Military Review

On the development strategy of the Russian Navy


Frigate project 22350

When the author wrote an article “Is Russia ready for sea defense?”, then rightly believed that the situation in which our Navy is located is difficult. However, when the author re-read the series of articles by Andrey from Chelyabinsk (“The Russian Navy. A sad look into the future ", “Naval Aviation of the Russian Navy: Current Status and Prospects”), as well as reading articles by Alexander Timokhin “Broken wings. Will naval aviation be reborn? ” и "On the need to recreate naval missile aircraft", he had to conclude that the situation is even worse.

In principle, the above articles are very informative, they indicate the main problems of our Navy and the sea aviation, and the author of this material can add very little to what was said there. At the same time, there is a common fundamental problem for Russia - this is the degradation of our naval fleet and naval aviation, and talk about it is necessary. It makes no sense to amuse the public with the ostentatious launches of the Caliber against terrorists from our ships and submarines; you need to honestly and impartially give information about the state of the Navy, the tasks facing it, the problems and possible ways to solve them. Therefore, this article was written: it is impossible to remain silent and to raise the problem, only then there is a chance that it will be eliminated over time.

On the need for strategic planning in the construction of the fleet

SSBN project 955 "Borey"

Why is the article talking about "strategy"? As if these issues are not being addressed at the level of the Ministry of Defense. Of course, to some extent, these issues are resolved there. An example of the strategic approach of our Ministry of Defense is the new SSBN of project 955 Borey. Three submarines with a displacement of 24 tons are already in operation, two more should replenish the fleet this year. These submarines have a difficult fate, but our military, shipbuilders and rocket launchers brought the project to a working condition, despite all the difficulties, and it is these submarines that will in the new century be the basis of our submarine forces of strategic deterrence. Russia implemented this project, implemented because there was a clear understanding that it was needed. The same understanding should be in the construction of any ship for the Navy and not only the ship, this applies to aviation. And here questions arise.

Why, for example, for our fleet, patrol icebreakers of project 23550, patrol ships of project 22160, large and expensive UDC? The author is not opposed to the construction of these ships, perhaps they have the right to life, but now, when the class frigate, corvette, multipurpose nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines, anti-submarine ships are elementary, building something else is simply unreasonable.

RTO project 22800 "Karakurt

You can understand the order of the MRK series of project 22800 Karakurt. Engines for frigates are not yet ready, and the Navy needs to be updated, at least at the expense of RTOs. But to the project 20386 corvettes there are again questions: the engines for them are based on the same M90FR gas turbines as for the 22350 project frigates. That is, those gas turbines which are not yet in the series. Again, is it worth it to start a new corvette project, when even 20380 corvettes mastered by the industry build 7-8 years each? How long will the new corvette be built? With such a "zoo" of ships of various projects, we completely lose the advantage of large-scale production.

IL-38N "Novella"

If we talk about naval aviation, the situation here is even sadder: there are no naval AWACS aircraft, there are no EW aircraft, there are no new anti-submarine aircraft, new PLO helicopters are not being produced, and MPA has been abolished. Even the modernization program of the IL-38 to the relatively modern IL-38N Novella hung in uncertainty: 8 aircraft were modernized, but over the past two years there were no reports of new arrivals, but news about the modernization of the IL-38N in a certain Supernovela.

Maybe this is not bad, but neither the “Supernovels” nor the new IL-38N naval aviation received in 2 years. We have only 38 Il-8Ns and these are the only planes that can at least put something against the potential enemy’s submarines. And here the trouble is not even in the absence of serial samples, but in the absence of a technical backlog. Simply put, if the top military leadership had carried out systematic work on the development of the Navy and naval aviation, then somewhere else from the mid-2000s, R&D should have begun on a new PLO plane, on a new anti-submarine helicopter, on an AWACS sea plane. If this were done, then today we would have if not serial samples, then at least experimental ones, ready to be launched into series.

Just a catastrophic situation is observed in the field of torpedo weapons. The nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines are armed with obsolete UEST-80 torpedoes with a range of up to 18 km. But even worse is the situation with the BOD of project 1155; they use 533 mm SET-65 torpedoes adopted for service in 1965. Their range reaches 15 km, and the guidance system can hardly be called modern. The worst crews of the IPC project 1124 - they are armed with torpedoes SET-53 with a range of 8 to 14 km (the latest versions). It was adopted in the distant 1958 year. Wherein Italian electric torpedo "Black Shark" reaches a range of 70 km at low speed, the American Mark 48 has a range of 50 km. Thus, our submarines, not to mention anti-submarine ships, are in a very vulnerable position.

To summarize, let’s say that today we have achieved the following “successes” in the development of the Navy: we are building ships with incomprehensible functions, we are building submarines with outdated torpedoes and without modern anti-torpedo protection (see the article by M. Klimov "AICR" Severodvinsk "surrendered to the Navy with critical deficiencies for combat readiness"), we are building several types of corvettes with similar functions at once, updating our naval aviation very little.

The general impression is this: our potential adversaries are building a fleet for war, for victory at sea, and we - for the "demonstration of the flag." And one of our main problems is the lack of a clear understanding of the functions that our fleet must fulfill.

For convenience, we will make a list of the problems of our Navy and naval aviation.

1. The lack of serial gas turbines for frigates and corvettes. Previously, they were supplied by the Zarya-Mashproekt plant, but after the reunification of Crimea with Russia, supplies ceased. Now we are waiting for the results of the Rybinsk Saturn.

2. Extremely slow production of diesel engines for RTOs of project 22800 at PJSC Zvezda (according to media reports no more than one engine per year).

3. The lack of engines for MRK project 21631 "Buyan-M" (using Chinese engines).

4. The lack of modern torpedoes for nuclear submarines, diesel-electric submarines and surface anti-submarine ships. The UGST “Physicist” / “Case” program is in an undetermined state; instead, UET-1 electric torpedoes with a very short range of 25 km come into service.

5. Lack of modern anti-torpedo protection for submarines.

6. Extremely long construction periods of both submarines and NK. Even the small corvettes of project 20380 we are building for eight years.

7. Lack of modern anti-submarine aircraft. Conventionally, only 8 IL-38N Novella can be attributed to them.


8. The lack of naval aircraft AWACS. There are only a few Ka-31 helicopters with a range of detection of ships of 250-285 km.

9. The lack of modern EW aircraft.

10. The lack of VNEU for diesel-electric submarines, while a number of countries: Sweden, China, Germany, Japan already have submarines with VNEU.

