Legends and myths of the Great Patriotic War. What is the reason for this beginning

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Legends and myths of the Great Patriotic War. What is the reason for this beginning

Previous material caused the expected perplexity. But it was obviously premature to draw conclusions at that level, if not difficult, although some commentators, as is customary for us, made them easily and naturally. Although a lot of letters and minutes separate us from the true disclosure of the topic and acceptable conclusions.

I am very grateful to everyone who wrote another article in the comments, especially to Alexei. Very balanced and logical.



But really, it makes sense to sort things out, trying to get answers to questions, since everything is wrong in our stories definitely. I understand that some would like "fried and hot" facts right now, but alas. Everything should take its course, because I continue.

In the first article, we (though not all) were convinced that with the new types of airplanes in the SC Air Force, not everything was as rosy as we would like and as many historians write. And indeed, why it was necessary to increase the number of new aircraft by 4 times before the start of the war, it is not yet entirely clear. But the road will be overpowered by the walking one. Especially in a country where distortion of history is commonplace.

But now we’ll talk about what gave the Luftwaffe a real advantage in June 1941. So far - without the human factor. Separate material should be given to this component, and we will do this in the near future.

So, on 22.06.1941/1540/377, on the contact line there were not XNUMX new types of aircraft, but XNUMX. A little less. But also a figure, whatever one may say.

But only airplanes standing at airfields are half the battle. The second half was needed, namely, trained and trained pilots, engineers, technicians, engine drivers (for some machines). Gadgets, radio engineers and gunsmiths, thank God, were not required, but there were enough problems with the above.

Probably, it is not worth explaining in detail to our audience that introducing new technology into the business is always fraught with certain efforts. Our Air Force was no exception, and on the equipment that was already in the troops, even on the eve of the war, various improvements were constantly being made to eliminate detected structural-production and operational defects and defects.

You must admit that it is one thing to operate and test an airplane under ideal conditions of a factory airfield and quite another to use unpaved runways and taxiways at the majority of airfields of that time.


Plus, the training of technical staff is also a very significant aspect, but the human factor, I repeat, is for now set aside.

In general, it would be like the planes had to go through a full cycle of tests, including in the troops, under the control of already no fancy bison test pilots, namely those who would later have to use the machines in combat mode.

Opinions, reviews, acts, everything had to be put together in one heap, and ...

And in the end, full instructions for the use of aircraft in a combat situation should have appeared.

By the way, these instructions are a very important point in the further training of pilots and facilitate their combat work.

And here you are - on June 20, 1941, an order was issued by the Air Force Research Institute, which required by August 1, 1941 to complete operational tests and tests for combat use in both day and night conditions of all new type combat aircraft.

Based on the test results, the Air Force Research Institute planned to develop the very instructions that were to be sent to the troops.

1. According to the technique of piloting these aircraft, both day and night, at all heights to the working ceiling of the aircraft.

2. For combat use in day and night conditions: bombing from horizontal flight and diving, air combat at all heights to the practical ceiling of the aircraft.

3. On the operation of the aircraft, motor, weapons and special equipment.

Smart? Cleverly. Especially with night flights, which we basically have learned units, and night aviation was never created at all.

It is clear that the tests were not completed, since the war began. This is a very sad fact, since in reality these documents would be very useful for our pilots who, in fact, went into battle on new types of unfinished aircraft, without the necessary knowledge and skills in the combat use and operation of them in the air.

And here is a difficult situation for you: which is worse, inferior in all respects, except for the maneuver, the I-16, or the same MiG-3, from which it was generally not clear what to expect in a real battle?

Once again referring to Pokryshkin’s memoirs, how did he start the war on the MiG-3? But it was Pokryshkin, but Golodnikov, whom I respect no less, has a story about how one commander was unable to open fire on an enemy aircraft, because he did not know the nuances of handling the command weapons.

The fact that the new aircraft entered the troops did not solve the problem of confrontation at first. Note this, because the pilots really did not have time to master these machines.

The Luftwaffe also had one more total advantage: the radio.

There are two components here: radio communication and radar. And here it is very difficult to object to those who say that it was very sad with us.

Fighters of new types, although they had regular seats for radio stations such as RSI-3 "Eagle", but they were not equipped. Radio transmitters were placed only on commander’s vehicles, approximately one on 15 aircraft. Receivers were placed more often, but the use of Soviet radio stations was very much hampered by the lack of normal protection against interference, so that the receivers caught all the work of the engine and electrical systems of the aircraft.

But even the presence on our aircraft of receivers and transmitters would not greatly facilitate the combat work of pilots. It was very important to have the appropriate infrastructure on the ground that would search for enemy aircraft, organize air battles, coordinate with ground troops and air defense, target designation and guidance.

In principle, there was only the service of air navigation monitoring (air surveillance, warning, communications), but it worked according to the principles of the First World War. There are enough memoirs to date on how the posts of the airspace monitoring and logging department worked. The towels that were laid out on the ground, indicating the direction where the enemy planes flew, miraculously seen through binoculars, is, of course, not a masterpiece.

Plus no responsiveness. Even if the AEROS post noticed German planes, even if he reported over the telephone to the airfield, it was simply unrealistic to target planes that were already in the air. Therefore, it was necessary to raise (if any) free squadrons and aim them somewhere towards the enemy. Because VNOS posts at the beginning of the war had no connection with airplanes.

“They flew, but they didn’t find the enemy” (we look at Pokryshkin, he often sees this, and not only him).

The lack of radio communications, normal guidance and adjustment services for aviation, the possibility of real control of aircraft in the air, lack of coordination with ground forces - this was such an advantage for the Luftwaffe that it was impossible to level even thousands of new aircraft.

Indeed, what is the use of hundreds and thousands of airplanes if it was impossible to control them?

It turned out to be a very ugly situation in which our pilots had to constantly catch up with the enemy, look for him, completely not receiving support from the ground in the form of information, while the Germans, having an advantage in this area, chose more advantageous positions for attack and caused damage.

It is difficult to blame someone for this state of affairs. Yes, if our electronic industry at the time the war began was not in its infancy, then in any case it was losing the German one for a clear advantage. The plants were so weak that they simply could not meet the needs of the army and the air force in radio stations. We are not even talking about radar.

But the enemy was all right. Before the war, a commission led by Alexander Yakovlev purchased a number of aircraft models in Germany, including Bf.109E, Bf.110, Ju.88, Do.215.

It turned out that a German aircraft could not be imagined without a radio station, radio half-life, without equipment for blind landing and a number of systems designed to make life easier for a pilot in battle.

In Germany, the beacon and direction finding service was very well developed. Airfield radio stations, radio beacons, direction finders, light beacons, airfields equipped for night flights and day flights in difficult weather conditions with blind landing equipment - all were designed to serve one purpose: safe and easy flights of German pilots.

When the war began, it is clear that all this equipment was used to work at the front.


For example, when the Germans raided Moscow, they used Orsha and Warsaw beacons. Soviet bombers flying to Berlin relied solely on navigational skill and precision. There was a relative order with this, but there were cases when the planes went astray and flew off to the wrong place.

In general, I believe that the absence of a radar detection service, a radio control service for aircraft and communications in the air force of the spacecraft in general created more problems than the absence of the latest types of aircraft. Agree, it would be possible to have not 10 thousand aircraft in the western direction, but 15. There would be only one effect - more organized, "sighted" in terms of information, German aces would beat even more, taking advantage of their advantage in the organization.

There was one more important moment. Now the old-timers will say: well, again ... Yes, again. Again about the motors.

How many times have I mentioned the eternal problem of avimotors, but motors were indeed the weakest link in our aircraft industry. Alas, it’s true. The only excuse can be considered the lack of engine building as such at the time the reference began, that is, 1917.

This is not to say that the Germans began their journey with roses and schnapps, they had no better after the defeat in the First World War. More precisely, comparable to us. But the Germans had their great engineering school, they had the potential.

And so they also started with licensed engines.

Nevertheless, when Yakovlev dragged a Bf.1940E fighter at the VSS Research Institute and the testers of the institute turned the Messer inside out, I had to admit that the DB 109 motor was simply magnificent both in terms of performance and reliability. It was even proposed to copy it and start producing in series.

The idea, let's say, was good, as was the motor itself. However, our engineers, unfortunately, could not cope with the automation, which was stuffed with DB 601.

Proposal for the introduction of direct fuel injection equipment into the engine cylinders, a supercharger start-up machine, an afterburner start-up machine for installing them on our engines. Alas, they could not. All this appeared with us, but much later than with the Germans.

However, looking ahead, I note that when the first normal automatic machines appeared, the Germans did their best to operate the so-called Kommandogerat, a central control unit that not only made the pilot easier to control, but simply did it amazingly: one movement of the handle of the gas sector at the same time controlled air dampers, fuel equipment, radiator shutters, ignition timing, propeller angle of attack ...


Cabin Bf.109F-2

If the German pilot needed to fly faster and higher, he simply moved the control handle. The Soviet octopus had to move, twist, push, controlling modes. Because usually the screw stood in one position, the radiator flaps stood upstream and so on.


MiG-3 cab

It is not surprising that thanks to the automation of the DB 601, not only was it more powerful than the VK-105, it also consumed less fuel than our engines. For one horsepower of power when working in comparable mode, the DB 601 consumed less fuel than our M-105 and AM-35A by 25,5 and 28,5 percent, respectively.

In general, of course, the Germans were comfortable flying and fighting with such a set of automation. Moreover, automation was planned during the development of the aircraft, as it were, so to speak, it was standard equipment.

Judge for yourself by the same Ju. 88:

- when the air brakes were opened on Ju.88, the plane automatically went into a dive, while the device automatically limited to limit overloads when exiting the dive;

- when dropping bombs from a dive, the plane automatically leaves the dive;

- when flaps are released for landing, the angle of the stabilizer is automatically changed and both ailerons acting as flaps deviate downward;

- on take-off exactly after 1 minute, the afterburner of the motors automatically turns on;

- at a climb after reaching a certain height, the 2nd supercharger speed is automatically turned on;

- motor temperature is automatically adjusted;

- the quality of the mixture and the suction pressure are automatically adjusted depending on the density of the air (flight altitude);

- airplanes, blind landing equipment, radio compass are installed on airplanes.

In principle, the last four points were valid for fighters.

What happens: Bf.109E was not much better in terms of performance characteristics than the same MiG-3, Yak-1 and LaGG-3. However, all this automation gave the Germans a huge advantage, incomparable with superiority in the performance characteristics.

While our pilot fought with handles, toggle switches, levers and buttons (and you can also recall the 45 revolutions of the landing gear handle on the I-16), the German was engaged in his immediate business - he was looking for a target, the direction to which he was prompted by radio radar operators and observers from the ground , choose a favorable position and prepare for battle.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War, especially the first and part of the second periods, showed that we failed mainly due to the technical backlog of our fighter aircraft, which had a significant impact on operations in ground operations.

In the early days, the Luftwaffe gained strategic dominance in the air throughout the front and held it until the Battle of Kursk and the battle in the sky over the Kuban.

And now it will be possible to draw a preliminary conclusion.

By the beginning of the war, we had in the five western border districts 377 fighters of new types, which were at the stage of refinement and testing.

In addition, 3156 fighters of outdated types: “maneuverable” fighters I-15, I-153 and “high-speed” fighters I-16.


The fact that the main load fell on them in the first period of the air war is understandable. The fact that even on these aircraft our pilots inflicted damage on the enemy suggests that at least the training of the flight crew of the Air Force was not inferior to the training in the Luftwaffe.

However, the maximum speed of Bf.109F was higher than the speed of the I-153 fighter with the M-63 engine by 162 km / h, and compared with the speed of the I-16 fighter with the M-63 engine by 123 km / h.

Plus technical innovations, plus the availability of radio communications.

Incidentally, of the 1233 Luftwaffe fighters on the Eastern Front, the latest Bf.109F were 593 units. That is, there were more of them initially than our new aircraft. If we add to this 423 pieces of Bf.109E, which was on an equal footing with our new types, then the picture is generally sad. 1016 new “Messers” versus 377 new ours.

Given all the above, it is clear why the Luftwaffe easily and naturally ensured air superiority for three years, right?

But there is a third nuance, which we will discuss in the next part, and then we will make the final conclusion.
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193 comments
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  1. +9
    April 17 2020 18: 13
    But are the untrained pilots and those. the staff is not a human factor, which the author, it seems, dismissed at the beginning of the article?
    1. -8
      April 17 2020 19: 45
      True noted!

      And yet - no one canceled the effect of surprise.

      The attack of fascist Germany was vile.
      1. +14
        April 17 2020 20: 15
        Quote: I

        The attack of fascist Germany was vile.

