Military Review

RKKA anti-tank rifles in production and at the front

191

Anti-tank rifles in the museum. In the foreground is the PTRD, followed by the PTRS. Photo: Vitalykuzmin.net


One of the main means of combating enemy armored vehicles for the Red Army during the years of World War II was the anti-tank guns of two models. PTR design Degtyarev and Simonov were created as soon as possible and only a few months after the outbreak of war found use on the battlefields. The constant development of enemy armored vehicles could limit the real potential of the PTR, but until the very end of the war weapon and arrows-armor-piercers did not remain without work.

As soon as possible


The development of light anti-tank systems of the type of PTR of a different look has been carried out in our country since the beginning of the thirties. At different times, various models were adopted. However, in August 1940, all work ceased, and the existing products were removed from service. The command of the Red Army considered that in the arsenal of the probable enemy the heavy-armored weapons would soon arrive Tanksprotected from fire PTR. Accordingly, the development of anti-tank defense was associated with artillery.

The opinion of the command changed on June 23, 1941. On the day after the outbreak of the war, an order appeared to resume work on the subject of MRA. The gun of the N.V. system was again sent to the landfill Rukavishnikova. Leading enterprises received orders to develop new PTR. Only a few weeks were given to complete the work.


Cartridges of 14,5x114 mm in a pack for loading PTRS. Photo: Vitalykuzmin.net

New projects were created as soon as possible. So, KB-2 of the Kovrov Tool Plant No. 2 presented two PTRs - from the chief designer V.A. Degtyareva and from a group of engineers A.A. Dementieva. According to the results of the PTR tests, Dementyev was seriously reworked, after which it received a recommendation for adoption.

In parallel, S.G. Simonov. It differed from the previous sample by the presence of gas exhaust automation for independent recharging. Despite the great complexity, the project was prepared on time, and the PTR went to the training ground to confirm the characteristics. The refinement was associated with serious difficulties, but in the end we managed to get the desired results.

On August 29, 1941, two new anti-tank rifles, the PTRD of Degtyarev and the PTRS of Simonov, were adopted by the Red Army. Preparations for serial production have begun. The simpler PTRD was launched in September, and by the end of the year more than 17 thousand units were produced. The launch of PTRS was a little delayed, and the first serial products left the assembly line only in November. In the same November, two types of PTR were first used in battles.

Language of numbers


PTRD and PTRS were large-caliber rifles chambered for 14,5 x 114 mm, designed to destroy various types of protected targets. With their help, it was proposed to hit tanks, firing points, including armored and aircraft. Depending on the type of target, fire was fired at distances of up to 500-800 m.


Armor strikers with PTRD in position. Photo: Wikimedia Commons

Two MFIs used a cartridge of 14,5x114 mm, originally created for the Rukavishnikov rifle. 1939. During the war, the main modifications of the cartridge were equipped with armor-piercing incendiary bullets B-32 (hardened steel core) and BS-41 (cermet core). 30-g weight of gunpowder provided acceleration of a bullet weighing 64 g to high speeds.

A characteristic feature of the PTR was the long barrel length, which made it possible to fully use the energy of the cartridge. PTRD and PTRS were equipped with rifled trunks 1350 mm long (93 klb). Due to this, the initial velocity of the bullet reached 1020 m / s. Muzzle energy exceeded 33,2 kJ - several times higher than that of other small arms. The presence of a gas engine slightly reduced the energy of PTR Simonov and affected the combat qualities.

Using a B-32 bullet, both PTRs from a distance of 100 m with a direct hit punched up to 40 mm of homogeneous armor. At a distance of 300 m, penetration for the ATRA was reduced to 35 mm; PTRS due to automation could show less high results. With a further increase in the distance, penetration indicators decreased. As noted in the instruction on the small business of 1942, firing on armored vehicles could be carried out from 500 m with the best results at 300-400 m.

Evolution of goals


The abandonment of the PTR in 1940 was due to the fact that the Red Army command was expecting the appearance of tanks with frontal armor with a thickness of at least 50-60 mm, which only artillery could handle. As the events of the summer of 1941 showed, the enemy was simply overestimated. The main tanks of the Wehrmacht had much less powerful defense.

RKKA anti-tank rifles in production and at the front

The Degtyarev shotgun and his calculation in Stalingrad, August 1942. Photo by Pavel Troshkin (1909-1944) / Wikimedia Commons

The basis of the German tank fleet was light class vehicles. So, one of the most massive was the Pz.Kpfw.II tank - about 1700 units of all modifications. Early versions of this vehicle had armor up to 13 mm thick (body) and 15 mm thick (tower). In later versions, the maximum thickness of the armor reached 30-35 mm.

When attacking the USSR, approx. 700 light tanks Pz.Kpfw. 38 (t) Czechoslovak production. The hull and turret of such equipment had armor up to 25 mm thick, mounted at different angles. Other areas were noticeably thinner.

Before the attack on the USSR, German industry managed to master the production of medium tanks Pz.Kpfw.III of a number of modifications. The cars of the early series had armor no thicker than 15 mm. In the future, protection increased to 30-50 mm, including using overhead parts.

Medium tanks Pz.Kpfw.IV initially had 30-mm frontal armor, but with further improvement, the protection was repeatedly improved. On the latest versions, a forehead 80 mm thick was used. However, even on the later Pz.Kpfw.IV, the side projection had a protection of no more than 30 mm.


Experiment: Simonov rifle with a telescopic sight. Photo: Armedman.ru

All subsequent German tanks, created after the attack on the USSR, had relatively thick armor on all projections. Its penetration from the PTR at any range and angle was excluded.

Bullet against armor


Thanks to the fairly high characteristics, the PTRD and PTRS could hit the Wehrmacht light tanks at distances of up to 300-500 m. Early medium tanks were also a good target, which could be disabled by a successful hit. However, in the future the situation began to change. Improved modifications and completely new tanks featured enhanced protection, both on the forehead and in other projections, which could protect them from PTR fire.

Despite the strengthening of the frontal projection, the side often retained less thick armor, which did not go unnoticed by the armored personnel carriers. Later tanks did not make their way into the side - they responded with fire on the chassis, optics and weapons. The arrows kept a chance to hit the target from an acceptable distance.

It should be noted that the realization of the full potential of the PTR was associated with special difficulties and required the shooter to be courageous, and sometimes heroism. Unlike the tank crew, the calculation of the PTR for the position had minimal protection. The effective firing range did not exceed several hundred meters, which is why the armor-piercers risked attracting the attention of tankers or accompanying infantry. At the same time, such a tank-dangerous target became a priority for the enemy.

As a result of this, a successful battle with enemy tanks was accompanied by constant high losses among personnel. This fact is reflected in the army folklore in the form of a saying about the long trunk and short life. However, under the difficult conditions of 1941-42. I did not have to choose. Anti-tank rifles were a full-fledged element of anti-tank infantry, working together with more powerful artillery.


German light tank Pz.Kpfw.II. Soviet PTR pierced his armor from any angle. Photo: Wikimedia Commons

In production and at the front


The serial production of the PTRD started in September 1941, and within a few months, tens of thousands of such products were counted. Production continued until 1944, and during this time the Red Army received more than 280 thousand guns. PTR Simonov went into series a little later, and the complexity of the design affected the pace of production. It was produced until 1945, transferring to the front a total of 190 thousand products.

PTR entered the states of the formations in December 1941. Then the infantry regiment was given the company PTR with three platoons of three compartments in each. The department included three calculations with guns. In the future, as the troops were saturated with armaments, it was possible to change staff - until the introduction of gun companies into the battalion of the rifle regiment. Also, over time, the company PTR appeared in the anti-tank division of the division.

With all the difficulties and risks, in the early stages of the war, two types of anti-tank missiles were very effective weapons. It allowed rifle units to fight the vast majority of enemy armored vehicles, as well as to hit other targets. In the future, the reservation of enemy tanks improved, and by 1943-44. they ceased to be the main target of armor-piercers. However, PTR continued to be used to defeat light armored vehicles of various classes, firing points, etc. Separate cases of successful firing on low-flying aircraft are known.

Even having “lost” their original anti-tank mission, the Soviet anti-tank missiles were massively used until the end of the war and successfully completed their tasks. The last 14,5 mm bullets were already fired on the streets of Berlin.


Middle Pz.Kpfw. IV Ausf. H. Thick frontal armor protects against PTR, but the side sheets had to be supplemented with screens. Bundesarchive Photos

During the years of the war, serial PTRs managed to show themselves as effective, but difficult to use weapons. On the combat account of the PTR calculations, hundreds and thousands of protected enemy vehicles, both temporarily disabled and out of combat, and completely destroyed. Thousands of armor-piercers received well-deserved military awards.

Contribution to victory


In general, история Soviet anti-tank rifles of the Great Patriotic War is of great interest. Since the beginning of the thirties, our designers managed to study well the issue of light anti-tank systems and then lay the foundation for their further development. The development of the PTR area was interrupted for a short time, but already in the summer of 1941 all measures were taken to create and introduce new models.

The results of these measures were not long in coming, and a simple and effective mass anti-tank weapon appeared at the disposal of the Red Army small arms. PTRs became a successful addition to artillery and were used until the very end of the war. Moreover, their potential turned out to be much higher: Soviet anti-tank rifles are still used in local conflicts.
Author:
191 comment
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. Cyril G ...
    Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 18: 29 New
    -10
    And those who covered up the PTR works in 1940 were not real pests, and before that they had not diligently given them progress from 1931-32.
    1. alone
      alone 9 May 2020 19: 02 New
      -2
      Quote: Cyril G ...
      And those who covered up the PTR works in 1940 were not real pests, and before that they had not diligently given them progress from 1931-32.

      PTR is a purely defensive weapon .. The doctrine of the Red Army ruled out any defense .. The whole tactics and strategy of the Red Army was to conduct military operations on the territory of the enemy .. On the territory of the enemy they do not defend, but attack
      1. Lopatov
        Lopatov 9 May 2020 19: 20 New
        18
        Quote: lonely
        PTR is a purely defensive weapon.

        Not on your nelly.
        Suppression of anti-tank weapons, fire on machine guns and loopholes bunkers / bunkers, the destruction of counterattacks and tanks and armored vehicles operating from ambushes.
        1. Lopatov
          Lopatov 9 May 2020 20: 13 New
          13
          Quote: lonely
          PTR is a purely defensive weapon ..

      2. Cyril G ...
        Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 19: 21 New
        +7
        Show the document with the denial of defense from the Red Army on the eve of the war.
      3. Aag
        Aag 9 May 2020 19: 23 New
        -6
        "Anti-tank guns of two models became one of the main means of fighting enemy armored vehicles for the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War."
        It seems like a streamlined formulation, but, according to my knowledge, at least incorrect.
        Apparently, you need to specify the time and place (rifle units) ...
        If it’s not right, correct it. But, in the first line of the article, declaring it without explanation is error (IMHO).
      4. chenia
        chenia 9 May 2020 19: 25 New
        15
        Quote: lonely
        .Doctrine of the Red Army ruled out any defense


        Profound conclusion. So the doctrine of the SA of my time also determined the offensive by the main form of hostilities, but anti-tank infantry equipment existed from RPGs to ATGMs. And according to the staff of that time in the rifle battalion should be more serious-45mm PTO.
        Yes, and the Germans (1941) have one blitzkrieg, but there should be defense against PT, they even covered the flanks with guns (10,5 cm) art. regiment, and this is in the presence of a battalion.

        ruled out any defense is delirious delirium.
        1. alone
          alone 9 May 2020 19: 34 New
          -10
          Quote: chenia
          excluded any defense - this is delusional nonsense.

