At the border of two environments. The evolution of promising submarines in conditions of increased probability of their detection by the enemy

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Given the capabilities of new search tools, the task of secrecy does not have absolute technical solutions today. Even a completely silent substrate will be detected due to the low-frequency active "backlight", and the high search performance of new tools and the possibility of their application with aviation allows you to quickly build up anti-submarine potential in the area of ​​"primary detection" of the submarine, virtually eliminating the possibility of evasion.
Under these conditions, the solution to the problem of stealth and combat stability of submarines is possible only at the tactical and operational levels. In many cases, today the most effective way to restore the secrecy of a detected submarine will be tactical - to “kill” the carrier of anti-submarine means “who took contact” with it.

Captain 3rd rank reserve Maxim Klimov ("Who will win the underwater duel?")


Submarine Stealth


Improving the acoustic and non-acoustic methods for detecting submarines (PL), as well as increasing the number of sensors placed on manned and unmanned aircraft, surface and underwater platforms, can lead to the fact that the main advantage of the submarine - stealth, will be largely leveled. Despite the fact that at the same time there is a decrease in submarine noise down to the natural background level, the complex use of active low-frequency illumination, magnetometric detection methods, optical scanners with laser illumination, thermal trace detection and radar measurement of the rise of a water column can lead to the possibility of underwater detection enemy boats will increase significantly.




Sea Hunter (2 "Sea hunter") - a pilot unmanned vessel of the US Navy, designed to search and escort submarines

The problem is that a submarine, especially a nuclear one, is a rather large object that will somehow affect the environment. It is likely that over time, active countermeasures will be widely introduced - acoustic phase suppressors operating in antiphase, coatings based on metamaterials that have specific controlled properties for the absorption or re-reflection of sound waves, a body made of composite materials, but this is a matter of the distant future. In the case of water displacement, the only way to reduce the probability of detection is to reduce the size of the submarine.

The dimensions of nuclear submarines (NPS) are largely dictated by the dimensions of their power plant. In addition, the size of the submarine is affected by the level of automation, which reduces the number of crew, and the presence of weapons, the stock of which largely determines the effectiveness of the submarine. After all, a submarine is not a plane, and cannot quickly return to the base to replenish the ammunition, and reloading the ammunition outside the base is not always possible and unmasks the submarine as much as possible. In other words, even according to the most optimistic forecasts, the displacement of atomic and non-nuclear submarines will still be thousands of tons.


One of the most compact nuclear submarines (on the left) is the Soviet submarine of project 705 (K) Lira with a liquid metal reactor and maximum automation, which reduced the crew to 32 people with an underwater displacement of 3180 tons. On the right is the American Tallibi nuclear submarine (SSN-597) with an underwater displacement of 2607 tons, 66 of which the crew, apparently, were packed like herring in a barrel

We can agree with the conclusion of Maxim Klimov, stated at the beginning of the article, that in some cases the restoration of stealth of submarines is possible only by destroying the platform that detected the submarine - an anti-submarine aircraft, ship or submarine.

Given that the probability of detecting submarines can significantly increase, promising submarines should become a much more aggressive and multi-functional fighter, capable of striking at all types of anti-submarine weapons of the enemy.

Modern multi-purpose submarines can effectively fight their own kind, as well as surface ships, but with an air adversary everything is much sadder. On the submarine there are portable anti-aircraft missile systems designed to destroy air targets from surface damage. But when the submarine is under water, it is defenseless against airplanes and helicopter submarines and can only rely on secrecy, which in the context of the development of integrated anti-submarine detection systems can no longer be considered sufficient.

Submarine Air Defense


The need to equip submarines with anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM), capable of functioning from under water, and to provide submarines with the possibility of hitting enemy aircraft, was repeatedly considered. You can recall the concepts and prototypes of air defense systems for submarines given in the article mentioned at the beginning of the article by Captain 3 rank reserves Maxim Klimov ("Do I need submarine defense submarine?") Also developed, developed and promising air defense systems for submarines, possible design solutions and concepts for the use of air defense systems were considered in the articles of the author: “Atomic multifunctional submarine cruiser: an asymmetrical response to the West” и “Nuclear-powered multifunctional submarine cruiser: a paradigm shift”.

If we talk about air defense systems only as a means of self-defense of submarines, it is necessary to take into account the specifics of anti-submarine aviation - these are subsonic, low-maneuverable and mainly low-flying targets, such as the American Boeing P-8 Poseidon PLO aircraft or Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk PLO helicopter. Relative to a high-altitude target, the U.S. Navy Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton long-range reconnaissance UAV can be considered a target, but its ability to search for submarines is limited, and a maximum flight altitude of 17 meters is not a problem for modern air defense systems.


The main objectives of the submarine air defense system are the Boeing P-8 Poseidon anti-aircraft aircraft, the Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk anti-aircraft helicopter, and the US Navy Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton long-range reconnaissance UAV

Based on the tactical and technical characteristics of aviation threats to submarines, it can be assumed that a promising air defense system for submarines (air defense missile systems) can be developed on the basis of the Poliment / Redut naval air defense system, which, in turn, was created on the basis of the latest ground-based air defense system S-350 The Knight.


ZRK C-350 "Vityaz"

The advantage of the Poliment / Redut / S-350 Vityaz air defense system is the presence of medium-range anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) 9M96E, 9M96E2 with an active homing radar (ARLGSN) and 9M100 short-range missiles with an infrared homing head (IKGSN) capable of hitting targets without continuous targeting or highlighting the SAM targets.

In articles “Atomic multifunctional submarine cruiser: an asymmetrical response to the West” и “Nuclear-powered multifunctional submarine cruiser: a paradigm shift” It was proposed to place a full-sized radar station (radar) on a separate mast extended from a periscope position. But the strategic missile submarine cruiser (SSBN) of project Borey, project 955A, on which there is sufficient space to accommodate the radar mast, was considered as the basis for the creation of the nuclear multifunctional submarine cruiser (AMFPK). Despite criticism, the author is confident that a retractable radar can be implemented, just look at much bolder projects, for example, deploying retractable artillery on American nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) "Ohio".


Installation of a 155 mm vertical gun in the Ohio SSBN missile silo with the possibility of firing while submerged

Also, a Virginia-type submarine was considering the possibility of installing an additional section of the hull seven and a half meters behind the cabin, including two universal mines with a diameter of just over two meters, which, like the mines of the modernized Ohio missile carriers, could contain Tomahawk cruise missiles ”, Additional cubicles for swimmers, unmanned underwater vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), a vertical gun or anti-aircraft missile installation on a telescopic mast, including a 25-mm automatic a cannon and / or Stinger air defense system.


The concept of promising nuclear powered submarines of the Virginia type

At the border of two environments. The evolution of promising submarines in conditions of increased probability of their detection by the enemy
The concept of UAV launched from under water

By the way, a mine with a diameter of two meters is quite suitable for placing intercontinental ballistic missiles on multipurpose nuclear submarines, which was considered in the article “The evolution of the nuclear triad: prospects for the development of the marine component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation” as a measure to increase the survival of the marine component of the Russian nuclear triad.

However, it cannot be denied that the development of a radar on a mast pulled out from under the water is a complex engineering task that will require time and additional financial resources. At the same time, the radar is far from the only way to detect air targets.

For primary detection of air targets, information from electronic reconnaissance sensors capable of detecting radar radiation from aircraft and PLO helicopters, as well as acoustic sensors capable of detecting the noise of aircraft engines and PLO helicopters, can be used. The additional search for the target and the issuance of target designation of missiles can be carried out using the optical and thermal imaging channels of the periscope operating in the anti-aircraft mode. In the future, periscopes can be equipped with conformal radars with an active phased array antenna (AFAR).


Periscope "SAIL-98"

The “PARUS-98” periscope is intended for installation on modernized and newly developed prospective submarines and provides:
- a circular overview of the drive surface and airspace in the daytime, at dusk and at night, including in difficult weather conditions;
- detection of surface coordinates, air and coastal facilities;
- reception of signals from satellite navigation systems "Glonass" and GPS;
- reception of signals from satellite navigation systems "GLONASS" and "GPS";
radar detection and other radio equipment.


A prerequisite should be the ability to launch missiles from under the water. The launch of missiles directly from under water can be realized, by analogy with the launch of cruise and anti-ship missiles. In this case, preliminary target designation is entered into the missile control system prior to launch.

Alternatively, an ejection from a mine and the ascent of a missile launcher can be realized in a specialized container connected by cable to the submarine. In this case, the launch of missiles is carried out after surfacing and obtaining target designation, after which the cable of the container is cut off and discarded.

After launching and leaving the water, SAM with the help of ARLGSN or IKGSN carries out additional search, capture and defeat of the target.

Defense and maneuver


The presence of air defense systems alone does not guarantee the safety of submarines. With the initiative, PLO aircraft can strike before the PL detects the enemy. In this case, the submarine should be able to evade the strike or actively counteract it, as well as quickly strike back.

One of the leading trends in the world of weapons is to give military equipment the ability to destroy not only the carrier, but also the direct attacking ammunition. On armored vehicles this is implemented using active defense systems (KAZ), on combat aircraft using air-to-air (B-B) missiles capable of hitting enemy B-B missiles with a direct hit (hit-to-kill).

Similarly, the ability of a submarine to repel enemy fired torpedoes can be realized using anti-torpedoes. In Russia, anti-torpedoes for submarines are developed on the basis of the Package-NK complex for surface ships. Unfortunately, taking into account the significant lag of the Russian Federation in the development and serial production of modern torpedoes, the characteristics of anti-torpedoes also remain in question. I would like to believe that all issues with both torpedoes and anti-torpedoes will be resolved, and the Russian Navy (Navy) will receive a reliable and modern weapon.


German anti-torpedo SeaSpider and anti-torpedoes of the Russian package-NK complex

Also, as a means of counteracting attacking torpedoes, towed and autonomous false targets - acoustic jammers can be used. An example is the Vist-2 Small-sized Hydroacoustic Countermeasure Device (MGPD), which is launched from the side of a submarine and creates a powerful acoustic jamming that suppresses homing torpedoes and submarine sonars. Also, the “Vist-2” MGPD can work as a false target due to the emission of an acoustic signal simulating a submarine.


MGPD “Whist-2”

- types of hydroacoustic counteraction - interference and / or imitation;
- type of interference - broadband obstructive sighting in frequency;
- type of simulation - the secondary sonar field of the submarine;
- interference emission mode - continuous and pulsed;
- range of radiated frequencies - corresponds to the frequencies of the sounding torpedo packages;
- the radiation field of the signals is circular in the horizontal plane, sector in the vertical plane;
- the range of working depths of the drift is 15-350 m (automatic maintenance of the drift range from the setting horizon is provided);
- working time - 6 minutes;
- the speed of the submarine during the installation of the device - up to 12 knots;
- weight and size characteristics: caliber 123 mm, length 810 mm, weight - 13,5 kg.


An important factor affecting the ability of submarines to deal with both air defense submarines and other types of surface and underwater adversaries will be the maneuverability of promising submarines and their ability to intensively change the depth of immersion. For example, in the event of an aviation attack, a PLO submarine must quickly emerge to the periscope depth from which a search and defeat of the enemy missiles can be carried out.

One of the most maneuverable submarines can be considered the previously mentioned Soviet submarine of project 705 (K), which can be called a "submarine fighter." A unique reactor with a liquid metal coolant allowed Project 705 (K) submarines to accelerate to a speed of 41 knots (76 km / h) for 1-1,5 minutes and rotate 180 degrees in 40-45 seconds. According to submariners, the nuclear submarines of project 705 (K) could unfold almost on the spot, "like a helicopter."