        Any attack on the enemy who is not expecting this can be called vile.
        1. 0
          April 24 2020 11: 09
          In what sense is vile? The fact that the Germans started the war without a declaration was at that time similar in the order of things. The same thing happened on November 30, 1939, when the Winter War began without any declaration of war, but for some reason no one calls the attack of the Red Army vile. Well, maybe only the Finns, but they are stupid.
          1. 0
            April 24 2020 14: 55
            Quote: Procyon Lotor
            In what sense is vile?

            In the literal sense. To attack under the current non-aggression treaty - no one has done so. No claims and clearly articulated reasons. In the complete absence of territorial and economic differences.
            Moreover, even the closest entourage of Hitler, at least Halder (the military) and Ribbentrop (politicians and diplomats) did not sincerely understand the meaning of the attack on the USSR.
            ONLY BRITAIN was interested in the German attack on the USSR in 1941. But in such an Anglophilia of Hitler, up to moronity, the leadership of the USSR could not believe.
            The error is understandable, but it cost us a lot.
        2. 0
          29 June 2020 20: 57
          Quote: Aron Zaavi
          Any attack on the enemy who is not expecting can be called vile

          You might think that you declared war in 1967. But in general, at night on June 22, a note was issued declaring war. Moreover, twice, in Moscow and Berlin. Before or after the beginning of the database xs
        3. 0
          14 July 2020 18: 30
          Oh well, Stalin wasn’t preparing such a simpleton for war. If the Germans didn’t say hello to the beginning of the war, Hitler himself said if I knew that everything would turn out like this, I would not have once started a war.
      2. +7
        April 18 2020 00: 49
        Either the attack was dastardly or intelligence (vigilance) was absent. Stop, isn't it one and the same thing, just named in different words, like "spy" and "scout"?
        1. -2
          April 20 2020 18: 05
          Quote: Proctologist
          Either the attack was dastardly or intelligence (vigilance) was absent. Stop, isn't it one and the same thing, just named in different words, like "spy" and "scout"?

          Well, if you go further according to your logic, then military art is the art of lies! hi
      3. 0
        April 23 2020 18: 22
        There was no such suddenness. That's how they know at the bazaar what is being done at the top, all of Europe, and of course in the USSR, knew that Hitler would attack. Stalin hoped that after the Finnish war, enlightenment would come in the heads of the army commanders. But Stalin did not know that the weapons would be removed from the planes, the sight would be removed from the artillery, and the tanks would be sent to different places, leaving them without weapons and fuel. But it was done. All the while Ukrainian places passed - this was happening. So they came to Russia and then the car stopped, a rebuff began.
        1. 0
          15 June 2020 08: 14
          The order of the Headquarters: "do not step back without an order", a rebuff immediately began ...
    2. kig
      0
      22 May 2020 08: 28
      Quote: Leader of the Redskins
      But are the untrained pilots and those. staff is not a human factor

      Author:
      This component should be given separate material, and we will do this in the near future.
  2. +8
    April 17 2020 18: 15
    There were many reasons. Both organizational and purely technical. And the fact that at the beginning of the Second World War the Red Army did not have the opportunity to create a solid front line and more or less keep it, even if retreating from time to time, the Red Army Air Force also did not have the best effect, since the Air Force was forced to destroy not a small number of damaged aircraft that more favorable situation, it would be possible to repair the outbreak to the east while moving the same front line. + To this, the German ground forces also captured / destroyed quite a few airfields of the Red Army and destroyed everything they could there.
    1. 0
      April 19 2020 16: 34
      It seems to me that the thing was that no one trusted anyone. After all, everyone wrote denunciations, and in the end, at the end, people in the top positions turned out to be completely incomprehensible what they should do in this position. But they were betrayed to the party until the last friend on whom they had not yet managed to write an anonymous letter. Who at the very beginning of the war gave the order to remove weapons from aircraft, and from artillery sights, supposedly for revision. My wife’s grandfather was called up on the first day and it turned out that no one was ready for anything. Moreover, the warehouses were looted not only in the district centers, but even in Kiev. Such confrontation and betrayal was before the troops rolled back to the territory of the RSFSR. Here there was already no such thing. This was the land of workers and peasants, and not of any riffraffers who swore allegiance and waited for the moment to stick a knife in the back.
      1. +1
        April 21 2020 11: 29
        Neighbors in the United States knock on each other even more trenchantly than we did at 30. And does it bother them in some way, does it affect the military sphere? The biggest mistake was in overestimating the military capabilities of France. due to which the completion of most of the plans was spelled out for 42 years. Completion of the border line of fortifications, re-equipment of airfields and "refitting" to concrete and many other plans.
  3. +12
    April 17 2020 18: 21
    The most important thing is the pilots raid: the Germans on June 22, 1941 he was hundreds of hours for the pilot, and even in combat conditions, we have dozens of hours in peaceful conditions (the resource of engines did not allow more).
    1. +14
      April 17 2020 21: 22
      Quote: Operator
      we have dozens of hours in peaceful conditions (the resource of motors did not allow more).

      It was not even a resource. There was no fuel for preparation.
      In order to accelerate the training of flight personnel, it is necessary to stop interruptions in the supply of gasoline. As a rule, every year, comrade People’s Commissar, at the very height of flights in the summer, starting from the month of July, and sometimes from the month of June, the supply of gas stops, parts switch to hungry rations, making flights to the better months because of this for flights (June, July, August). This situation is further intolerable. You won’t learn to fly without gas. The normal supply of gasoline begins again from the month of October, when, in fact, flights according to weather conditions are already beginning to collapse, and airfields are getting wet. To create a powerful Air Fleet, capable of performing combat missions in difficult conditions, interruptions in gasoline must be stopped.

      And there were no training aircraft for training.
      Having a large number of young flight personnel (in the district of only 823 people), it is imperative to have a larger number of training machines. We now have such a situation that there are 4 pilots per UTI-35 aircraft. UTI-4 flies only 45 minutes, after which recharging is required. Thus, at maximum voltage during the day on this plane, you can bring out or check the training no more than 10 people. So, the remaining 25 people are waiting for the next day, the next turn.
      (...)
      At least we need to have at least 5 training aircraft on a regiment. We have a lot of training machines, but these are not the ones you can test on. There are a large number of aircraft, not only in the Leningrad District, but also in other districts - UT-1, but you cannot train on these aircraft, because they are single-seat and the instructor cannot check pilots. Therefore, no one flies on them and does not use them in training, so it is more advisable to remove them at Osoaviahim.
      © Novikov A.A., Major General of Aviation, Air Force Commander of the Leningrad Military District. Materials of the meeting of senior management of the Red Army December 23-31, 1940
      1. +2
        April 18 2020 15: 44
        Quote: Alexey RA
        . There was no fuel for preparation.

        not surprising - if you compare the air force of the Red Army and the Luftwaffe request Immeasurable growth in numbers runs into the wall of resource availability ... hi
      2. 0
        April 18 2020 17: 21
        Quote: Alexey RA
        It was not even a resource. There was no fuel for preparation.



        That's for sure:

        The requirements of the NPO, NKVM, NKVD for the supply of fuel for the 1941 war year were identified in the mobilization applications of these departments.

        When calculating the need for fuel, the number of equipment was determined, the volume of its work (hours or mileage) during the war year, the fuel supply standards to ensure the planned amount of work.

        The number of equipment was calculated not on the basis of the indicators provided for by the mobilization deployment plan of the armed forces, but on the basis of its real availability and industrial supply capabilities according to the plan of current military orders. The calculations of the NPO mobilization application for fuels and lubricants are given in Appendix No. 4.

        At the same time, the application of NPOs for high-octane aviation gasoline amounted to 78 thousand tons for B-2.656, for 74 thousand tons for B-985.189, 70 thousand tons for B-600 aviation gas, 284 thousand tons for other gasoline, and 4.735 thousand for gasoline. tons of diesel fuel - 1.629 thousand tons. {296}.

        The mobilization plan of the national economy for the 1941 war year provided for the supply of NPOs to 174,5 thousand tons of B-78 aviation gasoline. In the presence of 56,9 thousand tons of this type of gasoline in the untouchable reserves of NPOs, the security of annual demand was less than 22,5%. For other types of gasolines, the NPOs planned to meet (taking into account the use of cash untouchable reserves) by B-74 by 28,6%, by B-70 and RB-70 - by 98,8% {297}. But the B-70 and RB-70 were used mainly on outdated types of aircraft, and the main share of the needs for them fell on training units and refresher courses.

        For the ground forces, the requirements for fuel supply were met by 70% for KB-59 and B-82,5, for 62% for gasoline, and 45,3% for diesel fuel. That is, the most favorable was the situation with the provision of fuel for light tanks T-26 and BT. At the same time, the rearmament of the army to new types of tanks with diesel engines - KV, T-34, T-50 - was not adequately provided with fuel {298}.

        According to the NKVMF, it was planned to satisfy requests for B-78 gas by 43,6%, for naval fuel oil - by 48,3%. (Unlike NGOs, these figures are based on the needs of the year of war and the need to increase the mobilization reserve) {299}. [225]

        http://militera.lib.ru/research/melia_aa/10.html
    2. +5
      April 18 2020 12: 32
      (for some cars). Appliances, radio engineers and gunsmiths, thank God, were not required,
      Well, read on somehow got sick ... sad I wonder what kind of aircraft at that time did without instruments? belay
      1. 0
        April 19 2020 22: 57
        No. Just devices and weapons did not differ from the old types of aircraft.
    3. +1
      April 18 2020 17: 24
      Quote: Operator
      The most important thing is the pilots raid: the Germans on June 22, 1941 he was hundreds of hours for the pilot, and even in combat conditions, we have dozens of hours in peaceful conditions (the resource of engines did not allow more).


      In the Red Army Air Force there were quite a few experienced pilots who fought in Spain, Finland and the Japanese, but they did not fully utilize their experience. And the almost complete absence of radio stations on the Red Army aircraft also played a very negative role.
      1. +1
        April 18 2020 18: 03
        What was the proportion of pilots with combat experience in the Red Army Air Force as of June 22, 1941?
        1. 0
          April 18 2020 20: 06
          Quote: Operator
          What was the proportion of pilots with combat experience in the Red Army Air Force as of June 22, 1941?


          In the Finnish War in the Red Army alone, about 2400 aircraft took part. There are about 500 aircraft at Halhingol. There are about 250 aircraft on Hassan Lake. About 770 Soviet pilots fought in Spain. Those. it can be assumed that only 2000 Soviet pilots took part in the Finnish War alone. And maybe more. Even 2 thousand pilots is already not a little.
          1. +2
            April 18 2020 20: 55
            Some of the 2000 pilots with combat experience on June 22 were still in the Far East.
            1. 0
              April 19 2020 16: 10
              Quote: Operator
              Some of the 2000 pilots with combat experience on June 22 were still in the Far East.


              I do not argue. But the main part was still in the western part of the USSR.
              1. +2
                April 21 2020 11: 18
                Quote: NF68
                I do not argue. But the main part was still in the western part of the USSR.

                Here are the data on the training of crews of the border districts and YES on 01.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX:
                Of the total number of crews for flights at night in PMP are ready:
                LVO: 323
                GOOD: 154
                CALL: 285
                KOVO: 508
                Air defense: 21
                YES: 223

                Of the total number of crews, the following are ready for flights during the day at SMU:
                LVO: 306
                GOOD: 126
                CALL: 242
                KOVO: 359
                Air defense: 21
                YES: 112

                Of the total number of crews, they are ready to fly at night to SMU:
                LVO: 27
                GOOD: 0
                CALL: 17
                KOVO: 0
                Air defense: 0
                YES: 24
            2. +1
              April 19 2020 16: 55
              Quote: Operator
              Some of the 2000 pilots with combat experience on June 22 were still in the Far East.