          The doctrine was such that to wage war on the territory of the enemy with little blood .. On the territory of the enemy they do not defend, but attack .. The concept of defense was that the troops had to fight off counterattacks and in general act so that the enemy could not even think about the offensive ..As part of the Red Army in 1941, up to 30 mechanized corps were formed or were at the formation stage as part of 2 TD and 1 MSD .. These forces were not intended for deaf defense. Each mechanized corps fully armed corresponded to the Tank Army of 1945
          1. Lopatov
            Lopatov 9 May 2020 19: 42 New
            +7
            Quote: lonely
            The doctrine was such that to wage war on the territory of the enemy with little blood .. On the territory of the enemy they do not defend, but attack ..

            Nevertheless, they were preparing to defend themselves.
            1. alone
              alone 9 May 2020 19: 43 New
              -1
              Quote: Spade
              Nevertheless, they were preparing to defend themselves.

              Certainly ... But the main bet was put on offensive actions hi
              1. Lopatov
                Lopatov 9 May 2020 19: 46 New
                +6
                And because of this powerful development has received fortification?
                1. alone
                  alone 9 May 2020 20: 06 New
                  -4
                  Quote: Spade
                  And because of this powerful development has received fortification?

                  It was developed, but in most cases it showed insolvency during a maneuver war .. The French, the Belgians did not save it .. And the shock forces preferred to bypass it, leaving these lines behind them .. That’s why after the war they lost relevance .. Although personally I saw in us a modern fortified area, which operated until 1989
                  1. Lopatov
                    Lopatov 9 May 2020 20: 11 New
                    +7
                    Quote: lonely
                    It was developed, but in most cases showed insolvency during a maneuver war ..

                    You are confusing something.
                    Quote: lonely
                    She did not save the Belgians

                    And she saved Moscow. And Stalingrad. And the Battle of Kursk ended in victory only thanks to the "untenable" fortification. Like the Balaton defensive operation
                    1. alone
                      alone 9 May 2020 20: 34 New
                      -4
                      Quote: Spade
                      And she saved Moscow. And Stalingrad. And the Battle of Kursk ended in victory only thanks to the "untenable" fortification. Like the Balaton defensive operation

                      Well, the Stalin Line was also from the ranks of these forts. And it was also passed. Field fortification + the ability to use it in a defensive battle = those examples that you cited ..
                      But the French were not lucky with their Maginot .. The Germans hit the wrong place, in the Ardennes, went into the operational space and the whole army that was defending in Maginot was unsuccessful .. in the end they were simply surrounded and forced to surrender
                      1. Lopatov
                        Lopatov 9 May 2020 20: 39 New
                        +9
                        Quote: lonely
                        Well Stalin Line

                        You are definitely confusing something. Field fortification is not just "lines"
                      2. alone
                        alone 9 May 2020 20: 42 New
                        -2
                        I mean a line of fortified areas like Maginot, them Stalin, etc .. And the trenches and dugouts my dear, even now no one has canceled
                      3. Lopatov
                        Lopatov 9 May 2020 20: 50 New
                        +9
                        Quote: lonely
                        I mean the line of fortified areas

                        An individual trench for shooting is also a field fortification.


                        Quote: lonely
                        And my dear trenches and dugouts, even now no one has canceled

                        And the trenches and dugouts, my dear, are used in defense
                        Which, as you stated above, was "excluded"
                      4. alone
                        alone 9 May 2020 20: 59 New
                        -3
                        Quote: Spade
                        Which, as you stated above, was "excluded"

                        She was assigned a secondary role .. Please tell me, How do you explain the fact of the presence of 4 mechanized corps as part of a ZOVO and 5 mechanized corps as part of a UZOVO? For defense? I don’t think .. The strategy was such that, when attacked, the rifle units and artillery regiments stop the enemy, damage him. .and the mechanized corps begin to drive the enemy to the very place where their mother gave birth .. Moreover, the blows should be such that the enemy should only think about where he should run
                      5. Lopatov
                        Lopatov 9 May 2020 21: 21 New
                        +4
                        Quote: lonely
                        She was assigned a secondary role.

                        And the oncoming battle is tertiary?
                        laughing
                      6. alone
                        alone 9 May 2020 21: 36 New
                        -5
                        Well, if from the enemy lupanuli from all the artillery barrels, of which there were 90 thousand units only in the Western direction, and then an avalanche of armor, which numbered 12-13 thousand tanks, not counting armored cars, with infantry of about 2,5 million people surged, probably thought that there’s no talk of any oncoming battle ..
                        Surely serious mistakes were made in the preparation of the plans .. In general, there are a lot of questions and interpretations about 1941-1942 ...
                      7. Lopatov
                        Lopatov 9 May 2020 21: 48 New
                        11
                        Just look at the pre-war Charters and manuals, and all city legends will disappear.
                      8. alone
                        alone 9 May 2020 21: 51 New
                        -2
                        Quote: Spade
                        Just look at the pre-war Charters and manuals, and all city legends will disappear

                        Yes, you have to ... There’s nothing to do anyway hi
                      9. KVIRTU
                        KVIRTU 10 May 2020 14: 09 New
                        +3
                        I recommend PU-39 (field charter of the Red Army). Chapter 10. Defense.
                  2. +5
                    +5 10 May 2020 19: 19 New
                    +4
                    Yeah, that's just the number of thousands of tanks must be cut down to 1 and 2 categories out of 5, those are combat-ready .... And the foe had 5 versus 2,5 ... and naked tanks could "rush", for a sufficient number of trucks and there were no tractors for the pikhote and the artel ... in fact, in the Battle of the Border, there were bare tanks and rushing to and fro .. There they ended, but the pace of the offensive was thwarted as a result. If we were the first, the result would be similar
                  3. EvilLion
                    EvilLion 19 May 2020 09: 20 New
                    +1
                    Only the Americans would have yelled about how we are hijacking the Germans.
                2. EvilLion
                  EvilLion 19 May 2020 09: 24 New
                  0
                  What are 90 thousand? 76 mm guns at the beginning of the Second World War was 200% of the set, respectively, the old guns went to the warehouses, and it was due to them that they were armed in the fall of the 41st. They will not sell 2.5 million people 4-5 million. Well, nothing.
    2. Cyril G ...
      Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 20: 41 New
      +4
      I will draw your attention when the Germans came across heavy naval artillery covered by field fortification, they had some serious problems. They didn’t take Leningrad, they fiddled with Sevastopol for a very long time by the standards of WWII. 9 months. There was a stopper in Tallinn too
    3. alone
      alone 9 May 2020 20: 45 New
      +6
      Quote: Cyril G ...
      I will draw your attention when the Germans came across heavy naval artillery covered by field fortification, they had some serious problems. They didn’t take Leningrad, they fiddled with Sevastopol for a very long time by the standards of WWII. 9 months. There was a stopper in Tallinn too

      If field fortifications cover heavy artillery with a caliber of 203 mm and higher, and especially marine, any army will have big problems .. laughing
    4. Range
      Range 10 May 2020 00: 52 New
      -2
      If the traitors (the then Liberda) hadn’t blown up the explosives depots in Sevastopol, then the Nazis would have taken it, i.e. our troops would not have to leave it.
  • +5
    +5 10 May 2020 19: 13 New
    -3
    And Moscow and Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge ended in a victorious counterattack .... The Germans simply stupidly circled the defense or tore in the forehead ... in the first case, the Germans stepped so deep into the Soviet defense that they tore their pants, in the second and third they practically sold or defended, but got lyuli from reserves ..
    1. EvilLion
      EvilLion 19 May 2020 09: 22 New
      0
      Near Kursk, the Germans advanced in the weakest place and carried everything in front of them, stopped them with counterattacks, despite the fact that the density of troops was then anomalously high
  • Cyril G ...
    Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 20: 03 New
    +4
    Do you think that the formation of 32 mechanized corps is an act of terry wrecking and treason? We could not provide them with tanks, cars or adequate personnel. How many tank armies did we have in 1944? Do you remember? My answer is 6. The tank army is 41 years old in terms of the number of tanks. Moreover, 6 TA was enough for us to defeat the Reich and its lackeys.
    1. chenia
      chenia 9 May 2020 20: 28 New
      +4
      Quote: Cyril G ...
      Do you think that the formation of 32 mechanized corps is an act of terry wrecking and treason?


      He always claimed that Meretskov was pressed for good reason (although he languidly resisted such an expansion), Zhukov also had to. But the army lobby was dragged (this is how many posts appeared), straining Stalin and that industry. So at least they would drive the MK out in the exercises (there was a year). and the staff was optimized (then there would definitely be less tanks). But it is impossible to elevate to the rank of wrecking, other motives and thought they would have time to correct it at the conservatory.
      1. Cyril G ...
        Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 20: 30 New
        0
        I don’t even remember trying to bring MK to the exercises. The result is predictable
        1. chenia
          chenia 9 May 2020 20: 35 New
          +4
          Quote: Cyril G ...
          I don’t even remember trying


          In the fall of 1941 they planned, did not have time. But there was a whole year. This is the fault of both Meretskov and Zhukov — to replicate such formations with a muddy OSh.
          1. Cyril G ...
            Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 20: 43 New
            +3
            Rather, Tymoshenko vs Zhukov. Chicks of the nest of Yakirov. Natives of KOVO
            1. chenia
              chenia 9 May 2020 20: 56 New
              +2
              Quote: Cyril G ...
              Rather Tymoshenko vs Zhukov


              Yes you are right. By inertia, I inserted Meretsky (he didn’t want to get up to 30 MK), he approved the OSh and for six months, he didn’t even try to verify the exercises.
            2. alone
              alone 9 May 2020 21: 01 New
              +5
              Quote: Cyril G ...
              Rather, Tymoshenko vs Zhukov. Chicks of the nest of Yakirov. Natives of KOVO

              Well, you probably still don’t know about the plans of Tukhachevsky, who wanted to have 150 thousand tanks and 100 thousand aircraft at hand .. From these figures, even Stalin felt uneasy
              1. Cyril G ...
                Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 21: 23 New
                +1
                I probably know, it was necessary to shoot right away ...
              2. alone
                alone 9 May 2020 21: 28 New
                +2
                Quote: Cyril G ...
                I had to shoot right away ...

                Well, still shot ..
              3. Cyril G ...
                Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 21: 29 New
                +1
                Thought too long
              4. alone
                alone 9 May 2020 21: 40 New
                +5
                Quote: Cyril G ...
                Thought too long

                Probably thought to shoot him or put him in a psychiatric hospital .. Then we stopped at the first option .. In the psychiatric hospital, he still had to be fed
              5. Cyril G ...
                Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 21: 42 New
                +1
                Yeah......
  • EvilLion
    EvilLion 19 May 2020 09: 04 New
    0
    You just had to sit and do nothing. Then that's for sure everything will work out.
  • Alexandra
    Alexandra 10 May 2020 16: 10 New
    +2
    http://zhistory.org.ua/mehkovo.htm

    "... The first military (training) exercise of the 4th mechanized corps and the 6th rifle corps with the involvement of aviation was also held in August 1940. Like the KSHU, it was devoted to working out the issue of entering a mechanized corps into a breakthrough.

