led you to understand what result.

The reconnaissance was carried out and, according to its results, the planes of the 30rd regiment went on target early in the morning of June 73. The first to reach the target were 6 SB bombers, of which the Germans shot down 5. This happened around 8:30 in the morning.

Around the same time, the crews of the 57th air regiment went into battle. Two DB-3s started, which carried out reconnaissance of the situation at the bridges, dropped bombs and transmitted information on the radio.

True, no one received the radiograms, and 15 DB-3 and DB-3F bombers took off on a mission. Captains Khrolenko and Suitcases commanded the groups.

At the same time, two SB groups from the 73rd regiment approached the area. These were 5 vehicles driven by the senior lieutenant of Kosov, and 6 vehicles of Captain Ivanov. Kosov acted very carefully and brought all the cars back without loss.

Then the Germans lifted all the fighters they could into the air, and about 30 Messerschmitts appeared in the sky above Dvinsk.

Of the 9 DB-3F groups of Captain Khrolenko’s group, 4 cars were shot down, and the rest were damaged. The survivors managed to hide in the clouds.

A group of SB bombers of the 73rd regiment under the command of Captain Ivanov, out of 6 vehicles, lost 4.

One of the crews of this group, the plane of junior lieutenant Pyotr Pavlovich Ponomarev, after he was shot down, repeated the deed of Gastello, having made a fire ram of German troops on the highway. For a very long time the crew was reported missing and has not been awarded to this day.

Today, when the fate of the crew of junior lieutenant Ponomarev is established, it would be reasonable to note the heroic deed. Even after 80 years.

Noon.

A group of 8 Ar-2 captain Syromyatnikov from the 73rd regiment approached the crossings. The planes worked from a height of 1400 meters, but worked inaccurate because of a decent height. The Germans did not notice this group, and it safely left for the airfield.

But two SBs of the same 73 regiment, half an hour after the Ar-2 attack were discovered, and the planes were shot down.

By 13 o’clock to the targets approached take off at about 11:00 from airfields near Leningrad aircraft of the 1st mtap. DB-3 and DB-3F of this regiment went into the squadron system, and before departure the captain of the 8th air brigade, captain Ermolaev told the pilots that there were no German fighters over the target. In general, Ermolaev lied. Enemy fighters over Dvinsk were and were waiting for the next wave of Soviet bombers.

The 1st mine torpedo-borne regiment flew in four groups:
- 6 DB-3 of Captain Grechishnikov;
- 9 DB-3A of captain Chelnokov;
- 9 DB-3F captain Plotkin;
- 8 DB-3F of captain Davydov flew off half an hour late.


Having approached the goal, our pilots found that the Germans were waiting for them. A uniform battle began in the air, as a result of which 6 of 4 planes of Captain Grechishnikov’s group were shot down, 9 of 4 planes of Captain Chelnokov were shot down, and 9 of 6 planes of Captain Plotkin.

Total - 14 out of 24.

This is not to say that our bombers played the role of replenishing the accounts of the Luftwaffe aces. Five Messerschmitts out of 30 in the sky above Dvinsk were shot down by our crews.

During these battles, a unique event occurred in the history of aviation. The crew of junior lieutenant Pyotr Stepanovich Igashov made a double ram. Firstly, there is evidence that one of the five enemy fighters shot down on that one was hit by the gunner of this crew.

Then the ignited DB-3F Igashova rammed a German fighter, gaining altitude and standing in front of the nose of a damaged bomber. After that, the plane went into a dive and crashed into the thick of German troops, having also committed a "fire" ram.

None of the four crew members jumped. We decided to go with the commander to the end.


Sadly, while Captain Gastello received the posthumous title of Hero of the Soviet Union, the crew of Junior Lieutenant Igashov was forgotten for a long 25 years. And only in 1965, on the eve of the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Victory, the rewarding of the crew commander of junior lieutenant Pyotr Stepanovich Igashov, navigator of the junior lieutenant Dmitry Grigoryevich Parfenov, the arrow-radio operator of the junior lieutenant Alexander Mitrofanovich Khokhlachev, the gunner of the Red Navy Vasily Voenyamenovich Novinovichovich Novinovichovich Novinovichovich Novinovichovich Novinovichovich Novinovichovich posthumously.

Justice triumphed in 1995, when the crew was posthumously awarded the title of Heroes of Russia.

The crew commander Pyotr Igashov remained alive during this ram. He was captured by the Germans and then, in October 1941, shot by the Gestapo.

The last group of bombers, Captain Davydov, was lucky. Having developed fuel, the fighters began to return to the airfields, so the group lost only one plane.

What the Germans could not do, they simply decided to finish ours. And a brilliant decision was made at headquarters: “We can repeat it.” And the surviving crews were ordered to fly out again ...

True, there really was no one to do this. The returning planes were in such a state for the most part that they could not even talk about any sorties.

The second time flied Captain Syromyatnikov Ar-2 from the 73rd regiment, bombed without loss for the first time. They carried out the second bombing around 19:30 with seven aircraft and again did not lose a single vehicle. This squadron turned out to be the ONLY one that did not lose a single crew that rainy day.


But before Syromyatnikov’s raid, the 57th BAP sent 8 SB planes flying in the morning for other missions to Dvinsk under the command of Captain Rubtsov and 6 DB-3F Captain Efremov.

In fact, that was all the three regiments were able to scrape together after the first raid. And these crews did not fly to Dvinsk.

Captain Rubtsov failed the mission. The group lost orientation and scattered. Two planes landed in Staraya Russa, six reached the target, where they came under air defense fire. Not a single plane came back. One car with a damaged motor sat on a forced one, five were shot down over the target.


Captain Efremov, approaching the goal last, performed a miracle. He turned east and went from where the Germans did not expect him. The Germans were able to shoot down only one aircraft out of six. The rest were able to successfully bomb and return.

As a result, the crossing was destroyed. For three whole days. After which the Germans pulled up the engineering units and restored it.

The Baltic Fleet bombers lost 34 cars downed, and all returnees were in varying degrees of damage. In fact, by the end of the day on June 30, all three bomber regiments ceased to exist. Plus two heavy bomber regiments near Bobruisk.

There was nothing to fly on. Some of the aircraft were recoverable, but the main problem was that experienced crews were lost.

The 73rd regiment was assigned to re-equip Pe-2, the 57th regiment was re-equipped with IL-2.

1 mtap understaffed DB-3F, remaining on the fly. Eugene Preobrazhensky was appointed commander. Under his command from the island of Saaremaa, on the night of August 7-8, 1941, 15 DB-3F, led by Preobrazhensky, will take off and bomb Berlin.

15 crews are all that they could scrape together after the Dvina meat grinder. A difficult task: take off at night, fly to Berlin and return back. Now, after reading this material, let this moment not surprise anyone. There was no one to fly. And all thanks to the frank short-sightedness and lack of professionalism of our generals and admirals.

It is not always pleasant to read such materials. Not very nice to write. But this is our story. As she is.


Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the battles for our freedom!
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  1. New Year day
    New Year day 13 May 2020 18: 31 New
    33
    it is difficult to judge from the height of today's day, but it was, alas, on all fronts.
    "The final report on the combat activities of the Black Sea Fleet in the Second World War 1941-1945." The third volume of this closed document of the operational department of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet: “On November 7, 1941 in the sanitary transport“ Armenia ”completely died:“ Sevastopol Maritime Hospital ”for 700 beds, the naval hospital of the Black Sea Fleet and its property, 5th medical unit , a base infirmary, and so on ... the death toll is about 7000 people, 8 people were saved. After the death of “Armenia”, the Black Sea Fleet was left without medical support, and it was necessary to create the main hospital of the Black Sea Fleet No. 40, basic infirmaries, calling the doctors from the reserve. Loading on one satransport of the entire composition of several medical institutions became a grave mistake "...
    1. Andrey Mikhaylov
      Andrey Mikhaylov 13 May 2020 18: 51 New
      22
      To add to yours that another mistake was the exit of ambulance transport by Armenia in the afternoon, a great tragedy, but the story is like that.
    2. antivirus
      antivirus 13 May 2020 18: 55 New
      +9
      Until death, the order could be easily executed, but beyond death, it’s not a feat. debt
    3. bubalik
      bubalik 13 May 2020 19: 09 New
      13
      Silvestr (Sylvester) Today, 19: 31

      ,,, not specific German or non-German pilot named what sunk ship - still. Why?
      1. Catfish
        Catfish 14 May 2020 02: 50 New
        19
        Why?

        And he is a war criminal. According to all laws of any warring country, the sinking of a sanitary (hospital) ship is a war crime. Well, if the Germans, on the orders of Doenitz, forged the logbooks of submarines (you know), then it was not difficult to hide the name of one pilot, because they themselves perfectly understood what they were doing and how it was regarded throughout the world.
        1. bubalik
          bubalik 14 May 2020 08: 52 New
          +4
          Sea Cat (Constantine) Today, 03: 50

          ,,, legally, the armament of “Armenia” deprived of its protective status and made it a legitimate military target. As a result, the pilots could not bear criminal responsibility for the sinking of an armed vessel.
          1. Catfish
            Catfish 14 May 2020 10: 55 New
            +4
            Then the war criminals, along with the pilot, were those of ours and those who, contrary to generally accepted international laws, either foolishly armed a hospital ship or turned an auxiliary ship carrying artillery into ambulance, in any case, the fault is not only the Germans.
            However, "the Fritzes also had a stigma in the gun", otherwise why hide the name of the pilot. Why do you think?
            1. bubalik
              bubalik 14 May 2020 12: 15 New
              +6
              ,,, this story is muddy.
              ,,, sunk from an airplane or was it a mine? ,,, there is another version that it is possible that our plane is involved.
              ,,, 7000 people died. Passenger capacity of this ship how much? even taking into account that they were loaded without a norm, but it seems to me not like 7000 hours.
              ,, why so few survived?
              “Cap Arkona” the ship was larger than Armenia, there were about 5 thousand concentration camps on it. On May 3, 1945 the British fighter-bomber attacked the Hockers Typhoons Mark 1B.
              “Cap Arkona” caught fire and later rolled over. The prisoners who survived the bombing were shot from machine guns by security guards and pilots who were ordered to destroy all the people on board the attacked ships.
              And still 350 prisoners survived, losses among the Germans on board: out of 600 people, thanks to life jackets, despite the cold water, the temperature of which did not exceed 7 ° C that day, almost 500 survived. German trawlers saved 16 sailors, approx. 450 SS men and 20 warders.
              ,,, and from Armenia only 8h what request
              1. Catfish
                Catfish 14 May 2020 13: 04 New
                +2
                Hmmm, I agree that there is a lot of turbidity here. And the Germans themselves admit the sinking of the "Armenia", or is there silence here too?
                1. bubalik
                  bubalik 14 May 2020 13: 32 New
                  +8
                  I myself did not see the ZhBD, but on the forum it came across that:
                  ,,, traditionally, the drowning of “Armenia” is attributed to group II./KG26, its 6th squadron (12 aircraft) was based at the Buzeau airfield west of Galati, in Romania, from where this squadron operated on communications in the Odessa region.
                  Theoretically, her planes could reach Yalta, the distance from the airfield to Yalta is about 700 km, the radius of the aircraft, 800-900 km (flight range 1950 km). But there is one "but": Since October 19, 1941 the squadron’s planes didn’t make a single combat flight. There is a combat logbook KG26, there are all the magazines of the Black Sea naval commandant (T-1022 Admiral Schwarzes Meer), there are magazines of the coastal commandant of the Ukraine sector (KTB Seekommandant Ukraine 41), but they could not be found.
                  The consumption of aircraft torpedoes is also absent (there are documents too). Moreover, there is an indication in the ZhBD of the compound that during this period, due to the low quality of German torpedoes LT F5b, the aircraft was re-equipped with Italian torpedoes W. Active operations of this squadron did not begin until the transfer to the Saki Crimean airfield, but this happened much later.
                  1. Catfish
                    Catfish 14 May 2020 14: 26 New
                    +3
                    And there was definitely a plane ??? Did they radio from "Armenia" that they were attacked by aviation? And I do not know how much you can trust the testimony of the surviving eight sailors, in such a state of shock, anything could seem to them. Could it really be a mine? I don’t really believe that "Armenia" could have been sunk by mistake by our own plane, well, from where at that time some German ships could have come from Yalta, especially such a transport.
                    But why there are so few survivors is, of course, a question. After all, no one on the water shot them, and there are no cannibal sharks in the Black Sea.
                    You don’t want to take up the investigation yourself, it’s worth it.
              2. tpokorp
                tpokorp 14 May 2020 14: 02 New
                -6
                maybe there were no German trawlers nearby?
                or did the wounded swim badly under that moon?
            2. Jager
              Jager 15 May 2020 15: 22 New
              +1
              I very much doubt that the presence or absence of weapons somehow stopped. The Nazis spat on all the customs and rules of war.
          2. Comrade Bender
            Comrade Bender 14 May 2020 15: 26 New
            +5
            Have you ever thought about the fact that the armament of "Armenia" was a necessary measure, because the German "aces" had not paid attention to any vehicles marked with a red cross before?
    4. The leader of the Redskins
      The leader of the Redskins 13 May 2020 19: 17 New
      11
      My grandfather, Vasily Semenovich, a fifteen-year-old kid, together with his younger sister, watched as a troika of three slowly flying in the direction of the railway station troika TB3 was shot down over their village by a couple of Messerschmitts. And everything happened so quickly that they were able to observe the death of all three cars ...
    5. Alekseev
      Alekseev 13 May 2020 19: 23 New
      17
      Quote: Silvestr
      difficult to judge from today’s height