11. The elimination of MPA, as a result of which our fleet lost air support.

12. Obsolescence of missile weapons. First of all, it concerns RTOs of project 1234 with anti-ship missiles P-120 Malachite. This missile, which was adopted in 1972, is now hopelessly outdated, and its carriers of the 1234 missile launchers have a very low combat value.

13. Lack of modern mine protection equipment. Read more in the article by Andrey from Chelyabinsk “The Russian Navy. A sad look into the future: mine-sweeping disaster ".

The conclusion, unfortunately, is obvious. Russia today is far behind the leading maritime powers. There can be no talk of US opposition at sea. At sea, we lag behind not only the United States, but also Japan, China, Great Britain, and Germany. And, worst of all, we lag behind not so much in the number of ships (in this indicator we are second only to the USA and China), but in technologies: shipbuilding, engine building, marine weapons, anti-submarine aircraft.

Long-term perspective

So, our position in terms of naval combat readiness is unenviable. In addition, our fleet is dispersed over 4 theater of operations almost isolated from each other, therefore, we cannot now demand anything more from it than:

1. Ensuring the deployment of SSBNs in areas of combat duty.

2. Coastal defense near our naval base under the guise of a DBK of coastal troops and airborne forces.

These are the two tasks that our fleet is facing now, and which they will face 15–20 years before we can again acquire an ocean fleet capable of performing more complex tasks. However, this does not mean that the fleet does not need to be engaged. The ways of development of the fleet will be discussed below. We list them also point by point.

1. First and foremost, a strategic program for the development of the Navy for a couple of decades ahead is needed. The goal of this program should be not so much to “build ships” as to eliminate technological lag from leading sea powers, learn to make engines for ships, and provide orders to shipbuilding enterprises. This program should focus not on quantity, but on quality. Let us lay fewer submarines, but they will be provided with modern torpedo weapons, anti-torpedo protection, and VNEU.

2. The program should emphasize in shipbuilding universal and industrial ships: Project 22350 frigates should become the core of the future fleet, it also makes sense to lay project 20380 corvettes, Project 636 diesel-electric submarines, and Project 885M nuclear submarines. No patrol ships, patrol icebreakers, even UDC-type “Surf” should be postponed for 10-15 years.

Flying laboratory based on IL-114

3. An important place in the program should be given to naval aviation. It is necessary to develop a modern anti-submarine aircraft, for example, based on the Il-114, especially since such a project existed. In addition to the aircraft itself, it is necessary to create modern sonar beacons. In addition, the renewal of the fleet of Ka-27 helicopters is required due to the release of a modern PLO helicopter.

Indian Su-30 with anti-ship missile system “Bramos” - clone P-800 “Onyx”

4. The revival of MPA is required. Some authors believe that MRA is too expensive and easier and cheaper to build aircraft carriers. However, the state of our shipbuilding industry is such that relying on the construction of aircraft carriers in the next 15-20 years, alas, is too optimistic. So MRA is still uncontested. Tu-22M3 should be modernized for new missiles: X-32, P-800 Onyx, maybe under the Dagger and return to naval aviation. By the way, such modernization program is and most importantly, that it be implemented in full. However, the main strength of the MRA should not be Tu-22M3, which are relatively few, but cheaper and more versatile Su-30SM, which have already been purchased in small quantities for naval aviation. Such machines adapted for the use of Onyx need 100-150 pieces.

5. Creation of modern anti-mine systems based on remote-controlled unmanned vehicles.

6. Development of diesel-electric submarines with VNEU. According to the latest data new OKR on VNEU is opened.

7. It is necessary to create modern torpedo weapons and in parallel with them anti-torpedo protection systems.

If such or close in essence the program is implemented, what will we get on the way out? Of course, we will not receive a second, third or even fourth strongest fleet. A large and strong fleet needs a lot of money, which the country does not have yet. But no need to tear and chase after America or China. We now need to practically re-learn how to build ships, engines for them and create naval weapons. And the first stage is the acquisition of technological competencies and groundwork for the creation of new military equipment. The main thing is to eliminate technological lag, to obtain new weapons, even in a small series.

Another issue is the financial one. The fleet is the most expensive type of troops, is it necessary to spend money on it when there are other important projects: T-14 Armata, self-propelled guns Coalition, RS-28 Sarmat, Avangard program, Su-57, resumption of Tu production -160. All this requires a lot of money. The author believes that spending money on the development of the fleet is necessary. After all, it is the fleet that ensures the deployment of the strategic nuclear forces, the fleet can defend our economic interests on the shelf of the Arctic, and there is the Far East - a huge region - where there are few railways, few roads and the main communications are carried out by sea. In addition, it is in naval armaments that we have the largest lag behind the leading powers and must be eliminated, otherwise our fleet will simply lose its defense significance and turn into a set of outdated, ineffective ships.

Short term

MRK project 12411 "Lightning" with anti-ship missile R-270 "Mosquito"

At present, the Russian Navy has 26 combat-ready ships of 1-2 rank, 40 RTOs, 26 MPKs, 42 mine sweepers, 16 diesel-electric submarines, 13 multi-purpose submarines. What is their real combat value? Of the 26 ships of 1-2 ranks - 6 Project 1155 BODs. For their time, these were good ships, but today they carry outdated torpedo weapons, do not have long-range air defense systems, and have no anti-ship missiles. Another 2 - patrol corvettes of project 22160 unable to fight with either NK or submarines.

Out of 40 RTOs, 8 are Project 21631 Buyan-M, which are offshore platforms for launching the Caliber, 2 modern RTOs of Project 22800 Karakurt, 11 RTOs of Project 12341, one of which has been modernized for X-35 missiles, the rest carry obsolete P -120 "Malachite", and there are 19 more RTOs of project 12411 "Lightning" with missiles P-270 "Mosquito". "Lightning" due to their sufficiently powerful and difficult to intercept missiles can still be considered more or less serious "fighters". Thus, among 40 RTOs, we have 22 ships suitable for fighting at sea.

With the IPC of Project 1124 Albatros, the situation is even worse - due to the lack of high-quality torpedo weapons, using them against modern submarines means sending them to certain death.

The situation with the submarines is no better: the lack of modern torpedoes, anti-torpedo protection, and VNEU on diesel-electric submarines puts them in a very difficult position in confronting the probable enemy with submarines.

