Legends and myths of the Great Patriotic War. The human factor of the Red Army Air Force and the Luftwaffe

Legends and myths of the Great Patriotic War. The human factor of the Red Army Air Force and the Luftwaffe

In two previous materials, we talked about the number and quality of aircraft on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX. In one of the articles I promised to talk about the human factor.


Let's start from the bottom, with the training of pilots. In our difficult time, people publish just a mountain of information on how everything was bad in the Red Army Air Force in terms of training pilots. I have great doubt about the information that pilots were thrown into battle with 2-3 hours of flying time on a combat aircraft.

I will quote from such revealing material, so to speak. Spelling saved.

“Fighter pilot Kozlov N.A., studying at the Chuguevsky aviation school in 1937-1939, received 16 hours on the I-25. Klimenko V.I. He graduated from the Chuguev Air Force School in September 1940, having mastered four types of aircraft and having a flight time of 40-45 hours. Graduated in 1939. Kachinsky flying school Pokryshkin A.I. flew on I-16 10 hours 38 min. Pilot Baevsky G.A. in Serpukhov Aviation School, I flew on I-15bis for 22 hours and 15 minutes. Graduates of the Kachin school in 1940. Amet-Khan S., Garanin V.I., Dolgushin S.F. received 8-10 hours of flight on a combat aircraft. Compare: German pilots in their educational institutions received an average of 200 hours of training flight, plus another 150-200 hours in parts of the Luftwaffe. The Americans had about 450 hours. ”

The fact that figures have reached our times right up to the minute is, of course, great. And here we run into the literal sense of the word on dual sensations.

On the one hand, oh how deplorable everything is! The Germans flew for 200 hours, the Americans for 450, and ours - nothing at all. They buried corpses and all that.

Sorry ... Pokryshkin - three times Hero of the Soviet Union. Sultan Amet Khan - twice Hero of the Soviet Union. Dolgushin - Hero of the Soviet Union. Garanin - Hero of the Soviet Union.

It’s somehow strange, right? 10 hours of Pokryshkin and 200 hours of Hartman - is this a different clock? One allowed them to become one of the most useful (namely useful, and not productive) pilots of World War II, and the other - to draw through the false "Abshussbalken" and cling to themselves trinkets.


Oh yes, such non-punctual Germans lost Hartman’s flight book ... Apparently, that she didn’t get to Zadornov.

By the way, in vain. So many Russians could be destroyed. Laughing would burst, reading the writings of Hartmann, well, to hell with him, hello to the special Luftwaffe cauldron in hell.

I specifically do not cite the author of that scribble, simply because it is in bulk on the Internet. But that Belarusian wrote, somewhat not understanding the essence of the numbers, alas. And the numbers speak of very interesting things.

200 hours of Hartman’s training allowed him, especially not fighting (attacks from the clouds and other “tricky” Hartman’s maneuvers do not need such training), to shoot down more than 100 aircraft. 10 hours of Pokryshkin’s preparation allowed him to shoot down 59 aircraft and bombers and attack aircraft to shield Hartman from the whole war.

And here’s the paradox, Hartman Pokryshkin couldn’t do anything!

And yes, this whole crowd of aces of the Luftwaffe for some reason did not allow Germany to win the war in the air. It’s a shame, probably, the “Abshussbalkenes” were petty, flaunted with crosses, and nevertheless, Germany was in ruins, the Soviet attack aircraft that they did, they did with the front line of defense from Koenigsberg to Constanta, and from Pokryshkin in the air the sphincters relaxed at the most experienced aces .

For some reason, we did not announce the presence of Hartman or Rally in the sky. And even if they had announced, the untrained “Ruspilots” would have surely come running with the intention of checking how cool the German aces are. Checked the same. Repeatedly.


You know, here it’s obvious not how many hours were spent on pilot training, but how these hours were spent. Here, obviously, the essence can be revealed. You can spend 500 hours training a pilot, but it will turn out, sorry, Rudel. You can spend 20 hours and get a pilot who calmly drives Rudel into the coffin.

The issue is exclusively quality.

Further, I will cite as evidence a certain Walter Schwabedissen, who inspired an opus entitled "Stalin's Falcons". In general, the book is cognitive in terms of aviationbecause Schwabedissen knew what he was writing about. In technical terms. But for the rest - that’s still a cocktail, because what only Schwabedissen did not command. And he sat in the anti-aircraft corps, and the regiment of night fighters, and in headquarters. But he didn’t fly, he didn’t approach the Eastern Front for a shot, but he wrote about our pilots. Nobody will forbid, right?

“But there is another truth - about the thousands and thousands of unknown pilots who fell in air battles, whose names no one will ever recognize and remember. It was they who, somehow trained, poorly trained, almost having no flying experience (not to mention combat), who covered tens and thousands of bodies and finally buried German aircraft. The illiterate, mediocre and, in fact, criminal high command of the Red Army threw them into battle to certain death. ”

Heartbreakingly. “Tens of thousands of bodies covered the Luftwaffe” - this is strong. I did not understand a bit how it is. Rammed, or what? Top falling?

Okay, that’s not the point. The point is another story of Schwabedissen. Pondering about the bad Soviet aircraft, about how insignificant the command of the Red Army Air Force was, the German suddenly gives out this:

“It was often possible to observe how the IL-2 attacks its targets, while German fighters could not even fly into the air due to bad weather ... Soviet attack aircraft flew in any weather, including rain and snow, and not the wind, neither storm, rain or low temperatures prevented their actions ... the Soviet attack pilots were courageous and aggressive, and the characteristic weak features of the Russian character were less pronounced than those of the fighter pilots ... Soviet attack aircraft turned out to be much more effective "what was it supposed before the start of the campaign ... By the end of 1941, the training of flight personnel had reached a commendably high level."

That is, the IL-2 terrified the Germans already in 1941, and, despite the scanty preparations, the Soviet pilots flew when the German aces did not even think about flying, because it was too dangerous?


In general, yes, we can say that the Russians flew because they did not understand that it was impossible to fly. Dangerously. From lack of preparation.

Funny right? Experienced and trained Germans sit at airfields and drink schnapps because the weather is not flying, and inexperienced Soviet pilots fly and have a hard life with the German infantry.

Excuse me, did I understand everything correctly? Inexperienced pilots with 10 hours of preparation calmly flew in the rain, fog, poor visibility, found German positions and worked on them? Did German flyers with 200 hours of training sit on their tails exactly?

One wants to say: “On the contrary, it would be necessary ...”

It is definitely impossible to say that on 22.06 the Germans did not have an advantage in training. Yes, it was, but not so fatal. A pilot with 200+ hours behind his back is a piece of goods, whatever one may say.

But let's see if everything was so sad with us?

Not by that much. Yes, we didn’t have time, but: at the March plenary session of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of 1940 — and this, excuse me, is the level — new guidelines were adopted in training flight personnel.

The Red Army Air Force also organized a multi-stage training system, some not-so-conscientious researchers are trying to present a picture of what was sent to the front from the flying club. How real it is with the front - in general, a special conversation, but after flying in the flying club for 20-25 hours, a person ended up in a military school of flight personnel, where his training continued.


Military schools have already given specifications, trained pilots for fighters, bombers and scouts. The latter were abolished in 1941. As part of the military school program, the fighter pilot received another 24 hours of flying time, and the bomber received 20 hours.

And only then did the higher command school go. There, the training program determined up to 150 hours of preparation.

It is clear that the “before” is both 50 and 100 hours. But in general, yes, on paper, the program looked no worse than the Germans. The issue of implementation was, but I do not think it was so significant. The veterans themselves in their memoirs said that 10 hours was more than enough to understand the plane. And for an experienced pilot, and even after I-16 school, the question of retraining to another model was not at all.

On the issue of mass. The number of educational institutions was increased, if in 1937 there were 12 of them throughout the country, then at the time the war began - 83. The number of training aircraft increased from 3007 in 1937 to 6053 in December 1940.

They did not manage to fully implement the program, but nevertheless, in 1941 the Germans were not met by cadets of flying clubs with 2-3 hours of flight on the I-15.

There were losses at the beginning of the war, the losses were enormous, but: the merit of the aces of the Luftwaffe here is not as huge as it is shown by the cursors stories. Many pilots simply perished in encirclements, boilers, boarded a forced on enemy territory.

In previous articles, I made a statement (and I think I proved it) that, technically, the Red Army Air Force was much inferior to the Luftwaffe. But not in terms of pilot training, for how, excuse me, then explain the very impressive losses of the Germans?

In the statement that there were 1 destroyed Soviet ones for the initial stage of the war per 6 downed German plane, it makes sense. Not shot down, but destroyed. Fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, bombs, left at airfields due to lack of fuel and so on.

However, then everything leveled off. Soviet schools and colleges continued to take shots from flying clubs and teach them. Yes, there were accelerated courses, but these are 10 and 6 months, respectively. Plus ZAPy, plus training shelves where training continued.

And you can criticize the Red Army Air Force training system for as long as you like and praise the German, but ... Why did the Germans end with the pilots? Aces why in the earth were?

Indeed, in theory, the Luftwaffe aces were supposed to knock their teeth in one’s left and right, knocking these heaps of unprepared Soviet pilots who climbed in thousands ... well, not on embrasures, let's say, on the trunks of the Messerschmitts and Focke-Wulfs.

But it didn’t happen. And somehow the aces started ... ending ... Moreover, on all fronts.


And in 1943, the Germans did not have any advantage in the quality of training of flight personnel. This is noted by those who fought, shot down and remained “alive, intact, eagle” from among our pilots. And they, you know, know better.

So all these fantasies about the “cool German training school” of the Luftwaffe and none of the Red Army Air Force are nonsense. It turns out quite the opposite, the Soviet school turned out to be cooler, because it was the Luftwaffe that ended. And in 1945, the Germans already had something for green beginners. But in fact, the air war by the Germans was lost in the East, and in the West, and over Germany.

In general, it was always common for the defeated to tell how cool they were and what prevented them from winning.

But the Luftwaffe also had strengths, especially at the beginning of the war, which led to success. This should be noted. As I said, excellent tactical coordination and the ability to create a strategic advantage.

Given the completely different structure of the air forces of the two armies, at the initial stage the Germans could very beautifully create an advantage not only in airplanes in an important direction, but also qualitatively in terms of personnel. Ace squadrons including. And yes, here they got an advantage in the full program.

Plus a more modern tactic, which I also talked about. The layered six fighters, which have a connection with the ground forces and their own command, will work out the area much more efficiently than the three planes without communication at all.

However, everything is perfectly painted about this with Pokryshkin. As soon as ours changed their approach to tactics, when the flightless mines like Kraev were replaced by normal combat pilots like Pokryshkin, the Germans generally felt sad.

And then, the search for excuses began, such as "filled up with corpses" and a demonstration of exaggerated accounts. From my point of view, puffed ones who want to pray for them - please, but it's not about the numbers.

The bottom line. The fact is that at the end of the Luftfaffe war, where Hartman and the company were well-trained free hunters, all of them were in crosses and Abshussbalken, but their army, which was pressed by the Red Army Air Force, was howling and swearing, but the hartmans could not do anything.


Why, all of Germany was moaning under American and British bombs, but alas, the Luftwaffe could offer nothing more to the Germans.

And the result is sad: 1945, ours are also in the stars on the fuselages, but the Germans fly only when it is possible, and not when it is necessary to carry out tasks.

The different concept of the use of the Air Force in the USSR and Germany led to different patterns of action in the air and different final indicators for the shot down enemies. But if the Germans put this at the forefront, then our main goal was to carry out a combat mission. Therefore, Alexander Pokryshkin, drooling on the floor, continued to cover the attack aircraft, looking after the dumping Eric Hartman.

And thanks to such tactics and strategy, the Red Army Air Force fulfilled its strategic task of destroying the fighting force of Germany, and the Luftwaffe ... And the Luftwaffe completed the task of shooting down aircraft!

Successful work on the ground forces of the enemy was of paramount importance to us, naturally, the Red Army Air Force suffered losses in the air from both enemy fighters and air defense, but this is normal and justified by the task!

In the initial period of the war, given the completely outdated tactics and the minimal desire of the Soviet commanders to change at least something, the Germans had an advantage.

And here I consider the main drawback of the leadership of the Red Army Air Force to be the complete absence of any initiative and desire to think. You can talk about how poor bloody Stalin repressed generals from aviation, but here the most striking example is General Kopets.


Major General of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union (for battles in Spain), chief of the Air Force of the Western Military District, who threw bombers at the Germans in the afternoon without fighter cover (despite the presence of the 43rd fighter air division in the okrug) and lost 22.06.1941 aircraft over the 738 526 on the ground), shot himself in the evening of June 23, 1941.

The rest were arrested, interrogated only later. Many were shot. Did it help? I don’t know, more precisely, I don’t presume to judge, but 1943 showed everything. The battle in the sky of the Kuban, when the Luftwaffe began to lose. When mass aircraft, which were not inferior to the German ones, went, when those who met aces in the air in June 1941 began to appear in command posts.

And - crackled ...

A lot can be said about the shortcomings in the Red Army Air Force system and the lack of an appropriate level of competency among the command. And you can build many versions on the topic of what gave the Germans such a huge advantage at first.

My summary list looks like this:

1. Lack of training for army and division commanders.
2. The insufficient level of training of commanders of air regiments.
3. The complete lack of coordination between the commanders of different types of troops.
4. Lack of communication at all levels.
5. Lack of operational management in a changing environment.
6. The ability of the Germans to create a tactical advantage in a certain sector of the front and make maximum use of it.
7. A definite advantage in the modern aircraft models of the Germans.

All. Enough. This list was enough for the Red Army Air Force to lose the first stage of the air war with a bang. However, the main causes of the defeat on 22.06 were corrected. Yes, over time, but corrected, so much so that by 1944, our aviation had surpassed the German one in all respects, from quantity to quality.

And not a word about the training of pilots. Here for me the axiom is the fact that our pilots were in no way inferior to the Germans.

Want an example?

On June 26, 1941, near the Moldavian town of Ungheni, a pair of Me-109E discovered a lone Soviet aircraft. The leader of the pair was Walter Bock, an experienced pilot, who accounted for 4 victories in France and 2 in Poland.

Our plane was piloted by a young lieutenant decommissioned the day before by color blindness, who was carrying documents on his I-153 to the headquarters of the air division.

Easy prey? Well, yes, Me-109E vs I-153, 200 hours of training Bokkh, combat experience, downed English, French and Polish planes ...

Well, you realized that everything went slightly against the plan of the Germans, right? The "Seagull" was spinning in a heavy-boiled snake, spitting out bursts of two of its ShKASs (very deadly for the 109th), but, as a result of circling the Germans and finding themselves in an advantageous position, the Soviet pilot fired the missiles he had.

And hit.

The slave did not seek further adventures and left. But Bokh ... Well, it happens ... But he did not suffer.

So began his combat path twice Hero of the Soviet Union Grigory Rechkalov.


In general, I have nothing more to add on this issue.
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  1. Bormanxnumx 7 May 2020 18: 10 New
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    Oh yes, such non-punctual Germans lost Hartman’s flight book ... Apparently, that she didn’t get to Zadornov.

