The death of the cruiser "Emerald"


In the cycle dedicated to the Russian "lightning", the armored cruisers "Pearl" and "Emerald", we left these ships at the end of the hostilities of the Russo-Japanese War, in which they took part. For the Emerald, this was a breakthrough between the Japanese troops surrounding the remains of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons, and for the Pearls, when he, together with Oleg and Aurora, arrived in Manila after the Tsushima battle. But considerable interest are the further service and death of both of these cruisers. In the proposed material, the author will consider the tragic end. stories cruiser "Emerald".


Victim of panic moods


According to the classic point of view, the death of the cruiser was the result of a psychological breakdown of his commander, Baron Vasily Nikolayevich Ferzen. He quite reasonably and adequately commanded the cruiser in the battle of Tsushima. After the devastating day battle for the Russian squadron, in the evening of May 14, V.N. Fersen left the Emerald with the main forces of the squadron, although it would have been much safer to try to break into Vladivostok alone. And finally, despite the shock experienced by the Russian sailors and the commander of the Emerald, at the sight of the miserable remnants of his squadron and practically intact Japanese fleet morning of May 15, V.N. Fersen nevertheless found the strength to ignore the shameful order of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatova about surrender and go on a breakthrough.

But then the commander of the Emerald panicked. Instead of going directly to Vladivostok, for some reason he took the northeast, wanting to bring the cruiser either to the bay of St. Vladimir, or to the bay of St. Olga, and, as a result, put the cruiser on stones in the bay of Vladimir. Then, instead of sending a message to Vladivostok and waiting for help from there, he blew up the cruiser.

How sound is this point of view?

Breakthrough and chase


Let us briefly recall the circumstances of the “beautiful departure” of the “Emerald” from the main forces of the enemy, which took place on May 15. The cruiser made a breakthrough at about 10.30 am trying to develop the maximum stroke. It is difficult to say what kind of speed he reached, nevertheless, an analysis of the officers' reports suggests 21.5 knots. Russian official history claims that the 6th Japanese military detachment and the Chitose armored cruiser were chasing the cruiser. But get close to the ship V.N. Fersen at a distance of effective shooting they failed: A.A. Alliluyev and M.A. Bogdanov in his work on cruisers such as the Emerald, note that the shells fired from Japanese ships to the Emerald did not reach. According to several domestic sources, the pursuit of the Russian cruiser was stopped at 14.00.

According to Japanese data, everything was a bit wrong. Only the Akitsushima and Chitose went for the Emerald. The first “chased” the Russian cruiser for about half an hour, having a speed of not more than 14 knots. "Chitose" was a little more persistent. Having quickly lost sight of the Emerald, he was moving in the direction where the Russian cruiser had gone a little over two hours, developing 17 or 18 knots. They didn’t open fire from Japanese ships, the Emerald also did not shoot beyond the range, which follows from the report of its commander. And it can be argued that the Japanese refused all attempts to catch up with the Emerald a little later than 12.30, maybe at 13.00. Where, then, in Russian sources, the time is 14.00?


Armored cruiser "Akitsushima", Kobe, 1897

Perhaps this is taken from the testimony of the Investigative Commission of the navigational officer, Lieutenant Polushkin, who claimed that “the pursuit of the enemy cruisers lasted about 3 hours” and “around 14.00 the enemy cruisers disappeared from sight”. Here we can only assume that the officer, writing down from memory, was inaccurate, or that some other Japanese ships or ships that were mistaken for cruisers pursuing him were seen on the Emerald. It is also possible that Polushkin did not mean the Japanese cruisers themselves, but the smokes that can be seen long enough after the ships releasing them disappeared over the horizon.

Further events on May 15


Be that as it may, the Emerald believed that they had only come off the Japanese at 14.00:14 p.m. and had no doubt that the enemy cruisers would continue the pursuit - this should be taken into account when evaluating the further actions of the crew and commander of the Russian ship. From Japanese sources it follows that the chase was stopped earlier, but here there can be no complaints against our sailors. It often happens at sea that it’s not what is actually happening, especially when it comes to observations at a great distance. In addition, the refusal of the Japanese to chase looks completely unnatural. Their forces surrounding the Russian squadron had an overwhelming numerical advantage, and the United Fleet admirals had in abundance comparatively high-speed armored cruisers, which they could send in pursuit of the Emerald. Clear explanations of why this was not done, the sources do not contain. Perhaps the attention of the Japanese commanders was so captured by the capitulating squadron N.I. Nebogatova, that they had forgotten to give the corresponding order, hoping that another admiral would give the necessary command? Or did the Japanese, knowing the "passport" speed of the Emerald, believe that it would still not be possible to catch it? But even in this case, an attempt should still be made - the Japanese knew from their own experience that ships in combat conditions were far from always capable of giving the course demonstrated by tests. In addition, our opponents should take into account that in the battle on May XNUMX, the Emerald could be damaged, which did not allow it to maintain high speed for a long time.

Thus, the refusal to prosecute Emerald looked completely illogical and V.N. Fersen could not, and should not have counted on such a gift of fate. He didn’t expect it: without a doubt, both the ship’s commander and his officers understood the poor condition of the Emerald’s vehicles, but it was still clear that after “parting” with the pursuit, for some time it was necessary to go at maximum speed to finally break away from the Japanese cruisers and only then reduce the speed.

Alas, the Emerald power plant failed to withstand such a load. Somewhere between 14.00 p.m. and 15.00 p.m., that is, only within an hour after the "Emerald" ceased to "see" the pursuers, the steam line burst on the ship, supplying the steering machine and auxiliary mechanisms of the feed machine. From the side, the accident had a very eerie appearance - the cruiser noticeably lost track, and along the ramp leading to the boiler room upward thick clouds of steam burst forth. The stoker Gemakin was not taken aback: just a few minutes after the accident, he pulled canvas tarps on his hands and a bag over his head, doused with cold water, was already descending into the stoker. Soon he was followed by one of the drivers. The accident was eliminated in half an hour, but, of course, it was no longer possible to commission the steam line.

Usually it is indicated that the speed of the ship was reduced to 15 knots, but, apparently, the drop was even more noticeable. So, the senior officer of Emerald P. Patton-Fanton-de-Verraion pointed out: “Initially, the speed was about 21,5 knots, then, about 3 hours, when the steam line burst, they reduced the speed to 14-15 knots, and then reduced and up to 13 ".

Thus, by approximately 15.00:15 on May XNUMX, the Emerald from a high-speed and practically intact cruiser turned into a wounded-slow-wrecker, unable to evade the battle with the vast majority of Japanese armored cruisers. There is no doubt that if the Japanese had shown a little more perseverance in the pursuit of the Emerald, then he would have expected a heroic death in battle. Fortunately, this did not happen, but still the position of the Russian ship remained extremely difficult: in addition to the loss of course, the coal reserves on the cruiser caused great concern.

And again to the issue of overloading Russian ships with coal


Unfortunately, the exact amount of coal on the Emerald on May 15 is impossible to indicate. V.N. Fersen highlighted this issue in his testimony of the Commission of Inquiry:

"How many tons of coal were, I can’t say, the last loading of coal was on May 10 in the North China Sea, after the passage of the island groups of Mao Tao and Likey, where 750 tons were received."

The indicated 750 tons obviously led to the ship overload - according to the project, the normal coal reserve was 360 tons, and the maximum, calculated by the capacity of coal pits - 535 tons. However, it can be assumed that V.N. Fersen mistakenly overestimated the amount of coal somewhat (on the morning of May 11, the Emerald reported that he had 629 tons of coal), but in any case, it turned out that at the time of the last bunkering the coal reserves far exceeded the total coal reserve for the cruiser. It would seem - horror-horror-horror, to what this nightmare coal maniac Z.P. brought the squadron Rozhdestvensky, that's just ...

On the morning of May 13, coal reserves at the Emerald accounted for almost the maximum load, 522 tons.


Data from the morning reports of the ships of the Russian squadron submitted to the Investigation Commission by the senior officer of the Almaz armored cruiser Captain 2nd rank Dyachkov

After the battle on May 14 and the breakthrough on May 15, the cruiser was left with coal not just small, but catastrophically small. In total, the cruiser had 6 boiler rooms and 16 boilers, while in the first and second stoker there were 1 boilers, and in the rest - three. So, almost all of the remaining coal reserves lay in the pit of the first stoker. There were almost no coal in the pits of the 2nd and 2rd stoker, and the 1th, 2th and 3th stoker had no coal at all. In order to use them, the sailors had to manually carry coal from a large pit at the first stoker. In words - it’s easy, but it’s almost 4/5 of the cruiser’s length! Moreover, for this it was necessary to raise it to the upper deck, transfer it, and then lower it into the necessary stoker.

And in fact, the reserves of the first boiler house turned out to be not very large - despite the fact that the cruiser went only 1 knots the rest of the day on May 15 and 16, by the time coal arrived in St. Vladimir’s Bay, there were about 13 tons. Taking into account the testimony of Lieutenant Polushkin that the cruiser spent about 10 tons of coal per day of the economic course, it turns out that the Emerald left about 60 fuel left, with a force of 4 hours of the economic course. And this despite the fact that the whole tree on the cruiser, excluding 5 boats and masts with ropes, was sent to the furnaces and burned on the night of May 3-15 ...

Undoubtedly, at the beginning of the Tsushima battle “Emerald” had a coal reserve close to maximum. But on May 14, the cruiser did not receive any noticeable damage that would entail an increased consumption of coal. It also cannot be said that V.N. Fersen abused the speed qualities of his ship. Sometimes on May 14 the Emerald would go full speed, but for the most part it stayed close to the main forces and moved at a fairly moderate speed. The same applies to the night of May 14-15. At the same time, from the beginning of the breakthrough on May 15 to the breakdown of the steam line, when the Emerald squeezed out everything it could do from its power plant, it took 4,5 hours.

In other words, nothing extraordinary happened in the battle of Tsushima in terms of fuel consumption with the cruiser - ordinary combat work for a ship of its class. Nevertheless, by the evening of May 15, there was exactly enough coal left on the Emerald to “crawl” to Vladivostok with an economic route of 13 knots. And not a ton more.

Why did this happen? Of course, the Emerald did not have everything in order with the power plant, but alas, things were a little better on many other ships of the Russian squadron. But the fact is that the features of the running modes in battle lead to a high consumption of coal, even if the ship does not receive damage, and if it does, then it can increase even more. And the commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron could not ignore this.

According to the author, the story of the cruiser Emerald is an excellent example that explains why Z.P. Rozhdestvensky needed "extra" coal on the squadron.

But what if the fight does happen?


The prospects of meeting with Japanese ships on May 15-16 for the Emerald were extremely depressing. Of course, the extreme fatigue of the crew would have affected. It is clear that there was no time to rest during the battle of May 14 and the breakthrough of May 15, but then V.N. Fersen had to use almost the entire crew to drag coal into the empty fireplaces. Here is how he described it himself in the testimony of the Investigative Commission: “The team that worked on May 14 without rest was so tired that three people had to be assigned to work performed in ordinary times alone, especially to supply coal to the boilers. The entire combat team was busy pulling coal on the upper deck. "

Analyzing sea battles of those times, we often confine ourselves to studying the technical condition of ships, while ignoring the state of its crew. But one must never forget that it is people who fight, not technology.

However, at the Emerald and on the technical side, everything was more than bad. In the event of a fight, of course, it would be impossible to drag coal along the deck, and this led to the need to stop the fumes in the 4th, 5th and 6th stoker, thus stopping only 9 of the 16 boilers working in this way. Naturally, the middle car had to would stop too and the cruiser would have to fight with two out of three working vehicles. But it would also be dangerous to overload them - the Emerald refrigerators were very clogged, which had a particularly bad effect on the operation of the right-hand car. The latter, even when driving at 13 nodes during May 16, had to be stopped periodically.

Thus, if, say, on May 16th, the Emerald would meet an enemy cruiser, then all that was left for it was to enter the battle, having 7 boilers out of 16 and 2 out of three under steam. Perhaps, having dispersed both of them “to the fullest”, the ship managed to give full speed, which was only possible in such a situation - offhand there are hardly more than 18 knots. But, even if a miracle happened and the cars could stand it, the coal reserves were enough for about 2 hours, after which the Emerald completely lost its course and could only move with the flow.

In the event of a battle with at least some equal enemy, the Emerald was doomed.

Actions V.N. Fersen in the evening of May 15 and 16


As you know, in order to go to Vladivostok, the Russian squadron had to adhere to the general course NO23, but the Emerald during the breakthrough was more likely to go to O, that is, to the east. This, of course, was a forced decision, since the course of the breakthrough was determined by the position of the Japanese military units, between which the cruiser should have slipped. But then, when the Japanese ships disappeared from the horizon, Baron V.N. Fersen should adjust the route and decide where exactly he will lead the cruiser entrusted to him.

Why didn't the Emerald go to Vladivostok? All sources known to the author give the same answer: V.N. Fersen feared to meet the enemy forces there. Today we know that there were no enemy cruisers on the way to Vladivostok, and this decision of the cruiser commander seems unnecessary caution. But it is today.

And then for the Russian sailors the refusal of the Japanese to pursue the Emerald was categorically incomprehensible. And the only reasonable explanation why this happened was that the Japanese, instead of fleeing east to the fast cruiser, which they might not have caught up with, immediately went north-east, along the shortest route to Vladivostok. That is how they could level the advantage of the Emerald in speed, and in addition, from the point of view of the Japanese, it would be wise to put a cruising barrier near Vladivostok to intercept not only the Emerald, but also other Russian ships that fought off the main forces of the squadron at night from May 14 to May 15.

Thus, reasoning with an open mind, the probability of stumbling upon Japanese forces on the way to Vladivostok seemed very high, while the Emerald did not have any chances to survive after such a collision. So the decision of V.N. Fersen go to the bay of St. Vladimir or St. Olga looks quite logical and reasonable.

But where exactly did the Emerald commander lead his cruiser? Here, in the sources, big discrepancies begin. So, A.A. Alliluyev and M.A. Bogdanov write:

“Coal was running out when, on the night of May 17, the Emerald approached the bay of St. Vladimir, but the commander, who had spent almost the third day almost without sleep, suddenly decided to go south, to the bay of St. Olga. But on the way, hearing about the Japanese ships that often looked there before the war, Fersen changed his mind and the cruiser, burning the last tons of coal, headed back. Unfortunately, it is in the bay of St. Olga had the coal stock so needed for the cruiser. ”

One gets the feeling that V.N. Fersen just darted in a panic, not knowing where to stumble. But here V.V. Khromov, in his monograph, describes the same events much more calmly: "At 18.00 we took a course leading to a point equidistant from Vladivostok and Vladimir Bay 50 miles from the coast, and there they were about to decide where to go." And further on according to V.V. Khromov V.N. Fersen really wondered whether to go nevertheless to go to Vladimir Bay or to go to Olga Bay, which is on the same side. And, on the advice of his senior officer, he nevertheless chose Vladimir Bay. It is also worth noting that the distance between these two bays is as much as 13,5 nautical miles, so it would not have been possible to burn a significant amount of coal even in the case of “throwing” between them.

If you read the documents, then, according to the testimony of the lieutenant of the navigational officer, Lieutenant Polushkin, the commander of the Emerald decided to go to the bay of St. Vladimir immediately after the report of the mechanic that the cruiser is unable to give a move in excess of 15 knots. due to fear of damage, that is, in the evening of May 15. Moreover, according to V.N. Ferzena: “At first I planned to go to Olga, but the senior officer expressed the opinion that this bay was probably mined to give shelter to our destroyers from the enemy. Having recognized this opinion as solid, he chose Vladimir as the closest to Olga, where he hoped, perhaps, to find a telegraph station. ”

Unfortunately, the author was unable to find an exact description of the Emerald route, which could only dot all the i's. But nevertheless, based on the foregoing, the conclusion suggests itself that there was no “shyness” between the bays, and that V.N. Fersen made a decision where to lead the cruiser in the evening of May 15. Moreover, this decision was quite balanced, made after discussion with the cruiser officers and did not look at all like any panic.

And then ... the night of May 16 and the day following it, the cruiser hardly moved at 13 knots, periodically stopping the right car. To the bay of St. Vladimir "Emerald" arrived at the first hour of the night on May 17. And here, in a good way, one should have anchored off the coast in order to enter the bay in the morning, but the Emerald did not have enough coal until the morning. Thus, V.N. Fersen had no choice but to lead the cruiser into the bay in the darkness of night.

Did the Emerald commander have any other options? The author does not see those. To anchor the cruiser at the bay and completely extinguish the firebox to save coal was extremely dangerous. In order to "unscramble" them back, it would take time, and considerable, and the sea to that and the sea, which sometimes presents surprises, and it was impossible to leave the ship without the ability to make a move at night. And just like that, it was impossible to “play” with the speed of the ship in order to manage to approach the bay during the day or vice versa, at dawn - there simply was no coal for that.

Catastrophe


Further well-known. V.N. Fersen was planning to put the Emerald in the depths of the southern part of the Fertoing Bay (a rather complicated way of setting 2 anchors) side to the entrance to the bay and thereby be able to meet with full on-board fire any enemy ship that tries to go to the cruiser. Then the commander intended to establish contact with Vladivostok, and there already act according to the circumstances.

Unfortunately, these calculations were not destined to be executed. The Emerald quite successfully passed the entrance capes, but then, trying to pass through the three-cable passage to the southern part of the bay, took it too close to Cape Orekhova and jumped out onto the reef. The cruiser sat tight - two-thirds of its hull were very shallow, with the left side out of the water about 60 cm (two feet).

And this failure, apparently, became the very straw that breaks the back of a camel. Before the Emerald is stranded, all the actions of V.N. Fersen look logical and reasonable. But everything that happened afterwards no longer fits into the idea of ​​the brave and resourceful commander that V.N. showed himself to be. Fersen before that.

The attempt to take the Emerald aground was carried out “for show” - only provisions and a part of the crew were transported from the cruiser to the shore, but the ammunition and water in the boilers remained in place. V.N. Fersen explained this by the fact that he could not deprive the cruiser of shells due to the danger of the appearance of the enemy, but who prevented the ammunition from being transported to the stern of the Emerald? Shoot at St. In any case, Olga could only have two 120-mm guns, a jute and a right shkane, so the rest of the guns, obviously, did not need ammunition. And if there was a need to blow up the cruiser, the shells and charges detonated in the stern no worse than anywhere else in the hull, and they would have inflicted no less damage. In addition, such a solution loaded the stern, unloading the center of the hull and bow, that is, created good prerequisites for the removal of the ship aground. The water from the boilers could probably also be drained - not from all, but only from those that could not be used anyway due to the lack of coal.

Thus, it seems that V.N. Fersen did not do everything possible to save his cruiser. Having lost hope to take the ship aground, V.N. Fersen was absolutely sure that the Japanese would soon find the Emerald and considered its destruction the only way to prevent the capture of the cruiser by the Japanese. He considered it impossible to fight, since only two 120-mm guns could shoot towards the exit of their bay.

It may well be that in terms of the battle V.N. Fersen was right. As far as the author could figure it out, the Japanese, when they appeared at Vladimir Bay there was no need to climb into it, they could shoot the Emerald maneuvering at sea. Under such conditions, 120-mm artillery could be quickly suppressed. But why it was impossible to wait for the appearance of the enemy, and only then blow up the cruiser?

In his testimony of the Commission of Inquiry V.N. Fersen explained his decision by the fact that he was not sure of the destructiveness of the prepared explosions. In other words, the commander of the Emerald feared that on the first attempt the cruiser would not receive decisive damage excluding its aground and towing, and that it would be necessary to re-mine and detonate it - but there would be no time left for it because of the enemy.

There was a certain reason for these considerations, but even taking all this into account, it was necessary to soberly assess the risks. If the Japanese appear at all, if they find a cruiser, then perhaps its undermining will not lead to decisive damage ...

Could the Japanese be expected to appear at Vladimir Bay, where the Emerald accident occurred? The author is absolutely sure that V.N. Fersen really should have expected the Japanese from Vladivostok, although in reality they were not there. But the likelihood that the Japanese would still view the coastline for hundreds of kilometers should be estimated as very small.

Yes, theoretically, without finding the Emerald near Vladivostok, the Japanese could have assumed that it was standing somewhere in the bays of the Russian coast and carried out a search there. But what would it look like in reality? Obviously, the detachment, which the Japanese could immediately send to patrol near Vladivostok after the battle, would not have to be assigned to bunkering after such a long time, so the passage to Vladivostok was again open. Why, then, should the Japanese return and search along the coastline?

Nevertheless, the ships of the United Fleet did indeed visit Vladimir’s bay, but this only happened on June 30, when the Japanese sent Nissin and Kassugu with the 1st detachment of fighters for reconnaissance and demonstration - that is, without any connection with the search for the cruiser.

In other words, even in theory, the chances of the Japanese appearing at Vladimir Bay were, although non-zero, but not high. In reality, the Japanese after the Tsushima battle are not about scouring the coastline - they even considered the patrol at Vladivostok unnecessary. Thus, the firm conviction of V.N. Fersen in the fact that the Japanese "are about to appear" was obviously mistaken.

Finally, the suspicion of the commander of the Emerald that the first attempt would not succeed in destroying the cruiser also did not materialize. For the detonation, the charging compartments of Whitehead mines were used, which were laid in the aft cartridge cellar and the provisions compartment located at the bow cartridge cellar. At the same time, the tubes of segmented shells in the cellars were installed on impact.

It is not entirely clear why the cellar itself was not mined in the nose, but the room adjacent to it, but this had a decisive effect on the effectiveness of the blasting. The explosion in the nose did not seem to cause heavy damage, but caused a fire that reached the cartridge cellar, so that the shells in it burst within half an hour. But the explosion in the stern turned the hull right up to the midsection. There wasn’t any talk about agrounding and towing, but the commander, after inspecting the cruiser, found that the vehicles were preserved and further blew them up, after which the Emerald finally turned into a pile of scrap metal.


Spoiled "Emerald" in 1905

Thus, we can state that none of V.N.’s considerations Fersen, with whom he was guided, making the decision to undermine the cruiser was not justified. The Japanese did not appear at Vladimir Bay, and the cruiser was actually destroyed by an explosion on the first try.

The third mistake V.N. Fersen should be considered a rejection of the military council. I must say that the commander of the Emerald was not inclined to collect it before, but there can be no complaints. When it was necessary to make a breakthrough, there was no time to gather advice, and the decision to turn to Vladimir Bay instead of Vladivostok was completely within the competence of the cruiser commander and the military council.

But now it was about the destruction of the Emerald, and in the absence of an immediate threat - after all, there were no Japanese on the horizon. Thus, V.N. Fersen was both an occasion and time for a military council, but instead, he limited himself to individual conversations with officers. During these conversations, only two officers, warrant officer Virenius and mechanic Topchev, spoke out against the immediate destruction of the cruiser, while the rest agreed with their commander.

But, if so, was there any sense in a military council? V.V. Khromov, in his monograph, expresses an interesting hypothesis that the decision of the council could still lead to the rejection of the Emerald. The fact is that, as you know, the youngest officer first speaks at a military council, and then in seniority. So, the first at the military council would be to speak to Ensign Shandrenko (Shandrenko?), And he, according to the entries in his diary, was against the immediate destruction of the cruiser. Behind him were the midshipman Virenius and the mechanic Topchev, who, as we know, also opposed the blast.

If this happened, and the three junior officers spoke out in favor of refusing to immediately destroy the Emerald, then it would be much more difficult for the remaining officers to support the idea of ​​a cruiser commander. And - who knows, it could very well turn out that the military council would speak out against the destruction of the ship. However, of course, V.N. Fersen, in this case too, could have made the decision to undermine the cruiser, taking full responsibility for himself - he had such a right.

Of course, it is impossible to argue that the military council prevented the immediate destruction of the cruiser. But it is obvious that the refusal to conduct it destroyed the last chance to save the Emerald from its own commander. There is also no doubt that the Emerald could have been saved. In the bay, Olga had a telegraph, through which it was possible to contact Vladivostok, and, according to V.V. Khromov even managed to send the armored cruiser Rossiya to the rescue of the Emerald. Undoubtedly, he could share coal with a cruiser that ran aground. And it is more than likely that, using a giant armored cruiser as a tugboat, the Emerald could be put into open water, after which both ships could return to Vladivostok. There were no Japanese troops that could interfere with them.

conclusions


The blame for the death of the cruiser "Emerald" should be entirely and completely laid on his commander, V.N. Fersen. The baron has established himself as an experienced navigator, having led his essentially unfinished cruiser through half the world. He reasonably commanded the Emerald in the daytime battle devastating for the Russian squadron on May 14 and did not leave the main forces of the squadron to their fate on the night that the Japanese destroyers went hunting. V.N. Fersen directed his ship to breakthrough when the rest surrendered. To do this, you had to have real courage, especially since the commander of the Emerald had a good idea of ​​how unreliable the mechanisms of his cruiser were, and what would happen if they failed at the wrong time. And finally, all the actions of V.N. Fersen after separation from the Japanese, including the decision to enter Vladimir’s bay at night, were quite reasonable and adequate to the situation, as it was supposed to be presented on the Russian cruiser.

Apparently, V.N. Fersen did not panic even after the Emerald was stranded. But the heavy burden of responsibility for the ship entrusted to him, the fatigue of the 9-month transition to Tsushima, the psychological stress from losing the battle with a crushing score led to the thought: “The Japanese are close and about to appear and capture the Emerald, and I don’t I can prevent this ”became, for him, in fact, intrusive. Obviously, the worst thing for V.N. Ferzen was to surrender the ship to the enemy: he could not and did not want to follow the example of Admiral N.I. Nebogatova.

According to the author, the commander of the cruiser Emerald should not be blamed for cowardice. It is noteworthy that V.N. Fersen, destroying the cruiser, did not seem to play, he really was absolutely sure that he was doing the right thing. It can be assumed that V.N. Fersen's is some form of neurosis or some other form of mental disorder, and that this case should probably be studied from a medical point of view.

But there is no doubt another. The commander of a warship cannot afford such luxury as neurosis, he must be extremely psychologically stable in any situation. V.N. Fersen, alas, was not like that.

One can argue about whether V.N. Fersen Gold weapon with the inscription "For courage" for the breakthrough of "Emerald". But, according to the author, in the future he should not have been appointed to the post of commander of a ship, or, especially, a detachment of warships, as happened in reality: after the Russo-Japanese War, V.N. Fersen commanded the Aurora cruiser, the 2nd mine division, the cruiser brigade, and even the Baltic Fleet battleship brigade. Probably, he should have been left in a “coastal” position, like the commander of a major port, or persuaded to resign.

To be continued ...
Author:
Photos used:
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  1. 27091965 April 21 2020 18: 12 New
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    +12
    Better late than not when. Thank you for continuing the series of articles.
    1. lucul April 21 2020 20: 57 New
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      Better late than not when. Thank you for continuing the series of articles.

      I read the Japanese article about Tsushima - so they are the starting point of victory, in battle, they put the use of radio on their ships, which made it possible to achieve coherence in battle. When ours had signal flags (pennants), and because of the use of landmines by the Japanese, the signal flags turned out to be completely ineffective in battle.
      The author generally bypassed the use of radio.
      1. 27091965 April 21 2020 21: 38 New
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        Quote: lucul
        I read the Japanese article about Tsushima - so they are the starting point of victory, in battle, they put the use of radio on their ships, which made it possible to achieve coherence in battle.


        Quote: lucul
        The author generally bypassed the use of radio.


        The discovery of the Russian squadron is described in a previous article.
        1. lucul April 21 2020 21: 53 New
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          The discovery of the Russian squadron is described in a previous article.

          It makes no difference, the fundamental mistake of the battle was Rozhdestvensky’s refusal to use the radio.
      2. Macsen_wledig April 21 2020 21: 44 New
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        Quote: lucul
        I read the Japanese article about Tsushima - so they are the starting point of victory, in battle, they put the use of radio on their ships, which made it possible to achieve coherence in battle.