    Noteworthy is the fact that, in preparation for the teachings, G.K. Zhukov and M.I. Potapov considered issues related to the choice of the concentration area of ​​the mechanized corps, its removal from the line of entry into the breakthrough, and the procedure for the deployment of troops to it. G.K. Zhukov, together with M.I. Potapov, decided to designate a concentration area of ​​the mechanized corps troops 15 km from the entry line, which, in their opinion, precluded the detection of a connection by the enemy. It was also decided to introduce the hull into the breakthrough in marching columns along two parallel routes.

    On the eve of the exercise, G.K. Zhukov addressed the commanders of the formations and units participating in it. He emphasized that military exercises with the participation of the mechanized corps of the new organization were held in the Red Army for the first time, and called on the command staff to be creative in solving the assigned tasks. Georgy Konstantinovich separately dwelt on the issues of organizing the interaction of forces and means when introducing the corps into a breakthrough and suggested developing not a textual, but a graphic table of interaction.

    During the exercises, G.K. Zhukov and M.I. Potapov visited the command posts of the divisions and in some regiments, and observed the actions of the troops. The exercise as a whole was successful. At its analysis, the commander of the district’s troops once again drew attention to the need for a more detailed organization of interaction at the top of the links, as well as to the training of tank drivers and car drivers in order to eliminate traffic jams and lagging of equipment on the extension routes ...

    ... The second military (training) exercise of the 4th mechanized and 6th infantry corps was held in mid-September 1940, taking into account the experience of previous exercises. In the course of the exercise, it was planned to draw the attention of the entire command staff to the development of such issues as increasing the speed of the mechanized corps offensive in the operational depths of enemy defenses, using rounds and sweeps of enemy strongpoints, breaking through defensive lines in the depths of enemy defenses on the move, and defeating the enemy in a head-on battle by encircling , dismemberment and destruction of his troops in parts.

    On September 26–28, 1940, the final exercise of the 6th Army was held on the theme “The offensive of the army and the introduction of a mechanized corps into a breakthrough” (4). It was attended by the Chief of the General Staff, Army General K. A. Meretskov, Army General G. K. Zhukov, representatives of the Main Directorate of Armored Forces and the Military Academy of the General Staff. Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko led the teachings of the People’s Commissar of Defense. He praised the results of the exercise and encouraged the most distinguished participants.

    On October 16, 1940, in accordance with the directive of the district commander of August 8, 1940, an experimental exercise was held on the theme “March and the encounter battle of the mechanized corps”. It was attended by the headquarters and troops of the 8th Panzer and 81st Motorized Divisions of the 4th Mechanized Corps. The purpose of the exercise was to verify the possibility of preparing and conducting the march in a short time, as well as working out the issues of communicating to the subordinate units and subunits the decisions of the corps commander during the march to the sharp turn of the columns with the troops entering new routes in readiness for the oncoming engagement.

    The results of the exercise were assessed positively by G.K Zhukov. For its high-quality preparation and conduct, the leadership of the corps (including the author of the article) was awarded valuable gifts ... "

    The problem was not in exercises, but in very dense pre-war ideas about the tactics of massive combat use of tanks. Tactical densities of tanks per km of the offensive front were adopted in 30-35 vehicles, more than two lower than German ones. There was no understanding that a tank attack must be accompanied by artillery fire, both howitzer and tank support guns put forward for direct fire. The prevailing opinion was that the tank itself was artillery. The tank units did not have their own infantry units, and as a result, escort of attacking tanks by infantry was usually not possible to organize. etc.
  • Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 10 May 2020 18: 04 New
    0
    Quote: Cyril G ...
    I don’t even remember trying to bring MK to the exercises. The result is predictable

    ... instead of thinking creatively whether it would be more convenient to storm Berlin from the northeast or southeast, Comrade Zhukov issued orders on conducting experimental exercises of the mechanized corps of the Moscow military district in September 1941, during which exercises it was necessary to check and determine "... the saturation of weapons and the most appropriate placement of these weapons in units and subunits, the controllability of units and subunits, their mobility, the organization of intelligence and command and control bodies, the saturation of units with means: ferry, APO, air defense etc., the work of the rear of the tank and motorized divisions in all levels, without any convention, with a normal depth of delivery ... ".
    © D. Shein
    The exercises were supposed to:
    ... measure the time required to draw and form columns of the tank and motorized divisions, the actual depth of columns on the march, the average speed of the columns, the time required to deploy from the marching order into battle, the front width and the depth of battle formation, determine the adequacy of reconnaissance equipment , methods of organizing artillery support for the attack, whether the available time equipment and supplies for all types of supplies correspond to the actual needs of the mechanized corps units and formations and the reality of the state
  • alone
    alone 9 May 2020 20: 40 New
    +1
    Quote: Cyril G ...
    Do you think that the formation of 32 mechanized corps is an act of terry wrecking and treason?

    no .. I don’t think ... In the USSR there were a large number of tanks that were superior in armor and
    in arming any German tank in its qualification ... by the fact that it was possible to arm 15 mechanized corps ... start the war 2-3 years later, the Germans would have seen all 32 fully armed mechanized corps in front of them
    1. Cyril G ...
      Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 20: 51 New
      +4
      artillery, cars and personnel - that’s the problem, Plus, we got a mixed tank rabble
    2. EvilLion
      EvilLion 19 May 2020 09: 19 New
      0
      What, the T-26 is superior to the Pz-IIIG? Not even funny. This is irrespective of the suitability of these tanks for arming precisely mechanized corps, rather than individual tank brigades attached to infantry formations.
      1. alone
        alone 19 May 2020 10: 23 New
        0
        Quote: EvilLion
        What, the T-26 is superior to the Pz-IIIG?

        Why do you compare the T-3 with the T-26? What was worse than BT-2, BT-7 from T-3? What was worse than the T-34-76, KV-1, KV-2 from the most powerful German tank T-4? You can compare the T-26 with the T-2. It’s better not to talk about the T-1 at all ... a gun with a machine gun ..Soviet tanks were head and shoulders better than German ones .. But how they used them is another matter .. This is a question for the comforces that launched the mechanized corps battle in parts and without air support, plus the disgusting organization of providing corps with fuel and ammunition .. More than half of the tank fleet was destroyed by the tankers themselves, so that it would not fall into the hands of the Germans whole. All talk about the fact that Soviet tanks were worse than German is a lie
        1. EvilLion
          EvilLion 19 May 2020 10: 45 New
          0
          BT horseradish already because it burned much better than the T-26, proofs at Zhukov near Khalkhin Gol. KV-2 is a piece of scrap metal, which is typical, then they didn’t do similar machines, but you can’t load such a chassis and an engine with more than 46-47 tons. The Pz-III at the beginning of the Second World War is a much more advanced tank than the T-34 and KV-1, and in the 42nd Pz-IV with a long-barrel 75 mm gun it is clearly better than the then T-34, it will then be the T-34 . 43rd year and T-34-85 with which the Pz-IV is difficult to argue.

          It is quite legitimate to compare the T-26 with Pz-III, all the more so since the release of the T-26 was only to cease from the 41st year. Of course, the T-26 with a 45 mm gun is better than the earlier Pz-III because it has at least a high-explosive grenade, but then the situation changes. At the same time, the same Pz-III has not 3 people in the crew, but 5, that is, the commander there is seriously unloaded and is occupied precisely by the command, and is not busy with the gun. It is clear that the other against the T-34 is not serious, but the Pz-IIIG already has good chances against the T-34.

          Not everything in a tank is determined by millimeters, you know.
          1. alone
            alone 19 May 2020 10: 49 New
            0
            Quote: EvilLion
            Not everything in a tank is determined by millimeters, you know.

            Quite .. Half of the German tanks that crossed the border were t-1 and t-2. Generally sucks ..
            The point here is in command and control .. at the initial stage, the Germans preferred it
        2. Cyril G ...
          Cyril G ... 19 May 2020 10: 46 New
          0
          If I remember correctly, the mechanized corps were subordinate to the armies. It ended predictably
  • alone
    alone 9 May 2020 20: 48 New
    +3
    Quote: Cyril G ...
    Moreover, 6 TA was enough for us to defeat the Reich and its lackeys.

    I fundamentally disagree .. In addition to 6 TA, in the Soviet Army there were a lot of separate tank corps and brigades. Not all fronts had tank armies in their composition .. TA were concentrated in the main directions.
    1. Cyril G ...
      Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 20: 52 New
      0
      Tank aria-44, equal to tanks in the mechanized corps-41. Is not it?
      1. alone
        alone 9 May 2020 21: 05 New
        +1
        Quote: Cyril G ...
        Tank aria-44, two times less tanks than in mechanized corps-41. Is not it?

        About the same, maybe a little less
        1. Cyril G ...
          Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 21: 22 New
          +2
          I got better. I agree. equal approximately. This in the 43rd approximately 450-500 tanks were
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 10 May 2020 19: 55 New
        +3
        Quote: Cyril G ...
        Tank aria-44, equal to tanks in the mechanized corps-41. Is not it?

        EMNIP, the only time that a wartime TA approached the pre-war MK in terms of the number of tanks and self-propelled guns is 6 guards. TA in the Manchu operation. And then the TA-45 did not reach the MK-41 somewhere in 80 tanks. smile
  • +5
    +5 10 May 2020 19: 23 New
    +2
    It’s quite .... Establishment of inflated plans, either unfulfilled, or unnecessary and redundant, was also in industry in the 30s ... your subtle pest is when a pest shreds the shirt to the navel and accuses all dissenters of the wrecking
  • EvilLion
    EvilLion 19 May 2020 09: 03 New
    0
    No, we think that you are an ordinary anti-Soviet for 500 rubles. and the optimal composition of fur. formations of the Germans, too, was not formed immediately and was also based on the principle "from what is."
    1. Cyril G ...
      Cyril G ... 19 May 2020 09: 12 New
      0
      Then who are you? You did not realize what I wrote? For the 32x MK there were no tanks, one could only hope for the end of 1943, and then there was a shabby hodgepodge. No other materiel, Not important cars. And most importantly, of course, people. So things are not done, from the word at all. So things are not done from the word at all.

      However, even more interesting was the issue of providing a deployable group of fuels and lubricants ....
      1. EvilLion
        EvilLion 19 May 2020 10: 02 New
        0
        This is a question for an industry that has successfully thwarted plans. At the same time, another question automatically arises for you, but what do you propose to do? Do not create fur. connections in general? The French were turned on the genitals in many ways precisely on this, they simply spread the tanks throughout the army. I am not discussing the issues now that the creation of the management of such a large connection creates many posts, and the request for N units does not mean that they will give N, it will be more likely NM. That is, there is always some kind of lobbyism, and the military generally always ask for more and more.
        1. Cyril G ...
          Cyril G ... 19 May 2020 10: 41 New
          0
          Create of course. Only it is necessary to proceed from the availability of equipment. tanks are not the main thing here. The main artifact, well-thought-out fuel and lubricant service, infantry capable of interacting with tanks. Formed. worked on the division exercises. corps formed of divisions ....
          Naked tanks are useless.
          1. EvilLion
            EvilLion 19 May 2020 12: 31 New
            0
            Do not consider yourself smarter than Zhukov. Believe me, he knew better than you, as in the Red Army with infantry.
  • chenia
    chenia 9 May 2020 20: 14 New
    +5
    Quote: lonely
    The concept of defense was that the troops had to repel counterattacks


    You won’t believe it, but you have to beat off counterattacks and counterattacks even in the most successful offensive operation. Our control units (of that time) envisaged this for the formation of any level, and the transition to defense is the end result of even the most successful strategic operation.
    Quote: lonely
    As part of the Red Army in 1941, up to 30 mechanized corps were formed or were at the formation stage as part of 2 TD and 1 MSD.


