According to the results of the thirties. The state of the armored fleet of the Red Army before the war

The last prewar Tanks KhPZ. Far left - serial BT-7, right - two T-34 options

В stories The Red Army the thirties remained a period of active construction and development in all areas. Particular attention during this period was given to the creation of mechanized / armored forces. All the measures taken allowed by the end of the decade to create a massive and well-equipped military branch, which will be crucial in a future war. However, not everything went smoothly, and by the summer of 1941, far from all the problems were managed.

Construction period

The beginning of the construction of the armored forces of the Red Army can be considered 1928, when mass production of the MS-1 / T-18 tanks began. The finished equipment was handed over to the mechanized forces, where it was brought into one regiment. Already in 1930-32. new units and formations appeared, and hundreds of tanks counted.

In the same period, the serial construction of new types of armored vehicles began, including own Soviet development. In parallel, the design of samples was carried out for the future. Industry mastered the directions of light, medium and heavy tanks, continued the development of armored vehicles and was looking for new solutions. A true evolution of structures was observed, in which several generations of technology replaced each other in a matter of years.

T-37A amphibious tank in the museum

Actively resolved issues of organizational structure. So, according to the experience of recent conflicts, mechanized divisions, brigades and corps were created and reorganized. Recent changes of this kind have already taken place in 1941, after the outbreak of World War II.

Light and small

Perhaps the main focus in the thirties was the development of light tanks for various purposes. Over time, their value to the troops declined, but by 1941 the Red Army still had a significant amount of such equipment. Moreover, not all light tanks and wedges were ready for combat use.

According to well-known data, by the beginning of the summer of 1941 in the Red Army there were more than 2,5 thousand T-27 tankettes, with more than 1400 units. were under repair or needed it. Another mass vehicle was the T-37A amphibious tank - approx. 2300 units, less than 1500 combat ready. There were fewer floating T-38s - 1130 units, of which approx. 400 under repair or pending.

By the beginning of the war, amphibious tanks and wedges were used only in supporting roles. A significant part of such equipment could not be operated due to breakdowns, while others managed to develop a large part of the resource. In addition, combat capabilities no longer met the requirements of the time.

Pre-war light tank T-40

The basis of the fleet of light tanks was made up of more efficient T-26 family vehicles, the production of which was completed only at the end of 1940. By the beginning of the war, more than 10 thousand such tanks were in the Red Army. 1260 tanks were double-turret, recognized morally obsolete. 1360 cars were subject to repair. It should be noted the presence of more than 1100 chemical and 55 remote-controlled tanks based on the T-26, as well as 16 combat-ready self-propelled guns SU-5.

A significant share of the fleet of armored vehicles was BT light tanks. By the summer of 1941, the Red Army had more than 7,5 thousand BT tanks of five modifications. The most massive (over 4,4 thousand) were the relatively new BT-7; continued release of their improved modifications. Less than 1400 Fleet Tanks underwent repairs or were waiting for him. It should be borne in mind that by the beginning of the fortieth BT early modifications began to be displayed in training units.

Literally on the eve of the war, a light floating T-40 tank went into production. By the beginning of summer, the industry had delivered 132 such machines. A few weeks in June, before the start of the war, they delivered another approx. 30 units Of the existing fleet at that time, only one tank was in need of repair.

Middle class

The first domestic medium tank in the series was the T-28, which was produced from 1933. Until 1940, a little more than 500 vehicles were assembled. Part of the equipment was written off based on the results of the fighting; other damaged cars were being repaired. Modernization was also carried out. By June 1, 1941, the Red Army had 481 tanks of this type, of which 189 were not ready for use. In the short term, the army planned to abandon the T-28 due to the final obsolescence.

Light tank T-26 in a single-turret configuration - the most popular model in the Red Army

The class of medium tanks includes the most successful armored car of the Great Patriotic War - T-34. The production of such equipment began in 1940 at two plants. By the beginning of 1941, only 115 tanks had been assembled, but then the pace of production increased. For the first half of 1941, 1100 tanks were manufactured. By June 22, the Red Army managed to get 1066 units. In the near future, new deliveries took place.

Heavy machinery

In 1933, the first Russian heavy tank, the T-35, entered service with the Red Army. The production of such armored vehicles continued until 1939, but did not differ at a high pace. The annual maximum was 15 tanks (1936), while in other periods they produced no more than a dozen. In total, the army received 59 serial T-35s. By June 1941, there were 55 heavy tanks in the units, of which 11 were under repair.

To replace the T-35, several projects were developed, and the new KV-1 heavy tank reached the series. The production of such equipment began in February 1940, and already in April the army took the first cars. By the end of the year, 139 units were built. KV-1. By the beginning of the summer of 1941, two plants were built in Leningrad and Chelyabinsk by approx. 380 tanks; the bulk of the equipment managed to enter the troops.

Simultaneously with the base KV-1, the KV-2 with other weapons went into the series. In 1940, the LKZ built 104 such heavy tanks. In the first half of 1941, another 100 cars were handed over, after which their production ceased. The last batches were handed over to the customer after the outbreak of war.

One of the surviving T-28 medium tanks

On June 1, 1941, 370 KV-1 tanks and 134 KV-2 units were in combat units. In June, before the war, another approx. 40 cars of both models.

Wheeled armored vehicles

The most important component of the armored forces were armored vehicles of various types. So, by the beginning of June 1941, the Red Army had almost 1900 light armored cars. Basically, they were BA-20 - more than 1400 units, including 969 equipped with radio equipment. Other light armored cars of several models were built in smaller series.

The oldest of the medium armored cars was the BA-27. At the beginning of the war in the Red Army there were 183 such vehicles, most of which worked out almost the entire resource. 65 armored cars were sky-ready. Newer average BA-3s were available in the amount of 149 units, 133 were ready for operation and combat use. In the years 1935-38. improved armored cars BA-6 were produced. In June 1941, there were 240 such vehicles, including 55 radians. In combat readiness was more than 200 units.

The most massive medium armored car was the BA-10 and its modification of the BA-10M. In total, they produced more than 3,3 thousand of these machines, of which almost 3 thousand before the start of the war - until June 22, the customer was transferred to approx. 2,7 thousand units In good condition were 2475 units. - 1141 radium and 1334 linear armored cars.

KV-1 heavy tank of the installation party of 1940

Also, the Red Army had other types of armored vehicles, less numerous. For example, in 1940-41. managed to build a total of 16 heavy armored cars BA-11. The last two cars were handed over after the start of World War II.

Quantity and quality of

As of the beginning of the summer of 1941, the armored troops of the Red Army in terms of the number of military vehicles were one of the largest forces in the world. However, they had a lot of significant problems and difficulties of various kinds. Some of them were managed to the best of their ability, while others turned out to be overly complex for a quick solution.

First of all, the specific distribution of armored vehicles in classes is noticeable; also noteworthy is the proportion of cars of different years of manufacture. Even in the pre-war period, the T-26, T-28 and T-35 tanks, the early modifications of the BT, and also some armored cars were called obsolete. However, all this equipment still made up a significant share of the total fleet. This was especially pronounced with the T-26 tanks - the most massive at that time.

Not all available cars were combat ready. A noticeable percentage of equipment, different depending on models and modifications, was under repair or expected it. In addition, the armored vehicles of the old models managed to work out most of the resource, which reduced the potential of the combat-ready fleet.

Armored car BA-10 and its crew

It should be borne in mind that tank units were deployed throughout the country and covered a number of strategic directions. The concentration of all troops in one direction was not possible for organizational and military-political reasons.

In general, by the summer of 1941, units of the Red Army had about 25-27 thousand tanks of all classes. Several thousand cars were not ready for technical reasons. The main contribution to the future victory was made by the tanks of new models - T-34 and KV. However, by the beginning of the war there was only approx. 1500 of these armored vehicles. They accounted for only 7% of the combat-ready tank fleet. However, production continued, and the share of modern technology was constantly growing.

Developmental age

In the thirties, Soviet tank building went a long way. It began with a copy of foreign equipment and its release in a small series, and then mastered the development of its own designs and the mass assembly of thousands of tanks. Thanks to this, in just a decade, the few and limitedly developed mechanized troops of the Red Army turned into large and powerful armored troops.

The development of armored vehicles was conducted not only in our country, but also among a probable enemy. New challenges and requirements arose, due to which the existing equipment quickly became obsolete. The USSR tried to respond to such circumstances to the best of its ability. However, the possibilities were not unlimited, and by the beginning of the war the state of the armored fleet was far from ideal. However, without previous years of hard work, everything would have been much worse.

Comments

[Doccor18]

Soviet tank building has achieved impressive results. KV-1 and T-34 were just a breakthrough!
The only thing that did not have enough industry was time.
Still a year without a war ...

[Aaron Zawi]

One of the main shortcomings of the Soviet BTV was the low radio frequency of equipment, which made it poorly managed on the battlefield.

[hohol95]

In the French army, were all the tanks radio-controlled?
And were they easier to manage?

[75 Sergey]

Week surrendered

[Catfish]

Alexey , so they got the full program, the impression that no one controlled them at all. I think that even if all the French tanks were radio-fired, everything would end all the same Dunkirk.
And here, indeed, it wasn’t very good with radio communications. Here you see for yourself, in the photographs of the floating reconnaissance aircraft T-37A and T-40, if you find an antenna there, I have a box of vodka from me. Is this how they sent out what they scouted via pigeon mail? But even with all the shortcomings and shortcomings, the war was concluded with Victory, and the French, despite de Gaulle, so drove a trailer.