        I wonder how there something could transmit “Mikasa” with a downed mast, and, accordingly, with demolished antennas?
        1. lucul April 21 2020 21: 51 New
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          I wonder how there something could transmit “Mikasa” with a downed mast, and, accordingly, with demolished antennas?

          Judging by the actions of the Japanese, it conveyed quite well.
          Just for comparison - the battle in the Yellow Sea - both ours and the Japanese used the radio, the result is nothing.
          Under Tsushima, Rozhdestvensky ordered to keep complete radio silence, and our sailors also kept it, which was a fatal mistake in the battle.
          1. Nehist April 22 2020 01: 36 New
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            Well, radio was rarely used, just Togo used repetitive ships, which greatly simplified the supply and recognition of signals. What unfortunately did not do ours
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 23 New
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              Quote: Nehist
              Togo simply used repetitive ships, which greatly simplified the supply and recognition of signals. What unfortunately did not do ours

              Rozhdestvensky specially allocated Pearls and Emeralds for the rehearsal service.
          2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 22 New
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            Quote: lucul
            I read the Japanese article about Tsushima - so they are the starting point of victory, in battle, they put the use of radio on their ships, which made it possible to achieve coherence in battle.

            I don’t know who misled you. Can I link to an article?
            Quote: lucul
            When ours had signal flags (pennants), and because of the use of landmines by the Japanese, the signal flags turned out to be completely ineffective in battle.

            Japanese radio played a big role - as a means of communication between the scouts and the fighting squads of the Japanese. This is true. But as a means of controlling a detachment of ships in a radio battle, it was of little use even in the WWII, not to mention the RPE. And most certainly the radio was not the cause of the defeat of the 2nd and 3rd TOE.
            In fact, the radio almost loses flag signals in terms of information transfer speed. First you need to tell the text of the radiogram, then transfer it to Morse code, then make sure that they received the order correctly, then give the execution order ... In the case of flag signals, you must first dial and raise the signal, then wait when it is rehearsed by other ships (rehearsed, that is, raised the same - that means, they saw and understood correctly) and then give the command "Execute".
            Quote: lucul
            Just for comparison - the battle in the Yellow Sea - both ours and the Japanese used the radio, the result is nothing.

            In the battle in the Yellow Sea, ours did NOT use the radio to transmit combat orders for rebuilding.
            1. lucul April 22 2020 17: 46 New
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              In the case of flag signals, you must first dial and raise the signal, then wait for the other ships to rehearse (rehearsed, that is, raised the same one, which means they saw and understood correctly) and then give the command "Execute".

              What happened to our squadron after Rozhdestvensky was wounded, and the battleship Prince Suvorov incapacitated? This moment was emphasized everywhere, in all works devoted to Tsushima.
              In fact, the radio almost loses flag signals in terms of information transfer speed.

              Offhand
              https://flot.com/publications/books/shelf/signal/2.htm

              Admiral Makarov also appreciated the prospects of radio communications and widely implemented it in the Navy.
              Can I link to an article?

              I have to rummage, I won’t tell you right away.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 18: 14 New
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                Quote: lucul
                What happened to our squadron after Rozhdestvensky was wounded, and the battleship Prince Suvorov incapacitated?

                What does this have to do with the issue under discussion? Would radio cure Rozhdestvensky? repelled the shells of the Japanese?
                Quote: lucul
                Offhand

                Excuse me, why link to a general article? What is the use of writing
                Despite the modest successes in training the radio telegraphists of our ships during the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, they were ready to provide fairly confident intra-squad communication and create radio interference to the enemy.

                They were not ready. You read better about how many radiograms were not received on the English and German ships of the First World War, when the equipment became much more advanced. Do you think Beatty used his own stupidity to transmit orders in signals in the same battle with Dogger Banks?
                Quote: lucul
                Admiral Makarov also appreciated the prospects of radio communications and widely implemented it in the Navy.

                So they were, these prospects. But before the control of a detachment of ships in battle, radio communication has grown in WWII
      3. Senior seaman April 22 2020 12: 37 New
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        Quote: lucul
        use of radio on their ships

        Doubtful.
    2. Jura 27 April 22 2020 11: 28 New
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      The author didn’t attach the map, otherwise it would immediately become clear that Ferzen’s insanity came on the evening of May 15.
      Otherwise, why extend your path to the shore by a hundred miles with a hook if you have barely enough coal. And why go at 13 knots, if the economic move is 10 knots, if you, popped FIG knows why, to the north?
      1. vladcub April 22 2020 13: 06 New
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        , Yuri, you have not changed: you will find something to complain about with Andrei.
        Weak to lay out his own story? Criticizing without substantive arguments is easier than telling yourself
      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 29 New
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        Quote: Jura 27
        The author didn’t attach the map, otherwise it would immediately become clear that Ferzen’s insanity came on the evening of May 15.

        Attach you, what is the problem? And I don’t even ask how you came to this “conclusion” - judging by the text below, you don’t understand what you’re writing about
        Quote: Jura 27
        Otherwise, why extend your path to the shore by a hundred miles with a hook if you have barely enough coal.

        When Fersen found out about the state of coal pits (just in the evening of May 15), he was on an equal footing from Vladivostok and Vladimir / Olga
        Quote: Jura 27
        And why go at 13 knots, if the economic move is 10 knots, if you, popped FIG knows why, to the north?

        Well, yes, it was necessary to read literature about the REV, to find out that the Japanese were not chasing the ship. And Jura, where did you get the idea that the economic speed of the Emerald was 10 knots? Did you read it in the book? So I hasten to upset, the real economic speed of Russian ships of that era could be very different from that which was calculated in theory and then got into books.
        1. Jura 27 April 23 2020 04: 48 New
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          [/ quote] Attach you, what is the problem? [quote]

          Or maybe I still get a fee for you for the article?
          You’re the author, so give the layout with the help of the map: this is so much to Stok, so much to Z. Vladimir, so much to Nakhodka, etc. And then everyone will be convinced that Fersen is not quietly mad.
          They are chasing, not chasing, as it can be seen from the smokes on the horizon.
          In all books, the usual economical vehicle is 10 knots (you could still go at 8 knots, the range increased). It has never been such that the Emerald at 13 knots could travel a greater distance than 10. This is against the laws of physics.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 23 2020 18: 32 New
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            Quote: Jura 27
            Or maybe I still get a fee for you for the article?

            Well, that will be somewhat difficult. Firstly, because I refused the fee specifically for this article in favor of VO, which is currently going through hard times due to the coronavirus. And secondly, the fee is paid for writing articles, and not at all for the author of the article to convince Yura of something27.
            Quote: Jura 27
            You’re the author, so give the layout with the help of the map: this is so much to Stok, so much to Z. Vladimir, so much to Nakhodka, etc.

            Yura, you as always mixed everything up. Why did you suddenly realize that you can make any demands on me as an author of articles? Who do you think you think you can put forward such demands? :)))
            Would you, Yura, go with your requirements ... to the Internet, and make your own website there dedicated to ship subjects. Pay authors a fee - then, and only then you will have the right to demand that they comply with the materials of any of your criteria
            And from me you can demand something in one single case. In the event that I admitted in the article an unsubstantiated, that is, not confirmed by sources or something else statement.
            So, on your question, my conclusions in the article are by no means unfounded. I quoted VV Khromova
            At 18.00 we went on a course leading to a point equidistant from Vladivostok and Vladimir Bay 50 miles from the coast, and there they were about to decide where to go

            That is, I justified that Ferzen did not have any shynesses. He left in the direction of O from the enemy cruisers, and went there after a breakdown for about three hours (roughly from 15.00 to 18.00 roughly) - this was absolutely justified, since the cruiser, which had lost speed, had to choose a course that would lead him as far away from pursuers. Then, after assessing the condition of the coal pits, it turned out that there was very little coal, and the ship was equidistant from Vladivostok and Vladimir Bay. And all this (although I did not write this in the article) is confirmed by the testimony of officers of the Investigative Commission
            Do you disagree with this? It’s not a question, take the map and give the layout: the author is not right, because
            Quote: Jura 27
            from so much to Stok, so much to v. Vladimir, so much to Nakhodka, etc.

            And nothing else, Yura27
            Quote: Jura 27
            They are chasing, not chasing, as it can be seen from the smokes on the horizon.

            Yeah. And if there are no smokes, the cruiser lays down on a different course and in half an hour smokes appear - what shall we do? You can’t run - 13 knots. Take the last and decisive? Yura, do you think at least a little what you write.
            Quote: Jura 27
            In all books, the usual economical vehicle is 10 knots (you could still go at 8 knots, the range increased). It has never been such that the Emerald at 13 knots could travel a greater distance than 10. This is against the laws of physics.

            Jura, 10 knots of economic progress for cruisers such as Pearls appeared as TK from Novik, whose economic speed was just 10 knots. And the Germans and ours were very wrong with Novik, because they believed that on the economic course the ship would go under part of the cars (or under two, but I have a suspicion that under one). But Novik under the two machines gave out only 8 knots and this did not become his economic speed - they experimentally determined that his economical move was 10 knots when two cars pull 75 rpm and the average 52-55 rpm (so that the screw rotates) .
            So, I do not remember that someone determined the economic speed of Pearl cruisers by experience. Ships of this type were quite different from Novik - and their real economic speed could be higher and lower than 10 knots. This is the time.
            The second one. Suppose that the economic course of the Emerald was exactly 10 knots. But this speed corresponded to a certain scheme of the machines (I indicated it above for Novik). However, it is far from a fact that the ship could provide such work of the machines - after the breakthrough on May 15, it actually burst the steam line, the salinity in the refrigerators was high and the right car was periodically knocked out until it was completely stopped. That is, it is far from a fact that the cruiser could physically go in the mode of economic progress.
            The third. Coal reserves on the ship could only be estimated. The emerald went at 13 knots, the mechanic had an idea of ​​how much he was spending at that, figured out the reserves, and dividing one by the other he realized that at 13 knots they would reach the shore. It’s not a question, of course, one could give less, a certain amount of coal would save. But it also increased the time before approaching the shore. Remind me about the weather in the morning of May 14? Togo did not immediately venture the destroyers into the sea to withdraw, if that. That is, the increase in transit time with weak cars and a minimum of coal remaining, generally speaking, is a bit skully - the weather will break out, and the cruiser would not have reached anywhere.
            That is why all the arguments about the economic course - nothing more than a theoretical philosophization based on afterglow - on how much coal is left, that the weather did not happen, etc. etc.
            1. Jura 27 April 24 2020 05: 12 New
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              [/ quote] And secondly, the fee is paid for writing articles, and not at all for the author of the article to convince of something [quote]

              That’s how it is visible, judging by the crap that is often printed here.
              1. Jura 27 April 24 2020 05: 16 New
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                [/ quote] Why did you get the idea that you can make any demands on me as an author of articles? [quote]

                With the fact that you do not justify your conclusions set forth in the article.
                1. Jura 27 April 24 2020 05: 27 New
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                  [/ quote] At 18.00 we went on a course leading to a point equidistant from Vladivostok and Vladimir Bay [quote]

                  Therefore, I wrote that a cuckoo went to Ferzen long before the explosion of the cruiser.
                  That is, why it was impossible to choose a point closer to Stock and away from s. Vladimir?
                  Or, why, it was necessary to go to z. Vladimir, and not in Nakhodka or in the Transfiguration (these are the closest points of the coast, from this very point)? After all, coal was scarce. That is, Fersen intentionally burned the last coal, DEPARTING from Stock, and not approaching it.
                  Having gone to Nakhodka, or to the Transfiguration, the Emerald could contact Stoke by radio or by the shore telegraph and call for help. In addition, coal also remained.
                  1. Jura 27 April 24 2020 05: 32 New
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                    [/ quote] Accept the last and decisive? Yura, you think at least a little what you write. [Quote]

                    Well, yes, military sailors do not exist to fight.
                    Courage (with golden weapons for it) is exclusively an escape from the enemy, taking advantage of speed superiority. Some epic shame (it's about rewarding).
                    1. Jura 27 April 24 2020 05: 36 New
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                      [/ quote] So, I do not remember that someone determined the economic speed of cruisers such as Pearls empirically. [quote]

                      Right now, let me remind you: "heroic" flight from the scene of the battle of the "Pearl" and co. to Manila. Distance from Tsushima to z. Vladimir and to Manila yourself look or tell?
                      1. Jura 27 April 24 2020 05: 39 New
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                        [/ quote] Coal reserves on the ship could only be estimated. [quote]

                        At that time, there was such a procedure: the measurement of coal residues in coal pits - it was a regular procedure, which provided sufficient accuracy.
                      2. Jura 27 April 24 2020 05: 42 New
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                        [/ quote] About the weather in the morning of May 14 to recall? [quote]

                        It’s better to remind about the weather on May 16, because on May 14 there is nothing to do with it.
                      3. Jura 27 April 24 2020 05: 46 New
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                        [/ quote] bad weather breaks out and the cruiser wouldn’t get anywhere at all. [quote]

                        Yeah, this is in the style of the reasoning of the then officers of the RIF: to z. The weather doesn’t let us reach Vladimir, but to the closer Nakhodka, it will definitely hurt.
                      4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 24 2020 19: 59 New
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                        Quote: Jura 27
                        With the fact that you do not justify your conclusions set forth in the article.

                        He justified Khromov and, already in correspondence with you, a reference to the testimony of the officers. Do not like it - refute it.
                        Quote: Jura 27
                        Or, why, it was necessary to go to z. Vladimir, and not in Nakhodka or in the Transfiguration (these are the closest points of the coast, from this very point)?

                        It would seem obvious. The find is too close to Vladivostok (there will not be 50 miles in a straight line either), so climbing there is a great risk of running into Japanese ships, which could well patrol, say, at the entrance to Peter the Great Bay. But the most important thing is that, as a convenient landing site near Vladivostok, it, in theory, should have been mined. well, there weren’t any maps of mine production on the Emerald.
                        Quote: Jura 27
                        Having gone to Nakhodka, or to the Transfiguration, the Emerald could contact Stoke by radio

                        It was possible to go to the Transfiguration, but there the Emerald did not expect anything at all. there was neither a radio telegraph nor coal, while both could be found in Vladimir and Olga. Well, the capabilities of the Emerald radio station clearly did not allow contact with Vladivostok from the Transfiguration.
                        So neither Nakhodka nor the Transfiguration of the Emerald were suitable, and - for obvious reasons.
                        Quote: Jura 27
                        Well, yes, military sailors do not exist to fight.

                        That's right. Navy men exist to achieve the goals of warfare at sea. Obviously, if the “Emerald” entered the battle on May 15, it would only have added one more victory to Japan, that is, it would have fulfilled its own goals for it. It is very stupid and more than strange that you cannot understand such basic things.
                        You can enter the battle without the hope of victory only if there are no other ways, as happened, for example, with Ushakov or Donskoy.
                        Quote: Jura 27
                        At that time, there was such a procedure: the measurement of coal residues in coal pits - it was a regular procedure, which provided sufficient accuracy.

                        As always - you are mistaken. Measurement of coal reserves that had an irregular shape, and even during the transportation of coal from one firebox to another, cannot give an exact value. This I am silent about the density of coal.
                        Quote: Jura 27
                        It’s better to remind about the weather on May 16, because on May 14 there is nothing to do with it.

                        I say - it’s very simple to talk about it when you know what the weather really was.
                      5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 24 2020 20: 03 New
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                        Yes, I completely forgot
                        Quote: Jura 27
                        Right now, let me remind you: "heroic" flight from the scene of the battle of the "Pearl" and co. to Manila.

                        Yura, did you say something there for physics? You are not aware that Pearl machines and Emerald machines are two huge differences, and that Emerald machines are much worse? You do not know that both cruisers had generally comparable operating modes in the battle of May 14? You do not know that in these modes the Emerald had to a priori burn much more coal than Pearls? You do not know that pearls, unlike Emerald, did not run away on May 15, 4,5 hours at full speed? You do not know how coal consumption differs when stokers give full speed from traffic, not only by 10, but also by 18 knots? And what dependence of speed on power do you also not know? Is it that hard for you?
                        Then what are you generally aware of?
                      6. Jura 27 April 25 2020 15: 37 New
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                        [/ quote] You are not aware that the Pearl machines and the Emerald machines are two huge differences, and that the Emerald machines are much worse? [quote]

                        Really? Your sign in the post directly contradicts your words: where there is more daily consumption for “I”, somewhere more for “Zh”, somewhere almost equal expenses.
                        And how many hours at night 14/15 went under 18 knots? Unlike "I", which gave approx. 21/22 knots four hours.
                      7. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 25 2020 16: 22 New
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                        Quote: Jura 27
                        Really? Your post sign directly contradicts your words

                        She does not contradict anything.
                        From May 2 to May 4, Pearl’s coal consumption was higher, but there were artillery exercises and the cruising detachment went into reconnaissance, what did Zh and what did And it’s not known for sure, we just knew that I had a breakdown, so here maybe there’s just different running gear modes. From the 7th to the 10th, the consumption of coal in Emerald was greater, although the pearls ran and clarified both the dreaming balloon and the reconnaissance 12 miles ahead of the squadron. And, finally, after the last loading of coal, the consumption of Emerald is again higher, although here both cruisers seemed to be at the squadron.
                        Quote: Jura 27
                        And how many hours at night 14/15 went under 18 knots?

                        Levitsky points out that the speed was reduced from 18 to 12 knots "it seems about one in the morning or earlier." Most likely at midnight, as the watchman Oleg indicated precisely this time for "reducing the speed to 85"
                  2. Saxahorse April 24 2020 22: 08 New
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                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    The find is too close to Vladivostok (there will not be 50 miles in a straight line either), so climbing there is a great risk of running into Japanese ships, which could well patrol, say, at the entrance to Peter the Great Bay.

                    You seem to have forgotten about Russia, Stormbreaker and Athlete. The condition of these large and dangerous ships could not be reliably known to the Japanese. So early patrolling could be entrusted to a minimum of Kamimura’s squadron, without the risk of suddenly losing all of these same patrol ships ..

                    Stop dreaming already. The Japanese could not send anything to Vladivostok in advance. Everything serious enough for this, it was necessary under Tsushima.
                  3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 25 2020 08: 06 New
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                    Quote: Saxahorse
                    So early patrolling could be entrusted to a minimum of Kamimura’s squadron, without the risk of suddenly losing all of these same patrol ships ..

                    Generally not necessary. Armored cruisers of the Japanese could well simply retreat in the event of a wok, in addition, no one prevented the Japanese from sending 2-3 armored personnel carriers to Vladivostok
                    Quote: Saxahorse
                    Stop dreaming already.

                    Well, yes. I fantasize, our officers fantasized, one Saxahorse cuts the truth of the uterus :)
                    Quote: Saxahorse
                    Everything serious enough for this, it was necessary under Tsushima.

                    Saxahorse, ay! Tsushima is already over, ours lost. So send - I do not want
                2. Jura 27 April 25 2020 15: 40 New
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                  [/ quote] Justified by Khromov [quote]

                  And how Khromov substantiated that we must go in the opposite direction from the Stock, being at a point equidistant from Stock and s. Vl-ra?
                3. Jura 27 April 25 2020 15: 41 New
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                  [/ quote] who could well patrol, say, at the entrance to the Gulf of Peter the Great. [quote]

                  At night to patrol a line of 150 km and catch one-on-one KRL? You are a dreamer however !!!
                4. Jura 27 April 25 2020 15: 43 New
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                  [/ quote] But the most important thing is that, as a convenient landing site near Vladivostok, it, in theory, should have been mined. [quote]

                  Again violent fantasy - and not enter the bay, sending the boat to Nakhodka is absolutely, really impossible?
                5. Jura 27 April 25 2020 15: 45 New
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                  [/ quote] It was possible to go to the Transfiguration, but there the Emerald did not expect anything at all. there was neither a radio telegraph nor coal, while both could be found in Vladimir and Olga. Well, the capabilities of the Emerald radio station clearly did not allow you to contact Vladivostok from the Transfiguration. [Quote]

                  But nothing that of the Transfiguration could be contacted by Stoke on the radio (a range of 100 miles allowed)?
                6. Jura 27 April 25 2020 15: 48 New
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                  [/ quote] So neither Nakhodka nor the Transfiguration Emerald came up, and - for obvious reasons. [quote]

                  Perfect fit, be the commander is not half-crazy Fersen. And even it was not necessary to go into the bays, it was enough to contact Stock on the radio as soon as the range allowed.
                7. Jura 27 April 25 2020 15: 53 New
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                  [/ quote] Absolutely. Navy men exist to achieve the goals of warfare at sea. Obviously, if the “Emerald” entered the battle on May 15, it would only have added one more victory to Japan, that is, it would have fulfilled its own goals for it. It is very stupid and more than strange that you cannot understand such elementary things. [Quote]

                  The strange thing is that I never offered to join the battle “Emerald” on May 15.
                  I noted that it is foolish to reward for the courage of a brow who fled from the enemy, taking advantage of the speed advantage. Then, it was necessary to reward Reicenshtein with Grammatchikov (and Schulz at the same time), those who really broke through the battle, through superior forces.
                8. Jura 27 April 25 2020 15: 56 New
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                  [/ quote] As always - you are mistaken. Measurement of coal reserves that had an irregular shape, and even during the transportation of coal from one firebox to another, cannot give an exact value. This I am silent about the density of coal. [Quote]

                  Write complete nonsense - this is a regular way (and the only one accurate) to determine the coal stock and your plate is based on the measurement of coal in the pits. Do you believe her? Or not already?
                9. Jura 27 April 25 2020 16: 01 New
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                  [/ quote] I say - it’s very simple to talk about it when you know what the weather really was. [quote]

                  What's the problem ? The weather on May 16 is good, the barometer does not fall, so in the next half day everything will not change dramatically. Well, in general, if you are afraid of weather changes, then you can never go out to sea, and then suddenly for a storm?
                  In addition, Fernsen was awarded for courage, and he was afraid of some kind of weather. tongue
                10. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 25 2020 16: 43 New
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                  Quote: Jura 27
                  And how Khromov substantiated that we must go in the opposite direction from Stock

                  The need to go to Stock is your personal fantasy, why is Khromov justifying something here? The reasons why it was worth going to Vladimir I set out above
                  Quote: Jura 27
                  At night to patrol a line of 150 km and catch one-on-one KRL? You are a dreamer however !!!

                  Not one KRL, but any light forces that managed to pass after the battle in Tsushima. And why - at night? :)))
                  Quote: Jura 27
                  Again violent fantasy - and not enter the bay, sending the boat to Nakhodka is absolutely, really impossible?

                  That is, you propose to force the Emerald (at night?) To cruise at the bay, and send a boat there ... so what? :))) There, the villagers will bow with a map of minefields? :))))
                  Maybe enough already tormenting the unfortunate owl?
                  Quote: Jura 27
                  But nothing that of the Transfiguration could be contacted by Stoke on the radio (a range of 100 miles allowed)?

                  Since when did the Emerald radio station work for 100 miles? :) Share the source of such a stormy imagination.
                  Quote: Jura 27
                  I noted that it is foolish to reward for the courage of a brow who fled from the enemy, taking advantage of the speed advantage.

                  Do not get out. I quoted what you wrote
                  Quote: Jura 27
                  Write complete nonsense - this is a regular way (and the only one accurate) to determine the coal stock

                  Which, with all its staffing, still does not give an accurate picture, especially during the freelance transportation of coal on the decks of the Emerald
                11. Jura 27 April 26 2020 16: 23 New
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                  [/ quote] The need to go to Stock is your personal fantasy, why is there something to Khromov to justify? The reasons why it was worth going to Vladimir I set out above [quote]

                  Not mine, but ZPR, there was such an order, but the order to go to z. Vladimir was not there.
                  Well, of course, why does Khromov justify the crazy decision? I agree here.
                  And what are these reasons for going in the opposite direction from Stock?
                12. Jura 27 April 26 2020 16: 26 New
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                  [/ quote] And why - at night?: [quote]

                  Well, Fersen, awarded for bravery, was afraid of everything, then the weather, or the mythical enemy, therefore there is a night for special brave men, during which it is quite possible to get to Stock, from the conditional border of s. PV.
                13. Jura 27 April 26 2020 16: 30 New
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                  [/ quote] That is, you propose to force the Emerald (at night?) to cruise at the bay, and send a boat there ... so what? :))) There, the villagers will bow with a map of minefields? [quote]

                  You have all fantasies violent and violent !!! The officer who arrived on the boat contacts Stoke and finds out about the location of the minefields and requests cover from Stoke. This is if you could not contact by radio.
                14. Jura 27 April 26 2020 16: 32 New
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                  [/ quote] Since when did the Emerald radio station work for 100 miles? :) Share the source [quote]

                  From the very ones when it was installed. And for how many miles did YOUR radio work on the Emerald?
                15. Jura 27 April 26 2020 16: 35 New
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                  [/ quote] I quoted what you wrote [quote]

                  Once again, when and where, did I suggest that the Emerald enter the battle with the enemy during the breakthrough (or generally May 15)? Stop making up nonsense.
                16. Jura 27 April 26 2020 16: 38 New
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                  [/ quote] Which, with all its staffing, still does not give an accurate picture, especially during freelance transportation of coal on the decks of Emerald [quote]

                  Once again, this is a regular, fairly accurate method (the other gave even less accuracy), and you can calculate the coal transported very accurately, even more accurately than measuring coal pits.
                17. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 26 2020 21: 35 New
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                  Quote: Jura 27
                  And what are these reasons for going in the opposite direction from Stock?

                  Yura, this question was answered in sufficient detail by Khromov, official documents, and I in my article. But in general it’s funny to watch how you try to refute me :) "Why didn’t go to Nakhodka, ata him! Hmmm, it didn’t. Why didn’t go to Vladivostok !?" :)))))
                  Quote: Jura 27
                  You have all fantasies violent and violent !!! The officer who arrived on the boat contacts Stoke and learns about the location of the minefields and requests cover from Stoke

                  No, Yur, This is all your fantasies violent and violent. Then you scolded what Ferzen was worth, you didn’t save coal, now you advise him to go to Nakhodka at night, hang out at sea until morning, and ask for a map of mine settings by radio (!!!) .... Then I don’t see the point - At least some interesting arguments have been exhausted.
                  Quote: Jura 27
                  From the very ones when it was installed. And for how many miles did YOUR radio work on the Emerald?

                  And it is unknown. But at Zhemchuga the maximum recorded range was 95 miles, the radio telegraphs of Aurora were considered the best on the squadron, they knew how to transmit and receive radiograms for 60-70 miles. 100 miles is the maximum receiving distance, if that. And it’s far from the fact that the Emerald station could. And he had not to accept, but to send a radiogram
                18. Jura 27 April 27 2020 07: 12 New
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                  [/ quote] This question was answered in sufficient detail by both Khromov and official documents, and I in my article. But in general it’s fun to watch how you try to refute me :) "Why didn’t go to Nakhodka, ata him! Hmmm, it didn’t. Why didn’t go to Vladivostok!?": [Quote]

                  Khromov didn’t indicate any reasonable reasons, Ferzen directly violated the order of the ZPR to go to Stoke (obviously at 18-00 on May 15).
                  And I just consider options for action - more or less "brave" Ferzen. From a point 50 miles from the coast (this is just opposite Nakhodka / Transfiguration), you could go directly to Stock at night (by contacting him 60 miles on the radio) or a less brave option: go to Nakhodka and send a boat there to get in touch coast telegraph.
                  And do not need your next crazy fantasies about requesting a map of minefields by radio / telegraph - passages are requested in them. And since there were no minefields (except, directly at Stock), there was enough information about it.
                  It’s about 60 miles from Nakhodka to Stock, so it’s within range of the Emerald radio.
  2. Saxahorse April 26 2020 21: 20 New
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    Quote: Jura 27
    Generally not necessary. Armored cruisers of the Japanese could well simply retreat in the event of a wok, in addition, no one prevented the Japanese from sending 2-3 armored personnel carriers to Vladivostok

    Well you give !! Armored cruisers of the Japanese, a frank third grade, one that is not yet defective but is already somewhere nearby .. I want to remind you how many times they could not develop even 15 knots .. And a fight with the Varyag (poor Chioda died at 14 knots). the breakthrough of the Emerald just described by you (remember who died?). Do you think the Japanese did not understand what threatens the meeting of Chioda with the Thunderbolt? A picture at the level of a Korean who suddenly saw Asama .. Belyaev called Asama an armadillo in the report, however. It is scary and very painful if it comes to the battle.