    Yes, the result of these events was not only completely disrupted. at least some kind of BP (which for me is the main cause of the 1941 disaster). but also knocked out br tanks from the SK. And they (their units) in defense constituted an attack group for counterattacks and counterattacks. or carried out cover when leaving. But there is no BU (which did not deny the defense), or the staff is to blame. just a lack of equipment.
    1. EvilLion
      EvilLion 19 May 2020 10: 04 New
      0
      And another 100500 objective factors that could not be eliminated.
  • Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 10 May 2020 18: 02 New
    +5
    Quote: lonely
    The doctrine was such that to wage war on enemy territory with little blood ..

    You stubbornly confuse doctrine and propaganda. In the USSR of the 30s, doctrine and propaganda did not intersect in any way - they said one thing, but planned a completely different thing.
    It should be noted that the propaganda speeches of political and military leaders contained somewhat different tasks than the military plans developed under their leadership. So, in 1936, K. Ye. Voroshilov proclaimed the slogan that the Red Army would wage war "with little blood and on foreign territory." But this statement did not prevent the approval of the next year’s plan of evacuation from areas that may be occupied by the enemy, and the next norms of losses for the year of the war, which had very little in common with the mentioned slogan. Therefore, when analyzing preparations for war, it is very important to separate political propaganda from the real direction of military planning.
    © Melia A.A. Mobilization training of the national economy of the USSR.
    Quote: lonely
    As part of the Red Army in 1941, up to 30 mechanized corps were formed or were at the formation stage as part of 2 TD and 1 MSD .. These forces were not intended for deaf defense.

    You are stubbornly substituting defense as a whole with the most useless of its types - defensive defense. Simply because defensive defenses at the beginning of the 40s are a direct path into the cauldron: it is impossible to create authorized defense densities on the entire front in the direction of the main attack, so the enemy can always maneuver his forces and strike at the most vulnerable point. So it was in the "Typhoon", so it was near Stalingrad, so it was on the Kursk Bulge, so it was on the bridgeheads near Kiev in 1943, even during the storming of Berlin Katukov found and hit the weakest point of the German defense on the Seelow Heights. And then the units and formations sitting in the defensive end find themselves in the cauldron - despite all their superbly prepared positions.
    The defense against the enemy with mechanical units must be active - their mechanical connections must remain in reserve until the direction of the enemy’s main attack is determined, then move to the flanks of the breakthrough and strike towards each other to seal his neck before the enemy infantry is drawn into it. Without its mechanical units, it is almost impossible to repulse the enemy’s mechanical strike - the infantry’s mobility and firepower is simply not enough to seal a breakthrough in a timely manner.
    1. EvilLion
      EvilLion 19 May 2020 10: 05 New
      0
      He just still lives in the 1980s and reads the then "Spark".
  • +5
    +5 10 May 2020 19: 07 New
    +2
    Matched ??? By the nominal number of tanks - yes .... But only in TA 45 there were still a bunch of heaps of everything, in MK 41 there were only tanks ....
    1. Cyril G ...
      Cyril G ... 10 May 2020 19: 28 New
      0
      Speech exclusively about the number of tanks
  • strannik1985
    strannik1985 9 May 2020 19: 45 New
    +6
    All tactics and strategy of the Red Army was the conduct of hostilities on the territory of the enemy ..

    You are confusing military strategy and official propaganda. The first plans for the evacuation of industry were developed back in 1928, at first simply evacuation, then the deployment of industrial enterprises in a new place.
    1. alone
      alone 9 May 2020 20: 01 New
      +1
      Quote: strannik1985
      You are confusing military strategy and official propaganda.

      I don’t believe in propaganda .. There is a logic .. A country with a defensive doctrine forms 30 mechanized corps for this, each of which consists of 2 TD and 1 MR. action ...?
      1. strannik1985
        strannik1985 10 May 2020 05: 23 New
        0
        I don’t believe in propaganda .. There is logic ..

        The defensive doctrine does not imply only standing on the defensive, the same struggle for an offensive initiative in which MK is one of the elements of the battle order, and in fact in the border battle they were used for counterattacks.
      2. +5
        +5 10 May 2020 19: 28 New
        0
        There were 2 countries in the world that understood the maneuvering character of a future war ... Only in one of them it was thought that apart from tanks, the infantry and artillery attached to them must also be mobile .. In the other, they didn’t think of it or understood that both tanks and trucks tractors do not rivet ..
        1. EvilLion
          EvilLion 19 May 2020 10: 10 New
          +1
          And this is a lot of questions for Tukhachevsky and his mafia. They shot him for 4 years, during which time it was unrealistic to reformat the structure of industry radically. It was necessary at the beginning of the 30s to lay that this plant would not build tanks, but tractors, and this would be cheaper, since there is no need to make towers with shoulder straps under them, nor to lay higher requirements due to the large product weights.
          1. Cyril G ...
            Cyril G ... 19 May 2020 10: 48 New
            0
            I agree. It’s right that they shot, It’s very bad that they shot late.
    2. Cyril G ...
      Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 20: 05 New
      +4
      An updated plan for the Evacuation-41 train had a place to be. And the Red Army in 41 iron decided the outcome of the war, ensuring the evacuation of industry. An unprecedented operation.
      1. alone
        alone 9 May 2020 20: 10 New
        0
        Quote: Cyril G ...
        An updated plan for the Evacuation-41 train had a place to be. And the Red Army in 41 iron decided the outcome of the war, ensuring the evacuation of industry. An unprecedented operation.

        Cyril, any country has an evacuation plan .. Yes you are right, in many respects the outcome of the war was decided by the evacuation of industry .. Without this, it was almost impossible to win the war .. But this does not contradict
        what I wrote .. You can have an evacuation plan and at the same time have an offensive doctrine.
        1. Cyril G ...
          Cyril G ... 9 May 2020 20: 15 New
          0
          Did anyone do this on a scale?
          1. alone
            alone 9 May 2020 20: 26 New
            +3
            Quote: Cyril G ...
            Did anyone do this on a scale?

            But no one even managed to do this .. The longest land war before the Second World War was in France and Norway for about 2 months ... And to be honest, you should not compare the territorial capabilities of the USSR and others ... In the USSR, orders were given quickly, but fulfilled them even faster, knowing what this threatens .. Others didn’t .. And if it weren’t for the heroism of the troops, who in every way prevented the enemy, it would be impossible to evacuate .. The enemy didn’t cool down on Soviet territory .. Even admitted memoirs that resistance is not the same as in Europe we have to fight a purely military
        2. EvilLion
          EvilLion 19 May 2020 10: 12 New
          0
          You do not understand what the Soviet evacuation to the Second World War. This is a very clear plan for the transportation of all production to work in a new place, so no one does, usually just load the equipment into cars and store it somewhere. In advance, building new sites for it, if there is no clear understanding that there will be a war, is pointless.

          Any doctrine is offensive.
    3. Alexandra
      Alexandra 10 May 2020 16: 34 New
      0
      Just do not need to bind the 1941 evacuation to the plans of 1928. Historian A.V. Isaev claims that for 1941 there was no actual plan for the evacuation of industry that had been drawn up before the start of the war.

      1. EvilLion
        EvilLion 19 May 2020 10: 21 New
        +1
        Isaev sometimes carries enchanting nonsense. He simply did not find an evacuation plan. That is, such a document is now unknown. But instead of saying that there is no such document in historical circulation, he says that there was no plan. Well, let him try to move to another city within at least his family and apartment, as it would be without a plan.

        Sometimes he just doesn't see that the situation is beyond what he usually tells. For example, denying the hysterical "generals betrayed", he point-blank does not see that betrayal is clearly traced in Pavlov's actions. Generals betray much less often than a soldier in the environment thinks, but in some cases this is the case.

        I once argued in his LJ about the possibilities of France and Great Britain to prevent the Germans from fighting in Poland. There the tramp has been dragging on the EMNIP since March of the 39th year, the USSR all this time tried to put together a coalition against the Germans, during which time the French could mobilize 10 times, if they really wanted to fight, if they hadn’t done it by September 1, then it could be that anything but the technical inability to bend the Germans.
        1. Cyril G ...
          Cyril G ... 19 May 2020 10: 51 New
          0
          Isaev is wrong. The plan was iron. The question is who coordinated the implementation of the evacuation plan. I think that through the NKVD I need to look for documents
  • Hagen
    Hagen 9 May 2020 20: 34 New
    +2
    Quote: lonely
    The doctrine of the Red Army ruled out any defense

    But BUP-38 disagrees with you for some reason ... Perhaps you are not familiar with it?
  • Russo Turisto
    Russo Turisto 9 May 2020 22: 06 New
    0
    What prevented the hand from advancing in 41? According to his doctrine.
  • EvilLion
    EvilLion 19 May 2020 08: 50 New
    0
    I understand that there is zero knowledge, so I'll share. Any offensive in the strategic sense always provides for defense over a greater length of the front, this is often accompanied by simultaneous offensives of both opponents in different sectors of the front, and even in a tactical offensive alternates with the defense of the captured territory from enemy counterattacks. Enough already writing nonsense about "on someone else's territory" and the lack of defense. The last time the Red Army defended itself at the strategic level was in March 1945, when the Germans twitched for the last time near Balaton. And on tactical until the very surrender of Germany.
  • svp67
    svp67 9 May 2020 19: 18 New
    +3
    Quote: Cyril G ...
    And those who covered up the PTR works in 1940 were not real pests, and before that they had not diligently given them progress from 1931-32.

    They weren’t, because artillery and any, even the poorest anti-tank gun, were ten times better than PTRs, had to fight with tanks. Our PTR were not a panacea for German attacks. The soldiers did not love them and at the slightest opportunity they got rid of them.

    Our PTRs lost their combat significance already in 1942, with an increase in the armor of serial German tanks
    1. Lopatov
      Lopatov 9 May 2020 19: 22 New
      +2
      Quote: svp67
      They weren’t, because artillery and any, even the poorest anti-tank gun, were ten times better than PTRs, had to fight with tanks.

      Any, even the poorest ATGM is better than a grenade launcher?
      1. svp67
        svp67 9 May 2020 19: 27 New
        +2
        Quote: Spade
        Any, even the poorest ATGM is better than a grenade launcher?

        And what can we say about OTR
        1. Lopatov
          Lopatov 9 May 2020 19: 35 New
          -1
          Quote: svp67
          And what can we say about OTR

          Uh, not ....
          There are two battalion magpies of a PT platoon. There is a company of PTR, at least 18 guns. Did you have to give up the second?
          1. svp67
            svp67 9 May 2020 19: 39 New
            +2
            Quote: Spade
            Uh, not ....

            Yes Yes...
            Quote: Spade
            There is a company of PTR, at least 18 guns. Did you have to give up the second?