Forty-two mine minesweepers do not have modern mine weapons and use obsolete mine trawls. Their value in the fight against probable enemy mines is close to zero.

Thus, the modern fleet of Russia can only be considered limitedly combat-ready and it can be used in the fight against a knowingly weaker enemy. A collision at sea with a modern, even not very large fleet, will end for our Navy with heavy losses.

In this situation, the main emphasis in the short term should be placed on DBK and aviation with anti-ship missiles. DBK type “Ball” and “Bastion” are good for their relative cheapness, as well as the ability to use against ground targets, as a result of which they can be considered as a reserve for the Ground Forces. Aviation based on the Su-30SM armed with anti-ship missiles can also be used to cover the fleet from the air, and also as a reserve for the airborne forces in the event of a large-scale land conflict.


The situation of our fleet is difficult and requires vigorous measures to restore its combat effectiveness. However, these measures should be applied comprehensively: the goal should be not just the construction of ships and submarines, but the creation of a system of "power plant - ship - weapons." The fleet should not be developed separately, but in conjunction with naval aviation, which in the coming years should be considered as the main striking force of the fleet. And most importantly, we need a state fleet development program, within the framework of which the necessary R&D would be carried out, regular funding would be carried out, and the actions of the fleet and industry would be coordinated. And to do this it is necessary that our fleet be a reliable tool in protecting the interests of Russia.
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  1. Amateur
    Amateur April 18 2020 06: 11 New
    Self-isolation is what you want to bring.
    However, when the author re-read the series of articles by Andrei from Chelyabinsk (“Russian Navy. A sad look into the future”, “Naval aviation of the Russian Navy: current status and prospects”), as well as reading articles by Alexander Timokhin

    1. Dmitry from Voronezh
      April 18 2020 06: 36 New
      Well, I wouldn't say "it's all gone." In fact, many of the necessary work is underway. For example, recently they wrote in the news about the imminent launching of the 3rd frigate of project 22350, claiming that Russian engines have already been installed on it. There is progress in torpedoes, albeit still small. The most difficult thing, in my opinion, is the situation with VNEU for diesel-electric submarines and the new PLO aircraft. I suspect that Novella is still the pinnacle of our technical capabilities. And in general, if the fleet is systematically developed, then the technological gap will eventually be eliminated. Still, there are many talented people in Russia, in particular scientists, designers, engineers. I believe we can.
      1. Amateur
        Amateur April 18 2020 06: 51 New
        Well, I wouldn't say "it's all gone."

        Dear Dmitry! Not me, not you and not the gentlemen named in your article do not know the real state of affairs, tk. they go under the appropriate heading. People who have "clearance" will never "talk too much." Therefore, all information is taken "from open sources", which roughly corresponds to the expression "One woman said (OBS)".
        Happy upcoming holiday - "Bright Sunday of Christ - Easter" drinks
        1. Dmitry from Voronezh
          April 18 2020 06: 53 New
          Thanks for the congratulation! Happy holiday too!
          1. kepmor
            kepmor April 18 2020 11: 11 New
            Dmitry, at 1124M there never was a SET-53 ... they were withdrawn from service in the early 80s ...
            now in TA on the SET-65 albatrosses, although the test form should be TEST-72 ... but telecontrol is still not subject to our fleet ...
            we really do not have 26 combat-ready MPCs ...
            I know the situation with the IPC and minesweepers in the north firsthand ... in short, "a complete tryndets" ...
            1. Dmitry from Voronezh
              April 18 2020 14: 39 New
              Thanks for the first-hand information!
      2. Cyril G ...
        Cyril G ... April 18 2020 18: 44 New
        To begin with, the fleet management should at least recognize that there are problems in the fleet and they are more serious than in other types of forces. They are still chorusing “Tout va très bien, Madame la Marquise”
  2. mark1
    mark1 April 18 2020 06: 42 New
    Aviation, nuclear submarines, the massive introduction of auxiliary power plants (type VAU-6) for modernized and new diesel engines (as a wonderful alternative to VNEU), the massive (truly) construction of corvettes 20380/85 and frigates 22350 (M), the development of coastal defense forces and stationary detection systems and PLO, installation of multifunctional stationary combat platforms at the NSR sites, purchase of high-speed rockers and container ships for dual-use applications.
  3. Sailor
    Sailor April 18 2020 06: 48 New
    He set the article +, everything is written with knowledge of the matter and unfortunately nothing changes, just as the fleet was the stepson at the scraps in the Russian Federation, it remained, and the tasks set for it are grandiose.
  4. avia12005
    avia12005 April 18 2020 06: 52 New
    Instead of the Su-30 SM, it is advisable to form the MRA regiments from the Su-34. The bomb load is 4 tons more, the range is longer, the so-called. "free architecture" allows for an unlimited number of upgrades, its own autonomous power plant for starting and supplying power in the parking lot, and even the possibility (!) crew, comfortable conditions for the crew's combat work during many hours of flights over the sea and much more. good
    1. Dmitry from Voronezh
      April 18 2020 07: 09 New
      Yes, the Su-34 as a drummer is better than the Su-30SM. He also thought about him when he wrote the article. True, the Su-30SM is more universal: it can be used not only as a strike aircraft, but also to gain air supremacy. I think that is why he was chosen for the fleet. And in general, naval aviation, shock machines like air are now needed. ,
      1. avia12005
        avia12005 April 18 2020 08: 54 New
        There is still such an important nuance as the combat training course. It is impossible to prepare at once and at the same time a cool fighter and a cool bomber. Moreover, for naval aviation - the defeat of surface targets - this is a special kind of combat operation. And the bombers just love the Su-34.
    2. Angry
      Angry 5 May 2020 00: 43 New
      That's for sure! With the annual production of Su-34s reaching 20 units per year, two full-fledged regiments of the MRA DMZ can be created in 4 years. When a pair of Onyx anti-ship missiles is suspended with a range of 500-600 km, and Onyx M flies from the surface in general for 800 km, and even with an air start it will probably reach up to 1000 km, we will get very strong arguments near and far from our borders, like at the Northern Fleet and at the Pacific Fleet.
  5. Ross xnumx
    Ross xnumx April 18 2020 07: 23 New
    On the development strategy of the Russian Navy

    fellow fellow fellow
    The situation of our fleet is difficult and requires vigorous measures to restore its combat effectiveness. However, these measures should be applied comprehensively: the goal should be not just the construction of ships and submarines, but the creation of a system of "power plant - ship - weapon".

