Legends and myths of the Great Patriotic War. Aircraft of the initial period

87

Necessary preface.

Soon, with one degree or another degree of probability, the country will try to celebrate the 75th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War.



We have a certain advantage in this regard, we are all meeting here virtually, and no one will be able to prevent us from doing this.

First of all: artillery preparation has already begun. And on the Web, and on TV screens began to appear "expert opinions" of people, excuse me, not from a machine gun, who began to talk about "how it was."

All that falls out can be perceived in two ways. But the main leitmotif is simple, like a land mine: the Germans had little equipment, but they knew how to fight, we had a lot of equipment and people, they didn’t know how to fight. Links, arguments - in stock.

Why in two ways? Everything is simple. We have no distortions in any way. And if in Soviet times we were told about “tank armadas "of the Nazis and hordes of dive bombers over their heads, now the skew is going in the other direction. Yes, like "corpses filled up".

Truth, it is always in the middle.

My goal is also very simple. Show TU the very version that may be as close as possible to the truth.

We have already spelled out the letters and at one time came to the conclusion that the LaGG-3 was not a flying coffin, and the MiG-3 was not such a lightly armed plane. To the mutual pleasure of true connoisseurs stories and the vicious pant of all "we-know-corpses-Stalin-failed."

Continuing, dear?

What did I want to start talking about? Naturally, about the planes!

Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov pushed me to this, I am a very respected person, I must treat his words with attention, but not axiomically. Why? Yes, because Zhukov helped write. Someone from the heart, and someone censored and strangled censorship.

I was just wildly lucky, I have at my disposal the famous “ten”, reissue No. 10 of “Memoirs and Reflections”, 1990, which is as close as possible to the original.

And I'll start with a quote from Marshal of Victory.

“According to updated archival data, from January 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941, the Red Army received 17745 combat aircraft from industry, of which 3719 new types of aircraft ... Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3 fighters, and Il- "2, the diving bomber Pe-2 and many others are only about twenty types."

Professionals and fans, did you also want to shout “Stop!”? Yes me too.

I'll start with “about twenty types” of new aircraft. Alas, I think that here Zhukov was a little framed by assistants. Twenty or so new types - I can definitely say that our series is stunted aviation industry simply could not overpower.

The real problem was the start of production of any aircraft, and the engines for them ... However, we will talk about engines a little lower.

But really, what was new?

Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3, Su-2, Pe-2, IL-2, Er-2, Ar-2, TB-7. Moreover, TB-7 / Pe-8 is very conditional, since they were tortured by a little thing in Kazan and less than a hundred were tortured. Well, with Er-2 and Ar-2, too, you can’t say that you’ve overstrained. 450 and 200 pieces respectively.

Yes, for the sake of justice, it would be possible to add the Yak-2 (approx. 100 pcs) and the Yak-4 (less than 100 pcs). But the small-scale production of these aircraft simply does not give the right to say that they really could have at least some influence on the course of the war.

I do not see 20 models. And you do not see.

There is, however, the idea that the "new" recorded modifications. Then yes, there is where to roam. I-16 with M-62, I-16 with M-63, I-153 with M-63, Su-2 with M-88.

No, I agree with those who say that the I-16 with the M-63 was quite imagined. Pilots responded very positively, it is. And in 1942 they even wanted to put it on stream again. But such a huge BUT: it was an obsolete aircraft in all respects, except, perhaps, maneuverability. And he simply was not able to compete with the new Bf.109F. There, the speed difference reached almost 100 km / h, so there was simply nothing to catch.

Somehow 3 new Zhukov planes are not drawn. No, you can dial “by barns and gantry” by writing all new planes to the new ones, which I listed above. Another question, have they become new and formidable from this? I doubt it.

But a complete expanse for those who want to show how we did not know how to fight.

Therefore, when in other sources, albeit less loud-sounding, I see a figure of 1500 new planes - yes, I believe it.

In addition, the figure 1500 again appears in the case when it is said about the number of aircraft on the contact line in the enemy. That is, in the western districts.

However, do not forget that the planes arrived not only in the regiments, but also in training centers for retraining pilots. Yes, not very much, but a figure of 10-15% of the total is drawn. In addition, retraining is a constant accident, repairs and the need for new aircraft.

Meanwhile, in the center and in the Far East, pilots also had to be retrained for new equipment.

Now about quantity.

Yes, in 2,5 years, our industry has produced more than 17 thousand aircraft of all types. And, it is possible (just below) that they all fell into parts and formations.

A lot? Yes, I agree.

However, let's not forget about the expense.

First, the planes beat (mercilessly) during training / retraining of young (and not only) pilots. Quite a lot of memoirs have been left about this, both those who beat and those who acted.

Secondly, do not forget that before the very beginning of the indicated period there was a conflict on about. Hassan and the Spanish Civil War. There were losses, it was necessary to compensate them.

Then we have Khalkhin Gol and the war with Finland. Where losses also took place.

Plus, the systematic decommissioning of old aircraft (I-5, R-5, I-15 and so on).

As a result, a logical doubt arises: how correctly and honestly to accept this figure? Obviously, she is very doubtful. 17-odd thousand manufactured aircraft - this does not mean that they all stood in even rows at the "peacefully sleeping" airfields and waited for the Germans to bomb them. It doesn’t mean at all.

I also have claims about the figure of "1500 new types of aircraft" in the frontline districts. Zhukov gives this figure to himself (on page 346, who cares), moreover, he gives a link to “The History of the Second World War 1939-1945.”, But if someone meticulous goes further, where did the figure come from, then the detective begins .

In general, the work “History of the Second World War” was written for more than one year and was completed only in 1982. Starting from a four-volume edition, in the end it was an edition in 12 volumes.

So, this figure, which Zhukov cites, is taken in such work as “Documents and Materials of the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense”. There is (naturally) an indication of the fund, an inventory, a case, pages are indicated.

Everything is spoiled by the official certificate that on April 13, 1990 the document was destroyed at the direct direction of our main military historian, head of the Institute of Military History, Dmitry Volkogonov.

For what purpose Volkogonov ordered the destruction of a number of documents, it is difficult to say today.

My personal opinion is to confirm the myth that we had a huge number of aircraft on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX. Sorry, I have no other explanation.

However, so much has been written about the role of Dmitry Volkogonov in the "preservation" of the historical heritage of the Great Patriotic War that there is simply no desire to repeat it. And, alas, there has been no demand from Colonel General Colonel since 1995.

As there is no confirmation or refutation of how many planes really were at the disposal of the Red Army Air Force.

A separate question is how did they determine how many aircraft were in the Red Army Air Force at the beginning of the war?

A common table, which was published by several authoritative publications at once, and on which many authors of historical materials and studies relied. Even in school history books hit.

Legends and myths of the Great Patriotic War. Aircraft of the initial period

As you see, we have almost 11 thousand aircraft, the Germans have almost 5 thousand. Do not want to think about it. It is clear, of course, that if the German were all as one Me.109 of the latest modifications, and we have I-15, I-153 and “only” 1500 new ones, it would be difficult for us.

Although, if you suddenly believe the memoirs of pilots who knew how to fly, that “messer” on the “donkey” didn’t sweat too much. And we had a lot of them.

You know, you can, of course, say that "the German aces were cooler than the wind," but ... But didn’t they get rid of ours in Spain? Yes, the Germans walked well in Europe, but, excuse me, is Poland a powerful air power? France ... Well, yes, France. But France was smashed on earth. And they clashed quite well with the British, but did they win? No, the Battle of Britain remained with the British pilots.

