Was there a counterattack in 1941 near Dubno - Lutsk - Brody tank battle


In modern sources, the counterattack of five mechanized corps of the Red Army in the first week of the war in the area of ​​Dubno - Lutsk - Brody is often called the largest tank battle of World War II, superior to the tank battle of Prokhorovka.


In fact, this is not entirely true, there was also no tank battle near Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943, as General Rotmistrov later represented. The Fifth Guards Tank Army launched a counterattack on the enemy’s well-prepared anti-tank defenses and, sandwiched between the embankment of the railway and the floodplain of the river, suffered enormous losses from enemy artillery and tanks. Only at the final stage of the battle dozens of tanks from two sides participated in oncoming tank battles.

The German command, having fixed in the Dubno - Lutsk - Brody region an extension of large Soviet tank formations to the Kleist tank wedge, used the tactics of not an oncoming tank battle, but the organization of a solid anti-tank defense, as was the case later in the Prokhorov battle.

Plans of the Soviet command


From Dubno - Lutsk - Brody, the Soviet mechanized corps from June 24 to July 1 launched several disparate counterattacks on the German tank divisions of Kleist, did not achieve the goal to defeat and destroy the enemy, and suffered huge losses mainly from aviation and enemy artillery. At the same time, there were very few tank battles, in fact it was a “shooting” of Soviet tank formations thrown into the attack.

In contrast to the actions of the 2nd Panzer Guderian group, which at the same time organized tank mites on the flanks of the Soviet group in the Białystok region, which surrounded and destroyed five Soviet mechanized corps, the tank wedge of the 1st Panzer Group of Kleist (11td, 13td, 14 td, 16 td), having defeated the Soviet troops of the Southwestern Front on the border on June 22 and wedged deep east in the region of Radekhov, he was rapidly moving to Rivne in an attempt to break through to Kiev.

The General Staff, in its directive on June 22, ordered the South-Western Front to strike at the erupted enemy grouping from the north and from the south in the direction of Lublin, to surround and destroy the enemy.

In the evening of June 22, a representative of the Zhukovka Headquarters arrives on the South-Western Front, the front headquarters considered it impossible to carry out such an operation and offered to withdraw troops to the old border and then counterattack. This proposal was rejected and a decision was made to launch a counterattack with three mechanized corps (4th, 8th, 15th) from Radekhov and Rava-Russkaya to Krasnostav and from Vladimir-Volynsky 22mk to Krasnostav not to encircle but to defeat the enemy in oncoming battle.

The unexpected capture of Radekhov on the morning of June 23 by the German 11th and the breakthrough to Berestechko forced the Soviet command to reconsider the previous decision and launch a counterattack not on Krasnostav, but on the wedged Kleist group in the Brody - Lutsk - Dubno region from the south with forces of 8mk, 15mk and 8td, and from the north with forces 9mk, 19mk, 22mk.

Only 15 mk was deployed in the area of ​​counterattack, the rest of the mechanized corps needed to make long marches from 110 km to 495 km to the place of concentration.

Aspect ratio


The sources refer to different numbers of tanks in the mechanized corps as of June 22, up to 3607 tanks. This is most fully and thoroughly reflected in Drig’s book, Mechkorpus of the Red Army in battle, on the basis of which 3324 Soviet tanks participated in this battle. Although these figures are also relative, for example, according to the data of Komkor 8mk Ryabyshev, there were 932 tanks in the corps on the eve of the war. The number of tanks by types and formations as of June 22 is shown in the table.


On the German side, there were 728 tanks in five tank divisions (the SS Leibstandart tank division during the battle), of which 54 were commander (without weapons), 219 light Pz.I and Pz.II and 455 medium tanks Pz.III, Pz .IV and Czechoslovak Pz-38.

The Soviet tankers had 2608 light, amphibious and chemical (flamethrower) and 706 medium and heavy tanks. That is, the number of tanks on the Soviet side was 4,5 times superior.

In terms of quality, Soviet tanks were not only inferior to German tanks, but even superior to them. The German light tank Pz.I had a 13mm armor and two machine guns as armament, a Pz.II armor of 20-35 mm and a 20mm gun armament, a Pz.III armor of 30mm and a 37mm gun armament, a Pz.IV armor of 50mm and a 75mm short-barreled gun .

Soviet T-26 tanks had a 15mm armor and 37 (45) mm gun armament, BT series tanks 13-20mm armor and 45mm gun armament, T-34 armor 45mm and 76,2mm gun armor, KV-1 armor 75mm and 76,2 gun armor , 34mm. By their characteristics, the Soviet T-1 and KV tanks significantly exceeded all German tanks.

Counterattack on the southern flank


By order of the front headquarters, 15mk, 8mk and 8td were to launch a counterattack on the southern flank in the direction of Berestechko Dubno on June 25, but it did not take place because of the unavailability of the troops still on the march. Troops from June 26 were brought into battle as they arrived at their original positions and suffered heavy losses.


The compounds taking part in the counterattack were deployed in different places. Radekhov had only 15mk located in Brody and Kremenets, attached to the 15th mechanized corps 8td was part of 4mk and deployed in Lviv, and 8mk was stationed in Drohobych (65km southwest of Lviv).

Towards the end of the day, June 22, units of 15 mk occupied the defense of Rodekhov, and on June 23-24 they tried to take this settlement. Parts of the corps even broke into Radekhov on June 24, but the Germans pulled up artillery, including 88mm Flak anti-aircraft guns, and 15mk, suffering heavy losses in equipment and people, began to retreat.

Re-subordinated to the 15th mechanized corps 8td according to the plan for covering the border, on June 21 advanced to the border in the Dubrovitsy region. By order of Zhukov, on the morning of June 24, she should advance to the Busk region, but the commander of the 6th Army, Muzychenko, uses the division to counterattack near the border town of Magerov, where she lost 19 tanks. Only after this the division is redeployed to the Zhovkva area to replenish ammunition and by the end of the day on June 26 arrives in the concentration area near Busk, having completed a march of more than 200 km during this time and having lost a significant number of equipment due to malfunctions. On the morning of June 27, she immediately entered the battle from the march.

According to the plan for covering the border, on June 8, he advanced to Yavorov district to counterattack Krasnostav; on the morning of June 22, he was ordered to move east to the Brody area to counter-strike together with 24 μk. The corps, having completed a 15 km march and having lost up to 495% of equipment due to malfunctions and lack of fuel, did not fully arrive in the Brody area only by the end of the day on June 50 and that day had to strike back. Due to the unsatisfactory condition of the corps, the counterattack on Berestechko was moved to the morning of June 25. Having not collected all the 26mk parts, he launched a counterattack, met stubborn resistance of the Germans, who covered themselves with the impenetrable floodplain of the Slonowka River. The advance of the corps was insignificant, since it was constantly subjected to raids by German aircraft, which destroyed a large number of tanks, vehicles and fuel tanks.

Prior to the approach of 8mk and 8td, superior enemy forces in the region of Radekhov and Berestechko held back 15mk, receiving constantly changing orders from the front headquarters. The mechanized corps on June 24 received an order to concentrate southwest of Brody for a joint strike with an 8 micron strike in the direction of Berestechko-Dubno. Parts of the corps began to execute the order, but on June 25 received orders to return to the old frontiers and prepare for the strike in the direction of Radekhov-Sokal.


In the evening of June 26, the task was set, together with 8th in the morning of June 27, to advance on Berestechko and Dubno, the corps began to execute the order. However, the front headquarters, fearing a change in the direction of the German troops’ strike, decided to withdraw the mechanized corps from the battle and concentrate them behind the rifle corps. To this end, on June 27 at 2.30 an order was given 8mk and 15mk to leave the battle and transfer positions 37sk, the corps began to execute the order. Moscow did not approve this order and at 6 am a new order followed, to continue the offensive on Berestechko Dubno. The hull columns were turned 180 degrees with the task of capturing Dubno.