Underwater Fighter - Project 705 (K) Submarine

There is an assumption that the reactor with a liquid metal coolant will be installed on Russian fifth-generation nuclear submarines of the Laika type (Husky project). In this case, it is likely that the maneuverable and running (in terms of acceleration) characteristics of the Laika submarines will be comparable to those of the Project 705 (K) submarines.


The layout of the fifth generation multipurpose nuclear submarine of the Laika project

Consequences of the appearance of submarines ability to withstand aircraft PLO


The consequences will be significant. If now PLO aviation can act with impunity - without covering surface ships or submarine aviation, there is nothing to oppose it, then the appearance of anti-aircraft missile systems capable of operating from under water will change the situation by 180 degrees.

The flat surface of the sea does not provide aviation with the opportunity to take refuge behind natural and artificial barriers. The task of finding a submarine requires pilots to withstand certain modes of altitude and speed. PLO aviation itself does not have outstanding speed and maneuverability. In the complex, all of the above will turn planes, helicopters and UAVs PLO into targets.

The appearance of submarine air defense systems will require a comprehensive modernization of airplanes and helicopter submarines or the purchase of completely new models equipped with electronic warfare (EW), laser defense systems and / or anti-missile systems.


Image of C-130H Hercules with ATL Laser System


All this will lead to higher cost of aircraft PLO, and therefore, to reduce its number or increase the burden on the enemy’s budget. The presence of additional equipment and weapons for self-defense against missiles will lead to a decrease in the ammunition load of anti-submarine weapons, and will reduce the time of patrolling, which together will lead to a general decrease in the effectiveness of air defense aircraft.

The likelihood of suddenly getting missiles "in the belly" will lead to increased psychological impact and stress on the crews of aircraft and helicopter PLO, which also will not contribute to an increase in their efficiency. If the PLO helicopters operate in relative proximity to surface ships, then the PLO planes can operate at a considerable distance from the basing places. Consequently, if the PLO plane is shot down, then the crew will have few chances of survival. In turn, unmanned aircraft and PLO helicopters in the foreseeable future will not be able to replace manned equipment without loss of efficiency.

Aviation PLO can be considered the greatest threat to submarines because of its high mobility, which allows to quickly build up forces and organize patrols of large sections of the water surface.

Conclusions


The creation of an anti-aircraft missile system, designed to equip prospective and modernize existing submarines, capable of operating from under water from a periscope depth of immersion, will significantly increase the survival rate of domestic submarines in terms of quantitative and qualitative superiority of enemy anti-submarine aircraft outside the cover zone of surface ships and aviation Russian Navy.

Allegedly, the best solution could be the creation of the Almaz-Antey aerospace defense group of an anti-aircraft missile complex of submarines on the basis of the Poliment / Redut / S-350 Vityaz air defense system.

The appearance of submarine air defense systems in combination with anti-torpedoes, false targets and increased maneuverability of submarines will make it possible to switch sharply from tactics of maximum stealth to conducting an aggressive, dynamic battle if there is a possibility that the submarine is already detected or can be detected in the near future.

The appearance of submarine air defense systems will dramatically change the balance of forces in the direction of submarines, which will require the enemy to modernize and / or replace the entire aircraft anti-aircraft, as well as increase the proportion of unmanned platforms with obviously less efficiency.

The evolutionary increase in the characteristics of submarine air defense systems will significantly increase the effectiveness of submarines in delivering missile attacks on aircraft carrier attack groups (AAGs) due to the destruction of early warning radars (AWACS) capable of issuing target designation missiles launched by AAG guarding ships using low-altitude anti-ship missiles.

Submarines equipped with air defense systems can carry out raider operations against enemy transport aircraft, disrupting communications, significantly complicating the supply of enemy bases and contingents deployed far from its territory.

In the next article, we will talk about alternative weapon systems that can be used on the border of two environments.
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127 comments
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  1. +3
    April 30 2020 18: 19
    there is a competition of defenses and attacks ... the end and edge are not visible ...
  2. ABM
    +2
    April 30 2020 18: 25
    all this fiction ...
    1. The comment was deleted.
      1. -3
        April 30 2020 18: 49
        Yeah! Where is the money, Zin?
        1. -9
          April 30 2020 18: 50
          Offshore your oligarchs
          1. +3
            April 30 2020 18: 55
            So it is, only they are "not ours"
    2. 0
      April 30 2020 18: 55
      ABM (ABM) Today, 18:25 NEW
      0
      all this fiction ...


      Fiction now, and in the future, reality is possible.
    3. 0
      April 30 2020 19: 12
      Quote: ABM
      all this fiction ...

      about the S-350 SAM on board the nuclear submarine - of course yes! fiction, but after 15 years, everything may change .... maybe on the planet earth there will only be the corona virus))
      1. +1
        April 30 2020 19: 19
        C-350 is redundant. How to aim at such ranges and with what? We need a rocket like Thor / Shell, which can be visited by itself. Besides, what will change in 15 years? Someone is designing something like this? For example, they put a rocket for work on Suffren on air targets based on air-to-air missiles. We have Igla, Verba on submarines. But not on the basis of S-350 missiles.
        1. -1
          April 30 2020 19: 54
          Quote: Sky Strike fighter
          Moreover, what will change in 15 years?

          Could you imagine weapons like petrels in 2005?
          1. 0
            April 30 2020 20: 02
            What does the Petrel have to do with it? I mean the changes on the submarines. Although why, if there are vertical launchers on the submarines for anti-ship missiles and missiles, then it is impossible to launch missiles from them the same as on surface ships? It is necessary to solve the problem of launching from under water, although it was solved for CR / RCC and, most importantly, aiming at a target that I think will not be a big problem either.
            1. 0
              April 30 2020 20: 29
              Quote: Sky Strike fighter
              What does the Petrel have to do with it?

              you wrote -
              Quote: Sandor Clegane
              Moreover, what will change in 15 years?

              I replied that a lot could change during this period
            2. +5
              April 30 2020 21: 11
              It is necessary to solve the problem of starting from under water


              Just it is not difficult and has long been tested on numerous products.

              the main thing is aiming at a target that I think will not be a big problem either


              This is precisely the main problem. The aircraft cannot be found underwater. And if by a miracle they see something on the monitor while they are classifying it, and "the trace is gone"

              And how does the thermal seeker itself find the target "at random"? Winding circles? And what is its "sector of coverage"? This requires low speed, spiral maneuvering and time. SAMs do not know how. The energy is not the same.
              1. 0
                7 May 2020 09: 39
                Quote: Podvodnik
                It is necessary to solve the problem of starting from under water


                Just it is not difficult and has long been tested on numerous products.

                the main thing is aiming at a target that I think will not be a big problem either


                This is precisely the main problem. The aircraft cannot be found underwater. And if by a miracle they see something on the monitor while they are classifying it, and "the trace is gone"


                We are talking about a situation when an ASW plane has detected a contact and is actively refining it, i.e. moves in the submarine patrol area. "The trace is cold" will not work here, the ranges of detection and destruction of the aircraft are indicated in the article, i.e. returning to the area of ​​detection of the submarine to clarify its coordinates or to attack, the submarine aircraft can be shot down. And if he just flew away, then what? He did not complete the task.

                Quote: Podvodnik
                And how does the thermal seeker itself find the target "at random"? Winding circles? And what is its "sector of coverage"? This requires low speed, spiral maneuvering and time. SAMs do not know how. The energy is not the same.


                Here, the time from the moment the target was detected, its trajectory, and the missile launcher at the start is guided by an inertial guidance system so that the target falls into the zone of the ARL- or infrared seeker. If necessary, missiles does an additional search for body turns in the direction of travel.

                If the submarine did not go on a dive immediately after the shot, then the input of the correct coordinates of the target can be arranged, this issue has also already been solved for some missiles of the cc, cc.
            3. +5
              1 May 2020 02: 43
              The author himself did not understand what he was offering. He offers the submarine to ascend / ascend to the periscopic depth, extend the radar antenna and ... conduct a search for PLO aircraft? !!!
              At least he understands that not only submarines will fly to this radiation, but also carrier-based, basic combat ...? That reconnaissance satellites will also detect such a signature and immediately orient the aviation to search and destroy (in a combat situation)? And not with sophisticated rocket-torpedoes, but with the banal "Harpoon", as it should be for a surface (surfaced) target. Moreover, with guidance in the passive mode - on the radiation of the surfaced radar lol on the marching section.
              Even a combat fighter, as soon as it includes an airborne radar, immediately unmasks itself. Moreover, it becomes visible at a much greater distance than it is able to see for itself.
              Same thing with the author’s submarine radar.
              For submarines, ONLY passive search and target designation for their own air defense systems is possible! And this already means that the SAM can only be short-range.
              Only the optical-location station integrated into the periscope.
              No other is given.
              All other air defense systems ONLY for surface ships.
              But there is another solution to this issue - the "Container" type ZGRLS is capable of seeing at long distances (3000 km. For cruise missiles, and up to 6000 km. For large air targets, with no difference in target height) and therefore can give a warning to the headquarters of the Navy, commander of the submarine forces, about the actions of the submarine aviation in the regions of our submarine forces. And how to react to this, let the headquarters decide.
              In BMZ, it is possible to raise fighters of basic aviation and disperse enemy anti-submarines, in the distant - to warn submarines via satellite or long-distance maritime communications. If it circles around the submarine itself, you can swim up to the periscope depth and try to get an air defense system.
              In general, it is desirable to cover the surface area of ​​our nuclear submarines with the forces of the surface fleet.
              And for this, these forces must be had.
              And so - to build.
              And have a good base aircraft on heavy fighters.
              And there will be boat happiness. Yes
              1. +1
                1 May 2020 13: 07
                Quote: bayard
                He offers the submarine to ascend / ascend to the periscope depth, extend the radar antenna and ... conduct a search for PLO aircraft
                This is not scary, the main thing is that the ekranoplanes will not be put into the arsenal of the fleet! (joke!)
                1. 0
                  1 May 2020 20: 02
                  Quote: Vladimir_2U
                  This is not scary, the main thing is that the ekranoplanes will not be put into the arsenal of the fleet! (joke!)

                  You don’t accidentally do it here .. Under capitalism, the most expensive and useless systems, on the contrary, are in favor. Where else can you cut so much?
              2. 0
                7 May 2020 09: 48
                Quote: bayard
                The author himself did not understand what he was offering. He offers the submarine to ascend / ascend to the periscopic depth, extend the radar antenna and ... conduct a search for PLO aircraft? !!!


                Put forward the periscope, which is being done now.

                Quote: bayard
                Does he even understand that not only submarines will flock to this radiation, but also deck, base combat ...?


                Where, from the nearest bush, like sparrows?

                Quote: bayard
                That intelligence satellites will also detect such a signature and immediately direct the aircraft towards search and destruction (in a combat situation)?


                Why, then, do NK at all? They say that satellites can not always detect AUGs, otherwise the periscope of a submarine?

                Quote: bayard
                And not with sophisticated rocket-torpedoes, but with the banal "Harpoon", as it should be for a surface (surfaced) target. Moreover, with guidance in the passive mode - on the radiation of the surfaced radar lol on the marching section.


                On the periscope? Which moved forward for 10-30 seconds?


                Quote: bayard
                Even a combat fighter, as soon as it includes an airborne radar, immediately unmasks itself. Moreover, it becomes visible at a much greater distance than it is able to see for itself.
                Same thing with the author’s submarine radar.


                Those. Do you need to remove radar from fighters in principle?

                Quote: bayard
                For submarines, ONLY passive search and target designation for their own air defense systems is possible! And this already means that the SAM can only be short-range.
                Only the optical-location station integrated into the periscope.
                No other is given.
                All other air defense systems ONLY for surface ships.