That question is about the invincibility of the German aces. More precisely, very big doubts. Yes, I support those who believe that all of their hundreds of accounts are fiction and nonsense.

Ours also did not pollinate corn. Yes, there were few in Spain, but they fought with the Japanese and Finns. So if there were ours with less combat experience, then not by much.

And now the figure of the planes as of June 22.06 also causes doubts about its fluctuation, although the fluctuation is quite normal. From 9 576 to 10 743. Ask why it’s normal? Yes, just that. different sources used different numbers.

The secret is simple: some authors used the number of aircraft accepted by military acceptance, while others used parts. Difference? There is a difference. As between a ship launched and commissioned.

There is a big difference between the acceptance of the aircraft by the military representative at the plant and the actual delivery of the aircraft. Both in fact and in time.

The plane, which was flown by a military test pilot and for which, after testing, issued all the financial documents for calculation with the plant, already actually belongs to the Air Force. But he is still in the factory.

But when it is transferred to the unit’s airdrome, or, even more difficult, it will be disassembled, packed, brought by rail, unloaded, assembled again, checked and circled again - then it becomes the accepted part and put into operation.

Considering our distances and the capabilities of our transport network in the 30-40s of the last century, as much time could pass.

Plus, even the factory team had to get to the plane in order to collect it and hand it over to the pilots. Someone was lucky, and the brigades rode along with a train carrying aircraft, while others did not, the planes arrived in boxes and waited for the factory workers to be free and arrive.

Pokryshkin described it.

That’s why the numbers are somewhat different, it all depends on at what point the information is taken and from what source. There are figures that are given on June 30. The end of the month is normal, the end of six months is also nothing.

However, here are the nuances: already in July, two urgently formed special aviation regiments arrived at the front, armed with MiG-3 fighters (commanders - test pilots S. Suprun and P. Stefanovsky), a regiment of diving bombers on Pe-2 (commander - pilot -test A. Kabanov), an attack regiment on the IL-2 (commander - I. Malyshev).

Got it, right? Planes from the June (and what else!) Plan came to the front in July. Where and how were they recorded? In the June plan, right. But they got to the front already after they were counted, as expected on 22.06. But actually it was not so.

Four regiments - this is solid. And these are only regiments that were formed from experienced test pilots. And as it was in fact, we will not know. But the fact that many writers on the alignment of forces as of June 22.06 clearly neglected the fact that all the data on the number of aircraft belonged to the end of the first half of 1941, i.e. by June 30, and not by June 22, 1941, when the war began. And they used theoretical calculations on the number of aircraft.

Well, you must admit, 4 regiments that went to the front on June 30 really cannot be counted on 22.06.

As could not be taken into account at least 1 combat aircraft were at the factories of the 24st Main Directorate of the NKAP on June 1941, 449. Although, according to other sources, this figure is even higher: 690 combat aircraft Pe-2, Il-2, Er-2, MiG-3, LaGG-3, Yak-1, Su-2 accepted by military representatives, but not sent in part .

And there was:
- 155 MiG-3 aircraft at plant number 1.
- 240 LaGG-3 aircraft at factories 21, 23, 31.
- 74 Yak-1 aircraft at factory number 292.
- 98 units of IL-2 at the factory number 18.

And it was on these airplanes that the pilots of the hastily formed militia special-purpose regiments from test pilots and the leading engineering and technical staff of the Scientific Research Institute of the Air Force KA, military acceptance, instructors of the Air Force, academies, partly factory test pilots and technicians were planted.

These were highly qualified pilots, who, armed with the latest technology, could not but provide real resistance to the enemy. But this will be a completely different story.

Well, you must admit that it’s still absurd to consider these planes “in service” on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.

And if their 1500 conditional aircraft of new designs are otminusovat from what is not included in the part, then the picture is not quite quite rosy. For the calculator says that 1500-690 = 810 aircraft.

No, this is also a really good figure, but ... 100 Yak-2, 100 Yak-4, 50 TB-7 and so on. In reality, the aircraft of new designs (as confirmed by the same Pokryshkin, Golodnikov and many others) simply did not get to the parts and were "in service" only on paper.

In the six-volume edition of the history of the Great Patriotic War, the first volume contains the figures:

In the first half of 1941, industry produced:
- fighters of a new type MiG-3, LaGG-3 and Yak-1 - 1946;
- Pe-2 bombers - 458;
- attack aircraft IL-2 -249.

Add, we get 2 653 aircraft. Converges. Reading further, one can find a very important remark that "part of the new machines was just beginning to enter service with the factories."

So, in the first half of 1941, out of 2 aircraft, part was sent to the part, and part was only planned for delivery. It is logical that it was from unsent vehicles that 653 air regiments were manned in July. The air regiment is about 4 aircraft. We can say that we have already found 40 aircraft that did not end up in units on June 160.

Thus, of the 2653 aircraft of a new type adopted by military envoys in the 1st half of 1941, only a part went into service.

What part of these aircraft was actually delivered to the combat units of the Air Force?

The answer can be quite easily found in that part of the Air Force Directorate that was engaged in the retraining of flight personnel. It was called the “Office of the Formation, Acquisition and Combat Training of the Red Army Air Force,” and its competence included keeping records of the actual delivery of aircraft to combat units.

During the war, this department was called the Main Directorate of training, formation and combat training of the Air Force. It was headed by Colonel General A.V. First Deputy Commander of the Air Force. Nikitin.

From the documents of this Office, one can extract the following:

In total, in the combat units of the Soviet Air Force by the beginning of the war there were 706 combat aircraft of a new type, in which 1354 pilots were retrained. The retraining process went according to the approved schedules.

It was possible to find out that the units of the Air Force of the spacecraft at the time the war began had:
- MiG-3 fighters - 407 and 686 trained pilots;
- Yak-1 fighters - 142 and 156 pilots;
- LaGG-3 fighters - 29 and 90 pilots;
- Pe-2 bombers - 128 and 362 pilots.
Data on the IL-2 is not available, respectively, there were no aircraft.

And then the specifics began. Of the 1540 supposedly “combat” aircraft, not even 810 remained, as I had counted before, but 706. But this is for all the air forces of the spacecraft, and this, excuse me, is still the center of the country and the Far East too.

Specifically, in the air forces of the Western border districts there were 304 fighters and 73 Pe-2s, a total of 377 aircraft of a new type.

And it turns out that at the beginning of the war, the new type of combat aircraft in the combat units of the spacecraft had not 2 units, as it is “officially” accepted, but 739, which is almost 706 times less.

Accordingly, in the five Western border districts there were only 377 of them, and not 1, as it is also “officially” considered, that is, also 540 times less.

In general, in my opinion, the picture is more or less clear. It remains to ask the very last question: why and who needed it, such a distortion of the picture at the highest level?

That it was not a gag is a fact. I remember these numbers very well, from school. The stories that the Luftwaffe had all the planes were super (well, even if it does, it doesn't get any easier), and we had junk that was simply unrealistic to fight at.

Why, then, overestimate the figures, talking about the allegedly small number of aircraft of new brands, deliberately exaggerating 4 times?

A strange situation that requires a separate reflection, do not you?

In general, we are already used to the fact that, let’s say, the merits of the Germans are somewhat exaggerated by those who received from them. The Tirpitz and Bismarck were such superlinkers that King George 5 and Yamato were coal barges next to them.