            In the 41st no, but from the 42nd yes ... this unit became superfluous
            1. Lopatov
              Lopatov 9 May 2020 19: 53 New
              +1
              Quote: svp67
              In the 41st no, but from the 42nd yes ... this unit became superfluous

              The chassis of German tanks became invulnerable, armored vehicles and anti-tank vehicles were decommissioned, did the Germans no longer build bunkers and bunkers?
              1. svp67
                svp67 9 May 2020 20: 24 New
                +4
                Quote: Spade
                The chassis of German tanks became invulnerable,

                For a running 14,5 mm cartridge that elephant grains
                Quote: Spade
                armored cars and anti-tank bunkers were decommissioned, did the Germans no longer build bunkers and bunkers?

                You’re an artilleryman, whom in the confrontation will you put on a PTO or PTR? Bunkers and bunkers to hit must have a good shooting skill. On the PTR, our fighters said that this weapon is fired twice, once from the right shoulder, and the second time from the left ...
                1. Lopatov
                  Lopatov 9 May 2020 20: 35 New
                  -1
                  Quote: svp67
                  For a running 14,5 mm cartridge that elephant grains

                  You are composing something.
                  There, even fragments were dangerous.

                  Quote: svp67
                  You’re an artilleryman, whom in the confrontation will you put on a PTO or PTR?

                  Of course on the PTR.
                  VET at this time are busy fighting with tanks.

                  Quote: svp67
                  Bunkers and bunkers to hit must have a good shooting skill.

                  This skill was possessed. So much so that the PTR was used to suppress machine guns in the embrasures, ensuring the exit of sappers to combat overlap.
                  1. svp67
                    svp67 9 May 2020 20: 45 New
                    +1
                    Quote: Spade
                    There, even fragments were dangerous.

                    How? They won’t tear the caterpillar, they’ll damage the rink, but it’s not fatal
                    Quote: Spade
                    Of course on the PTR.
                    VET at this time are busy fighting with tanks.

                    Yes .. logical. Then I'm for the mortars ...
                    1. Lopatov
                      Lopatov 9 May 2020 21: 13 New
                      0
                      Quote: svp67
                      How so?

                      Disabled the chassis.


                      Quote: svp67
                      Yes .. logical. Then I'm for the mortars ...

                      Is there no bread? Then give the batteries ...
                      laughing
                    2. svp67
                      svp67 9 May 2020 21: 16 New
                      +3
                      Quote: Spade
                      Disabled the chassis.

                      It remains to understand what the caliber of this artillery is. For 76 mm, such a "feat" will still be excessive, but for 122 or 152, so yes,
                      Quote: Spade
                      Is there no bread? Then give the batteries ...
                      Well, the Germans very skillfully managed with the fire weapons that they had, including mortars
                    3. Lopatov
                      Lopatov 9 May 2020 21: 25 New
                      0
                      Quote: svp67
                      It remains to understand what the caliber of this artillery is. For 76 mm, such a "feat" will still be excessive, but for 122 or 152, so yes,

                      Nevertheless....

                      Quote: svp67
                      Well, the Germans very skillfully managed with the fire weapons that they had, including mortars

                      And because so many PTR had?
                      They write that only 28 thousand were converted into grenade launchers.
              2. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA 10 May 2020 18: 26 New
                0
                Quote: Spade
                This skill was possessed. So much so that the PTR was used to suppress machine guns in the embrasures, ensuring the exit of sappers to combat overlap.

                Only at close range.
                ... in responses from the front, they wrote that although they are trying to use the PTR on "soft" targets, the Ialo-Mali effect can only be obtained at close distances. And if you're lucky, the same MG calculation from the bunker is busy with something and will not make a pile of minced meat the first of the ptr-shchigov.

                It is difficult to expect successful firing at the embrasures from a shotgun with 300 and 63 cm core strips at a height of 55 meters and 500 and 105 cm at a distance of 92 m. That is, at 500 m, 70% of hits will fall in the region meter per meter.
                1. Lopatov
                  Lopatov 10 May 2020 18: 58 New
                  0
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  That is, for 500 m, 70% of hits will fall in the area meter per meter.

                  For suppression, enough for the eyes.
                2. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 10 May 2020 19: 59 New
                  0
                  Quote: Spade
                  For suppression, enough for the eyes.

                  To suppress bunkers or bunkers? Yes, the calculation will not notice that they are firing at it - until the PTR gets into the cheek of the embrasure. That, given the accuracy and accuracy of PTR, may not be soon.
                  And here is the calculation fishing rods the field is clearly visible.
                  Here is what those who used these PTR wrote:
                  According to the officers of the PTR Degtyarev and Simonov, due to the sharp increase in the armor of the tanks, they cannot fulfill their direct purpose. Shoot on bunkers, machine gun nests, etc. it is not always beneficial, since the PTR itself is often suppressed than the bunker or enemy firing point.

                  Due to the bulkiness of the size, the PTR is easily detected by the enemy and machine gun fire and light artillery is quickly incapacitated.
                3. Lopatov
                  Lopatov 10 May 2020 20: 37 New
                  0
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  Yes, the calculation will not notice that they are firing at it - until the PTR gets into the cheek of the embrasure. That, given the accuracy and accuracy of PTR, may not be soon.

                4. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 10 May 2020 21: 04 New
                  0
                  That is, PTRs are effective against bunker / bunker in extremely specific conditions: when working in a department, at a short distance, provided that they are part of an assault group.
                5. Lopatov
                  Lopatov 11 May 2020 07: 38 New
                  0
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  That is, PTRs are effective against bunker / bunker in extremely specific conditions: when working in a department, at a short distance, provided that they are part of an assault group.

                  What am I talking about?
                  Quote: Spade
                  PTR was used to suppress machine guns in embrasures, providing sappers access to combat overlap.
    2. tarragon
      tarragon 9 May 2020 21: 23 New
      0
      I do not agree with your point of view. For the Great Patriotic War it was a good weapon. I do not want to engage in copy paste, there is a lot of evidence of the successful use of PTR on award sheets. Panthers knocked out.
      1. EvilLion
        EvilLion 19 May 2020 10: 27 New
        0
        The successful use of PTR is always a competent ambush. You don't need to make hundreds of thousands of them for this. It is enough to have a separate platoon of armor-piercing snipers in the battalion who, if possible, will be able to shoot the "panther" into the roof, or to fire here or another fortified point.

        The rest of the PTR is wrecking.
        1. Cyril G ...
          Cyril G ... 19 May 2020 10: 53 New
          0
          At the company level, it would be useful to have a PTR unit anyway
        2. EvilLion
          EvilLion 19 May 2020 12: 33 New
          0
          Well, so in total the platoon to the battalion will be.
  • Lopatov
    Lopatov 9 May 2020 20: 03 New
    0
    Quote: svp67
    this unit was becoming redundant


    1. svp67
      svp67 9 May 2020 20: 26 New
      +1
      War is a process of very rapidly changing circumstances and conditions. This instruction appeared late, late
      1. Lopatov
        Lopatov 9 May 2020 20: 42 New
        0
        Quote: svp67
        War is a process of very rapidly changing circumstances and conditions. This instruction appeared late, late

        Let me remind you that PTRs were actively used until the end of the war.
        1. svp67
          svp67 9 May 2020 20: 51 New
          +1
          Quote: Spade
          Let me remind you that PTRs were actively used until the end of the war.

          That's how many newsreels of the 44th and especially the 45th year saw ... their active use is not visible there, but the artillery, they used it, they even delayed it on the second and third floors, there was a case, even BM-13, two installations on the second the floor was tightened, not to mention the use of PCs from simple launchers.
          Even our fighters had bazookas
  • Cyril G ...
    Cyril G ... 19 May 2020 09: 15 New
    0
    No, devices of this caliber in infantry are still applicable.
  • EvilLion
    EvilLion 19 May 2020 10: 23 New
    0
    The grenade launcher at least penetrates the armor, and has a bunch of different high-explosive grenades, in fact the RPG-7 - this is the 45 mm battalion gun of a later time. Here is just 1 in 1 n functionality.
  • chenia
    chenia 9 May 2020 19: 37 New
    0
    Quote: svp67
    Our PTRs lost their combat significance already in 1942,


    PTR for a rifle company is normal. And what are the other options? Grenades? Grenade launchers will then appear. Shoot at the sides and stern almost point blank when the tanks in position are the norm of that time. In the battalion (but this is a different level) were 45 mm M-42. And regimental and battalion anti-tank platoons with anti-tank missiles. this is the result of losses in 1941.
    1. svp67
      svp67 9 May 2020 19: 40 New
      +1
      Quote: chenia
      Shoot at the sides and stern almost point blank when the tanks in position are the norm of that time.

      The Germans did not allow such liberties, their infantry quickly crushed such enthusiasts with their machine guns, and then finished off with grenades
      1. Lopatov
        Lopatov 9 May 2020 19: 45 New
        0
        Quote: svp67
        their infantry quickly crushed such enthusiasts with their machine guns, and then finished off with grenades

        The same infantry that artillery was supposed to cut off? Which you propose to redirect to tanks.
        1. svp67
          svp67 9 May 2020 19: 46 New
          0
          Quote: Spade
          Which you propose to redirect to tanks.

          I AM????? To the tanks? Yes, not in any way. Tanks have someone to do without them
          1. Lopatov
            Lopatov 9 May 2020 19: 51 New
            -1
            Quote: svp67
            Tanks have someone to do without them

            And to whom is it?
            To heroic foot soldiers with bundles of grenades and Molotov cocktails?
            1. svp67
              svp67 9 May 2020 20: 27 New
              0
              Quote: Spade
              And to whom is it?
              To heroic foot soldiers with bundles of grenades and Molotov cocktails?

              Attack aircraft, VET calculations, self-propelled guns, tanks, in the end
              1. Lopatov
                Lopatov 9 May 2020 20: 41 New
                0
                Quote: svp67
                Attack aircraft, VET calculations, self-propelled guns, tanks, in the end

                And where to get them ???
                The enemy is not. he massages his tanks.
                And therefore, anti-tank defense without infantry is not viable in principle.
                1. svp67
                  svp67 9 May 2020 20: 52 New
                  0
                  Quote: Spade
                  And therefore, anti-tank defense without infantry is not viable in principle.

                  The Germans somehow cope with this for a long time and without PTR, before the appearance of "panserfaust"
                  1. Lopatov
                    Lopatov 9 May 2020 21: 28 New
                    +2
                    Quote: svp67
                    The Germans somehow coped with this for a long time and without PTR

                    Until 1942

                    From 1942 to "Panzerfaust"
                  2. svp67
                    svp67 9 May 2020 22: 01 New
                    +2
                    And nevertheless, the Germans pinned their hopes on their ATOs more than on these "wunderwaffe".
    2. chenia
      chenia 9 May 2020 19: 58 New
      0
      Quote: svp67
      The Germans did not allow such liberties


      Germans? HA! Ours did not allow this (though later) by throwing out carriages of shells (carrying out the front edge with all the saints). But nemchura, the little crooks at a minimum, everyone hoped for Hans platoon and Kurt company. Although, naturally, anti-tank equipment of the company level (of that time) would frighten the enemy more (it is better to land mines in front and on the flanks.) So that the main task of the rifle company in defense was to cut off the enemy infantry, and with tanks how it turned out.
      1. Kot_Kuzya
        Kot_Kuzya 10 May 2020 00: 29 New
        +3
        https://kanaev55.livejournal.com/451017.html
        In fact, the Germans just spent more shells than Soviet gunners, bringing down thousands of tons of shells at the positions of the Red Army.
        1. chenia
          chenia 10 May 2020 09: 45 New
          0
          Quote: Kot_Kuzya
          https://kanaev55.livejournal.com/451017.html
          In fact, the Germans just spent more shells than Soviet gunners, bringing down thousands of tons of shells at the positions of the Red Army.