    The option of sending "to Vladivostok 2-3 BRKR" is complete nonsense even in the alternative story so beloved by our "Senior Sailor". The Japanese squadron and so large trunks are less than one and a half times, and then all of a sudden Togo, just in case, will also take 2-3 ships of the first rank out of battle !?

    Sorry .. your answer does not count. laughing
  3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 26 2020 21: 25 New
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    Quote: Saxahorse
    Option with sending "to Vladivostok 2-3 BRKR" complete nonsense even in an alternative history

    For the most advanced, I repeat - no one bothered to send them AFTER the battle.
    Quote: Saxahorse
    Well you give !! Japanese armored cruisers, frank third grade

    Which they constantly sent to search and reconnaissance of Russian ships. It is a fact:)))
  • Catfish April 21 2020 18: 32 New
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    Hi Andrew! With a "return". Glad a new meeting. smile
    1. Grandfather April 21 2020 19: 27 New
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      "everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle, from the side ..." (c) the author is controversial.
      1. Catfish April 21 2020 19: 36 New
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        "Well, truth is born in a dispute." smile And the author is interesting anyway. hi
        1. Grandfather April 22 2020 02: 46 New
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          Quote: Sea Cat
          "Well, truth is born in a dispute." smile And the author is interesting anyway. hi

          I'm actually talking about a quote, not about Andrew! Andrey well done, he writes from the heart.
  • Macsen_wledig April 21 2020 19: 40 New
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    Here, in the sources, big discrepancies begin.

    In general, it would be nice to look at the documents, and not read the fabrications of historians.
    On occasion, I compared British and German documents on the Bismarck’s first and last campaign with what historians write - dear mother: in places such a terry alternative story that it’s just the way ...
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 30 New
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      Quote: Macsen_Wledig
      In general, it would be nice to look at the documents, and not read the fabrications of historians.

      those that are at their disposal (reports of the Investigative Commission, etc.) - I looked, but I don’t have any others.
      1. Macsen_wledig April 22 2020 17: 46 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Quote: Macsen_Wledig
        In general, it would be nice to look at the documents, and not read the fabrications of historians.

        those that are at their disposal (reports of the Investigative Commission, etc.) - I looked, but I don’t have any others.

        Yes, it is clear.
        In terms of the fact that you are working with accessible documents - in the end, you write a review paper about the fate of the ship, not the dissertation.
        My post, so to speak, is a general remark ... nothing more.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 18: 15 New
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          Quote: Macsen_Wledig
          In terms of the fact that you are working with accessible documents - in the end, you write a review paper about the fate of the ship, not the dissertation.

          That's for sure. I would very much like to dive into the archives, but who will feed the family? :))
  • Aviator_ April 21 2020 20: 14 New
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    It’s good that the article cycle has resumed. Respect to the author!
  • Charlie April 21 2020 20: 24 New
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    Oh, one of the most interesting authors of this resource has returned. Bravo
  • Senior seaman April 21 2020 20: 40 New
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    Hallelujah!
    Honestly, I was expecting you to continue, but was afraid to jinx it :))))
    1. anzar April 22 2020 13: 02 New
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      waiting for you to continue ...

      I think the reason is that "there is no silver lining" (quarantine)))
      And so this staticless character, while debunking the previous "myths" eats some ...
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 31 New
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        Quote: anzar
        I think the reason is that "there is no silver lining" (quarantine)))

        No, I'm working. despite quarantine. Moreover - generally speaking, I am on vacation, but still work :)
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 31 New
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      Good evening, Ivan! Thank!:)
  • smaug78 April 21 2020 21: 03 New
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    Thank. As always a great article!
  • businessv April 21 2020 22: 27 New
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    To be continued ...
    Andrey, as always, is very interesting and tragic. Thank you very much for the article, I look forward to continuing! good
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 33 New
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      Always welcome, thank you for your kind words! hi
  • Rurikovich April 21 2020 22: 32 New
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    At last... fellow The Lord heard my prayers smile drinks
    Today, after the fact, discussing certain actions of the commanders of ships is a thankless task. For not having the information that we know now, standing on the bridge of the ship and seeing only what is before your eyes and making decisions is a kind of "trash", especially when the lives of hundreds of subordinates depend on your actions. Therefore, quite logical explanations of Ferzen’s actions deserve a plus that is already worth it. yes
    Was Fersen a coward? Looking with whom to compare. Take the same Langsdorf - he still had fuel and, as a result, variability in decision-making, but Fersen had empty bunkers and, moreover, did not shoot himself. This is about the role of the personality in history.
    In principle, I agree with the conclusions. Yours faithfully, hi
    1. Silvio April 22 2020 07: 11 New
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      Take the same Langsdorf - he still had fuel and, as a consequence, variability in decision making
      In Montevideo, three cruisers were really waiting for the Germans to exit, and the path was very long and there was a meeting ahead with major Nevi forces. The British would not let Spee out of sight. When the Langsdorf graters were going with the headquarters on further actions, the option of breaking through the Atlantic was not even discussed. But the commander shot himself because, according to the tradition of the Kaiser fleet, the commander shares the fate of the ship.
      1. Macsen_wledig April 22 2020 13: 34 New
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        Quote: Silvio
        But the commander shot himself because, according to the tradition of the Kaiser fleet, the commander shares the fate of the ship.

        Where did you dig it? :)
        Emden commander Karl von Muller - died in Brunswick on March 11, 1923.
        The commander of the “Konigsberg” Max Loof died on September 20, 1950 in Berlin.
        The commander of the "Dresden" Fritz Ludeke died on February 22, 1931 in Riesdorf ...

        The list goes on ...
        1. Silvio April 22 2020 18: 15 New
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          These are the commanders of the ships fully fulfilled their duty. Their naval officer served honestly in relation to his work and his duty. And if he saw that he had acted in the wrong way, he judged himself. Langensdorf would not have held any responsibility for the death of the ship, but he mistakenly got involved in an unnecessary battle in spite of these requirements. Therefore, the Germans knew how to fight and win at sea, and not just die with music and self-drowning.
          1. Macsen_wledig April 22 2020 19: 38 New
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            [quote = Silvio] There would be no responsibility for the loss of the ship Langensdorf, but he mistakenly got involved in an unnecessary battle in spite of these requirements. [/ quote]
            At the start of the battle, he considered it necessary: ​​because the Harwood compound was identified as a small cruiser and two destroyers. In view of the geographical location, it was concluded that this was the cover of the convoy and decided to attack ...

            quote = Silvio] Therefore, the Germans knew how to fight and win at sea, and not just die with music and self-inflating. [/ quote]
            In World War II, they mostly died with music, which Raeder warned about right away ....

            Z.Y. And where can I find these very "prescriptions"? [
            1. Silvio April 22 2020 20: 34 New
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              And where can one find these very “prescriptions”?
              Presumably in the Bundesarchive. And so it is clear that the raiders were sent to the other end of the ball to drown British traders, and not to look for adventures on their own. The Germans not only died with music, but also defeated their opponents. Bismarck Huda drowned, and the Prince crippled, but did not finish because the order. Sheer also piled on Exeter, but also did not finish the wounded. The Varangian was dying with music, he could not shoot either. to no avail, but for the orchestra to play on the upper deck.
              1. Macsen_wledig April 22 2020 21: 33 New
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                Quote: Silvio
                Presumably in the Bundesarchive.

                Then how do you know what is written in them? :)

                Quote: Silvio
                And so it is clear that the raiders were sent to the other end of the ball to drown British traders, and not to look for adventures on their own.

                And what could be better than a convoy when there are many traders in one place and with a weak escort?
                Besides, when you go home ...

                Quote: Silvio
                Bismarck Huda drowned, and the Prince crippled, but did not finish because the order.

                Why didn’t - it is unknown to anyone ... One can only speculate.
                And you didn’t see the real “precepts” on the “Rainyubung”, nothing like that was written anywhere ... :)

                Quote: Silvio
                Sheer also piled on Exeter, but also did not finish the wounded.

                Two "Linder" evaporated from the battlefield?
                1. Silvio April 23 2020 07: 49 New
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                  And why is it tricky to philosophize, the raiders had the task of drowning importers or convoys with impunity, as you like. To receive holes and damage in naval battles is only in those cases if, as they say, hit. Witnesses were that Lutens deliberately did not pursue the wounded Prince, and Exeter barely hobbled to the base without main artillery.
                  1. Macsen_wledig April 23 2020 18: 15 New
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                    Quote: Silvio
                    Witnesses said that Lutens deliberately did not pursue the wounded Prince.

                    If you read the sources, then make sure that all the evidence from the category of "one woman said" ...
    2. Ivanchester April 22 2020 14: 29 New
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      Was Fersen a coward?

      Taking into account the fact that during the battle on May 14th the Emerald appeared twice near the wrecked ships (Oslyabya and Alexander) and at the same time did not save a single person from them, you cannot name a desperate brave Vasily Nikolaevich either.
      I think that if he were, for example, in place of the cap. 2 p. Kolomeytsev, it is unlikely that Admiral Rozhdestvensky would have held Tsushima.
      1. Rurikovich April 22 2020 18: 00 New
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        Quote: Ivanchester
        Taking into account the fact that during the battle on May 14th the Emerald appeared twice near the wrecked ships (Oslyabya and Alexander) and at the same time did not save a single person from them, you cannot name a desperate brave Vasily Nikolaevich either.

        Um what We read the description of the author of the Emerald actions in the afternoon battle on May 14
        According to the report V.N. Ferzen, he sent the "Emerald" to the dying armadillo, when he saw that Oslyabya was in distress: perhaps it was about the moment when the latter began to roll over. In addition to the "Emerald" to the site of the tragedy, the 4 of the destroyer, including "Violent" and "Bravy", also went. They were the first to have time and saved people with might and main when the Emerald approached: from the last one they threw beds, buoys and one whaleboat without rowers, the cruiser itself stopped.

        и
        The Emerald immediately went to the crash site. Approaching the overturned ship (the keel of the “Alexander III” was above the water), the Emerald stopped, and began to throw bunks, circles and other tackle, which the drowning people could hold onto, and in addition began to launch the rowing boat, because whaleboats at that time were either damaged or filled with water on the eve of the battle and could not be used. But at that time, the 2 combat squadron approached the site of the death of the “Alexander III”: the 6 of the armored cruisers of H. Kamimura, including the returned Asama. Of course, the Japanese ships immediately opened fire on the cruiser standing in place, and the Russian squadron could not cover the Emerald, as its terminal ships were already in 2 miles from it, and the distance to the enemy exceeded 40 cables. To honor V.N. Ferzen, the Emerald remained in place until the distance to the nearest Japanese cruiser decreased to the 23 cable, and only then ordered to give full speed. Since, of course, this could not be done all at once, the Emerald was moving closer to the Japanese ships before the 20 cable before it could break the distance and retreat to the main forces of the Russian squadron.

        I would also understand that Fersen generally scored to save the drowning and passed by ... But we do not see this wink
        1. Ivanchester April 22 2020 21: 34 New
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          So I do not claim that he is a hopeless coward, like a cap. 2 p. Baranova.
          But V.N.Fersen clearly did not reveal a risk appetite either. He seemed to want to save people from Oslyabya, but almost immediately discovered that he allegedly interfered with a certain maneuver of our battleships (which, by a strange combination of circumstances, the destroyers in the same place did not interfere at all) and hastened to leave the place of his death.
          He also began to help the crew of the Alexander, but was afraid to get hit on his ship and left, and as a result, no one survived the Alexander team.
          I believe that after the episode with a breakthrough from the encirclement (which in itself required both courage and decisiveness), Vasily Nikolaevich’s natural cautiousness took on extreme forms, and that’s why he brought his ship to the sad outcome that Andrei described so well in his article.
    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 32 New
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      Thank you, Andrew! hi drinks
  • Nehist April 22 2020 01: 43 New
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    In the end, Andrew made us happy with another article. The material is fully weighed and competently presented. Regarding Fersen’s fears, most likely he was afraid not of the arrival of the Japanese warships themselves, but of the many Japanese fishermen who could detect him and pass him on an instance. In the described period, this was completely real, since in the described period, the Japanese hunted crowds from our shores to the Kamchatka Peninsula
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 32 New
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      Greetings, Alexander!
      Quote: Nehist
      Regarding Fersen’s fears, most likely he was afraid not of the arrival of the Japanese warships themselves, but of the many Japanese fishermen who could detect him and pass him on an instance.

      Easily. But the fisherman needs a lot of time to return to the shores of Japan and transmit information.
    2. volodimer April 22 2020 19: 44 New
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      Greetings! Thanks to Andrey! I forgot the source, which indicated that later studies conducted to clear the forwarding in Vladimir Bay found anchors that were wound up to remove the cruiser aground, which immediately erases the suspicion that Ferzen was intentionally stranded. Why didn’t he go to Posyet, not to Olga but to Vladimir and not even Vladivostok ... The decision was difficult, perhaps if the Emerald "were from the local (Vladivostok detachment), then he rushed home, and so ... . It is a pity that it happened ... Although the "Pearl" is also no better than the essence ...
      1. Rurikovich April 22 2020 21: 35 New
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        Quote: volodimer
        I forgot the source, which indicated that later studies conducted to clear the forwarding in Vladimir Bay found anchors that were set up to remove the cruiser aground, which immediately erases the suspicion that Ferzen was intentionally aground

        There was an article in "Technique - Youth", which number I do not remember, but somewhere in the early 90's. Another 120 mm gun was raised, the photo was also hi
  • Kote Pan Kokhanka April 22 2020 05: 15 New
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    Andrey is sincerely glad to see you back !!!
    With respect and the sea region of our vast country, Vlad!
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 33 New
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      Many thanks, Vladislav!
  • Comrade April 22 2020 05: 19 New
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    Dear Andrew,
    I am very glad that you finally have the opportunity to return to the continuation of the cycle.
    Thank you very much for the detailed analysis of Ferzen’s actions, it was very interesting to read. I completely agree with many conclusions, and your assumption about the psychological state of Ferzin also seems reasonable.
    Thanks to Japanese sources, it is possible to clarify one of the controversial issues.
    the Japanese refused all attempts to catch up with the Emerald a little later than 12.30, maybe at 13.00. Where, then, in Russian sources, the time is 14.00?
    Perhaps this is taken from the testimony of the Investigative Commission of the navigational officer, Lieutenant Polushkin, who claimed that “the pursuit of the enemy cruisers lasted about 3 hours” and “around 14.00 the enemy cruisers disappeared from sight”. Here we can only assume that the officer, writing down from memory, was inaccurate, or that some other Japanese ships or ships that were mistaken for cruisers pursuing him were seen on the Emerald. It is also possible that Polushkin did not mean the Japanese cruisers themselves, but the smokes that can be seen long enough after the ships releasing them disappeared over the horizon.

    The words of Alexander Sergeyevich are confirmed by a map from the "Top Secret History of the Russo-Japanese War at Sea" with the charting of the cruiser "Chitose". This cruiser really lay back on course in 14:00 Japanese time.

    The difference between Japanese and Russian time there is a little over ten minutes.
    As seen on the map (I spread only a fragment, it makes no sense at all, because the site will "squeeze" the image, and you can’t make out anything), from 10:15 to 11:56 (Japanese time) the cruiser’s trajectory was an uncertain broken line, but then “Chitose” went in a straight line, up to a sharp turn in 2:00 R.M. (14 p.m.) on the reverse course.
    And in the combat report of the ship's commander it is said that he constantly received radiograms with which he was pointed at the Emerald. The map also shows that there was another Japanese ship, probably one of the auxiliary cruisers, who maintained visual contact with the Emerald, and who were mistakenly identified by us as the cruiser of the 6th combat detachment. This ship was pointing the Chitose to the Emerald with its radiograms, since the Emerald was not visible from this cruiser.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 34 New
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      Greetings, dear colleague! hi drinks
      Thanks for the clarification, now everything is clear.
      1. Comrade April 23 2020 03: 13 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Thanks for the clarification, now everything is clear.

        And here, a deeply respected colleague, laying the course "Chitose" when he was chasing the "Emerald".

        At the bottom of the scale attached for clarity :-)
        1. Saxahorse April 23 2020 22: 56 New
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          Dear Valentine, the scale is certainly good, but it was worth indicating in which units. The Japanese use miles somewhere and kilometers somewhere. Well and most importantly, there is not enough compass needle and initial coordinates. With the compass needle of the Japanese, as we recall, all sorts of miracles also happen.
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 25 2020 09: 22 New
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          Quote: Comrade
          And here, a deeply respected colleague, laying the course "Chitose" when he was chasing the "Emerald".

          Indeed, it was as if sake had built up beyond measure :)))))
          1. Comrade April 26 2020 17: 45 New
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            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Indeed, it was as if sake had built up beyond measure:

            If they saw Emerald with Chitose, they would not go in zigzags. Along the way, Fersen clearly did not deserve the golden weapon.
            He allegedly “broke through”, but the resistance from the Japanese, which is implied, was not really there. No one shot at the Emerald, and he, accordingly, did not shoot back.
            Three hours were in full swing, moving away from pursuers who did not actually see the victim.
            So yes, either Fersen was mad there on the bridge after the psychological stress he had received, or he fell into a panic, or simply desperately cowardly and therefore carried off his legs wherever his eyes looked.
            It can be assumed that the rewarding of his gold weapon “For Courage” is political in nature.
            If Fersen were brave, he would not be afraid to go to Vladivostok in order to actually “break through” through the enemy’s barrier to his native port.
            Tea, the Japanese would not sink him :-)
            1. Saxahorse April 26 2020 21: 43 New
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              Dear "Comrade," as usual, you will not deign to answer my questions? What is the scale? Where is the compass looking? Our .. European ..
  • hohol95 April 22 2020 08: 14 New
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    Then the commander supposed to establish contact with Vladivostok, and there already act according to the circumstances.

    It turns out that before the cruiser enters the bay of St. Vladimir the crew had no connection with Vladivostok? Or was the radio silence observed by order of the captain?
    1. Senior seaman April 22 2020 12: 34 New
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      Telefunken radio stations on the ships of the second squadron had a maximum range of 100 miles.
      “Emerald” as far as I remember, closer than 180 to Vladivostok did not come close.
      1. hohol95 April 22 2020 12: 55 New
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        Do not get it. Thank you for the clarification. hi
        It is only interesting how the destroyers Braviy and Grozny, smaller in size and coal reserves, reached Vladivostok.
        And the breakthrough of the so-called cruiser Almaz is also interesting. Which they began to build as a "messenger ship for the Pacific Ocean" (in fact, a yacht for the governor in the Far East, Admiral E.I. Alekseev).
        1. Senior seaman April 22 2020 13: 02 New
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          The smaller ship has less consumption :) By the way, the Bravo coal ended 12 miles from Vladivostok and still he had to lift the antenna with the help of a kite to contact the base and ask for help.
          "Diamond" simply did not participate in the battle and crept along the wall. Although, of course, he had nothing to participate in.
          1. hohol95 April 22 2020 13: 05 New
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            A smaller ship has less consumption :)

            Possible. hi And range ...
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 34 New
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              Quote: hohol95
              Maybe. hi And range ...

              Not always. In addition, it greatly depends on the condition of the machines and driving conditions.
              1. hohol95 April 22 2020 18: 22 New
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                As well as the quality of coal.
                I read somewhere that the RI fleet did not use coal mined in the country at all. And he bought it from the British. Is there any explanation for such actions? They wrote about the high cost of Russian coal!
                1. Senior seaman April 22 2020 20: 19 New
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                  Simply, the best characteristics for steam engines were for Cardiff coal, which was mined in Wales. Other varieties, in principle, could be used, but there was less heat, more ash, which is why steam-powered plants did not give out the required characteristics.
                  But, for example, in Port Arthur coal from Yantai mines in Manchuria was widely used.
                  1. hohol95 April 22 2020 22: 14 New
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                    On what angle did Russian ships go to World War I then?
                    And the desire that the British wanted to deprive our fleet of mobility would they simply stop selling RI coal?
                    1. Senior seaman April 22 2020 22: 22 New
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                      I will not give you the exact answer to this question.
                      But there are a couple of considerations.
                      1) We learned how to mix oil with PMV for coal, thus increasing the productivity of boilers.
                      2) Cylindrical boilers, apparently, were much less demanding on fuel quality.
                      That is, if the supply of Cardiff was critical, then somewhere around fifteen, no more.
                      And again, other grades of coal can be used, just boilers will often have to be cleaned and put up with a slight drop in steam production.
                      1. hohol95 April 22 2020 22: 44 New
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                        A striking example of the blockade of the Black Sea Fleet of the coal mines of Zonguldak.
                        Although coal was not mined there quite suitable for warships, on it the Geben and Breslau arranged the Grand Flit Dardanelles Wake in 1918.
      2. ser56 April 22 2020 18: 21 New
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        Quote: Senior Sailor
        maximum range of 100 miles.

        except the Urals, he has much more ...
        1. Senior seaman April 22 2020 19: 52 New
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          Yes, there was a Marconi.
  • Dmitry V. April 22 2020 09: 56 New
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    I agree with the conclusions of the author:
    both sides exaggerated the possibilities of the opposite.
    The Japanese felt that it was impossible to catch up with the Russian cruiser and left this occupation unpromising from their point of view.
    The commander of the Russian cruiser, quite reasonably believed that he would be cut off from Vladivostok, and if the cruiser did not arrive there, they would begin searching along the coast (finding a cruiser by the smoke in the bay is not such a futile task).

    The destruction of the cruiser without serious attempts to take aground is of course an unjustified haste, an unforgivable mistake.
  • Non-fighter April 22 2020 11: 04 New
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    Moreover, according to V.N. Ferzena: “At first I planned to go to Olga, but the senior officer expressed the opinion that this bay was probably mined to give shelter to our destroyers from the enemy. Having recognized this opinion as solid, Vladimir chose as the closest to Olga, where he hoped, perhaps, to find a telegraph station. ”

    Unfortunately, it is in the bay of St. Olga had the coal stock so needed for the cruiser

    The squadron goes to Vladivostok. Was there information on what was in those parts of the squadron? Where are the radio stations, where are the coal reserves, where are the mines (even without maps).
    And further. If coal is right next to Vladivostok, then after a possible battle with an increased consumption of coal, you will have to give SOS simply because there is no coal. What so that way you have to give up. So isn’t it easier to immediately choose the economic course, turning off all other steam consumers.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 35 New
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      Quote: Not the fighter
      The squadron goes to Vladivostok. Was there information on what was in those parts of the squadron? Where are the radio stations, where are the coal reserves, where are the mines (even without maps).

      Did not have.
      Quote: Not the fighter
      So isn’t it easier to immediately choose the economic course, turning off all other steam consumers.

      Far from the fact that 10 knots was the cruiser’s economic move
    2. volodimer April 22 2020 19: 19 New
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      Novik, after the battle in the yellow sea, was also unable to reach Vladivostok and was forced to accept the battle at Korsakov. failing to take coal. The Japanese were waiting for him there ...
      “Emerald” also did not go straight to Vladivostok, expecting that a Japanese squad was waiting for him on the way.
      The Vladivostok detachment of cruisers went beyond the Emerald ... But that one after being stranded and failures with removal were blown up earlier. Perhaps if they had waited, they saved the ship, but the story does not accept the subjunctive.
  • vladcub April 22 2020 12: 52 New
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    Andrei, I waited a very long time for the continuation of your cycle, which I ate.
    I am happy that you are with us again. Without you, we have a shortage of materials on the history of the fleet
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 35 New
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      Thank you very much, Svyatoslav! hi
  • VohaAhov April 22 2020 13: 03 New
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    Thank you so much for the article. Welcome back! I'll try to insert a photo of "Emerald", which shows how it is overloaded.
    1. Macsen_wledig April 22 2020 13: 39 New
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      Quote: VohaAhov
      I'll try to insert a photo of "Emerald", which shows how it is overloaded.

      It’s hard to judge without deepening marks ...
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 36 New
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      And thank you! hi Very good photo
  • vladcub April 22 2020 13: 32 New
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    Unfortunately, Andrei has a small logical error: “To shoot at the enemy entering St. Olga’s bay,” because he came to St. Bay’s Bay. Vladimir.
    And more: "in the future he should not have been appointed to the post of commander of the ship." I can’t judge how true the author’s conclusion is, I don’t know, the further service, but you can understand the Naval Ministry: strong-willed officers with combat experience are few, and the ship needs an intelligent commander
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 36 New
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      Quote: vladcub
      Unfortunately, Andrei has a small logical error: “To shoot at the enemy entering St. Olga’s bay,” because he came to St. Bay’s Bay. Vladimir.

      Blame :))) Of course, Vladimir
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  • mmaxx April 22 2020 14: 34 New
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    I absolutely do not understand Russian commanders. If after the battle we barely had enough coal to Vladivostok, then with what fright would the Japanese have had enough? Japanese military power blind? Why did the Japanese chase before Vladik some trifle if the main forces were defeated. Well, a couple of cruisers would come to Vladik. They would gobble up the remaining coal and other resources there and take a joke like the rest. Why didn’t anyone put himself in the place of the Japanese? Why did the Japanese have to do what they could not?
    I now consider, even if it is my personal and incompetent opinion, that even if the 2 TOE had arrived in Vladivostok without any damage, nothing would have changed. Very far Vladivostok from the main theater. The Russians would barely have enough coal to reach the Yellow Sea and immediately return. There is no sense in such military force. The resources of the port of Vladivostok were even smaller than Arthur. And on land, the Japanese are already winning. Some general military blindness in everything.
    1. ser56 April 22 2020 16: 21 New
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      Quote: mmaxx
      my personal and incompetent opinion is that even if the 2TOE came to Vladivostok without any damage, nothing would have changed

      Not at all for several reasons:
      1) The squadron in Vladik makes it possible to continue the war both on land and at sea ...
      2) There is a potential threat to communications ...
      3) This is a trump card in future peace talks ... hi
      Quote: mmaxx
      And on land, the Japanese are already winning.

      far from it ... request
      1. mmaxx April 22 2020 16: 34 New
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        1) To the supply areas of the Japanese army far. There will not be enough coal to conduct combat operations there against the Japanese fleet. In another place, our entire fleet is not needed at all. It turns out the same Tsushima. We are at the limit of range, overloaded with coal, etc. The Japanese are at home with everything that they have. Arrived. This is also despite the fact that ours did not surpass the Japanese in the fleet.
        2) No one interfered in the war on communications; Why not? All these operations of Vladivostok cruisers are about nothing. In Vladivostok, the cruisers later could not even be properly repaired. How to repair 2 TOE there? Will Christmas ferocity drive out communication? And the ships will immediately become operational? The 2TE had a bunch of great auxiliary cruisers. Where is the result?
        3) Trump is yes. But the Japanese are amazing realists. The whole manner of the Tsushima battle said that Togo was not afraid that the Russians would pass in some way. And precisely because he and the battleships and cruisers did not have the required cruising range. But his war was planned. Unfortunately.
        4) By May 1905, the Japanese had already thrown out Kuropatkin so much that, probably, only our army retreated so far from Napoleon. Port Arthur surrendered. All - have arrived.
        Trumps at the conclusion of the peace had to be kept somewhere in Kamran, etc.
        1. ser56 April 22 2020 16: 43 New
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          Quote: mmaxx
          1) To the supply areas of the Japanese army far.