During June 27, part of the 8mk troops under the command of Commissar Popel attacked the enemy in the Verba area and in the evening approached Dubno, leaving behind enemy lines. The main forces of the corps could not develop the success of the Popel group and it was surrounded. Waging heavy battles in the encirclement on June 11-28, Popel’s group suffered heavy casualties in people and equipment, and on the night of June 29, in separate groups without equipment, it escaped from the encirclement, concentrating southeast of Brody. In the evening of June 29, the front headquarters gave the order to withdraw the remaining 29mk, 8 mk and 15td from Brody Dubno and withdraw them to the front reserve.

Counterattack on the northern flank


All the corps taking part in the counterattack from the northern flank were outside the area of ​​concentration of troops. In the area of ​​Novograd-Volynsk (100 km east of Rivne) 9mk was deployed, in the Berdichev area (280 km southeast of Dubno) 19mk, and 22mk in the area of ​​Rovno (70 km east of Lutsk) and Vladimir-Volynsk (75km west of Lutsk).

The 22 mk actions were directed to cover the Kovel region, which was deployed in Vladimir-Volynsk on June 41, advanced to the Kovel region and took part in border battles, releasing the garrisons of some bunkers of the border URs and broke into Ustiluga on June 22, but withdrew under the blows of superior enemy forces in the area of ​​Turopina and in counterattack did not participate.

The headquarters of the corps, 19td and 215md were stationed in Rivne.

The front headquarters ordered 22mk to concentrate in the area of ​​Voinitsa and on June 24 to strike at Voinitsa and Vladimir-Volynsky and destroy the enemy. Having completed 110 km, the 19th march only at 13 hours on June 24 left Voynitsa from the east, having lost 72% of equipment on the march. The division immediately starts a counterattack on Voinitsa, suffers heavy losses from enemy artillery, loses most of its tanks, and by the morning of June 25 departs to the Oderoda line and fixates there.

Having moved from Rovno for a strike from the north along Vladimir - Volynsk 215md, having marched 120 km through Rozhitsa, Kovel, Turiysk, only in the evening of June 24 left 8 km north of Vladimir-Volynsk and took the line for attack. The Germans, having found the 215md units approached, attack them with the support of aviation and artillery on the morning of June 25 and throw them north. On this counterattack 22mk ended unsuccessfully.

After the fighting at Voynitsa, part of the 22mk corps covered the front section of Rozhitsa - Lutsk - Ostrozhets, holding back the enemy rushing to Rivne. 226sd standing in Dubno was sent to defend Lutsk, but the Germans, using their advantage in mobility, rush into Lutsk on the main road on June 25, knock out a small garrison and prevent 226sd units from entering the city.

German armored divisions continued the offensive and on June 28 captured the railway bridge and bridgehead in the area of ​​Rožitsa. In these battles, the 19th of the 22nd mechanized corps lost almost all the tanks (16 T-26 tanks remained) and all the commanders of the units. By order of the front’s headquarters, on July 22, he goes on the offensive on Dubno and the next day moves up to 1 km, reaching the Mlynov line, but unexpectedly counterattacked behind the rear of the German tank corps of the Leibstandart division and retreats to the starting line. This counterattack of 30mk was of limited success and only restrained the advance of the Germans.

By order of the front headquarters, 9mk and 19mk were supposed to be relocated to the Lutsk region and on June 25 put a 9mk counterattack from the north-east and 19mk from the east, together with 36sk to Mlynov and Dubno, and take possession of these points. Having completed a 280 km march from Berdichev, 19 microns only concentrated east of Mlynov by the evening of June 25, and having completed a 9 km march from Novograd-Volynsk late arrived at the borders of the Ikva River only at night on June 160.

On the morning of June 26, units of 19 mk hit Mlynov and Dubno on the left flank of the 1st tank group of Kleist, and in the morning of June 27 they also hit 9 mk. Fierce fighting lasted two days, 19mk tankmen broke into the outskirts of Dubno, but were knocked out by the enemy. The Germans began to bypass the tank divisions from the flanks, the corps suffered heavy losses and, under the threat of encirclement, towards the evening of June 27 began to leave the Goryn River. Despite the unsuccessful counterattack of 9mk, he seriously eased the position of 19mk and did not allow him to be surrounded.

The command of the front demanded that the corps advance continue, but they did not have the strength to do so. Still, on July 9, the 1mk went on the offensive and advanced 10-12 km, but because of the superior enemy forces, it could not further develop the offensive and on July 2 the corps received an order to withdraw.

\ After an unsuccessful counterattack of 19mk, in the evening of June 29th he conducted restraining battles on the approaches to Rivne, the German 11thd broke through to the Ostrog and created a threat to the encirclement of the corps. The corps commander ordered in the evening of June 28 to leave Rivne and gain a foothold on the Goryn River. In view of the threat of the Germans breaking into Zhytomyr, the commander of the 16th Army Lukin on June 25 organized a mobile group of 109md, which did not have time to go to the Western Front, and sent her to Ostrog.

Part of the 5mk 109md relocated from Siberia to the Kiev military district and on June 18 unloaded in Berdichev. Having made a 180 km march in the second half of June 26, she took up positions on the outskirts of Ostrog, which the Germans had already taken. On the morning of June 27, without artillery preparation, the artillery was still on the march, launched a counterattack on Ostrog and separate units broke into the city center, where fierce battles ensued. In the afternoon, the Germans introduced the main forces 11td and squeezed 109md from the city beyond the river Vilya, some of the troops were surrounded. Counterattacks on Ostrog continued unsuccessfully until July 2, the surrounded units in Ostrog failed to get out and they fell in battle, and at the end of the day the departure from Ostrog began.

Due to the failed counterattack and heavy losses, the front headquarters on July 2 gave the order to stop the counterattack and withdraw the troops.

The effects of counterattack


The counterattack organized by the Soviet command did not reach the intended goal of defeating the enemy, they only detained him in this triangle for a week and thwarted a breakthrough plan for Kiev. With this result, the mechanized corps lost 2648 tanks, after the battle in the hulls remained an insignificant number of tanks (8mk - 43, 9mk - 35, 15mk - 66, 19mk - 66, 22mk - 340). The losses of the Kleist tank group amounted to 85 tanks irretrievable losses and 200 tanks to be restored. The defeat of almost all the mechanized corps in border battles and the loss of almost all tanks led a few months later to their reorganization into tank brigades.

The reasons for the defeat were not in the small number of tanks and their poor characteristics, but in their inept use and inability to correctly organize military operations. The reasons were mostly organizational in nature. The Soviet command, organizing the counterattack, knew perfectly well that only 15 microns was concentrated in the place of its application, and the rest of the mechanized corps needed time to complete the march, in which there would be inevitable losses of equipment, which sometimes actually amounted to 72% of the total staff. The mechanized corps arrived in the area of ​​concentration with a delay and not in a hollow composition, nevertheless, they immediately rushed into battle without reconnaissance of the terrain and the state of the enemy.

It was not possible to organize a powerful counterattack, the actions of the mechanized corps were reduced to isolated counterattacks within a week in different directions with the dispersal of forces and means and the lack of coordination of actions. On the southern flank, a counterattack was delivered 15mk on June 24th, 8mk on June 26th and 27th, and 8th on June 27th. On northern fang, 22mk - June 24th and 25th, 19mk - June 26th, 9mk and 109md - June 27th.

The defeat was also facilitated by the extremely inept organization of tank counterattacks from the front headquarters to the unit commanders, and this, in the absence of radio communications at almost all control levels from the corps to linear vehicles. Tank formations and units often acted at random, not representing the real combat situation. Tankers joined the battle in most cases without the proper support of artillery and infantry, or in its complete absence. In addition, only German aviation dominated the air, destroying tanks and means of support, they practically received no air support from the mechanized corps.