    And where is the essence (strategy)?
    Why is the article talking about “strategy”? ... And here questions arise.

    I understand that when they start talking about strategy, they do not refer to the authors from Chelyabinsk or Uryupinsk, but use the provisions of the military doctrine, some military manuals, possible alleged tasks that the country's authorities, represented by departments and headquarters, have the right to demand from the Russian fleet ... In addition, the naval commanders themselves are obliged to give a list of forces and means to accomplish their tasks. Then you can talk about what is the global strategy of a sea power under the name of the Russian Federation and whether its capabilities correspond to the declared goals ...
    No. NOT FOUND ... Excuse me generously ...
  6. SVD68
    SVD68 April 18 2020 08: 11 New
    The article is somewhat chaotic. Although it is called "On Strategy", it speaks of particular points.

    There are dubious private offers.
    1. In 20 years, learn to do. This will doom itself to a lag of 20 years. It is impossible to create a modern engine building, releasing single engines. And for mass production you need a lot of consumers. Similarly, in shipyards, it is impossible to create modern shipbuilding by giving orders for single ships.
    6. Development of diesel-electric submarines with VNEU. The largest experience in operating submarines with VNEU in Japan. And the Japanese switched from building submarines from VNEU to submarines with lithium-ion batteries. Won't we run here after the departed steam locomotive when electric locomotives have already appeared?
    1. Avior
      Avior April 18 2020 11: 06 New
      6. Development of diesel-electric submarines with VNEU. The largest experience in operating submarines with VNEU in Japan. And the Japanese switched from building submarines from VNEU to submarines with lithium-ion batteries.

      There is a simple explanation.
      VNEU they have not their own, and their batteries, Japanese.
      Let and much more expensive VNEU.
      1. SVD68
        SVD68 April 18 2020 11: 16 New
        Quote: Avior
        There is a simple explanation.
        VNEU they have not their own, and their batteries, Japanese.
        Let and much more expensive VNEU.

        If we were not talking about serial already mastered boats, then we could agree with this interpretation. But the changes were made not in the new boat, but in the next serial. So this change improves performance. And this characteristic is not the price.
        1. Avior
          Avior April 18 2020 11: 17 New
          where to try, if not on a used boat.
          The first in the series and even with batteries would generally be extremely expensive
    2. Dmitry from Voronezh
      April 18 2020 14: 32 New
      Unfortunately, as practice shows, technological competencies are acquired over a long period of methodical and consistent work. For example, the Swedes did not immediately create their own VNEU for submarines, the same applies to the Japanese, who began working on lithium-ion batteries almost from the 70s of the last century. Therefore, if not 20, but 10-15 years of constant and regular work to close the technological gap is a real time. You are right about lithium-ion batteries - now this is the most promising direction in the development of diesel-electric submarines.
      1. SVD68
        SVD68 April 18 2020 15: 53 New
        Quote: Dmitry from Voronezh
        Unfortunately, as practice shows, technological competencies are acquired over a long period of methodical and consistent work.

        That is not the question. And the fact is that without broad engineering practice it is impossible to go to the forefront. It is necessary to create a lot so that during the mass exploitation all the shortcomings are revealed. And again, a lot, so that in the course of mass exploitation, the shortcomings of ways to eliminate the previous shortcomings are revealed.
    3. Cyril G ...
      Cyril G ... April 18 2020 15: 10 New
      Small nuclear power plant for recharging batteries, our version of VNEU.
      1. Dmitry from Voronezh
        April 18 2020 15: 59 New
        Yes it is possible. France, if I'm not mistaken, went down this path. They do not build diesel-electric submarines for themselves, focused on nuclear submarines. However, there is one thing: the nuclear submarine is inferior in terms of the noiselessness of diesel-electric submarines running on electric motors powered by batteries. A nuclear reactor involves the operation of circulation pumps, steam turbines - these are serious sources of noise.
        1. Cyril G ...
          Cyril G ... April 18 2020 16: 06 New
          It's not about that at all.

          Here -
          1. Dmitry from Voronezh
            April 18 2020 16: 16 New
            I read it, thanks! Good varant. What is the situation with this development today? Is work being done?
            1. Cyril G ...
              Cyril G ... April 18 2020 16: 17 New
              No comment.
    4. Boa kaa
      Boa kaa April 18 2020 19: 03 New
      Quote: SVD68
      The largest experience in operating submarines with VNEU in Japan. And the Japanese switched from building submarines from VNEU to submarines with lithium-ion batteries.

      Victor, hi
      The Germans (based on ECH) and Swedes (DS) have the largest experience in the field of VNEU application in the fleet. And the Japans and South Koreans rushed to the area that they had mastered better. But here's the whole problem, that after the density of the Li-I battery (LIAB) sits down, Soryu will be forced to put a "trunk" (RPM shaft) on the surface in order to start the diesel generator and knock out the battery. A 212A will quietly work on a screw-discharge from its ECH, while maintaining secrecy.
      It seems to me that the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet could well use a submarine with the new VAU-6. But for the Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic Fleet you need something from the category of "gas turbine" engines of a closed cycle or based on ECH.
      By the way, amas were already puzzled by mini reactors for their spacecraft. And we are building all eyes, although in this area the office of Afrikandov will give them 100 points ahead!
      In my opinion, it's time to stop being shy and pull the owl on the globe!
      1. SVD68
        SVD68 April 18 2020 20: 55 New
        Quote: Boa constrictor KAA
        The largest experience in the application of VNEU in the fleet is among the Germans (based on ECG) and the Swedes (DS).

        How many boats do they have with VNEU? Japan has 10. What is their capacity for VNEU? Japanese boats have 8000 bhp.
        1. Boa kaa
          Boa kaa April 19 2020 00: 35 New
          The Germans built (ordered) 27 buildings 212A, 214, and 4 buildings type 800 for Israel: 6-Germany, 4-Italy, 4-Greece, 3 ordered Pakistan, 6 is being built for Turkey.
          Japan - 10 types of Soryu and 1 type of Oryu on LIAB. Total 11.
          Swedes already A26 masteryat. But Poland wants to buy 4 A26 missile.
          Total, together with its 3 Gotlands - 7 units.
          About VNEU. Sorry, but you are confusing shaft power (hp) and unit capacity (kW).
          1. SVD68
            SVD68 April 19 2020 06: 16 New
            Quote: Boa constrictor KAA
            The Germans built (ordered) 27 buildings

            We are talking about operating experience, and not about the experience of construction.