          All paths go through the sea or ocean ... Raiders pass on the path is possible ... for example, you can mine roads between the Japanese islands request
          Quote: mmaxx
          This is also despite the fact that ours did not surpass the Japanese in the fleet.

          The EDB 2TOE were stronger than the Japanese armored fleet, and with the addition of 2x KR WOK, the situation is simplified ...
          Quote: mmaxx
          All these operations of Vladivostok cruisers are about nothing

          Only in your opinion request I agree on one thing - it was necessary to conduct more decisively, especially at the beginning of the war, but COM was in the way ... hi
          Quote: mmaxx
          But his war was planned.

          plans for war are often disrupted by the enemy ...
          Quote: mmaxx
          4) By May 1905, the Japanese had already kicked Kuropatkin so far

          Not at all - the railway worked, the resources were there, but Japan has already exhausted these ... request A question of will, no more ... without Tsushima IN2 could continue the war ...
          Quote: mmaxx
          keep somewhere in Kamran or the like

          and there was a base for 2TE? bully
          1. mmaxx April 22 2020 17: 05 New
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            Unfortunately, the events showed that the 2nd squadron with such control was significantly weaker than the Japanese fleet. And she didn’t break any plans of the Japanese. Rozhdestvensky also helped the Japanese to the best of their ability.
            Nikolasha could win the war after Tsushima. Russia could throw the Japanese out of the continent. It was necessary to engage in war and find a normal commander. But with what it was, it was simply amazing where the Russian army had been scrambling. And without any blitzkriegs.
            Comrade Lenin wrote that the war was being decided at sea. In Soviet times, this was repeated as a mantra. But this is not so. Everything was decided just on land. There were interests of Japan.
            And it was possible to stand in Kamran for a long time. This is not the basis for war. The farther the squadron, the worse it is)).
            Along the way, the political leadership was just below the plinth. And the Russian commanders are all from there. Therefore, probably, there is little war like Japanese, except for the Second World War, so popular for study. Everything is too clear.
            1. ser56 April 22 2020 17: 11 New
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              Quote: mmaxx
              with such management

              exactly request
              Quote: mmaxx
              Nikolasha could win the war after Tsushima.

              Russia fought ... request
              Quote: mmaxx
              and find a normal commander.

              Kuropatkin is not so bad ... request

              Quote: mmaxx
              Everything was decided just on land. There were interests of Japan.

              but at sea it was possible to help the army by violating the timing of the deployment of the Japanese army and its supply ... alas, the admiral's Russians understood this poorly ... request
              Quote: mmaxx
              And it was possible to stand in Kamran for a long time

              no, decomposition of personnel would begin ...

              Quote: mmaxx
              Everything is too clear.

              and well documented ...
            2. vladcub April 23 2020 17: 02 New
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              "everything was decided on land", maybe not all, but% 60 for sure.
              The trouble is that Kuropatkin Mukden lost before the end of the battle and in most battles, Yapov could be blundered, but Kuropatkin actually lost the war in the early days.
              This can be read from Denikin: "The path of the Russian officer"
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 39 New
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      Quote: mmaxx
      I absolutely do not understand Russian commanders. If after the battle we barely had enough coal to Vladivostok, then with what fright would the Japanese have had enough?

      Why not? Unlike our ships stomping across half the world, the Japanese were able to keep their ships' machines in order. And yes, the Japanese went into battle with full coal reserves
      Quote: mmaxx
      I now consider, even if it is my personal and incompetent opinion, that even if the 2 TOE had arrived in Vladivostok without any damage, nothing would have changed.

      You are right in many ways, but not quite. If the squadron miraculously teleported to Vladivostok, then it could withstand the battle with the Japanese with significantly less losses (but could not win it, of course)
      1. mmaxx April 22 2020 18: 00 New
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        The question is not a separate battle. And the outcome of the war at sea. Well, or at least bring to the difficulties of supplying the Japanese army. And so ... Well, the Japanese battleships would have moved a little north. They fought with the Russians. And the steamboats both went and would go.
        Yes, and to make at least a current repair to Russian ships after a campaign in Vladik ... this is a big question.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 18: 17 New
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          Quote: mmaxx
          Yes, and at least make repairs to Russian ships after a campaign in Vladik ...,

          no. Only rest after the campaign, and give battle closer to Vladivostok in order to be able to take the wrecked ships there. There was no chance to win
          1. ser56 April 22 2020 20: 08 New
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            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            There was no chance to win

            debatable! 2 TOE had 6 modern EDBs - Borodin, Oslyabya and Sisoy - 20 * 12dm / 40 + 4 * 10dm ... squadron 14uz ... 1 Togo detachment had 16 * 12dm / 40 + 1 * 10dm + 6 * 8dm / 40, 15th course. With such a balance of forces, the main thing is the training of personnel and the quality of leadership ... Experience has shown that “not a naval commander” Witgeft was quite capable of fighting with the Japanese with lesser forces and lower squadron speed ... which, up to Kamimura, is a detachment consisting of EDB IM1 , Navarin, DBKR Nakhimov, Russia, Stormbreaker is second only to the course, while Asama's experience shows the effect of shells from 12dm / 30 request
            1. mmaxx April 23 2020 03: 43 New
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              Russia and Stormbreaker excelled during the Japanese. Quite calmly left. And Rurik would have left if not for the "golden bullet." As the weather worsened, superiority in the course of the Vladivostok cruisers grew.
              And so ... Counted the boxes, counted the guns, counted the nodes. And how the comrades did not count how commanded and maneuvered Togo. How to organize intelligence, etc., also did not count. Throughout the war, our commanders could only do one thing: they went to the wake.
              1. ser56 April 23 2020 15: 00 New
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                Quote: mmaxx
                our commanders could only do one thing: we went to the wake.

                this is not true about Admiral Witgeft - he was able to organize an active mine setting, actively maneuvering in battle, he understood the role of speed - he even went to unfasten the system - the backlog of Poltava request Another thing - no luck - Togo did not die at a close break, but VKV - alas ...
                1. vladcub April 23 2020 17: 08 New
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                  I agree: Witgeft was not a naval commander, but almost "pulled his nose" Togo. Absurd accident and ...
                  1. ser56 April 23 2020 17: 20 New
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                    Quote: vladcub
                    was not a naval commander,

                    he wrote about himself ... he was a modest man, but very competent in his work, and indeed he wrote stories ... but in reality he is the most successful naval commander of Russia in the steam era - under his leadership, the fleet sank 2EBR, etc. . request
                  2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 23 2020 18: 42 New
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                    Quote: vladcub
                    I agree: Witgeft was not a naval commander, but almost "pulled his nose" Togo. Absurd accident and ...

                    And what? :))) The Japanese as a result of the battle damaged one single ship, Mikasa. And even that is not fatal. Russians have severe damage to the EDB except for Cesarevich and Victory. At the end of the battle, when the Russians turned away, the Japanese blocked their way to Vladivostok, and on Russian ships there was no coal to Vladivostok.
                    The second phase of the battle, when the Japanese crawled along the ranks of the Russian EDBs and, in theory, were supposed to grab the lyuli from the heart, the ratio of hits in Russian / Japanese ships was almost 10 to 1. That is, on average, the Japanese hit 5 shells on one of ours, but in the second phase, their accuracy has improved, but ours has deteriorated.
                    1. ser56 April 23 2020 19: 45 New
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                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      And even that is not fatal.

                      Seriously ? count the number of operating guns of the Civil Code at the time of the end of the battle at the squadrons?
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      The second phase of the battle, when the Japanese crawled along the ranks of the Russian EDB and, in theory, had to snatch the lyule from the heart,

                      VKV created the situation! Compare with Tsushima when the ZPR introduced a heap squadron into battle request
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      but in the second phase their accuracy improved, but ours deteriorated.

                      here it’s certainly the fault of more than one VKV request
            2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 23 2020 18: 38 New
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              Quote: ser56
              debatable!

              Undoubtedly.
              Quote: ser56
              With this balance of power, the main thing is the training of personnel and the quality of leadership ...

              Rozhdestvensky’s training was higher than that of Witgeft - statistics about getting into the Japanese to help you. On the 6th EDB of Rozhestvensky during the first 15 minutes of the battle, not being able to operate artillery on the entire side, they threw the Japanese almost as much as the 6th EDB of Vitgeft hit the Japanese for all 4 hours of the active phases of the battle in ZhM
              Quote: ser56
              Experience has shown that the “non-naval commander” Witgeft was quite capable of waging a battle with the Japanese with lesser forces and lower squadron speed ...

              Yes, the Japanese did not yet learn how to shoot as well as in Tsushima.
              1. ser56 April 23 2020 19: 49 New
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                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Rozhdestvensky’s training was higher than Vitgeft’s

                who argues, the conditions were different - the besieged fortress and squadron on the campaign, but the implementation of this training in Tsushima and the Yellow Sea does not bother you? And the implementation is just the commander ... request

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                unable to operate the artillery of the entire board

                and what prevented? hi
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                They didn’t learn how to shoot as well as in Tsushima.

                hell were different factors, incl. and notorious shells
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 24 2020 09: 09 New
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                  And what should bother me? What in LM in the Japanese hit 35-38 shells, and in Tsushima -230?
                  Both in Tsushima and in ZhM Togo was greatly substituted. But the Witgeft squadron could not provide the required number of hits, and Rozhestvensky could, only because of the weakness of the Russian shells it did not work. Shoot Rozhdestvensky shells in 1907 after the loop of Togo with a probability of 90%, Mikas would be knocked out, and Togo would be killed.
                  By and large, the difference was that the Japanese shot at Tsushima much more accurately, and their shells had great destructive power. And that’s all. And yes, in fact, Wittgeft still lost the battle, his death did not affect anything. And the smaller losses of Wittgeft are due only to the lower accuracy of the Japanese
                  1. ser56 April 24 2020 13: 24 New
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                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    And what should bother me?

                    Togo’s LM squadron was on the verge of loss of combat effectiveness - more than half of the main guns were out of order, the flagship was noticeably damaged ... this wasn’t in Tsushima ... and compare the losses of 1 and 2 TOE from MN attacks after the battle ...
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    only because of the weakness of the Russian shells did it give nothing

                    an old tale that is not confirmed - ours broke through the GK tower from the Japanese - the Japanese could not ... hi
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    and their shells had great destructive power

                    on non-armored structures ...
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    And yes, in fact, Wittgeft still lost the battle, his death did not affect anything.

                    you move away from the facts - it was the death of VKV due to a pair of varnish shots that led to a temporary loss of controllability of 1TOE!
                    By the way - then the confusion began, as after the afternoon battle in Tsushima request
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    And the smaller losses of Wittgeft are due only to the lower accuracy of the Japanese

                    you isolate one factor, but don’t see WHY there were fewer hits - the VKV did not allow itself to be shot as if in a dash, but ZPR allowed it! After he completed the loop of Togo, would he give him at least 12 bonds — who knows, and if he had given 14, then the result would almost certainly have been different ... ... request
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 24 2020 20: 30 New
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                      Quote: ser56
                      Togo’s LM squadron was on the verge of loss of combat effectiveness - more than half of the main guns were out of order

                      I really didn’t know that 5 is more than half of 16 :))) The Japanese lost exactly 5 12-dm guns in the battle in the BM. Russian ships received only slightly less damage. Although only one gun went out of order, and even then at night, the Retvisan bow tower was jammed and out of order, and at Peresvet it was badly damaged and only shot from time to time.
                      But the most important thing is that fighting efficiency is determined not by the number of guns, but by the fire performance. So, in the BM battle, the Japanese EDB fired about 5 times more shells despite the loss of XNUMX guns than in Tsushima. Such is the loss of combat readiness of the Japanese :))))
                      Quote: ser56
                      in Tsushima this was not

                      Yes, in Tsushima, the Japanese trunks did not burst. Which did not stop them with a smaller number of shells to achieve a much greater result.
                      Quote: ser56
                      an old tale that is not confirmed - ours broke through the GK tower from the Japanese - the Japanese could not ...

                      Again three errors in each word. First, ours didn’t break through any tower, and secondly, you confuse armor penetration with damage. In Tsushima, 4 shells flew into Mikasa's casemates, and only in ONE case the gun was disabled - when the Russian shell hit the gun directly. The Japanese did not penetrate the armor, but rather effectively disabled Russian artillery. already disassembled 100500 times, only for you this is a revelation.
                      And yes, the failure of 5 guns of the GK at Togo in the LM is not the merit of Russian artillery
                      Quote: ser56
                      you move away from the facts - it was the death of VKV due to a pair of varnish shots that led to a temporary loss of controllability of 1TOE!

                      The problem is that by the time Vitgeft died, the Russian squadron was already defeated. Its damage prevented the passage to Vladivostok, and the Japanese blocked their path, while the overwhelming fire advantage was on the side of the Japanese.
                      Quote: ser56
                      you isolate one factor, but do not see WHY there were fewer hits - the VKV did not allow itself to be shot as in a dash

                      If you had given yourself the trouble to read at least something about the battle in the LM, you would know that the merits of the VKV are not there. This Togo in the first part of the battle was very afraid of rapprochement with the Russian squadron, and sought to shoot it from afar. Witgeft wisely took advantage of this, no words, but he didn’t make such a gift to Rozhdestvensky. By Tsushima, he was no longer afraid of clinching with Russian ships.
                      1. ser56 April 24 2020 21: 04 New
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                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        I really didn’t know that 5 is more than half 16 :)

                        I embellished in the heat of the moment repeat but you are not an angel:
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Russian ships received only slightly less damage. Although only one weapon failed, and even then at night,
                        1 is not much less than 5? : request

                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        So, in the battle of ZhM, the Japanese EDBs, despite the loss of 5 guns, fired shells about one and a half times more than in Tsushima.

                        throwing shells to no avail - spoil guns ... one of the hypotheses of the GC exit is overheating ...
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        First, ours didn’t break through any tower,

                        even fuji? bully
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        while the overwhelming fire advantage was on the side of the Japanese.

                        bastardly, we start from the beginning ... request 16-5 = 9, 24 -1 (Sevastopol, before the battle) - 2 Retvizan = 21 ...
                        you have strange arithmetic ... bully
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        If you would give yourself the trouble to read at least something on the battle in ZhM

                        read and understand this is different ... request I had the honor to discuss with the author of a famous book about this fight ... repeat
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        You would know that the merits of the VKV are not there

                        Yes, I noticed - that there is no merit of the VKV in everything - and the EDB stumbled upon mines due to disobedience of Ivanov, etc. bully
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Witgeft wisely took advantage of this, no words

                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        then the merits of the VKV are not there

                        you already decide ... hi
                      2. Senior seaman April 24 2020 22: 23 New
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                        Quote: ser56
                        1 is not much less than 5?

                        1 and two more 2 gun turrets, which practically could not fire at the enemy.
                        Quote: ser56
                        even fuji?

                        Did Fuji have a tower? crying
                        Quote: ser56
                        16-5 = 9, 24 -1 (Sevastopol, before the battle) - 2 Retvizan = 21 ...

                        "Relight" where did they do it?
                        Two large shells hit the bow tower and damaged the horizontal rotation drive.
                        That is, the guns, as it were, are intact, but it’s impossible to direct them.
                      3. ser56 April 25 2020 15: 06 New
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                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Did Fuji have a tower?

                        good - barbet laughing
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        only you can’t direct them.

                        even taking them into account -9: 19 - it doesn’t smell like fire superiority ... request
                      4. Senior seaman April 25 2020 15: 56 New
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                        Quote: ser56
                        good - barbet

                        The cap of the barbet. If you believe Belov’s monograph from 76 to 152 mm thick. So-so achievement.
                  2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 25 2020 08: 40 New
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                    Quote: ser56
                    bastardly, started from the beginning ... request 16-5 = 9, 24 -1 (Sevastopol, before the battle) - 2 Retvizan = 21 ...
                    you have strange arithmetic ..

                    No, you just don’t want to count. At the beginning of the battle, the Japanese had 16 * 305 mm and 1 * 254 mm versus 15 * 305 mm and 8 * 254 mm, that is, from your point of view, the fire advantage was completely ours. But in fact, both our and Japanese heavy guns fired a comparable number of heavy shells, but the Japanese still had more - 636 versus 568. The Japanese reached 65 hits, we are 16. One in four.
                    But the problem is that in the second phase of the battle, when rapprochement occurred, and when the Japanese had their guns out of order, the number of hits was 6 - in Japanese ships and 45 (!!!) in Russian. That is, short (when the battle distance was reduced from 45 to 23 cables or less), the Japanese achieved 7,5 times more hits! That is, the superiority in the number of heavy guns 1TOE could not realize from the word "in general", the Japanese, in fact, beat our ships, and they almost did not answer. Although we had more heavy guns
                    Therefore, a comparison of the number of guns is generally meaningless in terms of assessing the firepower of squadrons.
                    Obviously, even if we assume that by the time of the VKV death, the number of hits in Russian ships was reduced by a multiple of the lost guns (17/12 = 1,4 times), but this is not so, then in this case, while maintaining the accuracy of the Russians at the same level , the Japanese were able to bring about 5,3 times more shells into Russian ships than they would receive.
                    If this is still not clear, and you continue to repeat the Japanese squadron about "almost lost combat readiness" - well, then I will finally understand that for you this is a matter of faith and not knowledge.
                    Quote: ser56
                    even fuji?

                    Fuji did not have towers, but there were barbets covered with 152 mm armor plates. And yes, Russian shells pierced the armor at 178 mm inclusive. There were no armor penetrations above the 178 mm EMNIP. Sense something.
                    Quote: ser56
                    read and understand this is different ..

                    Well take a look at the maneuvering schemes
                    Quote: ser56
                    I had the honor to discuss with the author of a famous book about this fight ..

                    It would be better to work with documents, honestly. You are constantly discussing with me, no use.
                    Quote: ser56
                    Yes, I noticed - that there is no merit of the VKV in everything - and the EDB stumbled upon mines due to disobedience of Ivanov, etc.

                    In general, yes.
                    Quote: ser56
                    you already decide ...

                    Everything has been determined for a long time - in my LM cycle. I believe that Witgeft maneuvered quite adequately. But he could only react to Togo’s actions, and Togo made many more mistakes in LM than in Tsushima — hence the difference in evaluating the maneuvering results.
                    And yes, Witgeft’s merit in undermining the 2nd EDB is not.
                  3. ser56 April 25 2020 15: 24 New
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                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    about from your point of view, the fire advantage was completely ours

                    purely arithmetic - 17:23 - do not agree? excluding SC ...
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    but the Japanese are still more - 636 against 568.

                    So what? what does this have to do with the number of trunks?
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    At the same time, the Japanese reached 65 hits, we are 16. One to four.

                    Japanese famous masters of deception - their weapons were destroyed from our hits ... request
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    about is short (when the battle distance was reduced from 45 to 23 cables or less), the Japanese achieved 7,5 times more hits

                    this contradicts common logic - don't you find? repeat
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    That is, the superiority in the number of heavy guns 1TOE could not realize from the word "in general", I

                    this is true, but you forgot one nuance - the Russian admiral was able to create a situation where the squadron could do this - but ZPR put his commandants in a deliberately bad situation request That the Russians fired poorly and there is a share of the guilt of the VKV, but this is another ... request

                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Therefore, a comparison of the number of guns is generally meaningless in terms of assessing the firepower of squadrons.

                    this scientific discovery must be written in the tablets of stupidity! bully
                    I agree with one thing - this is an important factor, but not the only one - the training of both the commandants and the admiral is important ...
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    You will continue to repeat the Japanese squadron about the “almost lost combat readiness” - well, then I will finally understand that for you this is a matter of faith and not knowledge.

                    your opinion is important only for you ... request
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Fuji did not have towers, but there were barbets covered with 152 mm armor plates.

                    Does it change the essence? Fuji was on the verge of an explosion ... one gun was out of order ...
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    It would be better to work with documents, honestly

                    what for? I am not a historian and do not write on these topics ... request but I know enough to observe how one half-truth is replaced by another ... request
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    In general, yes.

                    Another bike ... VKV is a miner by profession, he wrote books on mine business ... it was he who sent Ivanov to the production, but nothing to do with ... request Moreover, he specially ordered more than once ... I note - further in his career Ivanov did not shine ... request
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    But he could only react

                    if not a secret, what else could he do? The route was known in advance to everyone, his speed was less ... to tackle a la ZPR with two columns before the battle?
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    And yes, Witgeft’s merit in undermining the 2nd EDB is not.

                    nonsense...
                  4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 25 2020 15: 52 New
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                    Quote: ser56
                    this is true, but you forgot one nuance - the Russian admiral was able to create a situation where the squadron could do this - but ZPR put his commandants in a deliberately bad situation

                    It was created not by the Russian, but by the Japanese admiral. It wasn't Witgeft who made Togo slip past his ships 10 miles
                    Quote: ser56
                    Japanese famous masters of deception - their weapons were destroyed from our hits ...

                    Blessed is he who believes. Who wants to know the truth - looks at the photo and sees. I'm not talking about the fact that the Japanese lied only in the official Meiji, they wrote a secret story strictly for official use.
                    Quote: ser56
                    this contradicts common logic - don't you find?

                    "Logic is the enemy of the historian." No need to adjust the story to what seems logical to you.
                    Besides ... There are simply no other options. Even assuming the extreme case that the Japanese lied to us in everything, and that all 16 Russian hits fell in the second part of the battle, it still has 16 to 45, despite the fact that the facts of getting into our EDB were recorded on Russian ships, and not on Japanese ones. And even in this case, the Japanese at the end of the battle obviously exceeded us in firepower, even with the loss of 5 guns.
                    Quote: ser56
                    this scientific discovery must be written in the tablets of stupidity!

                    I understand that it’s hard to part with the usual cliches. But still, sometimes you need to turn on the head. You are used to reducing everything to the number of trunks, and do not want to abandon this error - you are comfortable in it. Therefore, the very obvious thing - that it is not the number of guns that is important, but the number of hits from these guns, is categorically beyond your strength.
                    Quote: ser56
                    Your opinion is only relevant to you.

                    Not only that, but that is not the point.
                    Quote: ser56
                    Does it change the essence? Fuji was on the verge of an explosion ... one gun was out of order ...

                    The same can be said of Mikas. Four hits in casemates, armor pierced several times. The Japanese stockpiled shells at the guns, had a reserve so as not to carry it far if it detonated everything ... But it did not detonate. Never. And only one gun failed. And if we had normal shells, then the story of Iwate, where with a single shell from Rurik hit 3 mm guns at once and killed 152 people would be the norm. Rurik shot, apparently, with old shells.
                    Quote: ser56
                    what for? I am not a historian and do not write on these topics.

                    You just chose a version of the story that is comfortable for you and you don’t want to know anything else.
                    Quote: ser56
                    Another bike ... VKV miner by profession, wrote books on the mine business ... it was he who sent Ivanov to the production, but nothing to do with ..

                    I described this moment in sufficient detail if you yourself do not want to mess with documents. Well, he did not order Witgeft to put up barriers in the place where the Japanese ships went.
                    Quote: ser56
                    if not a secret, what else could he do?

                    The question is not what he could do. Witgeft as a naval commander proved to be excellent in battle, I even admire him. Nevertheless, he merely used Togo's mistakes. ZPR, apparently, still forced Togo to make a mistake. So to say that VKV was superior to ZPR is impossible.
                    In both cases, the Japanese had the initiative, and the fact that Togo was much more stupid in GM than in Tsushima should not be credited to the VKV.
                    If very briefly, then Togo in LM was afraid to get close, depicting the crossing of T at a distance of 6-7 miles and lost time, and then for some reason passed by the Russian squadron, being between her and Arthur. What he then had to catch up, substituting under our fire, is precisely the result of his mistakes, and not the merit of Witgeft
                  5. ser56 April 25 2020 16: 09 New
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                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    It wasn't Witgeft who made Togo slip past his ships 10 miles

                    By no means, as far as I remember, there was damage to the Japanese request
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    I'm not talking about the fact that the Japanese lied only in the official Meiji, they wrote a secret story strictly for official use.

                    You have confirmed my thesis, no more ... request
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    "Logic is the enemy of the historian." No need to adjust the story to what seems logical to you.

                    an increase in hits with a decrease in firing distance is a commonplace, but for Russians, this logic does not work? bully
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Besides ... There are simply no other options.

                    Of course, Russians fell at a great distance, but stopped at a shorter distance ... Russia is the birthplace of elephants - the only option ... hi I’m doing a little physics, and when I find such a disagreement with logic, I’m just happy (very rarely request ) - there is an opportunity to really find something new ... repeat But our historian does not need riddles ... bully

                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Well, he did not order Witgeft to put up barriers in the place where the Japanese ships went.

                    1) he did not have the right to officially place in neutral waters ... request
                    2) Think about why COM took up perikidny shooting, and did not put mines on the approaches to the shooting - and he was advised ...

                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Witgeft as a naval commander proved to be excellent in battle, I even admire him.

                    I absolutely agree, alas, such a point of view is rare drinks
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    In both cases, the Japanese had the initiative, and the fact that Togo was much more stupid in GM than in Tsushima should not be credited to the VKV.

                    you contradict yourself again - VKV was able to take advantage of mistakes, ZPR - on the contrary!
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Togo. ZPR, apparently, still forced Togo to make a mistake

                    even in this case, ZPR made it even worse with his bunch, he shouldn’t have to lose his turn from 11 knots, but give at least 12 Borodinians, and better 14 - the rest would have pulled themselves up if possible ...
                  6. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 25 2020 18: 46 New
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                    Okay i think it's time to finish
                    Quote: ser56
                    By no means, as far as I remember, there was damage to the Japanese

                    I won’t even ask what kind of damage the Japanese could make them 10 miles behind the Russian squadron :)))
                    Quote: ser56
                    You have confirmed my thesis, no more ...

                    So far I have confirmed only one thesis - that if you do not like some facts, you ignore them. Your thesis that the Japanese lied is not confirmed by anything other than your desire that it be so. When you are told that in addition to officialdom (which, of course, hides the inconvenient for many Japanese people), their damage is confirmed by internal documents for official use, you simply ignore it
                    Quote: ser56
                    an increase in hits with a decrease in firing distance is a commonplace, but for Russians, this logic does not work?

                    The growth of hits with decreasing distance is commonplace only, ceteris paribus. But the conditions were not equal - it is known that a ship that is subjected to shelling loses accuracy. You don’t even think about the accuracy of the Russian commandants who could spoil 45 hits with heavy shells. You know that with decreasing distances, accuracy increases - and the rest does not bother you :))))
                    Quote: ser56
                    Of course, Russians fell at a great distance, but stopped at a shorter distance ... Russia is the birthplace of elephants - the only option ...

                    For you - yes, because, I repeat, instead of understanding and looking for logic in seemingly illogical facts, you ignore these facts.
                    Quote: ser56
                    I’m doing a little physics, and when I find such a disagreement with logic, I’m just happy (very rarely

                    All physics after wave-particle duality is a mismatch with logic. But you are somehow strange doing it, right word. Physicists, however, were smart enough to admit what they could not explain, not to ignore it.
                    Quote: ser56
                    he had no right to officially place in neutral waters ...

                    Could order unofficially, no problem. But - he didn’t order, otherwise he wouldn’t play indignation with the arbitrariness of the minzag commander - there was no one to play before, that would make sense. And indeed, if all this had been conceived in advance, the explanations would have been completely different.
                    Quote: ser56
                    you contradict yourself again - VKV was able to take advantage of mistakes, ZPR - on the contrary!

                    ZPR forced Togo to make a mistake, and took advantage of it - Togo Loop. The VKV did not force Togo, but also took advantage of his mistake when he was forced to catch up with the Russians. Where did you see the contradiction?
                  7. ser56 April 25 2020 21: 04 New
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                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    what kind of damage could the Japanese make them

                    propose to consider Togo a fool?
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    that the Japanese lied, is not confirmed by anything

                    Seriously? they lied about the sinking of the EDB, about getting into the trunks, but they couldn’t tell about the number of hits ... you have funny logic ... request
                    .
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    You just ignore it

                    Well, yes, they don’t lie in secret documents ... laughing
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    it is known that a ship that is under fire loses accuracy.

                    but among the Japanese it was growing ... bully
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    You ignore these facts.

                    by no means - just the facts must be able to verify ... request we are talking about a turret GK - a decrease in their accuracy is probably more likely at long distances - due to violation of sighting lines due to shaking volleys or hits ... request
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    All physics after wave-particle duality is a mismatch with logic.