          No! We even surpassed in 1941 (production of mobile stock). And the Germans were poorly able to massage artillery. Up to 200 stv / km only on the Kursk Bulge.
        2. Alexandra
          Alexandra 10 May 2020 16: 47 New
          0
          Spent, routine. But the Germans did not know how to attack. Triple fire shaft - this is not about the Germans.
  • Lopatov
    Lopatov 9 May 2020 19: 53 New
    0
    PTR companies were even part of the PT divisions of divisions.
    1. Snail N9
      Snail N9 9 May 2020 20: 48 New
      -1
      If we talk about the fight against tanks, then the Germans were smarter, evaluating:
      1) the grave consequences for the shooter of firing from the PTR with a large-caliber bullet, with a return exceeding all conceivable limits, the return of a traumatic shooter,
      2) the high cost of manufacturing PTR,
      3) the small, practically negligible off-target action of the PTR bullets, which led to the need for the shooter to stay in one place for a long time, to guarantee the destruction of the tank, which in fact led to the identification of its position and subsequent destruction, .... they concentrated their efforts on developing weapons based on the application of the cumulative principle of destruction of armor-RPG and cumulative hand grenades. Unfortunately, in the USSR at that time, they could not oppose anything to German developments, with the exception of copying German anti-tank, cumulative grenades, which even entered the troops in negligible quantities.
      1. Lopatov
        Lopatov 9 May 2020 20: 56 New
        -1
        Quote: Snail N9
        Unfortunately, in the USSR at that time, they could not oppose anything to German developments

        Due to the acute shortage of powerful explosives. Moreover, most of it went to the equipment of shells for small-caliber guns.
        For example, the production of RDX was eventually expanded. But until the end of the war, this required Lend-Lease raw materials.
      2. bk0010
        bk0010 9 May 2020 22: 02 New
        0
        Quote: Snail N9
        small, practically negligible, off-line action of PTR bullets
        They poured "bird cherry" into the bullet. The crew itself jumped out.
  • Aviator_
    Aviator_ 9 May 2020 22: 28 New
    +4
    The soldiers did not love them and at the slightest opportunity they got rid of them.

    And how can you get rid of the calculation (2 fighters) of the weapons put in the state?
  • Alexandra
    Alexandra 10 May 2020 16: 42 New
    0
    In 1943, when specially from the Soviet 14,5 mm PTR, the Germans installed spaced 5-10 mm screens on the sides of the hulls and turrets of their tanks. But even before that, of course, the PTR was not a highly effective means of combating German tanks with 30 mm side armor. There was insufficient armor-piercing action of the tungsten carbide core of the bullet after penetrating 30 mm of armor. For the most part, the "sand" core at the exit from the armor was destroyed. When penetrating thinner armor (armor of light tanks, armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles), the armor effect was significantly higher.
  • 210ox
    210ox 10 May 2020 14: 33 New
    0
    There was Marshal, who was later demoted to General Kulik. He successfully "fought" with anti-tank artillery. They slapped him after the war.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 10 May 2020 18: 39 New
      +1
      Quote: 210ox
      There was Marshal, who was later demoted to General Kulik. He successfully "fought" with anti-tank artillery.

      On the contrary, it was Kulik who raised the question about the insufficient armor penetration of the 45-mm anti-tank guns on serial German tanks. Who needs an anti-tank gun of the division level, capable of penetrating with a high-quality projectile only 40 mm of armor from a distance of not more than 150 m? By the way, Kulik also raised the question of the party of defective 45 mm BBS that was not withdrawn from the troops. And the NKBP regularly pointed out a mess with the production of the 76-mm BBS and he too (although the NKBP had to solve the problems).
      Uv. M. Svirin wrote that the "long" forty-five was developed on the instructions of Kulik - as a safety net for the 57-mm gun.
      As for the withdrawal from production of a 45-mm anti-tank gun ... at the beginning of the war, the Red Army had 14900 45-mm anti-tank guns or 101% of the state. Why, in such a situation, continue to produce a system that also does not meet the requirements for armor penetration?
      No one before the war, even in a nightmare, could have imagined that by September the army would lose 7766 anti-tank vehicles, and by the end of the year - 12015.
  • Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 10 May 2020 17: 48 New
    0
    Quote: Cyril G ...
    And those who covered up the PTR works in 1940 were not real pests, and before that they had not diligently given them progress from 1931-32.

    Do you know about the test results of the adopted PTR Rukavishnikov?
    In field tests in 1940, Rukavishnikov’s PTR from 400 m pierced a normal armor plate 22 mm thick. But at a distance of 200 m and 100 m during testing, a sheet 30 mm thick was not broken at all (although it was supposed to be punched). The problem was in the 14,5 mm cartridge with a B-32 bullet with a steel core.

    Rather, here those who took into service the PTR, unable to cope even with the side armor of a standard German medium tank, could be considered pests.
    1. Cyril G ...
      Cyril G ... 10 May 2020 18: 04 New
      0
      I’m kind of aware, but the fact that having made PTR on cartridge 12.7 / 108 by the mid-30s it was possible to have at least some kind of anti-tank weapon at the company level, even if it’s against BA only light tanks, it’s already a profit, in the worst case, you can break gusengitsu, etc., The best enemy of the good ... And then, as usual, from the IPC we require the capabilities of air defense EM URO, as a result, death stars are meaningless and merciless
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 10 May 2020 19: 09 New
        0
        Quote: Cyril G ...
        I’m kind of aware, but the fact that having made PTR on cartridge 12.7 / 108 by the mid-30s it was possible to have at least some kind of anti-tank weapon at the company level, even if it’s against BA only light tanks, it’s already a profit, in the worst case, you can break caterpillar, etc.,

        And why is it PTR if there are 18 full-fledged anti-tank guns and a tank battalion on the T-26 in the rifle division? wink So the PTR remained a "poor relative".
        And then, when the number of anti-tank missiles in the SD increased to 54, they began to demand at least 30-mm armor penetration from the anti-tank systems, which caused the destruction of Rukavishnikov’s tanks. In addition, KPV-41 and PTB-23 were on the way, in the presence of which the PTR became generally unnecessary.
        1. Cyril G ...
          Cyril G ... 10 May 2020 19: 30 New
          0
          Best the enemy of the good. That's why everything went lumpy
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 10 May 2020 20: 05 New
            0
            Quote: Cyril G ...
            Best the enemy of the good. That's why everything went lumpy

            Well no. You just need ersatz when everything else is lost.
            1. Cyril G ...
              Cyril G ... 10 May 2020 21: 25 New
              0
              I remain with my opinion that the separation of 2-3 PTRs, even if the 12.7 mm caliber as part of a rifle company, would not be completely redundant, but a 50 mm mortar wasted
  • strannik1985
    strannik1985 9 May 2020 19: 22 New
    +2
    When attacking the USSR, approx. 700 light tanks

    Since December 1940, PzKpfw 38 (t) E - G modifications with 50 mm frontal armor have been in production. Well, in the case of PTR, breaking does not mean defeat.
  • bubalik
    bubalik 9 May 2020 19: 55 New
    +2
    The Russian infantry has good weapons, especially a lot of anti-tank weapons: sometimes you think that every infantryman has an anti-tank rifle or anti-tank gun. The Russians have very skillful disposition of these funds, and it seems that there is no place where they were not.
    F. Melentin, General of the tank forces of the Wehrmacht.
    1. alone
      alone 9 May 2020 20: 12 New
      +2
      Quote: bubalik
      The Russian infantry has good weapons, especially a lot of anti-tank weapons: sometimes you think that every infantryman has an anti-tank rifle or anti-tank gun. The Russians have very skillful disposition of these funds, and it seems that there is no place where they were not.

      He wrote this recalling the Battle of Kursk .. Then, indeed, the entire defense was saturated with anti-tank weapons
  • zenion
    zenion 9 May 2020 20: 10 New
    0
    In 1962, an old turner in a factory where I worked, a mailbox. One man came, either a Jew, or a Georgian, looked at how we make products, these very guns and said - you are doing so well, you will make barrels for tanks. And we didn’t even have drills and machine tools. So he said by the end of the week there will be. By the end of the week, five were brought in and several people showed us how to drill trunks. Then we took the trunks from us and drove them for broaching and cutting. After a week, or maybe two, we already had machines for this.
  • dgonni
    dgonni 9 May 2020 22: 07 New
    +1
    I remembered. About 18-20 years ago, a friend asked in the village to help replace the posts on the hayloft. However, they rotted though an oak. In general, in the process, we came across a column extension from a piece of some tubular piece of iron. It turned out once upon a time that the deceased owner attached ptrd as a column extension. Still forged with square nails.
    Oddly enough, it was preserved perfectly. The shutter was locked. I had to soak everything in the solarium. But a week later they took it apart and cleaned it. Barrel without sinks. Above it is a light rust coating without shells. Thought thought so and handed it over to the museum. Where militiamen immediately rushed and requisitioned the bolt, although one drummer could have been dispensed with.
    But I can’t get a severe infection. Not for nothing in the newsreel frames they drag her in two.
    1. bubalik
      bubalik 9 May 2020 23: 41 New
      +3
      . No wonder the newsreels are dragging her in two
      ,,, the movie was remembered.


  • Pavel57
    Pavel57 9 May 2020 23: 44 New
    +2
    Quote: Cyril G ...
    And those who covered up the PTR works in 1940 were not real pests, and before that they had not diligently given them progress from 1931-32.

    The military has repeatedly made a mistake in choosing a new weapon, based on their ideas about future wars. There are enough examples.
    1. Kot_Kuzya
      Kot_Kuzya 10 May 2020 00: 36 New
      0
      Based on the experience of shelling German T-3 tanks, the 32-mm armor of which was barely penetrating even with a 45-mm shell, and assuming that the Germans already knew the use of the Soviet KV on the Finnish front, the military leadership decided that the new German tanks would have even stronger armor, against which even forty-five will be useless, not to mention the PTR. Therefore, they curtailed the production of PTR and forty-five, and gave the task to Grabin to develop a new anti-tank gun, which he created - the famous ZIS-2.
      1. Pavel57
        Pavel57 10 May 2020 01: 51 New
        +1
        It is believed that the 57mm gun was not released at first, that there were no goals for it. In my opinion, the reason is different - it was produced with a huge amount of marriage, and only Lend-Lease machines allowed to organize its normal production.
        1. Kot_Kuzya
          Kot_Kuzya 10 May 2020 02: 08 New
          0
          The role of 57-mm guns began to perform divisional 76-mm guns USV and ZIS-3. SPM in 1941-1942 was released 9 thousand, and most obviously went to the anti-tank units. ZIS-3 was fired by 48 thousand, of which half went into anti-tank artillery, and in 1942, out of 10 thousand issued by ZIS-3, 8 thousand guns went into anti-tank artillery, only 2 thousand into the divisional. For comparison, the 45-mm M-42 guns were released only 11 thousand for the entire war. That is, the Soviet military leadership was aware of the weakness of the 45-mm guns, and made the bet as the main anti-tank gun on the 76-mm divisional gun. Before the advent of the Panthers and Tigers, the 76-mm gun could quite satisfactorily deal with all types of German armored vehicles.
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 10 May 2020 18: 45 New
          0
          Quote: Pavel57
          It is believed that the 57mm gun was not released at first, that there were no goals for it. In my opinion, the reason is different - it was produced with a huge amount of marriage, and only Lend-Lease machines allowed to organize its normal production.