      On the contrary, it is much easier for us, we know the result.
      it’s good that such a topic was raised in the article, we must learn from the lessons of history, including the military.
      But after all, very competent people gave their assessments of the events of the beginning of the war dozens of years ago. Unfortunately, not everyone remembers them now.
      For example.
      KK Rokossovsky
      My brief information about the situation on the site of the 5th army and the corps he (commander of the Southern Federal District General Gen. Kirponos) now absentmindedly listened, often interrupted, running up to the window with exclamations: “What makes the air defense? .. The planes fly, and no one not knocking ... Outrage! " He immediately ordered to give an order to increase the activity of air defense and to call its chief to him. Yes, it was a bewilderment, since in the current situation at that time, another front commander, in my opinion, would not have been up to air defense.
      True, he tried to solve more important issues. So, several times over the phone I gave orders to the headquarters to transfer orders to someone about decisive counterattacks. But all this sounded uncertain, fussy, insecure. When ordering to throw either one or two divisions into battle, the commander was not even interested in whether the named formations could counterattack, did not explain the specific purpose of their use. The impression was that he either did not know the situation, or did not want to know it.
      At these moments, I finally came to the conclusion that this person could not afford such voluminous, complex and responsible duties, and woe to the troops entrusted to him. With [51] in this mood, I left the headquarters of the Southwestern Front on my way to Moscow. He had previously learned that the situation on the Western Front was also very difficult: the Germans were approaching Smolensk. Knowing the commander of the Western Front, General D.G. Pavlov long before the start of the war (in 1930 he was the regiment commander in the division of which I commanded), could conclude in advance that he was a couple to Kirponos, if not even weaker than him.
      K. Simonov:
      "- Did you read the play" Front "in Pravda last summer?
      - Read.
      - I heard a lot of general insults at her, but he was generally in favor. Considered mostly useful. And you?
      “I, in general, too,” said Serpilin.
      - But here's an interesting question: why? - Ivan Alekseevich again only showed with a gesture who he was talking about. - Why, despite the fact that he does not like criticism and self-criticism, did he approve of the play and ordered it to be published in Pravda? Did not think about this issue?
      - No.
      - I thought. Because, if you wish, you can deduce such a morality: in everything that fell on our heads in XNUMX and XNUMX, the Gorlovs are to blame, and no one but them. They are responsible for the past. On no one else. For this and for nuts! Note, this is an important point. What's next? Then the Gorlovs are replaced with Ognevs, and things start to go better, which is generally close to the truth, even though you are heading the staff for now. And now the question: what is not answered in the play? It was not answered where Gorlov came from. Why and how did he become commanding the front? Did they choose at the general meeting? "
      G.K. Zhukov said that none of the commanders of the border districts could successfully command the front. But at the same time, he emphasized that personal mistakes and the weakness of the top leadership are only one of the reasons for the tragedy of 1941. He believed that then our armed forces were inferior to the German forces "in all respects" in terms of the level of training of commanders, staffs and troops, and the level of combat training.
      Why did this happen? Learn the history of the USSR.
      1. New Year day
        New Year day 13 May 2020 19: 38 New
        +4
        Thanks, informative hi
      2. novel66
        novel66 13 May 2020 20: 33 New
        28
        But what Zhukov himself put the Western direction under attack, he did not remember ?? and then he has everything ... he alone is D Artannian
        1. Alekseev
          Alekseev 13 May 2020 21: 31 New
          -4
          Quote: novel xnumx
          Zhukov put Western direction under attack

          No need to juggle. How did Zhukov put it in jeopardy? How specifically? Or blah blah blah? And did he set up Southwest too? And the northwest? Or G.K.Zhukov in 4 months at the post of chief of the General Staff managed to ruin the entire Red Army?
          Is it not logical to think that this was done by someone else and not alone.
          1. novel66
            novel66 13 May 2020 21: 54 New
            -8
            read books ... more and more
            https://royallib.com/book/kozinkin_oleg/pochemu_ne_rasstrelyali_gukova_v_zashchitu_marshala_pobedi.html
            1. Wasiliy kostrow
              Wasiliy kostrow 14 May 2020 18: 34 New
              +3
              You are our scrapbook.
          2. Dmitry V.
            Dmitry V. 14 May 2020 10: 08 New
            15
            Quote: Alekseev
            How did Zhukov put it in jeopardy? How specifically? Or blah blah blah? And did he set up Southwest too? And the northwest? Or G.K.Zhukov in 4 months at the post of chief of the General Staff managed to ruin the entire Red Army?


            Is disposition familiar?
            The loss and defeat of the Red Army in the border battle was facilitated by the illiterate disposition of troops directly at the border. What the GSh and its boss in the person of Grigory Konstantinovich are directly responsible for - well, Zhukov was not a staff genius.
            НГШ - requires talent.
            1. Glory1974
              Glory1974 14 May 2020 12: 59 New
              +4
              The loss and defeat of the Red Army in the border battle was facilitated by the illiterate disposition of troops directly at the border.

              There were really no troops at the border. Divisions covered 25-30 km along the front. But this is because the army was not deployed.
              What the GSh and its boss in the person of Grigory Konstantinovich are directly responsible for - well, Zhukov was not a staff genius.

              How could he become a commander, failing to become the chief of staff? This is how to become an Olympic champion, failing to win city competitions.
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 14 May 2020 20: 15 New
                -6
                Quote: glory1974
                How could he become a commander, failing to become the chief of staff?

                Local "theorists" do not understand that Zhukov did not even really have time to command the district, and jumped from the post of army commander to the NGSH in just eight months, and after giving a little command to KOVO - where would such a chief have such commanding experience? Of course, we must first of all figure out who moved Zhukov so, and then make claims to those who appointed him to this responsible position, and then blame him for not coping with his new responsibilities. Of course, there is Zhukov's personal fault in this - he could have refused this position, but why he did not do this, let those who better understand the psychology of people of this level should wonder.
            2. ccsr
              ccsr 14 May 2020 20: 02 New
              -8
              Quote: Dmitry Vladimirovich
              The loss and defeat of the Red Army in the border battle was facilitated by the illiterate disposition of troops directly at the border. What the GSh and its boss in the person of Grigory Konstantinovich are directly responsible for - well, Zhukov was not a staff genius.
              НГШ - requires talent.

              Firstly, the location of troops on the border is determined by the current cover plan - I hope you will not dispute this.
              By the beginning of the war, new cover plans were developed in the districts in accordance with the directives of the people's commissar of defense, which issued them in May 1941:
              Top secret
              Of particular importance
              Ex. No. 2
              People's Commissar
              USSR defense
              May 14, 19 41

              No. 503859 / SS / s
              TO THE COMMANDING MILITARY OF THE WESTERN SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT
              Map 1: 1
              In order to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the troops of the district by May 20, 1941 personally to you, the chief of staff and the chief of the operational department of the district’s headquarters:
              a) detailed border defense plan from Kapchamiestis to the lawsuit. Lake Svityaz;
              b) a detailed air defense plan.
              I. Defense tasks:

              And here, Zhukov, if cover plans were developed in the districts, and the district commanders were personally responsible for this?
              Do you even understand that the chief of the General Staff will never determine the deployment of troops in the districts according to this plan, because in the operational management of the General Staff they are less aware of the local characteristics and infrastructure of the district. And none of the general staff then wants to be extreme if the troops fail and blame those who imposed a decision on the deployment of the district’s troops from Moscow - this is the ABC of the defense-People’s Commissariat of Defense-GS relationship.
      3. svp67
        svp67 13 May 2020 21: 29 New
        29
        hi
        Quote: Alekseev
        G.K. Zhukov said that not one of the commanders of the border districts could successfully command the front. But at the same time, he emphasized that personal mistakes and the weakness of senior management are only one of the reasons for the 1941 tragedy.

        Did Zhukov himself fully comply with the position of Nach GS? No. He made many mistakes when planning military operations in peacetime and in command and control of troops in the initial period of the war.
        In general, one of the biggest problems that is often remembered, but it seems to me that her whole tragedy is not completely understood, is that our army had few commanders with experience in fighting the First World War. In many ways, the tactics of the German troops was based on the tactics worked out precisely then. And our units and subunits were not ready to oppose something, we had to learn in the course of the war. But we also found strengths. One of these sides was the rich experience of our Civil War, which was distinguished by highly maneuverable and partisan actions, as well as experience in mobilizing and organizing production ...
        In short, many mistakes were made, and first of all, poorly prepared for such a war and the leadership of the troops by our generals, but the war quickly eliminated stupidity, putting forward those who knew how to learn fast and well, had strong-willed and commanding qualities.
        And the raised tragedy of our bomber aviation in these "dark days" only added to the overall unhappy picture, since these days the tragedy of the defeat of our mechanized corps, the loss of the forward naval base in Liepaja, with the loss of ships and much more took place.
        1. Alekseev
          Alekseev 13 May 2020 21: 51 New
          +5
          Quote: svp67
          Did Zhukov himself fully comply with the position of Nach GS?

          hi
          Not completely, he himself recognized this, his element is teamwork, not staff.
          I focused on the fact that the mass appointment of unprepared generals and officers to command posts and other failures in preparing the army for war is a systemic result, and not the result of wrecking and stupidity of individuals.
          Recently it was discussed that the same Zhukov, as the representative of the high command at the beginning of the war in the SWF, together with the command made seemingly correct decisions: by hitting thousands of tanks with fur. buildings on the flanks of the German advancing wedge to defeat the enemy. But what came of it? In fact, it turned out that intelligence did not determine exactly the direction of the main blow of the Germans, the fur. the hulls were not fully operational, the Germans had air supremacy, communications did not allow for clear command and control, tanks broke down and remained without fuel on marches, etc. etc.
          You can complain about surprise. But, for example, near Vyazma, there was no surprise ...
          1. svp67
            svp67 14 May 2020 05: 34 New
            12
            Quote: Alekseev
            I focused on the fact that the mass appointment of unprepared generals and officers to command posts and other failures in preparing the army for war is a systemic result, and not the result of wrecking and stupidity of individuals.

            But was this lack of system the result of stupidity, due to the small baggage of knowledge and simply the professional unsuitability of these commanders? I believe that this is exactly so, and everything else is just a derivative of this.
            Roughly, with big mistakes drawn up plans for covering the border, and the mistakes were not revealed by higher commanders and chiefs when protecting these plans and, as a result, the cross movement of mechanized corps from the areas of concentration to the indicated lines, causing pandemonium at crossroads and overloading of crossings, finding fuel and lubricants warehouses for more than a thousand kilometers from the front line, which did not allow organizing the supply of fuel in a timely manner to the troops ... Weak working off, and most importantly, the study of new methods of warfare, as a result, at the strategic level, the high command even "in a nightmare" could not imagine the depth to which they broke through German tank groups, and therefore could not promptly provide them with resistance. Refusal from a continuous trench in favor of single cells, the use of tanks without the support of infantry and artillery, this is at the tactical level ... Listing errors can take a long time. Therefore, I will simply say - we were not ready for that war ...
            Quote: Alekseev
            You can complain about surprise. But, for example, near Vyazma, there was no surprise ...

            And here another misfortune of that war began to manifest itself, which actually pursued us until the 43rd year. We were losing those troops that already received modern combat experience and were sent new, untrained in their place.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 14 May 2020 10: 46 New
              +9
              Quote: svp67
              Refusal of a continuous trench in favor of single cells

              EMNIP, individual cells were only the first stage of engineering equipment positions. Further, each of them had to be connected by a slot-shelter with a connecting trench. The result was a rifle trench with remote cells.
              But usually the rank and file tore off only the cells - "and so it will come down, all the same tomorrow, throw everything and retreat."
              1. svp67
                svp67 14 May 2020 15: 04 New
                +5
                Quote: Alexey RA
                EMNIP, individual cells were only the first stage of engineering equipment positions. Further, each of them had to be connected by a slot-shelter with a connecting trench. The result was a rifle trench with remote cells.

                Correctly, but not to the end, here the authors well described the difference between the construction of field defense based on individual cells and trenches
                http://znamyarodini.ru/rkka/fortifikatciia-vov/rkka/analiz-polevoi-fortifikatcii-rkka-v-vov
            2. Pavel57
              Pavel57 14 May 2020 20: 53 New
              +3
              We were losing those troops that already received modern combat experience and were sent new, untrained in their place.

              For Germans after 43g. it has become even more critical.
              1. svp67
                svp67 15 May 2020 07: 23 New
                +5
                Quote: Pavel57
                For Germans after 43g. it has become even more critical.

                Yes, that's why the war rolled to the West ...
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 14 May 2020 10: 35 New
          12
          Quote: svp67
          In general, one of the biggest problems that is often remembered, but it seems to me that her whole tragedy is not completely understood, is that our army had few commanders with experience in fighting the First World War. In many ways, the tactics of the German troops was based on the tactics worked out precisely then.

          I now know one army whose commanders had tremendous experience in the First World War they won. This army lasted a month against the Germans.
          ICHH, commanders with PMA experience made exactly the same mistakes in the use of motorized parts. as the commanders "from the bottom": the introduction of formations into battle from the march, the spreading of the strike fist to the tasks of the NIE, the use of motorized infantry of tank formations in other sectors in the role of infantry, the use of tanks without infantry.
          1. svp67
            svp67 14 May 2020 15: 09 New
            +5
            Quote: Alexey RA
            I now know one army whose commanders had tremendous experience in the First World War they won.