    Officially preserved the first flight book of Hartman, from the beginning of the war until 1943. - there are 150 victories. Novel, in the process of selecting ornate speech turns you lose (or distort) the details wink
    1. dvina71 7 May 2020 18: 27 New
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      Quote: BORMAN82
      there are 150 victories.

      victories or motors?
      And two .. the German pilot was defeated .. so to speak .. brotherly from the soul .. It doesn’t matter that the smoking plane still reached the airfield, sat down and, after a simple repair, was back in work ..
      The pilot of the Red Army needed confirmation of several sources, so that they would count the victory. Everything is simple here .. for every shot down plane they relied on money and not small ones. Therefore, more experienced pilots gave their victories to the followers .. Everyone had relatives in the rear and everyone lived not richly.
      1. 210ox 7 May 2020 18: 42 New
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        Interesting fact. In 450-1941, the Japanese beat the Americans with 42 hours of flying quite well ..
        1. Cyril G ... 7 May 2020 19: 00 New
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          450 was not there. The training program for deck pilots in 1941 provided for a 300-hour raid. And before the war, everything was significantly worse.
          1. Octopus 10 May 2020 01: 40 New
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            Quote: Cyril G ...
            The training program for deck pilots in 1941 provided for a 300-hour raid. And before the war, everything was significantly worse.

            Seriously? It usually happens that during a special period the preparation just sags. The Americans, however, were least affected.
            1. Cyril G ... 10 May 2020 11: 50 New
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              Seriously. Watch Polmar "Carriers". And in the memoirs of Sherman it was mentioned
              1. Octopus 10 May 2020 12: 13 New
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                Quote: Cyril G ...
                Watch Polmar "Carriers". And in the memoirs of Sherman it was mentioned

                What was the pre-war training of Navy pilots worse than the military in the number of hours? Did you read it from Sherman, seriously?
                1. Cyril G ... 10 May 2020 12: 18 New
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                  I'm talking about 300 hours of a military 2-year program. And about the pre-war raid there at the squadrons of deck Doutnlesov and Divesteiter at Midway was very weak. Before the war, they diligently saved on the armed forces.
                  1. Octopus 10 May 2020 12: 20 New
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                    You definitely don’t confuse the standards of pilot training and the small, by Sherman’s standards, attack of combat pilots in peacetime?
        2. Earthshaker 7 May 2020 20: 25 New
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          Well, the pilots of the imperial fleet were not made a finger - the pilots of Soryu, Hiru, Akagi and Kaga were the best pilots in Japan, I think so. When they died near Midway, their experience and skill perished with them. The excellent pre-war training of the flight crew turned out to be incapable of being reorganized on a military footing - a balance between knowledge, skills and time spent on training.
          1. Cyril G ... 7 May 2020 21: 47 New
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            By the way, about 80-100 crews actually died near Midway. The elite crew of the Japanese fleet finally crushed during the battle for Guadanalcanal. Where often the decks flew from the shore. And then the Nippon’s decks ended and a year and a half later, in the summer of 1944, the Americans encountered a pale shadow of 1 air fleet during the battle of Phillipin
            1. rich 8 May 2020 20: 11 New
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              And here I consider the main drawback of the leadership of the Red Army Air Force to be the complete absence of any initiative and desire to think. You can talk about how poor bloody Stalin repressed generals from aviation, but here the most striking example is General Kopets.
              Major General of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union (for battles in Spain), chief of the Air Force of the Western Military District, who threw bombers at the Germans in the afternoon without fighter cover (despite the presence of the 43rd fighter air division in the okrug) and lost 22.06.1941 aircraft over the 738 526 on the ground), shot himself in the evening of June 23, 1941.

              Vainly slander Kopets
              The chief aviation marshal of the USSR A.E. Golovanov in his memoirs draws attention to the imperfection of the pre-war organizational structure of Soviet aviation, namely the fact that the front air force commander Only the 12th and 13th bombing air divisions were directly subordinate to Ivan Kopets.
              3rd long-range aviation corps and 43rd fighter air division. The 9th, 10th and 11th mixed air divisions were subordinate to the army commander. At the same time, the 43rd Iad was based in the Orsha area and could not participate in battles at the border. Therefore, Kopets could use only SB and DB-3 bombers for a retaliatory strike, and without fighter cover.
        3. 2 Level Advisor 8 May 2020 00: 03 New
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          and a raid around the airfield helps a lot in battle, do you think? no, well, the pilot must feel the plane, it’s understandable .. but how can circles in the sky help to behave confidently while flashing enemy bullets? military experience is everything, that's why the fascists at the beginning were so confident ...
          1. Nike 8 May 2020 08: 23 New
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            They will help and greatly, they will help not to lose orientation and not to fly where it is not necessary, which is quite possible after the whirl.
        4. Octopus 10 May 2020 01: 39 New
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          Quote: 210ox
          In 450-1941, the Japanese beat the Americans with 42 hours of flying quite well ..

          They beat pretty average, the Guadalcanal among the Americans was already about 1: 1 in losses, despite the fact that the Japanese pre-war preparations were enchanting drolls. Individual training with the Americans was relatively decent, but tactics let us down, and very much. When they were enriched, it was okay, and there they also drove newer aircraft.
      2. Bormanxnumx 7 May 2020 18: 52 New
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        Quote: dvina71
        The pilot of the Red Army needed confirmation of several sources, so that they would count the victory. Everything is simple here .. for every shot down plane they relied on money and not small ones. Therefore, more experienced pilots gave their victories to the followers .. Everyone had relatives in the rear and everyone lived not richly.

        The network has information about the "successes" of the Soviet naval torpedo aircraft of the Northern Fleet. After the war, they began to compare the results of several sources, and it turned out that not everything is so rosy with us.
        But I would like to hear about the missing books)))
        1. dvina71 7 May 2020 19: 15 New
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          Quote: BORMAN82
          The network has information about the "successes" of Soviet naval torpedo aircraft

          The network has a lot of things .. there and T-14..mobiles .. that the Ukrainians, the Chinese ..
          1. Bormanxnumx 7 May 2020 19: 23 New
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            The successes of the Northern Fleet torpedo bombers were analyzed by Russian historians in the 2000s according to archival data. Therefore, the level of objectivity is clearly no worse than that of the Puchkovsky) guests.
            1. dvina71 7 May 2020 19: 53 New
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              Quote: BORMAN82
              The successes of the Northern Fleet torpedo bombers were analyzed by Russian historians

              Shirokograd?
              The fact is that analyzing ... is still difficult. Because the data on losses and on victories constantly rules. Significantly, top-bearers sunk 109 ships and 60 ships .. with an average displacement of 4k.t .. Given that they did it all with adapted equipment .. il-2, pe-8, Catalina .. and in what conditions .. when splashdown at any time of the year, away from the coast ... there are very few chances to survive. One can only express great respect.
              1. Engineer 7 May 2020 20: 16 New
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                Significantly, top-bearers sunk 109 ships and 60 ships .. with an average displacement of 4k.t.

                Miroslav Morozov
                https://www.ozon.ru/context/detail/id/16763512/
                Soviet AIT drowned about 40 ships and vessels
                Total naval aviation-109 ships and vessels (54 combat and APU)
                1. Cyril G ... 7 May 2020 21: 52 New
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                  This is only mine torpedo aviation. Really less. See below.
                  But the structure of naval aviation and also striking at ships included Il-2 attack aircraft, Kittyhawk fighter-bombers, Pe-2 dive bombers, SB bombers and ICBM-2 reconnaissance aircraft and more. So their resultantness in Morozov’s book is not reflected
              2. Bormanxnumx 7 May 2020 20: 31 New
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                Quote: dvina71
                .il-2, ne-8, Catalina

                Are these all torpedo bombers?
                1. dvina71 7 May 2020 22: 33 New
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                  Quote: BORMAN82
                  Are these all torpedo bombers?

                  The events of August 10, 1943 belong to the category of ordinary operations against an enemy convoy
                  Enemy fighters counted four Pe-2s, two Bostons, two Hampden, three Il-2 and five Aerocobra. The Germans believed that there were eight torpedo bombers of which only two pitches came out at a volley range.
                2. Mikhail Tynda 8 May 2020 06: 50 New
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                  Well, the IL-2T took place.
                  “Vyacheslav Yakovlevich Day, a former front-line aircraft mechanic who is now living and working as a surgeon (!) In Sochi (Russia), told us about the real use of IL-2T. He began to fight in the North, now in the famous Vaeng, next to the captain Safonov’s fighters and Colonel Aisherwood, and ended up on the Black Sea, in the Constanta region, consisting of 23 OSHAP Black Sea Fleet. So, in the summer of 1944, as a part of his regiment, in one of his squadrons, the Il-2T link constantly fought! What kind of cars were these? The base was the mass model Il-2 (wing with an “arrow”), from which both wing cannons of the VV (23 mm caliber) were removed and all the suspension units were thrown out. These measures yielded at least a quarter ton of payload savings, which, together with some saving on the ammunition of the remaining ShKAS and UB, allowed (in a very overloaded version) to lift into the air the lightest Soviet torpedo of the 45-Zb-AN brand (caliber 450 mm, length - 5450 mm, combat weight - 940 kg, throwing height at a speed of 320 km / hour - 30 m). Torpedo fastened directly to f I use the IL-2 in its diametrical plane with the help of two identically arranged special units, consisting of the actual suspension mechanism that held the torpedo, and two tubular struts-stops that did not allow it to scour from side to side. "
                  http://www.airwar.ru/enc/sww2/il2t.html
              3. Cyril G ... 7 May 2020 20: 31 New
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                MTA SF sunk 18 targets, including 9 torpedoes, 5 damaged, 3 of them torpedoes.
                AIT BF sunk 33 targets, of which 15 were torpedoes, 10 were damaged, of which 2 were torpedoes.
                AIT Black Sea Fleet sunk 19 targets, of which 3 torpedoes, 4 damaged.
                MTA Pacific Fleet torpedoes sunk 6 transports and kaibokan, bombs 3 vehicles.
                In total, 80 ships and vessels were sunk during the WWII AIT, 19 ships and vessels were damaged
                Total 99
              4. Nike 8 May 2020 08: 27 New
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                I doubt very much about the Pe-8s, there was nothing at all and they cherished very, very much.
            2. Cyril G ... 7 May 2020 20: 24 New
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              M. Morozov Torpedo bombers.
              In total, the MTA KSF hit 23 targets with bombs and torpedoes, 18 were sunk, of which 9 were torpedoes, 5 were damaged, and 3 of them were torpedoes.
              381 torpedoes spent
          2. Yuri Matyushkov 8 May 2020 06: 27 New
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            T 14 is that which is stalled in the square
            1. Alf
              Alf 8 May 2020 17: 30 New
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              Quote: Yuri Matyushkov
              T 14 is that which is stalled in the square

              And why did you fart?
        2. Octopus 10 May 2020 01: 34 New
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          Quote: BORMAN82
          But I would like to hear about the missing books)))

          What are you talking about? About the Hartmann book?

          This is a famous story, only one of his books has survived, up to the middle of the 44th year EMNIP, 200+ victories. On this basis, authors like Skomorokhov claim that in the 44th he no longer flew, but only took pictures, spoiled the Romanian Freuilians and sometimes wandered to Berlin for another tsatka, who was discharged from Goebbels. A little strange ideas about the enemy, but there's nothing to be done.
      3. Ryazan87 7 May 2020 20: 40 New
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        The pilot of the Red Army needed confirmation of several sources, so that they would count the victory. Everything is simple here .. for every shot down plane they relied on money and not small ones.

        Well, do not just flatter yourself with this.
        “So covering up your troops - a crime and not fulfilling my order - is also a crime. For all the days of battles, a tiny amount of bombers were shot down, and according to the report of the pilots, the fighters were “filled” as many as the enemy didn’t have, while bombers (meaning German bombers) even go hundreds without cover. "(from a directive dated July 10, 1943, commander of the 16th Air Army, General S. I. Rudenko, TsAMO RF. F. 486th Iap. Op. 211987 . D. 3. L. 131.)
        "I order: 1. Bring me the names of all the leading groups to be held accountable for the failure to comply with my order. I demand that all leading groups and all pilots barrage over the front line and warn that for failure to comply with this order I will be held accountable - send to penal battalions and even shoot before the ranks for cowardice. " (from the order of the acting commander of the 6th fighter aviation corps of the 16th Air Army, Colonel N.P. Zhiltsov, TsAMO RF. F. 486th IAP. Op. 211987. D. 3. L. 131).
        "... all our fighters patrol 10 kilometers behind the front line, stubbornly do not go to the front line, fearing anti-aircraft fire, and let the enemy bombers stay over the target for an hour. I am ashamed to look at it." (from the report of the commander of the 279th Fighter Aviation Division of the 6th Fighter Aviation Corps of the 16th Air Army, Colonel F.N. Dementyev, TsAMO RF. F. 486th Iap. Op. 211987. D. 3. L. 127. )
        And this is only for one air army in mid-1943 notice.

        Perhaps something else is true: in a certain period of the war, the Red Army Air Force command began to consistently fight with “postscripts”, “puffed” victories and fraud, which favorably differed from the Luftwaffe command.
        1. Octopus 10 May 2020 01: 27 New
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          Quote: Ryazanets87
          during a certain period of the war, the command of the air force of the red army began to consistently fight with the "postscript", "puffed" victories and fraud, which favorably differed from the command of the luftwaffe.

          )))
          The worse things are at the fronts, the less desire to deal with postscripts is obtained.
          1. Ryazan87 10 May 2020 23: 05 New
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            In general, yes. Firstly, with a more or less constant attack, more opportunities to check the real losses of the enemy. Secondly, the success of this offensive itself directly depends on the effectiveness of combat work in the air - hence the strong demand. Thirdly, the war in 43-44 entered, so to speak, into the "working" (sorry for some cynicism) phase. True, by the end of the war, writing began to flourish again: there were less and less Germans in the air, and there were more people wishing to distinguish themselves (including “guest performers” in combat units).
            R.S. The overestimation of the number of victories to a certain extent is an inevitable evil: the means of objective control were imperfect, the battles were already very fleeting. Many pilots are exactly what conscientiously erred.
            I remember reading a selection of analysis of air battles in the Arctic (according to documents from both sides), so everyone overstated.
            Here, for example, the famous battle of August 4, 1941. The surroundings of the Shongui airfield.
            According to the results, German pilots declared 6 victories, Soviet pilots - 3.
            Reality:
            On the German side, 1 aircraft was destroyed - Bf 110E-2 (Hauptmann Schaske died, non-commissioned officer Wittmann died of his wounds).
            From the Soviet Union - 4 aircraft were destroyed, 3 pilots died (Lieutenant L.N. Zvyagin, Senior Lieutenant N.V. Piskarev, Senior Lieutenant N.A. Shelukhin).
            1. Octopus 10 May 2020 23: 23 New
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              Quote: Ryazanets87
              The overestimation of the number of victories is to some extent an inevitable evil:

              Naturally. When they checked Korea, for all parties, the expected things came out. 3-5 times. But people who precisely on the example of Hartmann recognize that the application is not equally downed, then they run around the Internet, they are so joyful, they tell everyone how much to divide his account.
              1. Ryazan87 10 May 2020 23: 34 New
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                In order to cool down the fervor of such joyful storytellers, I recommend asking you why Hartman was condemned by the most humane Soviet court. There is some pattern gap coming.
                1. Octopus 10 May 2020 23: 48 New
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                  Quote: Ryazanets87
                  Hartman's most humane Soviet court.