                Let's just say priority, as indicated in the article. But if it will be possible to make a conformal radar, then why not? There is a hidden mode of operation for them. But, again, the article is about passive detection methods. The radar is indicated as an opportunity and / or option for the future. How can one read one and see the other?

                Quote: bayard
                But there is another solution to this issue - the "Container" type ZGRLS is capable of seeing at long distances (3000 km. For cruise missiles, and up to 6000 km. For large air targets, with no difference in target height) and therefore can give a warning to the headquarters of the Navy, commander of the submarine forces, about the actions of the submarine aviation in the regions of our submarine forces. And how to react to this, let the headquarters decide.


                Submarines can operate in more remote areas. And there is something doubt that ZGRLS is capable of detecting all targets in all conditions. The enemy also has electronic warfare.

                And ZGRLS is a big stationary target. She will not live long. Gouging the Kyrgyz Republic.

                Quote: bayard
                If it circles around the submarine itself, you can swim up to the periscope depth and try to get an air defense system.


                What is actually talking about.
                1. +1
                  7 May 2020 16: 58
                  Andrei, I’m still an officer of the air defense combat command in the past, and just in terms of the radar profile (RTV), so it’s worth taking my comments seriously.
                  Quote: AVM
                  Quote: bayard
                  The author himself did not understand what he was offering. He offers the submarine to ascend / ascend to the periscopic depth, extend the radar antenna and ... conduct a search for PLO aircraft? !!!


                  Put forward the periscope, which is being done now.

                  Do you propose instead of a narrow long rod of the periscope to put forward a mandolin of a pyramidal shape and a decent size?
                  Through the water?
                  Salty?
                  I can’t even think about it without a shudder.
                  And this mandolin will emit powerful sounding signals (in radar, sounding signals are powerful and super-powerful pulses) that RTR aircraft and RTR satellites will detect over thousands of kilometers.
                  And ...
                  Quote: AVM
                  on this radiation, not only submarines will fly off, but also deck, base combat ...?


                  Where, from the nearest bush, like sparrows?

                  If an aircraft carrier or naval base is nearby, then that’s right. Just rather like crows. ICAPL as a rule hang out near (up to several hundred kilometers) from the enemy AUG - this is their combat work, and SUCH unmasking will simply be a HOLIDAY for enemy anti-submarine and carrier-based aircraft.
                  Even if the radar only works for tens of seconds, the boat has already lit up, the area of ​​its presence has been opened and such a hunt will go ...
                  Well, you get the point.
                  And one more remark about the radar at the periscope. If you raise the periscope by 2 - 3 meters on the waves, then instead of the target on the horizon, she will see only the next wave (exaggerate). The height of the antenna post is crucial for detecting low-altitude targets and targets at an average height that are more than 50 km away. That is, this mandolin will also have to be raised by 8-10 meters to provide an acceptable overview. Are we talking about the sea?
                  Quote: AVM
                  Those. Do you need to remove radar from fighters in principle?

                  Those. fighters as a rule do not search for the target of their radar, but use external target designation when launching an attack on it (AWACS aircraft, ground-based radars), and turn on their radar only to capture the target and illuminate it (if rockets with a semi-active head are used). Also for the stealth mode of detection and attack, OLS are used to detect enemy aircraft and Raman weapons at distances of tens of kilometers.
                  At the same moment as the fighter turns on its radar in combat mode, an enemy radiation warning system is activated on enemy aircraft. So he (the fighter), turning on the radar to search for the target, will find himself before his radar finds this target.
                  Everyone knows this.
                  Quote: AVM
                  But if it will be possible to make a conformal radar, then why not? There is a hidden mode of operation for them.

                  What did you mean ? Integrate PAR antenna arrays into the cabin of the submarine? If she is conformal? belay This word is understood in this way. And what kind of "secretive mode" are you talking about? Using a multi-frequency signal? But this only matters for aviation - individual samples of such a signal have a much lower power and can force them to be mistaken for a REMOTE radar signal. But at sea this is unlikely to work. Direction finding. Especially if the signature of such a radar is known in advance (it is enough to take a reading of the operating radar once or twice with an RTR aircraft and put it into combat search algorithms for the future.
                  Quote: AVM
                  But, again, the article is about passive detection methods. The radar is indicated as an opportunity and / or option for the future. How can one read one and see the other?

                  I read what was written, and it was about air defense systems on a medium-range nuclear submarine. For this we need radars of very decent and critical dimensions for submarines. And what do you mean by passive search with radar? Direction finding of the radar side view of the aircraft PLO?
                  For this radar is not needed, for this there is equipment RTR (radio intelligence), but it will not give the exact coordinates of the target, only bearing. But there is nothing to breed triangulation of submarines under the periscope, for this you need at least two such submarines with reliable information exchange between them.
                  And those radars that are (and for a long time) on retractable submarine devices are navigation radars, they are not used in combat mode, but when approaching the base in order to see the coastline and rocks sticking out from under the water.
                  So the optimal solution for a submarine is an OLS in a glass sphere at the top of the retractable device. Modern aeronautical radar systems allow detecting an aircraft-type target at a distance of up to 50 - 70 km. in clear weather, as well as in the infrared and ultraviolet ranges. This is quite enough for target designation for short-range missiles (up to 40 km.). It is possible to use such missiles of the Redoubt complex or a cold version of the B-B class missiles for sand from UVP. The French seem to have taken this path.
                  Quote: AVM

                  Submarines can operate in more remote areas. And there is something doubt that ZGRLS is capable of detecting all targets in all conditions. The enemy also has electronic warfare.

                  ZGRLS have a decameter range (wavelength - tens of meters), this presents some problems for electronic warfare, especially in aviation, and the interference immunity of the newest ZGRLS is probably taken care of. In addition, they are usually located in the depths of their own territory and have very wide-spread antenna fields - picket fences from masts up to 40 m high. Another thing is that they are susceptible to disturbances in the ionosphere and, in the event of a nuclear war, can become blind for some time. But they have an amazing range of detection of any air, surface and even ground targets. Now they are only deploying, there is only one in service, but in the future such a station, located in, say, Cuba or Venezuela, together with a station in Kaliningrad, can cover the entire North Atlantic with their control. And information awareness is the first key to success. But everything should work together.
                  Quote: AVM

                  And ZGRLS is a big stationary target. She will not live long. Gouging the Kyrgyz Republic.

                  Such objects are usually very well covered, and how do they gouge them? Kp Firstly, not the fact that they will fly - in range from the line of a possible launch. And secondly - ZGRLS itself will open the start of such missiles and give target designation of air defense and fighter aircraft to destroy them.
                  With such an "all-seeing eye" we move into a completely different quality of information awareness.
                  If you see where PLO planes hang out, you can warn the submarines in time through any of the available communication channels, or send basic fighter aircraft to disperse them. When you see everything, you are the master of the situation.
                  "Military science is quite accessible for an ordinary person to study ... But fighting is difficult."
                  Clausewitz.
                  Quote from memory.
        2. D16
          0
          April 30 2020 22: 18
          C-350 is unnecessary.

          It is necessary to turn the submarine into a diving corvette. laughing
          1. +1
            1 May 2020 13: 15
            Quote: D16
            It is necessary to turn the submarine into a diving corvette.

            To the cruiser! fellow
            And so that he could take off and conduct an air battle! Yes
            1. D16
              +1
              1 May 2020 13: 21
              Article fierce nonsense. In the 80s, a Komsomolets dived for a kilometer and was out of reach for anything. Just easy to climb in shallow water.
              1. +2
                1 May 2020 13: 24
                Quote: D16
                Article fierce nonsense.

                Moreover, the author is already stubborn - in the second article about this song starts.
                The topic of nuclear submarine secrecy is specific and the people involved should be the reason for this, and therefore competent people.
                1. 0
                  7 May 2020 10: 14
                  Quote: bayard
                  Quote: D16
                  Article fierce nonsense.

                  Moreover, the author is already stubborn - in the second article about this song starts.
                  The topic of nuclear submarine secrecy is specific and the people involved should be the reason for this, and therefore competent people.


                  The article has links to the conclusions of experts:

                  Captain 3rd rank reserve Maxim Klimov

                  "Who will win the underwater duel?"
                  https://topwar.ru/index.php?do=go&url=aHR0cDovL290dmFnYTIwMDQucnUvYXJtaXlhLWktdnBrL2FybWl5YS1pLXZway12emdseWFkL2t0by1wb2JlZGl0LXYtcG9kdm9kbm9qLWR1ZWxpLw%3D%3D

                  "Do I need submarine defense submarine?"
                  https://topwar.ru/index.php?do=go&url=aHR0cDovL290dmFnYTIwMDQucnUvYXJtaXlhLWktdnBrL2FybWl5YS1pLXZway12emdseWFkL251emhueS1saS16cmstcG9kcGxhdnU%3D
                  1. 0
                    7 May 2020 17: 12
                    I respect Klimov’s opinion and in many respects agree with him. But arming a submarine with an air defense radar and a radar can be completely forgotten about stealth. Well, I wrote about this above.
              2. +1
                7 May 2020 10: 11
                Quote: D16
                Article fierce nonsense. In the 80s, a Komsomolets dived for a kilometer and was out of reach for anything. Just easy to climb in shallow water.


                1. The greater the depth, the faster the noise propagates, and the submarine is heard much further.
                2. 1 km is not everywhere, you have to "climb into shallow water" to carry out combat missions, for this the United States has optimized "Virginia".
                3. At a depth of 1 km, the hull is under heavy load, the slightest accident, an explosion nearby, and the submarine end.
                4. Make a torpedo 1 km easier than submarines. The standard torpedo Mk-48 has an immersion depth of 800 m. Just like high-speed torpedoes did for hunting for project 705.
                5. There is no Komsomolets and they are no longer being built. It is very expensive and appears to be inefficient.
                1. D16
                  +1
                  7 May 2020 13: 09
                  1. In order for the noise to spread rapidly, it must be. Modern submarines passive means to detect is problematic. Water in the oceans is not uniform in temperature and salinity. In order to receive the reflected signal, the helicopter must lower OGAS very deeply).
                  Even ship Bugas do not sink to such depths.
                  2. This is a matter of organizing work.
                  3. What could explode there ?. How long will it sink to such a depth? Where will the target designation come from?
                  4. It is possible to make a torpedo only as it finds a target without a mission control?
                  5. Komsomolets was expensive, that's true. It just so happened that in one place at one time too many accidents came together, almost random and incompetence, that the evolution of our nuclear submarines went a different way. Even somehow suspiciously).
      2. +1
        1 May 2020 01: 25
        Fiction is not to shove air defense systems in a nuclear submarine, but to make it possible to launch from a depth (otherwise the boat will be spotted) and hide radiation to detect aircraft and aim at the target (otherwise the boat will again be spotted, and launching an air defense missile would not launch missiles assigned combat mission, unmasking is unacceptable). And so - like the Germans did an underwater air defense system, a missile on the wire. And the French (DCNS A3SM, sort of).
    4. 0
      9 May 2020 22: 04
      The Germans have already experienced in their 212s. It is strange that the author did not mention.
  3. +2
    April 30 2020 18: 43
    Interesting article . But in my humble land opinion, upon reaching the threshold of the practical impossibility of securing a submarine, it is easier to abandon such ships in general, as obsolete ones, than to fence in them everything described in the article without an acceptable chance of survival. go to deep-sea drones - as an option - automated, minimized as much as possible and cheapened as much as possible. And all of the above a lot of pseudo-ideas - a dead end - an attacker in such a situation always will be in an initiative position with all that it implies.
    1. 0
      April 30 2020 18: 50
      Something seems to me that for deployment of anti-aircraft missile systems on nuclear submarines, AFARs will also need to be deployed on the nuclear submarines. How will AFAR work from under the water?
      1. +6
        April 30 2020 21: 17
        How will AFAR work from under the water?