[hohol95]

T-37TU - 643 pieces.
T-38 - 165 pieces.
I couldn't find a photo of the T-40. but in the book "Light tanks of the T-40 family." Red "scouts" the following information is given -

..As of June 1, 1941, the distribution of T-40 in military districts was as follows: Moscow Military District - T-40 radial and linear, 2 T-40 training; Volga Military District - 2 T-40 radial and 10 T-40 linear; Oryol Military District - T-40 Linear; Leningrad Military District - one T-40 linear; Western Special Military District - 30 T-40 line; Kiev Special Military District - 70 T-40 linear and 14 T-40 radium. Total for the Red Army: 113 linear, 17 radial and 2 T-40 training.

The radio-equipped T-40 was a very rare "beast"!

[Catfish]

The radio-equipped T-40 was a very rare "beast"!

What are we talking about! And so in all armor units with different types of tanks. Put the flag in the hatch and wave: "Do as I do!" Stone Age Compared to Germans.

[hohol95]

Here you see for yourself, in the photographs of the floating reconnaissance aircraft T-37A and T-40, if you find an antenna there, I have a box of vodka from me.

He gave the word ... Joke.
But the radial T-37A and T-38 were many times more radial T-40.
So the armored vehicles were not all radial.
Radio communication in the USSR of those years was even kicked by the lazy ...
But why then the more advanced in terms of radio communications, the British and Americans were defeated by the Japanese (they also did not have radios on every tank and there were not enough tanks)? You can blame the secondary importance of the Far Eastern Front for the British, but for the Americans it was in first place.

[Catfish]

Lesh, let's not talk about Japanese tanks, these are not tanks and it’s impossible to talk about them without tears of genuine pity. Yes, at least give each crew member of these riveted boxes a walkie-talkie, the sense of them will be ZERO.

But why then the more advanced in terms of radio communications, the British and Americans were defeated by the Japanese ...

But the British on land from all (about the Italians will not, not seriously) were defeated, both in the West and in the East and in Africa, because this war was a new type of war (Total), and the British were not used to such a war, a war of extermination It turned out to be for them (the army, not the navy and the air force) beyond their strength.
And here it’s not a matter of radio communication that ours proved it safely, but after the Kursk Bulge it was also shown, and not only to the Germans.
Yes, in the Pacific Ocean the Americans and on land beat the Japanese with success, I do not remember a case when at least one landing on the islands was not crowned with success. And there were big losses only during the landing, as soon as they had a foothold even on a tiny bridgehead and the Japanese could already make themselves hara-kiri on their own, without waiting for them to be pounded by carrier aircraft, or the tracks of "Shermans" were smeared on the ground.
But with the Germans they didn’t do it very well. Complete stupidity near Falez, then the Ardennes, I am silent about how Rommel drove them all through the desert with kicks and the war in Africa was won not by the Allied army, but by their fleet.

[hohol95]

The phrase "I'll be back" in the United States became famous many years before the release of the movie "Terminator". In 1942, breaking into Australia on a torpedo boat, it was pronounced by the commander of the defense of the Philippines, General Douglas MacArthur. He and his troops at this time did not restrain the onslaught of the Japanese and were forced to retreat.

And the Philippines, who didn’t hold back?
Japanese tankers could only regret, but we will not do this. All forces and resources were thrown at the Air Force and Navy.
And only the "Nomongan battle" shook the Japanese generals a little.
And at the beginning of the war, the Americans did not have Shermans.

[Catfish]

And the Philippines, who didn’t hold back?

The Yankees did not hold back. And who passed Kiev? Let's not start the war, because I was talking about landings on the islands.
Yes, they didn't have Shermans, but they had the M3 General Lee (modification of the M3, General Grant), which with its 75-mm cannon surpassed even German tanks, in spite of the idiotic design with a sponsor. Not to mention the Japanese.
I remember about the famous phrase Doug, but a little later there was also a second, even simpler: "I'm back."

In the photo the moment of return.
You know, constantly scolding the Americans, do not forget their soldiers, who, as much as possible and with their own blood, like ours, brought closer the common Victory Day.

[Catfish]

Lyosha, what the hell, did I say that Mac is better than our generals? Not a word. Which of ours did I scold? I am Rokossovsky in general the most talented commander of the Second World War, and not only among our generals and marshals. Neither the allies nor the enemy had a commander of this magnitude.
As for the DP-27, I believe that for the Second World War it was already obsolete, like the foreign machine guns that you mentioned. He, and all of the above, even the MG-34, are not suitable for sucking, I'm not talking about the MG-42, which is still copied all over the world.
For the English, I already said everything (the same thing with Singapore), if they consider their Monty an outstanding strategist, so what to talk about with them at all.
The same is with the Americans: Patton was put on a par with Napoleon and Caesar ... you can snarl.

[Cer59]

kills erudition nobles. yes you understand couch geniuses, in the country there was no horseradish at all. everything was just being created. only by 1938-39 there were working cadres from those who in the early 30s came to FZU, vocational schools. while studying, then studying at work. what was the machine park? it again to the 39th year the DIP machines went widely, and before that? in 1985, in Norilsk, the machine was still working, the woodworking machine of the 1890s shaggy year and worked perfectly.
what happened to the country with motor plants, with radio engineering, in the end that of oil refineries.
Germans had an average of 1 radiophased tank for 3-5 vehicles. and the British? Americans and French with Italians?
just crazy enough to look for a black cat in a black room where you do not have it. can in the end only be understood by 1939 in the country more or less normal with food and consumer goods?
that housing was built in the end. how they lived than breathed. how did more successful colleagues knock and betray? who wrote the denunciations?
sharashki L.P. Beria is not from a good life. *** the denunciations of the designers are so obvious *** that it has become easier to put everyone under lock and key. but no one writes that families received full maintenance and rations.
that again, by the year 39, the situation in the village had sharply improved. they just do not write about this. and Trotsky, learning of this, went out. demanding terrorist attacks in our country.
now the t-28 is a magnificent tank, with minimal modernization it could calmly beat the Germans before the cats show.
I already wrote that he was killed for the sake of the T-34. until 1943 a rather shitty tank. unreliable, suffering from a thousand diseases. complex body. disgusting review.
unreliable engine. Compared to the t-28, it was a step back. monstrous and.
and only in 1943, at the cost of the death of thousands of tanks, he began to modernize and became a tank.
and even after a modest question of one person with a pipe, we can look for other designers. after all, at least since December 1942 they knew about the tiger. what did you do?
Tank T-28. A Different Look - Alternative History
alternathistory.com ›tank-t-28-inoi-vzglyad /
So really in Kolomna they had to produce the t-28 U. with the machine-gun turrets removed and with a straightened front sheet of the t-34 type, and most importantly with a torsion bar suspension like the KV. So what? Yes, neither of which there were two commissions, and this was blown away. strongest pressure from Ukraine. but it’s empty to write about the undercover fight if we had three main tanks in 90 years. incompatible with each other in the spare parts.

[Catfish]

... the erudition of the nobility kills.

But you are alive. And you still "advertise" this clumsy monster.

[Cer59]

Alive, I read the tanker's memoirs written in 1972. we were then sent to collect them. it turns out that they did the right thing, and so are the memories of the t-40 commander. and their method for combating t-3 and t-4. it turns out that without breaking through the armor their aircraft gun when hit on the armor created such sound pressure that sometimes the tankers left the car or left the fire. they didn’t understand then, they just wrote, and now I’m scratching turnips, how is it?

[Doctor]

according to the Red Army: 113 linear, 17 radial and 2 T-40 training.
The radio-equipped T-40 was a very rare "beast"!

Even more rare. 14.

[hohol95]

So 14! Thanks for the addition.

[3x3zsave]

Uncle Kostya, you want to touch Che, but de Gaulle, do not touch !!! Horsky was a man, they do not commit 13 bad assassinations ...

[Catfish]

Hello Anton!
And I don't "touch" him, I wrote not lookingpaying tribute to both the general and the man.

[hohol95]

He was a good man; they do not commit 13 bad assassinations ...

If they attempted, then it was not good for everyone!
He was credited with the disappearance of rivals in the struggle for leadership in the Free French. (I don't remember where I read or looked about it)

[ecolog]

the French gathered too long with the strength to blow a jerk. while the Germans gathered already won. And ours from the very beginning shocked the Germans with counterattacks, albeit not quite prepared, and the Germans could not reach Moscow on time.

[Alf]

Quote: Aron Zaavi

One of the main shortcomings of the Soviet BTV was the low radio frequency of equipment, which made it poorly managed on the battlefield.

Yes, you are right, there were few radio stations and not the highest class.
Now the question is, how many domestic radio stations were there in Nikolaev Russia? How many factories in Ingushetia were there for the production of radio equipment? And in what year did such monsters as Siemens, Marconi, Telefunken, Ducrette appear? For some 10, or maybe less, years in the USSR, the radio industry was created from scratch. By the way, in 1940, in the Luftwaffe, only one ME-109 out of five had a radio transmitter, the other four had only receivers. And this is in a country in which the radio industry appeared in the 19th (!) Century. As the saying goes, "who else is the redhead still needs to be seen."

[pmkemcity]

Quote: Alf

Yes, you are right, there were few radio stations and not the highest class.

One acquaintance of the KVVKUS graduate said, they say, even Frunze noticed that communication would destroy the Red Army.
Here is a typical report from 11.03.42, 1066 regiment to the headquarters of 281 SD, in which, as it were, to the question of the headquarters "where are you?"

On this day my grandfather, a fighter of the very 1066 joint venture, was wounded. That's why I'm interested.

[svp67]

Quote: Doccor18

Still a year without a war ...

And sho? I assure you, little would have changed ... the troops would have been supplied with more "semi-finished" products in the form of very "raw" T-34s and KVs, some of which would have simply gone out of order during this time and would have been awaiting repairs, since personal the composition, instead of intensively studying new tanks, was forced to equip points of deployment in new places ... This is the reality of 40 and early 41 years

Quote: Doccor18

KV-1 and T-34 were just a breakthrough!