                  ))))
                  Yes, there is a little problem. But the way out - all fascists need it - is fast.
      4. illuminat 8 May 2020 21: 23 New
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        Quote: dvina71
        victories or motors?

        Wins. For motors, the number of victories has never been counted. For motors, points were taken into account when awarded. For the four-engine, the pilot received one (in words - one) victory. Another thing is that for one actually shot down aircraft they often received not one, but several pilots.
      5. Octopus 10 May 2020 01: 25 New
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        Quote: dvina71
        victories or motors?

        Victories, of course.

        One of the many stupid legends that walks in Runet is the "motor" count of victories in backlash. However, for the East this is not so important, there were practically no four-engine engines, and there are not so many twin-engine engines.
        Quote: dvina71
        The pilot of the Red Army needed confirmation of several sources, so that they would count the victory.

        If you had listened to even Serov, you would have known that this, of course, was a lie. Victories from the Soviet side were counted more than liberal.
    2. Alekseev 7 May 2020 20: 13 New
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      Quote: BORMAN82
      in the process of selecting ornate speech turns you lose (or distort) the details

      And the basis is probably inaccuracies.
      Without going into details on counting flight hours, we can say with confidence, according to the testimony of our pilots, that in general we were inferior to the Germans in the quality of training. This quality is the most important component of the effectiveness of military operations. Dominance in the air was won in general only in 1944.
      An example is the German offensive on the Kursk. The basis of the breakthrough tactics of the strongly fortified defense of our troops was the close interaction of German aviation and ground forces. Before attacking a strong anti-tank area, aviation must have dealt a powerful blow to it. And such tactics yielded results - the defense of the Voronezh Front was on the verge of a breakthrough, in order to rectify the situation, strategic reserves had to be put into battle (5th Guards TA and 5th Guards A.). Our aviation could not stop air strikes, although it tried.
      At the same time, work was underway, the flight crew, for example, of the guard fighter regiments was no worse than the German one, and on our and Lend-Lease advanced vehicles, our Air Force tipped the scales to their side.
      And the pilots in the first years of the war simply did not have the opportunity to prepare more carefully: the losses were too great ...
      1. your1970 7 May 2020 20: 32 New
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        For me, it’s quite enough that in Europe, that of ours, that of the British, that the Americans have about one order of downed planes - 20-30-40-50 ...

        And only the Luftwaffe drew 100500 victories ...
        1. Octopus 10 May 2020 01: 44 New
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          Quote: your1970
          that in Europe, that of ours, that of the British, that the Americans have about one order of downed planes - 20-30-40-50 ...

          Nothing complicated.

          The side that has a large quantitative advantage cannot have a large individual shot. For Americans, the rule of recalling aces from the front as instructors is added to this.

          Backlash is not distinguished by the number of victories, but by the number of flights, the intensity of the pilots. Everyone in the subject knows this.
          1. your1970 10 May 2020 08: 48 New
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            Quote: Octopus
            Backlash is not distinguished by the number of victories, but by the number of flights, the intensity of the pilots.

            How does this fit in with this?
            "You could often watch how IL-2 attacks its targetswhile German fighters couldn’t even fly up due to bad weather ... "Soviet attack aircraft flew in any weather, including rain and snow, and neither wind, nor storm, rain or low temperatures prevented their actions."
            1. Octopus 10 May 2020 11: 16 New
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              No way. The author has pulled several quotes on occasional occasions.
              In this regard, Huffman mentions an episode of the Battle of Kerch in November 1941: the city was already in the hands of the Germans, but Soviet troops were still loaded on ships in the port. In this situation, having no other opportunity and despite heavy snow charges and extreme cold, the Russians used attack aircraft to slow down the advance of German troops.


              Black Sea, late autumn, extreme cold, which does not allow the use of aviation. It is believed that someone lived too well.

              One-time operations in non-flying weather do not say anything about the intensity of aviation use. Bodenplatte is best known in this respect when the remnants of the Luftwaffe on January 1, 45th, killed themselves on the weather and airfields of the Allies in the zone of the Ardennes operation.
    3. Reklastik 10 May 2020 15: 38 New
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      because shining calm Roma is more important than bringing true facts))) Graphomania is a disease)))
  2. bubalik 7 May 2020 18: 22 New
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    I have great doubt about the information that pilots were thrown into battle with 2-3 hours of flying time on a combat aircraft.
    ,,, it is doubtful that on the next branch today it was
    joined the army already in 1941, enrolling in the Bataysk flight school. At the very beginning of the war, grandfather studied as a combat pilot and graduated from this school with honors. Two and a half years of the war had already passed, when in February 1944, my grandfather was sent to the 2nd Belorussian Front
    ,, and what, in two years of preparation, a flying time of 10 hours?
    1. 210ox 7 May 2020 18: 44 New
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      Probably referring to a certain type of aircraft. On U2 at the school, the raid was probably good. The point here is the experience of real battles and the tactics used.
      1. Bobrovsky 11 May 2020 07: 35 New
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        Exactly, in the experience of real battles and in tactics. The German aviation massively had good experience in real battles, and we had individual pilots in it. An infantryman who has won on the front month cannot be compared with the same, just on the front line. The warrior Remarque wrote that many were killed in the first two weeks, and then the losses fell sharply and it was no longer easy to kill a person who received real experience in fighting. And aviation in this matter is no different. We had a reverence for higher education. A person who graduated from the Frunze Academy could be appointed anywhere; many former infantrymen and horsemen became commanders of air divisions.
    2. Lexus 7 May 2020 18: 48 New
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      Sergey, welcome hi
      It’s just that for some it has become customary to spit in the past. The heroes of those wars are already either in heaven or at such an age that even spitting in the face for a lie is already problematic. It was the “camels" Roman who decided to "bring to clean water."
      At the same time, it is extremely unclear to me with whom we are fighting so fiercely today that it is now at 22 times that pilots are being planted at times more sophisticated aircraft.
      On May 18, 2017, pilot senior lieutenant Sergei Nefedov made a training flight on the Su-27P fighter over the Kaliningrad region. When approaching, instead of one switch on the dashboard, the young pilot hastily pressed another. As a result, the aircraft at a speed of 250 kilometers per hour folded the front landing gear and plowed the concrete strip with its bow. The fire did not happen by miracle, but the radar fairing, part of the “drying” casing were damaged, some sensors and other external equipment were broken, and the engines were damaged.
      Nefedov himself got out of the cab unscathed. But the military-investigative directorate for the Baltic Fleet immediately took up it. The officer whose the total flight time over five years, according to some reports, was only a miserable 22 hours (a little more than four hours of flight per year!), charged under Article 351 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation "Violation of flight rules and preparation for them." Despite the fact that the fighter by the forces of the regiment itself and even without being sent to the aircraft repair plant was soon returned to service, they offered to reimburse material damage to the Armed Forces for the amount never expected to be higher than 27 million rubles.
      1. Ryazan87 7 May 2020 20: 25 New
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        1. 22 hours was a raid Nefedova specifically on the Su-27. And not in general.
        2. Nefedov was found guilty and convicted of violating flight rules, which entailed other serious consequences through negligence (case No. 1-3 / 2018 (1-131 / 2017, Art. 351 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, a violation of paragraph 31 of the Federal Aviation Rules for Flight Operations State Aviation, clause 4.3.6. of the flight operation manual for the Su-27).
        Kaliningrad Garrison Military Court (1st instance) sentenced him by 2 years probation. This sentence was cancelled on appeal.
        The amount of 27 million figured as an expert assessment of the damage caused to the aircraft and was used in the qualification of the criminal case against Nefedova (those same "grave consequences"). Nefedova did not oblige to pay this money.
        R.S. less read unscrupulous media (such as the Moscow Komsomolets) or check on the basis of criminal cases (this is a matter of open access, GAS "Justice" to help).
        1. Cyril G ... 7 May 2020 21: 55 New
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          Well, if so, the naval command simply “adores” its aircraft, and loves to inflate an elephant from a fly
    3. Engineer 7 May 2020 19: 19 New
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      two years of training plaque 10 hours?

      On the combat easy. But this situation is undoubtedly more characteristic of the first period of the war.
      Modern cadets of flight schools begin to fly from the third year as far as I remember
      1. illuminat 8 May 2020 21: 29 New
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        Quote: Engineer
        On the battlefield, easy.

        Almost unbelievable.
        Quote: Engineer
        Modern cadets of flight schools begin to fly from the third year as far as I remember

        Well, now a poor preparation system. In the 80s they flew from the first course. And only at the end of the USSR began to fly from the second. But the experiment in the conditions of the collapse was not very successful.
  3. svp67 7 May 2020 18: 23 New
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    About what successes our and German pilots achieved very well in their lectures and conversations, Mikhail Timin talks, he does this based on archival documents. His stories contain everything about victories on both sides and defeats. And they are more objective, since they are deprived of excessive ardor
    Major General of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union (for battles in Spain), chief of the Air Force of the Western Military District, who threw bombers at the Germans in the afternoon without fighter cover (despite the presence of the 43rd fighter air division in the okrug) and lost 22.06.1941 aircraft over the 738 526 on the ground), shot himself in the evening of June 23, 1941.
    It’s good now, with our knowledge of the current situation, to draw our “right” conclusions and advise ...
    And it’s nothing that the Western FRONT Air Force on 04.00/22.06.1941/9 also had the most powerful 15 SAD, which was instructed to cover the troops and its bombers, and it was armed with new aircraft, not I-153, I-16 and I-43, as in 22 .... And this powerful division “melted” “like snow under the sun,” in fact, in the afternoon of June 25 ... it simply disappeared and didn’t get in touch, and its commander, Major General Hero Of the Soviet Union, Major General Chernykh, showed up without insignia on June XNUMX in Smolensk ...
    1. Snail N9 7 May 2020 19: 33 New
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      And what, Beshanov does not like?
      1. illuminat 8 May 2020 21: 29 New
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        Quote: Snail N9
        And what, Beshanov does not like?

        Russophobia, deceit and tenacity.
  4. matross 7 May 2020 18: 24 New
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    . And only then did the higher command school go

    And were they, these higher schools?
  5. Engineer 7 May 2020 18: 30 New
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    In general, I have nothing more to add on this issue.

    It would be better if the author told himself that. before writing this opus
    The whole article is a level of some forum holivar of the early 2000s
  6. sidoroff 7 May 2020 18: 33 New
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    so when General Kopets shot himself all the same. June 22 or suddenly
    The 23rd? and where is he from 18:00 on June 22
    I was able to find out about the number of aircraft lost. Wikipedia
    he could not read for sure.
  7. Cyril G ... 7 May 2020 18: 34 New
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    Not everything is so blessed.
    It was necessary, as a minimum, to give our losses in airplanes at the front, including in air battles, and compare them with the Nazis.
    The raid really was different. In the ideal case, Vasya Stalin had a total flight time of 150-155 hours. On average, before the war, in the region of 50-80 hours in total (flying club + school. By the way, it was unlikely that the flying club was on average 25 hours. Less. In the region of 12-15. Then, each training flight was really around 12-15 minutes.) Upon arrival to the troops.
    The main problems are correctly said organizational and managerial.
    1. dvina71 7 May 2020 19: 06 New
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      Quote: Cyril G ...
      It was necessary as a minimum to give our losses in aircraft at the front

      It’s hard to do directly. At least you need to raise all the archives and methodically count ..
      It’s probably easier to take the release of aircraft .. there are such tables
      Since 1931, an amnip has produced 70+ thousand fighters in the USSR. This, as you know, includes biplanes and I-16s, as well as new generation aircraft.
      Germany during this time produced 55+ thousand fighters. They don't bother with biplanes .. practically. and already in Spain our I-16s fought with me_109.
      In fact, we have that German fighter aircraft ceased to exist by the spring of 1945.
      And as part of the Red Army were whole armies of fighters.
      So .. at least no one was left dead with corpses ..
      1. Cyril G ... 7 May 2020 19: 28 New
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        I know that in matters of Luftwaffe losses, a dark forest. Just to draw conclusions, the author should at least give examples of loss statistics
        1. Octopus 10 May 2020 02: 05 New
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          Quote: Cyril G ...
          I know that in matters of Luftwaffe losses, the dark forest

          Hm. Backlash has days, they are criticized, but they are.

          But from the Soviet side a full Tryndets, especially in the 41st year. Something is classified, but there is simply no huge amount of materials and never has been. Where thousands of cars disappeared, how they disappeared - the devil knows him.
          1. Liam 10 May 2020 02: 25 New
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            Quote: Octopus
            the devil knows him.

            Not only hell. And Solonin knows
            1. Octopus 10 May 2020 03: 24 New
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              Quote: Liam
              Corned beef knows

              Well, Solonin is one of those authors that should be approached with caution. Anti-Soviet is often the same as Soviet, only anti.
              1. Liam 10 May 2020 14: 20 New
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                I did not meet any particular factual refutations of his arguments in this topic. All refutations are about Russophobia
          2. Bobrovsky 11 May 2020 07: 45 New
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            Yes, they usually perished. Quick retreat, lack of spare parts and, as a result, aircraft abandoned due to malfunctions. My grandfather fought in aviation since the beginning of the war and said that in 1941 the air division was served by a technical division. Aircraft flew to the new airfield, and the technical division followed. There was little equipment, there was a constant delay. In 1942, they switched to the RAB system (aviation-based areas), created a whole network of air bases and aircraft flew from one area to another, and the bases stood still, with repair shops and spare parts. It got better right away.
            1. Octopus 11 May 2020 11: 51 New
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              Yes, it is quite possible. But how to establish the losses of fighter aircraft and from fighter aircraft - nothing at all.
      2. Sergey Valov 7 May 2020 19: 55 New
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        The dynamics of the production of aircraft for the Soviet Air Force in the period from 22.06.1941/09.05.1945/XNUMX. on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX
        Type of aircraft since 22.06.1941/1942/1943 1944 9.05.1945 XNUMX to XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX total
        истребители 3941 9490 14275 16346 6635 50687
        Штурмовики 1061 7634 11254 10297 3664 33930
        Бомбардировщики 1891 2578 2672 3165 1597 11903
        По-2 (ночн. бомбард.) 1009 2130 2812 4382 1585 11918
        ИТОГО (без По-2) 6893 19722 28201 29808 11896 96520


        The dynamics of aircraft production in Germany
        in the period 1941-1944.
        Type of aircraft 1941. 1942 1943 1944 Total
        Fighters (day and night) 2964 4908 10187 23805 41864
        Штурмовики 696 1092 2817 4971 9576
        Бомбардировщики 3456 4428 5019 2596 15499
        Разведчики 1070 980 1030 1535 4615
        Итого 8186 11408 19053 32907 71554
        Took here - http://www.otvoyna.ru/aviazia.htm
        We need to add Lend-Lease to our planes, these are about 16 planes and the planes that were in service on 000/22.06.1941/20, this is about 000.
        The Germans should be added to the former on the eastern front on 22.06.1941/4000/XNUMX, this is approximately XNUMX. Half of the Germans can be safely subtracted from production, because they fought on other fronts.
        By June 1945, there were approximately 20 aircraft in our Air Force, I don’t remember the Germans, but there were several thousand.
        Conclusions who as fought do yourself.
        1. dvina71 7 May 2020 20: 04 New
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          Quote: Sergey Valov
          for they fought on other fronts.