Also of no small importance was the inexperience and unpreparedness of Soviet tankmen, who were not able to exploit equipment and conduct military operations. It affects a scanty number of armor-piercing shells in tanks or their complete absence, while the command knew that the Mechcorn were rushing against the armada of German tanks.

A serious role in the defeat of Soviet tankers was played by the Germans' competent use of anti-tank artillery, especially the 88-mm Flak anti-aircraft guns, which shoot all Soviet tanks at long range.

The losses of the tanks were not from oncoming battles with German tanks, but mainly from anti-tank artillery, the fire of defending tanks, aircraft and technical malfunctions on the march and during the battle. The battlefield remained behind the enemy, so all the damaged Soviet tanks went into irreparable losses.

The competent organization of the German command to repel counterattacks of the Soviet mechanized corps and the inept actions of the Soviet command allowed the enemy to win a landslide victory even with fewer tanks. The Soviet mechanized corps tried to break through the prepared anti-tank defense, the German command evaded oncoming tank battles, the Soviet tanks were destroyed by aviation and artillery, and only then did the German tank formations finish off the mechanized corps that had lost their combat readiness.

By the number of tanks participating on both sides in the battles near Dubno - Lutsk - Brody, it surpasses all other operations of that war, but it is hardly justified to call it a tank battle, tanks practically did not fight against tanks, the German command succeeded in other ways.
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  1. svp67 April 16 2020 04: 21 New
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    These battles showed that infantry, without tanks, but well equipped with artillery, was able to defeat tanks, without infantry and artillery. A very bitter lesson for our army
    1. tihonmarine April 16 2020 08: 14 New
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      Quote: svp67
      These battles showed that infantry, without tanks, but well equipped with artillery, was able to defeat tanks, without infantry and artillery.

      And the Germans also skillfully used aviation, when the Junkers Yu-87 “Piece” inflicted special damage, and our tank corps were without air cover.
    2. iouris April 16 2020 10: 02 New
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      Quote: svp67
      These fights showed

      ... that military training in peacetime is organized and carried out formally. Conclusion: if you want peace, fight continuously.
      1. Kronos April 16 2020 10: 57 New
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        Here, combat experience is important, you can train well, but in practice, be no better than those not trained in a real war.
      2. strannik1985 April 16 2020 11: 15 New
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        ... that combat training

        Although you can get along, tractors with artillery on the march will be left behind on the march, infantry and tanks will not be able to replace it.
      3. nnz226 April 17 2020 21: 46 New
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        Fighting continuously would not help! When there are 50-70 tankers for several hundred tanks - alles kaput! Considering that the tankers were often not on the ZiS-5 base (after all, three-ton), but on one and a half trucks, then, having made a march of 100 km, the vehicles had fuel only to go on the attack once, and even if they didn’t strike (1 mm armor is nothing!), then you still can’t go further without fuel. Plus, 15-grade education of 4% of the Red Army soldiers, which does not allow the competent use and repair of the tank, and the repair bases were scanty. That’s “mayo-scho maya”, a bunch of abandoned tanks due to empty tanks or minor breakdowns. The leaders in the late 80s did not have to count thousands of tanks and be proud of them, but such prose as repair bombs, spare parts for tanks, tankers. 30 tank in battle serves 1 to 10 people in the rear, and not vice versa!
        1. Igoresha 1 June 2020 08: 40 New
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          The leaders in the late 30s needed
          the same story with submarines (M. Morozov https://youtu.be/ZcKUinDW1aM) was riveted, but they forgot or did not have time to service their infrastructure
    3. Alekseev April 16 2020 10: 48 New
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      Quote: svp67
      A very bitter lesson for our army

      hi
      Yes, all summer 1941 - some bitter and bloody lessons.
      The article has a lot of right thoughts, but it’s not focused on what tank and fur were. corps.
      If the 8th fur. the hull was already almost formed, then, according to K.K.Rokossovsky, who was then in command of the 9th mechanized corps, it contained about 30% of the state’s old light tanks laid out in the state, there were practically no vehicles in the TD that they did not manage to get from the people's households. Those. most of the personnel could be used only as simple infantry, but parts of the corps did not have weapons assigned to the infantry. Nevertheless, Rokossovsky acted relatively successfully, received an order and was promoted to the post of army commander on the western front.
      As for the accusations of the command of the SWF in the stupid leadership, then there was nothing else. I will not quote the characteristic that the Rokossovsky gene gives. To Kirponos, who are interested in reading himself, this is not difficult now.
      I would like many to understand: the state of the Red Army before the war is not the result of a villainous conspiracy, but the result of the development of our state at a certain historical stage. The leadership, straining the country, managed to achieve impressive quantitative indicators, but here the quality ... The quality did not shine. And not only the commanders of the fronts and armies (someone also appointed them according to some principles), but also the quality of training of soldiers and units, sergeants, middle-level commanders.
      I will give an example from archival materials that were "lit up" in the Living and the Dead K.M. Simonova.
      “In the fall of the fortieth, after the Finnish one, the infantry inspector general checked the regiment commanders, and as I was on duty, I got acquainted with the draft of his report. Two hundred and twenty-five rifle regiment commanders were assembled. Do you think how many of them turned out to be graduating from the Academy at that time? Frunze?
      “Well guess,” said Serpilin, “based on previous events, apparently, not so much.”
      - And if I tell you: not a single one?
      - Can not be…
      “Don’t believe it if it’s easier for you.” And how many, do you think, out of two hundred and twenty-five normal schools have graduated? Twenty five! And two hundred are only junior lieutenant courses and regimental schools.
      “I can't believe it,” said Serpilin.
      - Well, you're not a young lady, I will not persuade. He did not believe his eyes. He admitted that not all regiments had such statistics. But still, two hundred and twenty-five regiments - this is seventy-five divisions, half a army of peacetime - is still a terrible picture! "
      It is naive to think that under such regiment commanders there were excellent company and soldiers.
      1. svp67 April 16 2020 14: 54 New
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        hi
        Quote: Alekseev
        He admitted that not all regiments had such statistics.

        Data on the formation of command personnel (middle and senior command personnel) of the 7th Panzer Division of the 6th Mechanized Corps. Out of 1180 people, 1 people have education from grades 6 to 484, 9 people in grades 528, 148 in secondary education and 20 in higher education. And in this case was staffed no better and no worse than others ...
        1. strannik1985 April 16 2020 14: 59 New
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          And this staffing corps is no better and no worse than others ...

          It seems to me that the Germans wish to get hold of 30 motorized buildings; they had the same problems.
          1. svp67 April 16 2020 15: 04 New
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            Quote: strannik1985
            It seems to me that the Germans wish to get hold of 30 motorized buildings; they had the same problems.

            The fact of the matter is that in terrible dreams they didn’t want it, the resources didn’t allow it, because they strongly thought that they would develop a global Blitzkrieg theory that included a lot and not only deep tank wedges in the enemy’s defense
    4. 113262a April 16 2020 10: 58 New
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      The lesson is forgotten. In the year 14, the wild loss of armor on both sides in the Donbass is the result of the same mistakes! Arta buried both our and non-brotherly boxes yet on the way to the deployment line, often in camp columns. It is very insulting and physically painful! (((
    5. qQQQ April 16 2020 16: 11 New
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      Quote: svp67
      A very bitter lesson for our army

      This lesson was still clear from the operation on Halkingol.
      1. svp67 April 16 2020 16: 17 New
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        Quote: qqqq
        This lesson was still clear from the operation on Halkingol.