            I agree, but unlike the Poles, the French, the British and others, we had almost two years, our military specialists were in the German army, all this had to be meaningful, all the operations carried out were sorted out and conclusions were drawn to reduce the mistakes made allies to a minimum
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 15 May 2020 12: 08 New
              +9
              Quote: svp67
              I agree, but unlike the Poles, the French, the British and others, we had almost two years, our military specialists were in the German army, all this had to be meaningful, all the operations carried out were sorted out and conclusions were drawn to reduce the mistakes made allies to a minimum

              What data? What kind of operations? All. what the General Staff of the Red Army had — these were re-calls by Karuzo Rabinovich — intelligence reports from second-third hands or based on press materials.
              In May 1940, the experience of the French company did not really have time to analyze even in the German headquarters. But the Germans, at least, had first-hand information, and the Soviet military had to rely on intelligence data.
              Intelligence again “failed” and informed the Soviet command that the Germans deployed 90 divisions on the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg borders, including 15 armored and motorized divisions, and even 40 divisions on the French border (for the 10th May 1940, according to intelligence, the Germans had more than two hundred divisions). Acting under the cover of approximately nine thousand combat aircraft, widely applying “new military techniques and methods” and “new offensive means (heavy tanks, motorcycle units, dive bombers, airborne landing forces)”, German troops “penetrated deep into France as soon as possible,” reached the coast of Northern France and thereby separated the Belgian group of allies from the main forces of France, surrounded the Belgian group of allies with up to 60-70 divisions ”, however, losing two thousand b of warplanes and about half a million people killed and wounded. “Only in the vicinity of Rotterdam was an airborne landing of 15 thousand people armed with machine guns, light guns, anti-aircraft guns and light tanks.” The Wehrmacht, according to Soviet intelligence, hacked the fortifications of the Maginot Line with heavy tanks armed with 100 mm cannons (although the data on the fighting mass of heavy tanks varied - according to some sources, the German heavy tanks T5 and T6 weighed 60 tons , other sources were limited to “only” 32 tons). According to the same valiant intelligence, no less than 2-3 German tank divisions had one regiment of heavy tanks, however, other sources reported the creation of two divisions of 35-ton heavy tanks. German motorcyclists, according to the comrades of the Stirlitz, rolled out in the fields and roads of Belgium and northern France in groups of up to sixty thousand people.
              © Ulanov / Shein
            2. strannik1985
              strannik1985 15 May 2020 13: 49 New
              +7
              I agree, but unlike the Poles, the French, the British and others, we had almost two years

              1. This time was not wasted, the Red Army of 1941 was very different from the SC arr. 1939, both in organization and in training.
              2. Foreign experience needs to be adapted to Soviet realities, for example, due to the lack of a medium-caliber artillery high-speed tractor, artillery support should be provided in another way, because of the payload capacity of the main cargo vehicles of 1,5-2,5 tons, the number of tanks in connections, etc.
              3. The USSR could not afford to keep the spacecraft fully mobilized according to the "West" option; it could not deploy all troops at the border without clear signs of preparation for an attack.
              1. svp67
                svp67 15 May 2020 13: 51 New
                +2
                Quote: strannik1985
                could not deploy all troops near the border without clear signs of preparation for an attack.

                And they did not have to be placed there. It just wasn’t necessary. It was necessary to create a deep foreland, and build defense at a distance of hundreds of kilometers from the border. But this could not be done for ideological reasons.
                1. strannik1985
                  strannik1985 15 May 2020 14: 21 New
                  +5
                  But this could not be done for ideological reasons.

                  100 km from the border - one daily crossing of a tank division, and the full term of mobilization of the district (front) - 30 days.
                  In addition, deaf defense is unpromising, so that the enemy does not break through the front, it is necessary to fight for the initiative, i.e. to advance.
                  1. svp67
                    svp67 15 May 2020 14: 31 New
                    +4
                    Quote: strannik1985
                    100 km from the border - one daily crossing of a tank division,

                    No, in a well-organized field, this is for a week, or even a month.
                    Quote: strannik1985
                    In addition, deaf defense is unpromising, so that the enemy does not break through the front, it is necessary to fight for the initiative, i.e. to advance.

                    The organization of the pre-field does not imply a "dull" defense, it is the most that is not "maneuverable". But it makes it possible to determine the main directions of the strike and inflict damage on strike groups, before the moment they reach the first line of defense, and by themselves concentrate mechanized subunits so that to inflict defeat on these groups
                    1. strannik1985
                      strannik1985 15 May 2020 15: 31 New
                      +4
                      No, in a well-organized foreground, this is for a week

                      On the model of what?
                      The organization is foreground and does not imply a "blind" defense

                      To conduct a maneuvering war, roads are needed, roads along which Soviet troops can move, but the Germans cannot.
                      1. svp67
                        svp67 15 May 2020 15: 48 New
                        +3
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        To conduct a maneuvering war, roads are needed, roads along which Soviet troops can move, but the Germans cannot.

                        As it happens ... It's all done by well-organized engineering
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        On the model of what?

                        For example, the Mannerheim Line
                      2. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 15 May 2020 16: 34 New
                        +5
                        For example, the Mannerheim Line

                        Those. The Karelian Isthmus, only it is 150-180 km from north to south and 50-110 from west to east, and the foreground itself is 30-70 km from the border. The Finns carried out covert mobilization in the summer of 1939, took people out of the isthmus, and mined roads. How do you imagine this with respect to the Soviet-German border with a length of ~ 1200 km?
                      3. svp67
                        svp67 15 May 2020 18: 06 New
                        +6
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        The Finns carried out covert mobilization in the summer of 1939,

                        We also conducted covert mobilization activities under the guise of exercises ..
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        transported people from the isthmus, mined roads.

                        With people, of course, it would be more difficult, but there wasn’t any mining ... every large bridge with us was already under the protection of the NKVD, and the rest could be prepared for an explosion and prepared for the action of a group of obstacles. And still, all these sacrifices had to be made, so that small victims would prevent large
                      4. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 16 May 2020 08: 42 New
                        +6
                        We also held covert mobilization events

                        In 1939, "A" BEUS started on September 7 and finished on September 17.
                        With people, of course, it would be more difficult, but with mining, no ...

                        A water barrier not covered by fire is not an obstacle, the Germans have regular bridge columns in the formations, maybe not one at a time, for example, there are two of them in 1 TD - a motorized bridge column B and K. For example, 2 TGr crossed the Bug to the south and north of Brest along the populated crossings.
                        In addition, bridges are also needed for a spacecraft war, just to blow them up to a depth of 100 km from the border on June 22 is impossible.
          2. ccsr
            ccsr 15 May 2020 18: 37 New
            -7
            Quote: svp67
            It was necessary to create a deep foreland, and build defense at a distance of hundreds of kilometers from the border.

            A strange theory, especially for those Soviet citizens who lived in this territory - didn’t they have to be protected from the enemy by all means?
            And moving the line of defense a hundred kilometers inland from the border, we gave not only a huge springboard for the deployment of German troops, but also the opportunity to use our resources, including human resources for our own needs.
            Quote: svp67
            But this could not be done for ideological reasons.

            There is nothing to do with ideological motives - this is a purely military decision, including the ability to mobilize conscripts living in this territory. That is why it was impossible to carry the line of defense inland.
            1. svp67
              svp67 15 May 2020 18: 45 New
              +9
              Quote: ccsr
              A strange theory, especially for those Soviet citizens who lived in this territory - didn’t they have to be protected from the enemy by all means?

              Alas, in military affairs it is very often necessary to sacrifice small things in order to avoid big trouble and ultimately win.
              Quote: ccsr
              related including the ability to mobilize conscripts living in this territory.

              That we in the 41st as a result and could not fully do and already called them in the 44th. And so, it is quite possible and it was necessary to call all of them for "large military training", in any case, to do it to the maximum in March 41
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 15 May 2020 18: 55 New
                -6
                Quote: svp67
                Alas, in military affairs it is very often necessary to sacrifice small things in order to avoid big trouble and ultimately win.

                In fact, our military science has always believed that part of the cover should fight on the border and die there, but not budge. Thus, they gave time for the deployment of district troops, mobilization events and for the organization of the transfer of formations from the internal districts. That is why the main line of defense was deployed almost immediately beyond the border zone, and this, by the way, was realized much later, in groups of troops abroad, when there were even nuclear weapons.
                1. svp67
                  svp67 15 May 2020 19: 01 New
                  +7
                  Quote: ccsr
                  That is why the main line of defense was deployed almost immediately beyond the border zone, and this, by the way, was realized much later, in groups of troops abroad, when there were even nuclear weapons.

                  You're not right. I myself served in one of the border guard regiments in the GSVG and I can say that this is not so. The main line was not organized along the border, it was organized in the depths, but we "sinners" had the honor of conducting a maneuverable defense, until the moment when the main forces of the group passed into the attack. There was a rather complicated scheme, and I can say that our army was not going to sit out in defense.
                2. ccsr
                  ccsr 16 May 2020 10: 45 New
                  -6
                  Quote: svp67
                  You're not right. I myself served in one of the regiments for covering the border in the Northern Military Command and I can say that this is not so.

                  How could it be wrong if you were practically at the border itself, and our reconnaissance battalions even kept watch along the border from observation posts?
                  Quote: svp67
                  The main line was not organized along the border, it was organized inland,

                  Firstly, it was German territory, and there we did not need to mobilize the local population, and secondly, all of our units were 100% fully staffed in peacetime, i.e. they immediately, without waiting for understaffing, entered the battle after raising and exiting the RPM. Thirdly, we had all the troops in tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, and unlike the rifle units of 1941, they could arrive at any point of the border within 30-50 minutes after leaving the road, which was impossible to do in 1941, with the exception of some garrisons, like the Brest Fortress. Fourth, the intelligence system in the GSVG was orders of magnitude higher than it was in 1941, which is why we had a temporary reserve so that your regiment would not only rise, but also arrive in one of the corridors from where the NATO forces were expected to attack. So the situation is completely different than it was in 1941 and this is obvious.
                  Quote: svp67
                  but we were "sinners" and had the honor of conducting a mobile defense, until the moment when the main forces of the group passed into the attack.

                  The main combat units of the group had practically the same temporal standards for raising troops and exiting the RPD as the shelves, they were simply dispersed over a large territory, because they could not be concentrated near the border due to the presence of nuclear weapons at the enemy.
                  Quote: svp67
                  There was a rather complicated scheme there and I can say that our army was not going to sit out on the defensive.

                  It seems so to you, but I don’t remember that at least one front-line KShU was carried out according to the scenario where our troops crossed the border and fought on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany - this is the answer to what we had to do. On the contrary, the option was often considered when the 8th and 3rd Armies suffered heavy losses and moved deep into the territory of the German Democratic Republic, where 1 and 2 TAs also suffered heavy losses, and they needed to be equipped with additional units from the BVO.
                  I think that this option was also optimistic - in fact, the main part of the group of forces would have been destroyed in the first hours of the war, and there could be no talk of any offensive. And where to advance if the FRG would be destroyed by our strategic nuclear forces.
            2. hjvtp1966
              hjvtp1966 21 May 2020 07: 00 New
              0
              I agree that if Stalin had not been blinded by the magic figures of the number of his troops and correctly assessed their qualities, as well as the strength of the swing of the German ax, he would have turned an arbitrarily large zone, even a thousand miles, into the foreground. Who would have objected to him? Toko would have hinted, and the next day both "Pravda" and "Komsomolskaya Pravda" and "Pupyrkinskaya Commune" would have thrown
              a cry for the organization of the Stakhanov movement to build a world fortress to protect the gains of the revolution. Unlimited power has such opportunities. Could just pour an artificial mountain range.
  • Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 13 May 2020 18: 40 New
    18
    TB-3. The maximum speed with M-17F engines at an altitude of 3000 m was 200 km / h, and even less at the ground - 170 km / h. The maximum rate of climb is 75 meters per minute. Turn - 139 seconds.

    These are the first TB-3 series. By the beginning of the war, these vehicles were either in the rear or transferred to the Civil Air Fleet. For the most part, TB-3 M-34 remained at Tbap with a speed of up to 300 km / h and ShKAS instead of YES.
    Most of the TB-3 of the 3rd TBAP was a relatively late modification with the M-34p engines and aft firing installations.

    https://warspot.ru/5224-zhivye-i-myortvye-v-nebe-nad-bobruyskom
    But on June 30, Admiral Tributs sent three regiments of naval aviation to the Dvinsk / Daugavpils region (330 km north of Bobruisk) with an unbroken hand.

    It was an answer in the style of Bader - very weighty and half a meter past. © ABS
    The order was given not by Tributs, but by the chief of staff of the KBF Panteleev, with reference to the instructions of Kuznetsov himself.
    At 23.30 on June 29 at the headquarters of the Air Force, an order was received from the Commander of the KBF Admiral V.F. Tributsa: "June 30 to act by all means to promote the naval base of Hanko." The more unexpected was the new order, received only 45 minutes later. In it, transmitted on behalf of the chief of staff of the fleet, Admiral Yu.A. Panteleev with reference to the instructions of the People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, was ordered to act on the tank columns of the enemy, crossing the Western Dvina River.
    © M. Morozov
    At the brigade headquarters there was a telephone connection with the 73rd regiment, and with the 1st and 57th there was no. There was no connection even between the headquarters of the KBF Air Force and the command of the 8th Naval Aviation Brigade. According to the memoirs, orders from the headquarters of the Air Force were transferred to where they could be received (for example, to the headquarters of the 61st air brigade), and from there they were transferred by messenger to the 8th air brigade.