              And some of the Luftwaffe pilots were already dead. The war in Europe, you know, went on without loss. The same Hartmann started flying in 1942. By the way, not all pilots were super-duper flyers. There is evidence that they fought when landing
              1. +2
                April 19 2020 17: 21
                In any case, as of June 1941, there were less than 10% of pilots with combat experience in the Red Army Air Force in the western districts, more than 90% in the Luftwaffe.
              2. +2
                April 20 2020 16: 55
                Quote: Pilat2009
                There is evidence that they fought when landing


                Somewhere I came across data that approximately 5% of all Me-109s built in Germany were broken during landings due to the narrow track of the chassis. This mainly concerned relatively inexperienced pilots and wounded pilots.
    4. -3
      April 19 2020 16: 40
      It's not obligatory. But you recalled the case when an apprentice became a blacksmith. The blacksmith put the chisel to the iron and said as soon as you beat the nod. Apprentice hit. The grandson asks the grandfather you fought. Grandfather nods his head fought. Where did you serve? In aviation. How many planes shot down? Almost all of which I did not add gasoline. Resource motors? What do you know about motor resources? If they do not hit, then the resource is large. Teachers ask how long a hare lives? Teacher - until his hunter saw.
  4. +9
    April 17 2020 18: 22
    To the above should be added carelessness on the verge of betrayal (or betrayal), cases of which such as "unload machine-gun belts", etc. have been described many times, and then the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army Air Force at the beginning of the war become clear. But all the more magnificent is the feat that they could recover and begin to beat the Swastikos in the tail and in the mane ...
    1. -7
      April 17 2020 23: 06
      Suffering huge losses exceeding the losses of the Nazis.
      Sometimes just burying their people for nothing (Rzhev).
      Victory "to the limit."
      1. +2
        April 18 2020 06: 22
        Do not smack nonsense. The losses of the military, namely the military, amounted to 8 million people from the USSR, and 8,5 million people from Hitler's Germany. This is the joint data of the USSR and Germany (Germany and East Germany) in 1954, which were produced on the basis of the census of 1939 and 1953 to determine the losses.
        1. +2
          April 18 2020 15: 10
          Not so long ago, several other figures were voiced in the Duma.
          In the 54th, obviously, they wanted to “varnish” reality.
          1. +7
            April 18 2020 18: 32
            There are a lot of liberal shellup in the Duma.
            And, in general, the rest of the losses are women, old people and children, and that 29 million people. along with the military. So who did your favorite fascists fight with? In 54, experts from West Germany were not interested in "varnishing", and even more so for the whole West it was not profitable.
            1. +2
              April 19 2020 17: 09
              In the Duma, EP has a clear majority, followed by Zyuganovtsy and SR, while Yabloko just does not.
            2. +2
              April 19 2020 17: 11
              Do not arrange manipulations and demagoguery. "My favorite fascists", casting past fool negative
              1. -1
                April 19 2020 18: 15
                Nefig then smack nonsense out of ignorance. Just in the EP a lot of liberalism.
                1. +3
                  April 19 2020 20: 50
                  EP has a lot of liberalism.

                  And who exactly? Can you give some examples? And who supports the Nazis?
                  1. -1
                    April 19 2020 22: 26
                    All liberals are open and hidden, passively and actively on the side of fascism. Like, everything is bad in Russia ... By the way, the Western elite has a fascist ideology. Or the West for you is the standard ..?
                    1. +2
                      April 20 2020 16: 23
                      Not used to taking anything on faith.
                      All liberals are open and hidden, passively and actively on the side of fascism.

                      Give examples, more specifically. Are they adherents of Nazi ideology? Do they justify Nazi crimes?
                      But we have many problems, as in the whole world (somewhere more, somewhere less). To talk about them means to be a fascist?
                      Then the question. About the terms: what do you mean by fascism?
                      By the way, the Western elite has a fascist ideology.

                      My question above is relevant.
                      Or the West for you is the standard ..?
                      You are trying to manipulate, not comme il faut.
                      1. -2
                        April 20 2020 20: 41
                        Why should you be trusted? Are you special? Liberals are more enemies of Russia than the West itself. I have not heard from a single liberal to condemn the Maidan, the UPA, the Essesses from the Baltic states, but all of Russia are being harassed and help the West in its collapse.
                      2. +4
                        April 21 2020 06: 14
                        Then they were strange fascists: those who had seen them justified the German fascists and their crimes (and at the same time went to Russian marches request )
                        I assume that by the term fascists you mean a different, not “classical” meaning.
                        How to help the West in the collapse? Who promises to get rid of the "oil needle", but things are still there?
                        We have a strange time when government patriots (also condemning liberals), in fact, through one have a reserve airfield in the countries they blame, they teach and settle children there, etc.
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          2. +2
            April 19 2020 16: 48
            Now the power is much smarter and more powerful than the one that died. Comrade Lenin planted a bomb under the USSR. But Stalin, instead of surrendering Leningrad, ordered to hold on and win. The thing is that if you can’t. Khoja Nasretdin was walking along the road and saw a stone. He decided to jump over it. He jumped, caught on a stone and fell. He got up, shook himself and began to lament - oh old age, old age. He looked around, saw that there was nobody and said - however, I was like that in my youth. What has this power done since 1991 for the greatness of the country, what can the people be proud of for the last twenty years? They can only spit in the past, like camels, as if they were not from the past.
            1. DDT
              0
              April 22 2020 18: 00
              Quote: zenion
              Now the power is much smarter and more powerful than the one that died. Comrade Lenin planted a bomb under the USSR.


              Comrade, you are confusing something. Lenin, this USSR created.
        2. +1
          April 18 2020 15: 30
          Quote: Spectrum
          and from Hitler’s Germany 8,5 million people.

          You probably meant on the part of Nazi Germany and its allies on the Western (for us) Front. If my memory serves me, then Germany itself had losses in l / s of about 6,5 - 7 million people. , but Finland, Romania, Italy, Hungary also fought against us ... and a lot of so-called formations. "volunteers" from all over Europe.
          But there were losses of a different nature on our part — missing, which were not taken into account in the statistics ... and these losses were considerable in connection with the retreats of 1941 \ 42. , giant cauldrons ... and 3 million prisoners of war of the RKK until the fall of 1941.
          All the more magnificent is Victory, after so many heavy defeats and losses.
          In any case, there was approximate parity in purely military losses, but Victory is ours.
          1. +1
            April 18 2020 18: 24
            The losses also included those who died from wounds after the war and disappeared. AT ALL, THE WHOLE ARCHIVE AFTER THERE WERE EXPLORED BY WEST EXPLORATION (under Yeltsin) and Khrushchev's jackals (under Khrushchev shook and falsified almost the entire archive), every piece of paper should be examined.
            1. +5
              April 18 2020 18: 59
              Already under Putin, it was believed and it turned out all the same that the direct military losses of the Red \ Soviet Army were slightly lower than the total losses of the Hitler coalition, and this was with our huge losses in the initial (1941 \ 42 years) war period. We have nothing to be ashamed of our losses - all of Europe fought with us. And WE won.
              Like it or not, but the training, the combat control system (communications, the work of the staffs), the interspecific interaction of the troops and the strategic initiative - all were on the side of the Germans.
              Therefore, the Victory is more valuable because we have overcome, learned and won.
              1. 0
                April 18 2020 22: 42
                And my late father-in-law was drafted when Czechoslovakia was liberated. So for all the time on the Western Front I have not seen a single living German. The artillery preparation was such that three shells fell on one square meter. And near Prague, in general, before the attack, they did not issue cartridges, so there was no need. The first person he shot in the war was a Japanese, already during the battle with the Japs in Mongolia. So the 'libertarian' lie of the penguinostan's henchmen got it already with their arrogance and stupidity.
                1. +7
                  April 19 2020 08: 34
                  And I met with a veteran who took upon himself the last German offensive in that war - near Balaton. It was very tough. But again, the losses of the Germans in the last phase of the war were greater than ours. So the overall balance of losses in the aggregate is still wrapped up in their direction.
                  And in Czechoslovakia, my beloved grandfather ended the war - then the commander of the squadron Il-2. The hero of the USSR .
                  1. +2
                    April 19 2020 14: 32
                    the last German offensive in that war was near Balaton. It was very tough. .... it was definitely incredible. my grandfather there ended the battle path in the arrows. a fragment in the aorta finished it off in the 84th. and rubilovo under the balonon was not .... shorter tin
              2. -2
                April 21 2020 19: 56
                Unfortunately, much higher, at least this is the official data of the Russian Ministry of Defense
          2. +4
            April 19 2020 17: 00
            My friend’s mom received a notice from the front - he died without a trace. She began to receive a meager pension for her son. He died in battle near Iasi in 1944. In the years 1972-73. Suddenly she receives a new notice. That in the battles of Iasi your husband died the death of the brave. An invitation from the military enlistment office arrives to her in the mail that she is expected to announce something important. She came to the draft board. There she read out a complete petition. That the battle there was fierce, that many people died and that just everyone was buried in a mass grave. The regiment's account book says that your husband showed heroism and was presented for the award with the Order of the Red Star. They give her the order and resolution of the Supreme Council. She burst into tears. She was already taken home by car of the military enlistment office. A few days later they summon her to the financial department and say that they received an order to recount her pension, starting in 1944. The sum is very large and they will transfer it to the savings bank. There, they already corrected her roof at the house, brought fuel for the winter. Already volunteers dug up a garden. Alyoshka, his son, walked like a rooster. Calmed down, only a month later.
            1. +4
              April 19 2020 17: 03
              There are many such cases, but your case is very indicative for today ... in the Soviet Union, this was the norm.
              Very good standard.
          3. -3
            April 22 2020 16: 16
            What nonsense, well, where does the stock of the ignoramus come from? What are allies to the devil? Kettlebell on the foot. Good for the Germans they were almost gone
            1. 0
              April 22 2020 16: 34
              The Germans were GOOD, especially after 1945.
              1. -2
                April 22 2020 16: 38
                Well, everyone understands, to the best of their understanding, why should I think of the Germans as a Pole, a lieutenant colonel of the Soviet and later Uzbek army. These are their problems. But they seem to be doing well right now
                1. 0
                  April 22 2020 17: 41
                  Quote: Icelord
                  why do I need a Pole,

                  And how many Poles did we serve in the Wehrmacht?
                  What about the French?
                  Swedes?
                  The Dutch?
                  Spaniards?
                  Norwegians?
                  But Finland did not fight the USSR with WWII?
                  What about Romania?
                  What about Hungary?
                  What about Italy?
                  Who was ordered not to be taken prisoner in the battle for Voronezh?

                  But there was a Polish Army. I served and was friends with some descendants of the officers of that army.

                  And what colonel did you serve in?
                  In Uzbekistan ?
                  Is it not under the guidance of my good friend - the commander-in-chief of the air defense of Novinsky Evgeny Ivanovich?

                  The concepts of good and evil, permissible and unacceptable, officer honor and fidelity to the oath ... of course, everyone has his own ...
                  Quote: Icelord
                  everyone understands to the best of his understanding
                  1. -1
                    April 22 2020 17: 43
                    No, I'm a border guard
                    1. 0
                      April 22 2020 17: 44
                      And in the USSR he was a lieutenant
                      1. -2
                        April 22 2020 17: 50
                        And there served a little, the only country really did help the Wehrmacht, Hungary, the rest, almost unarmed rabble. And by the way, my grandfather, the captain, by the way, was killed by the Red Army under Sevastopol. Our family is ancient, gentry, Lyubetsk, the youngest branch of the famous princes. We have been serving for 500 years
                      2. +2
                        April 23 2020 09: 50
                        Well, are you lying again?
                        Continuing to provoke?
                        Who is this "unarmed rabble"?
                        And Romania, and Italy, and France, and Finland, and Spain, and others like them - all the Wehrmacht allies WERE EXCELLENTLY ARMED AND EQUIPPED! All of them are not unarmed rabble!
                        Why are you writing this nonsense here?
                      3. -2
                        April 23 2020 09: 53
                        E no young man, you are entertained by denunciations in the good old Soviet tradition. This is not a concept. Communicate with yourself
                      4. +1
                        April 23 2020 10: 38
                        "Professional military lieutenant colonel", a descendant of the "gentry" - and lives "according to concepts" ??? NEVER BELIEVE! If he were a real military man, the conversation would go about HONOR! But not about the "concept". You are brazenly lying!
                        As for the one with whom I communicate, so I myself decide, without the snotty!
                      5. 0
                        April 23 2020 10: 18
                        icelord
                        "... No, I'm a border guard ... And in the USSR I was a lieutenant ..."
                        You, in my opinion, lie, dear!
                        Are you a Pole who served Uzbekistan, studied in the Union, and has a sister in America?
                        Do you yourself believe that you are trying to rub here?
                        It will not work.
                        How many oath have you taken?
                        Two or more times?
                        And how does the chief of an exemplary outpost suddenly give up his entire military career and go into "business" ...
                        You are trying to trick and impersonate who you are not.
                        All "your story" is sewn with white thread.
                        It is not clear just why you are lying here?
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        3. +1
          April 19 2020 16: 59
          Quote: Spectrum
          based on the census of 1939 and 1953

          The census does not give a complete picture. There are too many variables there.
  5. +12
    April 17 2020 18: 57
    Well, the author is not in the subject. Why does the author believe that the business of fighters in the war is the struggle against their own kind? Why is this a constant comparison of our fighters with the German? The primary task of a fighter is to prevent attacks from the air of its own territory, i.e. fight against enemy bomber aircraft. And what, the I-16 and I-153 could not successfully deal with German bombers? Did they lack speed? Armaments? The second task is to ensure the operation of our own bomber aircraft. It was a little more difficult, but nevertheless, to drive away the German fighters, to tie them in battle, it was a perfectly feasible task. It’s not necessary to shoot down, the main thing is not to let in your bombers and attack aircraft. Yes, on the drum, what is the speed of our fighters - the bomber is slower in any way.
    As for the author’s manipulations with the number of our airplanes, there is only one explanation - the notorious human factor. They didn’t have time to retrain combat pilots, didn’t deliver ammunition, threw it in good order during the retreat, defeated it by inexperience, etc. - this is all a human factor. Similarly with the training of technical and flight personnel - not trained - the human factor. Why not prepared? Did not know in advance what will be the arrival of new types of machines? They knew. Therefore .... but further it is already more interesting, and why, this human factor was so roaring in our army, country? And here the topic is very interesting, and very unpleasant. I don’t even want to start.
    1. +13
      April 17 2020 20: 43
      Quote: Sergey Valov
      Why does the author believe that the business of fighters in the war is the struggle against their own kind? Why is this a constant comparison of our fighters with the German?