        What you are trying to say became clear back in Spain, and this was a different lesson ...
        1. qQQQ April 16 2020 16: 26 New
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          Quote: svp67
          about what you are trying to say it became clear back in Spain, and this was a different lesson ...

          Maybe, but was there such a massive use of tanks in an offensive in Spain without the support of infantry? In my opinion, there they were used according to the classical, at that time, theory, infantry support.
          1. svp67 April 16 2020 19: 00 New
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            Quote: qqqq
            Maybe, but was there such a massive use of tanks in Spain on the offensive without infantry support

            Constantly, it came to the point that our tank commanders were forced to leave their tank with the power of words, and more with the power of arms to drive infantry after their tanks, instead of controlling a tank unit. Once there was a generally anecdotal incident when our commander thus forced the Franco infantry into the chain behind his tanks, which he learned about at the end of the battle ...
    6. NF68 April 16 2020 17: 28 New
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      Quote: svp67
      These battles showed that infantry, without tanks, but well equipped with artillery, was able to defeat tanks, without infantry and artillery. A very bitter lesson for our army


      These battles also showed how important it was to carefully work out the interaction between the ground forces and aviation, and how important was the full-fledged provision of troops with radio stations and cars.
    7. Doliva63 April 16 2020 20: 16 New
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      Quote: svp67
      These battles showed that infantry, without tanks, but well equipped with artillery, was able to defeat tanks, without infantry and artillery. A very bitter lesson for our army

      Infantry, if properly organized, secured and covered, can defeat everything. From tanks to coronavirus laughing
      1. NF68 April 18 2020 18: 12 New
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        Quote: Doliva63
        Quote: svp67
        These battles showed that infantry, without tanks, but well equipped with artillery, was able to defeat tanks, without infantry and artillery. A very bitter lesson for our army

        Infantry, if properly organized, secured and covered, can defeat everything. From tanks to coronavirus laughing


        If the tanks do not crush it in the trenches. That maybe they will win. But again, the infantry itself would not mind if they were supported by their tanks.
        1. Doliva63 April 19 2020 20: 19 New
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          Quote: NF68
          Quote: Doliva63
          Quote: svp67
          These battles showed that infantry, without tanks, but well equipped with artillery, was able to defeat tanks, without infantry and artillery. A very bitter lesson for our army

          Infantry, if properly organized, secured and covered, can defeat everything. From tanks to coronavirus laughing


          If the tanks do not crush it in the trenches. That maybe they will win. But again, the infantry itself would not mind if they were supported by their tanks.


          You are inattentive - I said the need to cover the infantry. And the infantry needs tanks to cover in attack-counterattack-offensive; on the spot, on the defensive, the infantry has enough other cover: air defense (from its own to the dowry / providing), artillery and aviation. If there is none of this, then the tanks will not save. You, apparently, are not military by education?
  2. fa2998 April 16 2020 05: 01 New
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    Isaev had a whole book about this counterattack, painted in detail. He thought about how a powerful blow he got with his fingers spread. Hulls and divisions drove from place to place — they lost equipment more than in battles. There was no experience with the commanders — which does not detract from determination tank crews. hi
    1. knn54 April 16 2020 08: 20 New
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      As the author said, the tanks were introduced "in stages", and with 200 km of march. The engine life was very small, sometimes even caterpillars flew.
      Regarding the training of crews. The Germans trained crews for tanks for months, as well as submariners. We often have mechanics, gunners and commanders trained on their own, there wasn’t that much time to “grind” (especially before the war).
      Plus, interaction with aviation, worked out on the fields of Europe for almost two years.
      Well, commanders. The same Pavlov could be a good tank divisional commander. Maybe the corps pulled. But not the military district. Like Kirponos.
      And the confusion in the Headquarters only confirms that there was no plan of attack on Germany. Staff games do not count.
      1. Sardanapalus April 16 2020 08: 44 New
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        Pavlov was shot, Kipronos was not, and Zhukov about Koprinos had another unflattering opinion. Why Pavlov was shot, but from the experience of previous years. I could not cope with the collective farm-factory-district, I did not give out a plan .. at least they planted it. And the next ones are already wise, muddied with postscripts and everything seems to be fine. And then it turned out so, they shot the first, but in the war you can’t write down the cities of the region that you lost. And then came the realization for one broken two not broken give. Hitler did not understand this until the end of the war.
      2. AAK
        AAK April 16 2020 09: 50 New
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        A colleague, the confusion in the Headquarters, the headquarters of the front and the corps confirms that there were no plans of just the same defense, at least passive, at least active with counter-attacks ...
      3. Doliva63 April 16 2020 20: 18 New
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        Quote: knn54
        As the author said, the tanks were introduced "in stages", and with 200 km of march. The engine life was very small, sometimes even caterpillars flew.
        Regarding the training of crews. The Germans trained crews for tanks for months, as well as submariners. We often have mechanics, gunners and commanders trained on their own, there wasn’t that much time to “grind” (especially before the war).
        Plus, interaction with aviation, worked out on the fields of Europe for almost two years.
        Well, commanders. The same Pavlov could be a good tank divisional commander. Maybe the corps pulled. But not the military district. Like Kirponos.
        And the confusion in the Headquarters only confirms that there was no plan of attack on Germany. Staff games do not count.

        But were there "military districts"? I have never heard.
  3. pmkemcity April 16 2020 05: 36 New
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    Zhukov decided to arrange a big Boyan Tsagan.
    1. Walking April 17 2020 15: 42 New
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      Quote: pmkemcity
      Zhukov decided to arrange a big Boyan Tsagan.

      But whoever would allow him to organize all this on his own, he would follow the rate instructions. But on the ground, the whole situation was completely different, not as seen from Moscow.
      1. pmkemcity April 18 2020 11: 38 New
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        Quote: Hiking
        he followed the rate instructions.

        Wasn't he the "bet" itself ?. What prevented the "new territories" from giving to the NKVDeshniki, and leaving the army on the old border? To organize a pre-field and active defense to "exhaust" the enemy? To open the directions of his strikes, to meet mobilized, deployed and fully armed? Fascist communications would stretch for 600 km and part of the energy of the first strike fell into the void.
  4. lelik613 April 16 2020 05: 37 New
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    I suppose that the defeat was due to the fantastic plans of the General Staff and the reassessment of their talents by his chief.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 16 2020 07: 03 New
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      The General Staff’s plans have nothing to do with it, but the fact that the command of the South-Western Front directly violated Zhukov’s orders
    2. Alexey RA April 16 2020 13: 43 New
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      Quote: lelik613
      I suppose that the defeat was due to the fantastic plans of the General Staff and the reassessment of their talents by his chief.

      Just the plan of the NSS was real: to assemble the mechanized corps of the South-Western Front (army and front) and with blows from the north and south to cut the panzerstrasse of the 1st TGr, having managed to strike until the German infantry approached.
      The problem is that the front command put M120X200 on this plan and, instead of implementing it, began to realize its plans. And only when the threat from the 1st TGr became obvious to the command of the South-Western Front, did it return to Zhukov’s plan. But it was already too late - the mechanized corps did not get time to concentrate, and the infantry of the Germans had already appeared in the direction of the attack.
      The situation was further aggravated by the initiative of the army commanders, who were extremely reluctant to give up "their" mechanized corps, and even tried to pinch off the "alien" mechanized corps passing through their strip.

      Pomnitsa, did they write about the "intimidation and lack of independence" of the red commanders after the repressions? In the first period of the war, this "independence" was higher than the roof - violation and non-execution of orders well intentioned was the norm. The problem was that this independence was not backed up by knowledge - as a result, the actions of commanders regularly ended in failure.
      Moreover, “independence” reigned not only in the SWF: the first tank division from Karelia was scratched for three weeks, even direct orders from the NSSh did not help. And when the division did arrive at a new place, it turned out that a tank regiment that had remained in Karelia for the NPP was withdrawn from it.
  5. Olgovich April 16 2020 06: 04 New
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    in terms of the number of tanks, the Soviet side had an advantage of 4,5 times.