"Tiger" and "Ferdinand" - well, just awful. The best that could be invincible and unkillable. The fact that the first released 1355, and the second and completely 91 pieces, no one cares.

I’m silent about the 190th Fokke-Wulf. To read the British - well, a beast, not a plane. How they shot down ours, I don’t understand.

And so in everything.

As for 22.06, then everything is more complicated. The Luftwaffe did not have quite a number of modern aircraft. There the Germans themselves flew on such rubbish, so what, "Stuck" - was it a modern airplane? Do not make me laugh. Heinkel 51? Plus everything that they gathered from Europe there ...

Perhaps readers will have their own versions, with pleasure I will familiarize myself.

It’s not entirely clear to me why it was necessary to exaggerate the numbers of new aircraft models. Either just a careless attitude to the issue (we can), or some kind of malicious intent.

If we show that we had German aces on modern airplanes, we met with the I-15 and I-16 all the time - it was so. As you can see, the new generation aircraft was really nothing at all.

If you decide to show that the German military machine was so cool that it could grind one and a half thousand new planes, then yes, it is possible. We had many generals and marshals who simply needed to show that the enemy was not just strong, but almost invincible. Justifying this own cowardice and stupidity.

Or perhaps the truth is somewhere in between. And it is possible that all versions have the right to life. We have the right to speculate, because we will never know who and why slipped Zhukov’s not entirely correct figures, why Volkogonov destroyed the archives, and so on.

And the farther from 1941, the harder it will be to find out the truth. But we will try our best.

Sources:
Zhukov G.K. Memoirs and reflections. T. 1.P. 339-346.
History of the Second World War 1939-1945 T. 4.P. 25-26.
1941: experience in planning and using the air force, lessons and conclusions.
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  1. +9
    April 14 2020 05: 52
    our stunted aviation industry

    in 2,5 years, our industry has produced more than 17 thousand aircraft
    ????????
    Another thing is quality ...
    And even if there were at least 100% of new types of aircraft in units, the course of events of the first days of the war would hardly have changed much. For qualitative changes, it took 2,5 years of fierce fighting.
    And by the way, at the expense of 17 aircraft (which were still not old), we survived the initial period.
    1. +4
      April 14 2020 11: 22
      The problem is not so much in quality as in the fact that the Germans were allowed to disorganize control and destroy the Red Army Air Force on airfields in the very first hours of the wars. As expected, after several months of "increased combat readiness" almost on June 21 in the evening everyone was dismissed to their homes. Essno, our people started to celebrate the unexpected weekend "as expected". And the anti-aircraft artillery was pulled to the training ground.
      1. +2
        April 14 2020 11: 28
        There were many problems, and with the command. and with hp (preparation), and the adopted tactics and combat readiness, and much more with what.
        In this particular case, I answered for the "stuntedness" of the pre-war aircraft industry.
        1. -1
          April 14 2020 12: 02
          New legends and myths ... It is necessary to mature: who benefits.
      2. +5
        April 14 2020 13: 48
        Quote: iouris
        The problem is not so much in quality as in that the Germans were allowed to disorganize control and destroy the Red Army Air Force at airfields in the very first hours of the wars.

        But was it - is it management? How can one count on managing entrusted parts over wired networks of the People’s Commissariat of Communications - in the front-line band? But they counted, because often there was simply no other connection.
        A key element of the Air Force and Air Defense - an early detection and warning system in the form of an airspace monitoring service - radio communications was provided by units of percent. By wire on army lines - by 20-25%. And the rest is civilian communication.
      3. 0
        April 17 2020 04: 22
        Quote: iouris
        Germans were allowed to disorganize control and destroy the Red Army Air Force at airfields in the very first hours of wars

        Pavlov and the company were not for nothing shot. About a day passed between the order of the General Staff on bringing troops on high alert and the German attack. And so, were the aircraft dispersed across field airfields, refueled, and loaded with ammunition? No, they stood beautifully in a ruler, wing to wing, at the bases, with semi-dry tanks, without ammunition, and the pilots were fired. And okay, only the Air Force. The guns separately, the shells separately, and the sights were removed (!!!) supposedly for either checking, adjusting, or finally rubbing alcohol on the optical axis. The tanks are in approximately the same condition at the bases, and the crews are separately in the camps for either combat training or physical training. Whether it was an ordinary mess in the armed forces, or intent, but for this it was not enough to shoot.
  2. +13
    April 14 2020 06: 07
    “Russia is a huge state with an unpredictable past!”
    M.N. Zadornov

    Well, about the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov. Georgy Konstantinovich was an outstanding commander and his role in the Victory cannot be overestimated. But as a writer-memoirist, he is assessed "ambiguously".
    I was just wildly lucky, I have at my disposal the famous “ten”, reissue No. 10 of “Memoirs and Reflections”, 1990, which is as close as possible to the original.

    In some places it was necessary to read that the "original" was pretty much "finalized" by his daughter in accordance with her concepts of current politics.
    1. +4
      April 14 2020 12: 05
      The winners write the story. Whoever defeats her will write a story. The future grows out of the past. Our future is unpredictable.
  3. +12
    April 14 2020 06: 13
    I will add my own five kopecks. At our VO, knowledgeable people cited figures that the greatest losses in the East of the Luftwaffe suffered just in the summer of 1941 And yet, preceding an article on the ratio of tanks in the Wehrmacht and the Red Army at the beginning of the War, I will quote Hitler, for accuracy I guarantee: "If I knew exactly the number of tanks the Russians had, I would never have attacked Russia!"
    1. +6
      April 14 2020 12: 23
      andrewkor, this quote is in Guderian's memoirs.
      1. +1
        April 14 2020 14: 55
        Quote: siemens7774
        andrewkor, this quote is in Guderian's memoirs.

        And the figure is in the Statistical Digest No. 1 of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Guderian had something to grieve about.
        1. +1
          April 15 2020 14: 24
          Guderian made a preliminary report at the OKW meeting on the tank troops of the Red Army on May 3, 1941. Hitler told him that he was not competent in these matters. Abwehr reported another figure. There is a clever book - G. Guderian. Memoirs of the German General. German Tank Troops 1939-1945
    2. +3
      April 14 2020 18: 55
      There is an audio recording of a conversation between Hitler and Mannerheim, which is considered unique, since Hitler does not hysteria on it, but speaks calmly. Here he mentions about 35 (it seems) thousands of Russian tanks. But it is important to understand that Hitler is not a standard of reliability.
  4. +17
    April 14 2020 06: 25
    I disagree with the author about 20 types of new aircraft. To begin with, you need to define the concept of "new type", then with the point where the number of new types is considered. If we disregard small-scale (100-200 pieces), but still put into service, then how unfair it turns out ... The designers built, the testers finished, the pilots flew, performed tasks, and with a stroke of the pen there is no such type!
    Well, and if still about the types, then where did the MiG 1, IL-4 go? ...
    I think with small-scale, we’ll get to just twenty, so here on G.K. Zhukov does not need to sin ...
    1. +6
      April 14 2020 10: 36
      MiG-1 and MiG-3 are almost the same aircraft. The difference between them is insignificant: an additional 3-liter gas tank was installed under the cab on the MiG-250, and to eliminate the MiG-1's lack of unsatisfactory static longitudinal stability, the engine was moved forward by 100 mm, and automatic anti-aileron slats were installed, all the gas tanks with the system were protected filling them with neutral gas, and added the ability to carry air bombs and RSs (in my opinion, not very relevant for a fighter, which is best used as a high-altitude interceptor). Some changes are not enough to consider the MiG-3 a new model, it is rather brought to mind the MiG-1.
      But the IL-4 (originally called DB-3M, then DB-3F) can really be called a new model in comparison with the immediate predecessor of DB-3: having the same purpose and almost the same shape (except for an elongated and pointed nose shape the navigator’s cockpit - which was not evaluated positively by all crews) DB-3F received a radically and completely modified fuselage design, optimized for the requirements of the new plazo-template production method mastered by the Soviet aircraft industry before the war, and new engines - first M-87, and then M -88 various modifications.
      Yak-2 and Yak-4 can not be considered different models either - these are just modifications of the original BB-22 for different engines: M-103 and M-105, respectively (however, these engines are also essentially modifications of the M-100, nee Hispano-Suiza 12Y). And to call them fighting is, to put it mildly, to sin against the truth. These were attempts (frankly unsuccessful) to somehow adapt the record aircraft (BB-22) to the requirements of the Air Force. And you can still recall the Su-2 and Su-4, although no - the Su-4 with the M-82 engine passed state tests only in April 1942, therefore, for obvious reason, it cannot be considered an aircraft of the initial period of the war.
      Honestly, I expected more from the article and from the author than a simple repetition of a long-known one. But maybe this is just the beginning?
      1. -4
        April 14 2020 12: 06
        Quote: Alexander72
        But maybe this is just the beginning?