      This is what is now called "air supremacy"
    2. +3
      April 17 2020 21: 31
      Quote: Sergey Valov
      Yes, on the drum, what is the speed of our fighters - the bomber is slower in any way.
      Not always - remember Mosquito.
      1. -3
        April 18 2020 00: 16
        Mosquito is a rare exception.
    3. +10
      April 17 2020 21: 38
      Quote: Sergey Valov
      And what, the I-16 and I-153 could not successfully deal with German bombers? Did they lack speed?

      And you compare the maximum speed I-153 and Ju-88A1. Or A4.
      Quote: Sergey Valov
      They didn’t have time to retrain combat pilots, didn’t deliver ammunition, threw it in good order during the retreat, defeated it by inexperience, etc. is all human factor

      But there is no gasoline for 1942. NKTP physically cannot give gasoline in the required quantities. They promise to rectify the situation in 1942.
      Quote: Sergey Valov
      Similarly with the training of technical and flight personnel - not trained - the human factor.

      And how to prepare technical staff if there are no special vehicles? And it won’t be - because the ZIS in 1941 was not able to give the required amount of the ZIS-6 chassis simultaneously for the BTV and the Air Force, especially given the explosive growth of the army. It even came to replacing the VMS with GAS in the ratio of 1: 1, which immediately reduced the supply rear capabilities of the rear.
      In general, the program for reforming the Air Force was calculated until mid-1942. In the spring of 1941, for example, a radical reform of the basing system began, with the transition to a completely new CSF and perforation of BAO. The deadline is, at best, August 1941.

      And to demand some kind of readiness for mid-1941 is like resenting the lack of readiness of a house under construction that has not yet been brought under the roof. smile
      1. +7
        April 17 2020 23: 28
        Quote: Alexey RA
        The Air Force reform program was designed until mid-1942.

        And not just the Air Force. The entire third five-year plan was aimed at improving quality and productivity.
      2. +3
        April 18 2020 00: 28
        “Compare the maximum speed of the I-153 and Ju-88A1. Or A4. ” - the bomber almost never flew at maximum speed on a mission, flew on a cruiser, and you should know this very well.
        “But there is no gasoline for 1942” - an article about 1941
        “And how to prepare technical staff if there are no special vehicles?” - and this is the human factor, i.e. lack of professionalism of workers of the People’s Commissariat of Defense. Equipment supplies should be agreed on time, and the training of technical personnel should be carried out before the supply of military equipment to the troops.
        "And demand some kind of readiness for mid-1941." - see above.
        1. +2
          April 21 2020 11: 22
          Quote: Sergey Valov
          “Compare the maximum speed of the I-153 and Ju-88A1. Or A4. ” - the bomber almost never flew at maximum speed on a mission, flew on a cruiser, and you should know this very well.

          And at the sight of the approaching fighter, the bomber will also continue to fly cruising? wink
          Quote: Sergey Valov
          “But there is no gasoline for 1942” - an article about 1941

          My mistake - And there is no gasoline for 1941. And in 1940, no, either.
          Quote: Sergey Valov
          and this is the human factor, i.e. lack of professionalism of workers of the People’s Commissariat of Defense. Equipment supplies should be agreed on time, and the training of technical personnel should be carried out before the supply of military equipment to the troops.

          So they are agreed - until 1942. In the summer of 1941, the Air Force did not have a home front at all - reform is underway, BAO is being formed, equipment is being shuffled.
          1. 0
            April 21 2020 12: 56
            “And at the sight of the approaching fighter, the bomber will also continue to fly on the cruiser?” - two options:
            1. Continue to complete the mission and fly as flew.
            2. Drop bombs in a "clean field" and flee to the maximum.
            In the first case, the fighter has every chance of attacking, in the second, the task of the fighter is completed, for complete happiness, you can try and destroy the bomber.
            “For the summer of 1941, the Air Force has no rear at all” - and this is called “wild unprofessionalism” of the leadership of the armed forces, because who needs an army that has been unworkable for more than a year as a result of the activities of this leadership itself.
            1. 0
              April 23 2020 11: 37
              Quote: Sergey Valov
              - two options:
              1. Continue to complete the mission and fly as flew.
              2. Drop bombs in a "clean field" and flee to the maximum.

              There are three options. There is also "the enemy left with a decline" - perhaps the most popular in our reports.
              Quote: Sergey Valov
              but this is called "wild unprofessionalism" of the leadership of the armed forces, for who needs an army that has been uncompetitive for more than a year as a result of the activities of this leadership itself.

              So she was not combat-ready before, just this was not visible. The reform of the Air Force rear was not started from a good life: according to the results of the Federal Frontier Guard, it became clear that the Red Army air base based system provides work only in peacetime, with stationary based air units.
              The experience of the war with the white fins in 1939-1940 revealed serious shortcomings in the organization of the aviation rear, the main of which were the bulkiness and low mobility of the aviation technical units, and the excessive attachment of parts of the aviation rear to the material support agencies. ground forces. The rear control system impeded the speed and autonomy of decision-making on the organization of aviation logistics support.
              The basis of the military aviation rear in those years was air bases, which did not justify themselves in combat conditions. Suffice it to say that the transportation of one base by rail required 6 to 7 military echelons of 70 to 75 wagons each.
              The reorganization of air bases carried out in the spring of 1940 did not completely solve the problem of increasing their maneuverability. Therefore, in accordance with the Decree of the party and government of April 10, 1941, it was decided to introduce a new organizational structure. The territory of the western border military districts was divided into 36 aviation-based districts (RAB). Each district was intended to provide three to four air divisions.
              © Colonel General of Aviation A. Zakrevsky The rear of the Soviet Air Force during the Great Patriotic War.
              1. -1
                April 23 2020 15: 27
                I am glad that we have almost the same vision of events !.
    4. +4
      April 18 2020 01: 42
      In general, the Soviet fighters I-15, I-153 and I-16 were inferior to the German bombers. The “hawks” simply could not catch up with the Junkers and Dorniers either in speed or in height.
      1. +1
        April 18 2020 15: 11
        and you’d better enlighten how many these Junkers and dornier were for 41 years. Nonsense! The basic composition is Heinkel-111. Now compare the Heinkel speed and 153.
      2. +1
        April 18 2020 16: 13
        However, they still shot down! Firstly, because the bomber loaded with bombs goes at a speed much lower than its maximum speed - otherwise it risks burning all the fuel and not reaching the base. Secondly, fighters usually barraged over a covered object, having a significant reserve of height. And in the dive, the I-16 accelerated to a speed of more than 550 km / h.
    5. +6
      April 18 2020 06: 10
      Quote: Sergey Valov
      And what, the I-16 and I-153 could not successfully deal with German bombers?

      No, most of these aircraft were armed with machine guns of caliber 7, 62 mm and could no longer successfully deal with enemy bombers
      Quote: Sergey Valov
      Did they lack speed?

      Yes. These fighters could not catch the same Yu-88
      1. +3
        April 18 2020 16: 16
        machine guns of caliber 7, 62 mm and could no longer successfully deal with enemy bombers

        Here are just the English pilots who won the Battle of Britain at Hurricanes and Spitfires with a purely machine gun weapons of 7.69mm did not know about it! ;)
        1. +5
          April 18 2020 18: 16
          Quote: su25
          But the British pilots who won the Battle of Britain at Hurricanes and Spitfires with purely machine guns of 7.69mm did not know about this! ;)

          As they knew, it was not in vain that after that, aircraft guns began to be installed on the Hurricanes
        2. +1
          April 19 2020 20: 46
          Can you tell me about the number of “Browning” on the first “Hurricanes” and “Fireballs”?
          And how many machine guns were on the mass versions of I-15/153/16?
          Precisely machine guns.
        3. -2
          April 21 2020 20: 01
          Hurricane has guns, so it was used as a flying weapon platform against bombers. A spitfire of the first aircraft gaining air supremacy
          1. +2
            April 21 2020 21: 42
            Hurricane has guns, so it was used as a flying weapon platform against bombers.

            Are you joking?
            Hurricane Mk.I
            The armament consisted of eight Browning machine guns of 7,69 mm caliber with a rate of fire of 1200 rounds per minute. They were located in batteries of four in the consoles, just behind the landing gear. The machine guns had a belt feed. The ribbons lay in boxes to the left and right of the machine guns. All boxes, except the farthest from the axis of the aircraft, contained 338 cartridges, the last boxes on each side contained 324 cartridges. The British equipped each tape with cartridges of the same type. Typically, three machine guns fired conventional bullets, three incendiary (two different designs) and two armor-piercing.
            The guns on Hurricane appeared after the end of Battle of England!
      2. +2
        April 19 2020 13: 38
        I-16 12,16,17,24,29 series had 2 ShVAK autocannons each.
        "Yes. These fighters could not catch up with the same Ju-88."
        Especially when, during an attack by Soviet fighters, German pilots unloaded anywhere and went on a dive.
        1. +2
          April 19 2020 15: 31
          Quote: Boris Epstein
          Especially when, during an attack by Soviet fighters, German pilots unloaded anywhere and went on a dive.

          In the vast majority of cases, in the early years of the war, German bombers carried out the tasks
          Quote: Boris Epstein
          I-16 12,16,17,24,29 series had 2 ShVAK autocannons each.
          Type -16 did not find. Type-24 - 4 machine guns ShKAS. Type 29 - a BS machine gun and 2 synchronous ShKAS. But skipped Tip-27 and 28, they were cannon
          But the trouble is, they are only 59 and 293 units, as well as Type 17 - 314
          1. 0
            April 19 2020 20: 52
            Only in series No. 17, the engine was an M-25V with a capacity of 750 horses.
        2. 0
          April 19 2020 20: 49
          And the most massive were the series ...?
        3. 0
          April 19 2020 21: 35
          And what are autocannons?
    6. 0
      April 18 2020 15: 12
      So the German fighters tied the battle (and inflicted serious losses, with their small) less perfect I-16.
    7. +3
      April 18 2020 15: 47
      Quote: Sergey Valov
      Yes, on the drum, what is the speed of our fighters - the bomber is slower in any way.

      Here you are wrong, the speed is important, especially the I-16 and even more so the I-15 could not keep up with the German bombers, therefore they occupied a higher altitude echelon and, when they found the bombers, dispersed in a dive to equal / exceed the speed. But there was ONLY one attempt at everything about everything - our I-15 and I-16 could not catch up with the enemy’s high-speed bombers for a second attack. This was remembered by pilots in many memoirs.
      A similar type of attack - from a dive, called "falconry attack".
      1. +1
        April 19 2020 21: 55
        Speed, of course, is important, but in this case, the tactics of using aviation, communication, and notification of the passage of enemy aircraft are even more important. I’m silent about the qualification of the flight crew.
        The British fought on the Gladiators until 1941, on the Avoskah they fought the whole war and a groan about this is not heard.
    8. +1
      April 19 2020 17: 11
      Quote: Sergey Valov
      Yes, on the drum, what is the speed of our fighters - the bomber is slower in any

      by no means
      ju-88 speed 450 km / h
      i-16 speed 470 km / h
      then, you need to find a bomber and catch up. But the bomber still has a shooter and he wants to live
      1. -1
        April 19 2020 21: 45
        Yu-88 speed 450 km / h - where and when did bombers with bomb load fly at maximum speed? In the dreams of gamers? But finding a bomber is another topic.
        1. +1
          April 19 2020 21: 57
          Quote: Sergey Valov
          where and when did bombers fly at maximum speed? In the dreams of gamers?