        There will be no.
        Yes, if they come up with and "put forward on the periscope" - the submarine will immediately lose its main weapon - stealth. In combat conditions, radar operation in active mode is very dangerous. And why is it needed? The submarine is not intended to search for and destroy enemy aircraft.
    2. +2
      April 30 2020 18: 53
      By the way, if you place the SSBN in an internal body of water, then the issue of protection from enemy PLO will be removed. There has already been a discussion on this topic, which has shown both the difficulties of transferring SSBNs to inland waters and the advantages that significantly exceed the difficulties.

      Of course, this does not solve the issue of protecting ICAPL.
    3. -1
      April 30 2020 19: 22
      Quote: KVU-NSVD
      grove to abandon such ships in general, as obsolete

      exactly! drinks
  4. +2
    April 30 2020 18: 46
    The danger is the variety and number of buoys with which you can detect nuclear submarines at a decent distance.
    PLO aircraft are often patrolled in pairs. What then?
    And if you count the number of orions, Hercules and deck Vikings and compare with the number of active submarines of the Russian Navy, then it will become sad at all.
    1. +1
      April 30 2020 19: 15
      Yes it was already. They did not find Severodvinsk (Ash). Even the Americans themselves confirmed this.
      For several weeks, the US Navy and aircraft tried in vain to find the Russian submarine Severodvinsk in the North Atlantic. However, the silent submarine slipped away from the enemy.

      A submarine several hundred miles from the US coast was hunted by an entire armada of ships and submarines, as well as special US aviation, according to Severodvinsk television.

      https://m.severpost.ru/read/91487/
      1. 0
        April 30 2020 19: 23
        Quote: Sky Strike fighter
        This was confirmed even by the Americans themselves.

        Are you sure this is not disinformation? bully
        1. 0
          April 30 2020 19: 52
          Yes, no, not disinfect. Even the model of Ash, after which some American admiral asked him to do.
          even Severodvinsk and Kazan have enormous potential in carrying out strategic strike operations, and having left the tasks of submarine battles with Virginia and Los Angeles for submarines of the Schuka-B class, they are able to overcome anti-submarine exclusion zones and access restrictions and the “A2 / AD” maneuver in the North Atlantic, and then make a successful attempt to launch a “Caliber” strike at the necessary strategic NATO forces in Western Europe or even on the east coast of the United States. We will not deny the level of danger of such operations, because we are all well aware of the intensity of the work of anti-submarine aircraft and frigates / electromagnetic submarines, which the command of the NATO Navy in the region can afford.

          https://topwar.ru/143677-tihaya-ugroza-pereigryvayuschaya-podvodnyy-flot-rossii-v-otsutstvii-realizacii-proekta-haski.html
    2. 0
      April 30 2020 19: 58
      Quote: knn54
      The danger is the variety and number of buoys with which you can detect nuclear submarines at a decent distance.


      The signal from the buoys must be received, processed, clarified, reset new buoys. Those. waste time. If the submarine realizes that it was discovered, then it can set an ambush for hunters.

      Quote: knn54
      PLO aircraft are often patrolled in pairs. What then?


      Knock down both? SAM is quite capable of coping with this, especially when there is a missile system with ARLGSN and IKGSN. 1 SAM with ARLGSN and 2 SAM with IKGSN for 1 PLO aircraft. Evading them will not be easy.

      SAM is less than the CR and RCC. Medium-range missiles 9M96E, 9M96E2 in the PKR mine fit three pieces, short-range missiles 9M100E and even more than 4-5 pieces. Those. removing 6 of the 32 missile launchers of the missile system of Yasen’s ammunition, it is theoretically possible to take 12 missile launchers and 8-10 missile launchers. Of course, the missile defense missile system may decrease due to containers for ascent, but it is difficult to accurately predict the exact number of missiles. I think for 2-4 aircraft there will be enough stock, and maybe more.

      Quote: knn54
      And if you count the number of orions, Hercules and deck Vikings and compare with the number of active submarines of the Russian Navy, then it will become sad at all.


      Yes, but the more important it is to protect them.
      1. +3
        April 30 2020 21: 24
        If the submarine realizes that it was discovered, then it can set an ambush for hunters.


        The submarine will understand that it was discovered only by the noise of the torpedoes coming at it. In this case, it is possible to flare the air defense system into white light, like a pretty penny, and begin the evasion maneuver, while counterattacking the torpedoes on the bearing to noise. After all, it will be impossible to classify an enemy torpedo as fired from a submarine or aircraft.
        1. 0
          1 May 2020 01: 27
          And on low-frequency exposure?
          1. +2
            1 May 2020 18: 57
            And on low-frequency exposure?


            If the submarine measured the distance in the echo mode, then they are going to use weapons (during the fighting, of course). That is, they specify the distance to produce shooting data. HOOK is able to detect such premises. If you mean backlighting with a low-frequency emitter, then the fact of detection is almost impossible to evaluate.
      2. 0
        1 May 2020 13: 23
        The air defense submarine is stronger than the impact ekranoplan! (Joke) Seriously, an air defense missile from under water is not a problem, the problem is the detection of a PLO aircraft, with at least some stealth. The way out and inexpensive, it seems to me, is passive direction finding from two or more retractable devices, including a non-penetrating type!
    3. 0
      7 May 2020 10: 18
      Quote: knn54
      The danger is the variety and number of buoys with which you can detect nuclear submarines at a decent distance.


      Detection of submarines is a probability value. It is increased by dropping additional buoys, flying around and scanning the water area with sensors, i.e. it takes time. And not like that - he sketched buoys, information immediately arrives - here is a submarine, dropped a torpedo and flew on.

      Quote: knn54
      PLO aircraft are often patrolled in pairs. What then?


      Knock down both?
  5. +8
    April 30 2020 19: 19
    In short - conceptual nonsense request
    1) The proposed anti-aircraft submarine will be even more expensive, and the price of nuclear submarines, and so on ... request In general, all these additions of the nuclear submarine’s functionality are anti-missiles, noise reduction, various long-range torpedoes, etc. they cast doubt on the very concept of nuclear submarines as weapons, as well as nuclear ABs - they are too complicated and expensive to fight ... hi
    2) As soon as the nuclear submarine begins to engage in combat with aviation, it will lose the main thing - secrecy, even having shot down the aircraft ... The speeds of aviation submarines (800km) and nuclear submarines (30uz) differ by more than 15 times, therefore the command of submarines can quickly build up strength and finish off nuclear submarines ... All attempts to get away from the strike due to the maneuverability of the nuclear submarines look strange - this has already taken place on the Goldfish, and the maneuver will not help against the strike from the nuclear warhead ... feel
    3) Raising the submarine’s radar immediately reveals itself on several grounds, even using it in passive mode, and even turning it on request In any case, the range of this radar from the height of its location will not be comparable even with the NK, and even with aviation in general ... hi
    4) A decision arises that the author does not like - either abandoning nuclear submarines altogether, or drastically reducing their size and cost - due to reduced functionality, switching to flocks from submarines or underwater drones controlled from an underwater command post ... At the same time, this cost a flock of drones will be such that it is not entirely clear who they are against request The problem of shipping disruption can be solved by hitting the ports, it is pointless to catch AUG in the ocean, and there are hypersonic CDs on the coast against the bottom hi
    1. 0
      April 30 2020 19: 41
      Quote: ser56
      In short - conceptual nonsense request
      1) The proposed anti-aircraft submarine will be even more expensive, and the price of nuclear submarines, and so on ... request In general, all these additions of the nuclear submarine’s functionality are anti-missiles, noise reduction, various long-range torpedoes, etc. they cast doubt on the very concept of nuclear submarines as weapons, as well as nuclear ABs - they are too complicated and expensive to fight ... hi


      All weapons are becoming more complicated. And it is not a fact that they will be so expensive, in comparison, for example, with the Kyrgyz Republic and the RCC, which are widespread everywhere.

      Quote: ser56
      2) As soon as the nuclear submarine begins to engage in combat with aviation, it will lose the main thing - secrecy, even having shot down the aircraft ... The speeds of aviation submarines (800km) and nuclear submarines (30uz) differ by more than 15 times, therefore the command of submarines can quickly build up strength and finish off nuclear submarines ... All attempts to get away from the strike due to the maneuverability of the nuclear submarines look strange - this has already taken place on the Goldfish, and the maneuver will not help against the strike from the nuclear warhead ... feel


      No one forces the submarine to unmask themselves; the captain must make a decision based on the situation. What would you prefer - to remain a punching bag, if you already discovered, and drown heroically, or try to give change?

      Quote: ser56
      3) Raising the submarine’s radar immediately reveals itself on several grounds, even using it in passive mode, and even turning it on request In any case, the range of this radar from the height of its location will not be comparable even with the NK, and even with aviation in general ... hi


      Periscope with a camera and thermal imager. What is now. And electronic intelligence sensors, they are already standing too. I would only consider acoustic ones if they are needed and they cannot be replaced by the GAS (the GAS can hear the sounds of aviation above the water, but I can’t say how efficiently). Radar can be added in the future, when there will be conformal solutions.

      And yes, the radio waves travel in a straight line. What the PLO plane sees, the PL also sees.
      1. +1
        April 30 2020 20: 16
        Quote: AVM
        And it is not a fact that they will be so expensive, in comparison, for example, with the Kyrgyz Republic and the RCC, which are widespread everywhere.

        fact... request in addition, air defense needs energy, volumes and people - the crew is growing with all the consequences request
        Quote: AVM
        captain must make a decision

        captain on a submarine? bully
        Quote: AVM
        What would you prefer
        you, as I have already noted, have problems with logic request
      2. +2
        April 30 2020 20: 18
        Quote: AVM
        And yes, the radio waves travel in a straight line. What the PLO plane sees, the PL also sees.

        Thank you, I don’t see any point discussing anything further with you - you are illiterate in these matters hi
      3. +3
        April 30 2020 21: 44
        (The CEO can hear the sounds of aviation above the water, but how effective I can’t say


        Yes, the acoustician will hear the roar of the plane if it flies low, but the control center will not be able to give it. Only a helicopter hovering motionless. It's easier, the target will "hang" at one point and make noise. But for this, the acoustician must have the appropriate experience. For all the time of my service, we have not encountered such a thing.

        Periscope with camera and thermal imager


        If at the same time will be "tied" to the mast of the air defense missile system, then "saw - shot" as "last resort shot"

        And electronic intelligence sensors


        There is such a thing on a separate mast. Bearing can give a working radar, but not the distance. It is only indicative.

        Radar can be added in the future


        Navigation radar available. A hovering helicopter will see. Even now it will be able to issue data to the BIOS. Nothing to shoot yet. In principle, realizable. She will not be able to work on the plane. A bit high.
        1. The comment was deleted.
          1. -1
            3 May 2020 05: 51
            I found it when I wrote about it.
            About dosing is powerful. radar. It seems that they received the radar impulse on the boat, it’s very small, it’s far logically, and it’s already above the wheelhouse with a searchlight (from the memoirs of the commanders on the BS in the 70s)

              > Alexander Sergeevich. Such is the question. locators, which, as it were, dosed the radiation. > Our divers estimated the distance to Orion by signal strength. Maybe that's why the RTR reconnaissance of the Dudko boat did not detect the operation of the aircraft's radar? This is the Orion-A data. In general, of course it is different. Depending on the scale you work on. On "Berkut" in the "Review" mode it is constant. If you work with the RSL, then the power is "cut". But this is still with those ancient computers. Bottom right. http://ipic.su/img/img7/fs/RLS.1561206069.jpg Orion has a different radar. That is, there are two of them, in the front and back sectors. They had trouble synchronizing their work. But again, this was in the early 70s. Now, naturally, the power is dosed. Well, detecting a working Orion radar for submarines is not difficult.