Yes, but the author somehow forgot about our other "breakthrough" light tank T-50

[bk0010]

Quote: svp67

I assure you that little would change ...

Would change. For example, the T-34, in the form in which it was built at 41, was not going to build, the T-34M would go into the series, with normal air filters and a gearbox, torsion bar suspension, increased armor thickness, commander’s turret, large shoulder straps of the tower and etc., the T-50 series (our version of the T-3, blitzkrieg tank) would go into series, they would manage to solve the problem with non-armor-piercing armor-piercing shells for forty-five, in aviation they would understand the types of aircraft and the production of engines. But technology is trivial; the main thing would be to learn something from the breakthrough of the people that they began to draft in the army after 39 years (Jan 39 - 1.5 million people, Jan. 40 - 3.8 million people, Jan. 41 - 5.2 million people ) and maybe even mid-level commanders would begin to appear with an idea of ​​the war, not from Napoleon’s time (hooray, we’ll build it with breasts!), but more or less modern, or at least those who were sent to schools at 39 would graduate.

[Alf]

Quote: bk0010

the T-34M would go into the series, with normal air filters and gearbox, torsion bar suspension, increased armor thickness, commander’s turret, large shoulder straps of the tower, etc.,

Are you sure that you would have managed to bring it to the series in one year? But it was more complicated than the T-34, some of which are torsion bars. And a new box "to the same steppe".

[bk0010]

In wartime, the T-44 by July 44 done. And here even the gun was not changed.

[BAI]

Are you sure that you would have managed to bring it to the series in one year?

In April 1943, the Artillery Committee of the GAU of the Red Army sent - “Uralmashzavod” tactical and technical requirements for the design of self-propelled guns with an 85-mm gun.

May 5, 1943 T-bills set deadlines and performers for the creation of new tanks and self-propelled guns.

Based on the test results, the commission recommended the self-propelled gun SU-85-N with the D-5C gun for adoption by the Red Army. which was formalized by GKO Decree No. 3892 of August 7, 1943.
From April to August - done in 5 months. Of these, 1,5 months were spent on a skirmish, which weapon to put - from the May decree of the GKO (S-18 TsAKB.) Or better (D-5S). Departmental interests have not been canceled even during the war. But still agreed on the best.

[Alf]

Quote: BAI

Are you sure that you would have managed to bring it to the series in one year?

In April 1943, the Artillery Committee of the GAU of the Red Army sent - “Uralmashzavod” tactical and technical requirements for the design of self-propelled guns with an 85-mm gun.

I’m sure, because the SU-85 was not made from scratch, they took the SU-122 as a sample.

The SU-85 was made on an existing base and on well-functioning units, and in the 41st there was nothing completed for the T-34M.

[svp67]

Quote: bk0010

For example, the T-34, in the form in which it was built at 41, was not going to build, the T-34M would go into the series, with normal air filters and a gearbox, torsion bar suspension, increased armor thickness, commander’s turret, large shoulder straps of the tower and etc.

Excuse me, but when would this happen, in how many years? Before you write, you better take a look at the difficulty with which the process of releasing this or that tank model was adjusted. "Normal filter and KP", and where would they be taken? Do not recall how long after all this appeared on the T-34, although they knew about this shortcoming and demanded the elimination of this shortcoming in all acts of testing. "Torsion bar suspension" yes, it is much more progressive than spring suspension, but the fact of the matter is that Kharkiv residents had a problem with it, there was nowhere to take ready-made torsion bars, and those that tried to produce themselves could not withstand the loads, but over time would have mastered the art of their production, but how long would it take? And the T-34M would certainly have appeared, but not by the 42nd year, but in marketable quantity and not by the 43rd

Quote: bk0010

but more or less modern, well, or at least those who were sent to schools in 39 would graduate.

Yes, the trouble that was taught at that time was in many ways not the same, and the level of literacy still left much to be desired.

Quote: bk0010

the series would go T-50

Well, if only he knew how to walk, then of course. And so, the plant, which was supposed to produce engines for them, sabotaged it, because you could not help but establish normal production of the V-2 engine more needed then, and how would you equip the T-50 armored boxes?

[bk0010]

Quote: svp67

Excuse me, when would this happen, after how many years?

In wartime, the T-44 by July 44 done.

Quote: svp67

Yes, the trouble that was taught at that time was in many ways not the same, and the level of literacy still left much to be desired.

At least some kind of military training is significantly better than nothing. After all, even then there were no films about the Great Patriotic War, the peasants had an idea of ​​civilian only.

Quote: svp67

Well, if only he knew how to walk, then of course.

The T-50 was put into production at 41, so the issue was resolved, it’s another matter that its capacities were given immediately under the T-34

[Octopus]

Quote: bk0010

In wartime, the T-44 by July 44 done.

Yes, a good example.

T-44, an intermediate result of the Kharkiv citizens ’regret to do something with the T-34, it never became a battle tank at all.

Quote: bk0010

T-50 was put into production at 41, so the issue was decided,

They put it into production, but they did not solve the issue. It happened, all the time.

[svp67]

Quote: bk0010

In wartime, the T-44 by July 44 done.

Sorry, but TWO points. First, in wartime, ALL forces were thrown at the release of weapons, to the detriment of everything. Second, how many were made and what was the quality?

Quote: bk0010

The T-50 was put into production at 41, so the issue was resolved, it’s another matter that its capacities were given immediately under the T-34

The reasons why this happened I wrote to you. There was no well-established engine production at that time for the T-50, there wasn’t

[chenia]

Quote: svp67

And sho? I assure you that little would change.

Well, probably it will not be quite right.
If with

Quote: svp67

instead of intensive study of new tanks, the personnel had to equip deployment points in new places ..

I agree completely, then in the fall of 1941 exercises and deployment were planned, and large fees.
And if it was assumed that the Germans were not ready in 1941 (and they really were unprepared), then few have built illusions about a peaceful 1942.
And the exercises would immediately have pulled changes in the OShS MK (primarily the BTV that interests us). And revealed (with mass application) at least the most obvious shortcomings of technology.
And as they say, it’s not so simple.
And I will say so, our rush to reorganize the Red Army so abruptly (excessively) would have dragged the BP for the fall-spring of 1940-1941 and the beginning of the war would have been different.

[Octopus]

Quote: chenia

I agree completely, then in the fall of 1941 exercises and deployment were planned, and large fees.

These are the usual tales of the club "history has given us too little time."

Large-scale exercises and training camps on the modern war, the Red Army began to carry out in the 35th year, Kiev maneuvers. Over the past time since the 35th year, the native country managed to shoot all the commanders who were related to them.

There were more than 30 tanks in the Red Army than in the whole world combined. One T-26 of the 31st year of what it was worth. As the Red Army learned to fight with tanks in 10 years - the 41st year showed clearly. What the Red Army was not enough more six months - can not cause any doubts. Exactly on the same Rivne-Lutsk-Brody, as in the summer.

Quote: chenia

And I will say so, our rush to reorganize the Red Army so abruptly (excessively) would have dragged the BP for the fall-spring of 1940-1941 and the beginning of the war would have been different.

It is believed that a lot of what the USSR did for emergency preparations for the war was done in vain. In wartime, a lot was rolled back. Starting with the wrecking SVT, ending with the wrecking Pe-8 and wrecking Leningrad super-heavy. Yes, LC Soviet Russia, my favorite.

[chenia]

Quote: Octopus

his native country managed to shoot all the commanders who were related to them.

Quote: Octopus

What the Red Army was not enough for another six months - it can not cause any doubts. Exactly on the same Rivne-Lutsk-Brody, as in the summer.

Quote: Octopus

These are ordinary club tales.

"Stalin is to blame for everything"

I have already said a thousand times that the OShS MK was bad and the corresponding exercises would have revealed this (as a result of the fighting, but then they quickly changed it). And from here MK would have 600 tanks, and not more than a thousand, and fewer units by a quarter (less blur frames). And this is controllability and the rear and technical support is different.
Further, the widespread use of new technology revealed

Quote: chenia

at least the most obvious technical flaws

, this is also unambiguous (and this we did, only already in the war.
But the creation of almost two dozen MK is pure wrecking. this decision buried the BP in the tank forces, and deprived the SK tank brigades (and this is the strike groups on the defensive), reducing them to almost world level 1.

[Octopus]

Quote: chenia

"Stalin is to blame for everything"

No, what are you. Stalin Bunny
What was there in the USSR, the dictatorship of the proletariat? Here the proletariat dictated some garbage.

Quote: chenia

(as a consequence of the fighting, then it quickly changed). And from here MK would have 600 tanks

And what are your reasons to think that you would reveal it instantly and change it instantly? Yes, even right on the right, and not on any else?

And the pre-war structure was the right scale. 200 cars +/-. Suddenly. The pre-war brigade renamed the corps.

Quote: chenia

this is also unambiguous (and we did this only in the war.

As if before the war, the GABTU and industry were not aware that the new tanks didn’t drive a bit, and the old tanks didn’t have a salary.

[chenia]

Quote: Octopus

What was there in the USSR, the dictatorship of the proletariat? Here the proletariat dictated some garbage.

Ha! So the dictatorship and the proletariat also scored the cover of the tomb of Nazism (or do you have other information? Well, it happens). The end result is known.

Quote: Octopus

And what are your reasons to think that you would reveal instantly and change

So they changed it. Instantly not, but pretty fast. MK-40 did not "intermeddle" at stake and this is obvious, the first significant exercises revealed the shortcomings of the OShS.