    Yeah, that is, Morozov you read. smile
    The organization of the air strike itself is worthy of particular attention. The main thing to consider when assessing it is that between the Air Force headquarters located in Tallinn (the main base of the Baltic Fleet until August 1941) (commander is Major General V.V. Ermachenkov, chief of staff is Colonel D.I. Surkov ) and the headquarters of the 8th bomber aviation brigade (Colonel N.K. Loginov; the 1st mtap and 57th bap) were located at the Kotly airfield near Leningrad; there was no direct connection. As a result, all orders for the organization of an air strike were transmitted by telephone to the headquarters of the 61st IABR (New Peterhof), then by the same method to the headquarters of the 5th air defense sector, from where a messenger was sent to the headquarters of the 8th air brigade, stationed in boilers. There was no radio communication even between the upper level control links. The same can be said about the connection with the headquarters of the Air Force of the North-Western Front (NWF), which, as it turned out in the future, seriously affected the planning of raids.
    © M. Morozov
    1. vadim dok
      vadim dok 14 May 2020 14: 51 New
      +1
      But on Tributz lies the tragedy of the Tallinn Kronstadt crossing!
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 14 May 2020 16: 05 New
        +9
        Quote: vadim dok
        But on Tributz lies the tragedy of the Tallinn Kronstadt crossing!

        Everyone was good there. From the command of SZN, which reached with the evacuation until the moment when there were no other people besides the central variant, and the army team handed over the only airdromes from which it was possible to cover the passage - to the local artists who destroyed the minesweepers in the warehouses of the base while the minesweepers didn’t there were enough trawls.
        The bet was placed on 53 minesweepers located in Tallinn. But the trouble is that about half of them - twenty-three - minesweepers, ten - basic minesweepers and twenty - slow-moving. There were no trawls on eighteen minesweeper boats. They failed during the previous trawlings, while the rest had one or two sets, and they were clearly not enough. At the same time, in the warehouses of the Main Base, subversive teams destroyed trawls and minesweepers that were transported from Kronstadt to Tallinn just before the war.
        Original Russian Text © V.M. Yoltukhovsky. "Mine war in the Baltic, 1941".
    2. 3danimal
      3danimal 15 May 2020 07: 21 New
      +1
      Low is all sad
  • Aaron Zawi
    Aaron Zawi 13 May 2020 18: 41 New
    24
    Then many exploits remained unappreciated.


    On June 26, 1941, when approaching a target, Captain Nikolai Gastello directed a burning car into the thick of an enemy mechanized convoy. The very next day, June 27, the deputy commander of the squadron of the 128th high-speed bomber regiment, senior lieutenant Isaac Presaisen, found himself in the same situation. 
    A gas tank shot through a shell. Presaisen threw the car at a peak and bombed the fascist infantry. But the flames that engulfed the plane could not be brought down. Then Presaisen sent a flaming bomber to a cluster of enemy tanks and motorized infantry. There was a terrible explosion. Debris of equipment with people flew into the air. The movement of German troops on one of the sections of the Minsk-Moscow highway was stopped for several days. 
    The feat of Gastello went down in the history of Soviet aviation as a fiery ram. The pilot was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. It was Isaac Preseisen's turn. When the fellow soldiers returning from the combat mission reported on Preseisen's feat to the deputy commander of the regiment Sandalov, he immediately flew to the place of the ram and, making sure that what had happened, reported to the commander of the regiment, Major Chuchev. After agreement with the divisional commander, Colonel Aladinsky, the award material was promptly issued and sent with Preseisen's nomination for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 
    But even posthumously, Isaac Preseisen was not awarded the Golden Star. As if there was no trace of a fiery ram. Worse, by order of regiment number 22 for September 1941, for some reason, he was listed as missing, which was reported to the pilot's wife Lydia only six months later. The chief of staff of the regiment, Captain Drobyshev, who prepared the award material and sealed the description of Preseisen's feat with the regimental seal in July 1941, sent a letter to Syzran Lidia in January 1942 with the following content: 
    "Dear Comrade Preseisen! Until now, we cannot believe that we have lost your husband forever, but our comrade in arms. We will wait for the victorious end of the war, when the fate of our comrades becomes more certain. But even if Comrade Preseisen died, he gave his life very dearly. We wish you vigor, faith in victory. Our cause is just, victory will be ours. " 
  • bandabas
    bandabas 13 May 2020 18: 41 New
    +9
    They fought. There was a reason, in contrast to the "couch" expert writers.
    1. zenion
      zenion 14 May 2020 12: 53 New
      +9
      When you listen to the stories of war veterans, you are amazed. My cousin was a tanker. The day before the declaration of war, about 50 commanders were sent to the Baltic States by civilian train. When they arrived at their destination, they were surprised that they were not expected there and no one was warned. Moreover, they were sent in one direction, a train with KV tanks in another direction, and shells and fuel in a third direction. It got dark and they began to shell from the attics and other buildings. And with them there were only pistols. They managed to escape from this town and they began to move towards the east with a forest. A military unit was nadibal in the forest, which was sent there for training. There they learned that the war had begun. They contacted Moscow by radio and ordered that all tankers be sent to Moscow to receive directions to the service. The next night, as he later found out, they found tanks and the rest for them. Aircraft were sent that bombed everything. So he asked - who gave such an order to make it impossible to use tanks and sent tankers, not to a military unit, but to a town on the edge of the border, tanks and equipment to another place.
  • really
    really 13 May 2020 18: 43 New
    +7
    It’s hard to read this truth, but it’s necessary, especially for those who are ready to fill everyone with hats. Thank you for the article
  • polpot
    polpot 13 May 2020 18: 43 New
    +3
    Thanks for the article, Eternal memory of the fallen Heroes.
  • Avior
    Avior 13 May 2020 18: 54 New
    29
    As in my opinion, the article is not certain
    In a war, a situation arises that not only 6 crews - the entire regiment must be thrown into a deadly attack, and this is justified.
    Therefore, in my opinion, it was necessary to start with whether it was possible to bomb the crossings at night, with a high probability that they wouldn’t get there, by the way, or if it was necessary to do this immediately.
    What was Pavlov’s tyranny, or real military necessity? The author did not even raise this side of the issue in the article.
    The same problem exists in the second case.
    But this delight of the author is incomprehensible
    . The second time flew Ar-2 captain Syromyatnikov from the 73rd regiment, bombed without loss for the first time. They carried out the second bombing around 19:30 with seven aircraft and again did not lose a single vehicle. This squadron turned out to be the ONLY one that did not lose a single crew that rainy day.

    If heavy long-range bombers, strictly speaking, are not intended for point bombing, then Ar-2 is just for this.
    Nevertheless, for the first time they bombed so that the Germans did not notice. It is clear that there were no shot downs if the enemy did not see them. It is not clear how and where they got the second time.
    Of course, that without loss is very good, but for military aviation it is still not an end in itself, the primary goal is still hitting the target and completing the task
    hi
    1. Mik13
      Mik13 13 May 2020 20: 23 New
      10
      Quote: Avior
      In a war, a situation arises that not only 6 crews - the entire regiment must be thrown into a deadly attack, and this is justified.
      Therefore, in my opinion, it was necessary to start with whether it was possible to bomb the crossings at night, with a high probability that they wouldn’t get there, by the way, or if it was necessary to do this immediately.
      What was Pavlov’s tyranny, or real military necessity? The author did not even raise this side of the issue in the article.

      The question is, in fact, a simple one. We need to see what the crossing capacity is and how many divisions will cross in 8-12 hours between night and day raids. And the price of the issue immediately becomes much clearer.
      1. Avior
        Avior 13 May 2020 20: 32 New
        +6
        not so uncomplicated.
        It happens, and one division can fundamentally change the situation.
        and what guarantee that they will be able to bomb them at night is also a big question, if it is not easy even during the day.
        in any case, the author should at least mention such a probability.
      2. novel66
        novel66 13 May 2020 20: 37 New
        10
        in fairness - at night the crossing is still not visible, in areas - there is no probability of defeat at all
        1. Wasiliy kostrow
          Wasiliy kostrow 14 May 2020 18: 51 New
          +4
          I made the same discovery.
    2. carstorm 11
      carstorm 11 14 May 2020 00: 08 New
      +6
      exactly. to draw conclusions without analyzing the operational situation in that direction is pointless. There are many options for making such decisions. but it is necessary to analyze and not immediately speak.
    3. 16329
      16329 16 May 2020 13: 31 New
      -10
      Pavlov was not a tyrant, he was an ordinary traitor, or an oppositionist, as it is now customary to put it, he was shot for "negligence" only because Stalin did not want to demonstrate political problems to potential allies in the highest military leadership of the USSR
      It should not be forgotten that the Red Army was created by Trotsky and not all of his associates were destroyed in the second half of the 30s
      Pavlov promoted through participation in the Spanish Civil War, in Republican Spain the influence of the Trotskyists was very serious
      1. Sergey Zhikharev
        Sergey Zhikharev 17 May 2020 13: 15 New
        +6
        And was it not Pavlov, following the results of the Spanish war, who stood for an increase in the protection of tanks. That the old concept - "speed is the best defense of a tank", has become obsolete with the advent of numerous anti-tank guns? If Pavlov was a Trotskyist, and there was some plan "to create defeat, blame everything on Stalin, and go out in white," then why be so perverted?
        1. 16329
          16329 18 May 2020 00: 33 New
          -10
          In the service, he had to write and do something, he was the head of the armored command and inspector for the combat use of tank troops during the Finnish campaign
  • bubalik
    bubalik 13 May 2020 18: 55 New
    14
    This is the task of the day - June 30. It is clear to everyone how heavy and serious she is. Hastily preparing for departure, aviators say, not hiding doubts and fears:

    “Why are we, sea pilots, being thrown on land targets?”

    - Yes, even hundreds of kilometers?

    - And how to fly in the afternoon with a full bomb load without fighter cover? - asks the commissar of the regiment, the navigator of the second squadron, senior lieutenant A.I. Vlasov.

    “True, comrades, today's combat mission is not an easy one,” says battalion commissar G. Z. Oganezov. - No words, the flight is distant and it’s bad that without cover. But the thing is about the fate of Leningrad. Do we, Baltic pilots, give in to difficulties!

    Author

    Hero of the Soviet Union
  • Peter is not the first
    Peter is not the first 13 May 2020 18: 56 New
    +4
    So, because of the stupidity and obstinacy of the high command, the Germans appeared with aces with hundreds of our planes shot down, and our grandfathers and great-grandfathers died.
    1. Sector
      Sector 13 May 2020 19: 03 New
      +7
      Quote: Peter is not the first
      So, because of the stupidity and obstinacy of the high command, the Germans appeared with aces with hundreds of our planes shot down, and our grandfathers and great-grandfathers died.

      Well, stupidity is not stupidity .. And the tactics of our troops lost to the Germans and they took full advantage of this .. We reached Moscow, but with heavy losses .. And then we all know .. "Get up, a huge country, get up to mortal battle .. "
      Then the Fritz could not oppose anything to the national Russian fighting spirit! soldier
      1. novel66
        novel66 13 May 2020 20: 39 New
        +6
        I would like with spirit, but also professionally
        1. Sector
          Sector 14 May 2020 15: 26 New
          +1
          Quote: novel xnumx
          I would like with spirit, but also professionally