          And now more about the other fronts of the Wehrmacht from 41 to 43?
          1. Sergey Valov 7 May 2020 20: 05 New
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            Independently.
            1. dvina71 7 May 2020 20: 09 New
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              Quote: Sergey Valov
              Independently

              No ... pipes. You have so freely halved the composition of the German air force on the eastern front ... Explain now .. how you did it.
              1. Nehist 8 May 2020 07: 48 New
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                Um ... On the Eastern Front, the Lftwaffe had a maximum of no more than 6000 aircraft with its allies ....
          2. Octopus 10 May 2020 01: 58 New
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            Three, Srezizemka and Britain. The raids on Britain were not decisive, unlike the 40th year, but never completely stopped. Starting in the 44th - the main front of the German IA, air defense of the Reich. There has never been so much EA in the East as Spaats pulled upon himself.
        2. dvina71 7 May 2020 21: 39 New
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          Quote: Sergey Valov
          our Air Force comprised approximately 20 aircraft

          On May 9, 17 thousand were only in the air armies of the fronts. Another 6 thousand in parts of air defense. As well as fleet aviation, long-range bomber and in the Far East. This is about 30 thousand combat aircraft.
          You also forgot that together with the Luftwaffe took part in the battles of the Romanians, the Finns ... three hundred and four hundred aircraft.
          Also on May 9, there were approx. 1000 German combat aircraft.
          More .. German warplanes were only halfway up to 42g, after about 2/3 they were in the east.
          1. Octopus 10 May 2020 02: 02 New
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            Quote: dvina71
            On May 9, about 1000 German combat aircraft remained.

            Where is such an amazing figure from? At the beginning of the Berlin operation, it was about enemy air superiority, and then everything disappeared somewhere in a month? By the way, did you lose all these planes in the air in the air of the Germans, or what?
            Quote: dvina71
            after about 2/3 were in the east.

            Another amazing figure.
  8. Pvi1206 7 May 2020 18: 37 New
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    Any legend is based on real events ...
  9. Petrik66 7 May 2020 18: 39 New
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    If an alien enters any bookstore, he will know for sure that the Germans won the war. All ss - sheep were two-meter pitching blondes firing Macedonian from two machine guns and chasing Russian tank hordes. If the same name goes into the modeler’s boutiques, then he will understand that the Tiger tank is the coolest, etc. Vietnam won rambo and chuck noris. etc. = see the list. Leave the wretched victory at least in the comics. Well, we have - "heroic Varyag", "Mercedes is leaving the chase", "southern thunder", etc. We will be condescending to the children of Zion from the Odessa film studio, they did the holy work as best they could.
  10. Alexey RA 7 May 2020 18: 44 New
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    And in 1943, the Germans did not have any advantage in the quality of training of flight personnel. This is noted by those who fought, shot down and remained “alive, intact, eagle” from among our pilots. And they, you know, know better.

    So this situation is the result of the course taken by the Germans to train pilots with an "above average" quality. Sort of flip side.
    Yes, in short wars and short large operations in the air, you can fight quality against quantity and win with small losses. But as soon as the war begins to drag out, trained aces begin to go astray in more and more numbers - simply because sooner or later anyone gets into the sight of a pilot, gunner or anti-aircraft gunner. The greater the scope of the battles and the longer the battles take place, the more pilots with combat experience are in the enemy’s possession, and this is also an advantage for losses. And there comes a time when the release of the pilots ceases to cover losses. And it’s impossible to quickly rebuild the training system, designed for the elite, into a full-fledged training system for the middle peasants.
    And the Air Force falls into the funnel: instead of training the middle peasants, the first spare units leave for the front line, which were intended for the advanced training of graduates. Then they start cutting pilot training programs lively, reducing training time and increasing school throughput. But the result is not the average, but the workpiece for the pilot. And since there are no spare parts anymore, this blank goes directly to the warhead. And already in 1943 there were squadrons with personnel "a pair of aces and" green "meat." And then the fall into the funnel only accelerates: beginners die much faster than aces, warheads require an increase in the pilot training rate, programs are reduced even more, gasoline is starting to run out, the quality of training drops even more, the loss rates increase again - and warheads again demand an increase in speed pilot training ...
    They write that Eshonnek shot himself precisely as a result of familiarization with the documents on the losses of pilots and the preparation of new ones.
    1. alone 7 May 2020 20: 14 New
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      Quote: Alexey RA
      They write that Eshonnek shot himself precisely as a result of familiarization with the documents on the losses of pilots and the preparation of new ones.

      Eshonnek as chief of staff of the Luftwaffe was also responsible for the defense of the airspace of the Reich ..
      In addition to the results of the losses of the pilots, there were also facts of the destruction of entire aircraft manufacturing plants in Schweinfurt and Regensburg, a rocket range in Peenemuende by Anglo-American aviation .. He was called to Hitler and after being shot he shot himself. By the way, in his death letter he demanded that Goering did not took part in his funeral .. Most likely Goering simply framed him, putting on him all the failures of the Luftwaffe
    2. Octopus 10 May 2020 02: 14 New
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      You described the real situation in Germany, but added a causal relationship. The German (and to the maximum extent Japanese) system was designed for blitzkrieg, of course, blitzkrieg requires superior quality. In terms of quantity, the German system was quite consistent with the English and French, the main limitation was the aircraft, not the pilots. American aviators, naval and army, initially had a much longer planning horizon and already in the 40th they launched the training conveyor, which by the 43rd year had given tens of thousands of pilots. Here the German side, finally moving from a blitzkrieg to a total war, learned with displeasure that increasing the release of Messers is much easier than increasing the release of pilots.

      What did the Soviet side - the devil knows. With the quality it became better, due to the training regiments, first of all, but the training in schools as it was at any gate, and remained to the end. Well, it’s not 3 hours already, in the 45th growth of Soviet training and the fall of German led to about the same level.
  11. Alexey RA 7 May 2020 18: 48 New
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    Training crews of the Red Army Air Force as of the end of 1940
    The situation is better in the troops of the Far Eastern Front and the Trans-Baikal District, mainly because they had the ability to give more air raids, having fuel. FEF has a flying time of more than 100 hours per pilot, according to ZabVO - more than 70 hours of flying per pilot, and some internal districts have 35 to 40 hours per pilot. Moreover, on average, such a raid happens from year to year. However, we cannot say now which regiments and squadrons are prepared entirely for operations at night, for operations in the clouds. And it seems to me that some organizational measures are needed here, otherwise you may find yourself in such a situation next year.
    The point is as follows. If you take the squadron on a new order, which just read out, then there will be less than 50 percent of ordinary pilots. The squadron of 15 pilots has the following personnel: the squadron commander, two deputy commanders for the combat unit, one for the political unit, 4 flight commanders (already 8 people). In addition to this, the squadron usually has an adjutant pilot, the head of the special services, so there are 5-6 ordinary pilots remaining in the squadron. Since young pilots annually join the ranks and our program is equal to this young growth, we begin our studies again under the program of the first year of service. This is not entirely correct, because there are a lot of old people in the ranks, they grow a little on the training of young pilots, but not significantly. Therefore, we cannot allow young animals to come every year in all parts. In addition, there is not enough gasoline, and it turns out that complex types of combat training are left for the last period and it turns out that there are no night and blind flights, and they cannot exist with such an organization, especially when a large number of commanders have a fear of accidents .

    In such large districts as LVO, OdVO, etc., we have five bombings per year per crew. Under these conditions, accuracy cannot be. There are 2,3 bombings per crew per year in the Transcaucasian Military District. In addition, in the field of fire training, we did not achieve the position that aviation use a fully photographic machine gun, because without this it is impossible to train aerial combat. Regarding aerial firing. We teach cone shooting at speeds of 200 - 250 [km per hour], because at high speeds the cones come off. Thus, it turns out that we are not creating a real combat situation.

    I want to say about night training, which is bad with us. For example: the whole Leningrad district flew 141 hours on bomber aircraft, i.e., that 3 pilots should fly a year. The Oryol district flew only 36 hours, and there is the 51st regiment, which flew to Belarus in the spring of 1940. This old regiment did not fly at night for a single hour. The Transcaucasian Military District is a little better, but even there night training is reduced to almost zero. The whole district flew at night only 331 hours for bombing. To raise night training, night shelves must be created.

    © Y. V. Smushkevich, Lieutenant General of Aviation, Assistant Chief of the General Staff for the Air Force
    1. Alf
      Alf 7 May 2020 19: 48 New
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      Quote: Alexey RA
      © Y. V. Smushkevich, Lieutenant General of Aviation, Assistant Chief of the General Staff for the Air Force

      The question is, what did Smushkevich do to correct these shortcomings?
      Or like Zhukov, who in his ... fairy tales stated that by June 41st the GKP for the General Staff was not built. "Someone" was not built. And the fact that by that time Zhukov himself was the head of the General Staff and he really hadn’t asked himself a question, but where would I sit if the war started, so Zhukov tactfully missed this point.
      1. Alexey RA 8 May 2020 11: 53 New
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        Quote: Alf
        The question is, what did Smushkevich do to correct these shortcomings?

        And what could Smushkevich do with NKTP, which not only did it chronically miss aviation gas, but also cut off its supplies in the summer? Or with the NKAP, which drove a plan for military aircraft, and not for training?
    2. Glory1974 8 May 2020 11: 00 New
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      Since young pilots annually join the ranks and our program is equal to this young growth, we begin our studies again under the program of the first year of service. This is not entirely correct, because there are a lot of old people in the ranks, they grow a little on the training of young pilots, but not significantly.

      I want to read and cry. It turns out that they worked out only the program for the "young", it has already been completed by the old people, but their hands do not reach the difficulties.
      2 years ago, one land contractor wrote a letter to Putin as supreme commander. In short, the meaning is the same as for Smushkevich: "I have been serving for the seventh year. The combat training program is repeated every six months. Again it starts with disassembling, assembling the machine, crawling, adopting a drill stand, etc. We are not learning anything new, there is no progress in training" . In general, nothing the guys have changed after that letter.
      Again, we will probably progress during the war.
      1. Bobrovsky 11 May 2020 07: 57 New
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        Grandfather Engels was a capitalist, but he carefully studied military affairs, he liked this business. Once he wrote - for 15 years the army that has not been fighting has been turning into an ordinary bureaucratic mechanism. A check arrives at any military unit and on papers there all the combat training is painted just fine.
  12. smaug78 7 May 2020 18: 50 New
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    My humble IMHO: lead in deployment, the rest is secondary to it.
    3. The complete lack of coordination between the commanders of different types of troops.
    4. Lack of communication at all levels. More?

    Too fantastic, you can read more
  13. knn54 7 May 2020 18: 54 New
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    And another "point" was not in the Red Army Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. Aviation was subordinated. In fact, to the commanders of ground units. German aviation acted in coordination with the advancing troops, but did not submit to tankmen or infantrymen.
    According to claim 7, in one of the training fighter groups equipped with Messerschmitt-109 vehicles, on the day of the attack on the Soviet Union, they managed to crash seven planes during takeoff and landing. In addition to the pilot error, there were design flaws - a narrow chassis track and poor visibility in the cockpit for the pilot.
    Article. Is understood., Plus.
    PS Undeservedly forgotten, even slandered by ace Ivan Fedorov. He shot down 134 enemy planes, carried out six rams and took two planes “captured” - forced them to land on their airfield. Having fined on household grounds, he was forgotten.
    During the year (from the summer of 1942 to 1943), he commanded a unique penalty group, which included 64 pilot-fines, who committed various crimes and were ready to atone for their guilt before their homeland. They brilliantly proved themselves in battle, having shot down 400 enemy aircraft. However, under the terms of punishment, they did not count victories.
    HERE Fedororv proved himself not only as an ace, but also as a skilled commander.
    1. Engineer 7 May 2020 19: 01 New
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      Undeservedly forgotten, even slandered as Ivan Fedorov.

      You forgot to mention that he either shot down Hartman, or the fascist managed to escape at the last moment
      Lord, write this yes in 2020 laughing
      1. knn54 7 May 2020 19: 09 New
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        Just do not, looking at night, mention the name of the “vulture-record holder”.
        1. Engineer 7 May 2020 19: 12 New
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          This is not a problem if Ivan Fedorov is nearby. laughing
          Let's catch up and overtake Goebbels dutysh
          1. Ryazan87 7 May 2020 20: 30 New
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            Fedorov made such a statement that all the Luftwaffe aside smokes. However, maybe just a man with humor was))
        2. Nehist 8 May 2020 07: 55 New
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          hmm .. Luftwaffe pilots made 6 sorties a day. And our maximum is three !!! Hartman may be the Vulture, but with the intensity of the sorties to beat planes, he could ...
    2. Nehist 8 May 2020 07: 52 New
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      Where did you get this nonsense? Especially about the penalty pilots ...
      1. Sergej1972 9 May 2020 04: 58 New
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        There were penalty squadrons, that's a fact.
    3. sibiryouk 9 May 2020 09: 19 New
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      All this is continuous fantasy, or HUNTING stories of Fedorov himself, who, according to his colleagues, was an excellent aerobatics, but an absolute competitor to Mr. Munchausen!
  14. Undecim 7 May 2020 19: 11 New
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    The article can be safely attributed to the "ranting" genre.
    If the author undertook to illuminate the training system of the Red Army Air Force flight personnel, moreover, not only to illuminate, but also to refute the claim that it was inferior to the similar Luftwaffe system, then a comprehensive comparative analysis of its (training system) of the constituent elements: the composition of schools and schools, methods should be presented their recruitment, the scope and quality of training, the organization of the educational process, the state of flight safety, material and technical and household support. Moreover, the analysis in dynamics is the pre-war period and the period 1941-1945, since there were serious differences. Naturally, there should be links to the source. Then you can draw some conclusions and say something. And without it, an empty talking room, with which the information space is already full.
    A few examples.
    In accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of February 25, 1941, training of the Red Army aircrew was carried out in two types of educational institutions. In military pilot schools, cadets had to learn how to fly during the day in simple conditions, group flights as part of a flight link and get the practice of flying along the route. In addition, fighter pilots learned the basics of air combat, and bombers - bombing from horizontal flight and diving on aircraft USB and SB to angles of 40 degrees. The total raid on one cadet of fighter schools was determined at 24 hours, and the bombing schools - 20 hours.
    At the same time, cadets were enrolled in the military schools of the pilots, both having undergone initial flight training in flying clubs and had no flight training - cadets from among those who had been drafted into the army, as well as recruiting junior commanders and Red Army soldiers. However, the attempt to equip military aviation schools with primary training by junior command personnel of all military branches did not prove worthwhile, since the level of technical knowledge did not always meet the required level. Therefore, on June 19, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decided to send only aircraft mechanics there.
    For two years, cadets of military command schools had to master the technique of piloting day and night, learn to drive a link and a squadron at all altitudes day, night and in difficult weather conditions, at the maximum radius of action of an aircraft with combat use, conduct air combat alone and in a group. The total flight time per student was set up to 150 hours.
    Lutwaffe pilot training began at age 12. Young people aged 12-18 went to flight training in the system of organizations of the "Hitler Youth Union" (Hitler-Jugend). During this period, future pilots studied aircraft modeling, gliding, the basics of parachuting, the basic principles of the theory of aviation, radio engineering and the material part of the air force. The training is led by instructors from the National Socialist Air Corps (NSFK).
    The training of the German Air Force pilots consists of two periods: pre-conscription, from 12 years before enlistment in the air force, x forces, and the direct period prepared in the training aviation regiments and flight schools. Young people aged 12-18 went on to study flying in the system of organizations of the "Hitler Youth Union" (Hitler-Jugend). During this period, future pilots study aircraft modeling, gliding, the basics of parachuting, the basic principles of the theory of aviation, radio engineering and the material part of the air force. The training is led by instructors from the National Socialist Air Corps (NSFK).
    Upon reaching the age of 18, young people who meet a number of requirements (Aryan descent, serving a job, no criminal record, health condition) are enrolled in the Air Force and sent to training and aviation regiments, where combat, physical and rifle training takes place for 2-3 months training (in peacetime, training in the training aviation regiment lasted 1 year). At the end of the program, students are sent to aviation training companies (training companies for pilot candidates), where they receive basic knowledge of air navigation and the material part of aircraft and engines. From aviation training companies are equipped with AB schools. These schools provide basic practical flying knowledge. The duration of schooling is 6-9 months. Plaque 100-140 hours. Self-release is carried out after 60 landings and a 5-hour raid with an instructor. The training is conducted on airplanes of three categories with gradually increasing difficulty in control. At the end of AB school, students receive a military pilot’s certificate, which subsequently records all the tests they pass.
    From school A-B, pilots designed to operate on multi-engine aircraft (bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, twin-engine fighters) are sent to school C for training on twin-engine aircraft. Duration of training is 2-3 months. Before the war, the mandatory raid was 60-70 hours. After the successful completion of school "C" on the certificate issued to the pilot, the mark "awarded the rights of a military pilot of the increased type."
    All pilots scheduled to work in bomber aircraft, after school "C" are sent to the school of blind flight. Many pilots of fighter and reconnaissance aircraft also go through a blind flight school. The term of study from 6 weeks is reduced to about 4 weeks. At the end of the blind flight school, bomber pilots are sent to bomber aviation schools, where students are first divided into crews consisting of a pilot, observer, radio operator and flight engineer. Duration of training is 2-3 months. Plaque 40-60 hours. At the end of the school, the pilot and his crew are assigned to the active unit or to the reserve combat training school for further training.
    Here it is already possible to compare something and talk about training levels.
  15. Avior 7 May 2020 19: 30 New
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    Graduated in 1939. Kachinsky flying school Pokryshkin A.I. flew on I-16 10 hours 38 min.