Quote: Octopus

And the pre-war structure was the right scale. 200 cars +/-. Suddenly. The pre-war brigade renamed the corps.

No!!! In the structure of the MK-40, not everything is so bad, but before TP. But the regiment is not fucking doing TBR. And then. these are 3 battalions, where there are 3 tanks in platoons. And that’s all! In MK 5 TP for 94-96 tanks becomes, in battalions of 30-31. This structure appeared later. Just keep in mind that the rank of formation (later) in our country did not correspond to the table of ranks. And where TBR is sometimes less than TP. A tank corps is the essence of TD. And already TA (but here already with options) would often correspond to the MK of the proposed option.
Well, this is if you understand the essence, and do not pay attention to the names of the formation.

Quote: Octopus

As if before the war, the GABTU and industry were not aware

Unfortunately, mostly those who were supposed to operate this equipment weren’t in the know, because they were not involved in the power supply.
And if full-scale exercises happened, the jambs immediately surfaced (before that, only a small circle of people had poisoned their lives), and when dozens and hundreds of commanders began to cite the impossibility of completing the task due to technical reasons.
How (at that time) would the relevant authorities and comrade react to this? Stalin?
That's it!
I think that the conservatory will fix it. And fast.

[Octopus]

Quote: chenia

. The end result is known.

Yes, I know this position. The war will write everything off.

Quote: chenia

So they changed it. Instantly no but pretty fast

In real life, they rolled back to the reduced staff teams, which was the only normal solution.

Quote: chenia

No!!! In the structure of the MK-40, not everything is so bad

For details, a long conversation. I'm purely about the number of tanks.

Quote: chenia

How (at that time) would the relevant authorities and comrade react to this? Stalin?
That's it!

It is known as. They will shoot old, put new, from cavalrymen. How are they in fact reacted.

[chenia]

Quote: Octopus

Yes, I know this position. The war will write everything off.

There are options? And France, those who "fought" for 8 months and then a month Ob ... fought.
British ? Also about ... fought. And then until 1943 the four German divisions were finally dealt with. And all without repression.
Well, the Germans and I didn’t have a strait.

Quote: Octopus

In real life, they rolled back to the reduced staff teams, which was the only normal solution.

Did not have! As soon as they began to advance. this does not work.
I had to turn to the tank corps (divisions -40) and TA (MK 40).

Quote: Octopus

Detail a long conversation

But this is the most important thing. Here you need to understand the nature of the tasks of each formation. and hence the structure. If the TBr SC was perfectly well formed for itself (there would have been just KV and T-28, T-36 fit in). That TP MK, is already something else.

Quote: Octopus

It is known as. They will shoot old, put new, from cavalrymen

In 1939? You. What? Then basically more affection and put pressure on consciousness.
Well, if someone does not understand, then another thing.

[Octopus]

Quote: chenia

There are options?

For the USSR? No, there are no special options. China, Indonesia, Poland had about the same level of losses.

Quote: chenia

I had to tank corps (divisions -40) and TA (MK 40)

Division 40 is slightly larger than case 45, I remember.

Quote: chenia

If TBR SC was quite normally formed

If the MK40 were normally formed, it would be a Wehrmacht tank group, and your grandmother would yourself know who.
I'm talking about the number of tanks in which the unit loses control, and only about it.

Quote: chenia

In 1939? You. What? Then basically more affection and put pressure on consciousness.
Well, if someone does not understand, then another thing.

Find Kiev maneuvers and pierce the biographies of the participants.

[chenia]

Quote: Octopus

For the USSR? No, there are no special options. China, Indonesia, Poland had about the same level of losses.

Well, if you fight with the Germans as a spectator, then the losses will be small.

Quote: Octopus

Division 40 is slightly larger than case 45, I remember.

And you are not careful. I said that the TP is extremely imperfect (therefore, the MK had to be driven out in the exercises), we introduce 94 tanks, 2 TPs into the divisions and get a little more than 200 tanks (with combat support units).

Quote: Octopus

If the MK40 was normally formed, it would be a Wehrmacht tank group, and your grandmother would know who

Oh, how by !!!
Tank group. this is our shock army copied from it. And our MK 40, this is their MK since the French campaign. Moreover, their TD (well, after France) is not an armored division (although it still managed at the first stages of the war), already at the end of 1942 it was completely bad, and after Kursk it was completely gone.

Quote: Octopus

I'm talking about the number of tanks in which the unit loses control, and only about it.

And I said so. that in a tank platoon (TP. TD), you need to have 3 tanks each, they came to this in the war (it happened even less). The experience of military operations suggested the best option, exercises would also contribute to this.
I talked about this in previous posts.

[Octopus]

Quote: chenia

enter 94 tanks, 2 TP in the division and get

You need to call it the corps and give the lieutenant general. For organizational reasons. And yes, 200 cars.

Quote: chenia

Tank group. this is our shock army copied from it

A long and rather meaningless story.

Quote: chenia

I talked about this in previous posts.

Quite possible. But I am not ready to discuss specifically the OSh of tank units to the very bottom.

[chenia]

Quote: Octopus

You need to call it the corps and give the lieutenant general

Yes it happened. After the war, the corps safely reorganized into divisions.

Quote: Octopus

Probably.

I that practice is the criterion of truth. And how could such powerful formations be replicated. without checking them in the case (at least in the exercises)?
Here is the main fault of both Meretskov and Zhukov in the positions of chief of the General Staff.

[Octopus]

Quote: svp67

the troops would have supplied more "semi-finished products" in the form of very "raw" T-34 and KV

It’s as if changed.

Give the Soviet government more time - it would have time to remove from production the T-34 and KV and put some T-34M and KV-3. With which everything would end the same as with the T-50. As a result, in the famous mechanized corps there would be 7 types of tanks (I don’t think of modifications), none of them are produced and no spare parts are available.

Ideal.

[svp67]

Quote: Octopus

Give the Soviet government more time - it would have time to remove from production the T-34 and KV and put some T-34M and KV-3.

This is a fantasy. They couldn’t, they simply didn’t have the strength to manage to mass-produce them in such a short time

[Octopus]

Quote: svp67

there wouldn’t be enough strength to manage their mass production in such a short time

To establish - of course not. But they would have time to withdraw the old ones from production. As they managed to close everything that related to the T-26 and T-28.

[svp67]

Quote: Octopus

As they managed to close everything that related to the T-26 and T-28.

What I think harmed. It was necessary to develop and launch at least self-propelled guns on their chassis

[Octopus]

Quote: svp67

What I think harmed

And so bad and so bad.

[antivirus]

1 year would not help --- to concentrate ALL responsible, competent, motivated citizens in the fur corps WAS NOT possible. they were needed in rural schools and pedagogical schools, in martens and dynamos, and who should count cows, grain and ZEKs? is a change in the mentality of peoples.
only the war forced all problems to be discarded and engaged in working out the interaction of the clans and within the Suhput troops (from the squad)
The main thing is that it didn’t reach the brains of many - the difference between pumping up fat at night and regular maintenance is regular.
"they shoot the driven horses" - and it is expensive to abandon a tank (how much more expensive for a half-impoverished country?)

[knn54]

Not to mention children's sores when designing old tanks (a lot of completely new ones were thrown) I will say about a couple of points with the T-34:
- when driving on the march for more than half an hour, the engine overheated;
-Not all tank parts of different (two) enterprises fit together ...

[Vladimir_2U]

Only a developed industry allowed the USSR to survive in the Great Patriotic War. Even an outdated tank is at least a protected machine gun and no gun, but a machine gun and the tank itself, albeit an unimportant one, need to be built. And so the Union dealt with this.

[Doccor18]

Light tanks were the most massive in all the armies of the world at that time. Wehrmacht at the beginning of the war had up to 75% of lungs
PzPkfv I and II. Only during fights
it became clear about their vulnerability, and the transition to medium and heavy tanks in mass production.

[Vladimir_2U]

Light tanks were different, the T-26 was carving one and two like a turtle god, and the T-50 had a reservation comparable to PzKpfw-III.

[Doccor18]

Each time, re-reading the data on the amount of military equipment of the USSR and Germany before the war, I can’t stop wondering how, having such a colossal advantage, the Red Army survived the initial stage of the war so hard.

[Pessimist22]

Better a lion control a herd of rams than a ram with a flock of lions.

[Vladimir_2U]

Is it colossal? The Germans did not hesitate to use captured tanks and artillery. But besides the Germans, there were their allies. With aviation, about the same, plus a frank drain on the implementation of measures at basing.

[Doccor18]

The USSR had 26000 tanks, including 12780 in the western districts; Germany had 4334 tanks in the east. I believe that a huge numerical superiority.

[Vladimir_2U]

Consequently, in the western military districts of the USSR, there were 12700 - 12900 combat vehicles on a caterpillar chassis. Of this number, 2230 tanks and wedges belong to the 3rd and 4th categories, that is, they required major and medium repairs (on average, the number of faulty vehicles was 19,1 ,22%). It is unlikely that they, with a wave of a magic wand, were put into operation on June 1941, XNUMX.

In total, the German troops and the troops of Germany's allies had about 5600 tanks and tankettes, concentrated against the USSR. And, consequently, the repeatedly praised "monstrous superiority of the Red Army" over the Wehrmacht and Germany's allies in armored vehicles, in fact, was twofold.

https://topwar.ru/8452-1941-god-skolko-tankov-bylo-u-gitlera.html
I’ll immediately note your number:

Quote: Doccor18

The Wehrmacht at the beginning of the war had up to 75% of lungs PzPkfv I and II

At the beginning of the war, there were practically no units on the Eastern Front of Germany, and there were no more than 800 deuces.