          I agree ! Enough to drive the Russian soldiers to machine guns in a frontal attack soldier ..In general, by taking Berlin we proved to the whole world our professionalism and fighting spirit ..and the strength of Russian weapons! I would not want to repeat it, but we are constantly provoked by the West trying to bleed someone else like China ..
  • knn54
    knn54 13 May 2020 19: 20 New
    +5
    Thanks to the actions of the Tributs, the Baltic Fleet (among sailors) received. As I consider it undeservedly. name Former fleet.
    As for the aviation of the Western (and not only) front, the IMPORTANT reason for what happened was the absence of the Air Force Commander-in-Chief in the Red Army, and besides Pavlov there were high-ranking generals who commanded the aircraft at their discretion.
    What the Nazis did not have. It did not occur to either Manstein or Guderian to direct (but not coordinate) the actions of the Luftwaffe. Ehring would not understand this.
    1. dmmyak40
      dmmyak40 14 May 2020 08: 53 New
      11
      Interestingly, in the book "Option" Bis "by Sergei Anisimov, Kuznetsov, opposing Stalin regarding the candidacy of Tributs as the commander of the squadron (which was supposed to operate on the communications of the allies in the North Atlantic) said:" Admiral Tributs will lead the squadron against the enemy and report with a clear conscience, that the squadron died, but did not surrender. I don't need this. In this part, Tributs resembles Admiral Rozhdestvensky. "
  • barium
    barium 13 May 2020 19: 30 New
    17
    unfortunately, the first Chechen one also showed such stupid leaders!
  • Undecim
    Undecim 13 May 2020 19: 42 New
    41
    So the story is not written. Especially the story of such tragic events. In each case cited by the author, one must begin not with the appointment of the guilty, but with an analysis of the operational situation that prevailed at the time of making decisions on a particular site and the circumstances that led to these decisions.
    And the situation was, without exaggeration, catastrophic. The main forces of the Western Front in the Białystok and Minsk "boilers", German motorized corps broke out into the operational space.
    The German 3rd Panzer Division of Lieutenant General Model on June 28, 1941 occupied Bobruisk. The 24th motorized corps of the 2nd tank group, Colonel General Guderian, operating on the southern flank of Army Group Center, breaking through the weak defense of the Soviet troops along the Berezina River, went to the Dnieper and began the fight for bridgeheads for the subsequent offensive. From the end of June, the Soviet command began urgently deploying troops of the 2nd strategic echelon along the middle reaches of the Western Dvina and Dnieper in the 450 km band with the task of preventing the enemy from breaking through to Moscow. Before the start of the battle of Smolensk, during which it was possible to delay the advance of the Germans and disrupt the plans for a lightning war, there were only a few days left.
    Therefore, any delay on the borders of the Berezina and the Western Dvina of the advancing Nazis was literally a matter of life and allowed the second strategic echelon to organize at least some sort of defense. Hence the whole tragedy of the moment - on the one hand - the fate of three bomber regiments, on the other, without exaggeration, the fate of the war. Losses are easy to count, but in fairness, you need to count those. whose lives were saved thanks to the heroism of the pilots. And this is much more complicated. Therefore, no one has the right to judge and label the people who gave the orders without a detailed analysis of the circumstances.
    1. Cetron
      Cetron 13 May 2020 21: 02 New
      +2
      And who led the red army into the cauldrons? Whose ingenious actions? Who commanded the fronts?
      1. Undecim
        Undecim 13 May 2020 21: 07 New
        17
        The article deals with specific combat episodes. Comment refers to them. And another holivar does not appeal to me.
      2. 16329
        16329 16 May 2020 13: 32 New
        -10
        Pavlov and commanded, he ruined the front in Belarus
    2. Pattor
      Pattor 13 May 2020 22: 45 New
      +6
      This is Roman. Not seeing the author in style it’s immediately clear who.
  • dgonni
    dgonni 13 May 2020 20: 38 New
    12
    In the village, my grandfather had a friend, a sailor. He was 10 years younger than his grandfather. But he died earlier. So, after he swallowed black oil with seawater after the Tallinn crossing and waving his bayonet on the Nevsky patch. Having received 4 serious wounds and miraculously survived in that war. At the mere mention of Tributs, he began to grit his teeth and went to drink glasses of 2 strong moonshine.
    As I understand it, if Tributs told him where the thread just got on the street. That he would not have lived a couple of minutes more.
    1. Sergey S.
      Sergey S. 14 May 2020 10: 45 New
      +2
      Quote: dgonni
      and waving a bayonet on a patch of Nevsky.

      You can’t write like that.
      It was worse than anywhere else.
      Quote: dgonni
      Having received 4 serious wounds and miraculously survived

      If he was on the Nevsky Piglet, then the problems with the psyche are understandable.
      He returned from hell.
      But in this case, it is not Tributs to blame for the terrible losses in several attempts to gain a foothold on the southern bank of the Neva.
      Although I can’t say anything good about Tributs, in fairness it must be understood that in the conditions of tactical and strategic defeats there are no good military leaders, and everything that is under attack is dying ...
      There is wine on the General Staff ... for the whole of 1941.
      Mistakes in the education of officers in personnel policy are also very expensive.
      1. dgonni
        dgonni 14 May 2020 10: 59 New
        +3
        Tributs with Panteleev drowned the people during the transition mom do not cry. And most importantly, mediocre and without any consequences for yourself.
        1. Sergey S.
          Sergey S. 14 May 2020 11: 15 New
          +3
          Quote: dgonni
          Tributs with Panteleev drowned the people during the transition mom do not cry. And most importantly, mediocre and without any consequences for yourself.

          There is a limit to allegories.
          Tallinn navigators did not come up with ....
          Again, in the environment of Tallinn and the lack of troops in Leningrad ...
          What else could be done?
          Escape to Sweden? - and there the Germans were waiting for the guard ...
          Tributs not protect. He had to do something unbelievable and take the fleet out of = impact ...
          But how, no one still knows for sure.
  • parusnik
    parusnik 13 May 2020 20: 49 New
    +4
    Not very nice to write. But this is our story. As she is.
    ...Yes, it's true
  • Pilat2009
    Pilat2009 13 May 2020 20: 58 New
    18
    If anyone thinks that only ours were mowing, then you can remember the "Black Day of the Luftwaffe" in Holland:
    In appearance and in terms of flight and tactical characteristics, the Fok-ker was an analogue of the early modifications of our I-16 (namely, the early ones, it didn’t reach the 1939-1940 models in all respects). These planes and staged on May 10 a real beating of German transporters. At dawn, at 6 hours 45 minutes, a group of Dutch fighters intercepted the first echelon of landing in the composition of 55 Ju-52 aircraft. Although the Dutch pilots themselves reported that they shot down 37 aircraft, in reality, as the Luftwaffe documents show, the Germans lost 39 aircraft.
    At seven in the morning the extermination of the Junkers continued. In addition to fifty fighters, in the Dutch air defense there were also 16 anti-aircraft batteries, three guns each. Anti-aircraft guns fired at the Walhaven airfield near Rotterdam until they were captured by German paratroopers. Dutch pilots broke through the deadly "umbrella" of patrolling German fighters and stormed congestions of people and planes on captured airfields and sandy beaches of the sea coast. In the afternoon, the Royal Air Force bombed the Blenheim bombardment of Valhaven.
    That was actually the first day of the "triumphal march." 157 transport "Junkers" was completely destroyed. K. Tippelskirch in his textbook well-known monograph was forced to admit that “the landing of airborne assault forces from the 22nd Infantry Division in the area between Rotterdam and Leyden was not successful everywhere, and in some places even failed and led to heavy losses .. . ”(96). The history of the struggle of the Dutch aviation lasted exactly 5 days. By noon on May 14, the number of combat-ready aircraft was reduced to zero. The Dutch Air Force died in battle, inflicting huge losses on the enemy. The Luftwaffe lost at least 189 aircraft of all types over the Netherlands!
  • AsmyppoL
    AsmyppoL 13 May 2020 21: 28 New
    21
    Honestly, I didn’t like the article ... The author can easily blame General Pavlov, but he himself can’t analyze whether it was necessary to launch airstrikes on enemy clusters and bridges on the afternoon of June 30 ... Or not ...
    The author twice complains about the failed TB-3 night departure ... But where they were supposed to fly and whether the upcoming flight was more necessary than daytime strikes on Guderian’s group is completely unclear ...
    I got the impression that the author needed to write something about the war, so he told us "his revelation" ...

    A night flight without preliminary reconnaissance may not be useful at all ... A sort of flight for show ... The author ignored a previously received instruction from the General Staff that air strikes by bombers would be no more than a link ...

    Also, you cannot believe everything that Konstantin Simonov described. For example, he confused the name of the DB-3 bomber, which was given to him by navigator Kvasov from the crew of the future Hero of the Soviet Union Ishchenko (two pilots in the book "The Living and the Dead") with TB-3. Their link consisted of three aircraft and was led by a squadron commander. The squadron commander's plane was shot down by a direct hit from an anti-aircraft shell over the target. Therefore, the Messer could not shoot down all three bombers ... And there are much more Messers! And our pilots, performing the mission, lost very few aircraft with the enemy's complete air domination ...

    The losses of our aircraft before June 30 were huge ... Golovanov: "... We insistently demanded that we be given cover or transferred to night combat work. We did not achieve either one or the other. We did not receive any fighters, and apart from Skripko's corps and our regiment, there was no controlled aviation in this direction, which fought and delivered more intelligence ...

    In just one day, June 24th 14 aircraft did not return from a combat mission ... By the end of June 28, out of 72 aircraft, only 14 remained capable of carrying out combat missions ... And without cover, our crews shot down 18 Me-109 fighters in air battles during the first week of the war ... "


    It appears from the text of the article that the stupid boss-stupid man, General Pavlov, threw defenseless planes against German fighter aircraft ... I am always struck by similar conclusions, not based on any analysis ...
    That I-16 no matter what types - all bad planes ... Although the hero of the Soviet Union Golubev flew and shot down German fighters on the I-16 even at the beginning of 1943. The famous "Beard" also fought well in the I-16 ...

    And here is what the direct participant of the battles V.V. Ponomarenko, who flew in the "defenseless DB-3":

    "... On June 30, the corps commander N.S. Skripko, we then promptly obeyed him. It is necessary to bomb the crossings across the Berezina. They said that the target was covered by our fighters. I took the six, there is shooting, everything is black with gaps. I walk away from the target to the rear of the Germans, turn around, fly to bomb. the crossing is a difficult goal, the pontoons are very tenacious. They dropped the bombs. The target is damaged but not destroyed. I have one plane hit. We take him in a circle, fighting off the attacks of the "Messers" ... He brought his people to Mogilev, sat there, then we fly home to Yelnya.

    I report to Golovanov: "Comrade Lieutenant Colonel, there is nothing to do there without the escort of fighters."
    - Well, what will you do? .. Let's get ready with the five to fly ...
    Suddenly the adjutant of Golovanov runs away: "The regiment commander decided to fly himself! He will lead another five." Three of them flew back in five ... Two of my pupils, my friends were killed ... I approached, asked: "Comrade lieutenant colonel, how is the goal? Worse or better?"
    - Clouds of fighter jets ...

    On that terrible day of June 30, when our five attacked by a group of eighteen Me-109 and Me-110, our squadron commander flinched and pulled out of the battle. I stepped forward and, swinging my wings, gave the command to come to me. The Messerschmidts cut off the plane of my closest friend, the first instructor back in the Bataysk aviation school, Zakhar Pruzhilin. He died with the crew ... Nikolay Bogdanov and Alexey Bogomolov walked side by side. That "Messerschmidt" who shot down Pruzhilin was literally cut into pieces by our riflemen with fire. At first, the Germans attacked insolently, they saw in us victims ready to be shot, but after they lost two more they moderated their agility ... I then applied my new method of avoiding fighter fire with an imperceptible, slight slip. the air gunner at the right time gave me a command, a small maneuver, and all the power of the fire flies by ... On the ground, A.E. Golovanov analyzed the flight, noted our concerted actions ... "


    The 212nd regiment lost 30 aircraft on June 11, which is less than on June 24 ... Against 18 fighters and five "pawns" could not reach the target ...
    1. Sergey Valov
      Sergey Valov 14 May 2020 07: 40 New
      0
      “You also can’t believe everything that Konstantin Simonov described” - The Living and the Dead is a work of art, not a historical study. For the novel, it makes no difference what the TB-3 or DB-3 bomber was there. In life, it all turned out the same.
      1. cavl
        cavl 16 May 2020 06: 05 New
        +2
        How not to believe this episode if Konstantin Simonov described what he saw with his own eyes?
    2. The comment was deleted.
  • iouris
    iouris 13 May 2020 21: 40 New
    +6
    By the beginning of the war, the bomber aviation of the Red Army did not have modern bombers. Air parades could not mislead foreign military experts. TB-3 - this exhaust of the doctrine of Marshal Douet - became obsolete in the late 20s. The methods of combat use, navigation aids and means of destruction of bomber aircraft were archaic. There was practically no radio communication and combat control. The command ("krasnopogonniki") assigned combat missions to aviation, not understanding its capabilities.
    As for the so-called "fire rams", then, most likely, this is a "product" of propaganda. Those who introduced this artificial form of glorification of bomber aviation pilots had little understanding of the issue. It is very difficult to direct a burning plane to the target, and the damage to the object of action from this cannot be critical. Most likely, the crews simply died in the air, and the vehicles lost control.
    The crews heroically tried to perform a combat mission, but could not. This is truly a tragedy. Its roots are connected with the technical backwardness of the Red Army, lack of combat experience, poor understanding of the capabilities of air defense and fighter aircraft of the enemy.
    The Red Army bombers received on Lend-Lease.
  • fif21
    fif21 13 May 2020 21: 40 New
    +1
    From the lessons of the past, you need to do work on mistakes. : hi You can recall the Kremlin cadets and much more. I completely agree with the author that the decisions were made based on the real situation, hastily and thoughtlessly.
  • The comment was deleted.
    1. cavl
      cavl 16 May 2020 06: 06 New
      +3
      That's right, since Messer pilots knew about the vulnerability of their cooling system
  • Old Horseradish
    Old Horseradish 13 May 2020 22: 31 New
    +7
    There is such an album of lithographs: pilots of the Red Army Air Force. In my opinion 35-36 years. So. From a whole pile of lithographs, only a few sheets depicting the pilots who survived. All the rest are repressed (destroyed) before the war. So the Germans didn’t have to fight. But what happened before the war itself:
    "On April 4, the deputy chief of the Air Force headquarters P. Yusupov and the head of the NIP department S. Onasko were arrested, three days later the head of the country's air defense department G. Stern, the deputy people's commissar of armaments B. Vannikov, the deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District Air Force A. Levin.
    The war began, and the flywheel of repression just turned around. On June 24, aviation lieutenant general P. Rychagov, the country's best combat pilot, was captured.
    Then the arrests became rampant.
    The interrogations were conducted by the most sadistic methods, although the executioners and the victims understood that there was no point in this. Merkulovtsy (this will be more true, because the Main Directorate of State Security belonged to the NKGB, and not to the NKVD) beat out absolutely wild confessions. Then the NKGB merged with the NKVD, and Beria, who became a member of the GKO along with Stalin, carefully watched so that the prisoners of the Lubyanka cellars didn’t get out of there, and carefully submitted the lists of the doomed to the Supreme Commander for signature.
    K. Meretskov accidentally managed to get out of the prison. Others - Rychagov, Stern, Smushkevich, Proskurov, Arzhenukhin, Volodin - will be destroyed on 28 October. "
    That is why the mega-catastrophe of 1941 occurred. And not only with the Air Force, but also with the entire Red Army.
    1. Old Horseradish
      Old Horseradish 13 May 2020 22: 56 New
      +3
      What do you think: didn’t the Germans know about the destruction of the command staff of the Red Army Air Force?
      They knew. They knew in details.
      And about the destruction of the command staff of the Red Army? Didn’t know either? They all knew. And this, by the way, was a detonator of the fact that Germany attacked the USSR. They would have thought 100 more times before attacking if a monolithic army stood in front of them. And not the army in a state of civil war.
      This is where all the roots of the 41st year come from.
      1. Catfish
        Catfish 14 May 2020 03: 13 New
        +3
        I agree with you, to this we can add that the German special services "had a hand in all the repressions in our country." So, Schellenberg, having analyzed the situation in Russia, ordered to prepare incriminating evidence against Tukhachevsky, they prepared incriminating evidence and threw it "where it should be" through the Czechoslovak ambassador. I do not have a very high opinion of Tukhachevsky, perhaps if he had stayed in his post in 41, everything would have been even worse for us, but ... what happened was that.
      2. Dmitry V.
        Dmitry V. 14 May 2020 10: 47 New
        +5
        Quote: Old Fuck
        And not the army in a state of civil war.