    On the one hand, oh how deplorable everything is! The Germans flew for 200 hours, the Americans for 450, and ours - nothing at all. They buried corpses and all that.

    source 10 hours 38 minutes
    ... It's time to release from Kachi. By September 20, 1939, a 2nd-rank military engineer A. I. Pokryshkin flew 2 hours 40 minutes on the U-18 - the mark is “excellent”, on the UTI-4 20 hours 7 minutes on the “good” and 10 hours 38 minutes on the I- 16 - "excellent." Instructor Junior Lieutenant Fateev gives an excellent training and flight characteristics:
    “Devoted to the cause of the party of Lenin - Stalin and the socialist homeland. Politically developed well. He is working hard on studying a short course in the history of the CPSU (B.). The overall development is good. Disciplined. In theoretical training, she studies only at good and excellent, having a total score of 4,8. Personal qualities - modest, proactive, decisive, smart in flight, hardy, reacts quickly and correctly to all kinds of deviations in flight. He loves flying, assimilates quickly and fastens well. Flies perfectly. Takeoff is excellent, the calculation in most cases is accurate, corrects it in a timely and competent manner. It does an excellent landing. Prudence in flight is good. In the task area performs quickly and accurately. I-16 piloting - “barrels”, wing overturns, immelmanns, hinges worked out perfectly, combat turns are good, the corkscrew is excellent. He is sociable with his comrades, and he helps many in theoretical training and in public life. In an international setting, he is well oriented. He takes an active part in Komsomol life, being a member of the Komsomol link. Physically well developed, good physical education.
    Conclusions on certification: It can be used in fighter aviation by a pilot on an I-16 airplane. He is worthy of conferring the military rank “Senior Lieutenant” (TsAMO. Personal file of A. I. Pokryshkin D. 711133. L. 10).

    Edition: Timofeev A.V. Pokryshkin. - M .: Young Guard, 2005.
    http://militera.lib.ru/bio/timofeev_av/05.html
    The fact is that further pilots were trained in the regiments.
    The Germans, by the way, had the same system
    hi
    1. Engineer 7 May 2020 19: 34 New
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      The fact is that further pilots were trained in the regiments.
      The Germans, by the way, had the same system

      And the British
      “Immediately call the names. Forshaw, Johnson, and Brown? “We nodded in agreement.” “How many hours did Spitfire fly?”
      "Eighteen, sir."
      "Twenty-three, sir."
      "Nineteen, sir."
      "Ohhhh. I will give you a few more hours here before we begin to take you on operations.

      Someone James Edgar Johnson recalls
      1. Octopus 10 May 2020 02: 28 New
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        Quote: Engineer
        Someone James Edgar Johnson recalls

        )))
        In late August, I was called into the adjutant’s office of the squadron and ordered to go to the 19th squadron, which was based in Duxford near Cambridge. I packed my miserable belongings and boarded the train. By this time my flight book had 205 hours in the air, including 23 hours on Spitfire

        The three newcomers, in gloomy silence, headed back to Duxford. On paper, we were considered pilots of the 19th squadron, however a huge chasm separated us from the real pilots.

        This is the 40th year, Spity is in short supply. Pokryshkin has a slightly different situation, it seems to me.
        1. Engineer 10 May 2020 12: 29 New
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          The situation is completely different
          Pokryshkin in peacetime flew three times less than Johnson who graduated in the military, and even at the most critical moment for England
          The essence of the problem is the same - how many do not fly to school to send immediately to battle is extremely inefficient.
          The solution is the same - in general, the commissioning of replenishment is carried out by the unit commander giving time to run-in in the field
          1. Octopus 10 May 2020 12: 37 New
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            Quote: Engineer
            Pokryshkin in peacetime flew three times less than Johnson who graduated in the military, and even at the most critical moment for England

            Ugums.

            But it seems to me that it’s not quite fair to write about 23 hours of a flight on Sleep, without mentioning the remaining 200 hours of his flight.

            Quote: Engineer
            The essence of the problem is the same - how many do not fly to school to send immediately to battle is extremely inefficient.
            The solution is the same - in general, the commissioning of replenishment is carried out by the unit commander giving time to run-in in the field

            Yes.
  16. AAK
    AAK 7 May 2020 19: 48 New
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    Colleagues, in my opinion, this article to get a completely adequate conclusion could be reduced to a simple table: 1st column - Air Force of the Red Army + Air Force of the Red Army, 2nd - Luftwaffe, and a few lines:
    1. the number of pilots on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, including - fighter aircraft, bomber (including torpedo-bearing) aircraft, attack aircraft, other types of air forces (reconnaissance, transport, communications, ambulance, others);
    2. the number of pilots from 22.06.1941/09.05.1945/1 to XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX who completed training and aimed at replenishing in the air units of the army (by type according to line No. XNUMX);
    3. The number of pilots in operating aircraft parts as of 09.05.1945/1/XNUMX (by type according to line No. XNUMX);
    The difference between the sum of the lines in sections 1 and 2 minus section 3 will give us real numbers of the absolute losses of pilots for each side. That's all...
    1. Sergey Valov 7 May 2020 20: 07 New
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      In principle, I agree, but we must take into account the losses of the Germans on other fronts.
    2. Ryazan87 7 May 2020 20: 34 New
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      1. With non-combat losses in the framework of such a technique, what will we do?
      2. How will we take into account the distribution of forces of the Luftwaffe (for example, how do we single out the losses of pilots involved in German air defense)?
      1. AAK
        AAK 8 May 2020 08: 37 New
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        To colleagues Sergei and Nikita, the author in his own article refutes in his own way the thesis that the SOVIET pilots “covered up the Luftwaffe with corpses, so for the sake of clarity of data I suggest taking only combat losses and only the Eastern Front (it’s clear that the Luftwaffe suffered losses in" battle for England "and in the African company, and in repelling allied raids on Germany. Both cadets and testers, etc., were defeated on both sides." Unfortunately, with the statistics that I tried to identify, it would be a bit tight in our archives, there would be data - you could look not only at the total losses, but also by type of air force and by the average number of sorties, after which pilots in each type of aircraft died, and a lot of other interesting information could be obtained on the basis of the analysis of qualitative statistics ...
        1. Ryazan87 8 May 2020 10: 19 New
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          There is still such a nuance: the number of aircraft shot down is not the same as the number of dead pilots: there were many who were shot down several times (remember the same Rudorffer). In addition, not so few people from the Air Force died on the ground, for example, during the bombing. It will be difficult to take this into account in the framework of summary statistics. One unit is laborious.
        2. Cyril G ... 8 May 2020 10: 47 New
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          Worst of all with German statistics.
        3. Octopus 10 May 2020 02: 30 New
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          Quote: AAK
          Unfortunately, with the statistics that I tried to identify, in our archives it’s a little tight, there would be data

          )))
          Tried to do it.

          There are no figures for the USSR.
  17. Avior 7 May 2020 19: 56 New
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    ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR
    On measures to prevent accidents in the air forces of the Red Army
    № 070
    ....
    The number of flight accidents in 1939, especially in April and May, reached extraordinary proportions. During the period from January 1 to May 15, 34 disasters occurred, in which 70 people died. During the same period, 126 accidents occurred, in which 91 aircraft were destroyed. Only for the end of 1938 and for the first time the months of 1939. we lost 5 outstanding pilots - Heroes of the Soviet Union, 5 best people of our country - vol. Bryandinsky, Chkalov, Gubenko, Serov and Polina Osipenko.
    .
    About flying schools

    1. The Military Council of the Air Force to ban all deviations from the established requirements for the physical condition of those entering schools and colleges.

    From now on, only those who have an excellent characterization (high school, fabzauch, factory, party and Komsomol organizations) and those who have graduated from high school flying clubs who have excellent reviews from production (before entering the flying club) and excellent reviews for time spent in school.

    2. Since 1940, people have been admitted to flying clubs with an education of at least 9 high school classes and only with excellent behavior. Introduce drill classes in flying clubs of Osoaviahima, for which increase the term of study by 3 months.

    Inspection of the Red Army University by June 20, 1939 to develop the relevant requirements and programs for the militarization of Osoaviahima flying clubs.

    3. The expulsion of cadets from schools for poor performance by order of the head of the school during training on a training and transition aircraft.

    The deduction from flight failure from a combat aircraft shall be made with the permission of the Air Force Military Council.

    For violations of discipline, by order of the Military Council of the Air Force, expel cadets from psols to combat units.

    In order to prevent incomplete schools, to keep in them for the first 6 months of instruction 1% of variable composition in excess of the plan [15].

    4. Self-raid on a combat aircraft in Air Force schools to increase to 30 hours.

    Exclude aerial shooting and high-altitude training from the school program.

    5. Air Force schools to transfer to a year and a half of training. The release in 1939 was postponed to June 15, 1940.

    Only those who have graduated from schools with good and excellent marks in piloting technique and discipline should be assigned to combat units of the Air Force from flight schools.

    6. The Military Council of the Air Force to review and report to me on 1.7.39 the order of acquisition and duration of training in schools and colleges of the Air Force.

    The order is large, those who wish can read
    https://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/Приказ_НКО_СССР_от_4.06.1939_№_070
    Pokryshkin’s characterization is excellent, but he and the pilot were excellent and flew to school.
    But there were undoubtedly problems with preparation, and serious problems
    Drabkin has some orders for pilots
    "I fought on a fighter. They took the first blow. 1941-1942"
    http://www.e-reading.club/book.php?book=20457
    http://www.e-reading.club/bookreader.php/20457/ya-dralsya-na-istrebitele-prinyavshie-pervyy-udar-1941-1942.html
    hi
  18. The comment was deleted.
  19. The comment was deleted.
  20. senima56 7 May 2020 20: 17 New
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    Everything is thoroughly painted by M. Solonin in his book "At peacefully sleeping airfields ..."
  21. Fishery 7 May 2020 20: 24 New
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    not at all in the subject, but reading the memoirs of everyone except the pilots, the veterans spoke quite negatively about the effectiveness of our aviation, right up to the years 43-44, they didn’t observe communications between the troops, they saw few planes, the Germans didn’t have an analog frame, they started to drive it by the end of the war, only, in general, they wrote somewhere in this vein.
  22. iouris 7 May 2020 20: 27 New
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    How is the purpose of the publication formulated? She is not. The subject of analysis? ... What is the position of the author? She is not, because there is no goal. The writing style is kind of naughty or nervous, from the fifth to the tenth. Dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany ...
  23. really 7 May 2020 20: 28 New
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    The author did not show the most difficult losses, total over the years and the total number of pilots. This is the only way to understand the severity of the war in the air. Ases of Pokryshkin’s level, the only ones by which one cannot judge the adequacy of training or vice versa.
  24. Earthshaker 7 May 2020 20: 30 New
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    You can be very prepared by the pilot, but I won’t know how to give commands as a wingman only by flapping wings.
  25. dgonni 7 May 2020 21: 06 New
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    The author got into a topic in which he is not very strong. Therefore, juggling in response to comments on past articles. And far-fetched conclusions.
    For the author!
    In your excerpt from the reader’s post, I mean a raid on a profile plane at an aviation school! And yet, and yes, the Germans rolled on the Messer somewhere around 200 hours with a release.
    The GSS you cited for June 22, 41, had a much larger total flying time than after school and not at all 20 30 hours.
    The general level of pilots in terms of aerobatics at the beginning of the war was approximately at the same level. That resulted in the famous Deutsche order not to get involved in dog dumps and not to play chivalry.
    In 42, a lot of excellent Soviet pilots and youth were knocked out by the Germans because of the entry into service of the Luftwaffe Guslav. Which by head surpassed everything that the Union had. The level of training of young pilots at our air force has dropped dramatically and began to level off somewhere around the end of 43 years. Beginners came to the front with a raid at 10-15 hours at best!
    Unbelieving on the site, I remember the memories of the pilots. Everything is described there. The pilots who survived the 42nd year were counted on the fingers of one hand, and they did not take an active part in the battles.
    During the battle in the sky of Kuban, the air force of the Red Army at the initial stage was actually defeated. And only the introduction of reserves into the battle in the form of fresh air corps on new imported equipment. He allowed to turn the tide of the battle.
    It should be borne in mind that in the sky the Kuban air force of the Red Army was already superior in numbers with almost equal technical characteristics.
    In the battle on the Kursk-Oryol ledge, the sky remained beyond the Red Army. But not for the reason that the Germans were knocked out or inflicted cardinal losses on them. The reason for the sharp decrease in the activity of the Luftwaffe was the need to protect the Vaterland from flying raids.
    And the bulk of high-profile Luftwaffe pilots were knocked out on the western front, reflecting the attacks of Lancaster and fortresses.
    The Germans considered the eastern front an easy walk, like a sanatorium in comparison with the western front. Due to the weaker training of the bulk of the pilots of the Red Army air force especially in the year 42-43. So because of the weaker flight data of Soviet aircraft.
    And yes. Hartman had no iron textiles to fight the fortresses. And three times he ran to the eastern front boom to zoom Ivan. They wanted him to the court of honor, but Hitler type spat and gave a free letter. Like let the star play a free hunt.
    The coalition lost the war in the air of the Luftwaffe and they suffered major losses in class pilots on the western front.
    Well, lastly! At the end of the war, German aviation stopped flying not because of a lack of aces or desire and fear. And not because of the lack of aircraft. The Luftwaffe landed the lack of fuel in the right quantities.
    Well, the numerical advantage in the local direction was deystvo able to create even in '45. Again, on the site, I remember in the memoirs there among veterans this is described and even with respect.
    1. Octopus 10 May 2020 02: 35 New
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      Quote: dgonni
      That resulted in the famous Deutsche order not to get involved in dog dumps and not to play chivalry.