[Alf]

Quote: Vladimir_2U

At the beginning of the war, there were practically no units on the Eastern Front of Germany, and there were no more than 800 deuces.

[Alekseev]

Quote: Doccor18

I believe that a huge numerical superiority.

It has been written more than once that tanks are not fighting, but tank troops.
Read "Soldier's Duty" by K. K. Rokosovsky, moments previously removed by the censors have been published.
Having a large number of tanks, we did not know how to use them properly.
Indicative attempts to counter tank and fur. buildings at the SWF at the beginning of the war. Without proper interaction with aviation and artillery, often without infantry, tank strikes, directed seemingly correctly, on the flanks of the German tank wedge were not effective despite the fact that in some parts there were many T-34s and KVs. But light tanks in general could not be used to break through the defense, they were simply quickly destroyed by German anti-tank rapid-fire guns. The T-26, and especially the BT, could have been useful in the operational space, but ... About half of the tanks the Germans managed to destroy, the other half went out of order for those. reasons and was thrown. SWF turned into an association with almost no mobile connections, which was one of the causes of the Kiev catastrophe. The art of correctly using tank formations was not easy and not a little blood, like everything on that Great War.
Perhaps in only in 1944 the business was almost settled.

[75 Sergey]

Most were outdated (cardboard with expended resources), there was no connection, re-organization was ongoing, re-equipment

[Alf]

Quote: 75Sergey

Most were outdated

A deuce is not out of date?

Quote: 75Sergey

with consumed resource

And what resource did German tanks have on 22.06.41?

[hohol95]

It would be doubtful if the Germans went into battle using equipment that had not undergone training and repairs!

[Alf]

Quote: hohol95

It would be doubtful if the Germans went into battle using equipment that had not undergone training and repairs!

Not at all. If you follow your logic about the completely renovated Reich tank fleet on 22.06.41, then the number of all TDs should have been reduced to the charter, but the numbers indicate the opposite.

[hohol95]

Will you give data for the USSR?
How many were in working order, how many needed repairs of various degrees of difficulty, broken down by spare parts, how many required factory repairs, how many were subject to decommissioning.

[Alf]

Quote: hohol95

Will you give data for the USSR?
How many were in working order, how many needed repairs of various degrees of difficulty, broken down by spare parts, how many required factory repairs, how many were subject to decommissioning.

Alex, do not dodge the answer. I asked a question about Reich tanks, I am waiting for an answer to this question.

[hohol95]

Where in your table are the cars under repair?

[Alf]

Quote: hohol95

Where in your table are the cars under repair?

A repair car in the difference between staff and cash.

[hohol95]

A simple book of tank fiction -
"German tanks in battle" -
Pz.I

On June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht had 410 serviceable Pz.I tanks, and in the tank units of the first line there were only 74 vehicles. Another 245 tanks were under repair or conversion. By the end of the year, almost all Pz.I involved - 428 units were lost on the Eastern Front.

Pz.II

As of June 1, 1941, the Nazi army had 1074 combat ready tanks Pz.II. Another 45 cars were under repair.

Pz. 38 (t)

After the end of hostilities, the division was transferred to Germany, to the Aris training ground. By June 1941, the 6th Panzer Division had 149 Pz.35 (t) and 11 Pz.Bef.Wg.35 (t) tanks. It was part of the so-called first line formations, that is, the most equipped and combat-ready.

Pz. 38 (t)
7; 8; 12; nineteen; 19 TD - 22 cars.
Pz.III

As of June 1, 1941, the Wehrmacht had 235 Pz.III tanks with 37 mm cannons (another 81 vehicles were under repair). There were significantly more tanks with 50 mm cannons - 1090! Another 23 cars were in the process of re-equipment. During June, an additional 133 combat vehicles were expected from the industry. Of this amount, 965 Pz.III tanks were intended for invasion of the Soviet Union, which were distributed more or less evenly among 16 German tank divisions out of 19 participating in Operation Barbarossa (6th, 7th and 8th tank divisions were armed with tanks of Czechoslovak production). So, for example, in the 1st Panzer Division there were 73 Pz.III and 5 commander Pz.Bf.Wg.III, in the 4th Panzer - 105 combat vehicles of this type. Moreover, the vast majority of tanks were armed with 50 mm L / 42 cannons.

Pz.IV.

By the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, out of 3582 German combat-ready tanks, 439 were Pz.IV.

Were many tank tanks under repair? In this case, two models Pz.I and Pz.II.
And this is without taking into account the French trophies of H-39 who fought in Karelia.

[Alf]

But they were under repair? And you say that everyone was combat ready.

It would be doubtful if the Germans went into battle using equipment that had not undergone training and repairs!

[Alf]

Quote: hohol95

How much was

Alexey, pay attention to the last two lines in my table.
"How many tanks are in the units?" I understand that we are talking about repaired and combat-ready tanks in units.
And the column "in total available" means the total number of tanks in the Wehrmacht. And the difference between these columns gives the number of tanks under repair on 22.06.41. As far as I know, all German tank units are listed here. It is possible that some there were tanks in schools, but not fifteen hundred.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Vladimir_2U

T-26 was carving one and two like god a turtle,

"One" - perhaps. But with the "deuce" already had problems: in 1941, the German armor was twice as thick, plus an automatic cannon, and even with subcaliber ones. And we have a "forty-five" with its problems with shells.

Quote: Vladimir_2U

and the T-50 had a reservation comparable to PzKpfw-III.

Here are just "three" was in the series. And "fifty kopecks" - no. However, it may be for the best.

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: Alexey RA

But with the "deuce" already had problems: in 1941, the German armor was twice as thick, plus an automatic cannon, and even with subcaliber ones. And we have a "forty-five" with its problems with shells.

Let me not believe about the sub-caliber for a 2cm assault rifle.

Quote: Alexey RA

And we have a "forty-five" with its problems with shells

Problems were manifested in the Troika, not weaker, the deuce was tough from any normal distance.

Quote: Alexey RA

Here are just "three" was in the series. And "fifty kopecks" - no. However, it may be for the best.

I agree. Although the tank was cute. T-60 is definitely better.

[Alf]

Quote: Vladimir_2U

Let me not believe about the sub-caliber for a 2cm assault rifle.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Vladimir_2U

Let me not believe about the sub-caliber for a 2cm assault rifle.

Please love and favor - 20-mm shell of the PzGr.40 cartridge:

Quote: Vladimir_2U

Problems were manifested in the Troika, not weaker, the deuce was tough from any normal distance.

In the "two" for the Ausf.C version, the forehead has grown to 35 mm.
And the 45-mm PTP had problems even with the "three-ruble note" mod. 1940 with its 30mm booking:

As you should know, the tests of shelling a new German tank in the autumn of 1940 showed that a 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937 is unsuitable, as it is capable of breaking through its armor at a distance of no further than 150-300 m ...

© Kulik

[Vladimir_2U]

Thank you, but it seems like a simple BB, but about the sub-caliber enlightened. But I did not argue that the T-26 was invulnerable to a 2-cm gun. Although there was a shielded T-26.
However:

Quote: Alexey RA

45 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937 is unsuitable, as it is capable of breaking through its armor at a distance of no further than 150-300 m

There is completely different data:

In October 1940, tests were conducted 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937 year. It turned out that the shell penetrates 30 mm thick, installed at an angle of 30 degrees from the normal, at a distance of 1000 m. Concern was caused by a sharp decrease in the penetration distance when firing at a 40 mm thick plate

https://warspot.ru/10340-svoevremennaya-pokupka

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Vladimir_2U

Thanks, but this seems like a simple BB

This is the PzGr.40 sub-caliber projectile: an armor-piercing core inside the light body, and a tracer in the bottom of the projectile.

Quote: Vladimir_2U

There is completely different data:

That's right, in the quote you quoted, the GAU report on armor-piercing and concrete-piercing shells firing on armor conducted at the ANIOP in 1940 is retold.
But there is one subtle point: in this quote the main thing is omitted - what kind of armor was used for testing in each case.
If you open the aforementioned document, it turns out that a 45-mm shell from a distance of 1000 m at an angle of 30 degrees to the normal penetrates the armor with K = 2400. That is, domestic armor, not German! And with domestic armor, the 45-mm BBS had no problems either in 1937 or in 1940 - it even made its way through defective shells.
But the armor with a thickness of 40 mm was taken from K = 2600 - German.

https://litl-bro.livejournal.com/22260.html
It seems to me, judging by the difference in the actual and tabular penetration for the 45 mm BBS on the 40 mm armor with K = 2600, he would have problems with 30 mm armor with K = 2600.

[Vladimir_2U]

Thank you, there are no objections to the reservation

Quote: Alexey RA

This is the PzGr.40 sub-caliber projectile: an armor-piercing core inside the light body, and a tracer in the bottom of the projectile.

Always (from the cradle ) believed that shells of this type are BB shells with a core, regardless of the material of the shell body.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Vladimir_2U

Always (from the cradle ) believed that shells of this type are BB shells with a core, regardless of the material of the shell body.

Well, the Germans attributed it to the class PzGr.40 - sub-caliber projectile.
How many countries - so many classifications.

[bk0010]

There is completely different data:
In October 1940, tests were conducted 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937 year. It turned out that the shell penetrates 30 mm thick, installed at an angle of 30 degrees from the normal, at a distance of 1000 m. Concern was caused by a sharp decrease in the penetration distance when firing at a 40 mm thick plate

About the German armor, the forty-five's armor-piercing shells simply split, by winter 41 they figured out to file them so that the hull split, and the core still hit the tank (EMNIP). Plus, there were large batches of defective shells, for which the PZ wrote "not suitable for hitting armored targets" (for armor-piercing shells!). Plus, there were very few of them at all, literally a few shells per barrel.