  6. +6
    April 30 2020 19: 22
    The author is very far behind the real situation. Work on equipping boats with air defense systems has already passed into the practical plane.

    The IDAS multifunctional underwater launch rocket developed by the German-Norwegian consortium ARGE IDAS (formed by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft, Diehl BG Defense and Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace. The first samples appeared back in 2006. In 2013, the Turkish ROKETAN joined the consortium.
    Designed to arm small submarines. It is distinguished by the ability to defeat not only ships (sea-to-sea mode), but also objects on land (sea-to-ground mode) and air targets, in particular helicopters (sea-air mode). The flight range is approximately 20 km. In this case, the rocket is launched from the bow launchers of submarines, part of the time moves under water, which prevents the submarine from being unmasked, and after reaching the surface it flies through the air. Rocket
    Equipped with infrared seeker. The length of the rocket is 2,5 m, the caliber is 240 mm, the diameter is 180 mm, the launch weight is 120 kg.
    1. +4
      April 30 2020 19: 34

      The French A3SM system was first introduced at the Paris Air Show in 2013.
      It has a version launched from a torpedo tube and a mast version.
      The first is a capsule (VSM) containing a medium-range Mica rocket (20 km). Starting is possible in the entire range of diving depths.
      The mast version contains an airtight container mounted on a lifting mast and containing three MBDA Mistral 2 short-range missiles that can be launched from a periscope depth.
    2. 0
      April 30 2020 19: 35
      Quote: Undecim
      The author is very far behind the real situation. Work on equipping boats with air defense systems has already passed into the practical plane.

      The IDAS multifunctional underwater launch rocket developed by the German-Norwegian consortium ARGE IDAS (formed by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft, Diehl BG Defense and Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace. The first samples appeared back in 2006. In 2013, the Turkish ROKETAN joined the consortium.
      Designed to arm small submarines. It is distinguished by the ability to defeat not only ships (sea-to-sea mode), but also objects on land (sea-to-ground mode) and air targets, in particular helicopters (sea-air mode). The flight range is approximately 20 km. In this case, the rocket is launched from the bow launchers of submarines, part of the time moves under water, which prevents the submarine from being unmasked, and after reaching the surface it flies through the air. Rocket
      Equipped with infrared seeker. The length of the rocket is 2,5 m, the caliber is 240 mm, the diameter is 180 mm, the launch weight is 120 kg.


      The author wrote, including about the IDAS complex, back in mid-2018 in the article The Atomic Multifunctional Underwater Cruiser: Paradigm Shift - https://topwar.ru/143629-atomnyy-mnogofunkcionalnyy-podvodnyy-kreyser-kak-smena-paradigmy.html

      These complexes are conceptually more likely ATGMs with the possibility of shelling air targets, half measures - the beginning of the road. Those developments that are underway are intended for the simplest purposes. Complex goals are too tough for them.

      Our air defense systems are some of the best in the world, so it would be logical to be the first in the field of underwater air defense systems.
      1. 0
        April 30 2020 19: 47
        Why didn’t they?
        1. 0
          April 30 2020 19: 50
          Quote: Undecim
          Why didn’t they?


          And we don’t have a 5th generation airplane yet? And how many new submarines do we have? What about modern AWACS aircraft?

          There is an inertia of thinking, established traditions, documentary limitations. Even the fact that any concern did not work with another direction is already a huge obstacle. There are limited funds and lobbying for interests.

          But we don't have DARP. On the other hand, there is secrecy. Who knows what will be there on the "Like"?
          1. +1
            April 30 2020 19: 52
            And most importantly - there is no groundwork since the Soviet era. There is nothing to finish, it is necessary to start from scratch, and there are problems with this.
            1. 0
              April 30 2020 19: 53
              Quote: Undecim
              And most importantly - there is no groundwork since the Soviet era. There is nothing to finish, it is necessary to start from scratch, and there are problems with this.


              I am sure that even despite the lack of groundwork (by the way, he can and is, at least there are patents for shooting from under water), we can implement such a complex. There would be political will.
              1. +3
                April 30 2020 19: 58
                About secrecy. I also missed the American AIM-9X. She recently disappeared from the media, but there was no information about the termination of the program. Considering that the UAVs on the American nuclear submarines are already a reality, it is not excluded that the AIM-9X was "finished".
                1. 0
                  1 May 2020 04: 27
                  And in your links to the foreign experience of creating air defense systems on submarines there is information about how submarines search, select and maintain air targets? For SAM without radar - this is nonsense.
                  1. 0
                    7 May 2020 10: 22
                    Quote: Alexander1971
                    And in your links to the foreign experience of creating air defense systems on submarines there is information about how submarines search, select and maintain air targets? For SAM without radar - this is nonsense.


                    It is one thing if an air defense system ensures the safety of an object when even 1 enemy ammunition arriving can significantly damage, for example, a plant, a nuclear power plant or an oil storage facility - without a radar at all.

                    Another thing is when an air defense system is used as a means of attack. Even MANPADS proved to be dangerous weapons. In our case, an air defense system is a means of attack, it does not need to hold a long defense of the object.
                    1. 0
                      7 May 2020 11: 08
                      That is, there is no such information.
                      And no wonder. For it is impossible to install a radar on a submarine. And there will be no submarine either a means of attacking aircraft, or a means of defense against aircraft. And the price of a good nuclear submarine is often higher than that of any plant or oil storage, and the price of a nuclear power plant can also be comparable.
                      1. 0
                        7 May 2020 12: 18
                        Quote: Alexander1971
                        That is, there is no such information.
                        And no wonder. For it is impossible to install a radar on a submarine. And there will be no submarine either a means of attacking aircraft, or a means of defense against aircraft. And the price of a good nuclear submarine is often higher than that of any plant or oil storage, and the price of a nuclear power plant can also be comparable.


                        Here the issue is not the cost of the facility, but its stationarity and the need to ensure round-the-clock defense.

                        In the case of a submarine, if it is detected and attacked, and the commander of the submarine understands this, and also understands that it will be difficult for him to hide due to some circumstances, then he decides to destroy the aircraft. It pops up to the periscope depth, raises the periscope, a quick view of the sky with a camera and a thermal imager and receiving information from acoustic sensors and RTR sensors, issuing target designation of missiles, launch 1-2-3-4 missiles.
                        Then:
                        - or the periscope is removed, the submarine is immersed, missiles are guided only by the IKGSN or ARLGSN;
                        - or the submarine continues to track the target until it is defeated and issue an adjustment to the missile system via a secure radio channel.
                      2. 0
                        7 June 2020 02: 42
                        Quote: AVM
                        What would you prefer - to remain a punching bag, if you already discovered, and drown heroically, or try to give change?

                        Quote: AVM
                        Floats to the periscope depth ...

                        If they are already hunting for submarines, she will not have time to trivially even make a review after surfacing. It is detected at the time of its ascent, or even in the process - this is not a quick matter. Actually, that's all.
                        Even if the platform for detecting and launching missiles is taken outside the submarine, its detection will unmask the submarine itself, because will clearly indicate its presence nearby. And it doesn’t matter what it will be: ANPA, BEC, UAV or buoys: UAVs / SAMs will be instantly direction-finding.
                        We do not live in the times of the USSR: all the leading countries implement network-centric concepts. Destruction of one aircraft will not do anything: all available PLO aviation will fly onto a signal detected before its destruction.
            2. D16
              0
              April 30 2020 22: 53
              And most importantly - there is no backlog since the days of the USSR

              In the USSR, there was an awesome but completely mediocre lost groundwork. It was called the nuclear submarine "Komsomolets". With proper operation, this nuclear submarine would never have problems either with aviation or with modern anti-submarine weapons of surface ships.
  7. +2
    April 30 2020 19: 31
    In order to detect aviation, one must ascend to the periscope depth, which will lead to inevitable detection. And why for the sake of a garden.
    1. -1
      April 30 2020 19: 52
      Quote: Michael m
      In order to detect aviation, one must ascend to the periscope depth, which will lead to inevitable detection. And why for the sake of a garden.


      Maybe then in general to remove the periscope, since it is a threat to the submarine? Periscope visibility is also reduced by the way. The submarine can already be detected and attacked, fight off the first strike with anti-torpedoes and false targets, and prevent the second and subsequent attacks from being delivered.
      1. ANB
        0
        April 30 2020 22: 37
        The depth of immersion must be increased.
        There was nothing much to get a goldfish in due time. Except for the SBN.
    2. 0
      April 30 2020 19: 56
      It is not necessary to launch a missile on an airplane from a submarine, and on the submarine itself it may not be known about its presence in the air, much simpler if the missile launches from a special container lying on the bottom of its shelf, and the enemy aircraft detects air defense from the ground, from space , from a surface ship or aircraft, after which they must transfer the coordinates to the boat, the relay located in the area where the containers are based, and she will send the command to emerge to the nearest of them, when it emerges and the rocket starts from it, it should read the exact coordinates of the aircraft directly from the detection means, such logistics.
      1. 0
        1 May 2020 05: 43
        In this scheme, the submarine looks superfluous.
    3. 0
      April 30 2020 19: 58
      Quote: Michael m
      In order to detect aviation, one must ascend to the periscope depth, which will lead to inevitable detection. And why for the sake of a garden.


      Not a fact.
      There is an external target designation.
      There are autonomous devices controlled by submarines
      There are indirect signs - dumping buoys, etc.
      1. 0
        April 30 2020 20: 15
        External target designation from where and how?
        Management of autonomous devices as an additional unmasking feature?
        Does resetting buoys say something about the altitude and speed of the aircraft, maneuvering it to aim at the target?
        Detection and destruction of submarines with the help of aviation is a task many orders of magnitude simpler than the inverse.
        1. 0
          April 30 2020 20: 20
          Quote: Mikhail M
          Detection and destruction of submarines with the help of aviation is a task many orders of magnitude simpler than the inverse.

          and most importantly - meaningless! hi and underwater AB is not far ... bully
        2. -1
          April 30 2020 20: 58
          Quote: Mikhail M
          External target designation from where and how?

          Satellite, aviation.

          Quote: Mikhail M
          Management of autonomous devices as an additional unmasking feature?

          Unmasking trait for autonomous devices? Yes, let them catch ...

          Quote: Mikhail M
          Does resetting buoys say something about the altitude and speed of the aircraft, maneuvering it to aim at the target?

          It says that there is a plane

          Quote: Mikhail M
          Detection and destruction of submarines with the help of aviation is a task many orders of magnitude simpler than the inverse.

          In greenhouse conditions with a complete absence of counteraction, yes.
          But this is exactly what is proposed to change.
      2. +3
        April 30 2020 21: 03
        Not a fact.
        There is an external target designation.
        There are autonomous devices controlled by submarines
        There are indirect signs - dumping buoys, etc.


        1- The boat can accept an external control unit only during a communication session at a periscope depth. Naturally raising the communication antenna, periscope, SORS antenna (detection of radar signals)
        And on a PLO plane, it is useless, because it instantly becomes obsolete.
        AND! In the database, only the established communication sessions are known, for which the subscriber pops up. Strategists don't need any communication sessions at all. They receive signals of combat control under water and for this "periscope" is not needed. If a submarine emerges to attack a miraculously discovered aircraft, no one in the "base" will know.

        2-Autonomous devices, and even controlled by submarines? This is for Ray Bradbury, the Strugatsky brothers, etc. There are no such weapons! And why would they be needed?