                    I see no reason to discuss that you don’t understand ... request
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    But you are somehow doing it oddly, right of words

                    you don’t even know what I'm doing, but giving grades is funny ... bully
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    But - he didn’t order, otherwise he wouldn’t play indignation with the arbitrariness of the minzag commander - there was no one to play before, that would make sense.

                    you are mistaken - VKV was an experienced staffman and was able to translate arrows!
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    And indeed, if all this had been conceived in advance, the explanations would have been completely different.

                    It was the VKV that ordered Ivanov to go on an active staging!
                    and the roots of everything that is said about VKV here:
                    N.O. von Essen:
                    “Now the late Admiral Wilhelm Karlovich Witgeft was an honest and well-intentioned person, a tireless worker, but, unfortunately, his work was always stupid, and always all his orders led to all kinds of misunderstandings and even misfortunes. Having served in the Navy for many years, Admiral Wittgeft was not a sailor at all, let alone a military man. In childhood, as he himself told, his father intended him for missionary work, and perhaps he would be more capable of this than for maritime service, since he could not be denied the possession of the word of mouth and a pen. Witgeft got into the maritime service as if by misunderstanding, and all his service was a complete misunderstanding. Consisting for several years as chief of staff at Admiral Alekseev ... Vitgeft enjoyed great confidence from Admiral Alekseev because of his hard work and tirelessness; but the same Admiral Alekseev constantly argued with him and was angry for his views and judgments, and Vitgeft was stubborn and intractable, and these two qualities, I think, were the main reason for his influence on the governor. Among the personnel of the fleet, Admiral Witgeft did not enjoy sympathy. On the contrary, he was mistrusted and even hostile. Everyone knew that only thanks to the stubbornness and folly of Witgeft, our inpatients in Korea and Shanghai were not promptly warned and withdrawn, and with the outbreak of war, we thus lost the Varangian and Korean and lost our participation in the Manjur war (hospital in Shanghai ), and also lost transport with military and other supplies ("Manjuria"), which was going to Arthur before the war and taken by a Japanese cruiser. Witgeft, stubbornly denying the possibility of declaring war, did nothing to timely recall the inpatients and warn the transport of the political situation. Finally, the unfortunate attack for us by the Japanese destroyers on the night of January 26-27 can also be partly attributed to Admiral Witgeft’s fault. ”
                    gossip and speculation raised to absolute ... Essen about a broken machine 12 dm guns is also categorical?

                    Well, I recommend a discussion:
                    "Telegram .... [everything as usual - Sergey] .... May 4, 1904 No. 9 (received at Mukden on May 6)

                    After ascertaining the nature of the movement of the enemy’s large vessels in a week, he took advantage of the absence period near the destroyers and the cloudiness, on May 1 he sent the Amur, under the escort of 6 destroyers walking in front with trawls, to place a fifty-minute mine can across the usual path of enemy ships, in the distance from 10 to 11 miles offshore, two miles east of the gauge.
                    Amur brilliantly carried out the order <...> The mines were placed 11 feet below the low water level, with the expectation of an explosion, closer to the keel.

                    The following is a description of the paint bombings. But about Ivanov’s disobedience - not a word, quite the contrary! "
                    http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?pid=281986
                  8. ser56 April 25 2020 21: 04 New
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                    Report of the Amur Mine Transport Commander, Rear Admiral Loshchinsky, Head of the Coastal Defense Detachment. June 4, 1904
                    Based on the resolution of Your Excellency on the headquarters of Temporary I.D., the senior flagship and Commander of the Pacific Squadron dated May 3 of this year, No. 159, I’m reporting that, since April 26, I’m fully prepared for an immediate exit to the sea for mine laying banks and having received on May 1 at the beginning of 2 o’clock in the afternoon favorable information about the position of the enemy ships blocking us, at 2 hours 25 minutes in the afternoon, with the permission of Your Excellency, anchored and set sail, having 50 ball mines prepared. Having passed the boom and other barriers of the raid, he entered the line of the exit gauge, where destroyers with trawls were waiting for me, which had indicated their place in the camp formation beforehand.
                    The first pair, from the destroyers "Courageous" and "Slender" at the beginning of the exit, and the second from the destroyers "Fast" and "Angry", 1 miles south of the first pair, along the same line of the exit target. The destroyers "Attentive" and "Hardy" had no trawls to guard the unit entrusted to me. Entering the first pair, he raised his signal “to have 2 nodes of the course”; following this, fearing that the deeper-seated destroyers of the 2st detachment might run into enemy mines, ordered them to enter my wake. The front pair of destroyers with a trawl at this time moved south, at a speed of about 10-1 knots, as was previously agreed. On the beam of the enemy’s firewall, which sank at the reef of the Bay of White Wolf, the trawler at the destroyers “Courageous” and “Slender” burst; immediately ordered them to remove the trawl and go ahead of the 5nd pair of trawling destroyers for reconnaissance and coverage of the hidden part of the horizon behind the Liaoteshan Peninsula, and he continued to follow the same course behind the trawl of the 6nd pair, raising them with a signal “to have 2 knots go. "
                    Soon, along the passage parallel to Cape Liaoteshan, the trawl burst at the second pair of destroyers. He ordered them to remove the trawls and go forward. Having ahead, horizontally, a small haze and not seeing the enemy ships, he went full speed, raised the signal 17 knots, having a course along the exit target. After going 6, and then 8 miles from the Port Arthur lighthouse, i.e., the location indicated for me to set up, I decided to take advantage of the circumstances that favored me and put the mine can further, namely, at a distance of 100-110 cable from the Golden Mountain , where, according to my observations, recently the largest enemy ships blocking us have most often stayed, and therefore went further and, at a distance of 10 miles from Port Arthur lighthouse, raised a signal: “suddenly turn 8 points to everyone left”, t. e., on the course of Ost. Two miles lay on this course, after which, on a signal, everyone suddenly turned 8 points to the right, again, together with the destroyers, lay down on a course parallel to the exit target, reduced the course to 6 knots and ordered the destroyers to stay ahead of the transport. According to the performance of the last signal by the destroyers, he began setting up a minefield.
                    When setting the second half of the third dozen mines, smoke was seen on the left beam, and then, with a slightly bursting haze, the silhouette of the ship; at the same time, Japanese telegrams began to be received on the wireless telegraph. I believe that they were big cruisers who, before my departure, retired to SO and, obviously, were now returning to the view of Port Arthur to the place where they always kept.
                    Having set all 50 minutes, and everyone stood up successfully, along the line of 12 '/ cable, across the course of the enemy ships, turned together to W. Immediately on the turn to the next course I again saw smoke ahead in the nose. I believe that it was smoke from the squadron of armadillos that was holding onto Liaoteshan. The presence of enemy ships almost on the traverse with me gave me confidence that I was not mistaken in choosing a place for setting up a mine can.
                    Departing from the place of laying mines for 2 miles and counting himself at the exit gauge, lay down on it, indicated the course change of the destroyers as a signal and went back to Arthur. By signal, the destroyers of the 1st detachment were ordered to go to the Amur wake, and the destroyers of the 5nd detachment had ahead of themselves. The whole way back was in full swing. Arriving at the sight of Port Arthur, he released the destroyers into the harbor, and he himself raised the signal "orders are executed." At 25 hours and XNUMX minutes in the afternoon, he anchored and moored in the same place.
                    The construction of this minefield, which yielded such quick and great results as the death of two first-class enemy battleships, imposes on me a moral obligation to ask for petitions from Your Excellency to reward the officers and crew of the ship entrusted to me for their youthful work, performed with special calm, impeccable endurance and rare zeal from each individual.
                    The unity of spirit in the desire to carry out the work in such a way that it served the benefit and glory of the adored Monarch and Russia and would be retribution to the enemy for Petropavlovsk, led us all in the process of carrying out preparatory work for the manufacture of mines and vehicles in their combat formulation, as well as in collecting information about the movement of enemy ships and the distances to them to select a suitable moment for the exit and place for the bank. Both this and the other gave me the opportunity to justify the trust of Your Excellency in me and my ship, the personnel of which were trained in combat missions under your flag and in direct command of a number of mine installations in January and February.
                    Presenting with these award sheets to the below-named officers, I take the liberty of asking for the award of the highest orders for military merits, which gave such important results for the further course of hostilities. I ask you to award the Molodetsky team with badges recognizing the Military Order and increase them to higher articles and ranks, as shown in the list attached hereto.
                    The destroyers accompanying me, by their consonant actions, attention during maneuvering, accurate and excellent execution of my signals, greatly contributed to the success of the work entrusted to me. I also consider it my duty to ask the petitions of Your Excellency for the rewarding of the commanders, officers and teams of these courts.
                    2nd-Class Captain Ivanov
                    http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?id=3273&p=16
                  9. ser56 April 25 2020 21: 07 New
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                    I repeat my comment 10 years ago, I hope to hear ...
                    "now about VKV and Amur:
                    "Sea Mine War at Port Arthur. V. Ya. Peasants" http://wunder-waffe.ru/Magazine/BKM/rjvminen/07.htm
                    “Four hours after the departure of the Commander-in-Chief, Rear Admiral Witgeft gathers a meeting of flagships and commanders of ships of rank 1-2. Later, until his death, this admiral practices collegial management to discuss all the most important issues at the meetings. The first question addressed on April 22 defensive minefields in front of the entrance to the internal raid, to prevent blocking the passage of firewalls.The majority spoke in favor of the inappropriateness of such a fence, and the question was removed. tocol of the meeting was: "At the first opportunity to put the minefield with transport" Cupid. " Time, location, number of mines was not indicated. Beginning April 26, Amur was ready to go on stage. "1) it is striking that the desire of the VKV to use collective intelligence put him on the line ... what's wrong with that?
                    2) it was established that the idea was definitely not Ivanova ....
                    Further...
                    “To cover the landing of the forces, the main forces of the Japanese fleet began a close blockade of Port Arthur. To do this, several detachments, replacing each other, cruised all daytime due to the fortress. Onshore observation posts of Golden Mountain, Liaoteshan and others monitored the movement of the enemy’s blocking forces. However, At first it was conducted without a system and a unified leadership. As the Russian official history of the naval war noted: "Meanwhile, Admiral Witgeft, who had just joined the command of the squadron in emergency situations and anyaty many meetings, not yet had time to settle in and focus setting so to give appropriate directives observation posts. ""
                    Well, it’s necessary to run into the VKV ... as without this ... an old song ...
                    "The squadron officers noticed that the Japanese blocking forces follow the same route daily. The Amur commander, captain of the 2nd rank, F.N. Ivanov, applied for special orders to the observation posts, and it was given by Wittgeft. It said: Amur transport will have to go to sea as soon as possible and put 10 min barriers at S at the entrance light range at S, and therefore it is suggested that duty officers of the signal station (Zolotaya Gora) not monitor the traffic closely friend, collecting information from the surrounding posts, p. when the officer on duty, in accordance with the location of the enemy and his movement, will find that the Amur transport can fulfill the aforementioned order, to inform the Admiral Loshchinsky on the boat for transport and " Amur". "
                    1) what we see is normal practice - the officer took the initiative - how best to complete the task, and the commander (VKV) supported his initiative ...
                    2) I highlight the range in red ...

                    “As a result, with the help of bearings taken simultaneously from different posts, the path of movement of the Japanese blocking forces was more accurately determined. However, Admiral Witgeft considered it possible to set mines no further than 5-6 miles from the coast of the Liaoteshan Peninsula. Not counting the right to violate international law of the sea. But and this place was still outside the borders of the 3-mile strip of its territorial waters. Witgeft gave the choice of exit time to Rear Admiral Loshchinsky, the head of the mobile and mine defense. "Everything is clear - VKV as a competent staff officer shared the answer vennost .... but the other admiral is also not a miss ...: D
                    “On this day, Lieutenant Gadd was on duty at the signaling station of the Golden Mountain. He collected data from other posts and concluded that, according to the conditions of visibility and the location of Japanese ships, the laying of mines is possible. At 13.30 he reported this to the headquarters of the mine defense on“ Brave ” and on “Amur.” Rear Admiral Loshchinsky, in spite of the authority granted to him in this matter, did not dare to take responsibility and issue an order to go to sea. He reported to the squadron headquarters about the favorable moment. armadillo "Sevasto Paul "conveyed:" The chief of the squadron ordered regarding the expulsion of Amur to be guided by the location of the enemy ships. ""
                    1) There is an OPERATION of the entire squadron
                    2) the decision was personally made by the VKV and gave precise instructions!
                    Further:
                    “Instead of organizing the launch of ships at sea, Loshchinsky calls the Amur commander and goes with him to the next meeting. Upon arrival, he again reports to Vntgeft and asks for permission to enter the Amur. The latter replied:“ Mine defense is yours case, and if you find it useful and convenient, then send it. "Only at 14.25 on the flagship battleship" Sevastopol "the signal rises:" "Cupid" to go as directed. Go carefully. ""
                    1) VKV does not replace subordinates and does not remove responsibility from them - which speaks well of him!
                    2) When the subordinate admiral began to drag out - VKV took responsibility for the order! And still talk about his indecision ...: D
                    further - how not to kick VKV ...
                    “With the receipt of the signal, Amur entered an external raid, where six destroyers were already waiting for it. By order of the captain of the 2nd rank Ivanov lined up in the warrant. The first pair was ahead with the trawl: destroyers Skryy and Angry, behind them at a distance of 2 miles - “Brave” and “Slender.” Amur himself followed their trawl. The mine guard in the wake followed without destroyer destroyers Attentive and Hardy. The first pair had 5-6 knots, the second commander Amur ordered 10 knots to move. As a result, the trawl of this pair immediately burst. When Amur having left in a 10-knot course, he caught up with the first pair, the captain of rank 2 Ivanov also ordered an increase in the course. There was a break in the second trawl. Left without trawls, the mine loader increased its speed to 17 knots. The horizon was closed by a haze and no enemy ships were visible. In contrast from the admirals, the Amur commander showed complete fearlessness. Neglecting the mine danger and meeting with an armadillo, two armored cruisers and two enemy cruisers, the captain of the 2nd rank ignored his timid commanders. At full speed, Amur flew over the fencing site designated by Wittgeft. "
                    1) those. increasing the speed of minesweepers is good ... just WHY? where so drove? would you be blown up?
                    2) and precautionary measures of VKV - this is so - timidity ....
                    Further :
                    “Ivanov decided to seize the opportunity and place mines where, according to observations and calculations, the route of blocking forces passed, that is, 10,5-11 miles from the Golden Mountain. Having arrived at a point 10 miles from the Golden Mountain. Ivanov ordered to raise the signal : “Suddenly turn everything to the left by 8 points.” After passing 2 miles with this course, Ivanov turned 8 points to the right, “Amur” reduced the speed to 6 knots and, after the destroyers came forward, began setting the mines. "
                    yes, but it was higher
                    “It said:“ The Amur transport is to go out to sea as soon as possible and put 10 min of barrage at S at the entrance light range on S ”
                    I'm confused ... isn't that about one thing? Or is there another myth about VKV?
                    well off ...
                    “Arriving at an external raid, Ivanov released the guard ships and after them entered the harbor at 17.25. A signal was raised on the flagship battleship:“ Admiral expresses his particular pleasure. ”However, when the Amur commander reported to Vitgeft that the barrage was farther, "Admiral did not show" pleasure. In principle, the failure to execute the order should have been brought to justice, but Wilhelm Karlovich did not dare to do this, and subsequent events showed how right Ivanov was. "
                    something about how much more maritime the conversation is no longer ....
                    “Due to the fact that the success of the May 1 affair was unexpected and impressive, Rear Admiral Vitgeft left without consequences a violation of the order by the transport commander about the location of the min. The death of Hatsuse showed the correctness of Captain Ivanov, rank 2, and not the squadron commander, and the winners are not judged. Witgeft turned to the Commander-in-Chief with a request to award the Amur commander with a gold sword “For Courage”, to award seven officers and to allocate 20 insignia of the military order for the lower ranks. ”
                    repeat - WHY? because VKV awarded without stinting ....
                    but it’s like the roots of the myth of VKV:
                    "Alekseev also petitioned the emperor for the production of Rear Admiral Witgeft as vice admiral. But the production was temporarily delayed" until the production of senior rear admirals who occupied prominent posts, although they were not in the theater, were warriors. "
                    The VKV frankly threw it and then hung it up differently .... in general it’s banal - intrigue, but how tenacious .... "
                  10. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 25 2020 22: 27 New
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                    All this is fine, but there is a very simple fact - the fact of violation of the order was reflected as in the report of F.N. Ivanova V.K. Vitgeft, tAk and in the report V.K. Vitgeft - to the governor, and therefore can not cause doubt.
                    So - alas.
                    If this was the idea of ​​the VKV, a secret order to Ivanov, then he would not have substituted Ivanov - both Ivanov and Vitgeft would have written in their reports that they had put mines 8 miles away. Ah, not at eight but at 11? Oh, they were mistaken, well, everything happens on the sea, you know the fog ... Or they would have written that because of the same fog the mines were mistakenly put at a greater distance than planned.
                    It was the translation of the arrows on Ivanov that proves that there was no secret, and he really violated the order
                2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 25 2020 22: 23 New
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                  Read the report
                  Quote: ser56
                  Having passed 6, and then 8 miles from Port Arthur Lighthouse, i.e., approximately the place indicated to me for staging, I decided take advantage of the circumstances that have favored me and put the mine can further, namely at a distance of 100-110 cable from the Golden Mountain, where, according to my observations, recently most of the time large enemy ships blocking us have been kept

                  A clear indication that Ivanov was self-willed.
              2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 25 2020 22: 20 New
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                Quote: ser56
                propose to consider Togo a fool?

                the fact that he made a mistake in maneuvering does not make him a fool.
                Quote: ser56
                Seriously? they lied about the sinking of the EDB, about getting into the trunks, but they couldn’t tell about the number of hits ... you have funny logic ...

                In which particular place of a secret story did they lie about the sinking of the EDB? Who told you that they lied about the trunks?
                Quote: ser56
                Well, yes, they don’t lie in secret documents ...

                No, they don’t lie. They did top secret for internal use strictly. She was never supposed to be released to the public at all, this is strictly for the academy of naval officers. And there is a sea of ​​reports, that is, damage to Japanese ebras is confirmed by reports of those who repaired them up to the consumption of materials, etc. Such things, and even in such a volume, it just does not make sense to juggle.
                Quote: ser56
                I see no reason to discuss that you don’t understand

                That is, as soon as it turned out that I was a little familiar with physics - right back :)
                Quote: ser56
                and the roots of everything that is said about VKV here:

                The roots are just a little lower in your report.
              3. ser56 April 26 2020 17: 08 New
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                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                That is, as soon as it turned out that I was a little familiar with physics - right back :)

                1) as Professor Rodimov said - you cannot know all physics, but I will ask in the exam ... bully
                2) I do not see the point in the discussion about those branches of physics that you do not know, but I know professionally ... repeat
              4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 26 2020 19: 08 New
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                Quote: ser56
                I don’t see the point in the discussion about those branches of physics that you don’t know, but I know professionally ..

                You see, a professional is different from an amateur in that he is able to explain complex things in his profession in simple words. So I would absolutely not mind getting an answer on wave-particle duality, so to speak, “for dummies” :)))
              5. ser56 April 26 2020 19: 37 New
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                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                on wave-particle duality,

                can you imagine 6 dimensional space for example? hi the term you specified from the same opera ... request
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                he is able to explain the complex in his profession in simple words.

                alas, it is necessary to explain in terms that not everyone understands ... request
                for example, the cathode’s emissivity depends on the density and temperature of the plasma that is created on the surface of the dielectric plate after a sliding discharge ... is everything clear? but it’s easier not to say ... request
              6. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 26 2020 21: 10 New
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                Quote: ser56
                can you imagine 6 dimensional space for example?

                Easily.
                Quote: ser56
                all clear? but it’s easier not to say ...

                As I said, a professional is always able to explain the issues of his competence in simple words :)))
        2. ser56 April 26 2020 17: 12 New
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          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          The roots are just a little lower in your report.

          I’ve been used to it for a long time that people don’t want to read or understand the text read .... request
          1) The idea of ​​an active MoH was put forward at a meeting led by the GVH
          2) The reconnaissance of the movement paths was made by the Gadd on the orders of the VKV
          3) access to the sea was at the direct direction of the VKV, through the subordinate Loschinsky, etc.
        3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 26 2020 19: 12 New
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          Quote: ser56
          I’ve been used to it for a long time that people don’t want to read or understand the text read ....

          Sergey, the problem is that everything you write
          Quote: ser56
          The idea of ​​an active MoH was put forward at a meeting led by the GVH
          2) The reconnaissance of the movement paths was made by the Gadd on the orders of the VKV
          3) access to the sea was at the direct direction of the VKV, through the subordinate Loschinsky, etc.

          It doesn’t cancel the fact that the VKV ordered the erection of the fence 8 miles away, where it simply did not make sense. He picked up the idea of ​​a minefield, but was afraid to put it where necessary, and therefore it makes no sense to say that it was thanks to Witgeft that Yasima and Hatsuse were destroyed.
        4. ser56 April 26 2020 19: 32 New
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          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          where it just didn't make sense.

          1) any business consists of stages .... request
          2) we read: "It said:" The Amur transport is to go to sea as soon as possible and 10 miles from the entrance lighthouse put 50 min of obstacle on the line of entrance lights on S, "
          3) Lieutenant Gadd found the Japanese track ....
          4) "Coming to a point 10 miles from Golden Mountain. Ivanov ordered to raise the signal: "Suddenly, turn everyone 8 left to the left." After going 2 miles on this course, Ivanov turned 8 points to the right, the Amur reduced the speed to 6 knots, and after the destroyers came forward, began setting the mines. "
          5) I am not a sailor, I can’t do the laying ... request but if you take away from 10 miles “Having set all 50 minutes, and everyone got up successfully, along the line of 12 '/ cable,” 8,8 miles will remain ... we will take into account the accuracy of the observation and request
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          that it was thanks to Witgeft that Yasima and Hatsuse were destroyed.
          see above - his contribution is noticeable, if not determining ... request
        5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 26 2020 21: 21 New
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          Quote: ser56
          It said: “Amur transport will have to go out to sea as soon as possible and put 10 min barriers at S at the entrance lights range on S

          It was. However, then Admiral Witgeft gave a general directive indicating the place of laying mines 8-9 miles from the entrance (lighthouse) setting time - at the discretion of Loschinsky. Moreover, all this is said in the same source that the Peasants used. The source, by the way, finds a logical explanation for Witgeft’s desire
        6. ser56 April 27 2020 19: 32 New
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          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          However, then Admiral Witgeft gave a general directive indicating the location of mines 8-9 miles from the entrance (lighthouse

          and if you add the line length of mines? request
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          production time - at the discretion of Loschinsky.

          VKV is a normal admiral - he does not replace subordinates and this is right! request
          And he does not imagine himself as the smartest, as some admirals, is able to listen, but also to order to execute ...
          but according to Essen - bad ... repeat Oh, these intrigues and pride ... request
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          the clerk, by the way, finds a logical explanation for Witgeft’s desire

          1) Speculation and intrigue ... see the beginning of this post ...
          2) pay attention to the first statement -10 miles!
          3) The source acknowledges that the Ministry of Health in any case, the violation is in neutral waters ... request
          4) Sorry for the replay -
          Quote: ser56
          The Amur transport will have to go to sea as soon as possible and at a distance of 10 miles from the entrance lighthouse
          + meeting decision -
          Quote: ser56
          therefore, it is proposed that duty officers of the signal station (Golden Mountain) follow carefully following the movement of the enemy, collecting information from the surrounding villagesc. when the duty officer, in accordance with the location of the enemy and his movement, finds that the Amur transport can fulfill the aforementioned order, report to the Otmazhnoy boat for reporting to Admiral Loshchinsky and the Amur transport.

          don't you find that the VKV has no word about the bombing of the PA?
          If you didn’t read the 2010 Tsushima branch, then I’ll repeat my thought - this is intrigue! Even with the living and at the post of acting The commander of the VKV did not receive anything for super success! And after death they poured mud at all - see Essen! It seems that the VKV was in the team of the Viceroy, he got into circulation (most likely it is ZPR as the GMH slowed down the production of VVV to the vice admirals on the proposal of the Viceroy) and the new ones (Essen, Grigorovich and others) used all the methods in the struggle for power - alas, this is corny ... request
  • Saxahorse April 24 2020 22: 13 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Both in Tsushima and in ZhM Togo was greatly substituted. But Witgeft’s squadron wasn’t able to provide the required number of hits, and Rozhestvensky could not, only because of the weakness of the Russian shells it did not work.

    Sorry, but this is complete nonsense. Rozhdestvensky did not engage in rifle preparation of the squadron in general from the word in any way. The whole difference in the number of hits is due solely to the fact that under Tsushima Togo sharply reduced the battle distance.

    Tales about the weakness of Russian shells from the same opera as about worthless, rusty ships .. As you know, everything hinders a bad dancer ..
    1. Comrade April 25 2020 02: 04 New
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      Quote: Saxahorse
      Rozhdestvensky did not engage in rifle preparation of the squadron in general from the word in any way.

      You mixed up Rozhdestvensky with Wigteft, that’s really for combat training scored.
      We have data on the battleship "Eagle", for practical firing he was taken over the state 40 12 ", 180 6 ", 300 75 mm, 1 500 47 mm and 2 850 37 mm practical shots.
      While parked in Nossi Be during three training firing, the battleship fired all forty 12 "training shells and a number of smaller caliber shells. How many and which ones are not known to us, however, according to the senior officer of the battleship" Eagle "captain rank 2 captain K. L. Schwede “the entire stock of practical (cast-iron) shells on our battleship did not have time to shoot, some of them, about 1/3, remained.”
      Rozhestvensky did not forget about stem firing.
      On the September 23, 1904 battleship Oryol, 1 three-line rifle cartridges of Berdan were used up, then another 386 rounds were used up in Kamranga.
      In addition, tentatively in Nossi-Bae, three more firing of Berdan cartridges was carried out, and the total number of cartridges used during stem firing is approaching 8 346 pcs.
      For comparison, in addition to the caliber training firing, the Mikasa battleship also practiced barrel firing, and in preparation for the meeting of the Russian fleet, it was spent 9 066 rifle cartridges.

      And now let’s recall the results of the training caliber shooting of Togo’s battleships, which took place on April 25, 1905. The fire was fired on an island with sizes from 24 to 30 meters in length and 10,5 - 12 meters in width. The range during the shooting was reduced from 3 to 000 yards. Accuracy amounted to 2 '' guns 62,5 % (8/5).

      It would be appropriate to compare the accuracy of the Mikasa with the accuracy achieved by the bow tower of Prince Suvorov. According to the letter of the first mined officer of the ship, Lieutenant P.A. Vyrubov of the 1st, during the third training shooting in Madagascar on January 19, 1905, five of the six training shells fired by the bow caliber of the main caliber hit the shield (83 %).
      1. ser56 April 25 2020 15: 29 New
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        Quote: Comrade
        with Wigteft, he really scored for combat training.

        there were reasons for this - the squadron was engaged in the affairs of the fortress ... there is his fault in this, but aren't the ship commanders equally guilty, at least?
      2. Saxahorse April 26 2020 20: 49 New
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        Quote: Comrade
        We have data on the battleship "Eagle", for practical firing it was taken over the state 40 12 ", 180 6" ...