      The famous order of the Deutsche - you will see this with any serious pilot, even Hartmann, even the Soviet one. It is impossible to spin. While you are spinning, either the enemy bombers will go to your side, or, conversely, your bombers will be left without cover, and the next German will be knocked out.

      Yes, plus Messer surpassed the I-16 in everything except horizontal maneuverability at low speeds.
  26. WapentakeLokki 7 May 2020 21: 38 New
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    ... the main um the `` postulate '' of propaganda; expert accounts are exaggerated first and secondly they generally need to be divided by 10 (..a better by 100 ..) because otherwise it’s very insulting !!! .. and here you can’t argue because accounting for the shot down aircraft of the Red Army Air Force has not yet been properly disclosed .. but there are still other accounts that are out of scope - these are the accounts of the Krigsmarine aces of the same U-boot .. and it would be nice to declare them blown but .. then Lloyd intervened. .alas all the ships were for insurance and the Lloyd, in case of drowning, paid this insurance and then you can’t argue .. it was..and that Kretschmer drowned 300K tons. (and Pren and Shchepke are a little behind ..) and those who drowned 100K that’s enough .. and it’s not possible to disavow these Fantastic accounts somehow .. (I really really wanted to .. especially against the background of the victories of our submarines ..) .. p I summarize ... the decent bet was on individual skill ... and the Soviets had a shaft ... and what’s characteristic is a shaft ... but it’s the same amount of hits in class ... and it wouldn’t be knocked down by one expert .. (theoretically not bad ..) all the same, the crowd is capable of trampling ... one by one .. well, the boys learned ... who survived of course like the mentioned Rechkalov ... only dropping the enemy below the baseboard .. (yeah, they were all cowards because they used Bum- Zoom and did not climb into Dog-Fight ..) we thereby omit our guys who managed to surpass these ... experts of the III Reich ...
  27. Glagol1 7 May 2020 21: 48 New
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    And with Pokryshkin, and especially with Kozhedub - under 100 victories (personally and in the group), they simply considered confirmed.
    Of course, the Germans exhibited aces, there are no questions, only victories they had blown.
    Lies are an integral part of Western civilization and their mentality.
  28. 123456789 7 May 2020 21: 50 New
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    Quote: Alexey RA
    beginners die much faster than aces

    only natural selection in real air battles and allows you to grow aces from beginners
  29. Oleg Zorin 7 May 2020 21: 56 New
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    Mr. Skomorokhov overdid it with florid expressions. Impossible to read
  30. agoran 7 May 2020 21: 59 New
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    In the early 70s, there were many books with memoirs of war veterans, not "combed" by the editors. It is very interesting to read and compare what they write now.
    So, when checking, before the outbreak of war, the Air Force ZVO by the GIMO commission revealed many shortcomings.
    It was noted, in particular, the low level of discipline, the low level of training of the flight personnel, the absence of refueling and armament zones near the parking lots of the Comrade.
    C-you were left in the parking lot without fuel and without weapons.
    Abbreviations for the concept may have been called differently before.

    Well, on the topic: in Spain, the German “aces”, seeing excellent piloting on the Rata, tried to leave the battle.
  31. Leo_59 7 May 2020 22: 18 New
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    Of course, the author is overly emotional, but such is his style.
    In the subject of the Air Force on June 22.06.41, XNUMX, I did not have a thorough comparative assessment of the organization of communication in ours and in it. troops, Airborne surveillance and coordination of troops by Air Intelligence. How was it conceived according to the charters? How could you fight without an accurate knowledge of the combat situation?
    In general, it’s just scary to imagine the well-known circumstances of the first 100 days of the war.
    Especially after reading Vladimir Martov 1941 http://www.idiot.vitebsk.net/i41/mart41_1.htm
    Knowing a few "If only", including the date of the attack, which should / could have been a month earlier (due to unplanned fuss in Greece), it was just miracle + heroism of the soldiers that saved us.
  32. The comment was deleted.
  33. Narak-zempo 7 May 2020 23: 58 New
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    Well, at least, the “allies” were duly jammed in full. And over France, and over Britain (they beat Tommy in the tail and in the mane, along with all their stray Polish-Czech riffraff), and especially gave a light to striped over the "Fortress of Europe". And on the Western Front, the "Abshus Balken" drew at all not fake.
    1. Narak-zempo 9 May 2020 11: 24 New
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      TROLLING
      The Tolerasts-liberalists who have their own fart burned up from the scorched tails of the “democratic” flyers are minuscule.
      But these Americans, the most unfinished by German aces, then shot in the back to our grandfathers in Korea.
      1. Octopus 10 May 2020 02: 48 New
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        )))
        Quote: Narak-zempo
        "allies" Deutsche jammed in full.

        Backlash in the West performed well only in Middle-earth. Yes, there is something to remember, although there they were crushed in the end.

        The battle for Britain is lost, the Reich is lost.
        Quote: Narak-zempo
        Americans who were not finished by German aces then shot in the back to our grandfathers in Korea.

        1. Your grandfathers in Korea had nothing to do. One of the most finished modes of our time - including their merit.
        2. Were the Americans smarter - your grandfathers to Korea would have survived much less. In vain you do not value a good attitude towards yourself.
        1. Engineer 10 May 2020 12: 50 New
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          Backlash in the West performed well only in Middle-earth.

          The battle for France was won outright.
          With a bang, the British lost aerial day offensive in 1941-1942. Moreover, the loss ratio is much worse than that of the Germans BzB and the conditions are much better.
          The nightly Allied bombing attack can be considered neutralized until Cologne in 1943.
          PS all this is achieved by equal or lesser resources
          1. Octopus 10 May 2020 12: 57 New
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            Quote: Engineer
            The battle for France was won outright.
            With a bang, the British lost aerial day offensive in 1941-1942.

            This is yes, perhaps. But the French, as I recall, at that time Hokey bought up American garbage dumps, and the English day offensive took place on the old school, without fighters.
            Quote: Engineer
            Allied nightly bombing attack can be considered neutralized

            Allies are in this case the British. And this "neutralization" lasted for several months, as you rightly noted, while the Harris butchers figured out what the night strategic bombing was all about. It is not at all as simple as it seems now, the very USSR or even Germany simply could not realize such night navigation.
            1. Engineer 10 May 2020 13: 12 New
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              and the English day offensive took place on the old school, without fighter jets.

              This is a day offensive in 41-42 years. Several bombers under a very powerful fighter cover, Operation Rodeo and Circus. Golden time for the JG26 And the fantastic debut of the 190th. You are confusing with the year 1940 - day bombing without fighter cover.
              Allies - in this case, the British

              The Americans were neutralized in the West as early as 1944.
              You correctly noticed while the Harris butchers figured out what all-night strategic bombing was all about. It is not so easy

              There is a very simple fact. Producing up to 43 years more planes, the Britons suffered more losses and inflicted less damage. They reached the level of backlash only in 1944.
              1. Octopus 10 May 2020 13: 32 New
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                Quote: Engineer
                Several bombers under a very powerful fighter cover - Operation Rodeo and Circus

                )))
                This is to say the least, with a fighter cover.

                There was a slightly different problem, it seems to me. These operations were obviously meaningless.
                Quote: Engineer
                Producing up to 43 years more planes, the Britons suffered more losses and inflicted less damage. They reached the level of backlash only in 1944.

                You are right, in the 42nd year, the backlashes remained superior to the West. 43rd here and there, in different ways you can turn.
                1. Engineer 10 May 2020 13: 40 New
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                  in the 42nd year, the backlashes maintained superiority in the West.

                  Having less power and the Eastern Front for more fun.
                  The Luftwaffe is hardly the greatest air force in history by the criterion of cost-effectiveness.
                  Americans have achieved much more but much more strength
                  The Japanese can argue, but the scale there is not the same.
                  RAF can not stand any comparison with the kids "flying hog."
                  1. Octopus 10 May 2020 14: 31 New
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                    Quote: Engineer
                    RAF can not stand any comparison with the kids "flying hog."

                    Yes, I recall your German language.

                    RAF its the main battle - won. Then, however, they began to engage in complete nonsense, but here the questions are mainly to Harris and Churchill. The German military machine as a whole - the whole range of military branches, was by far the best, you are right. Only the USN of the 45th year surpassed them, at a new technical level, the army continued to behave rather strangely.
                    1. Engineer 10 May 2020 14: 53 New
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                      Yes, I recall your German language.

                      Correcting the Monocle: Was wollen sie?
                      RAF their main battle - won

                      Oh yes, the only independent strategic success of Tommies in the air without the help of amers. For three years, a slap in the face, slaps and humiliations from the vile Kraut.
                      1. Octopus 10 May 2020 15: 05 New
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                        Quote: Engineer
                        and three years of slap in the face, slaps and humiliations from the vile Kraut.

                        Is it the 41st - the 43rd? For the British, it was a time of strategic impasse, a new strange war. It’s quite difficult to fight if you don’t understand what you should do, in general.

                        But in Africa, it was the British who provided the fighter cover, not the Americans, who generally fell into the cold with their Curtis, which they passed off as fighters.
                      2. Engineer 10 May 2020 15: 14 New
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                        Is it the 41st - the 43rd?

                        40-42
                        But in Africa, it was the British who provided the fighter cover, not the Americans, who generally fell into the cold with their Curtis, which they passed off as fighters.

                        "Our song is good, start over"
                        And provided a lot.?
                        The Angles themselves massively used both Curtiss and the even worse Hurricane
                        The collateral result is an almost complete copy of the events of 42-43 on the Eastern Front in terms of the ratio of losses to the results achieved
                        And there was a slap from the japs ​​in the 43rd over Darwin
                        The most important thing.:
                        The Germans lost their main battle in the air. Only not the Angles, but one stupid nation under the military and political leadership of clowns, mediocrity and traitors to national interests. laughing
                      3. Octopus 10 May 2020 15: 42 New
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                        Quote: Engineer
                        The Angles themselves massively used both Curtiss and the even worse Hurricane

                        ))) Yes.

                        But, unlike the Americans, Curtiss was not their best fighter.
                        Quote: Engineer
                        And provided a lot.?

                        Quote: Engineer
                        The result of the collateral is an almost complete copy of the events of 42-43 years on the Eastern Front

                        Well, actually the result of these events was the end of the Axis marine logistics and the surrender of the group on the theater of operations. Although they took it by quantity, not skill - perhaps so.
                        Quote: Engineer
                        Only not the Angles, but one stupid nation under the military and political leadership of clowns, mediocrity and traitors to national interests.

                        Still forgot
                        On frankly secondary machines with a Hurricane-level engine, glider and weapon
                        You are absolutely right. The law of the transition of quantity into quality sometimes works.

                        They filled up with corpses (s). Dead bodies and money.
                      4. Engineer 10 May 2020 16: 00 New
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                        Well, actually the result of these events was the end of the Axis marine logistics and the surrender of the group on the theater

                        I did not just give an analogy with the Eastern Front 42-43 years. In both cases, the campaigns were lost by the Germans primarily on earth.
                        The purely air aspect, even the most stubborn fan of the Allies is unlikely to bring them into the asset.
                        Sammari by the Luftwaffe until 1944:
                        Victory in France with strategic results
                        Convincing revenge for BzB in the West in 41-42
                        Neutralize Harris’s nightly air attack until 1943. Losses of bombers until 1943 did not compensate for the result
                        Net victory on the Eastern Front 1941
                        Maintaining superiority 1942 on the Eastern Front
                        Excellence in the Mediterranean until 1942
                        Good results in the struggle against superior forces in the Mediterranean in 42-43 and on the Eastern Front of 1943. Superior losses were inflicted, support for the ground forces was not redrawn, local superiority was achieved at the right moments.
                        Purely, the RAF has nothing in the asset except the Battle of Britain.

                        The Luftwaffe showed how to achieve operational and even strategic results by fighting in the minority. How to massage strength, achieving excellence. No RAF approached this
                      5. Octopus 10 May 2020 16: 08 New
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                        At first glance, that's right. At second glance
                        Quote: Engineer
                        Good results in the fight against superior forces in the Mediterranean in the year 42-43 ... Superior losses were inflicted, the support of the ground forces was not redrawn, local superiority was achieved quite well at the right moments.

                        In the East, yes, but in the West local superiority was achieved at the right moments so rare that led the Allies to dizzy without success, which was followed by far not to go, Bari flogging 02.12.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX.

                        The local superiority in a separate section, for example, over the Ludendorff bridge, the Germans could create and created in the spring of the 45th. Only it doesn’t need it, local superiority in a separate area.
                      6. Engineer 10 May 2020 16: 15 New
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                        In the 45th year, the Germans would be better off surrendering no later than January 1.
                        The question was originally about the achievements of backlash in the West. Suddenly it became clear that there were many of them, including in the West.
                      7. Octopus 10 May 2020 16: 17 New
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                        Quote: Engineer
                        The question was originally about the achievements of backlash in the West. Suddenly it became clear that there were many of them, including in the West.

                        Yes, in many ways you are right. The Allies picked up the key to the Luftwaffe only in the 44th. More precisely, it was not a key or even a crowbar, but a bulldozer.
                        Career.
                      8. Engineer 10 May 2020 16: 18 New
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                        Wow, the first compromise in our debate belay
                        Threat could not resist
                        Not allies but still Americans)))
                      9. Octopus 10 May 2020 17: 48 New
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                        Quote: Engineer
                        first compromise in our disputes

                        )))
                        Historical and religious disputes differ in that we differ in assessments (You do not like the British, I do not like the Americans), but we cannot differ in facts, except for purely technical source study nuances.