    In terms of quality, Soviet tanks were not only inferior to German tanks, but even superior to them.

    actions of the mechanized corps were reduced to isolated counterattacks during the week in different directions with the dispersal of forces and means and the lack of coordination of actions.


    One thing is not clear: the command did see that the corps did not have time to concentrate, arrive in parts, that they had lost a huge number of materiel on the march, were tireddid not scout and at the same time, it still drove them into a suicidal, unprepared attack on a prepared anti-terrorist operation.

    The complete incompetence of the command of the SWF, which led to huge losses and catastrophic consequences.

    The desire is understandable: it was politically important to stop and reject the enemy as quickly as possible, but they were taught at the Frunze Academy HOW to organize attacks and command troops ...

    And it turned out to be much harder than, as Kirponos himself wrote in his 1938 autobiography, "actively participated in exposing the enemies of the people and the fight against the opposition."

    From the memoirs of the mentioned Commissioner Poppel:
    Why, after a successful day offensive, was the corps ordered to withdraw? Because of the most unexpected and surprisingly simple. Front Command didn’t at all know about this success. In an atmosphere of general setbacks, confusion and turmoil, the threads of command and control of the troops were torn. Apparently, our reports to the front headquarters did not arrive, and there they involuntarily thought that we, too, had been shattered to pieces. Hence the decision arose that we would at least support with our fire weapons parts of the 37th Rifle Corps.

    It is characteristic that the night order did not even indicate the line from which we had to leave.

    By the way, Halder wrote down by the end of June 26: “On the side of the enemy acting against the South armies there is a firm and energetic leadership. The enemy is constantly drawing fresh forces from the south against our tank wedge.”

    But the next day, Halder noted in his diary: "The Russian formations that attacked the southern flank of the Kleist group apparently suffered heavy losses." Only by this could he explain our departure from Berestechko, not suspecting that we carried out the order of the front command.

    Well, how did the new order appear that ordered 8 mk to immediately attack Dubno? It must be assumed that, even with a delay, the front headquarters still received vague information that our corps did not lose combat readiness, was not broken, and, moreover, it can attack itself.

    In the meantime, the command demanded that the front take active action, especially in the Dubno region, a city to which the Hitlerite invaders had prepared the role of a transshipment base on the way to Kiev. So we were moved there ...

    But what could Dmitry Ivanovich and I say to the commanders then, at a new command post in a forest near Signo? Where was the excuse retreat after a successful attack, how to explain the new orderdemanding an offensive

    No words ...
    1. AsmyppoL April 16 2020 09: 30 New
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      How can we talk about the incompetence of the command of the Southern Federal District if it reported to the Chief of the General Staff on the inappropriateness of such an action even late in the evening of June 22? The chief of the General Staff, possessing more detailed information than the People's Commissar in Moscow did not refuse to counterattack ...
      Should the command of the South-West Fleet boycott the Directive from Moscow and the subsequent confirmation of the counterattack order by the Chief of the General Staff? )))
      1. Alexey RA April 16 2020 13: 49 New
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        Quote: AsmyppoL
        Should the command of the South-West Fleet boycott the Directive from Moscow and the subsequent confirmation of the counterattack order by the Chief of the General Staff?

        And so it did. The throwing of the 8th MK is precisely the result of the cancellation by the command of the SWF of the order of the NHS to strike at the 1st TGR and the subsequent return to this order. The classic situation is: an order-cancellation of an order-cancellation of the cancellation of an order is a mess.
  6. Eug
    Eug April 16 2020 06: 41 New
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    As for me - they pulled the troops up with marches and "active" orders, I’m sure that after a couple of days of continuous conflicting orders, marches and lack of sleep for the personnel, almost everything didn’t care ... Marching preparation was always a problem, plus the Germans very quickly closed the attack "tank hazardous directions of possible counterattacks - engineering barriers, mines, PTA .. And then attack from the march, without reconnaissance, without rest, without bringing the materiel into the strands, without air support, without fuel ... as I understand it, window dressing at the exercises it was taken at face value and the standards were taken precisely according to the results of the exercises, but they did not correspond to the realities. Well, the connection, especially the “inverse”, is also a byword .. Was there an alternative to such command actions - alas, I don’t know ...
    1. tihonmarine April 16 2020 08: 22 New
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      Quote: Eug
      And here to advance from the march, without reconnaissance, without rest, without bringing the materiel into the strands, without air support, without fuel.

      Plus, the concept of using tanks in Soviet tank troops consisted only of an offensive, while the Germans dodged the oncoming battle, exhausting the enemy with artillery, aviation, tanks from an ambush and only having knocked out the bulk of the tanks, disorganizing the enemy, they launched tanks into the attack. And this was inclusive until 1943.
    2. Sardanapalus April 16 2020 08: 56 New
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      It’s terrible to be in the confusion of the first months-ordinary. But even more terrible at least a battalion commander. On you, for your actions, other lives are responsible. And here, orders about which you know that they do not correspond to reality are pouring on top of you. Here's how to be. Creepy.
    3. AAK
      AAK April 16 2020 09: 52 New
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      That's right, colleague ... that’s exactly what happened, only much worse ...
  7. Operator April 16 2020 07: 20 New
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    The defeat of the Soviet mechanized corps near Dubno-Rivne-Brody is a direct consequence of the error of the High Command of the Red Army regarding the deployment of mechanized corps in front of the old border line, and not behind it.

    As a result, the command of the South-Western Front lost time reserve to determine the directions of the main attacks of the Wehrmacht and was forced to improvise instead of systematically tracking the movement of the German strike groups from the new to the old border and quickly locating the mechanized corps behind the line of the old border for counterattacks (according to the type of actions Soviet tank brigades in the battle of Moscow).

    Plus, Soviet front-line aviation, operating from field airfields located even deeper in the rear and protected by distance from enemy raids in the very first hours of the war, could fully provide fighter cover for mechanized corps and deliver bombing attacks on German troops.

    The catastrophe of the Cover Army and the forces of the second echelon is the price of the mistake of the High Command of the Red Army.
    1. chenia April 16 2020 09: 53 New
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      Quote: Operator
      The catastrophe of the Cover Army and the forces of the second echelon is the price of the mistake of the High Command of the Red Army.


      The operational plan is correct. Execution is worthless. We must proceed from what was considered to the last. that there will be a big provocation (the Germans are not ready. and they won’t start wars before 1942). And based on the experience of Khalkhin-Gol, they thought that a sobering blow would calm (at least temporarily) nemchuru. And the mistake was in spreading the BTV and the absence of the BP (as a result of the unreasonably carried out reorganization).
      1. Operator April 16 2020 15: 52 New
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        There is no need to reckon - when planning, you need to choose a competent solution that takes into account, among other things, a sudden full-scale attack.

        There were no literate people in the Supreme High Command of the Red Army in 1941.
        1. chenia April 16 2020 17: 52 New
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          Quote: Operator
          No need to count


          Just smart people and count. This is stupid suggest. The calculation was just real and showed that in 1941 the Germans did not have much strength. What happened, despite the most favorable conditions for them.
          Quote: Operator
          There were no literate people in the Supreme High Command of the Red Army in 1941.


          Well, what were they, they ended the war.
    2. Alexey RA April 16 2020 13: 51 New
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      Quote: Operator
      Plus, Soviet front-line aviation, operating from field airfields located even deeper in the rear and protected by distance from enemy raids in the very first hours of the war, could fully provide fighter cover for mechanized corps and deliver bombing attacks on German troops.