          It's not just about marriage. The fact is that the 57-mm anti-tank gun occupied production capacities at which it was possible to produce 76-mm divisions, with 3-4 pieces instead of one anti-tank gun. But without a divisional artillery regiment, it was impossible to send to the front reformed and newly formed infantry divisions.
          The situation with the 76-mm divisional guns was ... awful:
          At the beginning of the war, the Red Army had 8513 divisions.
          By September 1941, 3094 divisions were lost.
          And the Red Army guns were required in ever increasing quantities:
          By July 10, 1941, 34 divisions were completely lost and another 87 divisions suffered heavy losses. From the beginning of the war until December 1, 1941, a total of 124 rifle divisions were disrupted and disbanded. To make up for this loss, it was necessary to carry out the formation of new units and formations on a large scale, providing them with the necessary weapons. It was also necessary to compensate for the loss of weapons in the troops of the army, so that they retain their combat effectiveness.
          (...)
          ... in July 1941 it was required to form 71 divisions (56 divisions and 15 cd), in August 110 divisions (85 div and 25 cd), and in October 74 rifle brigades.

          In general, the SPM and its mobility gobbled up the 57 mm PTP.
  • Avior
    Avior 10 May 2020 00: 00 New
    -1
    MFIs, of course, differed in heroism by definition.
    But in general, PTR as a means of combating tanks did not differ in effectiveness.
    In fact, it is an ersatz weapon, and it is hardly correct to attribute to it wonderful properties.
    Large unmasked dimensions, low armor penetration, low armored action all this made the PTR not the most effective weapon.
    One can only wonder why, instead of the PTR, rocket-propelled grenade launchers were not produced — a really effective weapon against tanks of that time.
    The first samples - American bazooka - appeared in 1942, ordered by Lend Liz
    .
    It’s not clear why ours didn’t order and produce such weapons.
    1. garri-lin
      garri-lin 10 May 2020 00: 48 New
      0
      PTRs are essentially anti-material rifles of the time. They were not ersatz. By the time they lost their relevance as a PT agent, there were many other ways to use them. Accuracy was a huge plus. The theme with grenade launchers is certainly interesting. An analogue of the fauspatron would be useful both near Moscow and in Stalingrad. But what was not.
      1. Avior
        Avior 10 May 2020 04: 38 New
        -1
        I'm not sure about the sniper characteristics of the PTR.
        Initially, this was not required from the PTR and the cartridge to it, the tanks were not fired at from very large distances. There is a photo with an optical sight in the article, but, as I understand it, a PTR with a conventional open sight was typical, simply because the fight against tanks did not imply a long distance.
        As for RPGs, there was clearly a more convenient and effective anti-tank weapon, and even more so than a hand grenade.
        Faustpatron, by the way, is not exactly an RPG, it just has a throwing charge, in principle it could be used only at very short distances.
        For a fight in the city it was possible to use, outside the city, it was very difficult.
        The Germans had Ofenorors and pan-shrerski over much greater distances.
        Why ours didn’t take bakuki for Lend Lisa (they took only 3000 pieces). - I do not understand.
        By the end of the war, there were much more artillery of anti-tank missiles than at the beginning, but RPGs are just additional insurance and the ability to respond very quickly to the appearance of enemy tanks, especially in the oncoming battle or counterattacks of the enemy, before the anti-tank missiles have time to pull up, for example.
        1. garri-lin
          garri-lin 10 May 2020 09: 45 New
          0
          PTR were quite accurate. The heavy bullet and long barrel did their job. Optics would be desirable. But not necessarily. The embrasure of the bunker is not the main target. This is a bit more.
          The first fauspatron is essentially a hand grenade that does not need to be thrown with a swing. In the field they were used as the tank approached closely. The concept has changed only with increasing range. And accuracy.
          The bazooka differed little from the PTR in terms of exploitation. Well it was easier. Sighting range a little. 150 effective. 350 maximum. Armor penetration and armor are better. But again, it is unlikely to punch in the forehead. 60 mm.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 10 May 2020 18: 47 New
            0
            Quote: garri-lin
            PTR were quite accurate. The heavy bullet and long barrel did their job.

            70% of hits in the area meter per meter at a distance of 500 m is quite accurate? belay
            And I still don’t remember about the process of reloading PTR using a mallet.
            1. garri-lin
              garri-lin 10 May 2020 18: 49 New
              0
              Proof of accuracy is possible?
              1. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA 10 May 2020 19: 49 New
                0
                Quote: garri-lin
                Proof of accuracy is possible?

                Manual on a small business (NSD-42). Anti-tank self-loading rifle mod. 1941 of the Simonov-PTRS system. Single-shot anti-tank rifle mod. 1941 of the Degtyarev-PTRD system. - Edition corrected and supplemented. - M .: Military Publishing, 1944 .-- 96 p.
                Searched data - on page 84.
                Lies on Militer.
                http://militera.lib.ru/manuals/nastav_prtd-ptrs/index.html

                Just keep in mind that you need to watch the NSD-44 - Revised and supplemented edition. Because there is still
                Manual on a small business (NSD-42). Anti-tank self-loading rifle mod. 1941 of the Simonov-PTRS system. Single-shot anti-tank rifle mod. 1941 of the Degtyarev-PTRD system. - M.: Military Publishing, 1942 .-- 96 p.
                So, it gives smaller sizes of the core scattering bands, and even up to a distance of 1000 m. These data were clarified in the 1944 edition.
                1. garri-lin
                  garri-lin 10 May 2020 20: 41 New
                  0
                  Now the Internet is weak, I can not see. But it looks somehow illogical.
                  1. Alexey RA
                    Alexey RA 10 May 2020 21: 11 New
                    0
                    Quote: garri-lin
                    Now the Internet is weak, I can not see. But it looks somehow illogical.

                    In the same NSD there is a battle check: 4 shots at a shield with a black rectangle 20x30 cm from a distance of 100 m. The aiming point is the middle of the bottom edge of the rectangle.
                    A fight is considered normal if three or four holes fit into a circle with a diameter of 22 cm, and if the midpoint deviates vertically no more than 7 cm, horizontally no more than 5 cm.
                    With 100 m 3 of 4 hits - in a circle of 22 cm
      2. Alexandra
        Alexandra 10 May 2020 16: 56 New
        0
        Unfortunately, there were only 14,5 mm cartridges with armor-piercing (armor-piercing incendiary) bullets. A 14,5 mm cartridge with an incendiary bullet MDZ and an cartridge with a sighting incendiary bullet ZP appeared only after the war.
        1. garri-lin
          garri-lin 10 May 2020 18: 45 New
          0
          That was enough. What other bullets are needed?
          1. Alexandra
            Alexandra 10 May 2020 20: 26 New
            0
            When firing at firing points (machine gun nests, embrasures DZOT) explosive 14,5 mm MDZ bullets would be more effective than armor-piercing incendiary B-32. They would hit the enemy soldiers not only with a direct hit, but also with fragments.
            1. garri-lin
              garri-lin 10 May 2020 20: 38 New
              0
              But was it just like that at that time? For such a small caliber. What no fuse is needed.
              1. Alexandra
                Alexandra 10 May 2020 21: 32 New
                0
                Even in caliber, 7,62 mm, not to mention 12,7 mm.
                https://kk-combat.ucoz.ru/proekt1/Htm_boot/m_762v.html#v_p
                7,62 mm rifle cartridge with incendiary bullet Z
                7,62 mm rifle cartridge with sighting bullet P
                7,62 mm rifle cartridge with PZ sighting and incendiary bullet

                1. garri-lin
                  garri-lin 10 May 2020 23: 53 New
                  0
                  I thought you were talking about at least some serious high-explosive or fragmentation impact on the target. Ordinary MZDeshki worked well for the weak dural plane. For field fortification of stones, concrete, logs and other things, even in caliber 14,5, it was rather weak. The broken pieces of concrete knocked out by the BB were much more dangerous.
                  1. Alexandra
                    Alexandra 11 May 2020 00: 42 New
                    0
                    Field fortification was wood-earthen. Howbeit:
                    https://www.rulit.me/books/tehnika-i-vooruzhenie-1998-03-read-226371-6.html
                    "MDZ is the only one among other 14,5-mm bullets that has not only incendiary, but also high-explosive fragmentation effect."
                    So it’s capable of hitting manpower at the firing points not only with a direct hit.
                    1. garri-lin
                      garri-lin 11 May 2020 00: 53 New
                      0
                      And what was the use of indirect contact? Modern 23 mm and 30 mm shells almost do not give destructive fragments. And there is 14,5 mm. Zilch. The game was not worth the candle. And field fortification was very different. Especially in populated areas. Although a slip of 20 30 cm such a cartridge could compensate. And by the way, the usual armor-piercing incendiary fire mixture at such a distance also scattered well. And there the temperature is 2500.
                      1. Alexandra
                        Alexandra 11 May 2020 02: 07 New
                        0
                        In the B-32 pool, 1,25-1,45 grams of incendiary composition. In the MDZ pool, 3,5 grams of phlegmatized heating element. For comparison, shells 20 mm ShVAK guns:

                        "Initially, the pre-war series of cannon ammunition included high-explosive, incendiary fragmentation and armor-piercing incendiary shells. Weight 96 g, high-explosive fragmentation projectile contained 3.7 grams of tetrile or a mixture of" GTT "- hexogen, TNT and tetril-oskolazhigal. 0.85 grams of "GTT" and 3.9 grams of incendiary composition. Armor-piercing incendiary explosives did not contain, the mass of the incendiary composition was 2.8 grams. Already during the war, more powerful incendiary-fragmentation shells were put into operation, which were equipped with 5.6 grams of high explosive A-IX- 2. "
                      2. garri-lin
                        garri-lin 11 May 2020 15: 01 New
                        0
                        Your examples of shwak are relevant for aviation. What could easily damage the plane was not enough for a conventional rifle cell made of logs 12 cm in diameter. The aircraft is already under heavy load. It is only necessary to help external influences. These explosive grams can increase damage at the point of impact. But 30 cm from this point of harm from them will be a minimum.
                      3. Alexandra
                        Alexandra 11 May 2020 16: 10 New
                        0
                        You write as if you did not shoot from ShVAK cannons at ground targets. They shot, and even in the form of a TNSh-20 tank gun, these guns were installed on T-60 tanks. The presence of MDZ bullets would allow firing at the embrasures not only frontally "at a right angle" and would increase the effectiveness of the anti-aircraft missile system as an anti-aircraft weapon.
                      4. garri-lin
                        garri-lin 11 May 2020 18: 07 New
                        0
                        What bullets were fired from shvaks at ground targets? And what bullets did the T60 shoot? At 14,5 there were chemical bullets. Instead of a tracer, an OM charge. That would be useful from them, but they were not released. MZD with "non-frontal" fire would not have helped. The radius of damage is tens of centimeters. There are almost no slaughter fragments.
                      5. Alexandra
                        Alexandra 11 May 2020 21: 10 New
                        0
                        ShVAK gun - hence fired shells. The explosive content in 96 grams of ShVAK shells is indicated above.