        The fiasco of the Red Army in the "winter war", when they were unable to capture Finland and suffered huge losses - it was after the analysis of the actions of the Red Army by the German General Staff that the term "colossus with feet of clay" arose.

        That is, the German General Staff underestimated the strength of the Red Army, perceiving the weakness of command as the opportunity to break a poorly managed army with one quick blow.
        Ignoring the complexity of the winter war in Karelia, in the absence of roads, impassable woodland for tanks, and the Mannerheim fortified line prepared in advance, the Germans overestimated their strength and capabilities in the 1941 summer company, hoping to defeat the Red Army before winter.
        In July 1940, the Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, Major General Erich Marx, was instructed by the General Staff of the Ground Forces to develop the general idea of ​​a military campaign against the Soviet Union.

        These ideas, introduced by Marx, were discussed at a series of operational meetings with the participation of Hitler, Brauchitsch, Halder, and other generals. As a result, a new option arose. On September 3, 1940, General Paulus took the post of first chief quartermaster of the General Staff (i.e., chief of operations). Introducing Paulus in the course of affairs, Halder gave him the following directives: to develop an accurate plan for the invasion, counting on the participation of 130-140 German divisions. The purpose of the invasion was defined by Halder as follows: the defeat of the Soviet units in the western part of the USSR and the prevention of their withdrawal inland; access to the Volga-Arkhangelsk line so that Soviet aviation would lose the opportunity to bomb Germany.

        Paulus chose a slightly different option than Marx. He outlined the Leningrad-Smolensk-Kiev line as a preliminary goal. Paulus considered it necessary to create three army groups: “North” - with the goal of attacking Leningrad; "Center" - the strongest - with the goal of attacking Minsk - Smolensk; "South" - with the aim of accessing the Dnieper near Kiev. During November 1940, the General Staff held a series of staff games in Saint-Germain. Prominent military leaders, including Rundstedt, Halder, and army chiefs of staff, were involved in the exercises. On December 5, 1940, Halder reported to Hitler the results of the preliminary work of the General Staff. The text of this report has been preserved {318}.

        “The chief of general staff reports on the planned operation in the East. First, he reports on the geographical basis. The most important centers of the military industry are located in Ukraine, Moscow and Leningrad. In addition, Ukraine is a center for the abundant production of agricultural products. The entire area of ​​operations is divided into two parts by the Pripyat swamps - northern and southern. The last part of the road is bad. The best highways and railways in the Warsaw - Moscow region ...
        Of the three army groups foreseen, the north should move to Leningrad, the central — through Minsk to Smolensk, the south — with the main attack on Kiev. In the last group, one army will march from Lublin, the other from Lviv, and the third from Romania. The ultimate goal is the Volga and the Arkhangelsk region. In total, 105 infantry and 32 tank and motor divisions should be brought into battle, and significant units (two armies) will first be in reserve. ”

        After listening to Halder's report on December 5, Hitler limited himself to just a few remarks. He emphasized that it was necessary to prevent the Soviet Army from moving deeper (the idea of ​​General Marx). Hitler wanted to place tank strike groups on the inner flanks of the North and Center groups, that is, to create the most powerful breakthrough group here. “The group advancing in Moscow must be made so strong that it can then turn north” {320}. The number of divisions (130–140) he approved.

        A few days later Hitler conferred with Jodl and again discussed the Barbarossa plan. The General Staff’s plan seems to him quite logical, since it will allow, breaking through the Soviet defense, to go east, and then turn to Leningrad and Ukraine to complete the complete defeat of the Soviet Army. Hitler reiterates his idea that the main grouping should be north of the Pripyat swamps. At the same time, he drops a curious remark: “In 1941, we must complete the solution of all continental European problems” {321}. On December 18, the famous Directive No. 21, “Operation Barbarossa,” was issued, providing for the end of all preparations by May 15, 1941.
      3. Dmitry V.
        Dmitry V. 14 May 2020 10: 49 New
        +7
        Quote: Old Fuck
        They knew. They knew in details.


        True - there are supporting documents.
        Dashichev V.I. in the book "The Bankruptcy of the Strategy of German Fascism" (1973) contains an excerpt from the "TEXTGRAM OF THE MEETING AT THE VERMAHT'S RATE OF JANUARY 9, 1941" (with reference to KTV OKW, Bd. I, S. 253-258). There, the Fuhrer, in particular, said:
        "Although the Russian armed forces are a headless clay colossus, it is impossible to accurately predict their further development. Since Russia in any case must be defeated, it’s better to do it now, when the Russian army is deprived of leaders and poorly trained and when the Russians have to overcome great difficulties in the military industry, created with outside help "
      4. Lekz
        Lekz 19 May 2020 22: 13 New
        +1
        When you talk about the "destruction of the command staff of the Red Army" what do you mean? I am ashamed to ask about the victories of the commander Dybenko and the naval commander Frinovsky. Do not remind?
    2. 16329
      16329 16 May 2020 00: 52 New
      -10
      Quite right, too late, the authorities took up the Air Force, which went on too long in the favorites of the authorities. Read Golovanov about the level of training of pilots of the Air Force, about how Aeroflot (GVF) planes, Golovanov was his chief pilot) led the squadron of bombers in raids on Finland, as army pilots could not fly at radio targets and this was in 1939
      Golovanov had to re-create long-range bomber aircraft, it was a great happiness that the Air Force command could not eat it until the end of 1944
  • They are
    They are 13 May 2020 23: 05 New
    +6
    Soviet historians danced on the bones of the crews of the squadron of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, who died in the Battle of Tsushima after a round-the-world passage. But the "exploits" of Tributs were diligently hushed up: the defeat during the transition from Tallinn to Kronstadt, the loss of fleet aviation, the sending of boats through continuous minefields into the sea.
  • iouris
    iouris 14 May 2020 00: 27 New
    +2
    Quote: fif21
    From the lessons of the past, you need to do work on mistakes

    At least one example - in the studio!
  • LeonidL
    LeonidL 14 May 2020 07: 16 New
    +3
    And Pavlov, and Kobets, and Kuznetsov, who ordered Tributs to bomb crossings and bridges, these are "early" military leaders who did not have experience in commanding troops, but considered themselves capable of it. If you look at their service records, then before taking office as front commanders (districts), or the district's air force like Kobets, they never or for a very short time commanded formations and formations, did not go all the way through the military ladder, unlike Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Vasilevsky, Konev, Eremenko ... Many people still poorly understand that military science is a science that, without passing all the stages of service and training in an increasingly higher order of military educational institutions, you cannot understand and master, no matter how many brochures and clever works you read. Alas, many generals of 41 were not in a way professionals in military affairs, but in some way ordinary "amateurs". Therefore, they learned with blood, often someone else's, sometimes with their own.
    1. begemot20091
      begemot20091 14 May 2020 11: 06 New
      +1
      that military science is a science that without going through all the stages of service and training in an increasingly higher order of military schools you will not understand and master how many brochures and clever works do not read [/ quote]
      of two students who made it to grade 10 (with imprisonment for 2 years in grades 5 and 8), both entered military schools. one finished as a major, the other as a n / a colonel. We met at the "anniversary" of the release. Believe it or not, to gray hair "Bebel was confused with Hegel." And don't tell tales about a / c. The main criterion for admission to these educational institutions was the state of health. I served a little myself - I saw from the inside. I lost to them only in drill and knowledge of the Charter. All their "incomprehensible" standards related to mat. calculations, overlapped 2, 2,5 times. And when I bought the MK-61 calculator, then (gentlemen, fellow officers) they threatened to "unscrew" their heads - well, not for good reason. minds they had "this toy"
      1. LeonidL
        LeonidL 14 May 2020 17: 36 New
        +1
        Lovely hippo! You argue exactly how an amateur who does not understand anything in military affairs should reason. Both the major and the lieutenant colonel of the L-team are the maximum level of the battalion commander - what they will order is obliged to do, but to do well. As for the doubles, most likely you lied a little. In military schools there has always been a competition and entrance exams were taken strictly. and the credentials committee did not favor second-year students. And most importantly, we are talking about the highest command staff - commanders of formations and associations from divisions to fronts. But how pleasant it is for the layman to believe that he is also mighty, even a loser! At the current level of military science, it is very difficult for the two-man team to get into the officers, and if they get through, they will fly out. Well, about the high-tech military branches, the Air Force, the Navy, and strategists, there’s no need to talk.
        1. begemot20091
          begemot20091 18 May 2020 11: 53 New
          0
          I don’t know your rank - maybe your shoulder straps are heavier and your position "thicker" - I suppose you are the head of a school or a military university? I'm talking about realities, how it was and- belay as it is.
          Quote: LeonidL
          But how pleasant it is for the layman to believe that he is also mighty, even a loser!
          Here at the civil university (at that time), the loser could not have entered. By the way, I’m not an army. She is the same as us. Cadets even sometimes manage to solve a second-order equation, like students at a university that is not far away, a couple of stops.
    2. iouris
      iouris 14 May 2020 14: 19 New
      0
      Quote: LeonidL
      Alas, many generals of 41 were not, in a way, military professionals, but in some way ordinary "amateurs." Therefore, they learned with blood, more often someone else's, sometimes their own.

      Alas and ah! But there was something else ...
  • VS
    VS 14 May 2020 09: 24 New
    -13
    Quote: Alekseev
    Quote: novel xnumx
    Zhukov put Western direction under attack

    No need to juggle. How did Zhukov put it in jeopardy? How specifically? Or blah blah blah? And did he set up Southwest too? And the northwest? Or G.K.Zhukov in 4 months at the post of chief of the General Staff managed to ruin the entire Red Army?
    Is it not logical to think that this was done by someone else and not alone.

    Read the work of the VNU GSh - "1941 - lessons and conclusions". It is quite shown there - WHO is to blame for the defeat of the Red Army at the beginning of the Second World War)))
    https://liewar.ru/knigi-o-vojne/348-1941-god-uroki-i-vyvody.html

    The main reason is like az ZHUKOV and a company of cavalrymen))) With their plans for a retaliatory strike against the NON-ESSENTIAL forces of the Germans south of woodland - and accordingly the setup of the Red Army forces north of woodland when there IN ADVANCE LEAVED their forces TWICE weaker than the German!

    ""The Soviet command thoughtlessly approached the choice of strategic actions.
    The blitzkrieg’s fascist strategy was opposed not by defense, including maneuvering, with widespread use of sudden and well-prepared counterattacks, but, in essence, a strategy of lightning defeat of an invading enemy.

    However, unlike the German blitzkrieg, our so-called lightning-fast actions were not ensured either by the advance deployment of troops, or by their high combat readiness, or by the skillful organization of the counter-offensive, or by the support of counter-strike groups by aviation. Naturally, this led to defeat. ""

    “The main issue in assessing the operational and strategic plans of the enemy was the determination of his main strike. An analysis of this report and previous plans shows that the General Staff quite reasonably determined the deployment of the main forces of fascist Germany north of the mouth of the river. San in order to inflict and subsequently develop a major strike in the direction of Riga, Kaunas and further to Dvinsk, Polotsk or Kaunas, Vilnius and further to Minsk. ” (p. 52)
    - "It was assumed that in the Minsk sector 63 divisions of border districts, conducting active defense, could withstand the attack of the main enemy forces." (p. 55)
    - “The idea of ​​the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces and the construction of operational groupings of troops in the Western strategic direction to a greater extent reflected offensive goals. By virtue of this, the application of the main counterattack was planned according to the weakest grouping of enemy forces ”! (p. 98).
    Planning your main counterattack on the weakest enemy grouping is possible only if you know WHERE the enemy has weak forces and, accordingly, WHERE his main forces must wait!
    And Marshal M.V. Zakharov in the same way in his work “General Staff in the Pre-war Years” (Moscow, 2005) shows that the main strike of the Wehrmacht in the plans of our General Staff was always expected north of Polesie! But our main one was planned south of Polesie, from Ukraine. And on page 54 in this study it is indicated that "the General Staff planned to deploy the main grouping of forces south of Brest-Litovsk, that is, against the enemy’s minority forces."
    Those. the main forces of the Germans, the direction of the main blow, were expected by our General Staff only north of Polesie - in the Baltic states and Belarus.
    Also in this work it was shown above - the timing of the attack was well known - “The General Staff determined a completely unrealistic order of mobilizing divisions in new areas. By June 5, 1941, the cells left at the points of permanent deployment should have drawn up a plan for the reception of horses, wagons and mechanical transport and submitted applications for their transportation to new areas. By this time, the General Staff had actual data on the final concentration of enemy forces and the timing of their attack ”(p. 84)
    .
    At the same time, take a look at Appendix 6 - there is a date on the attack on the USSR)))
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 14 May 2020 10: 59 New
      15
      Quote: V.S.
      "" The Soviet command thoughtlessly approached the choice of strategic actions.
      The blitzkrieg’s fascist strategy was opposed not by defense, including maneuvering, with widespread use of sudden and well-prepared counterattacks, but, in essence, a strategy of lightning defeat of an invading enemy.
      However, unlike the German blitzkrieg, our so-called lightning-fast actions were not ensured either by the advance deployment of troops, or by their high combat readiness, or by the skillful organization of the counter-offensive, or by the support of counter-strike groups by aviation. Naturally, this led to defeat. ""

      Mutually exclusive paragraphs in all its glory. smile
      At first, the author relies on maneuverable defense with the widespread use of sudden and well-trained counterattacks.
      And then he writes that offensive actions were not provided either by the advance deployment of troops, nor by their high combat readiness, nor by the skillful organization of a counteroffensive, nor by the support of counterattack groups by aviation. That's interesting, but with maneuverable defense all this is not necessary?
      If the command and the country as a whole were not able to provide the offensive actions of the army, then maneuvering defense could not be provided either. If they can provide maneuverable defense, then lightning-fast actions will be provided.