        3-The only sign of staging buoys is the use of explosive sound sources to clarify the location of the target before the attack. There were such in the last century. Passive buoys can not be detected in any way, completely, in general (according to M. Zadornov)

        The only possibility of using missiles with submarines, in my opinion, is to attack a hovering helicopter from a mast mount when it is detected visually through the periscope. Like a "last resort shot". I saw, swore, caught it in the crosshair and pressed the button. It is also possible on the plane, they are not worn at 800 km / h when patrolling.
        1. 0
          April 30 2020 21: 27
          Quote: Podvodnik
          The boat can accept an external control unit only during a communication session at a periscopic depth.

          Not a fact.
          For example, optical with a satellite is possible at depths of 500-700 meters

          Quote: Podvodnik
          Autonomous devices, and even controlled by submarines?

          Yes.

          Quote: Podvodnik
          This is for Ray Bradbury, the Strugatsky brothers, etc.

          And to the Americans.
          They are now actively engaged in this topic.

          Quote: Podvodnik
          Passive buoys can not be detected in any way, completely, in general (according to M. Zadornov)

          Could you tell us about the technology of silent splashdown of buoys? Very interesting to read. Here for sure "This is for Ray Bradbury, the Strugatsky brothers, etc." (with)

          Quote: Podvodnik
          The only possibility of using missiles with submarines, in my opinion, is to attack a hovering helicopter from a mast mount when it is detected visually through the periscope. Like a "last resort shot". I saw, swore, caught it in the crosshair and pressed the button. It is also possible on the plane, they are not worn at 800 km / h when patrolling.

          The Germans learned to launch a rocket from an underwater container in 1944. Are our engineers more stupid?
          1. +4
            April 30 2020 22: 15
            For example, optical with a satellite is possible at depths of 500-700 meters


            Purely technically yes. For the press. Hardly ever. The database does not know the actual location of their submarines. Where do you aim the laser? For the entire specified area (or strip) of submarine location? Impossible.

            On autonomous vehicles: How will you control it from a submarine, if it is autonomous? By ZPS? (underwater communication). Informative, the transmission rate is "none" and unmasks. By cable? Optics probably? The speed of the submarine is limited, the maneuver is limited - will lead to a break. And how to take it, autonomous, back on board with this optical wire? For reconnaissance / sabotage only.

            Could you talk about the technology of silent flooding of buoys?


            I went to the "seas". Real targets heard, "Polynom" in active heard, heard crackling, and killer whales, and "Quakers". Do you really think you can hear dropped coins and even "classify" them? So it's only in the movie "Raise the periscope." The buoy descends by parachute and creates a single burst. There is no way to hear it with the ear, let alone classify it.

            The Germans learned to launch a rocket from an underwater container in 1944


            Well, we can run. It's not a problem. The problem is to develop data for firing SAM from underwater position.
            If "science" makes a rocket in the size of "Willow" with AI and the possibility of independent search-classification-capture-guidance, then of course I am with both hands. And if the range is under 100 km, generally a song. But I noted that this was for the Strugatskys, Bradbury and their colleagues.
            1. -1
              April 30 2020 22: 43
              Quote: Podvodnik
              Purely technically yes. For the press. Hardly ever. The database does not know the actual location of their submarines. Where do you aim the laser? For the entire specified area (or strip) of submarine location? Impossible.

              laughing
              But the submarine knows the location of the satellite. And he gets in touch first.
              And the "impossible" is done. This February. True, not with a submarine, but with an MQ-9 drone. 1,8 gigabits per second data exchange with geostationary.


              Quote: Podvodnik
              Do you really think you can hear coins falling

              I think the flooding of a buoy is much louder than dropped coins

              Quote: Podvodnik
              On autonomous devices: How will you control it from a submarine, if it is autonomous?

              Modern drones have long been no longer controlled like a radio-controlled model. You are trying to find a bump out of the blue. There is no problem.
              1. +1
                1 May 2020 19: 32
                But the submarine knows the location of the satellite.


                Yes, the submarine knows the parameters of the orbit and the location of the satellite. But if she tries to send a laser beam at it underwater, the sea around it will also "glow" due to the inhomogeneity of the medium and the presence of foreign inclusions. This is an unmasking sign. And the focus will be broken. The surface is not ideal, and when passing from one medium to another (air / water), the beam refracts and changes direction. Try dipping a ruler into a bowl of water at home, for example. That's right, it will "bend". And if you hit her coin at the bottom? Unrealistic. And if you start up the "wave", the ruler will wriggle, like so.

                I think the flooding of a buoy is much louder than dropped coins


                Yes, louder, but the buoy barrier is not thrown over the submarine, it is set at the intended course. A few kilometers away, or just on the likely deployment route. And the acoustician on the submarine does not constantly listen to "the whole sea". He observes the situation on the screen and listens to what interests him. Listens to the target being "driven". A single burst cannot be caught. It must be recorded and then listened to for classification. In my "century" this has not been done.

                Modern drones have long been no longer controlled like a radio-controlled model.


                I am aware, I have several radio-controlled models at home: airplanes, boats, cars. BUT:
                You noted earlier that with the help of autonomous drones, a submarine can detect an PLO aircraft, or a helicopter. As a result, take action to destroy the aircraft posing a threat. This is impossible due to the lack of communication between the PL-drone in real time. Through the audio channel due to low speed and lack of information. By cable due to restrictions on maneuvering the PL-drone bundle. The cable is "not iron" and tends to break. The use of a drone is only possible for reconnaissance / sabotage (SSO).
            2. The comment was deleted.
            3. The comment was deleted.
            4. +1
              1 May 2020 05: 36
              Podvodnik (Igor), I fully support your arguments. I subscribe to each.
  8. +1
    April 30 2020 20: 09
    In the next article, we will talk about alternative weapon systems that can be used on the border of two environments.
    I read the article with great interest, thank you very much for the interesting material with current photos! We look forward to continuing! good hi
    1. -1
      April 30 2020 20: 34
      Quote: Mikhail M
      Detection and destruction of submarines with the help of aviation is a task many orders of magnitude simpler than the inverse.

      But the submarine can carry larger and more complex missiles with a greater radius of action and in a larger quantity than a single aircraft. If an AWACS aircraft transfers the enemy’s coordinates to the submarine, then they can reach their radius of 300-400 km. Of course, the missile will have to be adjusted in flight, but not with submarines, but with AWACS, and the boat itself will play the role of just a carrier rocket.
      1. +2
        April 30 2020 22: 25
        If the AWACS aircraft transmits enemy coordinates to the submarine


        It's impossible. The place of the submarine does not know any AWACS. Even the fleet headquarters knows it only approximately. No one has constant communication with the submarine. A boat can pop up briefly to a communication session to receive information intended for it and subsequently act in accordance with it. Her main weapon is stealth.
      2. 0
        7 June 2020 03: 04
        Rave. Why, then, do submarines need missiles at all, if the Aircraft AWACS a priori itself requires air cover, which is able to disperse someone else's aviation.
        And then: next to each SSBN will fly AWACS? Great idea - opponents will only thank you for helping us find our submarines!
  9. +1
    April 30 2020 20: 25
    From the second half of World War II, the Germans, driven into the water by Allied radar, anti-submarine torpedoes, depth charges, etc., began to arm their submarines with radars, radio-detectors and quick-fire air defense systems. Alas, nothing helped. I’m not sure that attempts to create a universal submarine, besides rocket and torpedo armament, also carry a conditionally S-350 battery with a sufficient supply of missiles, with guidance radar, etc., will justify themselves. Submarines have already tried to create aircraft carriers, and with large-caliber artillery, and ... and nothing good came from crossing an elephant with a shark. I wonder how much submarine should occupy an air defense system with sufficient characteristics and a reserve of missiles? How many people should be increased crew? How TTX will change ... and so on. Very controversial issue.
    1. +1
      April 30 2020 20: 49
      Quote: LeonidL
      I wonder how much submarine should occupy an air defense system with sufficient characteristics and a reserve of missiles?

      In the beginning, you need to think about what percentage of the volume of our submarines takes up ballast (water), if 40% is like in Varshavyanka, then there’s no place left for missiles, you need to increase the displacement, and so in the states 7 missiles fit in one mine ...
      and radar guidance air defense supply is not needed, you need external target designation.
      1. +3
        April 30 2020 22: 38
        First you need to think about what percentage of the volume of our submarines is ballast


        It is calculated, for example, from the condition of the ascent of the submarine with one flooded compartment and adjacent central water storage tanks (tanks of the main ballast).
        Our submarines, indeed, have a much larger buoyancy margin than the American ones. That is why "we", after surfacing in the ice, throw pieces of ice down from the rocket deck, and "they" cut the boat out with chainsaws. They sit low. Weak pressure on the ice.

        then there’s no place left for rockets; it’s necessary to increase the displacement


        For firing missiles through the TA, additional space is not required. It is necessary to modernize the corresponding equipment - it is technically feasible and not very difficult. Well, "throw out" the existing ammunition from the racks and replace it with containers with missiles. What's even easier.
        In this case, the main problem is not the development / deployment of missiles on the submarine, but the tactics of application due to the inability to develop shooting data. There are no initial elements of the target’s movement. They have nowhere to take.
        1. +1
          1 May 2020 00: 25
          You confirm the practical futility of the submarine as the carrier of everything at once: "Well," throw out "the existing ammunition from the racks and replace it with containers with missiles. Which is even easier." to throw out the weapon for which the submarine was originally designed and quite rightly add: "... the impossibility of working out the firing data. There are no initial elements of target movement. There is nowhere to take them." And to put short-range missiles behind the wheelhouse is simply ridiculous ... aviation has long had long-range anti-ship missiles and it is quite simple to detect a submarine that is coming up.
    2. 0
      7 May 2020 10: 25
      Quote: LeonidL
      From the second half of World War II, the Germans, driven into the water by Allied radar, anti-submarine torpedoes, depth charges, etc., began to arm their submarines with radars, radio-detectors and quick-fire air defense systems. Alas, nothing helped. I’m not sure that attempts to create a universal submarine, besides rocket and torpedo armament, also carry a conditionally S-350 battery with a sufficient supply of missiles, with guidance radar, etc., will justify themselves. Submarines have already tried to create aircraft carriers, and with large-caliber artillery, and ... and nothing good came from crossing an elephant with a shark. I wonder how much submarine should occupy an air defense system with sufficient characteristics and a reserve of missiles? How many people should be increased crew? How TTX will change ... and so on. Very controversial issue.


      The submarines of those times were more like surface ships with the ability to submerge, and therefore they were attacked by everything they could. We will return to this topic. Now everything is much more complicated. From F-35 or F-18 against submarines is of little use.

      From C-350 only part of the equipment and SAM is borrowed as the basis for the development of submarine defense systems. It’s not necessary to imagine this as three air defense systems squeezed onto a submarine.
  10. 0
    April 30 2020 20: 44
    A PLO aircraft should be literally stuffed with detection sensors, electronic warfare equipment and weapons of attack and defense, which will inevitably lead to a reduction in the fuel supply on board, and therefore to a reduction in range.
    1. -1
      April 30 2020 22: 17
      And he is already stuffed
  11. +1
    April 30 2020 20: 54
    In view of the above thoughts (in the complex of correct ones), it seems that the depth of immersion and the possibility of applying it from great depths is the most likely development path ... there is a chance to find ... There is little to counteract.
    1. D16
      +1
      April 30 2020 23: 03
      it seems that the depth of immersion and the possibility of applying it from great depths is the most likely development path ... there is a chance to find ... There is little to counteract.