          The fifth prototype set a record by flying a 1000-kilometer circle with 2000 kg of load on board at an average speed of 517 km / h. However, after meeting all the demands of the Luftwaffe, including the possibility of dive bombing, the maximum speed dropped to 450 km / h.
          The maximum bomb load for the A-4 was 2800 kg, but, in practice, the standard load was 1500-2000 kg.
        2. +1
          April 19 2020 22: 00
          See this one. And at the same time, it was "difficult" to get closer to the firing distance for vehicles with M-25 engines. Only on a collision course. For "catch-up" they were no longer suitable! At the same time, the weak armament of the massive I-16 (series 5/10/24) is from two to four 7,62 mm machine guns!
          And only series 29 in the amount of 650 pieces was armed with 2 ShKAS and one 12,7 mm BS. And she could carry up to 200 kg of bombs or RS-82!
  6. +1
    April 17 2020 19: 03
    “The Luftwaffe easily and naturally secured air superiority for three years, didn't it?” If you read the memoirs of German soldiers from the Eastern Front, then it was far from the case.
    1. +1
      April 21 2020 13: 54
      Quote: Strashila
      “The Luftwaffe easily and naturally secured air superiority for three years, didn't it?” If you read the memoirs of German soldiers from the Eastern Front, then it was far from the case.


      Because the advantage of the Luftwaffe was created in the direction of the main blows - the foundation of the basics!
      Despite the fact that the Red Army Air Force was "smeared" along the fronts and where it is written in memoirs that the Soviet Air Force annoyed the German troops, these are not the main directions of strikes.
      Well, by 1944 and after the reform of the Air Force command of the Red Army of 1942, they learned to concentrate strikes and combine the strikes of bomber, assault divisions and corps, and the numerical advantage became superior.
  7. +8
    April 17 2020 19: 05
    How can I object to the author? But nothing! You can only add, but no need. The main thing is revealed. Given all the above, it is impossible not to admire our pilots.
    Thanks to the author.
  8. +24
    April 17 2020 19: 11
    The author went the right way and decided to show that the performance characteristics of airplanes, by themselves, no matter how high they are, are far from all. Like the number of aircraft.
    In order to implement these performance characteristics in battle, you need appropriate ergonomics, and automation. The closer ergonomics and automation are to the ideal, the less pilot is distracted by the control of aircraft and more attention is paid to completing a task.
    The lack of communication leads to a complete disorganization of management, and the numerical advantage loses all significance.
    Besides.
    1. A trained, trained pilot must be put on the plane, that is, a training system must be in place.
    2. Ensure the appropriate technical condition of this aircraft by conducting ongoing qualified maintenance and timely repair,
    3. Provide fuel and lubricants, spare parts and ammunition.
    4. Organize AIA - Earth support of aircraft navigation, the task of which is:
    - provide the aircraft with an aerodrome with appropriate equipment and infrastructure,
    -to provide the opportunity for the aircraft and the pilot to find the target, hit it and return to the airfield in simple and difficult weather conditions, day and night,
    provide a landing
    to ensure constant communication of aircraft with the ground and between themselves and informing about changes in the air situation;
    ensure the availability of an alternate aerodrome in case of impossibility to land on the main one.
    For each item, you can write an article, and not one.
    The author tried to fit almost all of this into one confused article, which, in general, is not realistic. Maybe it makes sense to expand the scope and pay more attention to details?
  9. +6
    April 17 2020 19: 17
    Before the war, three triples flew in triples-squadrons. After the start of the Second World War, there were twelve aircraft in the squadron. Also (like the Germans) they began to fly in pairs. At the link were 4 commander aircraft, a senior pilot and two wingmen.
  10. +13
    April 17 2020 19: 27
    Incidentally, of the 1233 Luftwaffe fighters on the Eastern Front, the latest Bf.109F were 593 units. That is, there were more of them initially than our new aircraft. If we add to this 423 pieces of Bf.109E, which was on an equal footing with our new types, then the picture is generally sad. 1016 new “Messers” versus 377 new ours.

    This is the essence of June 22, 1941.
    In addition, I can give a story told by the Hero of the Soviet Union Shevchuk.

    His regiment was based on the Western Front.
    And on the eve of the war, a new comez came to them.
    The first one. what he did - forced to build shelters for aircraft outside the airfield on his own ...
    And so they built ...
    Morning. Construction. Everyone is at the aircraft, and their squadron is at attention in an open field.
    The regiment commander yelled .... Pilots should be on airplanes!
    Then there was fun for the regiment of "Donkeys" are dragging!
    Every morning they rolled their I-16s onto the airfield, and after the formation they hid the planes back.
    The war began.
    Two squadrons died at the airport on the first day ...
    And this squadron in the first two months while she was alive shot down 22 fascists.
    I am sure there were among the downed and new automated ...
  11. +5
    April 17 2020 19: 39
    In fact, there are enough myths about June 22. The famous "1200" destroyed at the airfields, the myth of the Khrushchev thaw. The German General Heider ... (I don't really remember his last name) in the diary indicates that the Soviet Union's losses on June 22 amounted to 850 aircraft and the bulk of them were bombers used without cover by fighters. At the same time, more than 6000 sorties were made to repel the German offensive.
    The fact that there was enough dirty tricks and the German agents worked was a fact, many orders to disguise airfields (since the spring of 1941) were not fulfilled, the order to distribute airplanes and create false airfields was not fully implemented.
    The ratio of losses 1 to 2 in favor of the Germans, this is the first day. further actually 1 to 1, this is averaged.
    The main aviation losses the USSR began to suffer after a couple of weeks, when spare parts and fuel ran out, the equipment was simply abandoned at airfields.
  12. -11
    April 17 2020 19: 55
    Again Roman pulls an owl on a globe ... Instead of the Soviet myth, creating his own -ura-Russian ... Which is just as bad ...
    1. +10
      April 17 2020 20: 20
      And what is the author wrong? The essence of the myth?
      1. +3
        April 17 2020 20: 59
        The fact that the raid on the same airfield was carried out several times during the day + the lack of the possibility of airfield maneuver for our pilots is the main reason for "such a beginning". And everything that Roman writes is secondary ... Moreover, the first wave of German aircraft was often met by duty fighters.
        1. +7
          April 17 2020 21: 43
          Quote: smaug78
          The fact that the raid on the same airfield was carried out several times during the day + the lack of the possibility of airfield maneuver for our pilots is the main reason for "such a beginning".

          Plus, the lack of repair capabilities (hello to the reform of the rear of the Air Force), combined with frequent relocation due to a change in the front line. Because of this, it was necessary to leave aircraft stuck in the repair in the old place, which, with the rear established, could be restored in a couple of days.
          1. 0
            April 18 2020 08: 46
            Certainly, but I wrote more about the first day of the war.
        2. +6
          April 17 2020 21: 53
          That is, if the pilot does not know how to fly, shoot, navigate - this is secondary. The main thing is to have a backup airfield?
          1. 0
            April 18 2020 08: 45
            The ability to fly, shoot, navigate was present in our pilots, albeit to a lesser extent than in German. As well as the training system, infrastructure, etc. But unfortunately they will not help much if the runway is damaged and / or there are damaged, destroyed during the previous raid planes, and you need to raise the remaining planes into the air to reflect the second or third wave of raids. Something like this hi
            1. +4
              April 18 2020 08: 48
              Clearly, it's all about the runway. And didn’t you try to look at the question broader, further on the runway?
              You can not answer, a rhetorical question.
              1. -1
                April 18 2020 08: 51
                You can not answer, a rhetorical question.
                Thanks for permission laughing I am glad that you have a very broad view, but everything is in the wrong direction.
  13. +5
    April 17 2020 19: 57
    The author is not up to date. Team Herat is a BMW-801. The levers on Messer needed to be moved a little less than on Yak or Spitfire for example.
    1. 0
      April 18 2020 16: 21
      And, by the way, because of this "miracle machine" Kurt Tank himself almost ditched in a test flight. See "The genius of" Focke-Wulf ". The Great Kurt Tank" L. Antseliovich.
      The Messer was equipped with automatic control of oil and coolant temperature.
  14. +11
    April 17 2020 20: 02
    Fighters of new types, although they had regular places for radio stations such as RSI-3 "Eagle", but they were not equipped. The RSI-3 kit (fighter radio station) consisted of the RSI-3 Orel transmitter and the RSI-3 Sokol receiver.

    RSI-3M1 transmitter.
    About how to ensure the operation of this equipment. You can write a separate article.
    1. +10
      April 17 2020 20: 09

      RSI-4A receiver.
      1. +13
        April 17 2020 20: 12
        For comparison, the German "peer" radio station (transceiver) FUG-7a, which was installed on most versions of the Me-109.
  15. Eug
    +7
    April 17 2020 20: 02
    The Germans have a much higher number of air battles in relation to the number of sorties than ours - this is the quality of control.
    1. +2
      April 18 2020 16: 23
      This is primarily due to the low technological effectiveness of Soviet aircraft. Most typical maintenance operations required 3-5 times more time than adversaries.
  16. -4
    April 17 2020 20: 15
    well put on. writes, writes and crap. having really lost about 5 aircraft at airfields! we saved their pilots. Throughout the war we had an abundant supply of pilots. and it’s very strange that they often write from the school and into battle. even in 000 there were about five thousand pilots in reserve. and that was the axis of our victory.
    now about the price of air superiority. 1700 only one ME-109 of different series for June, July, and August !!!! Yes, for these losses to shoot a little command. this is almost 17 squadrons. These are what "? Yes, the most prepared. Aces of their darlings. Hollowed the Germans so that there was a crack."
    and who hollowed? and-16 !!!!! yes they are handsome. and until La went, and 7, 9 Yaki at the end of 42 and -16 carried the brunt of the struggle.
    the climb for the last 16 during the combat shorting reached 950 meters, and the speed of 550, as the pilots said, we gave but only the last series. the rest are above 450-480.
    Vorozheikin has a memo in his memoirs as the I-16 and the 153 early editions caught up with the U-88. It turned out just gained height and with a decline .... do not believe read.
    and even speaking directly of the latest aircraft, so to speak, only the Yak-1 and Lagg-3 (pre-war series) could have fought equal to the Germans. Mig-3 was heavy and at low altitude inactive.
    Now about the radio. the Germans had a transceiver 1 in five cars on the rest of the receivers.
    Now about the history. A gorgeous book research "" ALL STALIN'S FIRING AIRLINES "was published two years ago, a study that has no equal in the world !!!! and so not a single air regiment that went through the whole war had losses higher than it destroyed. times in our favor, so maybe it's enough to believe the stories of two beetles - Khrushchev (Khrushchev - Zhuk in Ukrainian) and Zhukov about our losses everywhere and everyone?
    but can remember what the hell in January 1943, Germany introduced total mobilization? and this with official losses of 300-500. Yes, they had a reserve army of 000 people at the beginning of the war, and three appeals of 1-200 of three ages, well, about 000 people, where did allies go?
    and so the Germans walked on their corpses, prompted by mediocre generals, since we had one such Zhukov. to understand this:
    B. V L A D I M I R O V
    D U T A I S L A V
    Leafing through a book of Marshal Zhukov G.K.
    "Memoirs and Reflections."
    and most importantly, Germany never called for losses officially.
    read: the loss of Germany.
    http://www.poteryww2.narod.ru/kritika/kritika_24.html
    written soundly. otherwise, 13-14 year olds would not be drafted into the army.
    and so, yes, our country suffered losses, but at a minimum. civilian population big losses. but the Germans also lost about 6 million inhabitants from raids alone.
    in 10 years the foundation has been laid. foundation of Victory.
    1. The comment was deleted.
  17. -1
    April 17 2020 21: 01
    it’s clear why the Luftwaffe easily and naturally ensured air superiority for three years,

    This is the most important legend and myth. At no point in time did the Luftwaffe have any superiority or air supremacy on the entire Soviet-German front because of its extremely small size. Locally and briefly - yes, it was possible to create.
    Again fixing on the IA. Again, the listing of minor tactical and technical details. Yes, German aircraft were technically more advanced. But there were few of them for such a huge front, there was no question of any dominance in the air.
    “They flew, but they didn’t find the enemy” (we look at Pokryshkin, he often sees this, and not only him)

    The Germans like this all the time. This is the specificity of the Soviet-German front. A very large percentage of departures from both sides, including bombers and attack aircraft, was generally without encounters with enemy aircraft. Even at 41m, Soviet bombers often did not meet an air enemy during combat sorties.
    Indeed, what is the use of hundreds and thousands of aircraft, if it was impossible to control them

    There is, for example, the only road on a certain section of the front that has a hard surface, which as a result is clogged with columns of enemy troops. In order for hundreds of aircraft to be able to attack these columns, a ground-based control and targeting system is not necessary. Which allowed the Red Army Air Force to use these hundreds of aircraft effectively. Yesterday I gave an example in another topic - June 29, 1941. On that day, parts of the 11 TDs were 62 (!) Times attacked by Soviet aircraft. And this is only one division. This is not Mortan, and not Falez at 44m, this is Z. Ukraine in June 41st.
    But I didn't come across any articles on this topic. Everything is somehow about the mythical German "air supremacy", or the senseless analysis of Hartmann's applications, or about the radio stations on Messerschmitt and their absence on the I-16
    1. +10
      April 17 2020 21: 40
      Quote: Force Multiplier
      Something about mythical german "air supremacy"
      -Not well, of course ..
      I suspected that - we frantically fled to Moscow with Stalingrad, so that we could kick the Wehrmacht harder then (which the Luftwaffe turns out to be mythically (!!!) supported) ..
      fool fool fool
    2. +9
      April 17 2020 21: 49
      Quote: Force Multiplier

      There is, for example, the only road on a certain section of the front that has a hard surface, which as a result is clogged with columns of enemy troops. In order for hundreds of aircraft to be able to attack these columns, a ground-based control and targeting system is not necessary.