        "Bast and bast - start over."
        The Germans, of course, won. However...
    2. 0
      April 14 2020 11: 21
      Quote: Leader of the Redskins
      Well, and if it’s about types, where did MiG 1 go,

      Well, another 100 LaGG-1 aircraft.
  5. +14
    April 14 2020 06: 35
    In our and German archives there are a lot of documents about the initial stage of the war and in the battle logs of ground units there are a lot of complaints that the Russians are constantly in the air and deliver strikes and considerable damage .... and this is written by the Germans. Again, when they write about that almost all planes at the airfields were destroyed, I'm sorry, but not all, but a lot and mostly the aircraft suffered on the western front, there wasn’t such a thing on others ..... and I always knew that memoirs as a source ... he is very careful.
    1. +9
      April 14 2020 08: 46
      Quote: Andrey VOV
      Russians are constantly in the air and inflict blows and considerable damage.

      Because the Germans fought in groups and threw them on request. It was impossible to cover the entire front from black to Baltic. The directions of the main strikes were most densely covered by the Germans, the rest according to the residual principle
  6. +11
    April 14 2020 07: 15
    We have the right to speculate, because we will never know who and why slipped Zhukov’s not entirely correct numbers, why Volkogonov destroyed the archives, and so on.

    And there is nothing to guess. Under Stalin, everything was secret. Then it was necessary to discredit the leader. Then it was embarrassing to admit a lie. Then they all died, and the rest did not care.
    Look at the current data of the same Air Force. Take the number of regiments, squadrons in regiments, planes in those squadrons and you get a scanty figure, which is several times less than any wikipedia. If you have access to the number of combat-ready units, you will generally be horrified. After a month or two of intensive exploitation, the entire miserable remainder will fail, the Chinese factories have been bombed, our pensioners from the factories spat on everything and went to the dacha to plant potatoes ... Here is a picture of the beginning of the "hot phase".
  7. +18
    April 14 2020 07: 19
    My goal is also very simple. Show TU the very version that may be as close as possible to the truth
    The goal is very positive, it is impossible to deny. But you can only achieve it in the only way - by working directly with archival documents.
    Type arguments "I remember these numbers very well, from school." like stories about destroyed archive documents without documentary evidence of the destruction - this is not the same version.
    This is from the stories "how it was".
    If we refer to documents generally available today, then with regard to aviation there is one.
    1. +20
      April 14 2020 07: 34
      The first chapter of this publication contains data on the quantitative and qualitative composition of the Air Force of the border western districts at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

      As can be seen from the table, as of June 1, 1941, there were 1367 new types of aircraft in the combat units of the Red Army Air Force of the five western districts, of which 102 were malfunctioning. That is, 1265 aircraft are in service.
      For these 1265 aircraft, there were only 602 crews, of which 229 were prepared to one degree or another for military operations, the rest were trained or even were still traveling from military schools.
      That is, out of 1265 aircraft of new types, there were actually 229 combat-ready ones.
      Links to archival documents from which the figures are obtained are at the bottom of the table.
      1. +11
        April 14 2020 07: 56
        My goal is also very simple. Show TU the very version that may be as close as possible to the truth

        Honestly, the author’s work does not make an impression of desire tell how it was in reality... Winks, we look here, we don't look here, etc. The usual position now is "not everything is so simple."

        Usually, immediately after the "ambiguity" begins some kind of conspiracy or other author's version of the story.
        1. 0
          April 14 2020 16: 19
          Quote: Octopus
          impressions of the desire to tell how everything was in reality. P

          exactly!
          "Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3, Su-2, Pe-2, Il-2, Er-2, Ar-2, TB-7." ask the author about the MiG-1 ... request will say everything - then 100 pieces ... we’ll ask, how many frames were issued before the start of the Second World War? hi
      2. +1
        April 14 2020 16: 24
        Quote: Undecim
        For these 1265 aircraft, there were a total of 602 crews, and ready more-less 229 of them were involved in military operations, the rest studied or even went from military schools.
        That is, out of 1265 aircraft of new types, there were actually 229 combat-ready ones.

        As for "to one degree or another" - for the most part, the crews of even border districts were ready to operate only during the day and in the PMU.
        CALL: 285 crews are ready for night flights at PMU, 242 crews at day in SMU, 17 crews at night at SMU.
        KOVO: 508 crews are ready for night flights at PMU, 359 crews at day in SMU, 0 crews at night at SMU.
        Pribovo: 154 crews are ready for night flights at PMU, 126 crews at day in SMU, 0 crews at night at SMU.
  8. +6
    April 14 2020 07: 42
    I read the memoirs of the pilot of the Su-2, a light bomber. He wrote that for the attack aircraft the German troops on the march attracted everything that flies. Losses of fighters, bombers and light attack aircraft such as R-5 were huge. German columns were well covered from the ground by small-caliber artillery, and from above by abrasive aircraft.
    The lack of radio communications and the order by any means to disrupt the advance of the columns left no choice and the pilots carried out precisely the ground attack aircraft and equipment.
  9. +8
    April 14 2020 08: 36
    Whatever they say, but at the beginning of the war the Germans fought better, the strategy, tactics, the interaction of the combat arms, and communications were much better. Thousands of tanks and aircraft abandoned by malfunctioning or without fuel.
    Say I16 and I15 are out of date? For direct escort of IL2, and even Pe2, Su2, I15,16 would have been ideal even before 1945, speed is not needed, maneuverability is needed, the attacker will quickly turn around and in the forehead. By the way, the losses of the Germans at the beginning of the war were huge, but then all our planes disappeared somewhere, were thrown at airfields without fuel.
    1. +7
      April 14 2020 08: 51
      Quote: Victor Sergeev
      but then all our planes disappeared somewhere, were thrown at airfields without fuel.