                        But in a religious dispute, assessments are the only important thing, to hell with Russophobic facts.
  • Sahalinets 8 May 2020 00: 04 New
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    I have a book of Schwabidessen. About filled up with corpses - this is from the translator! As for the rest, the author gives the opinions of various German officials and they often disagree! Well, there you can find many high reviews about the courage of Soviet pilots. He especially notes the air shooters, "who continued to shoot when their plane was already burning and crashed and always left him last."
  • jonht 8 May 2020 01: 39 New
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    Thank you very much, Roman! The nonsense about "filled up with corpses" took out, to look at the data, and now they are in the public domain, bolobol is not destiny, but they pass off their excrement as truth.
    We look forward to continuing the series of articles about aviation.
  • LeonidL 8 May 2020 06: 26 New
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    The novel missed one very important and significant item on the list. I would probably put this position first: German pilots and the vast majority received real combat experience from 1939 to 1941 until June 22. the mass of Soviet pilots did not have combat experience, with the exception of a relatively small number who fought in Spain, on the Halkin-Gol and in Finland. But all these conflicts were, firstly, relatively local, and secondly, the quality of training of the Japanese and Finns, their tactical techniques and their technique did not go to any comparison with the German. The combat experience, the first battle, the first whistle of bullets ... it means a lot to the military that the infantryman, that the artilleryman, that the pilot. The USSR was attacked by an experienced, mobilized army that gained victorious (!!!) combat experience. And the Red Army at first, taking into account the demobilization of old-timers and a sharp increase in the number of formations and associations, included alas in most recruits. This is true for the flight crew (young pilots), and for the technical, and for the BAO fighters. I completely agree with the rest of the list items. Thank.
    1. Bobrovsky 11 May 2020 08: 32 New
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      That's right. The Germans already had experience of modern maneuver warfare, and the experience was successful. We achieved a good level of interaction between the troops and all of this together played a role. In 1945, the Japanese army had extensive experience in the war in China and the United States. And in 9145 they encountered our army, which had the experience of modern European warfare. The Japanese officers recalled that they were driving through us like an asphalt skating rink.
  • Oleg_p 8 May 2020 08: 24 New
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    airmen ... Airplanes! With motors!
    How many pilots did the Germans save “autopilot”, which, whatever one may say, drove messers from the airfield to the battlefield and from the battle to the airfield how much %% of flight time is there? And then more questions about a large number of sorties per day ...
    And the walkie-talkies?
    This is all but the “logistical support” in the form of an air support service and interaction with the Wehrmacht.
    Well, Motors! Here is the same “injection”, which has any overloads on the drum for power output of the engine “to the mountain”. And the resource, which, the cattle, strives to take away from the engine the power that is "indicated in the performance characteristics", leaving in the hands of the pilot something that is hard to call a fighter.
    Well, the cab without overheating and CO (carbon monoxide) from the exhaust.
    1. irontom 8 May 2020 13: 47 New
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      It’s cool about Messer’s autopilot - I considered myself a connoisseur, and given the aviation university, not bad, but, you made me a day. What would you know - there was no autopilot even on the 110th. At least I have not seen such information.
      1. LeonidL 11 May 2020 20: 16 New
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        Autopilots stood on both the Bostons and the PE-8, like I heard about the Douglas and the LI-2.
  • 2112vda 8 May 2020 08: 24 New
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    Fishing, hunting, the number of “victories” over women and “military successes” are things of the same plan, depending on the existing political, ideological, or whatever context. They lie all, to a greater or lesser extent. In my family there were two fighter pilots, both died in 1942 in the battles for Stalingrad. The balance of power at that time was strongly not in our favor. The fact that the pilots were not prepared in our country is an ordinary nonsense of not quite smart people, only opportunists angry at the country write this.
    In technical terms, we really lagged behind Germany. We simply did not have enough time to develop our aviation industry. A large role in the backlog was played by the large nomenclature of aircraft types. For some reason, the I-16 was considered hopelessly outdated, and its practically contemporary Me-109 is very modern. I-16 could be further modified. The German “ordnung" did its job, we had shy away from one extreme to the other both in the matter of aircraft building, engine building and in aviation weapons. Then we had “true Leninists” without education and training, now we have “effective managers” with highly controversial and conditional education. So nothing changes in the "Danish kingdom". It is hoped that we will not have to face the same challenges that our grandfathers faced.
    1. Cyril G ... 8 May 2020 10: 51 New
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      Quote: 2112vda
      For some reason, the I-16 was considered hopelessly outdated, and its practically contemporary Me-109 is very modern. I-16 could be further modified.

      Right. There is an American counterpart to Wildket, produced until 1945. And yes, he had his own niche.
    2. Octopus 10 May 2020 02: 56 New
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      Quote: 2112vda
      there was shyness from one extreme to the other both in the matter of aircraft engineering, engine building and in aviation weapons.

      It’s even more interesting there.
      In the 40th year, Germany actually had one single-engine fighter in production, Messer, Focky. And in the USSR, where, according to Comrade Yakovleva, there are fewer engineers in the whole country than in one Messerschmidt firm, they graduate or prepare for production:
      1. Mig-1/3
      2. LaGG
      3. Yak-xnumx
      4. I-16
      5. I-153
      6. I-180 (not produced, but prepared for production).
      ... a bunch of small initiative people, including at aircraft factories.

      A thousand flowers bloom, so to speak.

      The result is a bit predictable.
    3. Bobrovsky 11 May 2020 08: 36 New
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      The Germans recalled - if the pilot on the I-16 or Seagull noticed the attacking plane in time, it was better not to mess with him, he would immediately turn around and you would get yours.
  • geniy 8 May 2020 08: 36 New
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    As for the quality of training for Soviet pilots, I have serious suspicions that modern authors are telling readers a lie. That is, in fact, everything was much more complicated. I suppose that a lot of unnecessary technical information was reported to Soviet ucletes instead of conducting as many training fights as possible. So I believe that Soviet pilots thoroughly studied aerodynamics - at the level of university professors. And besides, there are a lot of useless technical details, such as the size of the gap between the cylinder and the piston of the engine, the ignition order in the cylinders, and all the technical parameters of the aircraft: length, wingspan, height, diameter of the propeller, engine power, grade of gasoline, and much more.
    And besides, modern scoundrels-authors, I suppose, show readers only the number of hours of flight on combat training aircraft, but specifically for deception they do not take into account the flying time on training machines. That is: each pilot was first trained on U-2 training biplanes, then on UT-2 training monoplanes, and only after that on combat aircraft: I-16, I-153, MiG-3, Il-2 and others. So - for deception they show only a raid on military aircraft and it turns out very little. But the raid on U-2 and UT-2 - this is the number of hours - maybe hundreds of hours can be scammers-authors specially throw away, because if you show the Russian readers the total total raid of Soviet pilots on all training types of planes - it will be quite a lot. And then it will become clear to everyone that the raid of the Soviet pilots is quite large, and the cause of the defeat will have to be sought elsewhere.
    Personally, I believe that at the beginning of the war Soviet pilots were given little gasoline - (because it simply wasn’t there - all the warehouses were bombed). Therefore, Soviet pilots made very few sorties compared with German ones - which literally hung over the Soviet defense and chased after every person. You look at Pokryshkin’s raid - it’s just miserable. It seems that the great ace many times more time sat on the ground, and did not make sorties. And everyone else too. And all the Germans made five or six sorties every day.
    1. Undecim 8 May 2020 19: 12 New
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      So I believe that Soviet pilots thoroughly studied aerodynamics - at the level of university professors.
      Is this with the educational level that the cadets had? Why write nonsense, because the programs have been preserved.
      1. LeonidL 11 May 2020 20: 25 New
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        Not four classes were selected for flight schools. Read the memoirs - 10 -9 - at least 7, after technical schools and from university benches. In addition, in many cases, these were retrained instructors of avia-clubs with a great deal of flying experience and pilots of the Civil Air Fleet, including polar aviation. After the 42nd year, pilots of the take-off and landing type were not allowed out at all, after schools they were sent either to combat training courses, retraining, or at least to reserve regiments. from there, they would rather be taken over from factory plants, and experienced war veterans would receive combat vehicles. And the youth gradually flew the clock. Well, upon arrival to the regiments, they were not immediately allowed into the battle, they adopted the piloting technique, again military use, navigational training ... they were gradually introduced by more experienced ones. So everything is not simple and unequivocal. In the memoirs of pilots, even in life in every school, there is such a disagreement in the quality of training, uniforms, food, etc.
    2. Bobrovsky 11 May 2020 08: 38 New
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      There is also the number of parts played a role.
  • Dmitry V. 8 May 2020 10: 36 New
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    Therefore, Alexander Pokryshkin, drooling on the floor, continued to cover the attack aircraft, looking after the dumping Eric Hartman.

    Another ..., useless author to urge respect for veterans.
    In the heat of nobody’s interesting ambitions, the mass of the words "about nothing" ... and took something from Eremin ...
    https://historical-fact.livejournal.com/139638.html

    The level of training of the Red Army was weak?
    Yes.
    Why?
    The prewar increase in the strength of the Red Army Air Force is more than 4-fold.
    Pilot instructors noted several pre-war sets in the Air Force - the "command", when they called up the junior and middle command from the ground forces - from cavalry to infantry. The weakest was the pre-war - very poor preparation and a small raid - graduates of flying clubs.
    There was not enough training aircraft and fuel for such a massive call to the Air Force - the average level of training accordingly decreased.
    Fighter pilots of accelerated pre-war releases were no longer trained in shooting, group piloting, air combat - the rest was to be given in the military unit - training in target shooting at the training ground.

    What did the Germans think about the pilots of the 1941 Red Army?
    Technical backwardness and heavy losses forced Russian fighters to confine themselves mainly to air cover for ground battles. In addition, they adhered only to defensive tactics and never looked for a battle with German planes. Constant raids from dawn to dusk were a characteristic feature of the use of Russian aviation. On the other hand, they never attempted to concentrate really big forces in one place or at one time.
    .
    Colonel von Beust, however, comes to somewhat different conclusions. In his opinion, the Soviet military doctrine placed the fulfillment of the task above everything else. The odds of success or anticipated losses were not important in comparison. The main requirement is that the Soviet pilot take to the air and make contact with the enemy, regardless of conditions, conditions and consequences. The fact that the Soviet command wanted and tried to achieve tangible results by any means did not raise any doubt. Von Beust also notes that Soviet air operations were not so much the result of thoughtful planning as a reaction to current circumstances. Inadequate reaction to events, conditions and conditions in the frontline often led to stereotypical repetition of military operations, template tactical techniques, actions at the same time of day, in the same areas, even when the need for these operations has already disappeared.

    This was the result of miscalculations of middle and senior commanders who did not have tactical skills and were not able to provide their advanced units with the necessary training during military operations.

    Major General Fritz Morzik supports von Boist's point of view. is he states that the tactics of military operations of Soviet bombers, fighters and attack aircraft showed their insufficient training.

    http://militera.lib.ru/h/schwabedissen/02.html
    Schwabedissen Walter Schwabedissen Walter
    Stalin's Falcons: Analysis of the actions of Soviet aviation in 1941-1945.
    1. Dmitry V. 8 May 2020 10: 38 New
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      Ibid:
      Major General Klaus Webbe describes 1941 as the period when the Russians brought their aircraft, equipped with inexperienced pilots and equipped with outdated equipment, to almost complete destruction. The majority of Soviet pilots were not only worse, but significantly worse than their German opponents. And their weakness was due not only to shock from the sudden crushing blows of the Germans and bad Russian aircraft. To a greater extent, this was caused by a lack of flying instinct, a lack of creative thinking, inertness and insufficient training. The latter was also explained by the caution observed in most cases, bordering on cowardice.

      Thus, despite the numerical superiority, the Soviet Air Force was not a dangerous enemy.


      Colonel von Beust describes the average Russian pilot as follows:

      “... an adversary who is completely unable to conduct an independent attacking air battle and poses a very small threat in the attack. Often it seemed that, unlike the German pilots, Soviet pilots were fatalists who fought without any hope of success and self-confidence, driven by their fanaticism or fear of the commissars. ”


      The lack of aggressiveness among Russian pilots seems to be understandable to von Boist, who asks questions:

      “How could one expect real enthusiasm in combat from pilots with such hopelessly outdated aircraft, weapons and equipment? How was the pilot supposed to behave in battle, inferior to the enemy in technical, tactical and flight training, and who was demoralized by the huge defeats of the Soviet Union? It is well known that Soviet pilots often went into battle for their commander, adjusting to his actions as machine guns, without any idea of ​​the goals, route and situation in the air.
      When discussing the psychological aspect of their behavior in the air, it must be said that in defensive battles over their territory, Soviet pilots, in general, showed themselves much better than in attacking actions over the territory occupied by the Germans. Without a doubt, all these factors were primarily explained by the mentality of Russian pilots, who [48] were far behind the average German pilot. ”


      Von Beust expressed a glance at the Soviet Air Force, which most German air commanders adhered to in the summer and fall of 1941, although some works sometimes claim that Despite the low quality of combat training, Soviet pilots often showed great courage and perseverance in carrying out orders and resourcefulness in battle. Some also argued that the resistance of the Soviets was steadily increasing and that the Russians of the Second World War were very different from those faced by the German army in the First World War.
      1. Dmitry V. 8 May 2020 10: 48 New
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        In the same place, Schwabedissen:
        Towards the end of 1941, the first signs appeared that the Soviet Air Force had begun to recover from heavy defeats suffered in the summer. The Luftwaffe still managed to maintain air superiority, but it became clear that the desired complete destruction of Soviet aircraft could not be achieved.

        Strong aviation units equipped with modern types of aircraft began to appear at the front. This process went slowly, in different ways and at different times in different areas, so the German commanders did not immediately realize that they were witnessing a general revival of the Air Force. The increase in air resistance was especially evident in the areas of greatest fighting - near Moscow, Leningrad and Demyansk.
        1. Dmitry V. 8 May 2020 12: 09 New
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          And by 1944-1945, the enemy notes:
          Having achieved an overwhelming quantitative advantage, the Russians in 1944 achieved a certain equality in the quality of aviation equipment, and in the final phase of the war they sometimes had some technical superiority, but they could not realize it, primarily due to the lack of qualified flight personnel.

          At the end of the war, the training and combat training of pilots remained the weak point of Soviet aviation. Training in flying skills, moral and fighting qualities of pilots improved especially with the Red Army's transition to the offensive, but the Russians did not succeed in correlating this with the ever-increasing quantitative composition and constant modernization of aviation equipment.

          This view of the Luftwaffe officers is confirmed by the following excerpts from the memoirs of two aviation commanders. Captain von Reshke characterizes the Soviet Air Force in the North from the beginning of 1944 until the end of the war:

          “The quality of the material part of the Soviet Air Force by the spring — summer of 1944 was practically equal to the German one. In quantitative terms, the Russians had a clear superiority. Nevertheless, German aviation was still able to successfully carry out the tasks assigned to it.


          Major Yakhne returned to the Eastern Front in January 1945 after a long period of service in the West. This allowed him to competently draw a comparison between the Soviet and Western air forces. He believes that at that time the Soviet Air Force achieved air superiority over East Prussia, but was felt the difference between the nature of the action of Soviet aviation in the East and the Allied in the West.

          For example, in the West, transportation was almost impossible during the daytime, while in East Prussia the supply was almost without resistance.

          In the West, German fighters, as a rule, found themselves embroiled in aerial combat immediately after take-off, and, of course, were no longer able to complete the assigned tasks. In the East, in most cases, they found such an opportunity, although there were certain limitations in time and in choosing the area of ​​action.