      And by the way, where did these come from lightning fast? According to the cover plans, at the first stage there was just a mobile defense with barriers Iptabr and counterattacks of the mechanized corps.
    2. Lekz
      Lekz 19 May 2020 22: 18 New
      +1
      Speaking about the date of the attack on the USSR and the knowledge of its Soviet leadership, it is worth asking the question: when did Hitler himself know this date. June 5th, this date was open.
  • VS
    VS 14 May 2020 09: 42 New
    -16
    Quote: Alekseev
    Quote: svp67
    Did Zhukov himself fully comply with the position of Nach GS?

    hi
    Not completely, he himself recognized this, his element is teamwork, not staff.
    I focused on the fact that the mass appointment of unprepared generals and officers to command posts and other failures in preparing the army for war is a systemic result, and not the result of wrecking and stupidity of individuals.
    Recently it was discussed that the same Zhukov, as the representative of the high command at the beginning of the war in the SWF, together with the command made seemingly correct decisions: by hitting thousands of tanks with fur. buildings on the flanks of the German advancing wedge to defeat the enemy. But what came of it? In fact, it turned out that intelligence did not determine exactly the direction of the main blow of the Germans, the fur. the hulls were not fully operational, the Germans had air supremacy, communications did not allow for clear command and control, tanks broke down and remained without fuel on marches, etc. etc.
    You can complain about surprise. But, for example, near Vyazma, there was no surprise ...

    alas - intelligence completely gave the military everything that they needed - and they knew the direction of the MAJOR strike in the General Staff ... But it was just that MKs who were not combat-ready decided to use it so stupidly - this is - wrecking of clean water) it was necessary - and by stupidity it was done by non-commissioners with those plans or by intent - it doesn’t matter ...
  • VS
    VS 14 May 2020 09: 44 New
    -14
    Quote: svp67
    at the strategic level, the high command, even "in a nightmare," could not imagine the depth to which the German tank groups were breaking through, and hence they could not promptly counter them.

    alas - in the General Staff knew perfectly well - at what depth the Germans are able to break through their TG)))
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 14 May 2020 11: 02 New
      16
      Quote: V.S.
      alas - in the General Staff knew perfectly well - at what depth the Germans are able to break through their TG)))

      Yeah ... and even at the General Staff they knew about the German heavy tank divisions, about the German serial heavy tanks TV, T-VI and T-VII, about the massive use by Germans of motorcyclists and airborne forces during the French campaign. Intelligence, as always, provided accurate information about the enemy. smile
      1. cavl
        cavl 16 May 2020 06: 15 New
        12
        And by June 22, Brest instead of Guderian’s tank group had about two tank regiments, one motorized regiment and three cavalry brigades ... Only Kozinkin is bashfully silent about this issue.
        Instead of a 4 tank group, according to intelligence, there were only TWO TANK BATTLONS and two tank regiments at a distance of 40 kilometers from the border.
        Instead of a 3 tank group, up to three motorized divisions (for which simple infantry divisions were mistakenly taken), a tank regiment, and up to a tank battalion ...
        If the General Staff knew how deep tank groups should break through, the same General Staff knew perfectly well that without the presence of tank groups and their divisions the Germans could not break through at such a pace and depth to such a depth on June 22 ...
  • dmmyak40
    dmmyak40 14 May 2020 10: 22 New
    20

    Here is a photograph of Zakhar Pruzhinin, my mother’s first husband. Before the war, he was an instructor at the Bataysky flying school. Mother there was a cadet in the group of Pruzhinin. There they met and got married. These are the fates ...
    1. AsmyppoL
      AsmyppoL 14 May 2020 16: 15 New
      +5
      Thanks for the comment, Dmitry!
      This is the first time I come across a person who is a relative of the hero from the book.
      Thank you for writing at least a little about your mother and wife Zakhar Pruzhinin. I read it with great interest!
      Good memory to the heroes of the war!
      Time heals and I belong to the former Fritz (but not military attackers) without the hatred of the people of that generation. But yesterday, after reading the lines that the German fighter that shot down Zakhar Pruzhinin did not survive the same battle - I experienced satisfaction ...

      “On that terrible day, June 30, when our five were attacked by a group of eighteen Me-109 and Me-110, our squadron commander flinched and pulled out of the battle. I stepped forward and gave the command to line up with me, swinging my wings. The Messerschmidts were cut off from the formation. the plane of my closest friend, the first instructor back in the Bataysk aviation school, Zakhara Pruzhinin. He died with the crew ... Nikolai Bogdanov and Alexei Bogomolov walked side by side. That "Messerschmidt" who shot down Pruzhinin was literally cut into pieces by our riflemen with fire ...
      1. dmmyak40
        dmmyak40 14 May 2020 22: 33 New
        15
        Eugene, thanks! Zakhar Pruzhinin left behind his son Alexander (unfortunately, he is no longer alive), an incredibly talented architect. He worked in Moscow and knew many of this world, but remained a very simple, kind and direct person. I still remember his hefty already graying man riding with us on a trolley bus (although he could easily ride the Volga in terms of his position and income) and cleaning turnips for my children.
        In that battle, what happened is what the bomber pilots flying in the group are most afraid of: one of the aircraft left its place in the ranks. And this happened because of the cowardice’s cowardice, which threw the group and rolled off into the clouds. And the squadron continued to fight ...
  • xomaNN
    xomaNN 14 May 2020 11: 25 New
    0
    Remember the pilots of the Air Force of the Red Army and the Navy who carried out a THINKING order and died! And remember that the higher in the military hierarchy an illiterate or frankly thoughtless commander stands, the more harm he brings to his troops! So even for the "slaughter" of TB-3 on June 30, 41, Pavlov was worthy of being shot. What I got wassat
  • Starley.ura
    Starley.ura 14 May 2020 11: 40 New
    -4
    I really want all the "heroes" guilty of such tragedies to be "appreciated" at their true worth and by name. After all, the main reason for their repetition is impunity.
  • ccsr
    ccsr 14 May 2020 12: 09 New
    +7
    Author:
    Roman Skomorokhov
    To begin with about TB-3. It is clear and understandable to anyone who is not even very knowledgeable in aviation matters that only an incompetent or a traitor can send these vehicles to bomb during the day and without covering fighters.

    First you need to understand that the TB-3 was a morally obsolete aircraft in the mid-thirties, and was officially withdrawn from service in the bombing (but not military transport) units in 1939.
    As for the daytime, I recall that the dark time of the day on June 30 is 3-4 hours on the force, and it is much more difficult to get to the crossing at night, the more so make accurate bombing. As for the cover of fighters, unfortunately by June 30 their number decreased in the districts due to heavy losses in the first few days of the war, and they were not even enough to cover their troops from German air raids.
    As for Pavlov, I believe that he was shot fairly, but I consider it stupid to judge him for giving such an order specifically for TB-3 - he had no choice but to use everything that remained in the district. Any commander in his place would have done that, who realized that the only way to reduce the number of German troops being transported is to destroy the ferries at any cost to make it difficult to move them deeper into the territory of the ZAPOVO.
    The most unpleasant thing is that the bombers again flew unaccompanied. Yes, KBF fighters couldn’t provide cover by range, but in the area of ​​Daugavpils fighter aircraft of the Western front operated. However, according to reports, the issue of fighter cover was not raised at all.

    What does this have to do with Pavlov, whom you blame for everything, if the NPO and the NKVMF were not a single structure, and naturally even interaction issues were not worked out even at the KShU level of the aviation units of ZAPOVO and BF. Where, then, could it have appeared on June 30 - by pike? A strange rebuke in the direction of Pavlov and Tributs - they did not stand at the origins of the decision to divide the armed forces into two people's commissariats, they only reaped the fruits of what some military commanders had done before the war.
    And a brilliant decision was made at headquarters: “We can repeat it.” And the surviving crews were ordered to fly out again ...
    True, there really was no one to do this. The returning planes were in such a state for the most part that they could not even talk about any sorties.

    The absolutely correct decision was made based on that situation, especially since only one plane was lost. Well, the fact that the planes were in this condition, it only proves how strong the Germans offered resistance and how well they were prepared for the war. What is Pavlov or Tributs personal fault here?
    It is not always pleasant to read such materials. Not very nice to write. But this is our story. As she is.
    You just do not need to retell our military history on the agitation of various market experts, but it is better to study military affairs in order to be impartial in assessing those events, and even then make the right conclusions.
    Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the battles for our freedom!
    All citizens of our country support you in this, with the possible exception of a handful of renegades.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 14 May 2020 16: 21 New
      15
      Quote: ccsr
      What does this have to do with Pavlov, whom you blame for everything, if the NPO and the NKVMF were not a single structure, and naturally even interaction issues were not worked out even at the KShU level of the aviation units of ZAPOVO and BF.

      There is one more question - and which particular units of the army air force and in what condition were at Dvinsk and could cover naval aviation?
      Quote: ccsr
      A strange rebuke in the direction of Pavlov and Tributs - they did not stand at the origins of the decision to divide the armed forces into two people's commissariats, they only reaped the fruits of what some military commanders had done before the war.

      Yes, aviation had enough organizational problems without dividing them into people's commissariats. Some divisions are subordinate to the armies. others to the front. The PMSM, the same DBA, was used as a front-line infantry because it could be massaged at least somehow without collecting air regiments for various armies and without puzzling over their interaction.
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 14 May 2020 19: 45 New
        -11
        Quote: Alexey RA
        There is one more question - and which particular units of the army air force and in what condition were at Dvinsk and could cover naval aviation?

        This is a question of a more complex order - only professional military historians who possess the entire array of information about which units were there and what they had in service by this date could discuss such. The author of the article simply does not understand this, and spits with slogans, but his slogans do not withstand even the simplest criticism.
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Yes, aviation had enough organizational problems without dividing them into people's commissariats.

        Indeed, if you carefully study everything related to the control of aircraft in the air, then even technically this was not solved within the framework of front-line aviation, and there is no need to talk about the interaction of different types of aviation, because it was a big problem for all the air forces.
  • HaByxoDaBHocep
    HaByxoDaBHocep 14 May 2020 17: 05 New
    14
    The war was stunned by the surprise of defeat.

    In the direction of Bobruisk slowly flew in a clear order of nine slow-moving giants TB-3. Fighters did not cover the bombers. Already six cars were returning through the Berezina, and the Messerschmitt was rushing behind. He came in tail one to the other. A few minutes later six black columns of smoke rose above the forest. Then a disfigured attack aircraft Kholobaev flew in, also a twisted bomber collided with him ... And after that a fighter with an inoperative engine landed and spun around at the end of the run. From the cockpit they pulled the pilot with his head buried in the dashboard. Young, as if whitewashed in chalk, a person hanging on a skin flap with his left hand in a glove, and a jumping hand of a wristwatch ... At dusk, they saw how the SB bomber was pulling from the west on one engine with a drop. A fair wind carried him through the airfield directly to the residential buildings of the military town. The bomber began to turn away, he was pulled into a roll on one engine, laid on his back. Upon hitting the ground, a column of bright flame shot up, cartridges crackled in flames, flying with blue splashes ...