      In the first days and weeks of the war, front-line airfields were quickly captured and the aircraft relocated further. All the airfields of Minsk and Bialystok were jammed with airplanes. But the service personnel and technicians traveled independently. It was technically impossible to maintain the aircraft
    2. +3
      April 14 2020 09: 29
      but then all our planes disappeared somewhere
      There were few anti-aircraft guns in the USSR at the beginning of the war, aviation had to cover the troops from the air, the engine lasted for 20 hours (EMNIP), the resource ran out - everything, the plane does not fly. This does not include attacks on our airfields and the actual losses in air battles.
    3. +1
      April 14 2020 12: 07
      "For direct escort of Il2, or even Pe2, Su2, I15,16, were ideal even before 1945". -Sometimes reading something like that becomes scary for the author's mental health ..
      1. +2
        April 14 2020 12: 56
        Well, he got excited about the date, I agree. But in the main he is right - everyone rushed to count and reduce the entire Air Force to new types, writing down the "old" I-16 and I-15 in the trash incapable of fighting, which is not correct
        1. +2
          April 14 2020 20: 40
          in general, the all-metal glider and the advantage in speed (in normal mode, more than 100 km / h, at a dive of 250 km / h) allowed the messer to impose rules of the game beneficial to the fascist pilot, the I-16 could not do anything, even the La-5-7 were inferior at the speed of diving to the fascists ...
          1. 0
            April 17 2020 16: 23
            In fact, in the first months of the war, trying to stop the advancing German columns, the command threw everything that was at hand to attack - as the I-16 and I-15 attack aircraft were quite suitable, in any case they coped with it better than the "newest" fighters
      2. +1
        April 17 2020 16: 34
        Quote: ElTuristo
        "For direct escort of Il2, or even Pe2, Su2, I15,16, were ideal even before 1945". -Sometimes reading something like that becomes scary for the author's mental health ..


        I-15 and I-16 for a couple of years before 1945 were ideal targets for German fighters who had a maximum horizontal speed of 200, or even 250 km / h greater. Even in 1941, neither the I-15 nor the I-16 could, with rare exceptions, compete on equal terms with the Me-109 F-2 or Me-109 F-4 with a maximum speed of 600 and 635 km / h. And when most of the most experienced pilots of the Red Army was lost, the situation became even worse.
  10. +14
    April 14 2020 09: 27
    After these two quotes:
    “The document was destroyed by direct order of our chief military historian, head of the Institute of Military History, Dmitry Volkogonov.”
    “These were highly qualified pilots who, armed with the latest technology, could not but provide real resistance to the enemy.”
    It became clear that the author does not understand the topic, but simply manipulates numbers.
    I will explain. On the first quote. The document can be destroyed, but the documentation of the factories producing the equipment can be destroyed, MAP (I don’t remember what it was called then) is physically impossible, these are tons of documents where everything has been preserved. So the reference is restored, albeit by hard work, but restored.
    On the second. Test pilots were highly qualified pilots, but they were testers and not combat pilots. They flew excellently, but did not engage in combat training in principle, and the fighters were weak, certainly better than the green graduates of the schools, but weaker than the combat pilots. Of course, some of them came to the test work from parts, but without regular training, skills are lost.
    Further, I’m not going to disassemble the bloopers.
    1. +5
      April 14 2020 10: 34
      I agree that it is possible to eject a document from the archive, but it is difficult to eliminate the factory documentation on production (MAP was then called NKAP). At least, if you engage in serious research, then traces can always be found. Only who will do this now?
      I also agree about the test pilots. During the Korean War, there was such an episode - our command was given the task of forcing the F-86 to land on our territory, for which excellent aerobatic pilots and test pilots were sent to Korea. But aircraft tests and air combat are different things, the very first meeting with the Americans showed this - the testers suffered losses without completing the assignments. Later it was possible to get the padded Saber, which landed on the seashore, but this was the merit of the combat pilots.
    2. +1
      April 15 2020 15: 35
      actually you’re right, it’s like the Dutch investigators slipped the missile engine into the rocket engine: in four months they found the form and the storage place the Dutch shut up but somehow forgot to apologize ...
  11. +1
    April 14 2020 09: 28
    You just need to discard all the dregs, stop counting, and just know that we won, which means we are right. And then, after Karl, they discussed it for 12 hundred years that if we had shown a little bit to the Russians, then after Napoleon, now after Hitler. And the fact that in the first months of the war was difficult, the one who strikes first also has an advantage in the fray. But at 45 meters no one could stop us. The Kwantung army was rolled out in a month. If I had to think, Tokyo would be taken.
  12. +3
    April 14 2020 09: 30
    The theme "We fly on coffins" came up at that time at least 3 times.
    Before the war (shot), during the war, (demoted, sent to the Far East), after the war (this is Vasily Stalin, you won’t take it off, but then it ended badly anyway)

    + according to the memoirs, 2 times less than the time of training flights + mass production (ahead of the rest of the planet) of aircraft in the 30-40s, which were already outdated by the war.
  13. +7
    April 14 2020 10: 08
    Well, that’s how it is, but the speed with which the Germans reached Moscow was impressive, and they had to be knocked out to the USSR’s border much longer, with an inhuman effort.
    1. 0
      April 14 2020 10: 40
      but the speed with which the Germans reached Moscow is impressive

      Germans - (June 22 - December 5)
      Napoleon - (June 23 - September 14)
      1. 0
        29 May 2020 11: 50
        Yes, Guderian in these situations should nervously smoke aside ....
        Somehow I did not pay attention to such a time gap ....
        To beat Heinz for two months is ......
    2. 0
      April 14 2020 11: 38
      the speed with which the Germans reached Moscow is impressive
      Then the speed of the Red Army from the end of 43 to 45 should impress even stronger.
  14. +3
    April 14 2020 10: 39
    you can’t say that you’ve overstrained. 450 and 200 pieces respectively.
    So we, what we consider the number of released NEW cars or their number of brands?
    Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3, Su-2, Pe-2, IL-2, Er-2, Ar-2, TB-7 ...
    ... Yes, for the sake of justice, it would be possible to add the Yak-2 (approx. 100 pcs) and the Yak-4 (less than 100 pcs). But the small-scale production of these aircraft simply does not give the right to say that they really could have at least some influence on the course of the war.
    I do not see 20 models. And you do not see.
    In this statement - no. It lists 11 types of combat aircraft. And let's see, what else was new to our Air Force in the period from 1939 to 1941, it is this same period that Zhukov indicated.
    As a source of information, let us take VB Shavrov's book "History of Aircraft Structures in the USSR. 1938-1950."
    And so we do not have enough to find 9 (nine) types of new aircraft received by the troops
    1. R-10 (KhAI-5)

    2. PS-84 (Li-2)

    3. GTS

    4. MiG-1 (somehow everyone forgets about it)

    5. MDR-6 (Che-2)

    6. IL-4 (DB-3F)
    1. +2
      April 15 2020 00: 13
      R-10 began to be mass-produced in 1937.
      GTS - only 27 cars.
      MDR-6 (Che-2) - 17 cars from 1940 to 1946!
      MiG-1 - 100 cars.
      Forgot more DI-6 - 222 cars.
      On June 1, 1941, there were 71 DI-6s in the USSR Armed Forces (40 of them were faulty).
  15. +4
    April 14 2020 10: 59
    If you look at the history of air regiments which later became guards and began the war in June. That most of them were just equipped with equipment for double staff. The old donkeys were not written off but stood at the airfields of the regiments. The number of retrained pilots on new equipment was also very different, depending on location. There were more retrained in the south than in the northern direction or in the same Belarus. Which, in principle, is not surprising given the weather conditions.
    If you read the same Pokryshkin, then mass migrants to them went to the regiment in the month of May. And the regiment fought in the initial period on two types of aircraft. Both because of the incomplete staffing with new equipment, and because of the incomplete assimilation of this.
    The number of losses was greatly influenced by the tactics of application. The same Kaberov wrote in his memoirs that, in principle, lagg-3, and they received real varnishes, was not so bad. It just needed a boom zoom and not a bend.
    Again, the aerodrome service and its level. The Germans had complete order with this, which made it possible to compensate for the smaller number of aviation, its more intensive use.
    According to the recollections of the surviving Deutsch Pilots, 5 sorties a day during the initial period of the war was the norm. Well, the ability to concentrate aviation in the right place and in massive numbers. What created the illusion of total superiority of German aviation.
    Although they could do such things at the end of the war.
  16. +2
    April 14 2020 11: 04
    Germans had little equipment, but they knew how to fight, we had a lot of equipment and people, they didn’t know how to fight.