          The aviation units of the Western Allies operated throughout the day both in the combat areas and over Germany. The Russians only tried to achieve and maintain air superiority over the front line and in the front line and destroyed the fortifications and troops.

          Despite the increase in combat power, the improvement of flight and combat training of flight personnel, an increase in the flight technical characteristics of aircraft and more advanced tactics, Soviet pilots were too careful in battle. This, no doubt, can be explained by the effective actions of German fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery. Even during the battle on the outskirts of Berlin and in Mecklenburg in April 1945, the Soviet Air Force limited its activities to the front-line area, but Yakhne admits that their actions were very effective and achieved their goals.
  • Pilat2009 8 May 2020 10: 43 New
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    Quote: BORMAN82
    Quote: dvina71
    The pilot of the Red Army needed confirmation of several sources, so that they would count the victory. Everything is simple here .. for every shot down plane they relied on money and not small ones. Therefore, more experienced pilots gave their victories to the followers .. Everyone had relatives in the rear and everyone lived not richly.

    The network has information about the "successes" of the Soviet naval torpedo aircraft of the Northern Fleet. After the war, they began to compare the results of several sources, and it turned out that not everything is so rosy with us.
    But I would like to hear about the missing books)))

    I'll tell you more. Judging by statistics, our fleets have sunk thousands of barges, boats, BDKs and scows
    Nameless.
  • Egor Gladyshev 8 May 2020 10: 44 New
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    There is another factor, German pilots fought en masse under the drug Pervitin, now it is called amphetamine.
    Thanks to the drug, German pilots withstood 5-6 flights a day, But under the drug a person does not reason sensibly. They were crazy drug addicts.
  • Pilat2009 8 May 2020 10: 51 New
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    Quote: geniy
    As for the quality of training for Soviet pilots, I have serious suspicions that modern authors are telling readers a lie. That is, in fact, everything was much more complicated. I suppose that a lot of unnecessary technical information was reported to Soviet ucletes instead of conducting as many training fights as possible. So I believe that Soviet pilots thoroughly studied aerodynamics - at the level of university professors. And besides, there are a lot of useless technical details, such as the size of the gap between the cylinder and the piston of the engine, the ignition order in the cylinders, and all the technical parameters of the aircraft: length, wingspan, height, diameter of the propeller, engine power, grade of gasoline, and much more.
    And besides, modern scoundrels-authors, I suppose, show readers only the number of hours of flight on combat training aircraft, but specifically for deception they do not take into account the flying time on training machines. That is: each pilot was first trained on U-2 training biplanes, then on UT-2 training monoplanes, and only after that on combat aircraft: I-16, I-153, MiG-3, Il-2 and others. So - for deception they show only a raid on military aircraft and it turns out very little. But the raid on U-2 and UT-2 - this is the number of hours - maybe hundreds of hours can be scammers-authors specially throw away, because if you show the Russian readers the total total raid of Soviet pilots on all training types of planes - it will be quite a lot. And then it will become clear to everyone that the raid of the Soviet pilots is quite large, and the cause of the defeat will have to be sought elsewhere.
    Personally, I believe that at the beginning of the war Soviet pilots were given little gasoline - (because it simply wasn’t there - all the warehouses were bombed). Therefore, Soviet pilots made very few sorties compared with German ones - which literally hung over the Soviet defense and chased after every person. You look at Pokryshkin’s raid - it’s just miserable. It seems that the great ace many times more time sat on the ground, and did not make sorties. And everyone else too. And all the Germans made five or six sorties every day.

    I think that driving 200 hours for one is too much luxury during the war. And the Germans made such a large number of sorties because they brought their operational airfields as close to the front line as possible. Someone even wrote in his memoirs that they heard the rumble of motors. bills pharmacology - there were drugs capable of increasing stamina
  • kig
    kig 8 May 2020 12: 05 New
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    And let's read Drabkin, "I fought with the aces of the Luftwaffe." In this book, he interviews pilots who fought in the years 43-45. Here, for example, Krivosheev G.V., graduated from the Kachinsky school in July 1943, and ended up, as expected, in the reserve regiment:
    they stayed in the reserve only 27 days, having passed the so-called "combat use": air combat, firing at ground and air targets, flights along the route. But is that really preparation ?! We had a total raid of only 15 hours!
    - A general raid on all beginners.
    Next, Buchchin Semyon, graduated from Kachu at about the same time:
    Gasoline was allocated a minuscule for flights; at first, except for the U-2, there were no aircraft. Later drove the I-16 and several "Hurricanes". For all the time of training there was not a single training shooting, even on a cone. Group aerobatics was not practiced. To be honest, they simply prepared candidates for the dead, on the basis of the "take-off and landing" principle. By the time I graduated, I had accumulated a little more than 20 hours of flight, of which maybe 1 hour (4 flights) on my own! As a fighter, I was not ready for real battles. In addition, we have never made a parachute jump at a school!

    There are, of course, pilots who claim to have taught them well enough. But there are some. Of course, we can say that Drabkin chose the wrong pilots for his book ...
    1. Dmitry V. 8 May 2020 13: 46 New
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      Quote: kig
      - A general raid on all beginners.


      General raid - perhaps about all types of aircraft UT-1 UT-2 and I-16, etc.
      But in 1942, fuel was bad for training flights - more than 60% of what was planned was lost.
  • WayKheThuo 8 May 2020 12: 51 New
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    That feeling when you read an article and understand - The author is "in the subject"!
    Thank you, Author!
    Thanks to such articles and Authors, it makes sense to spend some time from your life watching VO.
  • xomaNN 8 May 2020 13: 06 New
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    The situation with personnel in the Red Army Air Force was the same as in the whole of the Red Army. But taking into account the fact that the lieutenant pilot must be trained in the use of equipment, the mastery of personal skills is much more than the lieutenant of the infantry, the failures were more noticeable. And in 1941, "big blood" became combat aviation regiments. And yet, yes, by 1943, pilots who had already gained experience or pilots who were able to create a skeleton of l / squad sat down on new types of aircraft. And they were already completing the battle replenishment
  • Shiden 8 May 2020 23: 00 New
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    The article is clearly written to show not about the weakness of the Soviet pilots but about the inflated victories of the German pilots. Although my opinion the whole tragedy of the 41-42s was revealed at Khalkhin Gol where pilots with military experience of Spain and China were gathered from all parts to achieve air superiority in local conflict. And this two years before the war? For victorious realities, they forgot about the losses, did not make conclusions.
  • not main 9 May 2020 00: 54 New
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    Thank you for the article!
  • DDT
    DDT 9 May 2020 13: 04 New
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    I did not understand what the article was about. The angry denunciation of everything and everything, but the fact that the Soviet pilots flew on biplanes, when the Germans had been fighting on high-speed monoplanes for many years, they threw 18-20 year old guys who died on the very first flights immediately from the school. So whose fault is the industry? Or maybe all the same command? Which stubbornly did not want to part with the biplanes and gave the industry the technical tasks that it had to fulfill? And as for the fact that Pokryshkin or Kozhedub claimed to have more downed planes than they counted, all the same, not one of them was standing next to Hartman with 200 shot down. hi
    1. Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 13: 18 New
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      Somewhere on military materials was a study on Hartman in 1944. Confirmed 1 application out of 10 for the investigated period of time.

      And ours must be compared with the allies if that.
      1. DDT
        DDT 9 May 2020 13: 24 New
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        Yes, God knows, you know, I would come to such a consensus that if Hartman and our command believed him about more than 200 shot down planes, then we were mere mortals, God himself ordered all this mess to be seen. We do not deny 60 shot down Pokryshkin? And by the way, Hartman, the only one of all the aces of the 2nd World War, was tried "for damage to social property." I do not condone Hartman, he was still there. He even shot the pilots by parachutes so that they would not survive and then fight against him. But it’s so indiscriminately questioned and brings to a review of the results of the 2nd World War, to the demolition of monuments to the Soviet soldier and other delights of the info war.
        1. Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 13: 32 New
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          This is not a review of the results, namely that there was a cross-check on the minute by documents. From and to. Study of the combat activity of our aircraft.
          We believe, for example, Morozov, huh? In terms of the fact that he carefully cut the final performance of the Navy of the USSR. Capital at what at times from applications. And then a citizen of Oktyabrsky for 1943 reported for the fall of 1943 about a hundred sunken BDBs. Confirmed 10 really won victories in total.
          Why should we treat the Nazis differently?
          So what's the problem with Hartman. If it is confirmed that he was lying?
          1. DDT
            DDT 9 May 2020 13: 36 New
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            Cyril, the fact of the matter is that no one has yet confirmed to us that he was lying. I agree that Hartman counted all disabled planes. But you know what, what our command did. Did you know that many of our pilots, to make sure that they really shot down, escorted enemy aircraft to the ground? In combat, to "confirm"? Is that better than just taking a word to the pilot?
            1. Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 13: 55 New
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              Once again, a specific time period was taken. Our losses are known in time. Loss or missing. Look there is an application. There is no loss. So is the essence of the work clearer?
            2. Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 13: 57 New
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              We have more or less adequately explored the North in terms of air battles. There, the real situation, the Germans reported 25 shot down in a battle over the convoy. We have shot down an MZA attack aircraft, an air fighter, and another attack aircraft made an emergency landing on the water off its shore. Impressive?
              1. DDT
                DDT 9 May 2020 17: 32 New
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                No, not impressive. Who reported to whom? Everyone is exploring, exploring, and the Great Patriotic War archive is still classified under secret. Why?
                1. Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 18: 46 New
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                  Read books on the topic - Having frozen "Torpedo bombers" Skrobach "46 ShAP" Latkina "Attack aircraft SF" and so on? And what do you want from the archive. Understand correctly. Working with the archive is very difficult, and you have to either live near the archive or have a lot of money ...

                  A multivolume “USSR Air Force in War” would have been published, where losses would have been reliably recorded and victories according to German documents, so that a cross-check on documents would have spared no money on him.

                  And I just gave you an example of how you can inflate 3 really lost Soviet aircraft in 25 Luftwaffe wins.
      2. Octopus 10 May 2020 03: 19 New
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        Quote: Cyril G ...
        Somewhere on military materials was a study on Hartman in 1944. Confirmed 1 application out of 10 for the investigated period of time.

        Apparently, this is about
        https://warspot.ru/3125-hartman-nad-yassami-fantazii-v-pogone-za-mechami
        According to the author, during the week-long battles near Iasi, the “blond knight” shot down and knocked out no more than 4–5 Soviet aircraft, overestimating their real result by 7–8 times.


        That is, if we extrapolate this week to the whole account of Hartmann, then he shot down only 50 Soviet planes, and with such a crap account he would be only an American ace No. 1 or a Soviet ace of the top ten, Glinka-Vorozheykin. Ugh, nothing to talk about. (I note in brackets that the author of the article on German archives does not consider checking the accounts of Glinka and Vorozheykin to be necessary).

        But in this article there is one more point that you apparently missed. But in vain.
        In the air battle over Iasi, the Soviet 5th Air Army and the XNUMXst Luftwaffe Air Corps came together. The Soviet aviation group had an impressive composition - the command of the air force of the spacecraft involved the following formations:

        1st Guards Assault Air Corps (8th Guards Shad, 9th Guards Shad, 12th Guards Iad);
        2nd Assault Aviation Corps (7th Guards Shad, 231st Shad);
        The 2nd Guards Bomber Air Corps (1st Guards Bad, 8th Guards Bad, 218th Bad);
        4th Fighter Air Corps (294th Iad, 302nd Iad);
        7th Fighter Air Corps (9th Guards Iad, 205th Iad, 304th Iad);
        312th night bomber aviation division.
        The German air corps could oppose this power with the JG 52 fighter squadron, part of the SG 2, SG 10 and SG 77 assault squad forces, as well as Romanian aviation units - at that time the concentration of such Luftwaffe forces on one small section of the Soviet-German front was already a rarity. This was especially true for fighter aircraft - it was here, a year after the battle in the Kuban, that all three groups of the most productive German squadron under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Dieter Hrabak came together again


        6 Soviet fighter divisions against one German fighter squadron. And how, a lot of war?
      3. Engineer 10 May 2020 12: 42 New
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        Somewhere on military materials was a study on Hartman in 1944.

        Well there is a very specific check.
        Hartmann announces Aerocobra. According to the documents, only Yaki is lost. So the fascist is lying. No options
        Hartman claims Ily shot down 3-4 km. Our silts did not fly so high. So the fascist is lying. No options
        In general, the accounts of many pilots are fully verified. And it was VERY different
        Muller in the north really shot down God forbid a third of what they counted
        Marsail in Africa shot down 2/3 counted and recounted several times
        It is symbolic that nobody checked the accounts of our two icons. For all their steepness, the feeling that we are afraid of something.
        1. Cyril G ... 10 May 2020 17: 12 New
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          Actually, there it was exactly the opposite. If you want to check Pokryshkin, does someone bother you personally?
          1. Engineer 10 May 2020 17: 31 New
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            [quote] Actually, it was exactly the opposite there. [/ quote]
            Really?
            [quote] With a stretch, we can assume that Hartman was mistaken in determining the type of aircraft attacked by him, or there is confusion in the documents. Then at 15:20 instead of the LaGG, he shot down the “Aerocobra” of the pilot of the 438th IAP junior lieutenant N.T. Motuzko, who did not return to his airfield. However, it is doubtful that such an experienced pilot as Hartman might not have recognized "Aero Cobra". [/ Quote]
            Indeed, for the pilots of the 7th Jacob this day was harder than the previous one - for all reasons, 21 Aerocobra were irretrievably lost in the battles! Another fighter made an emergency landing, and at least six were damaged. The German pilots managed to inflict particularly severe damage on the joint efforts of all three groups of JG 52 to the 16th Guards Iap Pokryshkinsky, who lost just five fighters in just one morning battle. However None of the losses fit the time and place for the application of Hartman, who chalked up his first empty hat-trick in the battles of Iasi.
            Of the five “Aerocobras” lost, the 9th Guards Iad and 205th Iad do not know the time of departure of only one fighter from the 438th IAP - after the attack of the Bf 109 pair at an altitude of 4000 meters, Junior Lieutenant G.I. Vodolazhsky was forced to use a parachute. However, this loss is unlikely to be related to Hartman, since all his claims were made at heights of up to 2000 meters.

            [/ quote] The next day, June 2, Hartman announced in one flight two downed "Aerial Cobra" (18:10 and 18:15), but not a single loss of American fighters with red stars occurred at this time, although the 7th Jacob lost three fighters that day.

            Hartmann's results are clearly overpriced, but the article sometimes has some kind of hypercriticism

            [quote] If you want to check Pokryshkin, does someone bother you personally? [/ quote]

            Yes, now I’ll go to the archive in Podolsk to shovel documents
            In the 2000s, a story happened with the first 2-3 downed planes on the account of Pokryshkin who perhaps were attributed to him by mistake, but in fact they were hit by Rechkalov. It just started a mass hysteria. No one was interested in the real state of affairs. The very idea expressed by the author was considered blasphemous.
            At the moment, no one has completely reconciled Kozhedub and Pokryshkin. This is a simple fact.
  • Shteffan 9 May 2020 16: 51 New
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    Some yelling.