            Quote: Boa constrictor KAA
            About VNEU. Sorry, but you are confusing shaft power (hp) and unit capacity (kW).

            You can provide your details. But the essence will remain the same - everyone has VNEU - an auxiliary engine of the "pedestrian" course. Only the Japanese have tried to make VNEU for combat modes.
            1. Boa kaa
              Boa kaa April 19 2020 10: 32 New
              Quote: SVD68
              about operating experience,

              Swedes. PL Gotland in service since September 1996
              Germans. U31, the first submarine, pr. 212, in operation since October 2005.
              The Japanese commissioned their Blue Dragon (Soryu) in March 2009.
              the Japanese tried to make VNEU for combat regimes

              LIAB is not an "installation". This is the "storage" of electricity. More than packed in it, he will not give out. The installation can work until the components for the production of electric power run out. Both the Germans and the Swedes have a single GED, like the Japans. Therefore, the statement that japanas are ahead of the whole planet is not correct. They claim to have solved the problem of spontaneous combustion of LIAB. Whether this is so - time and operating experience will show.
  7. Chaldon48
    Chaldon48 April 18 2020 10: 27 New
    In general, in the event of a serious conflict, our fleet will face a "heroic death". Boldly comrades all in place, the last parade is coming!
    1. Boa kaa
      Boa kaa April 18 2020 19: 11 New
      Quote: Chaldon48
      in the event of a serious conflict, our fleet will face a "heroic death"

      In the event of a serious conflict, all mankind will face an "inglorious" death!
      By the way, of all that remains after a "serious" conflict, only the nuclear submarine fleet can survive. Well, there are also "moles" in their CPUs, although it is doubtful that after a blow to the OS they will have "light, water, sewage" ... the ventilation will also be bent because it is impossible to drive CO through the pipes indefinitely. Exactly CO, not CO2 ... Hopcoliptic cartridges just won't last so long ...
  8. Gust
    Gust April 18 2020 10: 54 New
    I’ll dilute Dmitry’s article with a spoon of honey.
    1. There are no serial gas turbines. Serial gas turbines are, the problem is in the gearboxes and the test bench for the assembly, it seems to be completed. On this occasion, there were comments by Aristarchus L. it seems with photos. So not everything is so bad- GTE is much more complicated than the gearbox.
    2. There are no diesels, the star slows down. Yes, it slows down. But not only she, more than KB, and desperately. There are serial Kolomna diesel generator sets from locomotives (economical and serial), and there are GED from DPL. For a long time it was possible to jump to full electric movement, or to electromechanics through a gearbox, it would be a desire, everything in metal has long been mastered.
    3. See p. 2.
    4. See comments by Timokhin and others. There are torpedoes themselves, you need to stop lobbying for junk - but this is for naval commanders and design bureaus.
    5. Under PTZ DPL deploy, who and what it is. Just not about Nixie and other EW buoys, but the type of Package integrated into the DPS. In any case, OCD is required, everything is real.
    6. Timing is a consequence of the general degradation of the real sector. Now only a parallel tab on many SHA. Regarding corvettes, a very controversial issue in their series. If the frigate turned out to be successful, then there are big questions to the corvettes.
    7. The largest jamb. Apparently, new Ila are waiting as carriers. In the meantime, several Tu-204s could be put into operation as MP and PLO aircraft.
    8. A-50 / A-100 are redundant, we are waiting for Ila as a base.
    9. Well, I don’t know. There is no information in the open press.
    10. A very controversial issue on VNEU. In my opinion, a powerful VNEU is needed for those who do not have nuclear submarines. We need a submarine with a powerful modern battery with characteristics at least half the characteristics of VNEU, this is enough.
    11. Net wrecking. Recovery is required as soon as possible.
    12. According to the tasks, the coastal defense complexes overlap with the RTOs, the latter are also being modernized.
    13. MTSC are built in a series, there are advantages and disadvantages.
    As you can see, 80% of the problem is not in the budget, but in erroneous constructive decisions and stupid lobbying of useless pieces of iron in the presence of useful ones. But these are already questions to the security agencies.
    1. Cyril G ...
      Cyril G ... April 18 2020 15: 17 New
      According to paragraph 6. Corvettes, regardless of frigates, are needed as air in order to plug not even holes, but gaping dips in the OVR. And you need 30 of them.
      By punt 10. The best VNEU for us is a small nuclear power plant of the type Topaz there, for charging the battery.
      According to paragraph 13. For minesweepers, it was necessary to begin with the modernization of the existing mine-sweeping forces with new effective mine detection complexes. What did not happen in reality.

      Bookmark MRK must be stopped.
    2. Dmitry from Voronezh
      April 18 2020 16: 09 New
      Thank! Valuable comment. On VNEU let me discuss with you a little. The nuclear reactor is inferior in noiselessness to electric motors, in addition, diesel-electric submarines with VNEU are cheaper than nuclear submarines.
    3. Nemchinov Vl
      Nemchinov Vl April 21 2020 02: 38 New
      Quote: Rafale
      For a long time it was possible to jump to full electric movement, or to electromechanics through a gearbox, it would be a desire, everything in metal has long been mastered.
      But it seems gearbox 6 RP (GTE and partial electric movement on 20386) in metal not mastered and not ready ?! And even more so for a long time !!
  9. Operator
    Operator April 18 2020 11: 07 New
    Another cargo-cult idea: how to strengthen the position of the Russian Navy in the state of terpily laughing
  10. Charik
    Charik April 18 2020 11: 07 New
    understand the hell again with torpedoes, in another article people write that the Physicist and the Case are both on the submarine and in purchases annually
  11. Charik
    Charik April 18 2020 11: 36 New
    Yes, not every Vasya will fight off Malachite
  12. Doctor
    Doctor April 18 2020 12: 14 New
    The main problem of our fleet is the "Gorshkovskoe" thinking of the current naval commanders. From lieutenants to admirals, they served under the influence of the doctrine of a large "balanced" fleet and are now passing on this experience to the young.
    And they also introduce this thinking into the consciousness of the country's leadership, and the leadership, considering them experts, is trying to implement their recommendations as far as possible.
    1. Cyrus
      Cyrus April 18 2020 13: 42 New
      But I, for example, believe Gorshkov more than you personally.
      1. Doctor
        Doctor April 18 2020 13: 52 New
        But I, for example, believe Gorshkov more than you personally.