      Golden words Yuri Venediktovich. laughing Remember the Komsomolets submarine. Everything was invented before we thought about it.
      1. 0
        7 May 2020 10: 29
        Quote: D16
        it seems that the depth of immersion and the possibility of applying it from great depths is the most likely development path ... there is a chance to find ... There is little to counteract.

        Golden words Yuri Venediktovich. laughing Remember the Komsomolets submarine. Everything was invented before we thought about it.


        Well, everyone loves this Komsomolets, whose fate, by the way, is very sad. If everything was so simple, then everyone would build a titanium deep-sea submarine. Oh, the SSBNs would have definitely been built. An invulnerable rocket mine, great?

        The Mk48 torpedo has a working depth of 800 meters. Do you think you wouldn’t do 1000-1200 meters? And what do submarines do at 1000 meters? How to search for targets, launch rockets?

        Read why abandoned deep-sea and high-speed submarines.
        1. 0
          7 June 2020 03: 41
          Quote: AVM
          The Mk48 torpedo has a working depth of 800 meters. Do you think you wouldn’t do 1000-1200 meters?

          And what: launching a torpedo at 800-1200m is not a problem. The problem is getting there. The dashboard must be given the TS, and the water - the medium is heterogeneous. In a recent article on VO they already examined how unpredictably the HAS signal can propagate, and what the detection range of torpedoes is.
  12. +2
    April 30 2020 20: 59
    It seems to me ... Creating air defense for a submarine .... Uhhh, it's better to develop an all-round super sound tank .... Or a force field ... In general, this is not realistic at the moment
    1. +2
      April 30 2020 22: 43
      Or a force field ... In general, this is not real at the moment

      Ett for sure! (with)
      Gravitsap has not yet been invented. Ketsay is not enough.
  13. DDT
    -1
    April 30 2020 22: 03
    We have one very serious problem. Those 90s are now buzzing around. Yes, they are creating submarines of unrivaled performance. Without guile, even "dialogue partners" admit. But as a result, if anything, this miracle submarine, which has no analogues in the world, will remain one on one with the probable AUG, with all that it implies. And in general, the situation with the battleship of Germany or Japan will repeat itself, he was alone, he was crushed by numbers. Why am I writing this, because even if you put the S-350 on a submarine, it will have to surface in order to use it than it will reveal itself. Why should it surface? So there is no AWACS nearby or a satellite that does not fly in orbit, which will show the target and helpfully give information so that the submarine, without surfacing, fired a missile and hit an anti-submarine helicopter or aircraft. Still, it should be in a complex, and we have not had this since the collapse of the union. And I don’t see that understanding this fact, at least somehow worried our enlightened public ...
  14. +1
    April 30 2020 22: 16
    It is strange that the author did not talk about existing submarine defense projects
    https://bmpd.livejournal.com/366487.html
    http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/poly_sm/poly_sm.shtml
    https://topwar.ru/11548-vooruzhenie-podlodok-popolnitsya-zenitnymi-raketami.html

    And others
    But a bunch of questions arise with everyone
    The main weapon of the submarine is stealth.
    When using an air defense system, you can forget about it
    At the periscope depth, stealth drops sharply, the boat is simply visually visible from the air, the enemy will detect the working radar of the boat from the horizon with all the sad consequences for the boat
    But even if you do not radiate, modern search radars are able to statistically distinguish the periscope mark against the background of the waves, like with Aegis's lamp 3.
    And the modification of anti-ship missiles capable of firing from afar at a boat at periscope depth is a matter of time, technically this is not a difficult task.
    You can’t pick up radar polymer on any periscope, the dimensions are not the same.
    If the polymer is used, it’s easier for the boat not to dive at all, it’s more reliable.
    And you get a surface ship smile
    1. 0
      7 May 2020 10: 36
      Quote: Avior
      It is strange that the author did not talk about existing submarine defense projects
      https://bmpd.livejournal.com/366487.html
      http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/poly_sm/poly_sm.shtml
      https://topwar.ru/11548-vooruzhenie-podlodok-popolnitsya-zenitnymi-raketami.html

      And others


      I wrote in previous articles, there are links to them. As well as the article by Maxim Klimov, which also examined SAM submarines. I see no reason to rewrite the same thing.

      Quote: Avior
      But a bunch of questions arise with everyone
      The main weapon of the submarine is stealth.
      When using an air defense system, you can forget about it


      We are talking about a situation when a submarine is already detected.

      Quote: Avior
      At the periscope depth, stealth drops sharply, the boat is simply visually visible from the air, the enemy will detect the working radar of the boat from the horizon with all the sad consequences for the boat


      However, the submarine has to go to the periscope depth.

      Quote: Avior
      But even if you do not radiate, modern search radars are able to statistically distinguish the periscope mark against the background of the waves, like with Aegis's lamp 3.


      Periscopes are being modernized, they are manufactured using low visibility technologies, and raised for a very short time. The advantage of ARLGSN and IKGSN is that it is enough to give target designation, and then the periscope can be removed.

      Quote: Avior
      And the modification of anti-ship missiles capable of firing from afar at a boat at periscope depth is a matter of time, technically this is not a difficult task.


      Very difficult - it will be a missile torpedo with a concomitant decrease in range, speed and probability of hitting a target.

      Quote: Avior
      You can’t pick up radar polymer on any periscope, the dimensions are not the same.
      If the polymer is used, it’s easier for the boat not to dive at all, it’s more reliable.
      And you get a surface ship smile


      We will return to this in the next article. In the context of self-defense, a radar submarine is optional.
      1. 0
        7 June 2020 03: 16
        Quote: Avior
        And the modification of anti-ship missiles capable of firing from afar at a boat at periscope depth is a matter of time, technically this is not a difficult task.

        Very difficult - it will be a missile torpedo with a concomitant decrease in range, speed and probability of hitting a target.

        Again the bagpipe about missile torpedoes ... If it is already known that the submarine is at periscope depth, no missile torpedoes are needed. Enough powerful landmine on the surface of the water next to the hull.
  15. +1
    April 30 2020 22: 22
    Frankly, it’s more and more difficult to believe in the secrecy of modern submarines. In the North Sea, the depths are 50-100 meters, and is it possible to imagine some kind of Borea or Shark there that is 170 meters long and with a displacement of 15 to 50 thousand (!) Tons of supposedly stealthily underway? Yes, there a breaker on the surface will be like a torpedo boat ..

    It is clear that they do not go at full speed at such depths. On the other hand, there are no other depths in the north for us! To dive into the ocean do not need hundreds ... thousands of kilometers to go under the watchful eye of satellites and PLO aircraft. The prospects for all large boats look sad, not only ours. The case when "size matters"!
    1. +1
      April 30 2020 23: 03
      It is not necessary to think that the air defense for the submarines is utopian, such as if it pops up to launch the C-350, they will immediately find it and sink it, everything is somewhat different.
      1 At a certain stage of the theater of operations, the coordinates of surface targets and air targets detected by AWACS and over-the-horizon ground-based radars are constantly being broadcast
      2 submarines can stick out the antenna for 10 seconds and find out the necessary information,
      3 evaluate information and decide whether to wait or emerge,
      4, let’s say that they surfaced without purging and after 10 seconds they clarified the target parameters, launched homing missiles into the necessary squares (five or six pieces) for different targets at different distances from 200 to 400 km and plunged in another 10 seconds, it took less than half a minute to complete.
      Now questions
      1 enemy, have time to detect a boat in 20-30 seconds? ...is not a fact
      2 if detected, should he use laser weapons? ..to disrupt the attack
      3 and most interestingly, what should the crew of an anti-submarine aircraft do when the S-350 flies into it?
      1. +1
        1 May 2020 19: 38
        and the most interesting thing is what the crew of an anti-submarine aircraft should do when the S-350 flies into it


        Pray.
      2. 0
        1 May 2020 19: 59
        Quote: agond
        It’s not necessary to think that the air defense for the submarines is utopian, such as if it pops up to launch the C-350, they will immediately find

        Launching a rocket is definitely a khan of stealth. The boat clearly indicates its area and then the hunt begins .. Below they offer something like a delayed launch, but this is also nonsense. opponents are primarily aviation and it over the area in a matter of hours and minutes. Either the target is lost or see option 1, the submarine discovers its area and waits
        full hunt ..

        The only option is a preliminary separate sweep of the area from enemy PLO aircraft by coastal aircraft or surface ships. Alas ... Kuznetsov at death, there are no others. request
  16. +1
    April 30 2020 22: 41
    Conclusion from the article (on the move) (article interesting / right now do not delve into leisure)
    It’s necessary to penetrate the anti-aircraft system!
    I don’t know why, but it’s necessary. So that the bulo.
    What is characteristic, none of the submariners have ever complained to me specifically about the air defense of the boat. Here is none, and not once ...
    What on diesels, what on others ...
    They complained about something else. But not for that.
    1. +2
      April 30 2020 23: 19
      What the author offers is fierce nonsense. Get a surface cruiser
  17. +1
    1 May 2020 00: 25
    Not a specialist in pl. But the article is very interesting.
  18. -1
    1 May 2020 03: 20
    after the first paragraph I stopped reading, I don’t even recommend it to the others :) because there it’s necessary to treat a person, the author instead of jammers for buoys offers a submarine with anti-submarine aircraft bad .... triode and diode
  19. +2
    1 May 2020 03: 42
    Oh-oh-oh-oh! So the S-500 is returning to the submarine! And yak! I remember ... I still remember those articles where the Author famously cracks down on all the enemies of the submarine, not excluding the ICBM! And I forgot the author's praise, and what the Author writes about in the articles I do not remember, but "S-500 on a submarine" is forever!
  20. +3
    1 May 2020 05: 54
    When a submarine uses a weapon (no matter what - what torpedoes, what missiles) it loses stealth - its main advantage. A possible way to prevent this is to delayed start.

    The bottom line: at first, the submarine quietly releases his weapon, which remains underwater in a drift. Then the submarine quietly leaves for a safe distance. And then the weapon "comes to life" and attacks the target. The enemy, who sensed where the attack came from, starts looking for the submarine where it is no longer there. His PLO forces are combing through an empty space, while incurring losses from other "surprises" left in advance by the departed submarine.

    This is just such a tactical technique for evading ASW that is needed by submarines of the near future. In fact, this is the deployment of a kind of "mine laying" (including anti-aircraft) on the enemy's PLO, the use of mine warfare techniques. Result: the enemy will fear chase the SP. For the main damaging factor of mine weapons is not the mines themselves, but the so-called. "mine fear" (restriction by the enemy of his own maneuver, refusal to move in certain areas, refusal of certain actions, giving up the initiative - and all this because of fear of losses due to mines).

    How to do it technically?
    An autonomous disposable capsule with one (or several) missiles, a set of sensors, a power source, possibly with some other "decoy" (simulator of individual signs of a submarine like a fake periscope, radio transmitter, etc.) and, of course, with a self-liquidator. The price is unlikely to be much more expensive than an PLO-buoy or an active submarine simulator (not counting the price of missiles).

    PLO aviation has unique unmasking features that do not allow it to be confused with its own aviation or with civilian aircraft. Chief among them - PLO aviation is forced to constantly "work" at certain frequencies to search for targets and transfer data. The sensors of our capsule detect these radiation and launch the rocket (missiles), then homing works.