      In the deeper rear - where is this? And how deep can the IA airfield be carried to the rear if the combat radius of the main fighter of the Red Army Air Force is about 160 km.
      1. Operator April 16 2020 16: 05 New
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        For the fighter cover of the old border - to a depth of at least 160 km from it.

        With the preparation of reserve field airfields to a depth of at least 160 km from the rear line of deployment of mechanized corps.
  8. smaug78 April 16 2020 08: 42 New
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    tank battle near Prokhorovka
    the same tank battle as near Dubno and Brody.
  9. Krasnodar April 16 2020 09: 10 New
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    In the absence of air cover, tanks become mobile targets
  10. AsmyppoL April 16 2020 09: 25 New
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    The haste of the decision to counterattack by the command of the Red Army is associated with a lack of knowledge about the concentrated German strike groups in southern Poland. Hit faster on un concentrated German troops ...
    At the same time, the people's commissar of defense and the chief of the General Staff were well aware of the presence of 900 German tanks on the southern front of the Lviv ledge (on the Lipkany - Stroesti - Neifratauts line). It was also known that up to 900 German tanks were available at Bucharest ... At the same time, according to intelligence, only infantry divisions were in the zone of the German front reserves.
    It was necessary to defeat the enemy at least on the northern front and regroup forces to counter the strike from the south ...
    1. AsmyppoL April 16 2020 10: 26 New
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      I think that the reasons for the unsuccessful decision are: ignorance of the situation, haste in making decisions and fear of Stalin for the solution of the problem imposed on him.

      At the headquarters of the Southwestern Front in the morning and afternoon of June 22, they only knew about the presence of German tank units at Przemysl. According to intelligence, an infantry division reinforced with two tank regiments was located directly at the border. In the second tier was a motorized division.
      A panzer division was supposedly northwest. In the depths of the territory, another tank division was stationed ... To the northeast of the border there were up to two tank battalions and there were no more tank units in the area. From the knowledge of such a situation the mechanized corps were deduced on June 22 ... What should be expected from the enemy from such knowledge? Only a blow to Lviv, but this city is covered by the powerful forces of the Red Army ...



      Could the enemy somehow advance to Brody on June 22? Yes, there was nothing to advance the enemy. According to intelligence in this area there are only up to two infantry divisions. The nearest tank division is 80 km from the border in this zone.
      To the north of this region there is an infantry and motorized division to strike in the direction of Lutsk.
      In the depths of the defense, even before two motorized divisions, but without tanks ... It is not known where the German command will direct these divisions ...

      No one understood how many German troops and which were moving deep into our territory ... Even in the late evening of June 22, it was only known that there was only one enemy tank division in the section of the Grubeshov-Rava-Russian front ...
      And the fact that the Germans have more tank divisions in this area and they know how to fight much better, and also that no one from the leadership of the Red Army suspected their interaction was an order of magnitude or two higher ... It was simply that our high command had little experience ...

  11. AsmyppoL April 16 2020 09: 34 New
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    Quote: svp67
    These battles showed that infantry, without tanks, but well equipped with artillery, was able to defeat tanks, without infantry and artillery. A very bitter lesson for our army

    It seems to me that these battles showed slightly different: an offensive without reliable knowledge of the operational situation that intelligence is obliged to provide and without communication is doomed to defeat
    1. strannik1985 April 16 2020 11: 25 New
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      It seems to me that these battles showed

      Partial ignorance of the situation is rather the norm than an exception. It’s just that in TK / MK / TA arr. 1944-1945 there was a set of forces and means to stop these "surprises", but not in MK arr. 1941.
  12. faterdom April 16 2020 11: 27 New
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    The defeat was also facilitated by the extremely inept organization of tank counterattacks from the front headquarters to unit commanders, and this, in the absence of radio communications at almost all control levels from the corps to linear vehicles

    A serious role in the defeat of Soviet tankers was played by the Germans' competent use of anti-tank artillery, especially the 88-mm Flak anti-aircraft guns, which shoot all Soviet tanks at long range.

    And now, together: Goering’s Luftwaffe (which included organizationally and anti-aircraft gunners from “Aht-aht”) were equipped with radio stations, and in addition to directly destroying our armor and automobile equipment by air, they gave a good picture to the headquarters for decision-making, where anti-aircraft gunners were already on the ground ( from Goering’s department, I remind you) they interacted very well with OKV ground crews, and managed to deploy guns to meet our tanks.
    Unfortunately, these days we did not have a vision of the overall reliable picture of the commanders, nor a normal connection, especially to an individual tank or aircraft, nor even interaction between uniform infantry and mechanized units and formations.
    I had to study at such a terrible price, but by the end of the summer, ours had become different, did not give up Leningrad, and came up against Moscow.
  13. xomaNN April 16 2020 11: 32 New
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    So much in the minds of the Soviet military commanders sat Stalin's order "To smash the enemy on its territory!" And the fear of the leader and his punishing hand, the NKVD overshadowed the reasonable arguments and even those elementary skills that were in their heads. With thousands of tanks and guns, how much more effective was the Red Army to create defense lines in the western regions of Ukraine, fortified by their own tanks in defense. And so "to slow down the pace of advance of Hitler’s tanks. But, I so wanted to mindlessly attack," like a whirlpool " hi
    1. strannik1985 April 16 2020 11: 40 New
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      Smash the enemy on its territory!

      So far, absolutely no logical order (strategy) has been brought in at the headquarters of the front (s). The defense is simply unpromising, see the breakthrough of the South-West Federal District and the formation of the Kiev boiler.
    2. Alexey RA April 16 2020 13: 57 New
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      Quote: xomaNN
      With thousands of tanks and guns, how much more effective was the Red Army to create defense lines in the western regions of Ukraine, fortified by their own tanks in defense.

      After which the Germans simply strike in the least protected places, chopping the static defense into boilers. Typhoon is an example.
      And our reserves would not have time to parry German breakthroughs - at our units weights hanging on their legs artillery with traction on agricultural tractors at a speed of 3-5 km / h.
      1. chenia April 16 2020 18: 10 New
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        Quote: Alexey RA
        After which the Germans simply strike in the least protected places, chopping the static defense into boilers. Typhoon is an example.

        And that would be, but in statics it’s easier to fight, it could mean more. Time is the main thing. Nemchura would look for weaknesses. and all basically reconnaissance in battle. Would have braked more. Yes, and classical counterattacks, and even counterattacks when in the North Caucasus would have been TBR, would be real. Not the Germans would not have been overthrown, but would have been detained. And there the second operational echelon. Then the second strategic. And not with wheels in battle. Yes, and boilers would hold down a significant part of the forces. But given the level of BP and the coherence of the Red Army at that time, this would help. but not really.
        1. Alexey RA April 16 2020 20: 09 New
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          Quote: chenia
          And that would be, but in statics it’s easier to fight, it could mean more.

          Not easier. All attempts by the Red Army to stand in tight defense in 1941 and 1942 ended with front-line breakouts and boilers.
          A tough defense is good in the presence of normal intelligence and mechanized reserves, the mobility of which is comparable or superior to the enemy. We do not have this in 1941 (and in 1942 too). This means that there is only one way out - to try to impose a battle on the enemy by himself, forcing him to maneuver reserves and expend shock groups.
          Quote: chenia
          Yes, and classical counterattacks, and even counterattacks when in the North Caucasus would have been TBR, would be real.

          Hay-Lepel. Two mobilized MK and infantry. Result: infantry does not follow tanks, mechanized corps are “stratified” on the march into tanks, infantry and artillery, the command sets the tasks of the MK anyhow, without taking into account the Charter and terrain, the MKs are squandered into combined groups.
          1. chenia April 16 2020 20: 51 New
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            Quote: Alexey RA
            Not easier. All attempts by the Red Army to stand in tight defense in 1941 and 1942 ended in front-line breakouts and boilers


            If at all. that's right. But if by the summer of 1941, then what an offensive. And the failures in 1942 are our attempts to advance. This event is more difficult than defense (though retreat in defense is even more difficult).