        I understand this, about people like you.
        I also realize that for the majority of the leadership of the Navy, teachers of maritime educational institutions, and even more so for veterans of the Navy, especially here in VO, the Gorshkov fleet structure is ideal, they lived with it and will die with it.
        Just as at the end of the 19th century sailors "sailing ships" remained true to their ideals to the end.
    2. Cyril G ...
      Cyril G ... April 18 2020 15: 20 New
      The fleet must be aimed primarily at solving the problem of assisting the army.
      1. Boa kaa
        Boa kaa April 18 2020 19: 25 New
        Quote: Cyril G ...
        The fleet must be aimed primarily at solving the problem of assisting the army.

        Having a length of service of 37 calendars (46 preferential), I have never seen an Army in the sea!
        I have never seen a land unit watching an AVM or hanging on the tail of Gadget in readiness to drown it ...
        So, do not confuse God's gift with fried eggs!
        There are purely naval tasks that only the fleet can solve.
        1. Cyril G ...
          Cyril G ... April 18 2020 19: 42 New
          Why do not you follow the aircraft carrier?
          - There are no purely naval tasks. Our fleet primarily solves the tasks of combat support. And even the strategic nuclear forces, being extremely vulnerable to the probing adversary’s SS, essentially only duplicates the Strategic Missile Forces.
          And due to a host of reasons, the fleet has never been effective with us, is not now, and will not be in the future.
          1. Boa kaa
            Boa kaa April 18 2020 19: 44 New
            Quote: Cyril G ...
            Why, follow the aircraft carrier

            For example, "Enterprise" carried 104 nuclear warheads on board ...
            Further to tell or guess yourself?
            1. Cyril G ...
              Cyril G ... April 18 2020 20: 37 New
              Do not tell me further, but at the same time what you could do at the pump station, if the enemy unexpectedly suddenly starts! It has become interesting to me.
  13. Cyrus
    Cyrus April 18 2020 13: 40 New
    "The spoon is good for dinner" - The ships of the ocean zone are needed yesterday, as a result of which abandoning them is a catastrophic mistake. It is a big mistake to hope that the coastal defense fleet will be able to withstand the enemy's navy, especially since the US fleet is acquiring "long arms."
    The problem of the geographical position of our country is partly solved by the USSR recipe, in particular the creation of the OPESK (at least 3) - the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic and the Pacific / Indian Oceans.
    The SSBNs, in addition to the task of nuclear deterrence and delivering a retaliatory strike, have one more task, although it is not customary for us to speak about it loudly, this is a sudden preventive counter-force strike on enemy territory, for this the patrol routes should be made as close as possible to the enemy, and without strong this is not possible for ocean KMG / AUG, apart from the fact that it is impossible to destroy enemy strategists in patrol areas without a fleet.
    In other words, the "coastal" and "oceanic" components of the Navy should develop in parallel.
    I agree completely with everything else, without strategic planning and rethinking the role of the fleet in the armed forces of our country, nothing will work.
    1. Angry
      Angry 5 May 2020 01: 32 New
      Well, yes, everything is correct, OPESK is needed. "But just by clothes and stretch your legs." You cannot leave the Ocean while partners are operating there. We also need the Force projection wherever we need it. While we really have a small number of ships, but it is there. And these are 4 cruisers, 5 newest frigates, 8 BODs, 6 corvettes. In addition, there are two pairs 1154 and 1135 TFR. And there is AVL Kuznetsov. We need to deal with it, but not in terms of fashion, it will drag on for a five-year period, but to minimize the cost of our own weapons and create on its basis a multipurpose air defense aircraft carrier with a regiment of MiG-29K fighters. It will not handle strike missions, the only serious and long-range anti-ship missile "Onyx" would have allowed not to enter the range of the "Aegis" air defense, but not a single aircraft would lift it from the deck. Therefore, she must be on the escort's BNK and nuclear submarine. In addition to the fighter regiment, test all the latest aviation technologies and ship / deck-based aviation. The same Ka-52K must be run in the ocean. And drones and Lampreys, etc., etc. Subordinate everything to this task only. All defensive weapons will be on the escort ships. Dismantle the ZRAKi, if there is already no spare parts for them. Leave SAM "Dagger" at a minimum. If someone has the task of drowning him, they will drown even with ZRAKs, even with air defense systems. There are no unsinkables in any fleet. But in the presence of a sufficient number of fighters (24) with backup crews (48), even these 24 Flashes will complicate the task for those who wish. It is clear that there will be no "drowning", because after that only the Third World War. So we are able to organize one OPESK, with the help of the Kuznetsov multipurpose aircraft carrier, even now. And this must be done! "At sea - at home". And every year walk, walk and walk! And with the advent of two UDCs, a couple more. But that will be in seven years.
      1. Cyrus
        Cyrus 10 May 2020 09: 40 New
        After 5 or 7 years, in the mid-20s or 30s ... if we have time for this, which I strongly doubt.
  14. iouris
    iouris April 18 2020 14: 36 New
    What does the development strategy of the Russian Navy follow from? I remember that for a long time the Russian Federation did not have foreign policy, then military doctrine and strategy ... then it ceased to follow.
  15. Sergey Kazarinov
    Sergey Kazarinov April 18 2020 18: 18 New
    To begin with, the code Mosquito is P-100, not P-270. The modification M-M - P-105. Further, your article is written according to the pattern "Everything is lost, chief". The fleet, and even more so the country, is not preparing for war, neither in the BMZ, nor in the DMZ. Yes, indeed, the fleet is developing at the wrong pace and far from the direction in which we would like. However, you, the author, focus your view on the actions of the forces of the fleet, forgetting that he does not act alone. You are thrown from side to side. Here I would like to completely challenge everything you have written, on each item, tk. literally everything smacks of populism, superficial analysis. So what is the conclusion, where as measures to restore the combat effectiveness of the fleet, the so-called. comprehensive measures to create a system "power plant - ship - weapons", it was proposed to switch to the so-called. state programs for the development of the fleet. Why were they all tied up in one ball? The combat capability of the fleet is determined by the range of tasks assigned to it by the leadership of the Defense Ministry and the country. As far as I understand, there are no global tasks for today, and everyone clearly understands this. And don't make a tragedy out of it. Everything has its time. And if the fleet today performs the tasks that have been assigned to it, then it means that it meets the current criteria of combat effectiveness. It is absurd to compare combat capability today and what it was in Soviet times. I would like to note that offering as a so-called. "restoration" of the fleet's combat effectiveness, comprehensive measures to create a certain system "power plants-ship-weapons", as well as the creation of the so-called. state programs for the development of the fleet, you involuntarily suggest the thought: do you yourself understand what you wanted to convey to grateful readers? I got the impression that your article is just a set of populist recommendations and appeals. As for the state programs - this is how they are in the face of the State Program for every 10 years. And they were developed (-yut_ their people with no less experience and experience. And, of course, these GPV include all your recommended activities. This is the ABC. You want naval aviation as part of the Navy, so who doesn't want that? Close the elbow, but you won't bite . Modern operations are carried out as air-land-sea (for example, Syria). Therefore, the fleet in operations will be supported by the forces of the Aerospace Forces. Today, the Aerospace Forces are developing (although there are the same problems and a small cart, as without it), including 4 military districts have been created for the operational-strategic interaction of the fleet and the army. I note the measures for regular financing as good wishes. But the proposal for the interaction of the fleet (as a customer) and industry I note as very valuable, here, as they say, " dog ", here dark things are happening on both sides to the detriment of the fleet. All my comments are only on the conclusion, as a generalization of the article. The article is very ill-considered, crude, I probably wanted to say a lot, but you have something lo wrong
    1. Dmitry from Voronezh
      April 18 2020 22: 11 New
      Thanks for the constructive criticism! The article really turned out to be crude and not all thoughts are stated there as well and clearly as I would like. At the same time, the list of problems indicated in it, I am sure, is not an empty phrase, but there are places to be. This is confirmed from various sources and these problems in total give a simple conclusion that our fleet has low combat efficiency, not only in comparison with the US or PRC fleets, but also in Japan with which we have a territorial dispute, a comparison with Germany, Italy , France, Great Britain will not be in our favor either.
      As for my suggestions, in my opinion there is no recipe to quickly fix the situation. It requires long-term work on the development of the fleet, which has regular funding and may even be a priority for the Navy among other branches of the armed forces.
    2. Cyrus
      Cyrus April 19 2020 00: 09 New
      But no, during the Great War, the videoconferencing team will be busy with their problems this time. The tasks of the Navy have not changed for centuries, the only thing has been added nuclear deterrence and a preventive nuclear strike, and our fleet cannot fulfill any task, you hope to remember that our enemy is overseas with all the consequences.
  16. LeonidL
    LeonidL April 18 2020 20: 03 New
    "also having read the articles by Alexander Timokhin" Broken wings. Will naval aviation be revived? " and "On the need to recreate naval missile-carrying aircraft", he had to conclude that the situation is even worse. " - don't make people laugh! The opinion of an amateur with no education, no experience in the sea service, who never served as an officer anywhere, plunged you into despondency? Just a fairy tale! "VO" turns into a kind of alternative General Staff, Defense Ministry, the Kremlin and so on, a whole host of amateurs is building the strategy of the Fleet! It's already funny.
    1. iouris
      iouris April 18 2020 21: 46 New
      Quote: LeonidL
      "VO" turns into a kind of alternative General Staff, Defense Ministry, the Kremlin and so on, a whole host of amateurs is building the strategy of the Fleet! It's already funny.