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: bk0010

About German armor armor-piercing shells

Armor of different thicknesses happens.

[bk0010]

There, it seems, the problem was that the armor was Krupp (this is not the manufacturer, but the designation of the technical process), its surface rigidity was significantly higher, and here the shells (tested on our armor) also cracked.

[NKT]

PzPkfv II Ausf.C was superior in booking T-26 and BT-7

[Octopus]

Quote: Vladimir_2U

T-26 was carving one and two like god a turtle,

One in the 41st already look, and two of his bulletproof armor confidently took without subcaliber. True, she herself was bulletproof. Here it is necessary to separately discuss the situation with the Soviet BB.

[Alf]

Quote: Vladimir_2U

Even an outdated tank is at least a protected machine gun and no gun, but a machine gun and the tank itself, albeit an unimportant one, need to be built. And so the Union dealt with this.

Better a bad tank here and now than a great one, but on paper.

[LKWUE]

No equipment and its quantity will save if there is no understanding how to manage it. Which demonstrated the beginning of the war. The Germans were stopped for six months only near Moscow, and then for three long years they were driven back to the border.

[novel66]

. The concentration of all troops in one direction was not possible for organizational and military-political reasons.

yeah. especially in KOVO, somehow everything concentrated there ... for some reason, but in the west ...

[The leader of the Redskins]

Well, why this next listing? Laurels G.K. Zhukov and his books haunt? There, probably, the number of tanks were first printed for a wide range of readers.
And cut Simultaneously with the base KV-1, the KV-2 went into the series
How can this be if KV2 was developed on the basis of KV1, after the Finnish war?

[75 Sergey]

Miscellaneous machines

[Alexey RA]

According to well-known data, by the beginning of the summer of 1941, more than 2,5 thousand T-27 tankettes remained in the Red Army, with more than 1400 units. were under repair or needed it.

Heh heh heh ... with the T-27, a funny story came out: during the inventory of armored vehicles after the arrival of Tymoshenko, there was a difference of as much as 780 T-27 - between the presence in the army and the release of industry. However, the shortage was for all types of armored vehicles:

BT-7 - 96 cars
BT-2 - 34 cars
BT-5 - 46 cars
T-26 - 103 cars
T-38 - 193 cars
T-37 - 211 cars
T-27 - 780 cars
BA-10 - 94 cars
BA-6 - 54 cars
FAI - 234 cars
Raised archival material since 1929 for accounting, special. the sending and decommissioning of combat vehicles did not give a significant change in reducing shortages, since decommissioning of combat vehicles was not carried out until 1936.
The number of decommissioned vehicles, for example T-27 - 26 pieces - clearly does not correspond to reality since the production of these vehicles began in 1931 and over 10 years this figure should undoubtedly be much larger ...

© Ulanov / Shein.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Alexey RA

Heh heh heh ... with the T-27, a funny story came out: during the inventory of armored vehicles after the arrival of Tymoshenko, there was a difference of as much as 780 T-27 - between the presence in the army and the release of industry. However, the shortage was for all types of armored vehicles:

Ah, I was waiting for a link to appear on them or not)
Great job, in my opinion.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Trapper7

Ah, I was waiting for a link to appear on them or not)
Great job, in my opinion.

Duc ... "Order in the tank forces" and "The first T-34" are the basic works on domestic armored vehicles of the period 1939-1941.
Out of the corner of my eye, I managed to look into the primary organization according to the "Order" (reports of the commanders of MK KOVO and ZOVO on the state of the units entrusted to them) - if the book is simply horror, then there is horror-horror-horror.

[Undecim]

Another article about nothing, transfusion from empty to empty.
According to the actual number of armored troops of the Red Army as of June 21.06.1941, XNUMX, there is not a single document in the public domain and not a single official figure.
The maximum that can be found is the figures for the technical condition. Like for example the history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. Military Publishing House, 1963, T. 1. M., p. 475.
As of June 15, 1941, of the old types of tanks, 29 percent needed overhaul and restoration, and 44 percent needed average repairs.
That is, we can assume that 73% of the Red Army tanks by the beginning of the war were practically unsuitable for use.
The number 25000 with various variations is a product of the post-perestroika count of historians, let's say, according to indirect data. Even if we assume that this figure is close to real, it turns out that at the beginning of the war, the Red Army had approximately 7000 combat ready tanks in total strength.

[LeonidL]

The number of 24000 - 25 tanks was introduced by Rezun. everything is simple, he knew that with the coming of Hitler to power, starting from the 000rd year, the number of armored vehicles (all) production increased sharply from 33 units to 300 per year. Multiplying 3000 years by 8, I got 3000, well, for an even account I added a thousand. Moreover, the advanced public took it as the number of tanks along the border with Germany. But the tanks stood in the Far East along the entire line of contact with the Kwantung Army, the tanks were transferred to China, Mongolia, Spain, the tanks were lost in the Finnish war, on Khasan and Halkin-Gol, tanks were written off for wear and tear, for accidents - that is, as many authors correctly point out , in the border districts there was no such "global" numerical superiority. The new tanks, among other things, had "childhood" illnesses, were poorly mastered by the crews - hence the many technical problems. Tanks were often abandoned without repair, which was then calmly carried out by the crew. By the way, the big problem was the lack of 24000 mm armor-piercing shells, the lousy quality of 76 mm.

[Undecim]

In 1991 the collection "The Eve and the Beginning of the War: Documents and Materials" was published. It was compiled by the school history teacher Lev Kirshner.
There is such an author’s calculation.

The author calculated that over 11 years 30 tanks were produced. And the sources cited. But the figure is about nothing. And how many of these 000 remained in service and what types?
That is, you can find many options in popular literature, but they are all "mid-ceiling".

[LeonidL]

Yes, the school teacher is the head! There is an "Encyclopedia of Tanks", I think a more solid edition, there are English-language ones that give the TOTAL amount of armored vehicles produced of about the same order. Where 30 comes from - I don't understand. In principle, old non-core sources are listed.

[boris epstein]

Yes, I have an Encyclopedia of Maev’s tanks. If you add everything released since 1918 (Russian Renaults), which Rezun did, then 27000 will be typed. But you should not forget that 400 tanks of the USSR were transferred to China, 1000 more were loaded onto ships for Spain (about 400 reached the Republicans) - the British and French arrested and confiscated Soviet ships in their ports to offset a policy of non-intervention, 3 ships sank German submarines in the Mediterranean Sea. There were 1300 tanks in the USSR and Finland in Mongolia. 4000 more vehicles On June 22, they were in the Far East against the Kwantung Army (of which 2000 were transferred to the front, but they only managed to battle across Moscow). Another 2000 were introduced into Iran to provide southern Lend-Lease routes. We pass through the discharged MS-1-800 vehicles, BT-2-600 vehicles, two-tower T-26-1626 vehicles, T-27 wedges (used as tractors for 45-current vehicles and as communication vehicles -3300 vehicles, minus the worn out exercises (No one has yet canceled depreciation.) Really amphibious T-37 and T-38 tanks armed with one machine gun should not be counted either. As a result, if 7000 is typed, it’s good. And the Germans are cunning in their numbers. They captured quite decent for 1941 Renault R-35 and Citroen S-35 - about 800 cars, as well as Polish 7TP (analogues of our T-26 cannon), as well as the English Matilda in Greece (at the English Expeditionary Force) and in Dunkirk at General Gort's Corps Many trophy tanks, as well as units and twos, were converted into assault guns (the Germans, when calculating self-propelled guns, only consider their artillery assaults based on triples).

[LeonidL]

Boris, this is exactly what I wrote in my comments.

[boris epstein]

I do not detract from your merits, it just helped a little. I added and named the number of captured French, English, Polish tanks and specified the numbers of losses in Finland and Khalkhin Gol, deliveries to China and Spain, written off as obsolete and introduced to Iran. That is, we are completely in solidarity.

[Doctor]

A number of 24000 to 25 tanks was introduced by Rezun. everything is simple, he knew

More precisely had access. Now we can.

http://militera.lib.ru/enc/0/pdf/statsbornik1.pdf

[LeonidL]

Rezun did not need access - this is known data, long published. he simply stupidly multiplied, but as in everything he tried to lie a little bit on a large scale, without specifying that it was all armor-plated from MC to HF, produced in the USSR before the war.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: LeonidL

A number of 24000 to 25 tanks was introduced by Rezun. everything is simple here, he knew that with Hitler coming to power, starting from the age of 000, the number of armored vehicles (in total) production increased sharply from 33 units to 300 per year. Multiplying 3000 years by 8 I got 3000, well, for an even count I added a thousand.

In fact, in a large number of tanks there is nothing wrong. The same Ulanov and Shein justify this with the experience of the First World War, when it turned out that the pre-war stocks of fire weapons and supplies by August 01.08.1914, 1944 were catastrophically small and the industry did not have time to release new ones. At the same time, intelligence reported that German production capacities were quite capable of producing more than a thousand tanks per month, and even more from the factories of France and the Czech Republic. And by the way, intelligence turned out to be right - in 20 Germany stamped more than XNUMX thousand tanks a year.

[LeonidL]

I agree with you, Dmitry. Moreover, the established mass production helped to quickly increase the production of BT during the war years.

[Doctor]

According to the actual number of armored troops of the Red Army as of June 21.06.1941, XNUMX, there is not a single document in the public domain and not a single official figure.

Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Statistical Digest No. 1.
For favorites - (pay attention to the circulation on the last page).

http://militera.lib.ru/enc/0/pdf/statsbornik1.pdf

[Undecim]

Thanks for the link. I wonder who this unknown hero, who xerilized or scanned, apparently in a hurry, one of 25 copies. The main thing is that the introduction says that for a "wide circle of historians". What a narrow "wide circle".