            Quote: Alexey RA
            mechanized reserves mobility


            Carefully, I indicated TBR as part of the UK. And at the tactical level, it’s already possible to have a strike group for counterattacks (yes this BU requires). already the resistance of defense is growing. And cover for retreat (tank ambushes). I do not build illusions. so that they would stop the advance of nemchury.
            But their losses would be greater, but ours, on the contrary, less. Well, the pace of attack would be different. And by the end of summer. they would force the Germans to advance in only one direction (which happened only towards the end of autumn). It also happened, but with the loss of a bunch of equipment in MK.
            And in 1942 they began to advance. immediately returned to tank formations and associations.
      2. xomaNN April 16 2020 19: 27 New
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        In several articles "Tanks are to blame for everything. 1941" in the magazines "Technology and Armament" 2020. serious factual analysis. And there it is clearly shown how attempts to transfer the tank corps of the spacecraft led to the fact that more than half of the T34, KV, T-28 corny broke and were abandoned by crews without spare parts. And if they were used in active defense? Those. part on the front, and part in the near 2nd echelon. And they are ready to stop German breakthroughs on rocky roads. And the T-34 motor resource, small at the time, was not burned in the stages. Or intelligence immediately battalion or company T-34? And not the T-26, of which there were many. As a result, the T-34s were knocked out before the battle. A bulletproof T-26 and BT already as a fighting force = 0! And in the photo dozens of abandoned thirty-four ...
        1. Alexey RA April 16 2020 20: 15 New
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          Quote: xomaNN
          And if they were used in active defense? Those. part on the front, and part in the near 2nd echelon. And they are ready to stop German breakthroughs on rocky roads.

          And they tried it. According to the results of Muzychenko’s actions, it turned out that for defense one and a half mechanized corps for the army were needed.
          1. chenia April 16 2020 21: 00 New
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            Quote: Alexey RA
            for defense one and a half mechanized corps for the army.


            Front SK 20-25 km. and the tank brigade will be in time, especially in the areas of prospective strikes (in wooded Belarus and northern Ukraine) used by units (strike groups). BP had to be engaged further than the Dnieper Germans would not be allowed.
  14. aglet April 16 2020 12: 04 New
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    Quote: AAK
    A colleague, the confusion in the Headquarters, the headquarters of the front and the corps confirms that there were no plans of just the same defense, at least passive, at least active with counter-attacks ...

    plans were enough. but they all lost relevance in the early morning of June 22
  15. aglet April 16 2020 12: 07 New
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    Quote: Olgovich
    One thing is not clear: after all, the command saw

    the command there and then was the beetles. Now it is clear?
  16. novel66 April 16 2020 12: 07 New
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    who here proclaims about Zhukov ?? concrete example, as usual, forehead against the wall
  17. Dmitry V. April 16 2020 12: 27 New
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    The reasons for the defeat were not in a small number of tanks and their poor characteristics, but in their inept use and inability to properly organize military operations. The reasons were mainly organizational in nature.


    And this is true.
    A characteristic episode of this battle, in Penezhko Grigory Ivanovich
    "Notes of the Soviet officer" who fought in Popel’s corps:
    The prisoner - chief lieutenant, adjutant to the commander of a tank regiment, a middle-aged, already graying German - speaks Russian well, which he learned when he was young when he worked somewhere in Russia as a mechanical engineer. He stands at attention. Answers questions boldly, sometimes with irony.

    “Tell me,” the colonel asks him:
    - Do you know why Germany is fighting against Russia?
    “It is known,” he answers.
    - Почему?
    - The Führer ordered.
    - This is not an explanation. I want to know the motives.
    “The Führer announced the motives,” the prisoner says. “They should be known to you.” And in general, I wonder why you, the Russian colonel, did not ask me the first thing, what kind of regiment and division I was, and you asked political questions that were irrelevant. I am not a politician, I am an ordinary German officer. Two months before the war, I knew you on the card, I knew that you, Vasiliev, the commander of a tank division, participated in the Finnish and Mongolian campaigns, and were awarded the highest order. I know all your regiment commanders. I know your intelligence chief. And who do you know from the German senior officers? Yesterday every two hours I knew where your division was, and you didn’t even know that we were going to intercept you.

    He suddenly turns to me and asks:
    - What time is it?
    I am perplexed, but still I look at the clock, I answer:
    - Exactly zero thirty.
    “You see, Mr. Colonel,” the German says, “the difference is four minutes — zero thirty-four on your watch,” he points with a nod to Vasiliev’s wristwatch.
    Vasiliev does not move, does not remove his hand lying on the back of the chair. The clock is in front of the captive. German raises his voice:
    - Is it possible to fight like that?


    I recommend reading - the atmosphere of this battle is very colorfully conveyed.
    http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/penezhko_gi/01.html
  18. Dmitry V. April 16 2020 12: 45 New
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    For example, a description of the battle in the Yavorov area:
    Several tanks jumped out of the forest, blowing blue haze and rushed through a clean, mowed meadow. All of them kept a combat course right to the west, to where, a mile from the forest, on my map there appears a trickle no more than a meter wide. Peering into the distance, about three kilometers along the highway to Yavorov, I saw German tanks. They moved towards us in battle order "line" and fired.
    .
    Far away, in the direction of Nemiruv, where a continuous cloud of smoke rose to the sky, another group of tanks attacked. But all my attention was focused on a green meadow, on which two black greasy tracks stretched behind each machine that went on the attack. I could not understand why such deep traces, why tanks are so slow, and some even stopped and seem lower than those walking nearby. Near the stopped cars, crews swarmed. Soon, only individual tanks were pulled forward. They caught fire one after another from the fire of enemy artillery, rumbling like thousands of blacksmith hammers. In the air appeared several German aircraft with tailed tails. They swirled and blew smoke bombs down. Violet streaks of smoke stood in the sky for a long time, like a blot smeared on paper.

    “Damn it, the flanks of our battle formations show!” - cursed one of the commanders standing behind.

    The whole lieutenant tanker, smeared in mud, drove up to the group of commanders on BT-7. I heard him, very excited, reported that tanks got stuck in a meadow that turned out to be peaty, that they were shot by German artillery, who was ambushed by the meadow, in shrubs, in a grove and in the extreme gardens of the village....

    With this data, I hurried back to my division.
    Remembering how amicably and beautifully the attack of our tanks, rapidly breaking out of the woods into the meadow, began, I thought: “But if it were not for the peat bog, everything would have been completely different!”

    “You won’t take a German’s daring, you need brains,” says Nikitin, but I feel that it’s not a matter of excessive dashing, but some striking, completely incomprehensible to me carelessness. [/ B]


    A case in point is how an attack is made on uncharted territory against unknown enemy forces and its sad result.
    There, Penezhko G.I. "Notes of the Soviet officer"
    http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/penezhko_gi/01.html
    1. Alexey RA April 16 2020 13: 59 New
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      Quote: Dmitry Vladimirovich
      A case in point is how an attack is made on uncharted territory against unknown enemy forces and its sad result.


      Materiel 8 TD, landed in a swamp during a counterattack on Nemirov, Lviv ledge, June 24, 1941. Source - LJ Yu.Pasholoka.
      1. Dmitry V. April 16 2020 14: 54 New
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        Quote: Alexey RA
        Materiel 8 TD, landed in a swamp during a counterattack on Nemirov, Lviv ledge, June 24, 1941. Source - LJ Yu.Pasholoka.