      What if VO is our only "think tank"? Even dissertations are written using the "copy-paste" method.
      1. LeonidL
        LeonidL April 19 2020 04: 16 New
        Well, if it's a dissertation, then full yu
    2. Dmitry from Voronezh
      April 18 2020 22: 28 New
      I would not say that plunged into gloom. Most of our problems are known and obvious. But as regards PLO aviation, for example, I really thought that the situation is better than it is. As for the ranks and ranks, can't a person without high rank have sound thoughts? At least some ...
      1. LeonidL
        LeonidL April 19 2020 04: 34 New
        Dear Dmitriy! I have already written many times that only a person who owns all the information, intelligence in the first place, can make the right conclusions, because decisions are not made at the kitchen level, these are strategic decisions. Here everything is taken into account and rechecked, a thorough and serious analysis is carried out not by pictures and not open sources, not by rumors from the gateways, the selection of priorities and the allocation of the budget accordingly. It's not rubber, not Chinese, not American ... I think it all starts with military doctrine, and not with the screams of a children's room named "VO" "Want more boats! Good and different!" What is the strategic goal of the Russian leadership? Not in unleashing and "winning" a global thermonuclear war, but in the creation and possession of such a qualitative and quantitative composition of weapons that would prevent this war. In this regard, the priority is the creation of advanced types of strategic weapons, including those based on the latest physical and other principles of FUNDAMENTAL science, high-tech weapons. The capabilities of the surface fleet in this regard are limited, hence the structure of its revival - from small to larger. Indeed, in the days of EBN everything was ruined, much of the most important remained abroad. Think about it - the overwhelming majority of large surface ships finish and finished their journey without ever engaging in battle. With a probability of 99 percent, the time of sea battles has passed irrevocably. The United States and China are building surface fleets with different, but by no means strategic goals, these are the goals of achieving and maintaining world domination. For the PRC so far in the APR region, for the United States in the global context of "police" functions. But for Russia, both are neither a priority, nor even a goal, more and more limited. From this it is worth dancing without making hasty "flotation" conclusions. It is not worth shaking a wave of public opinion from patriotic profane and enthusiastic inhabitants, for whom bread is not fed, but let the authorities, generals, admirals and others bite. Moreover, one should not succumb to the provocations of the "all-propalist" Timokhin. More or less like this.
        1. Cyrus
          Cyrus April 19 2020 13: 16 New
          Everything that you wrote is not true.
        2. iouris
          iouris April 19 2020 22: 46 New
          Quote: LeonidL
          Indeed, in the days of EBN, everything was ruined, much of the most important remained abroad.

          And what is EBN? We were born and raised at GDP! All that was before this has long been irrelevant.
          1. Golovan Jack
            Golovan Jack April 19 2020 23: 46 New
            Quote: iouris
            We were born and raised with GDP

            belay Yah? I would never have thought of such a thing about you request

            Quote: iouris
            All that was before is long irrelevant

            You just said something like the following: "I live on the tenth floor. What will happen to those below is irrelevant."