        Did you make such a discovery !? It is easy to recall that on all ships of the squadron, 20% of practical shells were loaded in excess of full-time ammunition. Plus, a separate vehicle with practical shells was reported to go with the squadron, the one that received damage after the collision and was forgotten by Rozhestvensky in Libava. The same shells from which they eventually sent to Vladivostok.

        As a result, all preparation was reduced to the very minimum. You can recall the same Levitsky that most of the practical shells were eventually brought to Tsushima unused .. Three firing from Madagascar .. Barrel, blanks, practical. The results are lower than the plinth, but it didn’t excite anyone, Rozhdestvensky at that moment bombed Peter with telegrams asking for his resignation. This courtier upstart didn’t even think that he really would have to fight, the fall of Port Arthur was a shock to him.

        It should be noted that Nebogatov in the course of his hasty, catching up campaign, combat training devoted ten times more time. For example, he was the first in the Russian fleet to organize firing at maximum distances of 35 or more cable. And the first one discovered big problems with rangefinders.

        I already wrote that any of the younger flagships of the RI squadron would have conducted the Tsushima battle an order of magnitude better. A Christmas ordinary court upstart who destroyed the squadron entrusted to him and, as a result, the country purely for career reasons.
      3. The comment was deleted.
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 25 2020 08: 47 New
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    Quote: Saxahorse
    Sorry, but this is complete nonsense. Rozhdestvensky did not engage in rifle preparation of the squadron in general from the word in any way.

    Very fat trolling
    1. Saxahorse April 26 2020 20: 51 New
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      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      Very fat trolling

      Are you the type of reasoned answer? Very in your style .. laughing
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 26 2020 21: 07 New
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      So long ago answered, the point of repeating and feeding the troll?
  • rytik32 April 27 2020 15: 37 New
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    The number of hits in LM and Tsushima is easily explained by the following factors:
    1. The distance of the battle. Under Tsushima is clearly less.
    2. The number of trunks. The 2nd squadron was more numerous than the 1st.
    3. The duration of the battle.
    For shells, I advise you to read the series of articles
    https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/55381.html
    https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/58642.html
    https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/58524.html
    https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/55723.html
    https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/56157.html
    https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/56681.html
    https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/56353.html
    https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/55860.html
    https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/69262.html
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 27 2020 16: 07 New
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      Quote: rytik32
      The number of hits in LM and Tsushima is easily explained by the following factors:
      1. The distance of the battle. Under Tsushima is clearly less.

      Let’s nevertheless clarify that Rozhestvensky’s head EDBs (maybe the first 6, maybe less, but certainly not with all the guns, since Mikasa was on a fairly sharp nasal angle) threw at least 15 hits in the first 25 minutes of the battle (minimum - because only hits are taken into account, the time of which was recorded by the Japanese, that is, there could have been more) from a distance of roughly 45 cables. At the same time, the excitement at sea was much stronger than in the sea.
      I also remind you that the Russians 6 EDB in the FM during the first hour of intense fire of the second phase, when the distance fell from 40 to, roughly 23 cables reached the EMNIP as many as 9 hits or less.
      1. rytik32 April 28 2020 02: 30 New
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        In addition to the number of hits, you should look at the quality. According to current data (links I posted above), only 6 to 9 large shells hit Mikasu at Tsushima. And in the Yellow Sea?

        In my opinion, you exaggerated the distance in the plot of Tsushima. For 45 cables, Mikasa probably also came up with Nikolai 1. But between the flagships there were 32-27 cables, i.e. about the same as in LM.

        It’s just not very correct to compare the accuracy of shooting at the beginning and at the end of the battle. People get tired, devices go astray ... Count already then hits for comparison of getting to Mikasu in the last 15 minutes of the battle)))
      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 29 2020 16: 40 New
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        Quote: rytik32
        In addition to the number of hits, you should look at the quality. According to current data (links I posted above), only 6 to 9 large shells hit Mikasu at Tsushima. And in the Yellow Sea?

        The substantiation of 6-9 large-caliber shells in Mikasu raises a big question - both the SSI and Campbell talk about 10 hits, but somehow I'm still more inclined to trust them. And in the Yellow Sea - 9 305 mm and 3 * 254 mm. But the question is not this, but the fact that to determine the quality of shooting you need to take the percentage of hits, but it is impossible to figure it out by Rozhestvensky’s EDB.
        Again - 5 of them slammed into Mikasa during just 15 minutes of the battle, when the number of shots of Russian heavy guns a priori could not be large
        Quote: rytik32
        In my opinion, you exaggerated the distance in the plot of Tsushima. For 45 cables, Mikasa probably also came up with Nikolai 1. But between the flagships there were 32-27 cables, i.e. about the same as in LM.

        Yes, it is likely. But there are a lot of ambiguities, since the Japanese say that we started shooting from about 8000 meters or less, that is, 44 cables, Campbell - from 9 thousand yards, and we - that from 32 cables. But the second phase of the battle in the LM took place at shorter distances, and there was no wind of 4-5 points.
        Quote: rytik32
        It’s just not very correct to compare the accuracy of shooting at the beginning and at the end of the battle. People get tired, devices go astray ... Count already then hits for comparison of getting to Mikasu in the last 15 minutes of the battle)))

        Yes, how to say? It is a pleasure to discuss with you, the arguments you give are completely reasonable and correct. But keep in mind that during the second phase the fatigue did not prevent the Japanese from more than doubling the effectiveness of firing from heavy guns - even though 5 of them failed. (19 hits in Russian ships in the first phase and 1 in the second). In addition, the accuracy very much depends on whether the ship is under fire or not - when Togo caught up with Vitgeft, the leading Russian armadillos had the opportunity to shoot, while remaining unfired themselves.
      3. rytik32 April 30 2020 02: 32 New
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        Andrei, good afternoon!
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        and SSI and Campbell talk about 10 hits, but somehow I'm still more inclined to trust them

        A source is now available - a description of the damage scheme [caused] by the Mikasa combat ship with shells ”in the report of the ship’s commander, 1st rank captain Izichi Hikojiro.

        I do not mind the fact that 2TOE in the beginning of the battle showed excellent firing accuracy (5% according to Gribovsky). But the result of the beginning of the battle is well known: Mikasa took a position that was very unprofitable in range and course angle for firing our ships. But Suvorov and Oslyabya, on the contrary, turned out to be exactly "opposite" to the center of the Japanese detachments under concentrated fire and were soon suppressed.
        This is a 100% error in maneuvering and another error in the choice of squadron speed.
        What about shells? It is enough to compare the losses of the crew of Mikas-Tsesarevich in ZhM and Mikasa-Orel in Tsushima. And it turns out that our shells were not so bad. They killed and wounded him, obviously not worse than the Japanese.
      4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 30 2020 21: 34 New
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        Quote: rytik32
        A source is now available - a description of the damage scheme [caused] by the Mikasa combat ship with shells ”in the report of the ship’s commander, 1st rank captain Izichi Hikojiro.

        So SSI seems to be written on the basis of his reports :)))
        Quote: rytik32
        But the result of the beginning of the battle is well known: Mikasa took a position that was very unprofitable in range and course angle for firing our ships. But Suvorov and Oslyabya, on the contrary, turned out to be exactly "opposite" to the center of the Japanese detachments under concentrated fire and were soon suppressed. This is a 100% error in maneuvering and another error in the choice of squadron speed.

        I agree, but given the difference in speed and with the right actions of Togo, this is an inevitable result. He generally could cross without any loops. I will say more precisely: with the right maneuvering of Togo, the T crossing of the Russian squadron was guaranteed. But it did not happen, and it is possible that this is the merit of Rozhestvensky, who started maneuvers with 2 columns. The key factor was speed, and there was nothing to choose from here - even the fastest Russian EDBs had a squadron speed less than the Japanese.
        Quote: rytik32
        What about shells? It is enough to compare the losses of the crew of Mikas-Tsesarevich in ZhM and Mikasa-Orel in Tsushima. And it turns out that our shells were not so bad.

        I do not think that such a comparison reflects the quality of the shells. The objective of the shells is to reduce the combat potential of an enemy ship with its subsequent destruction. The Japanese coped with this, ours didn’t. In the same Tsushima, both Suvorov and Orel lost centralized control very quickly after the fire was concentrated on them, the control of the fire had to be transferred to the plutongs, which reduced its effectiveness by several times. The Japanese also successfully disabled our artillery without breaking through armor, the same Eagle was an example to this.
        What did our shells do? The same Mikasa remained fully combat-ready until the end of the battle in Tsushima, and in ZhM his main damage (aft tower) was received as a result of the explosion of his own shell in the gun.
      5. rytik32 2 May 2020 12: 05 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        He generally could cross without any loops. I will say more precisely: with the right maneuvering of Togo, the T crossing of the Russian squadron was guaranteed.

        I read your article on this topic and do not agree with you. I share the position of the American admirals who at the same time were looking for a way to level the superiority in speed of the probable enemy. So the Americans came to the conclusion that attempts to cover the head should be answered with a lapel from the enemy, i.e. go to a circle with a smaller radius than the enemy.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        I will say more precisely: with the right maneuvering of Togo, the T crossing of the Russian squadron was guaranteed. But it did not happen, and it is possible that this is the merit of Rozhestvensky, who started maneuvers with 2 columns.

        You can apply your argument to the first phase of the battle. But further, it was not Rozhdestvensky who already commanded the squadron, and those who led the squadron maneuvered quite successfully, even better than in the beginning of the battle. So, in fact, the Japanese could not deliver T crossing either in ZhM or in Tsushima, having an advantage in speed.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        The objective of the shells is to reduce the combat potential of an enemy ship with its subsequent destruction. The Japanese coped with this, ours didn’t.

        And even the Japanese shells successfully coped with the destruction of the combat potential of their ships, especially in the LM))) And in Tsushima, the Japanese had to significantly reduce the rate of fire of 12-inch guns. So our shells on the background of the Japanese - quite nothing! I recall that no one had good shells then! And it’s better to let the shells explode poorly behind thin obstacles and have little explosive than explode in their own barrels and can’t effectively penetrate armor because of an instant fuse.
  • mmaxx April 23 2020 03: 52 New
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    The question is: will the Japanese come up to fight closer to Vladik? Having the opportunity to destroy the cruisers there, they did not even demonstrate such a desire. The reason is the same. Now we understand her perfectly. Will have to act at the limit of range. Does it need that? Let them sit in Vladik and fail on their own for technical reasons.
    That is, all that is needed is to organize intelligence. He knew how. And his commanders matched.
    The quality of command largely decided the outcome of the war at sea.
    1. ser56 April 23 2020 15: 01 New
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      Quote: mmaxx
      Will have to act at the limit of range.

      What prevents to organize a base in Henzan? The experience of the base on poisoning under the PA is already there ...
      Quote: mmaxx
      The quality of command largely decided the outcome of the war at sea.

      exactly! and we sin on shells and training hi
  • ser56 April 22 2020 16: 17 New
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    Not bad - finally the cycle is completed ...
    as for "The commander of a warship cannot afford such luxury as neurosis, he must be extremely psychologically stable in any situation. VN Ferzen, alas, was not like that."
    in principle, true, but it seemed that there was a systemic problem in the training of officers in the RIF - the commander Boyarina ordered in an even simpler situation to leave the ship ... request
    Maybe they were not afraid of the tribunal, in the sense that we understand it in the Soviet sense?
    The British had decisive commanders, but they also judged their commanders and admirals severely .... repeat
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 22 2020 17: 40 New
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      Quote: ser56
      Not bad - finally the cycle is completed ...

      No, more about Pearls will be :))))
      1. hohol95 April 22 2020 18: 25 New
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        Will you write about the "Pearls" right up to the "Slaughter in Penang Bay"?
      2. ser56 April 22 2020 19: 58 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        No, more about Pearls will be :))))

        We are waiting! drinks
  • Niko April 22 2020 16: 29 New
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    Thanks, good article. A little bit about the "conclusions". As for the command of ships and formations, I will not say, the question is complicated, but about: "was it fair to award Ferzen with a golden weapon with the inscription" for courage "I will say: if it is true that the admiral who surrendered the rest of the squadron spent only 2 (two) years in the fortress, then Ferzen you can give two gold, award, with inscriptions on the background of the rest it is very good. And the awards in such difficult moments for the country carry a lot more burden than just stating a fact: it was ignited. The cruiser is sorry, but the honor of the flag (for which the captain did not little at a difficult time) is much more expensive. And the whole story (including the death of the ship) is no worse than that of the Varangian or the Guardian
    1. ser56 April 22 2020 16: 46 New
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      Quote: Niko
      that the admiral who surrendered the rest of the squadron served only 2 (two) years in the fortress

      and in vain ... request there would be a massacre and 2000 corpses ... request the wealthy did not at least abandon their flagship and share his fate ... request
      1. Niko April 22 2020 17: 06 New
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        I also welcome pacifism, therefore, not an admiral. And respect is not deserving of those who save their lives behind the public (supposedly) interests, we don’t have to live our whole life at the expense of the state, but at the only moment when we need to prove that it was not in vain: to betray our homeland Conclusion: my respect for the enemy dying under his flag, shame on my compatriot dishonoring the flag
        1. ser56 April 22 2020 17: 15 New
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          Quote: Niko
          saving his life behind social (supposedly) interests

          1) does not roll against Nebogatov - he, like the others, was taken to the slaughter without communicating plans ... request
          2) the military value of his detachment in the morning was insignificant - his courage in saving people ... would die a durik hi
          Quote: Niko
          dying under his flag

          it’s like when you kill Rurik yourself ... and in your coordinates and the return of the Varangian, it’s Rudnev’s cowardice ... repeat
          1. Niko April 22 2020 17: 25 New
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            You have no connection between killing yourself or not. There are concepts: Duty, Honor. And my respect for people who are ready to "just" die for their homeland without hiding behind the ideas of peace. There are plenty of such examples
            1. ser56 April 22 2020 19: 53 New
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              Quote: Niko
              not hiding behind the ideas of peace

              jammed you? hi what a peacefulness is expediency! prisoners have always been and will be in war ... request
          2. Niko April 22 2020 17: 39 New
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            Regarding legal issues: the lawsuit removed the questions, unfortunately they were afraid to enforce the sentence (while the commanders of the ships, in spite of a lot of problems, preferred to fulfill the duty and the Empire grew as soon as it appeared in my head: "oh, I suddenly became peace-loving" the empire came to an end "
            1. ser56 April 22 2020 19: 57 New
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              Quote: Niko
              the questions were removed by the trial,

              Seriously? laughing it was a note of traces ... therefore, they pardoned quickly ... repeat
              Quote: Niko
              as soon as it appeared in my head: "oh I suddenly became peace-loving" the empire came to an end

              "On May 11, Rafail met with the Turkish squadron that left the Bosphorus Strait, which consisted of fifteen ships: six battleships, two frigates, five corvettes and two brig. Rafail tried to hide from the superior enemy, but due to low winds he failed and he was surrounded. ”On the council, the officers decided to fight“ to the last drop of blood ”, as required by the Maritime Charter of 1720, but when conversations with the sailors began, the negotiating officer reported that the team did not want to die and asked to surrender the ship [3 ]. As a result, Captain 2nd rank Semyon Mikhailovich Stroinikov ordered to lower the flag and surrender the ship to the Turks. "
              enlighten ... hi
              1. vladcub April 23 2020 18: 32 New
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                Then Emperor Nicholas 1 forbade him to marry so that there was no procreation. Only to the chagrin of Emperor Nicholas did Stroinikov already have a wife
          3. Niko April 22 2020 20: 10 New
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            "He was led to the slaughter" is a typical example of a commissar
            The "trench propaganda" that destroyed the empire, which simply needed to hold out for half a year at the front and the fleets, because the enemy was almost crushed (albeit with the help of the allies)
            1. ser56 April 22 2020 20: 44 New
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              Quote: Niko
              He was led to the slaughter "- a typical example of a commissar

              Quote: ser56
              without informing plans ..

              Do you think it is normal that Nebogatov did not know the plans of ZPR for the battle? bully
              Quote: Niko
              collapsed empire

              Bullshit - the empire overthrew the empire. decided to play in the state. coups, but demolished it at the turns of history ... hi Did it become your commissar Shulgin? bully
              1. Niko April 23 2020 07: 49 New
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                No, I don’t think Rozhdestvensky’s leadership is “normal”, all the more ideal it’s the fault that Tsushima became the tragedy of Russia on it, but the fault is that Tsushima became the Shame of Russia on Nebogatov. And a man who “shared the fate of the ship”, if you mean surrendering after the first shot, cannot be an example for a person who left the ship after the battle (but spent the bulk of the battle under concentrated fire) and the actions of Miklukho-Maklai and Ferzen are always an example (let these people and not without flaws)
                1. ser56 April 23 2020 19: 41 New
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                  Quote: Niko
                  that Tsushima became the Shame of Russia on Nebogatov.

                  stupidity ... request Shame was in the incompetent rout of 2TE, and not the surrender ...
                  Quote: Niko
                  for the person who left the ship after the battle (but spent the entire main part of the battle under concentrated fire)

                  you have 2nd standards ... ZPR and its staff escaped from the flagship, and then passed a working EM ... hi
                  1. Niko April 24 2020 09: 34 New
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                    I understand double standards, comfortable expression. You write about the miraculous Suvorov floating on the water - “The flagship” and about the nevertheless combat-ready squadron of Nebogatov “The combat value of the detachment was insignificant” and this is not double standards for you. But ok, I understand that people with your convenient worldview (when betrayal and violation of the oath justifies itself for the sake of) it becomes more and more useless to argue. in this worldview there is no place for either the Varangian, or the Brest Fortress, or even Ferzen, against their background cowardice and meanness are obvious ....
                    1. ser56 April 24 2020 13: 37 New
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                      Quote: Niko
                      You write about the miracle of Suvorov floating on the water

                      Is this the reason to run from the flagship? Could a wounded ZPR take command from another ship?
                      This was a shame ....
                      Quote: Niko
                      under combat combat squadron of Nebogatov

                      Who is combat ready? Lost Artillery Eagle? Or BBO with shot guns?
                      Enter a little topic, but do not write nonsense ... request I note, the flagship of Nebogatov was the only one to knock out the enemy ship (Asamu) from the line request
                      Quote: Niko
                      and this is not double standards for you

                      factology
                      Quote: Niko
                      with your convenient worldview (when the betrayal and violation of the oath is justified for the sake of pleasing) it becomes more and more useless to argue.

                      1) sailors are not suicide bombers - in a hopeless situation, after the exhaustion of defense means, captivity is not a shame ... request Let me remind you, it was a colonial war hi
                      2) your hysteria and the transition to personality says a lot about you, young lady! bully
                      Quote: Niko
                      there is no place for Varyag or Brest Fortress

                      Paying tribute to the courage of fighters and sailors, I have to tell you the obvious - both of these episodes are largely mythologized ... request It would be better for the Varangian to leave without a fight at night, and the Brest Fortress was originally stupid of the Soviet command - the troops suffered heavy and meaningless losses ... request
                      Quote: Niko
                      against their background, cowardice and baseness are evident ..

                      Do you have a huge combat experience? how many orders? hi or are you a couch warrior? bully
                      1. Niko April 24 2020 17: 03 New
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                        I’m a couch. And I don’t see anything wrong with that. And if the statement of obvious facts about your worldview hurts you, do not speak out loud, this is a public resource. And everyone knows that a coward and a traitor usually do not justify, but overshadows the heroes, usually a person with similar qualities
                      2. ser56 April 24 2020 19: 12 New
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                        Quote: Niko
                        I am sofa. And I see nothing wrong with that.

                        but I see - there are a lot of courageous when it does not concern them ... request
                        Quote: Niko
                        .a if the statement of obvious facts regarding your worldview offends you,

                        you are not smart enough and educated to understand understand my worldview! hi
                        Quote: Niko
                        and obscures their heroes, usually a person with similar qualities

                        Stupid and not distant people with poor education usually go on insults on the Web wink
                      3. Niko April 25 2020 09: 53 New
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                        From your "paying tribute, BUT" even those who don’t have it turn upside down from the defenders of Brest, the boys who left near Moscow die in 41m, to the Japanese boys who left for flying schools at 44m, 45m.
                      4. ser56 April 25 2020 15: 32 New
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                        Quote: Niko
                        even those who don’t have it are turned over in a coffin

                        it’s just an uncomfortable truth when the miscalculations of the authorities were closed by the bodies of soldiers request
                        Quote: Niko
                        Japanese boys who left for flying schools at 44m, 45m.

                        these Japanese boys ate the prisoners' liver - by the way our allies ... request
                    2. Niko April 25 2020 10: 22 New
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                      You seem to be the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union and the orders you have so much that everyone does not fit on your chest, this is a powerful argument .... I represent our dialogue with you somewhere in the basements of Brest on June 24,26 ..... "us thrown here for slaughter! "we have exhausted all means ... prisoners, this is normal" "leadership error" "is not rational .... etc
                    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 25 2020 12: 42 New
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                      Quote: Niko
                      You seem to be the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union and the orders you have so much that everyone does not fit on his chest

                      Just pay attention to the knowledge level of your opponent’s material
                      Quote: ser56
                      Wounded ZPR could take command from another ship

                      Rozhdestvensky did not dare to remove the skull fragments from the wound in Japan for 2 months already, roughly an hour after the battle, he lost consciousness, and, in essence, did not return to him. That is, there were short glimpses, but he could not command anything.
                      Quote: ser56
                      It would be better for the Varangian to leave at night without a fight

                      The fact that at night the Varangian stood at the sight of the destroyers, Sergei does not know. Although he took an active part in the discussion of the cycle, where I described all this.
                    4. ser56 April 25 2020 15: 47 New
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                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      to the level of knowledge of the material

                      well above average bully
                      Quote: ser56
                      Could a wounded ZPR take command from another ship?

                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Wounded ZPR could take command from another ship

                      you have a very bad citation culture! without taking a question mark into the quote, you have distorted the meaning of my phrase - to put it mildly, this is a bad deed! hi The use of such moves characterizes you very badly from a moral and ethical point of view negative What got so criticized that went for a forgery? bully
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      but he could no longer command.

                      That is why the flight from the flagship is only a cover for the staff or his personal cowardice - although in any case he gave his consent, so this is not important ... request
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      oh, that at night the Varangian stood at the sight of the destroyers, Sergey did not know

                      and the Varangian had guns and mine nets - when he tried to fire mines, he could protect himself! MN stood at a distance of a direct shot of 6dm guns (do you need to chew about this?) - pointing the MA at the KR is a direct act of war! Yes, there were other measures of secretive preparation for giving the course - for example, to blind the MN with searchlights, a person who wants is looking for a way ... hi
                      You, Andrei, have the "logic" of a hostage, not a fighter ... request
                    5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 25 2020 19: 00 New
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                      Quote: ser56
                      and the Varangian had guns and mine nets - when he tried to fire mines, he could protect himself!

                      Could not. He could open fire in response to the torpedoes, and after that the Russians would start a war, since to prove that this answer is simply impossible. The nets need to be set for a long time and they do not protect the ship from the bow sectors, and the destroyers could give way at any time.
                      Quote: ser56
                      MN stood at a distance of a direct shot of 6dm guns (do you need to chew about this?) - pointing the MA at the KR is a direct act of war!

                      Only in your imagination.
                      Quote: ser56
                      Yes, there were other measures of secretive preparation for giving the course - for example, to blind the MN with searchlights, whoever wants to find a way.

                      A way to do what? :))) On a stupid suicide, also having landed in the instigators of war?
                      You come up with completely worthless options - destroyers could torpedo a cruiser even with networks, even without, even at a low speed, even at anchor. You can also recall that in addition to the destroyers, Takachiho, Akashi and Asama remained in the raid.
                      But most importantly, Rudnev had an order NOT to Hinder the Japanese landing. It was impossible to leave in silence, to break through with a fight - to directly violate the order.
                      But you do not care.
                      Quote: ser56
                      well above average

                      Noticeably above average, you only persist in your own mistakes. Alas, you have no knowledge at all.
                      Quote: ser56
                      you have a very bad citation culture! without taking a question mark into the quote, you have distorted the meaning of my phrase - to put it mildly, this is a bad deed!

                      Sorry, that’s why I didn’t understand.
                      Quote: ser56
                      What got so criticized that went for a forgery?

                      There is no criticism. There is a thoughtless repetition of once and for all hardened "truths."
                    6. ser56 April 25 2020 21: 35 New
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                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      He could open fire in response to the torpedoes, and after that the Russians would start a war, since to prove that this answer is simply impossible.

                      nonsense - the production of MN in the Russian KR already gives rise to ... hi
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      they protect the ship from the bow sectors

                      funny logic for you - networks protect most of the ship and the most important! In addition, it is possible to turn the ship when maneuvering the MN, and maneuvering is already an attack!
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      A way to do what? :)

                      hide your preparations ...

                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      destroyers could torpedo the cruiser even with networks, even without, even at low speed, even at anchor.

                      aha, but the Kyrgyz Republic has no guns - a sheep ... bully you really have the logic of a hostage ... request
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Rudnev had an order NOT to obstruct the Japanese landing. It was impossible to leave in silence, to break through with a fight - to directly violate the order.

                      1) Rudnev, as the commander was responsible for the safety of his KR!
                      2) Leaving at night is not a breakthrough with a fight - until the MN launched an attack ... then self-defense ...
                      by the way - Rudnev could not start a war - the Japanese attacked the PA that very night bully
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Alas, you have no knowledge at all.

                      this is your opinion and incorrect ... hi
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Sorry, that’s why I didn’t understand.

                      have passed! drinks

                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      There is a thoughtless repetition of once and for all hardened "truths."

                      it’s funny ... you have a picture of a REV that reflects a ossified myth ... request
                      The late Polutov struggled with myths, but alas ... recourse
                    7. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 25 2020 22: 12 New
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                      Quote: ser56
                      nonsense - staging MN in the Russian KR already gives rise to ..

                      Really nonsense. Learn international law. Since when is staging a warship in the immediate vicinity of another an act of declaring war?
                      Quote: ser56
                      funny logic for you - networks protect most of the ship and the most important! In addition, it is possible to turn the ship when maneuvering the MN

                      Another nonsense. If the Varangian, putting the nets, makes a small move, the destroyer gives it too, calmly bypasses the cruiser and torpedoes it. All.
                      Quote: ser56
                      aha, and the Kyrgyz Republic has no guns - a sheep ..

                      There is. And here is the result of their application. The cruiser makes a move, it is torpedoed, it opens fire and damages the destroyer. No one heard the torpedo shots, they are quiet, but everyone knows the explosion of a mine.
                      Total the next morning - the Varangian was sunk, all witnesses confirm that at first there were Varyag’s shots, and then - an explosion of torpedoes. Outraged by the unprovoked attack, Japan declares war :))))
                      Quote: ser56
                      you really have the logic of a hostage ...

                      I have logic. You do not have it.
                      On Varyag no one knew that there would be an ultimatum. They only knew that the Japanese were landing and had orders not to interfere. Any actions of the cruiser standing at the sight of the destroyers can provoke the Japanese, but this cannot be done - Russia is corny not ready for war.
                      Quote: ser56
                      by the way - Rudnev could not start a war - the Japanese attacked the PA that very night

                      But how did Rudnev know this? :)) He knew exactly what he knew.
            2. ser56 April 25 2020 15: 35 New
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              Quote: Niko
              You apparently

              plagiarism ... find your arguments bully
              Quote: Niko
              "we were thrown here for slaughter!" we have exhausted all our means ... prisoners, this is normal. "" management errors "" are not rational .... etc.

              we are lucky that this is not so ... request and the guys in the Brest Fortress were framed by the recent leadership of the Red Army request But, I note, this was written at best in closed editions ...
            3. strannik1985 April 25 2020 15: 42 New
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              and the guys from the Brest Fortress were framed

              A funny interpretation of the reluctance of the USSR to attack the Reich.
            4. ser56 April 25 2020 15: 55 New
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              Quote: strannik1985
              A funny interpretation of the reluctance of the USSR to attack the Reich.

              war is not a matter of desire ... request
            5. strannik1985 April 25 2020 15: 59 New
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              war is not a matter of desire

              In order not to "expose the guys in the Brest Fortress", mobilization must be announced a month before June 22.
            6. ser56 April 25 2020 16: 40 New
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              Quote: strannik1985
              mobilization a month before June 22.

              not at all - it was necessary to withdraw the troops from the fortress into the field, left a battalion for defense ... request
            7. strannik1985 April 25 2020 17: 20 New
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              by no means

              Brought out-framed in 62 missiles, there should be 10-12 only rifle instead of 4 rifle divisions by June 22, 1941.
            8. ser56 April 25 2020 17: 25 New
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              Quote: strannik1985
              instead of 4 rifle divisions by June 22, 1941.

              is it better that they perished in the trap of the fortress?
            9. strannik1985 April 25 2020 18: 13 New
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              better that they

              Not better, either.
              The fortress closes the railway and bridges, preventing the supply of 2 TGr along the most convenient route.
            10. ser56 April 25 2020 20: 34 New
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              Quote: strannik1985
              Not better, either.