[Avior]

Humorous people came up

total serviceable tanks in the collection of 18 691.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Avior

total serviceable tanks in the collection of 18 691.

Nah, these are just tanks of the first and second categories. But how many of them are serviceable is unknown. For:

Orders of KO No. 12–16 of 1940 and the Manual on Accounting and Reporting in the Red Army provided for the division of all property according to its quality condition into the following categories:
1-th category - a new, not used, meeting the requirements of technical conditions and quite suitable for use for its intended purpose.
2nd category - former (in) use, fully operational and suitable for its intended use. This also includes property requiring military repair (current repair).
3-th category - requiring repair in district workshops (medium repair).
4th category - requiring repair in central workshops and factories (major repairs).

The main thing is highlighted - in the second category, Chokh recorded both serviceable tanks and requiring maintenance. But the GABTU is doing poorly with military repair.

BT
Surrender completely unsatisfactorily: gearboxes, gearbox gearboxes, tracks, axles, complete wheels and motor equipment.
The People’s Commissariat and Glavavtotraktorodetal completely refuse to manufacture complex scarce units and parts (wheels, half shafts, balancers, cranks, final drive cover, guitars, etc.)
(...)
T-26 - plant number 174 (...)
Plant number 174 does not comply with the delivery dates under the contracts. The scarce parts give up very badly: cylinders, lower halves of the crankcase, valve guides, rims of the drive wheels, lower rollers, bandages of the lower rollers, etc.
Tank troops are currently in great need of spare parts and assemblies, especially in the case of the scarce nomenclature. Repeated appeals of the GABTU KA to the NKSM did not find a proper solution on the above issues.

As a result, in the troops, tanks that formally require maintenance are actually on the joke.
6-th MK:

For combat vehicles, there are no spare parts for the T-28 tank on the undercarriage of the undercarriage. There are no caterpillar drive wheels and half shafts to the BT tank. For other brands of military vehicles, spare parts supply is 60–70%.

9-th MK:

The availability of spare parts is unsatisfactory; there are no spare parts at all. There are also no spare parts at the current allowance, with the exception of a number of random non-working parts.

In the 39th tank regiment, tanks were received after overhaul from repair facilities and were enrolled in a combat training park. Tanks are not equipped with tools, accessories and spare parts ... The shelf does not have the most necessary spare parts, which does not allow to fix minor damage. The lack of spare fuses leads to attempts to install bugs. For 25% of tanks, tracks are worn out and require replacement.

© Ulanov / Shein

[Avior]

this is not my assessment or figure, this is the figure that they so directly mean

as for

quite serviceable and suitable for use for its intended purpose. This also includes property requiring military repair (current repair)

this does not mean that they are unsuitable for military use, as you understand.
It is clearly and directly written

intended use for its intended purpose

maybe you need to paint something, maybe the lock on the hatch junk - anything can be.
but the evaluation criterion is clear - suitable for use.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Avior

this is not my assessment or figure, this is the figure that they so directly mean

Yes, I understand that this is a quote.
It’s just that the authors of the collection either deceived, or didn’t figure it out, or decided not to dig deep - and from the definition of the Second category they took only the first part: former (in) operation, fully operational and suitable for intended use. And completely forgot about the second: This also includes property requiring military repair (current repair).

Quote: Avior

this does not mean that they are unsuitable for military use, as you understand.
It is clearly and directly written

These are different parts of the second category. It includes both serviceable cars and machines requiring current repair (that is, currently faulty, but theoretically commissioned by the forces of the unit in which they are registered).

Quote: Avior

maybe you need to paint something, maybe the lock on the hatch junk - anything can be.

Well here is a typical example:

Up to 30% of the available fleet of vehicles requires a change in track tracks.

Current military repair. A few hours of work (well, if the fairy doesn't arrive ) - and the tank from the second part of the second category moves to the first: quite serviceable and suitable for use for its intended purpose property.
That's only trouble, sadness: no trucks. Not at all - the industry did not deliver. And recorded in a serviceable tank (well, well, the second category) in fact, when the unit exits upon alarm, it will be left in the PDP.

[Avior]

Everyone has the right to their opinion
I respect yours, but this is only your interpretation, based, frankly, more likely on assumptions (note that tanks were not entered into battle all for an hour or two in most cases, and in parts the parts were in the form of tanks 3-4 categories that require significant repairs and they were probably used as a source of spare parts), since I don’t see any exact complex documented figures for specific tanks in specific parts, and I don’t expect, essno, that you alone will replace a large group of historians with access to documents and sodeyst iem experts and provide such evidence ..

Above is the interpretation of a large group of specialists from the institute of military history of the Moscow Region, and not only them, the participating experts and organizations are listed in the preface, their authority is undeniable, the work is not for the general public, so there is no need to talk about deliberate falsification. They attribute them to serviceable. To refute them requires much more than an assumption.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Avior

keep in mind that tanks were not entered into battle all in an hour or two in most cases, and in parts the spare parts were in the form of tanks of category 3-4 requiring significant repair and they were probably used as a source of spare parts

So the parts are needed the same - there were no the most running and wearing parts. One tank can be removed from one tank of the 3rd and 4th category of the same tracks. And you need them - for 30% of the tanks of the unit.
And the second delicate moment - the tanks sent for repair (the third and fourth categories) continued to be listed in the unit. That is, according to the documents, the tank is listed as part of the BOVO, but in fact it has long been dismantled in Leningrad.

[bk0010]

There would also be someone to do this repair: at the factories there are elderly men, and those who were called "from the plow", it takes a long time to teach them to repair the tank.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: bk0010

There would also be someone to do this repair: at the factories there are elderly men, and those who were called "from the plow", it takes a long time to teach them to repair the tank.

The factories are even worse: the shops have been transferred to the production of new tanks, the old lines have been dismantled, and there are no spare parts. In "Order in the Tank Forces" there was a wonderful story of how the T-28 was screened and repaired at the LKZ:

By the time of the termination of repair of T-28 machines at the Kirov plant there were only 83 T-28 tanks, of which:
23 cars were in various stages of repair
27 cars disassembled for repair
17 cars not disassembled
16 cars written off under acts ...
After the Government’s decision to remove T-28 machines from the Kirov plant from repair, the plant director issued an order to cease production of T-28 parts. Based on this, [parts] located at different stages of production and parts removed from repair machines were removed from all the workshops of the plant.
Yet 23 cars in various stages of repair were completed, and a significant number of parts of the repair machines were used to complete these machines. Due to the fact that the parts from the disassembled machines were not enough for the complete assembly of these 23 machines, a number of units (sloths, drive wheels, upper rollers, tracks) were partially removed even from those machines that are considered unassembled according to documents. As a result of this, it is impossible to restore all disassembled machines at this time at either Kirovsky or another plant:
10 buildings located at the Izhora plant are rejected and unsuitable for assembly.
17 buildings require major repairs, which, on the basis of a decision of the Government, the Izhora plant categorically refused.
Of the repair units at the Kirov plant, only gearboxes and final drives remained. The rest of the units, such as on-board friction clutches, main clutches, chassis, engines, gears to the fan are either used to repair 23 machines, or are rejected and taken out for re-melting.
From the availability of new parts in the warehouse of the plant, none of these units can be assembled due to the incompleteness of these parts.
Based on the foregoing, I ask:
Confirm the deregistration of ten disassembled T-28 tanks, the hulls of which are rejected at the Izhora plant ...

[Avior]

as for me, I could be wrong, but I strongly doubt that the second category includes both usable and unusable ones.
in this case, the total figure for the category would not carry a semantic load.
And so it clearly gives information - how many used cars can be used for their intended purpose.
And does not mix fit and unfit together for an incomprehensible purpose

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Avior

as for me, I could be wrong, but I strongly doubt that the second category includes both usable and unusable ones.
in this case, the total figure for the category would not carry a semantic load.

The figure just carries a semantic load: this is the number of tanks that are available directly in the unit, which are in operation (used to prepare l / s) and which the unit can theoretically put into operation on its own in a short time. Serviceable tanks - the value is extremely variable: because of each bursting track, the flying rubber on the wheel, a blown fuse or other minor malfunctions that can be fixed right in the field, no one will transfer the tank from category to category.
But the trouble is that this category was designed for BTVs, which have a normal supply of spare parts - in which tanks do not stand for months in the parks due to the lack of tracked tracks. Apparently, it was calculated from the calculation of the BTV of the 30s, in which the intensity of operation of the equipment was low, the marches were rare, and there were no three-month wars with the removal of ABT from the entire western theater of operations - so a small supply of spare parts was enough for the current repair.

[Avior]

I will not argue, since all this is at the level of assumptions without documentary evidence.
First, you need to confirm with documents that the sky-ready tanks or only the combat-ready tanks were taken into account (although, perhaps, they need repair).
Professional opinion - 18691 - serviceable. And to dismiss him in passing with the phrase "but they didn't figure it out" is not serious
Then - that they could not be repaired to the level of practical use - with the replacement of separate tracks, for example. But didn’t they all burst at the same time?
Obviously, some kind of car could not start at all, and before that it was considered to be serviceable.
And what from this?
I think the statistics from the Germans also did not take into account that some of the formally combat-ready tanks did not go into battle in the morning.
Therefore, I do not see the point in this discussion.
There is no documentary evidence refuting the data by a specialist; there is no subject of discussion, in my opinion

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Avior

First, you need to confirm with documents that the sky-ready tanks or only the combat-ready tanks were taken into account (although, perhaps, they need repair).
Professional opinion - 18691 - serviceable. And to dismiss him in passing with the phrase "but they didn't figure it out" is not serious

Total tanks of the main types: 21800, of which:
1st category: 2599
2st category: 15015
3st category: 2058
4st category: 2128

Total tanks and SU: 23106, of which:
1st category: 2611
2st category: 16080
3st category: 2157
4st category: 2258

© "Order in the tank forces" - table "The quantitative and qualitative composition of the armored fleet of the Red Army as of June 1, 1941"
Now add up the numbers of the 1st and 2nd category of tanks and SU. 2611 + 16080 = 18691. That is, it is precisely the first and second categories.