    The same goes for torpedoes and cruise missiles.
    In essence, next-generation submarines in their tactics will be more like underwater minzags. Their effectiveness is proven by WWII experience.
    1. +2
      1 May 2020 07: 45
      [quote = Pushkowed] A possible way to prevent this is to delay the start. [/ quote
      That's right, I completely agree with all points of your post.
      add my two pennies
      - looking at the plane in the sky in any way is easier than hearing a submarine under water
      - creating a rocket against an airplane is easier than a torpedo against a submarine
      1. +1
        1 May 2020 14: 28
        Air defense systems on submarines are not needed. We need a variety of drones. These can solve the problems of targeting and striking.
        The only and difficult task in this matter is the communication of the drone and the submarine. At this stage, this problem can be solved by a chain of drones of repeaters.
        Those. The submarine should turn into a sort of underwater aircraft carrier. At the same time, it can also save strike weapons. Here, to ensure secrecy, the idea of ​​a detachable container with the same calibers comes to mind. Those. the boat leaves them at a given position and after some time the container pops up and gives a salvo at the given coordinates. Then it can be destroyed.

        And in general, in the short term, that attacks, that for defense, it makes sense to have many (tens of thousands) light sensor drones, which combined into one network will provide data for the strike forces. Moreover, they can be equipped with one or two light missiles.

        PS But in fact, everything was invented before us. Just read a few fantastic sagas and the principles of weapons development will be clear. In this sense, I like the Honor Harrickton sagas. The development of the means of attack and defense is very well shown there.
    2. +2
      1 May 2020 19: 50
      setting up a kind of "mine formations" (including anti-aircraft)


      Incidentally, a very interesting idea.

      the main striking factor of mine weapons is not the mines themselves


      This is exactly what it is. They are able to "bind", "prevent", "prevent", etc. And such a weapon does not become obsolete for a very long time. Even now, an ordinary "horned" model of 1905 is capable, for example, of disrupting an amphibious landing. Although it is horned, if you touch it, you will fly high. Demonstratively sketched and that's it!

      Autonomous disposable capsule with ... with some other "bait"


      And our thick torpedo tubes provide thick creative opportunities.
      Do they have the Captor type? And if you do this with the expectation of missiles and sketch on the routes of deployment of aircraft anti-aircraft missiles (and it is possible and self-transporting). That will be a nix!
  21. 0
    1 May 2020 19: 32
    You can come up with an air defense system for submarines, all the more so this is not a problem, which leads to a rise in the cost of the project and the discovery of submarines, but it is much easier and cheaper to create imitation or interference.
  22. exo
    0
    2 May 2020 15: 28
    We should at least solve the issue of conventional torpedoes. And then, it will be seen.
    With the total advantage of NATO, in surface ships and in PLO aviation, the presence of air defense systems aboard a submarine will not solve anything. It will turn out, like that of the Germans, during WWII, with the strengthening of anti-aircraft artillery, of individual boats. The result was almost zero.
    The only way out: the activities of boats in areas covered by their ships and planes. That is, off its shores and in the Arctic.
    1. -1
      2 May 2020 20: 08
      Under the ice ???.
      Back in the early 90s, there were facts, especially on the transfer of boats to the Pacific Fleet, indirectly it turns out that the BPA saw the SSBNs under the ice.
    2. 0
      7 May 2020 08: 28
      Quote: exo
      We should at least solve the issue of conventional torpedoes. And then, it will be seen.
      With the total advantage of NATO, in surface ships and in PLO aviation, the presence of air defense systems aboard a submarine will not solve anything. It will turn out, like that of the Germans, during WWII, with the strengthening of anti-aircraft artillery, of individual boats. The result was almost zero.
      The only way out: the activities of boats in areas covered by their ships and planes. That is, off its shores and in the Arctic.


      Comparison with WWII is not entirely correct.

      Now the effectiveness of air defense is incomparably higher than then anti-aircraft artillery. Then the submarines could stupidly "drive" by all means, taking advantage of the need for frequent recharging of the battery and surfacing, but now, for nuclear submarines it is not so easy. Any aircraft could attack the surfaced submarine, and now only PLO aviation, which is not so much.

      The range of the Mark 54 PLO torpedo is only 2,4 km (there is a planning kit for 90 km, but for its use the PLO aircraft must climb high, and at high altitude it cannot search for submarines). For comparison, an PLO aircraft can be hit by missiles at a range of 20-40 km, and if an PLO aircraft decides to "shoot" from a high altitude, then even more.

      If a submarine is found far (300-500 km) from the enemy’s NK and submarine, then until they get to it, the submarine will have time to shoot down the PLO plane, then arrive to replace it, and then also ambush the NK. And if they act as a group? The PLO plane was shot down, the other two flew from base X, and go at full speed to the point of contact, and on the route of advancement of the submarine from the air defense system, it knocks the PLO aircraft not ready for battle? Or is there another SSBN with 100 anti-ship missiles aside from the ICAPL with the SAM, and the KUG that came into contact will enter the affected area without forcing the submarine to come closer?

      In itself, the presence of air defense systems is an opportunity to implement new tactical scenarios, a trump card in the sleeve. It may not be used, but the very possibility of its use will make the enemy react, spend resources.
  23. 0
    3 May 2020 22: 15
    IMHO, the author’s idea is suicidal for the nuclear submarines, they have other tasks, certainly not with aviation.
    As soon as the boat cuts the radar, this will be the beginning of the end for her.
    1. 0
      5 May 2020 13: 09
      Quote: Podvodnik
      the main striking factor of mine weapons is not the mines themselves

      This can be said about any effective weapon, that is, the very fact of its availability and willingness to use is that factor
      Regarding the issue of missile defense for submarines, if you make missiles universal, which, in principle, are already starting to be done, many questions are being asked where to store them on the submarine, that is, one missile should be suitable for attacking an aircraft, ship and object on land
      In the construction of small-sized underwater drones in large numbers, there are difficulties with the source of their power, but to create a small series of underwater PSUs on radioisotopes and a stirling engine is easier, with a displacement of less than 10 liters. that's just what tasks he can solve.
    2. 0
      7 May 2020 08: 09
      Quote: FRoman1984
      IMHO, the author’s idea is suicidal for the nuclear submarines, they have other tasks, certainly not with aviation.


      The problem is that aviation is fighting submarines. And now for defense aircraft, a defenseless target.

      Quote: FRoman1984
      As soon as the boat cuts the radar, this will be the beginning of the end for her.


      In general, the article talks about passive detection methods, radar for the future. But tell me, what is the difference between the inclusion of the radar from when the boat was discovered? If the PLO plane has already made contact and is actively bombarding it with torpedoes?
  24. +1
    24 May 2020 16: 22
    A lot of pictures. Knocks down reading.
  25. 0
    5 June 2020 08: 19
    Thank you laugh. So I see that the submarine floats to the periscope depth, throws out a huge radar and begins to show itself. I wonder how much time, in real life, this boat will live?
    It’s easier to lower the boat to the depth of Komsomolets and it’s not something that you will not find, but you will not use weapons. True, there is a trouble with communication, but this problem is smaller than making a huge target out of a submarine.
    1. 0
      9 June 2020 09: 54
      External target designation for submarines is a useful thing, but not necessary if it is possible to drop "anti-aircraft mines" from the boat; pop-up containers with missiles capable of floating on the surface in a given square for days and weeks, and capable of independently launching a missile at an aircraft flying in the vicinity, and even in the distance, if from external target designation.
      1. 0
        9 June 2020 13: 03
        Wow you have a fantasy. Have you served in air defense? Can you even imagine what a radar, a signal processing system, as well as the missiles themselves are? Can you imagine how much it costs and size? Well, about the pumping of the container and the effect of this on pointing silent. By the way, but can you tell me how such a heap of iron should be kept afloat on an inflatable raft the size of an aircraft carrier?
        1. 0
          9 June 2020 21: 23
          Everything can be much more prosaic, as it is known with a submarine it is possible to put an anchor mine (a barrel in the water column on a cable), our barrel at a depth of 2-3 m from the water surface, to the bottom 50-100 m) it has a whip receiving antenna sticking out of the water at 1 m, this antenna can receive a command signal from a ground-based radar to ascend and launch a rocket into a given square, in which the rocket itself must find the target. A more advanced version is a torpedo rocket, that is, a very slow torpedo is slowly pushed off the boat, it pops up and moves for a long time at the surface of the water against the current, the antenna sticking out of it, waiting for a signal from a ground-based radar or AWACS aircraft. And can the enemy detect a slowly maneuvering object 3 m long, 0.5 m in diameter at a depth of 2 meters with a receiving antenna? Well, maybe it can, but how fast ?, and how to track? and how to hit, more questions than answers.
          1. 0
            10 June 2020 09: 03
            Can you imagine what it means to transmit target information from a ground-based radar to a whip antenna? Will your boat sail near the shore? The detection range of targets by ground-based radars, to a maximum of around 600 km. Why do we need a submarine if modern weapons can destroy targets up to 400 km.? Can you imagine what an air defense missile is and what size a system should be capable of slow barrage, tracking a signal from a ground-based radar and starting from water? But your imagination delights me.
            Air defense on a submarine is nonsense that was abandoned back in the 60s, expensive, not effective and not needed. The power of the boat is in stealth.
            1. 0
              10 June 2020 19: 48
              Quote: Victor Sergeev
              Can you imagine what it means to transmit target information from a ground-based radar to a whip antenna?

              There are no special obstacles, the anchor ANTI-AIRCRAFT mine - the rocket "knows" its coordinates its identification number, the number of the square where the rocket should look for the plane is transmitted to this number from the ground-based radar, believe me, this is a very small amount of information, even radio operator Kat with a hand key could handle 5 seconds, not to mention modern means of communication, a variant of the ANTI-AIRCRAFT torpedo - missiles will be more difficult, but the anti-submarine aircraft is a relatively simple target.
  26. 0
    2 January 2023 23: 26
    I would like to point out one important detail. All passive and active complexes for increasing the stealth of a submarine over the past 50 years, when assembled in a submarine, are still useful.
    Because most of the time the boat either goes to the patrol/duty zone. Or carries out this patrol/duty. And most of the time it does not come into close contact with enemy air / fleet / enemy detection systems. And modern means of stealth are enough for "walking" so as not to be noticed.

    BUT the problem of modern submarines is to maintain stealth and the possibility of defense at the time of active opposition to the submarine. For example, when a boat tries to escort an enemy convoy. Or when patrolling in the enemy port area. Or when, after an attack, a search is underway. Or when the enemy began to actively search for nuclear submarines in places of potential deployment.

    And therefore, just stealth is not enough for the boat to successfully complete the mission, even if the means of disguise will surpass what we have now by an order of magnitude. The boats will have to start actively deceiving the enemy. In the conditions that the boat is now clearly visible, the boat will no longer hide, but snap and deceive. In the future, boats will need to switch to active countermeasures.

    Boats will need to:
    1) Learn to use imitators to create decoys (to divert the attention of opponents from yourself)
    2) Learn to repel attacks with bombs and torpedoes (the stock of bombs and torpedoes in aviation is limited)
    3) Learn to comprehensively use autonomous vehicles for preliminary reconnaissance at a great distance from oneself
    4) Learn to comprehensively analyze with digital instruments all the information about the environment received from the instruments of the boat itself, the instruments of unmanned aerial vehicles and information received from the reconnaissance fleet (satellites, friendly aviation, fleet, intelligence agencies, etc.).
    5) Learn to use remote weapons for their own purposes (smarter mines, container air defense systems with delayed launch, etc.)
    6) Significantly improve the quality and automation of the use of the underwater environment, both to increase camouflage and to increase the efficiency of using their devices and weapons
    7) Learn to communicate and coordinate with other boats in the area.
    8) Learn to conduct observations and reconnaissance outside the line of sight of the boat's instruments (using flying and floating drones).
    9) Teach instruments to operate in a wide frequency range to complicate the detection of a submarine by means of electronic warfare.
    10) Significantly and qualitatively improve the means of rescuing crews. Boats will become even more complex devices, and saving the lives of valuable specialists, fleet officers, will become even more necessary!

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