              Guderian went around the fortress and all ... hi
  • Senior seaman April 25 2020 10: 03 New
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    Quote: ser56
    It would be better for the Varangian to leave at night without a fight,

    What is it like? If you are talking about the night before the battle, then Japanese destroyers stood next to him all night.
  • ser56 April 25 2020 15: 49 New
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    see above my answer to Andrey from the anomalous region ... hi
  • Senior seaman April 25 2020 16: 19 New
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    Saw. As for mine networks - so-so proposal. Why, explain?
  • ser56 April 25 2020 16: 38 New
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    Quote: Senior Sailor
    As for mine networks - so-so proposal. Why, explain?

    1) no, it’s not necessary, but networks are one of the measures - in the complex, they could give an effect
    2) so, as an alternative - Rudnev makes a decision to break through at night, there is a secretive preparation for the campaign - networks are put in for disguise! At night, when ready, they unfasten the anchor network for stealth and give way - while blinding the enemy with spotlights! When you try to shoot / shot from the MA, open fire on the enemy MN. The move will allow you to make a dodge maneuver, the network will help fend off the torpedo, if it is released! No. cab at 30uz is 30 seconds of travel - comparable to the Varyag circulation time - there are chances ... request And another stroke - this is a neutral port, and not the fairway to it - the neutrals may be defeated, but the Japanese started, who did the RPE almost according to the rules ... so it’s not a fact that they shot from the MA first repeat
  • Senior seaman April 25 2020 16: 45 New
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    As I understand it, the fact that the network could not be used on the go is not an argument for you?
  • ser56 April 25 2020 17: 11 New
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    Quote: Senior Sailor
    the fact that the network could not be used on the go is not an argument for you?

    on the small - you can! There was a risk, but in such a situation there is nothing to do without risk! request I’ll note that Deflinger cut off the networks after the battle, so this is not a problem ... request
  • Saxahorse April 26 2020 21: 49 New
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    Quote: Senior Sailor
    What is it like? If you are talking about the night before the battle, then Japanese destroyers stood next to him all night.

    How scary to live !!! laughing

    Sorry of course, but your argument is even funnier.
  • Senior seaman April 26 2020 22: 20 New
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    Quote: Saxahorse
    your argument is even funnier.

    you don’t have it at all.
    Quote: Saxahorse
    Sorry of course

    Nothing, nothing, I'm used to what you are talking nonsense :))
  • volodimer April 22 2020 19: 02 New
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    I join in numerous comments.
    Waited for your articles. Thank!
    From the description that I came across earlier .. The actions of the commander of the "Emerald" after separation from the squadron are uniquely positive, although at the end unsuccessful.
    It looks like we read the same sources good
    Rurikovich separate hi
  • Saxahorse April 23 2020 01: 20 New
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    Our friend Andrei was again not too lazy to insert the same completely left table in the article, with fuel reserves compiled by the senior officer of the Almaz armored cruiser Captain 2nd rank Dyachkov, purely out of curiosity about the morning signals from the ships. And no one instructed Dyachkov to collect this data, and the squadron ship commanders hardly bothered themselves with a complete inventory of coal pits every morning. Obviously, the numbers on this plate are speculative. Moreover, the commanders tried to disguise reality, each in its own way. Who wanted to get rid of unnecessary loading, who, on the contrary, took extra tons from greed.

    A striking example of the striking discrepancy between the figures of reality, the emerald syster-thorn is Pearl. It can be recalled how, after the battle, his commander “suddenly” discovered in himself a coal reserve that made it possible to get to Manila, although before that he barely hoped to reach Shanghai. Despite the fact that according to the Dyachkova’s plate, Pearl has even less coal than Emerald, only 422 tons versus 522 tons. By the way, those who wish can look at the map and make sure that from about. Tsushima to Vladivostok will be about 1200 km (not in a straight line), and to Manila about 2400 km (also not in a straight line). At the same time, Pearls were enough for these 2400 km of fuel, and for some reason the Emerald was not enough for 1200 km ..

    The difference in power reserve is already twice as suggestive of serious thoughts about the reasons for such fantastic differences. Or the commander of the Emerald and about the lack of coal is lying, or something strange with its consumption at the Emerald in comparison with the exact same Pearl.
    1. Comrade April 23 2020 02: 48 New
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      Quote: Saxahorse
      according to the Dyachkov’s tablet, Pearl’s coal is even less than that of Emerald, only 422 tons against 522 tons.
      At the same time, Pearls were enough for these 2400 km of fuel, and for some reason the Emerald was not enough for 1200 km ..

      "Emerald" approached the bay of Vladimir 16 (sixteenth) of May at the first hour of the night, and the "Pearl" to Manila - 21 (twenty-first) of May, approximately at 16:00 - 17:00.
      Let's move on.
      Quote: Saxahorse
      Or the commander of the Emerald and about the lack of coal is lying, or something strange with its consumption at the Emerald in comparison with the exact same Pearl.

      Take, for example, the cruiser Novik.
      On acceptance tests, the average consumption of coal at full speed was about one kilograms per one horsepower. The total capacity of the machines amounted to 17 789 liters. sec., therefore, per hour at medium speed 25 nodes at Novik burned up to eighteen tons of coal, respectively, per day it would come out 432 (four hundred thirty two) tons.
      At the same time, when 10 nodes daily coal consumption on the cruiser was 35 tons.
      Quote: Saxahorse
      The difference in power reserve is already twice as suggestive of serious thoughts about the reasons for such fantastic differences.

      So think about how much Novik could pass with the same supply of coal at a speed of 25 knots, and how much at a speed of 10 knots.
    2. Senior seaman April 23 2020 17: 16 New
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      armored cruiser "Diamond"

      Which one
      1. Saxahorse April 23 2020 22: 26 New
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        Quote: Senior Sailor
        Which one

        Good question! Should I inadvertently quote Andrei, I immediately find myself in a ridiculous position. wassat

        Let Andrei himself and ask how he managed to find the armor of the former yacht of the governor Almaz. laughing
    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 23 2020 19: 01 New
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      Quote: Saxahorse
      A striking example of the striking discrepancy between the figures of reality, the emerald syster-thorn is Pearl. It can be recalled how, after the battle, his commander “suddenly” discovered in himself a coal reserve that made it possible to get to Manila, although before that he barely hoped to reach Shanghai. Despite the fact that according to the Dyachkov’s plate, the Pearl’s coal is even less than that of the Emerald, only 422 tons against 522 tons.

      Saxacors, how many times told you - before you write, learn to read.
      According to Dyachkov, the coal reserves at Zhemchug are 492 tons, not 422.
      Quote: Saxahorse
      The difference in power reserve is already twice as suggestive of serious thoughts about the reasons for such fantastic differences.

      M-dya. You know, I won’t even joke about your “serious thoughts”. I'll just explain on fingers what it was
      First, the Pearl mechanic was mistaken somewhere and the actual coal supply was 80 tons more than estimated. Perhaps Levitsky knew about this, or maybe not, although I think I knew. But how can this episode be inflated to
      Quote: Saxahorse
      Obviously, the numbers on this plate are speculative. Moreover, the commanders tried to disguise reality, each in its own way.

      Can you confirm this with at least some evidence? On which other ships did the estimated stocks differ greatly from the actual ones?
      But this alone already tells us that the actual coal reserve on Pearls on the morning of May 13 was GREATER than on Emerald. 492 t + 80 t = 572 t on Pearls versus 522 t on Emerald.
      And then - everything is very, very simple. The pearls were more or less ready when he went camping, but the Emerald was corny not finished building. In the cycle I described this moment many times. Emerald machines were obviously much more voracious than Pearls. At the same time, after a daytime battle on May 14, pearls went after Oleg and Aurora only at 17-18 knots, after midnight - they reduced the speed to 12, then to 10 knots and then they were already going to an economical vehicle. That is, if on the afternoon of May 14, the speed modes of Emerald and Pearl are comparable (only Emerald should have spent a lot more coal than Pearl due to the loose cars), and then the Pearl did not have to burst for 4,5 hours at maximum speed.
      The difference in coal costs has already been brought to you by a respected Comrade. At full speed, the Emerald spent MUCH more than Pearls 17-18 knots.
      All this allowed the Pearls to reach Manila, and there are no "fantastic differences" here
      1. Saxahorse April 23 2020 22: 47 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Saxacors, how many times told you - before you write, learn to read. According to Dyachkov, the coal reserves at Zhemchug are 492 tons, not 422.

        Congratulations! You caught me on the door! And you too !! good
        A little higher, at the prompt of the "senior sailor" they laughed at your pearl about the "armored Diamond". laughing


        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Can you confirm this with at least some evidence? On which other ships did the estimated stocks differ greatly from the actual ones?
        But this alone already tells us that the actual coal reserve on Pearls on the morning of May 13 was GREATER than on Emerald. 492 t + 80 t = 572 t on Pearls versus 522 t on Emerald.

        You make me happy right with every comment. Already the fact that the actual coal reserve at Zhemchug was probably more than 80 tons and clearly confirms the unrealistic figures of Dyachkov. Why did you decide that there, in the table, is even one figure correct? Maybe he also confused the Pearl with the Emerald?

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        That is, if on the afternoon of May 14, the high-speed modes of Emerald and Pearl are comparable (only the Emerald should have spent a lot more coal on them than the Pearl due to the loose cars)

        It should be noted that just in the daytime battle, the modes of Emerald and Pearl are clearly different. If Pearl darted the whole battle for Oleg and Aurora leading the battle in full swing (18-19 knots however), then the Emerald humbly hid behind armadillos crawling at 9 knots, as we recall. I would put on a much greater consumption of coal from Pearls. Well, the quality of the cars on both ships was equally poor. And if the projected cruising range was 6000 miles, then in fact the "pebbles" showed 3520 miles with a total reserve of 535 tons., I.e. approximately 0,15 tons per mile. So your assumption of 50 tons of "extra" at the Pearl is about 600 km. move. Which does not completely cover the difference of 1200 km. in reserve

        In general, the riddle of excessive fuel consumption on the Emerald seems so far a muddy and incomprehensible problem.
        1. Senior seaman April 24 2020 09: 44 New
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          Quote: Saxahorse
          If Pearl darted the whole battle for Oleg and Aurora leading the battle in full swing (18-19 knots however)

          Why do you think so? Pearls joined the “Oleg” and “Aurora” only after sunset.
          P.S. About the "armored" in the signature under the table immediately and did not notice :))
          1. Saxahorse April 24 2020 22: 19 New
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            Quote: Senior Sailor
            Why do you think so? Pearls joined the “Oleg” and “Aurora” only after sunset.

            Goofy. Eco nailed you .. Sooner I praised your attentiveness. Come on and re-read the whole history of Tsushima pliz .. The real story ..

            I am aware that you have a big fan of the alternative, but it’s here that they talk about the real Tsushima, and not about the inventions of your colleagues in alternative history.
            1. Senior seaman April 24 2020 22: 53 New
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              Quote: Saxahorse
              Sooner I praised your attention.

              When I need your praise, I will let you know :)))
              Quote: Saxahorse
              The real story.

              At 7 o’clock the sun went down, and Japanese destroyers attacked our frustrated and shocked squadron in different directions. The battleships turned "all of a sudden" to S, the cruisers, following their movement, too, but could not keep their order due to the scattered transports, and the darkness that went on, the ongoing battle and the attacks of the destroyers did not allow them to find the squadron and reconnect. The destroyers attacked by the cruiser "Oleg" and "Aurora" and, as it turned out later "Pearls", hiding all the lights, gave full swing.
              http://wunderwafe.ru/WeaponBook/Aurora/chap09.html
              so this one:
              Pearls darted the whole battle for Oleg and Aurora leading the battle in full swing

              did not have. "Monk" in the wake for "Aurora" went
              About 3 1/2 hours the cruisers (ours. — L.P.) again had to repel the enemy cruisers, and here the “Vladimir Monomakh” entered the wake of the “Aurora”
              But the "Pearl" ....
              Quote: Saxahorse
              I know

              I am afraid no.
              1. Saxahorse April 24 2020 23: 03 New
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                In an effort to repel the enemy and at the same time maintain their place on the non-firing side of our battleships, the (Russian - L.P.) cruiser again hit the crossfire of Nissin and Kassuga and a group of cruisers.

                Judging by this quote from your link, the authors of that article are not far from you, lovers of the alternative.

                It is not difficult to recall that Nissin and Kassuga did not go with a group of cruisers at all .. Instead of fiction performed by the ship's doctor V. S. Kravchenko, it is better to read the testimonies of combat officers, participants in the battle. At least the same Levitsky. fool
                1. Senior seaman April 24 2020 23: 37 New
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                  This is not an article or even the memoirs of Kravchenko, but the book of Polenov. The passage itself, directly from the magazine of the cruiser Aurora.
                  cruisers again hit the crossfire "Nissin" and "Kassuga" and a group of cruisers.

                  And how does it follow from this passage that the Garibaldi went with the cruisers? What is not clear to you in the term "crossfire"?

                  Quote: Saxahorse
                  better read the testimony of military officers, participants in the battle. At least the same Levitsky.

                  Sure, not a problem. Cite an excerpt from which it follows that
                  Pearls darted the whole battle for Oleg and Aurora leading the battle in full swing
                  with the correct link. \
                  P.S. Apparently, you did not read Kravchenko either, since he has nothing of the kind :)
                2. Senior seaman April 25 2020 00: 23 New
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                  Do you need Levitsky?
                  https://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01005079885#?page=51
                  According to his testimony, the Pearl at 16-00 (and not the whole battle) went to the wake not for the Aurora, but for the Monomakh. I hope you do not argue that this old cruiser also accelerated to 19 knots?
                  And on the next page at 6-30, “Pearl” goes in a column with “Diamond and” “Svetlana”, and “Oleg”, “Aurora”, “Donskoy” and “Monomakh” separately.
                  What did you interpret about AI there?
                  1. Saxahorse April 26 2020 21: 04 New
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                    Quote: Senior Sailor
                    What did you interpret about AI there?

                    At least you reread Khromov, whom Andrei almost quotes verbatim in his cycle ...

                    Pearls were among the transports immediately after the death of Oslyaby, literally half an hour after the start of the battle. After the turmoil (caused by the appearance of the Japanese cruisers) and the collision with the Urals, Pearl entered the battle with the Japanese cruisers.

                    At 16 o'clock, when there was a pause in the battle, Enquist ordered his cruisers to be built, at this command Pearl entered the wake of Monomakh. Which in itself confirms that all the time before that, he fought together with the Enquist cruisers. (unlike Emerald, which continued to work as a repetitive flagship vessel). After and until the end of the battle, there is no longer any doubt that the Pearls held the flagship Oleg and Aurora in the battle.

                    You can read about this with Levitsky, who confirms that holding onto Aurora was not too easy, since the cruiser was overloaded.

                    The fact that in the end just these three cruisers came out of the battle to the south, even you think you will not risk refuting ..
                    1. Senior seaman April 26 2020 21: 40 New
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                      Quote: Saxahorse
                      The pearl turned out to be

                      Sorry, I was not interested in your speculation, but asked for confirmation of your words
                      If Pearl darted the whole battle for Oleg and Aurora leading the battle in full swing (18-19 knots however) from the testimony of Levitsky, to whom you yourself referred.
                      And from the words of Levitsky, it definitely follows that if he was rushing about, then he wasn’t after the cruisers, but around armadillos. Like the Emerald.
                      And joined the Enquist cruisers around 16-00
                      Quote: Saxahorse
                      The fact that in the end just these three cruisers came out of the battle to the south, even you think you will not risk refuting ..

                      And why should I refute this if I wrote about it from the very beginning? :)) Just in such a composition ("Oleg", "Aurora" and "Pearls") this detachment turned out to be, just after sunset.
                      Quote: Saxahorse
                      You at least reread Khromov

                      Aurora Magazine did not convince you. Levitsky, you didn’t justify your high confidence ... now you are trying to drag Khromov.
                      Well let it be Khromov ...
                      At 16.10, so as not to interfere with the fire of his armadillos, the Pearl joined the cruiser detachment, joining the wake of Vladimir Monomakh, and fired with Japanese cruisers attacking transports. At 17.25 the battle stopped ...

                      ..k 21.00 behind "Svetlana" and "Diamond". In complete darkness, the “Pearl” also nearly lost, but Captain 2nd rank Levitsky, smelling smoke and showing his lantern Ratier his call signs, took a place on the left beam “Aurora”, so as not to lose sight of “Oleg”. At 23.00 we left the strait

                      Who else are you referring to?
                      1. Saxahorse April 27 2020 22: 56 New
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                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Who else are you referring to?

                        I refer for example to Andrew laughing
                        In the last period of time, the Emerald was still trying to fulfill its role as a "rehearsal and rescue" ship with the main forces, and the "Pearl" joined the cruisers of Rear Admiral O.A. Enquista.

                        With the amendment, that the Pearl joined the cruisers immediately after the death of Oslyaby.

                        I don’t understand how to argue with the obvious facts. Pearls are trying to get around Nebogatov from the south, maneuvering among transports, colliding with the Ural cruiser, following Enquist's orders, but you insistently insist that he was not there .. You have some kind of logic problems. All facts directly indicate that Levitsky fought in the southern group of ships under the general control of Enquist.
                      2. Senior seaman April 28 2020 09: 53 New
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                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        In the last time lapse

                        No objection. For in the last gapbut not at all rushed the whole battleas you deigned to write recently.
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        I don’t understand how to argue with the obvious facts.

                        All that is actually obvious is that you have not read carefully the sources you are trying to link to.
                        With the amendment, that the Pearl joined the cruisers immediately after the death of Oslyaby.

                        That's just to participate in the battle of the cruiser Enquist began at 14-30. Oslyabya began to sink at 15-15 (3 from 1/4 according to Levitsky's testimony), and Zhemchug joined the cruisers at about 16-00.
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        fulfills the orders of Enquist

                        And of course, it’s not difficult for you to list exactly which Enquist’s orders were fulfilled by the “Pearls”?
                        Simply, Dobrotvorsky writes that he advised the admiral to take command of himself to give orders to the stone commanders to drive off the Japanese destroyers, but Enquist said that they were not subordinate to him. And it was about 18 hours.
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        but you insistently insist that he was not there ..

                        No need to juggle. I persistently assert that your statement that “Pearls” darted all over the “Oleg” and “Aurora,” and at a speed of 18-19 knots, was sucked out of a finger.
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        You have some logic problems

                        No. It is your knowledge problems that you are stubbornly trying to replace with your speculation.
                      3. Saxahorse April 28 2020 22: 34 New
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                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        That's just to participate in the battle of the cruiser Enquist began at 14-30. Oslyabya began to sink at 15-15 (3 from 1/4 according to Levitsky's testimony), and Zhemchug joined the cruisers at about 16-00.

                        You have obvious problems with the chronology. Oslyabya rolled out of action and rolled back at 14:32, Pearls hanging on the traverse of the second flagship immediately dived into the hole between Orel and Sisoy and also went south behind Oslyabya, but on the other side of the line. However, already at 14:50 Oslyabya capsized. The pearls abandoned attempts to bypass Nebogatov from the south and cut through the BWO system just because he also saw the Japanese cruisers.

                        Further I mentioned above, maneuvering between traveling vehicles and a collision with the Urals. He opened fire on the Japanese at the same time, about 15 hours. He simply had nowhere to go but to snuggle up against the Enquist cruisers. And at the time you mentioned 16 hours there was just a pause in the battle and Enquist ordered the cruisers to build up so that they wouldn’t rush about ..
                      4. Senior seaman April 29 2020 09: 15 New
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                        You have obvious problems with the chronology.

                        you yourself referred to Levitsky. And in his testimony it is written exactly like this:
                        I sent the cruiser in full swing into the interval formed by the Oslyabya crashing out and, under the stern of the Eagle, jumped to the left side of our squadron. It was at 3 1/4 o'clock in the afternoon. "Oslyabya" was drowning at this time ...

                        Notice, the cruisers have already entered the battle for almost an hour, but the Pearl does not think to join them.
                        Pancake, Read materials to which you refer !!!
                        And at the 16 hours you mentioned

                        “Pearl” finally really joined the Enquist cruisers and stood behind the “Monomakh”, which even in youth could not reach the speed of 18-19 knots, which you are talking about.
                        Which, sobsno, was required to prove. Your statement that the "Pearl" whole battle darted behind “Oleg” and “Aurora” with a speed of 18-19 knots, it is not confirmed. Accordingly, your conclusion
                        I would put on a much greater consumption of coal from Pearls.

                        has no foundation.
                      5. Saxahorse April 29 2020 22: 56 New
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                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Your statement that the “Pearls" fought the whole battle for Oleg and Aurora at a speed of 18-19 knots is not confirmed.

                        Okay, convinced! hi

                        Also read what eyewitnesses write. The truth is that Levitsky obviously does it in time, but the transports saw him from the very beginning of the battle and thank him for his support. For example, the Irtysh separately noted the help of the Don group, Monomakh, Pearl and Emerald. Unlike Oleg and Aurora, they either appeared or ran away.

                        Pearls, however, still ran more in that battle than the Emerald attached to the battleships somewhere around 16 hours.
                      6. Senior seaman April 29 2020 23: 10 New
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                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        For example, the Irtysh separately noted the help of the Don group, Monomakh, Pearls and Emerald.

                        Hallelujah!
                      7. Saxahorse April 29 2020 23: 30 New
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                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Hallelujah!

                        This, however, is about the first part of the cruising battle, it turns out that the "pebbles" first arrived in time to help Monomakh who entered the battle with Uriu and Virgo. However, later, in the second part of the battle, the Emerald still returned to the battleships and the Pearl continued to run with the cruisers.
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 24 2020 20: 43 New
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    Quote: Saxahorse
    And you too !!

    Yes, please :))) Only now I’ve gotten into a big article on a tertiary issue, and you, in a short commentary on the issue raised. Anyway.
    Quote: Saxahorse
    Already the fact that the actual coal reserve at Zhemchug was probably more than 80 tons and clearly confirms the unrealistic figures of Dyachkov.

    No, it does not confirm. You such a notion as the representativeness of the sample at school skipped? One does not judge many.
    Quote: Saxahorse
    It should be noted that just in the daytime battle, the modes of Emerald and Pearl are clearly different.

    Do not want to read my articles - read other sources. I repeat, there were no special differences.
    Quote: Saxahorse
    If Pearl darted the whole battle for Oleg and Aurora leading the battle in full swing (18-19 knots however), then the Emerald humbly hid behind armadillos crawling at 9 knots, as we recall.

    Your memory is frankly bad. Until 16.00 Emerald and Pearl were with armadillos, after 16.00 BOTH KRAISER fought along with Oleg and Aurora. The only difference was that the pearl was exactly what joined, and the Emerald acted independently, but next to the rest. By the way, your passage about “the whole battle” was especially amusing. The pearls fought Aurora and Oleg for exactly an hour, from 16 to 17, well, maybe until 17.15
    And yes, after that, the Emerald also ran to Alexander III, and then was forced to flee from the BRKR, drawing close to them with 23 cables.
    Quote: Saxahorse
    Well, the quality of the cars on both ships was equally poor.

    Which is completely not confirmed by any document. All sources report that the Emerald was much worse.
    Quote: Saxahorse
    So your assumption of 50 tons of "extra" at the Pearl is about 600 km. move.

    (heavy sigh) Yes, for 4,5 hours at full speed on May 15, the Emerald could easily lime 100-120 tons or more. coal consumption at Zhemchuga with its maximum of 18 knots there and did not lie close
    1. Saxahorse April 24 2020 22: 39 New
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      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      No, it does not confirm. You such a notion as the representativeness of the sample at school skipped? One does not judge many.

      I begin to doubt that you are truly an economist by training. Representativeness implies, above all, the integrity of the sample. And it’s not at all a scribble of a bug-eyed starpom confusing ships with a hangover. There is no confirmation that at least one of the figures drawn by Dyachkov corresponds to reality. But the very first figure subjected to real verification turned out to be grossly distorted.

      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      Do not want to read my articles - read other sources. I repeat, there were no special differences.

      You are not a Buddha or a Mohammed to demand such reverence for his writings. None of your articles on increased coal consumption were exactly the ones that Emerald said.

      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      Your memory is frankly bad. Until 16.00 Emerald and Pearl were with armadillos, after 16.00 BOTH KRAISER fought along with Oleg and Aurora.

      I cannot but be amazed at the flight of your imagination. You are corny lying or confusing. I recommend that you take up another article entitled "Battle of the Cruising Force at Tsushima". It seems like you suddenly learn a lot of new things for yourself.

      I repeat once again, in the Tsushima battle, Pearl joined the cruisers and the Emerald continued to play the role of a rehearsal vessel with the main forces, 2TOE battleships. And he really tried to repeat the signals of the flagship or matelot at every moment of the battle! I already blamed you for completely ignoring this point in your articles. It turns out that you not only ignored all the available evidence, but managed to draw your own, honestly delusional, conclusions ..

      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      Which is completely not confirmed by any document. All sources report that the Emerald was much worse

      It seems you should re-read the entire cycle of your own articles. Emerald had a bunch of problems with piping and seals! It was the colossal leaks in all the pipes that made him overhaul right on the hike. But there wasn’t even a word about coal overrun twice as compared to Pearls!

      By the way, if Dyachkov really confused the Emerald with Pearls in his ridiculous tablet, then this completely explains the Pearl head start in terms of power reserve. The difference of 30 tons + 80 tons "from the bedside table" at Levitsky is just 110 tons or 1350 km of travel.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 25 2020 09: 02 New
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        Quote: Saxahorse
        And it’s not at all a scribble of a bug-eyed starpom confusing ships with a hangover.

        Saxahorse, every time you once again break the bottom, and it seems to me that there is nowhere to fall below, it turns out that I'm wrong.
        Quote: Saxahorse
        There is no confirmation that at least one of the figures drawn by Dyachkov corresponds to reality

        There is only ONE case in which these numbers are incorrect. Accordingly, in other cases, deviations were not detected. Levitsky separately described the mechanic’s mistake when he knocked out the amount of coal after the battle. At the same Emerald, there was no talk of errors, of unaccounted coal, which does not allow us to suspect incorrect accounting of coal. The same goes for other ships.
        Quote: Saxahorse
        I begin to doubt that you are truly an economist by training.

        I have long doubted that you attended school, and so what? You start with coal from the logic: "You were not in Berlin? Give a certificate that you were not in Berlin!"
        Quote: Saxahorse
        I recommend that you take up another article entitled "Battle of the Cruising Force at Tsushima"

        I recommend you re-read it again.
        Quote: Saxahorse
        You are not a Buddha or a Mohammed to demand such reverence for his writings.

        Rave. I wrote
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Do not want to read my articles - read other sources.

        What respect is there?
        Quote: Saxahorse
        I repeat once again, in the Tsushima battle, Pearl joined the cruisers and the Emerald continued to play the role of a rehearsal vessel with the main forces, 2TOE battleships.