      Uh-huh ... and then the "messengers" appear. And Berezina begins - walking in small groups for constant impact on the enemy planes are destroyed in parts. But there are no fighters of their own - after all, a ground-based control and guidance system for the target is not necessary; there is no one to call and direct the fighters, even if everyone fights off by himself.
      We have already seen that by the beginning of the war we did not have much. Interactions with fighter aircraft did not work out, aerial firing and bombing at the firing range were carried out in an extremely simplified environment. We did not have time to prepare for combat operations at night, to reach the target and to bomb in the rays of searchlights, we did not study the tactics of warfare by fighter aircraft of a probable enemy, did not know the vulnerabilities of Nazi Germany fighter planes. Our compounds were controlled by flags on the ground, and in the air, by radio signals in the form of an aircraft rocking from wing to wing, radio communication was not used. In the first weeks of the war, bombers and even attack aircraft often sprayed the enemy instead of delivering powerful strikes against the enemy in a short period of time.
      I observed the consequences of such tactics from the ground when I descended by parachute. After two pairs of Me-109s dealt with our planes, having lost only one plane, a pair of Il-2s flew in from the east and began to storm the enemy tanks on the move. The Messers who remained there pounced on them and immediately shot down both attack aircraft. A few minutes later, the other two "silts" flew in, and the same fate befell them. Soon a flight of Pe-2 bombers flew over me and the bombing began. The Messerschmitts rushed to the attack. After a short air battle, only two of our planes left home unharmed.
      The crews of our attack aircraft and bombers behaved heroically, entered into an unequal air battle and even burst into flames burst into the tank column of the Germans, bombed and fired at it ... But if we acted at the same time, in a unified battle order, would deliver a crushing blow to the enemy with a powerful steel fist , he would have suffered much greater losses, and we would have saved people and equipment.
      © Bogdanov N.G. In the sky - Guards Gatchinsky
      1. -4
        April 18 2020 00: 41
        and then "messers" appear. And Berezina begins - planes moving in small groups for constant impact on the enemy are destroyed in parts

        Nevertheless, the result of the bombing, even in the above example, fully justified the losses incurred. A war in the air is not about whose fighters are more downed. In addition, Messers did not always appear, more often than not, and the tactics used
        small groups for constant exposure to the enemy

        most effective. The Germans used exactly the same tactics. And they also liked to send bombers in the afternoon in small groups without cover. Because it was technically impossible for both sides to escort high-speed bombers operating at a distance from the front line. Mainly escorted Ju 87 (but also not always), which far from the front line did not fly
        Guidance on the target - the Germans also did not have it at 41m. Fighters spent 10k sorties a day covering their convoy columns (JG 3) or patrolling crossings (ferries across the Dniester and JG 77), and most of these sorties took place without meeting with Soviet planes
        1. +2
          April 18 2020 14: 50
          Quote: Force Multiplier
          The Germans used exactly the same tactics. And they also liked to send bombers in the afternoon in small groups without cover.

          And here you should read our aces - about small groups of German bombers and without cover. request And about the effectiveness of our strikes "in small groups" there is a bitter episode in Simonov's documentaries and in "The Living and the Dead". Six bombers without cover ... during the day ... the returning one is finished off by messers in front of the author.
          1. 0
            April 18 2020 18: 28
            You should read the documents of both parties. Everything is there, and about the Luftwaffe tactics, and about the high activity and efficiency of Soviet aviation at 41m, which popular literature so persistently does not notice
    3. +1
      April 18 2020 14: 44
      Quote: Force Multiplier
      Everything is somehow about the mythical German "air supremacy",

      Interestingly, have you read the memories of at least one soldier of the ground forces? Everyone practically has unpunished bombing of our positions by the Germans in the 43rd. Yes, and at 44, but less often and not always with impunity.
      1. +2
        April 18 2020 18: 39
        Quote: victor50
        Have you read the memories of at least one soldier of the ground forces? Everyone practically has unpunished bombing of our positions by the Germans

        ))
        I will tell you more. Where there really was air supremacy - France 44 - from time to time in the memoirs of land explorers there are Germans flying and making some garbage. Well, that is, not directly horror-horror, but they come across completely. The same Patton is unhappy when crossing the Rhine, March 45th.
      2. +3
        April 18 2020 19: 30
        Have you read the documents of the German ground forces? There, in the summer of the 41st, constantly about the high activity of Soviet aviation, the great losses from its actions and the mention of the lack of cover from the Luftwaffe.
        Regarding excellence. The numbers speak for themselves. During the day of June 24, 1941, 5 Air Corps made 253 sorties. On the same day, the SWF forces that opposed it made 591 sorties (not counting 63 hells and 14 hells), of which 241 were bombers, which amounted to 41% of the available number.
        In total for three June 22-24, Fl.Korps made 5 sorties, and during these three days it declared 1244 Soviet planes in air battles and 97 on the ground (of which 529 and 6 were announced on June 107, respectively). Some 24.06 sorties (rounding in favor of the Germans) must be added to this number IV. Fl.Korps vs SWF. Another 200 reconnaissance units attached to the army, not included in the 16th building. An average of 5 departures per day each. 10 +1244 + 200 = 480 flights in three days with the maximum use of everything that can fly.
        Only on 23 June did the Air Force of the South-West Fleet carry out 1022 sorties (not including 63 and 14 divisions), and at the same time acting half-force. And they lost 22 planes for three reasons on 24.06-448 for all reasons, 32 of them were in accidents and disasters, 15 were left during the retreat, 16 were destroyed on their own to avoid falling into the hands of the enemy, and 234 were destroyed by the enemy on the ground. The number 234 destroyed by the enemy on the ground is 13 SB, 2 Pe-2, 3 Il-2, 3 Yak-2 and 7 DB-3, but 77 I-153, 27 I-15 and 66 I-16, 35 MiG- 3 and 1 Yak-1. The conclusions from the figures for casualties on the ground are obvious - German raids on Soviet airfields did not at all affect the ability of the SWF to strike at enemy ground troops.
        A simple comparison of the number of sorties also eloquently suggests that the Germans had no air superiority
  18. -6
    April 17 2020 21: 49
    A few comments on the article by a respected author.
    “Excellence,” not for three years, but for two. Less than two years old, inflated ,, nemchura. ,, Kuban ,, is the spring of 1943. ,, Rowed ,, Natsik in full then. In your text it goes, for, for some reason, Kursk.
    ,, Blown away ,, in the air finally on the Eastern Front Germans in 1944. In 1943, the Stalinist falcons fought on equal terms with these pogans (taking into account the quality of aircraft). Why so about ,, blonde beasts ,, Goering? Well, if they are so ... In the air they shot Soviet pilots who escaped by parachute ,, knights ,, ... (such and such). They shot at the columns of refugees .. ,, ordinary people. For women, the elderly and children ... Sanitary vessels drowned. And when ,, roasted cock ,, began to firmly ,, peck ,,, they began to treat the captured Soviet pilots, to relax in concentration camps .. Since 1943, they have already “appeased” the future winners of harmonica.
    And their tactics, “jackal,” have been the whole war. Attack from above, from the sun, on a dive, catch on take-off and landing, burn a beginner, finish off, wounded ...
    The so-called ,, capitalism ,, he is just such ... educates. Petty ,, traders ,, considered a twin-engine plane for two downed cars ...
    And if you take only the human factor ...! Then where are they to Gastello, Talalikhin, Safonov, Maresyev!
    ,, Good radio stations ,, have ceased to help the Natsiks since 1943, as well as ,, good engines ,,. Is not it? And, good watch raids, too.
    With the engines of the USSR the whole war was tight. The West is still surprised at their capacity. Which we, however, x in and t about l about. What about them? They have imperialism. World ,, cooperation ,,. Whose engines stood on the first ,, thin ,, and ,, lappethniki ,,? That's right - British. Who crazy amounts swelled into Nazi Germany's aviation industry ALL WAR? That's right - US imperialists. And, of course, they received adequate returns - profits and, publicly available, technical achievements.
    Soviet Russia had to rely ONLY on itself. Helped, allies ,,? A good looking occupation, of course ... If you do not know what they came up with, and ORGANIZED WWII.
    Just like the First ...
    In 1939, having received from the neck of Japanese pilots at Khalkhin Gol, the Union quickly organized a field team of experienced aviators. This ,, fire brigade ,, quickly weaned ,, smile broadly ,, dashing warriors of the Land of the Rising Sun.
    And in 1941, with ,, Hans ,,, a similar ,, number ,, did not pass. Suprun's team could not cope with their task ... Excellent pilots, excellent materiel. ..Why?
    The answer lies in the spiritual realm. Russia has a task set by God - to preserve Orthodoxy (the established, correct and faithful relationship of the Creator and creation) until the end of time ,,. All other ,, pranks ,, and throwing type ,, building communism ,, (or ,, restoration of capitalism ,,), ,, international assistance, to anyone ... NOT ANYTHING INTERESTING. ABSOLUTELY ANYONE! (,, There is no fish here! ,,)
    There is a desire to argue? Get ,, 1941, and ,, sign. From one time did not get it? Get ,, 1991th ,, ... like in a correctional school ...
    But, it should be noted, the former graduate of the Gori Theological School I.V. Dzhugashvili-Stalin understood this.
    And the Soviet aviators understood. That is why you will not find such a “funny” emblem as the circle (symbol of Eternity) in the ,, sketchy ,, pentagram (symbol of the Antichrist) on Soviet ,, airplanes, after 1941. They didn’t refuse altogether from the asterisk, the brainchild of Trotsky-Bronstein, but they began to SUIT such a white border that it was comparable to the width of the very ray of the pentagram. (Pay attention to pictures of Soviet aircraft after 1943).
    Neither ,, radio stations, nor ,, engines ,, nor ,, flight hours, are determining factors. It was just EXCELLENT with this, for example, in 1991. But the wonderful Air Fleet of the Country of the Soviets (like the Army, Navy, KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs ..) did NOTHING to save the country from becoming colonial dependent on globalists - capitalists - ,, ideological heirs ,, villains who unleashed two world wars in the XNUMXth century
    1. 0
      April 22 2020 16: 11
      This is a stream of consciousness. Good mushrooms
  19. -4
    April 17 2020 22: 32
    For the contingent that does not want to understand, because it is too difficult, give myths and legends. Whoever needs it, he can figure it out, so finish these games in numbers (speed, height, number ...). The fact is that such reasoning naturally leads to the fact that "the Americans won, because they have more money, and ours were filled with corpses."
  20. -6
    April 17 2020 22: 56
    Mark Solonin, I believe, has everything described and explained in the wonderful book "On Peacefully Sleeping Airfields ..."
    1. -1
      April 18 2020 00: 00
      I think it’s useful for everyone to read, even if there are nuances there.
      http://www.urantia-s.com/library/solonin/peace_sleep/full
      1. +5
        April 18 2020 09: 20
        Well, Marek Solonin, of course, authority, though Rezun’s level.
        1. -2
          April 18 2020 09: 25
          Did I write authority?
          It is full of all kinds of inconsistencies and other things, I would not refer to it.
          This is journalism, which rather raises questions than gives answers to them.
          For too long in the mass consciousness it was that the Germans suddenly for one raid at dawn on June 22 destroyed the Soviet aircraft.
          1. +1
            April 18 2020 09: 34
            I agree that in this odorous heap there can sometimes be pearl grains (as in the famous fable of Lafontaine), but it’s a very odious source. But the whining about the destroyed aircraft, of course, is annoying, although in most of it it was lost due to the loss of territory, and hence the impossibility of repair, difficulties in fuel supply, untreated tactics of use, etc. And the possibility of massive use of aviation in certain areas appeared only with the creation of air armies (1942), that is, the structure of our air forces at the beginning of the war was not optimal.
            1. 0
              April 18 2020 10: 11
              Books are not always authorities, giving answers and correct explanations, sometimes they just raise a question on its own, even if the answer is incorrect, and you see it when you read it.
              Sometimes the questions are no less important than the answers.
              “They flew, but they didn’t find the enemy” (we look at Pokryshkin, he often sees this, and not only him).