    This is reminiscent of a paradox: 10 Aztecs versus 10 Europeans - Europeans will be defeated, each Indian individually is stronger than a European. 1000 Aztecs versus 100 Europeans - the Aztecs will receive a deafening defeat, on such a scale the best organization of Europeans matters

    We managed to copy everything - engines, weapons, the best technologies, build factories and launch mass production of aircraft
    Failed to copy only the organization of the Germans or the British

    In 1941, in a mortal survival battle, we encountered a nation that had formed hundreds of years earlier than us. And got 1941

    It’s even worse to fight the Anglo-Saxons - they are not inferior in organization to the Germans, but they have unlimited resources
    1. +3
      April 14 2020 13: 21
      Quote: Santa Fe
      Failed to copy only the organization of the Germans or the British


      After the purges of 1937-1939, the commanders were afraid to take the initiative and contradict impossible orders, there were a lot of random people who could not organize, did not understand tactics.
      The "training" was very expensive.
      1. 0
        April 18 2020 15: 40
        what cleansing? read with a pencil: "Purification" by Suvorov. pencil for notes you want to check ... but to no purpose he writes the truth, which they are trying to distort
    2. +1
      April 14 2020 13: 39
      Quote: Santa Fe
      In 1941, in a mortal survival battle, we faced a nation that had formed hundreds of years earlier than us

      From 1871 to 1941, exactly 70 years
      1. +2
        April 14 2020 18: 26
        Three simple facts, offhand.

        - Freiberg University, foundation year - 1457

        - The abolition of serfdom in Prussia - 1807

        - Industrialization - Germany was its first among the countries of continental Europe, at the end of the 19th century.


        And then every year before May 9, a search is conducted for the truth why it happened so badly in 1941. Because!
        1. +2
          April 14 2020 19: 30
          Are you talking about the creation of national states or cultural and social "backwardness"?
          The Italians and the French have universities even older, but you are not afraid of them. But you are afraid of the Americans. When did the American nation form?)
          1. 0
            April 14 2020 20: 38
            This is one and the same era, the oldest university in Germany in 1386. But the German devils managed to create industry earlier than anyone else in the 19th century
            —- /
            This is a British nation, for the British and living under British law. The Britons in the 17th century had ships and the ability to build states on the other side of the earth. When, according to the documents, the layout of the district and the borough borders were not completed in 1965, but in 1687, for example, how to understand this

            We have? In the 17th century there was a round dance

            And then they can’t understand the causes of the 1941 disaster
            1. +3
              April 14 2020 22: 39
              Quote: Santa Fe
              The Britons in the 17th century had ships and the ability to build states on the other side of the earth. When, according to the documents, the layout of the district and the borough borders were not completed in 1965, but in 1687, for example, how to understand this

              And what, then, "The Empire, over which the sun never set" ordered to live for a long time immediately after the two won world wars? Why was W. Churchill not re-elected for the next term after the "victory"?
              Quote: Santa Fe
              And then they can’t understand the causes of the 1941 disaster

              The reasons for the defeats of 1941 were sorted out long ago and for the military they are quite understandable. The Wehrmacht defeated three echelons of the Red Army, separated by distance, one after another. Without special miracles and by no means in the 1: 6 position, how sweetly the beaten German generals sing in their "memories of a soldier" and other "lost victories". Comparing the dates of university founding and the abolition of serfdom is a primitive and populist position. And how did the Russian army fight the Germans in WWI? Without the Soviet "educational program" and Stalin's five-year plans ... Did the "grandfathers" go out on the same "father's skill" for three years? Well at least Suvorov taught "left" and "right" to distinguish with hay and straw.
            2. 0
              April 18 2020 15: 46
              the answer is simple, in the heterogeneity of the USSR. read ol the political struggle from 1924 to 1937 gold. they tried to destroy our country from the inside. the cause of the Labor Party is of interest. Stalin was not taken seriously at the beginning. he was a screen for crooks. check out the 2nd exit. you will understand the reason for the liquidation of the old Bolsheviks, with blood on your hands up to your elbows. I recommend "Purification" of Suvorov. read not from a swoop but with a search for refutation of data in the sources. the affairs of this world are strange.
    3. 0
      April 14 2020 22: 13
      Quote: Santa Fe
      Failed to copy only the organization of the Germans or the British

      And by what criterion do you think that the Germans and even more so the British had the best organization? If you look closely, almost any victory of the West is behind a multiple advantage in resources. There are no miracles. 1941 is no exception. It will not work to create 20 tank divisions at the expense of "skill" - you need money and a lot of resources. And where did the loser in WWI Germany get the money from? Reparations had to be paid a little. Where are the resources from? There are no colonies.
      Quote: Santa Fe
      In 1941, in a mortal survival battle, we encountered a nation that had formed hundreds of years earlier than us.

      But I thought that the German nation took shape only in the 19th century ... Bismarck and all that. But the territory of RI has developed in its maximum configuration 100 years earlier.
      Quote: Santa Fe
      It’s even worse to fight the Anglo-Saxons - they are not inferior in organization to the Germans, but they have unlimited resources

      The Anglo-Saxons have always fought in gold. And when they were "slightly" strained by the Luftwaffe, they called it the Battle. Yes, in the sky of Taman and Kuban it was more terrible. And where did the notorious German organization go by 1943? But before the Citadel, none of the Anglo-Saxons really bothered the Nazis ...
      1. 0
        April 21 2020 03: 38
        And where only the notorious German organization had gone by 1943?

        She has not "gone" anywhere. Air Battle over the Kuban - the Red Army Air Force was won with great difficulty. Even in the first half of 1944, the Luftwaffe IA was able in a number of cases to quite successfully counter the Red Army Air Force not only on a tactical but also on an operational scale.
    4. 0
      April 15 2020 15: 42
      what are you! a nation a hundred years earlier .. And why then back in the beginning of the 20th century the Germans did not have a single German language?
  17. +1
    April 14 2020 11: 15
    Data on the IL-2 is not available, respectively, there were no aircraft.
    In the memoirs of V. Emelianenko, the moment of retraining 4 ShAPs on new technology is highlighted. "... In May 1941, based at the Bogodukhovo field airfield in the Kharkov region, the 4th Attack Aviation Regiment received new equipment ... ... the regiment should have 65 attack aircraft, and only 17 were brought in. The missing ones arrived only during the second half of June."
    1. +2
      April 14 2020 13: 06
      Quote: Fitter65
      In May 1941, based at the Bohodukhovo field airfield in the Kharkov region, the 4th Attack Aviation Regiment received new equipment ... ... the regiment should have 65 attack aircraft, and only 17 were brought in. The missing ones arrived only in the second half of June. "