            So, do not believe it - it has. Even as it has yes
    3. Cyrus
      Cyrus April 19 2020 00: 20 New
      Do you think that in the General Staff, people cannot be wrong? This is not true. Back to Midway, the battle was lost at the moment when Vice Admiral Nagumo T. gave the order to "remove bombs, hang torpedoes" why did the best aircraft carrier admiral (and this was proved by the battle at Santa Cruz Island) WWII? Some researchers and historians believe that the state of "war fatigue" is to blame for this, that is, when prolonged participation in hostilities dulls the sense of danger and reduces an adequate perception of reality, war becomes something commonplace.
      What we see now are NATO’s ongoing exercises, calls to the Ukrainian and Baltic ports of URO destroyers, strategic aviation maneuvers, the transfer of Amer’s troops to Europe, all this is becoming commonplace, you get used to it ...
  17. nikant
    nikant April 18 2020 20: 47 New
    Shipbuilding? Engine building? Electronics? Economy? This is dancing to a tambourine only around the Navy ... Specialists have calculated that launching one strategic missile from a boat costs the power tens of times more expensive than "land" launches. It makes sense to improve the Strategic Missile Forces even more steeply and launch mobile railway complexes at full power - first of all: a quick start will soon be dominant in general, taking into account the time for making a decision by either side !!! The same experts say that almost all Russian missile carriers "graze" by two American hunters ... Oil painting ... And most importantly: as long as the entourage, the oligarchs, officials continue to cynically rob Russia and lower the people, it will only get worse. Apparently, not everyone needs a strong and sovereign country.
    1. Cyril G ...
      Cyril G ... April 18 2020 22: 22 New
      And maybe really in the tens, if you count the required support forces. And if we need air defense with the air force in any situation, then with the navy everything is much more complicated and expensive. The Grand Navy made sense if we decided to repeat Jutland, Guadanalkanal, the Philippines, etc. within any reasonable time. If not, there are enough forces operating in coastal areas, and several ships to demonstrate the flag in distant waters. A kind of colonial frigate. Further, in the part of the SNLF, if the boat does not shoot from the pier and has already set sail. This means that a hunter can follow her, moreover, constantly. With the CiS organization that have a place to be today, is it necessary to carry out strategic nuclear forces? Well, perhaps to force the enemy to spend money and resources and efforts.
  18. Romario_Argo
    Romario_Argo April 19 2020 01: 37 New
    building something else is simply unreasonable

    TARK Nakhimov will destroy 4 AUG, TARK Peter the Great - 2 AUG, 3 RK Atlant - 3 AUG, 4 frigates pr.22350 - 2 AUG
    = 11 AUG and more in the USA and no
    if we upgrade TARK Lazarev then + 4 AUG
    and also in the construction of 2 ave. 22350 + lay another 2 = 2 AUG
    = 17 AUG US Navy
    as well as naval aviation, + submarines such as Ash, Antei
    1. Dmitry from Voronezh
      April 19 2020 02: 27 New
      The cruisers of the Orlan and Slava projects, of course, are powerful ships with long-range anti-ship missiles, but they will not be able to resist the AUG alone. Most likely, even before reaching the missile launch line, they will be attacked by enemy carrier-based aircraft and nuclear submarines. And even if it comes to launching missiles, it is very unlikely that they will be able to break through the ABM AUG. If the Zircons are adopted, the frigates 22350 will become a serious weapon, but they, too, will have to meet the nuclear submarines and enemy aircraft before reaching the missile launch line, it is unlikely that they will be able to survive.
    2. LeonidL
      LeonidL April 19 2020 04: 36 New
      Novel! "TARK Nakhimov will destroy 4 AUG, Peter the Great TARK - 2 AUG, 3 RC Atlant - 3 AUG, 4 frigates of Project 22350 - 2 AUG
      = 11 AUG and more in the USA and no
      if we upgrade TARK Lazarev then + 4 AUG
      and also in the construction of 2 ave. 22350 + lay another 2 = 2 AUG
      = 17 AUG US Navy
      and also naval aviation, + nuclear submarines such as Ash, Antey "

      Destroy it then destroy, but who will give it to him? Do not tell the audience, commander, naval commander!
    3. Cyrus
      Cyrus April 19 2020 13: 12 New
      Stupidity is not out of the blue, firstly they alone will not be able to destroy aug secondly when it comes to this AUG will not, there will be AUS.
  19. Cyril G ...
    Cyril G ... April 19 2020 18: 37 New
    With regards to the repeatedly shamed and damned Poseidon. The question is how true the picture we see and how much the statements correlate with reality.
    - gigatorpeda makes practical sense in exactly one case, like a doomsday weapon after the launch of the first wave of ICBMs.
    - however, at the same time, it should be a purely coastal weapon (As an option with an ordinary dry cargo ship), no fucking special PLA with a unique acoustic portrait. It must be possible to apply directly from any surviving pier.
    - I imagine such an option when a mobile detachment consists of a control machine (kung), a truck crane, special equipment is being transported on a tank trawl to the pier. Then, it is lowered into the water by a crane and mechanical switching is already afloat, after which it sets off.

    In the same form in which it seems to be realized today - no doubt bullshit on a moonlit night ...
  20. exo
    exo April 21 2020 11: 13 New
    - the fleet does not need a special AWACS aircraft. Such an aircraft is necessary only if there is an aircraft carrier. Enough airplanes, our fleet in its current form, solves problems near the coast
    -based on IL-114, normal anti-submarine, will not work
    - our fleet is not built to "show the flag". Not the scale of the ships.
    - begs the recreation of MRA based on the Su-34.
    Unfortunately, we will reap the fruits of the pandemic for a long time, the country will not be up to a large-scale program for the construction of the Navy.
  21. candidate
    candidate April 25 2020 18: 44 New
    There are technological ways, from here to dance. According to Yakovts Yu.V. - this is the interchangeability of generations of technology that are evolutionarily implementing a common technological principle. Any fleet is primarily a transport vessel, a means of transportation depending on the environment. A propeller acts as a propulsor. Only the transition to electric propulsion will make it possible to realize the requirements dictated by modern way of life and economic realities - speed, energy efficiency and profitability. The electric motor, as a basis, in all its diversity and packaging in terms of capacity building, provides an opportunity for the implementation of modern development strategies. Time is a decisive factor!
  22. barin
    barin 3 May 2020 09: 35 New
    In addition to ships, it is necessary to strengthen the aviation component
  23. Alexey Petrovichev
    Alexey Petrovichev 10 May 2020 20: 34 New
    I totally agree.