              It occurs, but not so often.
              In memoirs, as a rule, if a combat mission is a battle, it is necessary, in any case, this impression develops. True, questions arose — how is it, armada of enemy aircraft, but did not find the enemy?
              And when information about the number of sorties and fights conducted began to appear, questions began to arise.
              And it was at Solonin, for example, that I met the consideration of the question of the likelihood of an air battle of fighters, in which the only means of observation is their own vision in relation to the Second World War.
              And at the same time - on the features of the modern maneuverable BVB, which also has to rely on vision.
              hi
              1. +1
                April 18 2020 12: 37
                In memoirs, as a rule, if a combat mission is a fight,

                Well, who will describe the unsuccessful departure? Yes, and only dynamic episodes remain in my memory, again, memoirs are a separate type of literature, very close to epics, tales, legends. Clearly, not all authors, but many. Especially among the top command staff. As Yu.I. wrote Mukhin, the beginning of the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov's meaning is very reminiscent of the end of Manstein’s memoirs - what would they do if someone gave them additional troops.
          2. -3
            April 18 2020 09: 49
            Quote: Avior
            I would not refer to it.

            And who would they be?)
            Solonin is very much even in the subject. He is simply "odious" because it is difficult to refute)
            1. 0
              April 18 2020 10: 29
              Whenever possible, I generally prefer to refer to facts rather than authorities.
              As for Solonin - in my opinion, he tried to cover too much at once, and get answers to all questions, and this gives rise to criticism.
              For example, he writes that the I-153 was quite capable of waging a battle with Me109 in terms of horizontal maneuverability, although it is obvious that Me109 could impose its own picture of the battle, eliminating horizontal pain.
              But at the same time, I just think that reading it would be very useful, and primarily because of the questions that he raises.
              1. 0
                April 18 2020 10: 48
                Strictly speaking, I could. It's a pity they just fought in that war on the verticals. But these are details, the book is about something completely different. And the main messages and conclusions, it is difficult to refute in fact. The deniers are pushing more and more on "odiousness". That seems to be hinting)
                1. 0
                  April 18 2020 10: 55
                  Strictly speaking, I could.

                  could. if he could impose his battle.
                  And you need to read the book.
                  Stimulates the search for answers.
  21. 0
    April 17 2020 23: 56
    So, on 22.06.1941/1540/377, on the contact line there were not XNUMX new types of aircraft, but XNUMX. A little less. But also a figure, whatever one may say.

    but for me it's a good figure.
    This means that the Germans could not have destroyed them "at a peacefully sleeping airfield" with a sudden blow.
    the war continued after 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.
    Similarly, by the way, with tanks "which were not in the Western Districts", as they like to write when counting our tanks and are deleted from consideration
  22. -2
    April 18 2020 00: 42
    But there is a third nuance, which we will discuss in the next part, and then we will make the final conclusion.

    We wait until everything is bad, there are no special objections.
  23. +3
    April 18 2020 06: 46
    Everything seems to be correct, but the author has not mentioned yet, about TACTICS. The Germans excelled us in the tactics of using aviation, including fighter, and significantly. Our link of three planes could not compete with the link of four Germans, which was also split into two pairs. In the first wave of the attack on June 22, the Germans staged their raid, putting fighters in the second wave, and in the third they added bombers to them. And as a result, even if our fighters were able to take off to repulse the first wave, they attacked the second and third waves, they were simply destroyed, because they were not allowed to make a normal landing and they often just fell, having exhausted all the fuel. As a result, the fighters were forced to fight, with all that was left, in the sky above their airfields, leaving bombers, ground troops and other important objects without cover.
    The work of ground services was poorly debugged. The aircraft that went to the spare sites were left without fuel and ammunition, and were also destroyed.
    In short, it’s easier to say with what in our Air Force, on the first day of the war it was good - it was with the desire to fight back and beat the enemy.
  24. +2
    April 18 2020 08: 30
    Plus one more circumstance. I read that the I-16 fighter was quite strict in controlling the aircraft. It is possible that this also affected. And radio communication is the most painful topic of the initial period of the war, not only in aircraft, but also in tanks.
    1. +1
      April 18 2020 18: 31
      Quote: itarnmag
      I read that the I-16 fighter was quite strict in controlling the aircraft

      Unfortunately, yes, as a weapon platform I-16 was not the best model, which forced our pilots to approach the distance of the "pistol shot", but with the I-16 there was another problem, in terms of strength, in German qualification, it took second place from the bottom, before Yak ...
  25. +1
    April 18 2020 10: 22
    The main problem of the Red Army Air Force is the mismatch of the amount of aviation gasoline to the number of aircraft, for most of the war we had 5-6 flights per month for the plane, i.e. you can safely reduce the number of pilots by 2 times and the number of aircraft also 2 times.
    This would not affect the number of sorties, but gasoline can be allocated twice as much for preparation, and all planes, except for a short period in 2, be made all-metal.
  26. -2
    April 18 2020 12: 41
    "Before the war, a commission led by Alexander Yakovlev bought a number of samples of aviation equipment from Germany, including Bf.109E, Bf.110, Ju.88, Do.215." ////
    ----
    Germany calmly handed over to the USSR samples of its latest aircraft, and
    not "undressed", but in a complete set.
    This suggests that Hitler was seriously counting on an alliance with the USSR against England.
    1. 0
      April 18 2020 16: 49
      Or, as A.S.Yakovlev wrote in his memoirs, he planned to intimidate him with the superiority of German technology, realizing that for the remaining time it would be difficult to oppose it to anything. After all, a similar performance was also played for the French in 1940, shortly before the attack on them.
  27. 0
    April 18 2020 15: 42
    "Overall, I believe that absence in the Air Force of the spacecraft of the radar detection service "
    the author is not familiar with the subjects - "As of June 21, 1941, there were units of the VNOS troops in the 13 zones of the USSR air defense:
    6 regiments
    35 separate battalions
    5 separate mouths
    The implementation of tasks was ensured by a system of observation posts, and in the most important areas - radar stations. The VNOS system created a continuous field of visual observation of airspace in the border strip with a depth of 150-250 km and around the most important objects of the country with a depth of 60-120 km. So, only in the border military districts, in the deployed state were 1 regiment, 19 separate battalions, 3 companies of air support, 1 radio battalion, and Moscow air defense provided 702 air support posts.

    In the period from 21 to 23 September 1941, with the help of the first domestic radars (RUS-2) and subsequent actions of fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery and other air defense systems of Leningrad and the Baltic Fleet, the plan of the German military command to destroy the USSR fleet in the Gulf of Finland by conducting a three-day air defense operations of their air forces. "
    we can talk about the shortcomings, but deny the radar in the Red Army Air Force ignorance ... request
    1. 0
      April 18 2020 21: 39
      They watched it, they saw it, but they could not tell anyone! All communication is through a cordless telephone, and the wires tend to break often, especially during hostilities. And with walkie-talkies in the USSR it was very sad until the collapse. He used it during his service in the SA, he would have killed the designers. Better now? On footage of the combat training of the Russian army in the hands of soldiers in the hands of Kenwood.
      I will not make conclusions ...
      1. +1
        April 21 2020 11: 53
        Quote: Cetron
        They watched it, they saw it, but they could not tell anyone! All communication is through a cordless telephone, and the wires tend to break often, especially during hostilities.

        Worst of all, VNOS's communication went mainly along civilian lines. Because VNOS service was provided by a quarter at best with its own wired connection. And radio communication for VNOS was generally something deeply theoretical.
    2. 0
      April 19 2020 10: 37
      Sir, in your "competent" information there are no supporting links and precise data, how many air defense radars were in the zone of enemy strikes in June 1941. Therefore, taking into account your estimates of the author, you are -1.
      1. 0
        April 19 2020 18: 23
        Quote: Leo_59
        you -1.

        Yes, even a dozen ... bully
        Quote: Leo_59
        no supporting links or accurate data,

        but I did not write this article, I pointed out the inaccuracy ... request
        1. 0
          April 19 2020 19: 59
          Indicated ??? Then I "prompted" you ... So how many (and where) radar stations were in the DB zone in June-July 1941 (and this period is discussed in the article)? Would you deign to indicate?
          I am very ashamed, but I never heard of these radars (((
        2. 0
          April 20 2020 10: 39
          No worse - wait and catch up ...
          In 1941, such information was found about the radar of the Red Army (as if convincing)
          https://tech.wikireading.ru/2474
          The first domestic radars. Russia is the birthplace of Radio. Historical essays.
          Summary: if a crystalline salt fell into a bucket of water, then it is too early to salt the cucumbers;). Russia in general is much to the homeland ...
          1. 0
            April 20 2020 14: 25
            Quote: Leo_59
            No worse - wait and catch up ...

            why hysteria? laughing
            Quote: Leo_59
            https://tech.wikireading.ru/2474

            so everything is written - I read in another book - on the history of air defense ... request
            Quote: Leo_59
            I am very ashamed, but I never heard of these radars (((

            I’m waiting, thank you, for closing the knowledge gap ... drinks
            1. 0
              April 20 2020 14: 32
              "so everything is written - I read in another book - on the history of air defense ..."
              Do not wait.
              I don't like the pompous smug ignorant ...
              1. 0
                April 20 2020 14: 45
                Quote: Leo_59
                I don't like the pompous smug ignorant ...

                you exactly named yourself ... bully ignorant - you and I made you prove to yourself! it wasn’t difficult, right? I note that you suffer from banal fanaberia ... laughing
                Quote: Leo_59
                Do not wait.

                that you were raised badly, I already noticed ... request
                However, your level of education does not allow us to guess about it - here and live with it ... bully
                1. 0
                  April 20 2020 17: 36
                  The suggestion is this: you better open That Book itself (apparently your grandmother, who served in the air defense headquarters), from where you quoted your information, and find the difference between ignoramus and ignoramus. Only take off your glasses;)
                  1. 0
                    April 20 2020 19: 34
                    Quote: Leo_59
                    The offer is:

                    I will say this, your proposals are not even considered due to their nullity ... request
                    Those caught in ignorance apologize if they are well-mannered people - this is normal, you can’t know everything, but if you aren’t well-educated - then they transfer their inferiority complex to a chip .. feel
                    Flood went, good luck! hi
                    1. 0
                      April 20 2020 19: 48
                      Anamnesis: Hopeless.
  28. +1
    April 18 2020 16: 42
    I got the impression that the introduction of new types of aircraft into the troops in 1941 brought more problems than benefits. Not only that these rather "raw" machines could not be quickly mastered by the flight and technical personnel in those conditions, they required the expansion of most airfields due to the increase in the takeoff and run length. In the spring of 1941, military builders simultaneously "plowed" most of the airfields, which deprived the front-line aviation of the possibilities for dispersal and maneuver. The planes turned out to be crowded at a relatively small number of airfields, which the enemy was well aware of.
    M. Maslov cites data that "outdated" I-16s in 1941 had the best ratio of enemy aircraft downed to their own combat losses, surpassing even the Yak-1, officially designated "beloved wife" "the best Soviet fighter of the initial period of the Second World War". True, due to significant wear and tear of the material part, the "donkeys" had a higher proportion of non-combat losses.
    1. +1
      April 18 2020 18: 41
      Quote: su25
      I got the impression that the introduction of new types of aircraft into the troops in 1941 brought more problems than benefits.

      Certainly.

      And it's not just about airplanes.
    2. 0
      April 19 2020 08: 48
      Perhaps one should not rashly abandon the I-180. The plane, in fact, was the development of I-16.
      It could become an intermediate link between the I-16 and new aircraft with water-cooled engines. And, subsequently, as most of the shortcomings of the M-82 are eliminated, the country could get a modern fighter with an air-cooled engine.
      1. +2
        April 19 2020 18: 27
        Quote: ignoto
        should not rashly abandon the I-180.

        was setting to create new KB hi and Polikarpov is a great designer, not a hardware schemer ... request
        it’s another matter that having commissioned 3 types of new machines at once, they received 3 hemorrhoids with debugging, staging and blowing, and not one ... hi
  29. 0
    April 18 2020 17: 39
    Great article, a lot of new.
  30. +2
    April 19 2020 08: 49
    Quote: Spectrum
    the remaining losses are women, old people and children, and 29 million of them. along with the military.