        I repeat - you write nonsense.
        Quote: Saxahorse
        It seems you should re-read the entire cycle of your own articles. Emerald had a bunch of problems with piping and seals! It was the colossal leaks in all the pipes that made him overhaul right on the hike. But there wasn’t even a word about coal overrun twice as compared to Pearls!

        Saxahorse, the second obviously follows from the first. Loss of coolant APRIORI means greater fuel consumption.
        1. Saxahorse April 26 2020 21: 31 New
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          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          There is only ONE case in which these numbers are incorrect.

          In the complete absence of cases when these numbers suddenly turned out to be TRUE - Sorry but you just drive some garbage crying

          Again. Not once did Dyachkov’s numbers be confirmed. They are all taken from the ceiling.

          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Saxahorse, the second obviously follows from the first. Loss of coolant APRIORI means greater fuel consumption.

          But you seem to have forgotten your own articles! After all, they repaired the pipe to the Emerald! He stopped flowing at all seams! Otherwise, he would have died under Tsushima :)

          It looks like you forgot how to argue. Take the arguments directly from the ceiling, refute yourself ten times .. laughing
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 27 2020 16: 26 New
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            Quote: Saxahorse
            In the complete absence of cases when these figures suddenly turned out to be TRUE -

            Given that in other cases of excess / lack of coal was not detected - the remaining cases are true. Until the opposite is proved. You are not proven, so
            Quote: Saxahorse
            Sorry but you just drive some garbage

            However, I have long been accustomed to your "argumentation" :)
            Quote: Saxahorse
            But you seem to have forgotten your own articles! After all, they repaired the pipe to the Emerald! He stopped flowing at all seams!

            Wow:)))
            Quote: Saxahorse
            It looks like you forgot how to argue. Arguments directly from the ceiling you take, disprove yourself ten times.

            Saxahorse, factory imperfections impossible to fix in a campaign. To patch up - it is possible, but only. So - as always - by.
            1. Saxahorse April 27 2020 23: 16 New
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              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Saxahorse, factory imperfections impossible to fix in a campaign. To patch up - it is possible, but only. So - as always - by.

              As always, you did not understand the essence of the problems of the Emerald. Pulling and fitting pipe / steam-wire seals is a completely solvable task, wrench in hand and go! If this work had not been completed, the Emerald is not that 21 knots could not be developed; by the evening of the 14th, it would have already stood. Let me remind you that in the voyage fresh water ran out for him in less than a day, it just flowed endlessly, then he requested water from Oleg, then he rushed to the nearest port urgently.
            2. Saxahorse April 29 2020 23: 17 New
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              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Given that in other cases of excess / lack of coal was not detected - the remaining cases are true. Until the opposite is proved. You are not proven, so

              Since I had to get into the eyewitness accounts, analyzing the battle of the cruisers, a sea of ​​these very “cases of surplus / lack” that you managed to “not notice” was immediately revealed. I will not be lazy and recall:

              The cruiser Svetlana - coal at the beginning of the battle 620 tons in pits and 200 tons in bags. At Dyachkov we see only 626 tons.

              Cruiser Emerald - Fersen reports loading 750 tons on May 10, in the last coal intake, at Dyachkov on the morning of 11/05, only 629 tons behind Emerald. The difference is 120 tons.

              The cruiser Pearls, we disassembled, suddenly there were 80 tons of unaccounted for.

              Cruiser Almaz - in the morning 560 tons, the remainder in Vladivostok 180 tons - this is from the testimony of commander Chagin. This is confirmed by one of the hold mechanics - more than 500 tons in the pits. Dyachkov has 476 tons in the table. HERE how did he do it !? Especially if you remember that Dyachkov was the head of Chagin .. laughing

              Well, the consumption of Pearls and Emerald is not difficult to compare by looking at the full plate of the same Dyachkov. Here you are partly right, Emerald spent a little more. If Pearls spent 47-51 tons per day, then Emerald 49-53 tons of coal per day on average. However, this difference of about 8% is not sufficient to explain the Pearl's two-time handicap in the power reserve.
              1. Jura 27 April 30 2020 04: 27 New
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                [/ quote] However, this difference of about 8% is not enough to explain the two-time handicap of the Pearl in the power reserve. [quote]

                In the morning, the enquist went at an economic speed of no more than 10 knots, and Fersen spied like a sting at 13 knots, burning all the coal that would have been enough for Sakhalin.
                1. Saxahorse April 30 2020 21: 51 New
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                  Quote: Jura 27
                  In the morning, the enquist went at an economic speed of no more than 10 knots,

                  The difference in 10 and 13 knots is not so great in terms of consumption. Much more than 16-18 knots in battle give. Here, besides everything, Dyachkov confused everything with his tablets, Well, the others tried. Fersen to listen so he should have remained 120 tons, enough for Kamchatka, but he did not dare to drift, climbed into the dangerous bay in the dark.
                2. Jura 27 1 May 2020 04: 35 New
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                  [/ quote] The difference in 10 and 13 nodes is not so great in terms of consumption. [quote]

                  Fersen writes that at 12-00 on May 16 he left 60-70 tons of coal. Here's something else, it could work: in the morning of May 15, I turned off the extra boilers, but I didn’t, and it turns out that the turn is 13 knots, and all the boilers are in operation (they had steam for immediate full speed) and the coal consumption could be as for 18-20 knots. Moreover, the "I" before the delivery of Nebogatov, walked at 13 knots, and the "F" in the morning, he could turn off extra boilers from work.
                3. Saxahorse 1 May 2020 21: 04 New
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                  Quote: Jura 27
                  Fersen writes that at 12-00 on May 16 he left 60-70 tons of coal.

                  Fersen managed to write that on the 10th he loaded 750 tons of coal. With 535 tons of maximum capacity in Emerald coal pits, the figure is impressive. Although the same Levitsky wrote that because of piles of coal taken directly to the deck, there was a deformation of the turning mechanisms of the first side guns. They began to wedge when turning horizontally.
          2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 May 2020 15: 33 New
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            Quote: Saxahorse
            I will not be lazy and recall:

            In vain :))) Because you do not understand what to compare with and again sit in a puddle
            Quote: Saxahorse
            The cruiser Svetlana - coal at the beginning of the battle 620 tons in pits and 200 tons in bags. At Dyachkov we see only 626 tons.

            That's right, because the rest of the coal was not intended to ensure the cruiser’s travel, but was used to protect "various weak parts of the cruiser", elevator mechanisms, etc. which follows from the testimony of a mechanic and other cruiser officers. Total we have 620 tons in the testimony and 626 at Dyachkova. Openwork, as the officers indicated approximate figures in the testimony.
            Quote: Saxahorse
            Cruiser Emerald - Fersen reports loading 750 tons on May 10

            According to the memory, a year and 7 months after the events. He particularly notes that all the records have already been handed over to them on an instance and his report may be incorrect in some way. That is, the figures of Dyachkov’s faith are much more
            Quote: Saxahorse
            Cruiser Almaz - in the morning 560 tons, the remainder in Vladivostok 180 tons - this is from the testimony of commander Chagin. This is confirmed by one of the hold mechanics - more than 500 tons in the pits. Dyachkov has 476 tons in the table. HERE how did he do it !?

            You're lying, not blushing.
            Chagin really showed the presence of 560 tons of coal. But here, just to Dyachkov, there is more faith, since the commander showed from memory. But the hold mechanic confirms the data of Dyachkov
            On the day of the battle, May 14, the overload must have also been, but not in coal, which remained only in coal pits, but in other reserves. How much coal and water were there by the morning of May 14, I do not remember; I think that there were about 500 tons of coal, since, upon arrival in Vladivostok, we had about 170-180 tons of coal left.

            For reference - 476 tons, this is just about 500 tons :))))
            1. Saxahorse 1 May 2020 20: 47 New
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              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              That's right, because the rest of the coal was not intended to ensure the cruiser’s travel, but was used to protect “various weak parts of the cruiser”

              Eco has thrown you in! Those. coal in bags for use in boilers is by no means suitable? laughing

              You recall that some had to tear off the wooden decking and shove into boilers? The argument "childish" can not be said otherwise. wink

              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Chagin really showed the presence of 560 tons of coal. But there’s just more Dyachkov’s faith

              And here you are digging a hole for yourself .. Because the version of Chagin, which produces 380 tons of coal per battle plus a campaign, correlates well with the result of the Emerald. It’s just that roughly, very roughly, the Emerald should have worked. Of course, without Ferzin’s crazy ideas about “another 120 tons”. Although the fact that they are delusional, it’s difficult to prove straight away request

              But if we take Dyachkov as the main argument (although it is strange to reject the official testimony of the commander ..) the ends do not converge at all, and the question is what kind of garbage with coal it rises to its full height!
            2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 2 May 2020 09: 29 New
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              Quote: Saxahorse
              Eco has thrown you in! Those. coal in bags for use in boilers is by no means suitable?

              The question is that the ship reported on the coal used for the move, that’s all :)))) Of course, “protective” coal could also be thrown into the furnace, but it was supposed to be stored as protection. Hence the report data, which fully correspond to the data of Dyachkov.
              Quote: Saxahorse
              The argument "childish" can not be said otherwise.

              I understand that it’s a shame, well, why do you argue with me? Here you are guaranteed a permanent bad mood :)))
              Quote: Saxahorse
              And here you are digging a hole for yourself .. Because the version of Chagin, which produces 380 tons of coal per battle plus a campaign, correlates well with the result of the Emerald.

              laughing fool
              Saxahorse, are you in your mind comparing directly the Emerald and the Diamond? Ships with completely different machines, with their different conditions, with completely different running conditions in Tsushima and after ... He found a correlation, well, you need it :))))
            3. Saxahorse 2 May 2020 21: 32 New
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              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              The question is that the ship reported on the coal used for the move, that's all:

              So I’m saying this to you! Morning reports are stupidly collected on Dyachkov’s tablet, in addition, either by Dyachkov’s or signalmen. None of the commanders was eager to show their reserves exactly, all in the end found stash and considerable!

              I’ll probably keep silent about “protective coal”, this is your next wonderful pearl. Save for posterity perhaps. wink

              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Saxahorse, are you in your mind comparing directly the Emerald and the Diamond? Ships with completely different cars,

              In my common sense, I (by your prayers of course) have no doubt whatsoever. The machines on all the pebbles are exactly the same! laughing

              All the “pebbles” had triple expansion steam engines of about the same power per piece. Diamond has two of them; Pearls and Emerald have three pieces. The sizes of the "pebbles" are almost the same, which means that power at the same speed is spent about the same. A diamond just like Pearls and Emerald fought at 16 knots, sometimes accelerating to 18 knots. As a result, 380 tons of Diamond spent on the battle and the campaign to Vladik can be safely compared with the consumption of Pearls and Emeralds.

              By your efforts, I really noticed that Emerald spent on average 8% more coal. But even so, and taking into account Valentine’s opinion about 18 tons per hour at full speed, we get from Emerald the balance of 30-40 tons, essentially a day of economic progress. Ferzen should not have climbed Olga Bay at night. Coal was quite enough to hold out at sea until the morning.
            4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 3 May 2020 00: 12 New
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              Quote: Saxahorse
              So I’m saying this to you! Morning reports are stupidly collected on Dyachkov’s tablet, in addition, either by Dyachkov’s or signalmen.

              Alas, from the fact that you repeated it 100500 times, your words do not become true :)
              Quote: Saxahorse
              I’ll probably keep silent about “protective coal”, this is your next wonderful pearl.

              Lying is not good, Saxahorse. A lie is verified doubly stupid


              Quote: Saxahorse
              All the “pebbles” had triple expansion steam engines of about the same power per piece. Diamond has two of them; Pearls and Emerald have three pieces.

              But this is a masterpiece in general. Nothing that 2 Diamond machines have less than 8 thousand horsepower. and three Emerald cars have 17 hp?
            5. Saxahorse 3 May 2020 19: 43 New
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              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Lying is not good, Saxahorse. A lie is verified doubly stupid

              And in what place did I lie to you? Why did you repeat and confirm my comment? I wrote to you three times that Svetlana had 620 tons of coal in pits and 200 tons in bags. You have carefully confirmed this .. And cho? wassat

              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              But this is a masterpiece in general. Nothing that 2 Diamond machines have less than 8 thousand horsepower. and three Emerald cars have 17 hp?

              Well, as always, the main problem was to explain the basics of physics to the economist .. You really don’t understand that if Emerald had even a nuclear reactor, it would require the same power to develop the same speed as Diamond, with equal displacement and approximately equal contours! Learn physics at last Andrey! How many articles on the performance characteristics of warships have already been written and still such blunders in elementary physical questions! laughing
            6. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 3 May 2020 20: 57 New
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              Quote: Saxahorse
              And what?

              And the fact that the "inaccuracy" you found has a rational explanation and does not refute the data of Dyachkov
              Quote: Saxahorse
              Well, as always, the main problem was to explain to the economist the basics of physics ..

              Very hard. Especially when you don’t know physics yourself.
              Quote: Saxahorse
              You really don’t understand that if Emerald had even a nuclear reactor, it would require the same power to develop the same speed as Diamond, with equal displacement and approximately equal contours!

              If you were familiar with the basics of physics, you would realize that a ship with a width of 12,8 m and a draft of 5,33 m would have noticeably different contours than a ship with a width of 13,26 and a draft of 4,97 m. But they did not realize.
              The most important thing is that Diamond was designed for a speed of 19 knots, Emerald - for 24 knots. And I don’t know how to skip physics at school, so as not to understand that for this, even with equal contours, the Emerald will need more powerful cars than Diamond. Yes, if they had equal contours (but this was not), then for the same speed the power would be approximately equal, but the speeds were laid unequal :))) Hence, the Emerald had more powerful machines, which, naturally different from those on Diamond
              Fundamentals of Physics, Saxahorse
            7. Saxahorse 5 May 2020 20: 28 New
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              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              And the fact that the "inaccuracy" you found has a rational explanation and does not refute the data of Dyachkov

              It does not refute, but explains. Once again, Dyachkov brought into his table only the numbers that the commanders had instructed to transmit to the flagship in the morning calibration. Even of his cruiser, Almaz, of course, Dyachkov knew exactly how much coal he had in the pits, usually it was the senior officer who was assigned to prepare a daily stock report. However, the numbers that Chagin ordered to call the signalman, and not the actual 560 tons, were added to his tablet.

              Shein’s inaccuracy (Svetlana) differs only in that on Svetlana they thought up an excuse in advance in case of flagship claims. Therefore, the stash of Svetlana - 30% of the reserves, and the stash of other cruisers is more modest, 20% hiccuped. By the way, pay attention to an approximately equal share, about 20%, apparently more was already noticeable and less toad did not allow. laughing

              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Yes, if they had equal contours (but this was not), then for the same speed the power would be approximately equal, but the speeds were laid unequally :)))

              That's what I am complaining about ... Have you understood what you said? With equal displacement and approximately the same contours (and they are all cruisers!) And even the same boilers, the fuel consumption will also be about the same. Of course not up to a gram! However, the difference is not by orders of magnitude or even many times, just look at the same Dyachkov plate for example. Diamond spent an angle in economy mode about 10% less than Pearls. However, in battle, at 16-18 angles I had to spend more on the contrary, for Diamond 18 knots is almost the most complete move! Because the figure of consumption corners Diamond, 380 tons, you can safely take as a basis plus / minus 5-10%.
          3. Senior seaman 5 May 2020 18: 34 New
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            Quote: Saxahorse
            Emerald even has a nuclear reactor, for the development of the same speed as Diamond, with equal displacement and approximately equal contours,

            Uh ... equal contours of the yacht clipper stem and cruiser ram plow?

          4. Saxahorse 5 May 2020 20: 31 New
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            A little higher, I already answered Andrei. Both ships have cruising contours. It makes no sense to calculate grams of fuel, and within 10%, both power and consumption will be the same.
          5. Senior seaman 5 May 2020 22: 29 New
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            You wrote nonsense there.
            cruising contours

            This, sorry, what? The “goddesses”, whose machines developed almost a thousand forces more than the design, and had a knot less speed, had “cruising contours”? Are they exactly the same as the "Varyag", who had the opposite situation during the tests?
            and even identical boilers

            No censorship words!
            Where did you see the same boilers? Everything in the CMU is different there!
            On the “pebbles” there are three four-cylinder cars (two low-pressure cylinders), on the “Diamond” two - three-cylinder ones.
            On the first three-shaft installation, on the second - two.
            On the cruisers of the Nevsky Plant, Yarou boilers, on the Baltic - Belvili.
            And ramming is very significant. It seems that Melnikov wrote that they ate at least the speed knot of the then ships.
          6. Saxahorse 6 May 2020 01: 41 New
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            Quote: Senior Sailor
            The “goddesses”, whose machines developed almost a thousand forces more than the design, and had a knot less speed, had “cruising contours”?

            Cruising contours are 8,35 for Diamond and 8,28 for Emerald. There is a difference but it is scanty. As for the boilers, you are right, I got excited, there was Bellville on the Diamond without an economizer, on the Emerald Yarroy instead of German boilers. However, here the difference is not fundamental, I wrote about it above.

            Stop doing nonsense, look for truth in centimeters .. Machines of the same type show approximately the same results. I hope you do not need, like Andrei, to explain that the same power gives about the same speed and spends about the same amount of fuel?
          7. Senior seaman 6 May 2020 12: 15 New
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            Quote: Saxahorse
            Machines of the same type show approximately the same results.

            That is, the difference between three and four-cylinder cars is not available to you?
            Quote: Saxahorse
            explain that the same power gives about the same speed and spends about the same amount of fuel?

            Only with other things being equal, but they are never equal.
          8. Saxahorse 6 May 2020 22: 08 New
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            Quote: Senior Sailor
            Only with other things being equal, but they are never equal.

            You are an avid alternate, have you really never tried to calculate your boat? The most important parameters are just the fullness coefficient, displacement and power of cars - from here they get the estimated speed.

            All these parameters are the same for Diamond and Emerald. The difference in the number of screws or cylinders is calculated as a percentage. You are just acting up. wink
          9. Senior seaman 7 May 2020 11: 44 New
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            Quote: Saxahorse
            All these parameters are the same for Diamond and Emerald.

            In what place is the same “machine power”? there the difference is more than twice.
            Sorry, my censorship arguments are over :))
            Quote: Saxahorse
            The most important parameters are just the coefficient of completeness

            I don’t know how you figured it out: " Cruising contours are 8,35 for Diamond and 8,28 for Emerald."
            And what exactly is this coefficient (there are four of them), but I know for sure that the “pebbles” are longer and already “Diamond”, with more powerful machines. and to determine the speed, it is precisely this ratio that is important.
            And therefore, your example is completely incorrect.
          10. Saxahorse 7 May 2020 23: 57 New
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            Quote: Senior Sailor
            In what place is the same “machine power”?

            The speed is the same there! With the same machine power, the speed is the same as fuel consumption and vice versa !! laughing
          11. Senior seaman 8 May 2020 09: 08 New
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            Quote: Saxahorse
            With the same machine power, the speed is the same as fuel consumption and vice versa !!

            Two completely different ships ...
  • Niko April 27 2020 07: 36 New
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    Oh, Andrei, I’m afraid, as it were, with petty criticism and nit-picking on issues of the fourth degree of importance that you haven’t discouraged you from writing further. not always amenable to reasonable explanation)
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 27 2020 16: 29 New
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      They won’t take it away :)) There are just two people, Yura27 and Saksakhors, who are trying to get out of my way to refute me at least in some way. Yura27 I understand why, I once decently crushed corns on the althistory, and the saxors ... Who knows, I’m not a psychiatrist.
      In general, for them, any of my publications is like a rag for a bull. This has not bothered me for a long time.
      1. Jura 27 April 28 2020 05: 06 New
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        [/ quote] Jura27 it is clear why, I decently once crushed corns on him althistory [quote]

        Everything was exactly the opposite - from you there was no criticism of my work, from me constant criticism of your fantasies, but solely on the case.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 28 2020 08: 40 New
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          Yes of course:)))))))
          1. Jura 27 April 28 2020 09: 15 New
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            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Yes of course:)))))))

            They themselves admitted, I didn’t pull you by the tongue. wassat
          2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 28 2020 09: 19 New
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            Yura, even though you know how to accept a polite refusal for warm approval, to Churchill you oh how far :))))))
  • Jura 27 April 23 2020 04: 38 New
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    Quote: vladcub
    , Yuri, you have not changed: you will find something to complain about with Andrei.
    Weak to lay out his own story? Criticizing without substantive arguments is easier than telling yourself

    Stability is a sign of mastery! laughing
    I have already laid out all the arguments in the comment - briefly and on the case.
  • VohaAhov April 23 2020 13: 03 New
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    Quote: Macsen_Wledig
    Quote: VohaAhov
    I'll try to insert a photo of "Emerald", which shows how it is overloaded.

    It’s hard to judge without deepening marks ...

    I tried to combine 2 photos. Pay attention to the covers of the bow torpedo tubes and the covers for closing the anchor locks. On the top photo with normal load, and on the bottom with overload.
    1. vladcub April 23 2020 17: 15 New
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      If close up, it’s far away
      1. VohaAhov April 23 2020 20: 51 New
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        For some reason, only small pictures are inserted, but if you look closely, you can see.
        1. Saxahorse April 23 2020 23: 23 New
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          And you can take a ruler and measure directly on the photo. You are right, in the lower photo Emerald sits much deeper.
  • vladcub April 23 2020 17: 12 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Quote: ser56
    Not bad - finally the cycle is completed ...

    No, more about Pearls will be :))))

    Fine. The longer the better: less gray
  • Niko April 25 2020 10: 32 New
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    I want to apologize to the author, I was carried away by the dialogue with ser56 article deserves more than this "mental masturbation" in the comments
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 25 2020 12: 44 New
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      No problems:))) hi drinks Sometimes the comments were much worse
      1. Niko April 25 2020 14: 18 New
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        Thank you for understanding
  • candidate April 26 2020 22: 49 New
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    It would be nice to create a movie
    Tsushima battle show details
    Designate heroes, trace their fate
    And ship history forever reflect
  • Sasha_rulevoy April 27 2020 09: 57 New
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    fatigue by a 9-month transition


    About fatigue is a curious moment. First, fatigue was not in nine months, but only in three. And before that - two months "all inclusive" in Madagascar. Three months of peaceful transition, hostilities were not conducted. The commander of the Emerald Ferzen was not engaged in physical labor. He carried running watches along with three more navigators. The cabin is comfortable. He did not have to hang around the bridge around the clock. And why did the Japanese or the Arthurians not have fatigue by December 1904? They have 11 months of fighting, the last months in harsh climatic conditions, repairs and exercises. But how did officers withstand the WWII?

    For some reason, in the entire history of wars, only in the 2nd TOE the officers were "exhausted." The commanders "did not leave the bridges for days," Rozhestvensky was also "crushed by an exorbitant burden of responsibility." Well, with Rozhestvensky it’s clear - as a zero organizer, and paranoid, he took upon himself the duties of all the staff officers and part of the Suvorov officers right up to the boatswain who was watching the washing of the deck. Therefore, I didn’t leave the bridge for days. The officers of the headquarters of Rozhestvensky were embarrassed to move away from the admiral, therefore, too, they hung around the bridge for days on end, and therefore did not get enough sleep. But on other ships it was not much better. For the last months of the campaign, Rozhdestvensky for some reason announced a mine alarm every night. Sailors, probably, could somehow sleep in shifts at the guns, and officers had to stay awake at night, especially the ship's commander. Plus, Rozhdestvensky unnerved the ship commanders with information about the alleged close presence of the Japanese, and added it with rude treatment and nit-picking. There was something for the commanders, especially the punctual Germans, to have continuous stress and lack of sleep, and even against the background of general defeatist sentiments.

    Bottom line: Felkersam died, Ignatius in an incomprehensible euphoria, Sventorzhetsky jumped overboard, Filipovsky sick, Krzhizhanovsky and Semenov dream of dying sooner, if only this torture would end up being lack of sleep. Rozhdestvensky drags a leg, i.e. also seriously unwell with psychosomatics. On the squadron (except for the non-wealthy detachment) there is general alarmism, defeatism and demoralization.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 27 2020 16: 21 New
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      Quote: Sasha_rulevoy
      About fatigue is a curious moment. First, fatigue was not in nine months, but only in three. And before that - two months "all inclusive" in Madagascar.

      After that, reading the comment is no longer interesting. The Emerald arrived in Madagascar on February 1 as part of a catch-up detachment, and on March 3 the squadron left Nossi-Be.
      "All inclusive" included frying during the day, and at least 26 degrees of heat at night with humidity close to 100%. You would have to rest there so that understanding comes. At the same time, officers were not lying on the beaches, but preparing ships for the continuation of the campaign.
      I don’t see the point of commenting on the rest - you have 3 errors in each word.
      1. Sasha_rulevoy April 30 2020 05: 55 New
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        "All inclusive" included frying during the day, and at least 26 degrees of heat at night with humidity close to 100%. You would have to rest there so that understanding comes.


        The Maldives is not far there, I would not mind rolling, there is no such money.

        Day frying, you can not argue with that. Duck heard a song about a mad dog and an Englishman? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vMlyT_Sb7sg It’s easy to guess, in such a climate, assign shipwork in the morning and sleep in the afternoon. Felkersam, while walking alone through even hotter tropics, thought of this before. And now: he was good-naturedly joking with the lower ranks. We agree that a tired, exhausted man lacking sleep will not good-naturedly fool around, and even with the lower ranks. Rather, he will yell at them, break his shoulder blades and binoculars, disrupting a bad mood.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 30 2020 20: 37 New
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          Quote: Sasha_rulevoy
          It’s not hard to guess, in such a climate, assign shipwork in the morning, and sleep in the afternoon.

          Again. Climb into an iron box, at a temperature of 26 degrees MINIMUM (even at night) with humidity below 100 and try to work :)))) I guarantee, on the third day you will really regret that you got involved in all this. And the service on the warship is constantly flowing, a lot of work and it is impossible to reduce everything to the morning hours.
          Quote: Sasha_rulevoy
          Felkersam, while walking alone through even hotter tropics, thought of this before. And now: he was good-naturedly joking with the lower ranks.

          Yes. True, he accidentally died before the battle.
          Quote: Sasha_rulevoy
          Rather, he will yell at them, break his shoulder blades and binoculars, disrupting a bad mood.

          And how much evidence of the regular breaking of binoculars on the head (apart from Novikov-Priboy which is impossible to count as a source)?
          1. Sasha_rulevoy 3 May 2020 08: 18 New
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            Yes, in an iron box, this is certainly terrible, you can’t argue. But this applies only to hold and machine specialists engaged in the repair of mechanisms. And there are four of them on the ship. All other officers and 80% of the crew have no reason to go below deck. The decks were then wooden - do not burn. Above the decks are awnings. At sea, a fresh breeze always draws. All slept at night, too, on the decks, stripping naked, and the officers and sailors. Refrigerators on ships worked (according to Semenov - the team was saved from the heat by cold kvass). T.O. with a smart daily routine, parking would not be so different from all-inclusive.

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            True, he accidentally died before the battle.


            He died when he himself was no longer able to plan the daily routine and allocate sufficient time for rest. In the meantime, he had such an opportunity; he didn’t die, he felt great.
  • Andrey Krasnoyarsky April 28 2020 13: 19 New
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    A big plus of this material and the undoubted merit of the author: taking into account the psychological state of the cruiser commander and crew. Quite often military analysts lose sight of this important factor in the analysis of battles.
  • Oprichnik 5 May 2020 17: 56 New
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    Dear experts! I am addressing you not quite on the topic. My distant relative was a midshipman and volunteered on a campaign, presumably in armadillos, and died with a ship. I want to find where you can see the lists of crews, to know what it was on and remember. I am now the oldest in the Family and I want my grandchildren to know about their ancestors. His line was cut short during the years of the Civil War, famine and the Second World War.