      On rkka.ru in the table "The quantitative and qualitative composition of the aviation fleet of the Armed Forces of the USSR as of 01.06.1941" (section "Encyclopedia") 57 Il-2 attack aircraft and 0 crews for them are indicated: 5 Il-2 - in PribOVO, 8 Il-2 - in ZOVO, 5 Il-2 - in KOVO, 39 - in KhVO.
      1. 0
        April 14 2020 15: 19
        Quote: Alexey RA
        39 - in the HVO

        From the form 4 cap
        The next 48 aircraft of this type arrived only a few days before the start of the war, and one of them was destroyed during the landing (by 15.06.41 the regiment received 25 Il-2, and by 22.06.1941 another 33 such vehicles). ... A part arrived at the front-line airfield in Stary Bykhov on June 27.06.41, 55, consisting of XNUMX aircraft,
  18. +1
    April 14 2020 11: 31
    "Loss of communication - loss of control" ©
    1. What was the percentage of aircraft radio-communications in 1941? The question is rhetorical.
    2. Aircraft is not only a glider, but equipment. I-153, for example, a beautiful aircraft, perhaps the best biplane fighter, retractable landing gear. Here are just a manual cleaning, with the help of a winch. Attention is the question - how much is the pilot focused on controlling the aircraft while cleaning the landing gear?
    3. In tactics, we lagged behind, the fighter units were 3 aircraft. The Germans, on the other hand, used a more progressive tactic of 4 airplane units divided into pairs. I won’t go into subtleties, but it’s really a weapon of victory at the initial stage + we don’t forget about the radio stations on EVERY German fighter.
    This is the first thing that comes to mind when mentioning the causes of failure. If you wish, you can still recall something, but not much time.
    1. +1
      April 14 2020 16: 15
      Quote: Earthshaker
      2. Aircraft is not only a glider, but equipment. I-153, for example, a beautiful aircraft, perhaps the best biplane fighter, retractable landing gear. Here are just a manual cleaning, with the help of a winch. Attention is the question - how much is the pilot focused on controlling the aircraft while cleaning the landing gear?

      At that time, a manual mechanism for cleaning and releasing the chassis was quite normal. Some people, moreover, in a rich and industrialized country, before the war and in the war mass-built a carrier-mounted (!) Fighter with such a mechanism.
      1. +1
        April 14 2020 19: 17
        This was an example. Throughout the war, our automation of all aircraft control processes was at about zero level. And the devices were not the best.
  19. BAI
    +2
    April 14 2020 11: 55
    Auto calculates how many aircraft were made and how many were received by the troops. Did old planes disappear at once? Are they gone? Why aren’t the newly received and remaining in service aircraft summed up? Where did all SB-1941 and TB-2 go who took an active part in the summer events of 3 years? U-41 (Po-2) - what to do with this?
  20. +4
    April 14 2020 12: 30
    The dress rehearsal of the Patriotic War - the Finnish winter campaign in the air very clearly showed- HUMAN FACTOR! After all, the Red Army there had a huge quantitative advantage in aircraft of all types, from bombers to fighters and so on. And qualitatively, the Finns had clearly sloppy aircraft of different countries of production. But the loss ratio (the numbers are very different) 139 Finnish versus 261 ours indicate that the issue is in frames. From weak leadership from colonels to generals with blue buttonholes, to the real skills and combat skills of pilots, the skills of technicians.

    And in the year before 1941, the personnel did not change dramatically: the command did not become smarter, and the pilots did not learn to fly and fight. And the pre-war flight personnel were largely "burned" in the first months of the war and were replaced at the front by young pilots with reduced military training. time. And they, together with the "old men" who remained in the ranks, learned how to defeat the Fritzes in the air.
  21. +2
    April 14 2020 13: 00
    And it turns out that at the beginning of the war, the new type of combat aircraft in the combat units of the spacecraft had not 2 units, as it is “officially” accepted, but 739, which is almost 706 times less.
    Accordingly, in the five Western border districts there were only 377 of them, and not 1, as it is also “officially” considered, that is, also 540 times less.

    There is one more subtle point here - the distribution of aircraft and crews. On rkka.ru in the tables "Air Force Combat Schedule (as of June 1, 1941)" there are very interesting figuresthe number of combat-ready crews capable of simultaneously flying into the air to carry out a combat mission, depending on the availability of operational combat aircraft and combat-ready crews in the aviation regiments".
    And then it suddenly turns out that in the same call station for 1658 trained crews - 1707, but only 973 can fly into the air at the same time. In the KOVO, the picture is similar - 1901 aircraft, 1682 crews in total and 1227 can take off at the same time.
    Why is that? And because almost half of the air regiments are at the stage of formation and reformation. Crews are formally there - equipment has not yet arrived. And in other regiments - a double set of equipment, old and new, two planes per crew.
  22. +6
    April 14 2020 13: 16
    Although, if you suddenly believe the memoirs of pilots who knew how to fly, that “Messer” and the “donkey” didn’t sweat too much. And we had many

    What kind of jargon? Have respect for the story of the author, for veterans!

    The author is still a "specialist" - with a difference in speed of 50-70 km, very specific battle conditions must be formed in order to shoot down an enemy on the I-16, who has superiority in maximum speed and in vertical maneuver and dive.
    1. +6
      April 14 2020 13: 37
      My father was in the regiment in 1948 in Germany. Almost all the pilots fought, there were those who fought since 1943. One of them, who started fighting on the I-16, told his father that no one would have shot him down on the donkey, but he could not count on victory.
    2. +5
      April 14 2020 15: 42
      Quote: Dmitry Vladimirovich

      The author is still a "specialist" - with a difference in speed of 50-70 km, very specific battle conditions must be formed in order to shoot down an enemy on the I-16, who has superiority in maximum speed and in vertical maneuver and dive.

      Without disputing I will say - in one battle the Hero of the SS, pilot Safonov, fighting on the I-16 of the 24 series (if I am not mistaken), shot down three "Messers", only thanks to the maneuverability of the "donkey"
      1. Eug
        +1
        April 15 2020 08: 29
        And Golubev - two in March 1943 ..
      2. 0
        April 16 2020 11: 40
        Quote: Krasnoyarsk
        Without disputing I will say - in one battle the Hero of the SS, pilot Safonov, fighting on the I-16 of the 24 series (if I am not mistaken), shot down three "Messers", only thanks to the maneuverability of the "donkey"


        No doubt - the story is full of examples of high performance of Soviet pilots on the I-16

        For example, the regiment commander, Lev Shestakov, near Odessa shot down 3 aircraft in person and 8 in the group.

        In the western districts, the distribution of I-16 as of June 1941 was as follows:
        Air Force of the Leningrad Military District —396
        Air Force of the Baltic Military District - 142
        Air Force of the Western Special Military District —361 (424 according to other sources)
        Air Force of the Kiev Special Military District —455
        Air Force of Odessa Military District —143

        In the period from June 22 to July 5, 1941, Germany lost 807 aircraft of all types, and for the period from July 6 to July 19 - 477. The losses of the aircraft of the German allies, for example, Romania, which opposed the USSR in the southern part of its western border, were not taken into account. German and Romanian aircraft in the southern sector were opposed by the Air Force of the Odessa Military District and the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet.