        For customers, bulldozers buried in the cab - a well-known topic, then you have to dig.
  19. vch62388 April 16 2020 17: 19 New
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    It could not have been otherwise. The attack by several corps located in different subordination (of the front and different armies) is doomed to failure. The compounds have different commanders, different rear supply systems, different communication lines. All this closes somewhere very far right up to the front headquarters. How to get aviation support? From the Air Force of which army? How will the 6th OA Air Force find out when and where to support the 22nd MK 5th OA?
    The leadership of the SWF, in addition to the defensive battles conducted by the armies (in their areas), decided to organize a separate operation without concern for its support.
    Not just afterwards tank and air armies, horse-mechanized groups, etc. were created.
  20. Charlie April 16 2020 17: 24 New
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    Quote: faterdom
    The defeat was also facilitated by the extremely inept organization of tank counterattacks from the front headquarters to unit commanders, and this, in the absence of radio communications at almost all control levels from the corps to linear vehicles

    A serious role in the defeat of Soviet tankers was played by the Germans' competent use of anti-tank artillery, especially the 88-mm Flak anti-aircraft guns, which shoot all Soviet tanks at long range.

    And now, together: Goering’s Luftwaffe (which included organizationally and anti-aircraft gunners from “Aht-aht”) were equipped with radio stations, and in addition to directly destroying our armor and automobile equipment by air, they gave a good picture to the headquarters for decision-making, where anti-aircraft gunners were already on the ground ( from Goering’s department, I remind you) they interacted very well with OKV ground crews, and managed to deploy guns to meet our tanks.
    Unfortunately, these days we did not have a vision of the overall reliable picture of the commanders, nor a normal connection, especially to an individual tank or aircraft, nor even interaction between uniform infantry and mechanized units and formations.
    I had to study at such a terrible price, but by the end of the summer, ours had become different, did not give up Leningrad, and came up against Moscow.

    Duck with us now. Fifteen years ago, one of our captains took part in some joint exercises with the Americans, then they were still held. And he said, if the infantry gets into trouble, then they immediately hear on the radio their own artillery and their own aircraft and send their planes there right away. But this is not so with us. First, we have the infantry commander go to his command, and it is to command the aircraft to request support. And during this time the situation on earth will change. Their interactions between births are better, faster
    1. chenia April 16 2020 18: 22 New
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      Quote: Charlie
      But this is not so with us.


      And so it is with us. Only more artillery. Next to the infantry is always an artillery commander. and a few minutes and the division covers the target. Everything from learning.
  21. Charlie April 16 2020 18: 35 New
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    Quote: chenia
    Quote: Charlie
    But this is not so with us.


    And so it is with us. Only more artillery. Next to the infantry is always an artillery commander. and a few minutes and the division covers the target. Everything from learning.

    And if you slap him? The commander of this artillery. And the airman along with him. And at the adversary, commanders of various clans communicate with each other on the same frequency
    1. chenia April 17 2020 10: 45 New
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      Quote: Charlie
      And if you slap him? The commander of this artillery.

      Ha! There are a lot of them. We have a battalion commander on KNP, and not on fire, Then this is comm.ADN (and he has a commander of intelligence and comm. with HLC) and everyone is ready to take control of themselves and the overall fire control network.
  22. bubalik April 16 2020 19: 05 New
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    Fighting 8 MK 22 to 30.6.41


  23. Force multiplier April 16 2020 19: 42 New
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    Counterattacks were successful. The main task - to ensure the retreat of the Soviet armies from the border was completed, the advance of 1 TGr was slowed down, the enemy suffered serious losses. A pile of scrap metal of dubious value, but relatively little blood, was paid for this strategic success. By noon on July 1, TGr 1 announced the destruction or capture of 1114 tanks from the start of the campaign. Yes, probably not all Soviet tanks left by the crews were found by the Germans at that time. But note that the number is much smaller than the numbers found in the "historical" literature. The fact that part of the Soviet tanks was abandoned by crews or incapacitated by enemy aircraft makes the ratio of casualties in battles not so one-sided. Accordingly, all comparisons of the quality of training of command personnel, the number of radio stations, all the talk about whose tactics are more perfect and combat training better and whose tankers had more education classes, which the authors of military-historical literature love so much, are absolutely irrelevant. For this reason, there is the expression "do not see the forest behind the trees." The remaining applications - 168 art. guns and 50 anti-tank guns (that is, relatively few) and about 9000 prisoners (extremely few for such a large-scale battle).
    It is generally accepted that artillery played a major role in repelling Soviet tank attacks among the Germans. This is only partially true. For example, popular literature paints such a picture.
    Having completed 110 km, the march 19td only at 13 hours on June 24 left for Voinitsa from the east, having lost 72% of equipment on the march. The division immediately starts a counterattack on the Voinitsa, suffers heavy losses from enemy artillery

    In fact, in the morning and throughout the day of June 24, Pz.Rgt. 36 three times entered the battle with Soviet tanks and announced the destruction of 87 Soviet tanks. On June 25, this German regiment will lose 17 tanks in an attack on Torchin.
    Aviation. German aviation was active and its operations were successful. This is true. But for some reason they remember little that Soviet aviation was also active and its actions were also successful. Starting from the 25th day of the 1st TGr, Soviet aviation is highly active. The peak of activity of Soviet aviation was reached on June 29. On this day, only 11 TDs were subjected to 62 attacks by Soviet aircraft using on-board weapons (fighter and / or assault regiments equipped with fighter jets) and suffered heavy losses
  24. Operator April 16 2020 19: 59 New
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    Quote: chenia
    the calculation was real and showed that in 1941 the Germans didn’t have enough strength

    What, damn it, nemchura-all of Europe fought against the USSR in WWII except Britain. And the strength of the united Europe was 1,5-2 times greater than that of the USSR.

    Therefore, another characteristic, like illiteracy, to the Supreme High Command of the Red Army in 1941 is impossible to find.
  25. Ryaruav April 16 2020 22: 16 New
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    we were able to finally hit after June 22, well, the horse clearly had no experience both at the army and at the corps level, but it was not in vain that the people were killed by the Fritz, they were already doing the encirclement of Kiev cautiously, due to which many parts went to Odessa and Crimea
  26. Jarserge April 17 2020 15: 06 New
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    The question is put in the heading in the style of modern German "historians". Was there a second world war? Or read in an Italian source: "... in World War II, Italy fought in alliance with the United States and England against Germany and the USSR ....."
  27. Bashibuzuk1 April 17 2020 17: 55 New
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    I highly doubt the indicated figures for tank losses. Reading recalling M. Katukov, it was simply stated there that instead of 375 state-owned tanks, the tank division had, as of June 22.06.1941, 33, 2 BT-5, BT training tanks with used motor resources that were destroyed during first battle.
    M.E.Katukov "At the cutting edge of the main attack" p. 14.
  28. AsmyppoL April 18 2020 09: 00 New
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    Quote: xomaNN
    In several articles "Tanks are to blame for everything. 1941" in the magazines "Technology and Armament" 2020. serious factual analysis. And it clearly shows how the attempts to transfer the tank corps of the spacecraft led to the fact that more than half of the T34, KV, T-28 corrupted broke and were abandoned by crews without spare parts.

    Yes, very interesting articles
  29. Zhukov arrived ... and further on in the text .. Defense, even on existing powerful URs? Only forward! Read the Directives of the General Staff (Zhukov) of the first days of the war. The Luftwaffe was just having fun, destroying the marching columns of the Red Army, plus the inevitable breakdowns with a long march from the clear sky. The outcome of the battle is described in textbooks.
  30. barin 3 May 2020 08: 55 New
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    The Red Army then only learned to fight, and plus army reform on the eve of the war
  31. voyaka uh 15 May 2020 15: 09 New
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    But what is it called - an infantry battle? belay
    If thousands of tanks participate in the battle, this is a tank battle.