    My mother told me how they sat for almost two weeks in the open cracks under the German bombing. At this time, her younger brother fell ill and died, he was a baby. When the bombing ended, the road passing by was covered with torn to pieces the corpses of people, horses and domestic animals. The Germans simply ironed the columns of refugees. It was in 1942 near Stalingrad, we have a steppe, refugees have nowhere to hide. The refugees were from Ukraine and the western regions of Russia. Liberators are now telling us tales about "cultural" Europe. The beast has always been, is and will be the beast. They recognize only one thing, strength.
  31. 0
    April 19 2020 10: 45
    "But the Germans had their great engineering school, they had potential." The Germans had (and still are) a very HIGH production culture (production quality). Hence the work of automation, engine hours, etc.
    1. 0
      April 20 2020 00: 28
      And do not tell me why 100500 mile-hours of hours to an airplane that will survive the 15-20 departures with training.
      And so yes, the culture was. Especially in the tanks was noticeable at the final stage.
      1. 0
        April 20 2020 13: 13
        Coming out of this article: intensive training for Soviet pilots was impossible because of the rapid development of aircraft engines. In addition, there was infa that the low engine life of tank engines also led to premature failures. Well, low quality (i.e. a high level of marriage) is no secret. I do not seek to discredit Soviet equipment, but what happened was what happened. Unfortunately, we have quantity quantity to the detriment of quality - this is a parable in languages ​​(often - even now).
  32. +2
    April 19 2020 12: 16
    1. The Germans didn’t have any air superiority in 1941. There are indisputable statistics about German and Soviet airplane flights in 1941. From 22 June 41 to the end of the year, Soviet aviation made 459 thousand only combat aircraft flights. German aviation was not able to make half of the Soviet combat vielet.
    2. It is difficult to assess the real effectiveness of aviation on earthly targets, but neither Soviet nor German aviation inflicted any decisive losses on the enemy. The most effective use of German aviation was hit by long-range and near-range reconnaissance and correction of artillery fire, and Soviet night bombing by Po-2. For the troops on the battlefield and for teal targets, air strikes hit at best, only the hives did not change the course of hostilities.
    3, No radar and radio are needed to organize strikes on the German troops and the teal and to accompany fighter aircraft attack aircraft in tactical depth.
    4. Losses of Soviet aviation during a bistro retreat in the first place are the abandonment of cars at the aerodromes - an airplane with a slight damage or no fuel or an damaged aerodrome is abandoned during a bistro retreat. In addition, many cars are lost due to a technical accident, pilots' mistakes, loss of orientation and decommissioning due to the development of a resource. Then there are losses from the German automatic small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns. The last place was lost in aerial combat and not all of them were from fighters. In addition to this, very often fighters only finished off aircraft damaged by anti-aircraft fire or who had technical problems, and without the participation of fighters they lost. The same in full force can be said of the German losses.
    5. The lack of old Soviet fighter jets was beaten only when fighting with German bombers - there is no superiority in speed and weak weapons (also in the MiG-3). Of course, you can use visota to intercept Yu-88, but Yu-88 can also go away with a decrease. Guns were only hit in a small series of I-16s and their speed was still noticeably lower.
    Generalization: The Soviet retreat in 1941 was a consequence of the superiority of the German ground forces. The air superiority of German aviation did not beat, and the aviation of both sides did not have a decisive influence on the course of hostilities. The best remedy for air strikes is not to panic and go under the blow - the plane will not fall. Soviet losses due to bistro retreat and superior German small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery. If you are looking for some shortcomings of Soviet leadership in the air war, it is the lack of automatic anti-aircraft guns and machine guns and the unpreparedness of the ground forces to use a common small-arms weapon against non-flying aircraft and react to air raids.
    1. 0
      April 19 2020 14: 41
      Yes, good comment, the author was overly keen on technical parameters.
      Hello Bulgaria, where are BT cigarettes and beans in tomato and bear blood ... give me everything back ... !!!!
  33. 0
    April 19 2020 12: 26
    It was a lot of stupidity to equip new airplanes with the Germans without trained pilots with new planes.
  34. -1
    April 19 2020 14: 35
    In general, a good, sensible article. However, it did not indicate one of the reasons for the superiority of German cars — higher glider strength and correspondingly high dive speed. Thus, German aces had the opportunity to choose the moment and place of attack, and in case of any problem, quickly topple .... In addition, the author frankly scribbles claiming that the USSR and Germany began on an equal footing in terms of engine building ... this is not so. RI technically lagged behind Germany in 1913 for decades ... what can I say God-saved RI was inferior to Germany 1000 times in the production of nitrogen fertilizers ...
  35. +1
    April 19 2020 15: 46
    Thanks, worthy article. There is one more thing. My grandfather fought in aviation from the beginning of the war and said that at the beginning of the war one aviation division was served by a technical division. And during the redeployment, the airplanes flew to a new place, and then the technical division dragged along. Because of this, there were many inconsistencies and loss of time for servicing aircraft. And since 1942, they switched to the RAB system (aviation-based areas), a whole network of air bases was created, aircraft flew to new airfields, and there was already an air base with a ready airfield, spare parts, repair services and ammunition. Immediately felt an improvement. I agree with the reviews that many planes were abandoned due to the retreat and the impossibility of repair. The same thing happened with tanks. Yes, it was more difficult for our pilots to control, but the Germans themselves recalled that if a Russian fighter saw an attacking plane in time, it would turn quickly and it would be better not to mess with it. In terms of German tactics, my grandfather recalled how often when returning from a mission, planes that had already lost speed and were landing were shot by German fighters. Typical robber tactics of strikes from around the corner. And he often resented when we watched films about aviation, resented the fact that there they showed how the airfield defended anti-aircraft guns and said that during the whole war they had not seen a single anti-aircraft gun. I have a book about our engine engineer A. Mikulin he recalled how the aircraft engine plant was built in Kaluga. It was built by peasants from the surrounding villages and from the Kaluga region. They built and then studied on turners, milling machines, locksmiths and other professions. At first, they gave one hundred percent marriage. And the Germans already in the First World War had a sufficient number of specialists working for aviation. One must wonder how we were able to do a lot in this direction.
    1. 0
      April 20 2020 13: 18
      The rule is confirmed that the right organization is half the success.
  36. 0
    April 19 2020 16: 54
    Especially wise was the decision to bring planes in boxes and collect them at airfields. Then they went to the Germans ...
  37. 0
    April 19 2020 18: 47
    You consider yourself a "techie", but why then do you call numbers numbers? Arithmetic, early. school)))

    "... not 1540 new types of aircraft, but 377. A bit less so. But also a NUMBER, whatever one may say. ..."
    1. Aag
      0
      April 19 2020 21: 55
      Some bad analogies on a number of issues begs for today ... Although the VKS, in my non-specialized opinion, is not the most disastrous place in the RF Armed Forces.
    2. 0
      April 20 2020 00: 39
      In this case, this is not a technical term, but a literary device.
  38. 0
    April 20 2020 01: 47
    This factor was, but it was not the main one.
    With the number of 3500 fighters versus 1200, it was possible with competent organization and tactics to ensure at least parity in the air. In some places this was succeeded in a point, and there we see Guderian's nagging in his memoirs. If this had been possible in at least half of the sectors, this in itself would have made blitzkrieg impossible in the summer of 1941.
  39. 0
    April 20 2020 22: 16
    In general, I believe that the absence of a radar detection service, a radio control service for aircraft and communications in the air force of the spacecraft in general created more problems than the absence of the latest types of aircraft.

    UPDATE:
    If you believe:
    https://tech.wikireading.ru/2474, то
    "... In accordance with the decree of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of December 27, 1939, NII-20 was ordered to produce and hand over to the People's Commissariat of Defense 10 sets of radar" Redut "(RUS-2).

    By June 10, 1941, all ten sets were delivered to the customer. In 1941, in NII-20, a prototype of the single-antenna Redut-41 radar was created, which was already tested in combat conditions.

    In the battle for Moscow, the air defense forces could only have Russian radar RUS-2. In this battle, the military units that carried out the combat use of the RUS-2 radar were air surveillance, warning and communication radio platoons (VNOS). In the air defense system of Moscow, these radio platoons were included in the 337th separate radio battalion of VNOS according to the directive of the headquarters of the 1st air defense corps No. 1602 of March 26, 1941.

    By the beginning of the war, the radio battalion had 9 early warning radars, which occupied positions near the cities of Klin, Mozhaisk, Kaluga, Tula, Ryazan, Mytishchi, Vladimir, Yaroslavl, Kashin. On June 14, 1941, near Mozhaisk in the village of Kolychevo, the Redut-S radar station was deployed, that is, the first experimental prototype of a stationary single-antenna version of the RUS-1S [2]. "

    Total: at the beginning of the war near Moscow (and only!) There were only 10 Redut radars (+ one aglitskaya).
    The rest are obsolete, removed from service 45 units. "how" - radar Rhubarb) could be (or not?) around Leningrad.
    Conclusion - in the western border districts in June 1941 there was NOT a radar. With all the consequences. What was necessary for me, the researcher of the events of the first months of the war, it was important to find out.
  40. 0
    April 21 2020 13: 10
    DB 601 consumed less fuel than our M-105 and AM-35A by 25,5 and 28,5 percent, respectively.


    Not surprisingly, the situation is now comparable.
    Even in engines for commercial vehicles or special equipment, Kamins engines similar in power and environmental class consume 22% less fuel than YaMZ.
    At the same time, they are 3-5 times superior in reliability and resource.
  41. +1
    April 21 2020 13: 32
    The experience of the Great Patriotic War, especially the first and part of the second periods, showed that we failed mainly due to the technical backlog of our fighter aircraft, which had a significant impact on operations in ground operations.

    In the early days, the Luftwaffe gained strategic dominance in the air throughout the front and held it until the Battle of Kursk and the battle in the sky over the Kuban.


    Do not forget that the fundamentals of submission to the fighter aircraft of Germany and the USSR were different.

    Here is what the former deputy commander-in-chief of the USSR Air Force Vassily Vasilyevich Reshetnikov writes about this in his memoirs "What happened - that was" about "the Ustinovskaya restructuring of the USSR Air Force on the example of errors in the subordination of the Air Force in 1941-1942-1943:
    At that time, the air forces of the front-line aviation were again removed from submission to the Air Force commander. Turned by Ustinov’s “perestroika” into the Air Force of military districts, these structures that have arisen more than once belonged to Glavkomov’s competence only in matters of flight training methodology, staffing and military equipment. Now the commanders of the troops of the districts (fronts, if it comes to war) so easily will not let go of their hands the aviation directly subordinate to them for any kind of air operations there. She will hang and hang over the battlefield, covering and supporting the fighting forces. There will be very little success with the dominance of enemy aviation, especially in the balance of losses, and there is no reason to hope for any changes in the nature of the use of their own air forces. This is precisely the case when the organizational structure determines the nature of the combat employment of troops.

    The old chronic disease from the pre-war era underestimating the factor of air supremacy, as well as the principle of concentration of forces on the main task, turned out to be transient and strongly affected a considerable part of the new generation of potential commanders.


    And also there at Reshetnikov VV:
    They love, oh, how land commanders like to manage and command aviation.

    As those terrible days of the forty-first year, forgotten in memory failures, after which in the spring and summer of the next Headquarters it was necessary during the war, to untie the aviation hands, turn the air forces of the fronts into air armies.


    It was the subordination of the Air Force to military districts that did not prevent the Air Force from maneuvering and quickly concentrating them on the directions of the main attacks of the German troops - subordination to the districts and later to the fronts - departmental pulling of the aircraft - this is the main strategic mistake of the aviation command.

    Yes - tactical miscalculations were important in terms of poor communication of the airborne mission posts, but the inability to concentrate the air force led to unjustified losses and the deployment of the Air Force forces to "cover" the troops, instead of gaining air superiority and useless "flight" of the resource of engines and fuel.
  42. 0
    April 21 2020 16: 33
    Quote: Kostadinov
    bombers - there is no superiority in speed and weak weapons (also in the Mig-3).

    Even the BF-109F weapons are slightly better than the MiG-3 in the basic version.
    MiG-3 is a high-altitude interceptor, the fact that it was used for other purposes is another point.
  43. 0
    April 21 2020 21: 49
    Even before the heap: the main aviation losses occurred on the 2nd-3rd day of the war, when the ammunition and fuel ran out.
    Logistics was no better than communication. Given the German air terror on the roads. So the bulk of the aircraft was simply abandoned.
  44. 0
    April 25 2020 18: 31
    Before talking about the mistakes and fog of the war in June 1941, I must say about another non-aggression treaty concluded by our country (of course it’s hard to see from inside the country) with Japan and one of the articles of this treaty stated: when any party to the treaty attacks a third, it is considered null and void ..So, the beginning of the war is logical, therefore, the commanders who entered the general on the first day of the war were not shot by the governor only because of the confusion of the bungling of the special services.

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