        In the front-line units of the army aviation, the departure of I-16 was the most intense, by the end of 1941 there were 240 I-16. By mid-1942, this figure remained unchanged due to repairs and replenishment from the rear. During this period, "donkeys" were used not only as fighters, but also as attack aircraft and reconnaissance. With the advent of night bomber regiments at the front, I-16s were transferred to such regiments and operated at night - their main goal in this case was the destruction of searchlights. At the end of 1942, there were only 75 combat-capable I-16s at the front, in the middle of 1943 42.


        No doubt - the I-16 was a more maneuverable aircraft, and very dangerous in experienced hands, but he could not impose a Bf-109 battle.
        The battle took place when the pilots of the Messerschmites wanted or could not avoid it or made mistakes, and these are very specific conditions, agree?

        I infinitely respect the heroism of our pilots who fought on fighters significantly inferior to the enemy - how many of them died on the obsolete I-16s, because only heroism and skill were not enough.
  23. +2
    April 14 2020 13: 31
    The author breeds his Topvvar myths, as harmful as those of the liberals.
  24. 0
    April 14 2020 14: 35
    I met information that from half to two-thirds of the losses of the Luftwaffe during the entire war fell on the Western Front. Who knows whether this is true or not?
  25. +2
    April 14 2020 15: 35
    = There the Germans themselves flew in such rubbish, so what, “Stuck” - was it a modern airplane? =
    Modern, not modern, and there is nothing to compare it with, but the fact that he brought us troubles above the roof, so hardly anyone will argue with this.
  26. +3
    April 14 2020 16: 04
    A month ago, I talked on an expedition to the downed Pe-2 in the Olonets region of Karelia with Ilya Prokofiev, widely known in narrow circles, and so he was at TsAMO a couple of days before the trip to Karelia and said that he had declassified just at the beginning of the year, I emphasize SECRETARY! Another fund in TsAMO with documents of air units from the Northern Front. So with such a situation, we will collect even the available information for a long time.
  27. The comment was deleted.
  28. +1
    April 14 2020 16: 34
    Soon, with one degree or another degree of probability, the country will try to celebrate the 75th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War.
    With 100% probability, our country will celebrate Victory Day! How effective is another question.
  29. +2
    April 14 2020 16: 55
    The same picture is in armored vehicles (but with its own specifics, armor does not become obsolete as quickly as aviation).

    I absolutely agree with the author - figures taken "from the ceiling" are used everywhere. And when asked "where is the data from?" They answer, splashing saliva, that "it is a well-known fact" without any reference.
  30. +8
    April 14 2020 17: 13
    If we show that we had German aces on modern airplanes, we met with the I-15 and I-16 all the time - it was like that.

    1. The air war of 1939-45 is not in the battle of fighters. This is not the Olympic Games who how many shot down.
    The main assistance of their ground forces and navy. The main task of fighters is to defend their troops from enemy strike aircraft, the second will protect their strike aircraft and finally strike at the enemy’s target themselves on the ground.
    The I-16 and I-15 did not have enough speed to deal with Luftwaffe bombers, and not to escort their aircraft or attack the enemy on the ground.
    2. Aircraft losses in the Second World War - half loss on land, for technical reasons, loss of orientation, etc., 30% of anti-aircraft artillery and infantry fire from the ground, and only 20% in aerial combat, including not more than 12-15% from fighters.
    With a further loss of land of more than 80%, not from air strikes, but the machine is abandonment during retreat for various reasons. The role of the fighters, their speed, their ace pilots is very exaggerated.
    The main weapon in an air war is the ground forces, which destroy aircraft in the air and on the ground, and at the end they capture the enemy’s aerodrome.
    All this was confirmed with full force later in the Korean War.
  31. 0
    April 14 2020 17: 31
    Well done, good accounting in the good sense of the word ..!
  32. +2
    April 14 2020 20: 15
    History is not a science, but a version of truth.
  33. +2
    April 15 2020 00: 43
    As there is no confirmation or refutation of how many planes really were at the disposal of the Red Army Air Force.

    20 810



    And 3 in the Navy



    http://militera.lib.ru/enc/0/pdf/statsbornik1.pdf
  34. +1
    April 15 2020 14: 28
    By the way, the level of retraining and equipment for the new aircraft equipment IAS and OBATO is not taken into account at all ... But in vain. Because the real combat use is not only an airplane and the pilot trained in it is, first of all, providing ... Availability of new aircraft machines ready for maintenance, availability of necessary consumables and spare parts in warehouses and parts. The PARM equipment, after all, is corny fuel and oil of the required grades, not to mention the ammunition ... But here it was all very sad. The Germans calmly provided the whole war with 5-6 sorties, despite the fact that it’s good if we got 2-3 ... That is twofold superiority trite on the move. But at the beginning of the war everything was even worse ...
  35. 0
    April 16 2020 09: 44
    The right direction of thought is motivation! Moreover, the motivation comes from liberals and democrats! Criticism of the USSR and Victory in the war. Reason: justify the democratic path of development.
  36. 0
    April 18 2020 16: 18
    Quote: NF68
    were ideal targets for German fighters with a maximum horizontal speed of 200, or even 250 km / h greater.

    Max speed I-16 of release 40g - 470 km / h
    Max speed BF-109F-4 release (in fact) 2 halves of 41g - 630 km / h.
    The difference is 160km / h.
  37. 0
    April 21 2020 03: 22
    I'll start with “about twenty types” of new aircraft. Alas, I think that here Zhukov was a little framed by his assistants. Twenty or so new types - I can definitely say that our stunted aviation industry simply could not have mastered such a series.

    The real problem was the start of production of any aircraft, and the engines for them ... However, we will talk about engines a little lower.

    But really, what was new?

    Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3, Su-2, Pe-2, IL-2, Er-2, Ar-2, TB-7. Moreover, TB-7 / Pe-8 is very conditional, since they were tortured by a little thing in Kazan and less than a hundred were tortured. Well, with Er-2 and Ar-2, too, you can’t say that you’ve overstrained. 450 and 200 pieces respectively.

    Yes, for the sake of justice, it would be possible to add the Yak-2 (approx. 100 pcs) and the Yak-4 (less than 100 pcs). But the small-scale production of these aircraft simply does not give the right to say that they really could have at least some influence on the course of the war.


    Well - let's count. Given the fact that the "assistants" simply put down new serial rated types without taking into account their role-value in terms of production (which could indeed be zero).
    So: I-180, I-28, MiG-1, MiG-3, Yak-1, LaGG-3, BB-1 / Su-2, BB-22 / Yak-2, Yak-4, SB-RK / Ar-2, SPB, Pe-2, Er-2, TB-7 / Pe-8, IL-2, Be-4, Che-2, GST, UT-3. 19 types, however. hi
  38. -1
    3 July 2020 11: 56
    What is the point in this reasoning, if the planes in the main direction of the strike were destroyed in the parking lots? If there were more of them, more would have been burned. "New" aircraft are not always more efficient than "old" ones while the process of their development is underway. In addition, the training of the command staff of the Red Army and the Red Army Air Force in the initial period was at a low level. Why did it happen? This is the question. What is written there in the memoirs of Zhukov, who did not fully control the process of compiling "his" memoirs, is objectively of little interest in relation to aviation for a number of reasons, including because the command of the Red Army is directly responsible for the death of aviation. But all those involved understand that the "domestic" "red" commanders have always treated the Air Force in a very specific way. So it's not about airplanes at all. Combat-ready fighter aircraft was capable of inflicting huge losses on the Nazis in the first days of the war. And the Red Army Air Force, it can be considered, did not have a bomber.

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