    That was the first front-line day. What will the second bring?
    Emelianenko Vasily Borisovich

    "In the harsh military air."
    I read about the first days of the war in this book as a child
  • Living7111972
    Living7111972 14 May 2020 21: 21 New
    +2
    You can’t believe the COMMAND, I received an order to think for yourself how to do it. All by yourself, and so they monasterize, not even out of evil, but out of stupidity.
    True, I am not surprised at anything after seeing a Mercedes on an MI-26 suspension.
    But the question of survival only worries the surviving ...
  • qpeqop
    qpeqop 14 May 2020 22: 11 New
    +1
    But tell me, gentlemen, experts, if motorized infantry had a division not of three structural units, and not of four (as it is now in the NATO forces), but of five? Four linear and a fifth with rear support functions, that is, the rear not somewhere far away, but right here at hand, with fuel, ammunition, food, repairs, medicine, reserves, etc. for a week of continuous fighting? Can such units successfully fight without fear of operational environment? Would it be easier for the commander to combine such units in both defense and offensive? The arrangement of linear units is not frontal, but circular. The fifth unit in the center. Breakthroughs on the flanks and attacks from the rear are not terrible, and in a week of such survivability, you can come up with a lot of things. And just a question in the new organization of troops.
  • IL-64
    IL-64 14 May 2020 22: 35 New
    11
    Thank. Everlasting memory.
  • dmmyak40
    dmmyak40 14 May 2020 22: 40 New
    17

    This is the Bataysky aviation school in 1936, if I am not mistaken. Far left in the upper corner - my mother Chumakova Galina Petrovna. In the middle (with both hands tilted to our left) is her then instructor, and then her husband, Zakhar Pruzhinin.
    There is still a photo from Bataysk, it is necessary to scan.
    1. AsmyppoL
      AsmyppoL 15 May 2020 04: 11 New
      +3
      Thanks for both of your comments!
      I read it with great interest.
      Now I realized how the comasco who abandoned the group risked to leave alone in the presence of many enemy fighters. If you can scan the second photo - it will also be interesting to consider it.
      Are there any other memories of the early days of the war?
  • Bat039
    Bat039 14 May 2020 23: 09 New
    +4
    The heroism of some, most often is the result of outright stupidity, or deliberate wrecking of others ... Unfortunately so ..
  • certero
    certero 14 May 2020 23: 26 New
    +2
    Thanks so much for this article!
    I read in German memoirs about the bombing of this crossing.
  • MishaT
    MishaT 15 May 2020 00: 21 New
    10
    Excuse me, why is this stolen text exhibited without links to articles from which this libel is concocted? This is a question for the moderators.
    1. Mordvin 3
      Mordvin 3 15 May 2020 00: 28 New
      0
      Quote: MishaT
      Excuse me, why is this stolen text exhibited without links to articles from which this libel is concocted?

      And what is the percentage of originality?
  • MishaT
    MishaT 15 May 2020 00: 43 New
    16
    Quote: mordvin xnumx
    Quote: MishaT
    Excuse me, why is this stolen text exhibited without links to articles from which this libel is concocted?

    And what is the percentage of originality?


    Forgive me if even one paragraph is copied - without reference to the source, this is already theft, but here the pieces of text just go. Of two works: M.E. Morozov about the raids on Daugavpils on 30.06.41, KBF aviation and my work "LIVING AND DEAD IN THE SKY OVER BOBRUISKY" at https://warspot.ru/ 05 February 2016. Here even the photos are the same, they were too lazy to change for others. Shame...
    .
    1. Mordvin 3
      Mordvin 3 15 May 2020 00: 57 New
      0
      Quote: MishaT
      and my work "LIVING AND DEAD IN THE SKY OVER BOBRUISK" on https://warspot.ru/ 05 February 2016 Here even the photos are the same, they were too lazy to change for others. Shame...

      Maybe. Do not read. Well, what percentage?
  • Comrade
    Comrade 15 May 2020 01: 06 New
    10
    It is clear and understandable to anyone who is not even very knowledgeable in aviation matters that only an incompetent or a traitor can send these vehicles to bomb during the day and without covering fighters.

    This was a gesture of despair, not the result of stupidity or betrayal.
    The Germans in the spring of the 45th abundantly had enough of such situations, and also not from a good life.
    For example, night fighters were lifted into the air during the day, and due to the lack of skills and experience of daytime battles, they became easy prey for the British and Americans.
    What would happen was clear right away, but the Luftwaffe leadership had no choice; they urgently needed to show that there were still German planes in the sky.
    Therefore, do not rush to record General Pavlov as traitors, rather, he is a victim of circumstances.
  • Reklastik
    Reklastik 15 May 2020 07: 25 New
    +8
    I present to you the commander of the Western Front ...
    - the author would be an entertainer in the circus, judging by the style of the articles))))
  • Charlie
    Charlie 15 May 2020 08: 24 New
    +2
    But how could the front commander raise the air regiments of long-range aviation? The fleet commander could of course send the planes of his own fleet to strike. But long-range aviation has its superiors in Moscow. And Pavlov could not order the farmers to bomb the crossings. He knew subordination, not the first day in the army. The departure order most likely came from Moscow. Then the author in my opinion did not understand the essence. How much in vain does the loaf crumble on Pavlov, calling him a traitor.
    1. cavl
      cavl 16 May 2020 06: 20 New
      +3
      The Military Council of the Western Front could issue an order for the departure of aircraft of the 3rd corps. About such orders is written in the memoirs of Commander Skripko.
      Before that, the corps inflicted daytime air strikes on enemy columns.
      And on June 30 at about 13-00 the planes have already begun to prepare for a flight for another purpose
      1. Charlie
        Charlie 17 May 2020 00: 39 New
        +1
        As far as I know, long-range aviation units were not subordinate to any of the front commanders. They have their own kitchen. The military council of the front is a political department. The Zampolitans, of course, intervened in the command. But so that directly to steer, they did not have such powers.
        1. cavl
          cavl 17 May 2020 14: 29 New
          +6
          Skripko Nikolay Semyonovich "For near and far targets".

          "On June 29, German tank groups, which swept the capital of Belarus from the north and south, united eastern Minsk and cut off the escape routes of eleven rifle divisions of the Western Front. Subsequently, many Red Army men, commanders and political workers fought their way out of the encirclement, joined the local partisan detachments, and some died In a difficult and unequal struggle.In the circumstances, when our thinned out troops could no longer contain the frenzied onslaught of the Hitlerite hordes, Headquarters accelerated the advance of reserves to create a strategic defense front on the border of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. Military Council of the Front set the task of his aviation and the 3rd long-range bomber air corps to act on enemy tanks and motorized troops advancing in the direction of Pleshchenitsa, Borisov, to prevent them from crossing the Berezina River. The front command showed the greatest concern about its right flank. It was there that all our aviation was aimed ... "

          The military council of the front or before the war of the military district is an organ for making collegial important decisions. It includes the commander of the district forces, the chief of staff and a member of the military council. As an example, below is a telegram from the General Staff to the KOVO Military Council:

          "Directive of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the Military Council of KOVO (in a copy - to the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Maslennikov) 10.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX Top secret
          The chief of the border troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR reported that the chiefs of the fortified areas were instructed to occupy the foreground. Report to the People's Commissar for Defense on what basis parts of the fortified areas of KOVO were ordered to occupy the foreground. Such an action can provoke the Germans into an armed conflict and is fraught with all sorts of consequences. Cancel such an order immediately and report exactly who gave such an arbitrary order. Zhukov"

          "Note of the Military Council of the KOVO to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko 11.06.1941/01/00210 No. XNUMX/XNUMX Top secret
          ... In order to enhance the combat readiness of the KOVO troops, I ask you to allow me to hold this July 1 following activities ...

          Commander-in-Chief of KOVO, Colonel-General Kirponos
          Member of the Military Council of KOVO Corps Commissar Vashugin
          Chief of Staff of KOVO Lieutenant General Purkaev "
  • Molot1979
    Molot1979 15 May 2020 09: 16 New
    +5
    First you need to find out what was the situation in the areas of the bombing. Fools are actually much less than they seem. It could be that waiting with bombing until night was simply impossible. When any losses would be justified if the raid was a success. I have no special relation to Tributs. As for Pavlov, I agree with the verdict. But this does not mean that all his orders were wrong. It is necessary to check. Watch more widely than from the beginning of a raid to the end of a raid.
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 16 May 2020 10: 59 New
      -12
      Quote: Molot1979
      As for Pavlov, I agree with the verdict. But this does not mean that all his orders were wrong. It is necessary to check. Watch more widely than from the beginning of a raid to the end of a raid.

      This is an absolutely correct conclusion. But some local "experts" in military affairs simply do not know how to separate flies from cutlets, and they think that if Pavlov was shot, then all his orders were either criminal or incorrect.
      Although it is already obvious that having learned that there were still TB-3s that were intended for landing, I was ordered by the aviation commanders to use them as bombers so that they wouldn’t disappear in vain, given the pace of the German advance.
  • Dedok
    Dedok 15 May 2020 09: 33 New
    +1
    "... This does not include the lost front-line SB, Yak-4 and Su-2, which also took part in raids on the crossings ..."

    Maybe I'm drowning, but did SU-2 exist at the beginning of the war?
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 15 May 2020 09: 47 New
      +8
      Quote: Dedok
      Maybe I'm drowning, but did SU-2 exist at the beginning of the war?

      On 22.06.1941/2/XNUMX there were two aviation regiments on the Su-XNUMX in the ZOV:
      43 bap (Vitebsk) - 43 Su-2
      97 bap (Bobruisk) - 51 Su-2
  • andreykolesov123
    andreykolesov123 15 May 2020 10: 02 New
    -1
    the question is, and the level of competence of today's commanders has grown?
  • tank64rus
    tank64rus 15 May 2020 10: 26 New
    0
    If not for the professionalism of command.
  • Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 15 May 2020 11: 11 New
    12
    did everything they could. We got to the crossing. Despite the air defense fire, they made TWO approaches to the target, dropping bombs. And they went back. It was at the departure that they were intercepted by German fighters.

    The main thing here is "German fighters intercepted them on the retreat." Only on the retreat, after two approaches to the target. Soviet bombers were shot down by German anti-aircraft artillery. They flew nisko and were shot by 20 mm automatic anti-aircraft artillery and German infantry with machine guns.
    Fighters only finished off seriously damaged vehicles and then wrote everything down at their own expense.
    The main tactical error is not fighter escort, but a flight in the afternoon at low altitude (less than 1000 meters) of large vehicles. An ideal target for numerous German automatic anti-aircraft artillery.
    1. RuSFr
      RuSFr 15 May 2020 17: 34 New
      +4
      I will agree with you.
      Ischenko's plane, which is described by K. Simonov, after dropping bombs fell under the close gap of an anti-aircraft projectile. The shooter did not answer after that. At a retreat in a pair, Ishchenko bomber was shot down by a fighter
  • Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 15 May 2020 12: 40 New
    +6
    Quote: tank64rus
    If not for the professionalism of command.

    Of course you can beat better. But here the author once again considers the air war as some sort of separate competition.
    What did the Soviet aircraft do:
    The German attack on the decisive sectors of the front was slowed down by one or two days
    Destroyed a number of soldiers and equipment of the enemy.
    As a bonus, several German fighters were shot down.
    In exchange, 50 planes and about 200 flight personnel were lost.
    On the scale of this war, and for the summer of 1941, a good result.
  • nznz
    nznz 15 May 2020 14: 08 New
    +8
    I may not express myself in vain. It is hard to imagine what was happening then - statistics and reports, reports are dry documents that do not take into account trifles and nuances. And sometimes a lot of things are hidden in them. Why wasn’t it fixed by orders, instructions, tactical orders, yes God knows what the practical prohibition of (!) The work of bombers without cover? This question seemed interesting to me. And here is the situation - send bombers to the slaughter, well, they can be blamed for the losses, but the war, and losses with the clear advantage of the enemy can still be somehow explained. But inaction at the time when the enemy is actively advancing along the hardships is a tribunal and a bullet in the forehead . I admit the idea that by sending the bombers without protection to the notorious death, the military commanders saved their lives, preferring this sin to shameful death in the tribunal. The choice is not easy. Similarly, with the front line. Retreated to escape from the boiler-coward and bullet. I didn’t back down — boilers and losses. The war always set tasks for the commanders .. I remember the book On the fleets, the combat alert (Kuznetsov) —I violated the order and readiness. He announced and withdrew the fleet from the bases in a sea-maneuver and saved the aircraft’s attacks. essentially a fleet. But he went under the article, and could be put on trial.
  • VS
    VS 15 May 2020 15: 05 New
    -15
    Quote: Alexey RA
    Quote: V.S.
    alas - in the General Staff knew perfectly well - at what depth the Germans are able to break through their TG)))

    Yeah ... and even at the General Staff they knew about the German heavy tank divisions, about the German serial heavy tanks TV, T-VI and T-VII, about the massive use by Germans of motorcyclists and airborne forces during the French campaign. Intelligence, as always, provided accurate information about the enemy. smile

    read the materials of the meeting of senior officers of the Red Army in December of the 40th - they are on the network .. everything is visible - who knew what))) or did not know)))
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 15 May 2020 19: 45 New
      15
      Quote: V.S.
      read the materials of the meeting of senior officers of the Red Army in December of the 40th - they are on the network .. everything is visible - who knew what))) or did not know)))

      The same meeting at which Comrade Klyonov declared that the initial period of the war would be mandatory? wink
      I recently watched Isserson's book, The New Forms of Struggle. Hasty conclusions are given there, based on the war of the Germans with Poland, that there will not be an initial period of war, that today the war is resolved simply by the invasion of ready forces, as was done by the Germans in Poland, deploying one and a half million people.
      I find this conclusion premature. It can be allowed for a state like Poland, which, being arrogant, lost all vigilance and did not have any intelligence of what was done by the Germans during the period of months of concentration of troops. Each self-respecting state, of course, will try to use this initial period in its own interests in order to find out what the enemy is doing, how he is grouping, what his intentions are, and to prevent him from doing this.
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 16 May 2020 11: 04 New
        -12
        Quote: Alexey RA
        The same meeting at which Comrade Klyonov declared that the initial period of the war would be mandatory?

        Klenov, of course, is not the boss whose representations were guidelines for the entire Red Army, because there were other opinions, including on reports from military intelligence. But this statement only shows what ideas about the future war could exist in the heads of those higher military men who should have studied the experience of the German army more thoroughly, and not remain captive to their old ideas.