                        In general, during the war years, 14,5 mm cartridges were developed with a MDR bullet (explosive with a self-liquidator) and MD (incendiary explosive). They just woke up a little late and gave them TTT, at the end of 1944 and at the beginning of 1945:

                        https://kris-reid.livejournal.com/865378.html
                      6. garri-lin
                        garri-lin 11 May 2020 23: 55 New
                        0
                        Exactly in parallel with the Vladimirov machine gun. When a similar cartridge became relevant.
  • Pavel57
    Pavel57 10 May 2020 01: 49 New
    0
    They didn’t order bazookas .. maybe they too looked like Kurchevsky’s guns?
    1. Avior
      Avior 10 May 2020 04: 39 New
      -1
      3000 took and that means they knew what it was.
  • Nikolaevich I
    Nikolaevich I 10 May 2020 01: 21 New
    +1
    The author decided to tell us about the PT-guns of the Red Army during the war years; but for some reason limited myself to 2 samples ... PTR (D) and PTR (S)! But 2 more samples of PT-guns were produced and "sent" to the front! These are the 12,7-mm PT-rifle of Sholokhov ("clone" of the Mauser) and the 20-mm PT-rifle RES

    As for Degtyarev's PTR, I once heard such ... either a "legend", or a "true story" ... that Degtyarev, like Simonov, first "grabbed" the development of a self-loading "rifle" ... but then he "changed his mind" and converted the planned self-loading PT-gun into a single-shot ... But from the "self-loading" there was a "semi-automatic" bolt ... that is. the ejection of the spent cartridge case was carried out automatically ...
    1. Kot_Kuzya
      Kot_Kuzya 10 May 2020 02: 35 New
      +2
      These PTRs were produced by a minuscule, PTR Sholokhov in the amount of several hundred pieces, after the start of production of PTRD, its production was stopped. And the PTR RES was generally released in the amount of 71 pieces, and not all guns got to the front, some were shot to the point of complete deterioration at the firing range.
      1. Nikolaevich I
        Nikolaevich I 10 May 2020 03: 49 New
        +1
        A minuscule minuscule, but in 1941 .. PTR was also produced minuscule ... but each "ruzho" was valued "worth its weight in gold" ...
  • cat Rusich
    cat Rusich 10 May 2020 03: 57 New
    0
    I am for the PTRD. It is easier to manufacture, they will be given a shot at the target once. Recoil will knock the sight and you will have to aim again for the second shot. In principle, you can consider the version of the PTRD with a magazine (clip for 5 rounds), with manual reloading ("big" Mosinka).
  • Non-fighter
    Non-fighter 10 May 2020 10: 08 New
    0
    To the author: about the efficiency of use. How much BC was spent? More precisely, how often did they shoot? Can the numbers be voiced?
  • xomaNN
    xomaNN 10 May 2020 14: 49 New
    +1
    And how much time and money was wasted on dynamo-guns before the war? And PTR could have been actively burning German armored vehicles for 22 years since June 41. Who's guilty? Marshal Kulik? General Staff of the Red Army?
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 10 May 2020 18: 54 New
      0
      Quote: xomaNN
      And how much time and money was wasted on dynamo-guns before the war?

      The DRP topic was covered after the Kurchevsky case, which prettyly ruined the reputation of the recoilless people as a whole.
      Quote: xomaNN
      And PTR could have been actively burning German armored vehicles for 22 years since June 41.

      With armor penetration of 22 mm?
      The regular armored penetration of the PTR was provided only by the cartridge with the BS-41 bullet, which entered the troops after the outbreak of the war. Moreover, these cartridges in early 1942 were rare animals:

      Like this: at 26 PTR - 100 rounds of BS-41.
    2. Cyril G ...
      Cyril G ... 10 May 2020 19: 33 New
      0
      Tukhachevsky and K
  • Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 10 May 2020 18: 19 New
    +1
    For some reason, we are intensely discussing some spherical PTR in a liquid vacuum, which fully correspond to the tabular TTX. smile In fact, real PTRD and PTRS were, to put it mildly, not the best combination of design flaws, multiplied by manufacturing defects.
    PTRD:
    July 10-12, 1942 at the NIPSVO, tests of anti-tank rifles were held, which were attended by the deputies of the Main Art Directorate, People's Commissar of Armaments, as well as both creators of the PTR - Degtyarev and Simonov.
    1. Experienced PTRD of plant No. 74. 610 shots were fired from a shotgun with various cartridges under various conditions, with 189 cartridge cases being emitted (31%) using a mallet.
    The report noted that the PTR "under all conditions, works unsatisfactorily."
    2. Another one gross forward of this plant with improved chamber processing, awarded the rating "under all conditions it works extremely unsatisfactorily." At 275 rounds, a mallet was required to eject 264 times (96%).
    3. The third PTRD was able to “surpass” this result. “The survivability of the gun was determined in 43 shots. After each shot, the sleeve was knocked out with a mallet. When knocking out the 43rd sleeve, the handle broke off at the shutter. ”

    PTRS:
    Tests of serial PTRS June 30, 1943.
    "Delay - the failure of the trigger for its elimination requires disassembling the gun, that is, removing the trigger, which is associated with the failure of the gun in combat conditions, for a relatively long period. In the event of such a failure when repelling an enemy tank attack, death is likely Due to this circumstance, a requirement is imposed on rifles to ensure the reliability of the mechanisms. Delays - not removing the sleeve with a breakdown of the rim requires, for their elimination, usually the use of a ramrod, which is used to drive the sleeve through the barrel. the situation is not applicable, because it requires screwing a folding ramrod and leaving the armor-piercer from the trench or pulling the gun into the trench. enemy tanks, which may entail linen calculation, solely due to the unstable operation of the mechanisms of the gun. It can be seen from the presented results that the KE-944 gun does not provide stable operation of mechanisms under normal conditions solely due to poor processing and assembly of the gun mechanisms. "

    And like a cherry on a cake:
    NPO-USSR
    Main Artillery Directorate
    Red Army
    Office of Small Arms
    3 June 1942 year
    Heads of artillery fronts, districts and armies.
    On the subject: The use of 14,5 mm anti-tank rifles.

    According to reports from the fronts, districts and armies, cases of refusal in the work of Degtyarev and Simonov anti-tank rifles have recently become more frequent.
    .
    The practice of using PTR in the troops, especially in summer conditions, shows that even if the rules for preparing shotguns for shooting in accordance with paragraph 1 are observed, shotguns that do not provide free extraction can be found.
    To eliminate delays in reloading the rifle arising in this case, allow the troops to use a wooden mallet.

    For quotes - thanks uv. Andrey Ulanov AKA kris-reid.
    Let me remind you - we are talking about an anti-tank gun. Calculation of which should deal with this same punching of cartridges against the background of an approaching tank.
  • Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 10 May 2020 18: 22 New
    +1
    But what they wrote about the PTR from the troops ::
    On the combat use of anti-tank rifles by Simonov and Degtyarev.

    As experience shows, the anti-tank rifles of Simonov and Degtyarev, despite their relatively widespread use in the Red Army, did not justify their full purpose and cannot be considered indispensable weapons for the following reasons:
    1) 22 kg weight of the gun, taking into account another load, is heavy for the fighter. Such a weight and length of the gun complicates the actions of the fighter in battle, and when carrying a fly very often gets lost, which reduces the accuracy of shooting
    2) The poor extraction of cartridges, due to their frequent spell, does not allow the fighter to quickly reload the gun at the right time of the battle, and to use a wooden drift when the target (tank, armored personnel carrier) is at a distance of 50-100 meters, the fighter does not have time. Thus, at a critical moment, the fighter cannot accept the battle.
    3) The large recoil and imperfection of the wooden parts (especially the shoulder pads) leads to the fact that the soldier cannot fire for a long time.
    4) The recommended lubrication of cartridges as a means of jamming them is not practical, because in battle, a fighter does not have time to do this.
    Given the above, the guns of Simonov and Degtyarev can not be effective in a short-term battle with tanks and armored vehicles. Therefore, they require replacement with a more effective type of weapon.

    40th Army Artillery Commander
    © A.Ulanov
  • Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 14 May 2020 15: 19 New
    0
    One of the biggest mistakes of Soviet weapons in the war was the complete absence of the cumulative means of defeating armored vehicles for infantry and light grenade launchers or cannons like German surfactants.
    And they can be beat developed and adopted at least in 1942.
  • EvilLion
    EvilLion 19 May 2020 09: 49 New
    0
    Using a B-32 bullet, both PTRs from a distance of 100 m with a direct hit punched up to 40 mm of homogeneous armor. At a distance of 300 m, penetration for the ATRA was reduced to 35 mm;


    This is just a lie. Penetration of 100 m bullets did not exceed 25 mm. A breakdown of 40 mm is something already to a 30-37 mm shell.

    The abandonment of the PTR in 1940 was due to the fact that the Red Army command was expecting the appearance of tanks with frontal armor with a thickness of at least 50-60 mm, which only artillery could handle. As the events of the summer of 1941 showed, the enemy was simply overestimated.


    I'm sorry, what? At the time of the beginning of the Second World War, the early Pz-IIIs with a 37 mm cannon were already discontinued. The Pz-IIIG already had a circular armor of 30 mm, and the forehead of the tower was 37. In the future, shielded tanks will go, with a total thickness of just 60 mm. In this case, the bullet does not have a mass, and therefore an impulse sufficient to destroy the screen mounts. It is somehow strange in the 41st to focus on the Pz-II and 38 (t), which will be knocked out in the first months, and in their place will come cars of a higher level.

    The serial production of the PTRD started in September 1941, and within a few months, tens of thousands of such products were counted. Production continued until 1944, and during this time the Red Army received more than 280 thousand guns. PTR Simonov went into series a little later, and the complexity of the design affected the pace of production. It was produced until 1945, transferring to the front a total of 190 thousand products.


    That is, almost half a million guns. And what was the effect of using them in such monstrous quantities? Yes, about zero. The Red Army still required a huge number of anti-tank guns, while a battery of 85 mm guns could be a factor that will affect the offensive of a tank battalion. Rommel performed miracles in Africa with few 88 mm guns. The presence of 300 anti-tank rifles in the infantry division in the 42nd did not affect anything, the Germans did not even notice this "threat".

    In general, it surprises me how poverty is given out as virtue, because PTRs were made only because 45 mm guns were missing. Well, then Zhukov writes formidable orders that the PTR should be used. Well, he needs to somehow convince a soldier who understands the obvious futility of his weapon not to drop it, and can eventually be exchanged, one company of armor-piercers for one German tank. But I have a definition. doubt that replacing the 45 mm cannons with a PTR gave at least something other than the exclusion of some of the soldiers from the infantry battle. What is PTR in part, what is not, it is equally dependent in anti-tank defense on divisions and anti-aircraft guns. That is, the issue could be reduced by 10-20 times, almost without reducing the threat to enemy tanks. For individual calculations of large-caliber snipers (14.5 mm, for example, it is quite capable of breaking through a tree trunk and the shooter's head behind it.), That would be enough.

    No country in the world has seriously dealt with such nonsense.