Quote: Avior

Then - that they could not be repaired to the level of practical use - with the replacement of separate tracks, for example. But didn’t they all burst at the same time?

Well, and how to carry out current repairs, say, in the 9th MK?

The availability of spare parts is unsatisfactory; there are no spare parts at all. There are also no spare parts at the current allowance, with the exception of a number of random non-working parts.

As it was in "Order ..."

As you can see, even the average percentage of security does not convey the fullness of the picture - as a rule, the most severely deficient spare parts are also the most popular. Returning to the Formula 1 steering wheel example: even if you have a tall stack of several hundred spoilers and rear wings in your garage, this will give a rather high “overall” percentage of spare parts, but it will not change the fact that you cannot use the car due to the lack of a single steering wheel.

[1970mk]

T-34 and KV. However, by the beginning of the war there was only approx. 1500 of these armored vehicles.

Like LITTLE ... Considering Hitler’s Germany, the best was the T-4 with a 75mm stump in the amount of 400 pieces.
"Little" about what?

[novel66]

relative to the 45th

[Octopus]

Quote: 1970mk

Given Hitler's Germany, the best was the T-4 with a 75mm stump in the amount of 400pcs.

))
Still, the Shtug was the best for PTs; it is much more armored. But given the realities - competent tanks with competent infantry / mechanized corps of the 41st model - this does not matter.

[LeonidL]

“There was” does not mean to be combat-ready. For a civilian, there was already quite enough, for military people it was different, there was complete rubbish from repair funds, and a thorough repair was not started due to the lack of spare parts, and without crews at all and with crews not ready for combat. The total number doesn't really matter much.

[LeonidL]

I will add a few points: 1. The production of tanks of the BT series was discontinued in 1940, and the production of spare parts, respectively. Technicians climbed the "repair funds" and collected vehicles capable of fighting from the trash. 2. Speaking about the armored vehicles of the Germans, one should also take into account the huge amount of captured, quite modern, for example French, in addition, the presence of self-propelled (assault) guns on captured chassis. In 1941, the Red Army had only a few SPG units. 3. A large number of armored vehicles of the Red Army were based on the Far East - the danger of war with Japan has not been canceled. In addition - in schools, in educational units, in internal districts. So, the actual ratio of the number of armored vehicles is actually not so impressive. 4. And, finally, training of both tank crews and command personnel. A sharp increase in the number of large formations - tank and mechanized corps led to the fact that people came "from outside", for example, from cavalry, infantry with insufficient (to put it mildly) training, not very clearly understanding the operational and tactical features of a new branch of service for them. In addition, the demobilization of old servicemen who had not only good special training, but also the experience of the Polish campaign and the Finnish war, sharply reduced the training of tank crews. I think these factors should also be taken into account.

[really]

You have listed a lot correctly, then note that Germany didn’t send all the tanks to the eastern front, as there were some in the occupied countries, the threat of a landing from England.

[LeonidL]

Quite right! I am not an expert, but I tried to count all the armored property that ended up in the trophies of the Third Reich before the start of the aggression in the USSR. Plus the tanks of the allies, but they were, albeit not in huge quantities. According to my calculations, about 18, and the British and French tanks were quite competitive with the German ones. "Matilda" German calatushki did not take, and the French were quite at the level - they were used from the first days of the war against the USSR, for example, during the assault on Brest, in the area of ​​the unfortunate 000nd shock battles, etc.

[Octopus]

Quote: LeonidL

a huge amount of trophy, quite modern, such as French

Virtually none in the East.

Quote: LeonidL

In 1941, in the Red Army there were only a few units of self-propelled guns

BT-7A is quite an ACS class American M8, for example. What is the question?

Quote: LeonidL

So, the real ratio of the number of armored vehicles is actually not so impressive.

This is not so important because.

Quote: LeonidL

And finally, the training of both tank crews and command personnel

Frankly, let us down. Which is especially shameful, given the unprecedented armored power of the Red Army of the 30s.

[LeonidL]

It was practically: from entire Czech divisions of the 35th and 38th, to the French from Brest to Myasniy Bor, the Italians were given, the Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians even used the Polish.
How many and where can you find in 1941 BT-7A? There were only a few 57-mm ZIS-2 units based on the Komsomol group.

[LeonidL]

BT-7A produced 157 units, all with a closed rotating turret, originally prepared for the T-26. No one has ever ranked them among the SPGs. The Germans sometimes called the KV-2 a self-propelled gun, but it was a heavy tank. As the saying goes, "Even if you call it beetroot, don't throw it into the soup."

[Octopus]

Quote: LeonidL

The Germans sometimes called the KV-2 a self-propelled gun, but it was a heavy tank.

These are problems of national classification.

The thesis is that the absence of self-propelled guns in the USSR is a matter of organization, not technology. Making primitive "self-propelled carriages" in the German style is not difficult even for the USSR, they simply did not consider it necessary.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: LeonidL

1. The production of tanks of the BT series was discontinued in 1940, and the production of spare parts, respectively. Technicians climbed the "repair funds" and collected vehicles capable of fighting from the trash.

Not certainly in that way. The production of spare parts for discontinued tanks was transferred from the tank factories to the Glavtotraktorodetali factories. And chaos began: there is no production experience, no documentation, no consultations, not even materials - and those are not.

For unplaced 5000 thousand rubles. Glavavtotktorodetal factories were sent contracts in the amount of 3000 thousand rubles. and remained completely unplaced in the amount of 2000 thousand rubles.
The People’s Commissariat and Glavavtotktorodetal completely refuse to manufacture complex scarce units and parts (wheels, half shafts, balancers, cranks, final drive cover, guitars, etc.).
The concluded agreements with Glavavtotorktorodetal at 1.6.41 were fulfilled only by 0.3%.
To ensure the manufacture of BT parts at the Glavavtotktorodetal factories, it is necessary:
To oblige plant No. 183 to provide drawings and technical advice up to secondment to these plants of individual workers from plant No. 183.
To oblige factories Nos. 183 and 75 to supply the Glavavtotktorodetali parts with forgings and stampings according to the special plan of the People’s Commissariat.
To supply these plants with metal and material on a par with other tank plants.

© Ulanov / Shein

[LeonidL]

You are right, but that's exactly what I wanted to say, in fact, due to the transfer from the military industry to Glavavtotraktorodetali, the spare parts simply disappeared. I may not have formulated it very correctly, but in fact - right, the production of stocks has stopped. You have revealed the reason.

[Peter is not the first]

And our tanks are fast! And they drove them in June 1941 until the exhaustion of motor resources, breakdowns, or until the end of the fuel in the tanks so that before meeting the enemy most of them were already empty and faulty along the side of the road with machine guns removed. And by the fall, out of the many thousands of tank armies of our troops, hundreds remained, but even with such a small amount of armored vehicles remaining, forty-fifty, and kamikaze weapons - anti-tank grenades and incendiary bottles, our grandfathers were able to stop the fascist European Union.

[LeonidL]

Few people pay attention to the qualitative superiority of German technology - the presence of commander's turrets, excellent optics, more advanced aiming drives, the Maybach engines were equipped with fire-extinguishing systems, and Soviet BTs (except for the M series) had engines written off from aviation at all, with the crews closed. they were literally suffocating from gasoline vapors, the engines were fire hazardous not even because of gasoline, because of structural imperfections, during launches, for example, the BT had "torches" in the back. The presence of the fifth member of the gunner in the crews made it possible for the commander to command. I am silent about radio communication at all. Well, the quality of armor-piercing shells for 45mm was terrible in 1941 - they were injected. 76mm - often just not available at all.

[Operator]

If we compare the combat-ready Soviet tanks in the western border districts with combat-ready German (including captured French, Czech and Polish), Finnish, Hungarian, Slovak and Romanian tanks, as of June 22, 1941 the number of the first was approximately equal to the number of the second.

T-34 and KV-1 were not mastered in the troops, a significant part of them were in storage, engines and gearboxes of these tanks had an extremely low resource (for several days of battle), after which faulty tanks were thrown during the retreat. In the ammunition of the 76-mm guns there were no armor-piercing shells.

The most massive BT and light tanks did not have bulletproof armor and made their way through 20 mm automatic guns. 45-mm armor-piercing shells of BT guns had extremely low penetration due to production defects.

Therefore, at the beginning of the war, Soviet tankers did not have a single chance to confront the enemy on equal terms, which does not negate the local successes of individual tanks (mainly KV-1), which could not influence the general situation.

[dgonni]

The problem of the initial period of the war in terms of the use of both tanks and aircraft was in terms of controllability and the relationship of units and arms. The tankers still had a problem with the transport of infantry and its small numbers in tank corps. Tanks can capture an object but only infantry can hold it. What was already demonstrated in the first border battles. Namely, there are exactly fords in the area. When the tankers performed the task of capturing but could not hold. The same applies to escort facilities. It was thanks to the excellent cooperation between the infantry and tank infantry of the tank units and aviation that the Germans were able to grind the tank corps in the border battles of the war.

[Octopus]

Quote: dgonni

The problem of the initial period of the war

They did not know how to fight, by and large.

[LeonidL]

Right. And who was able? Only nonsense. Did you break the Poles? Broke, gained experience. Was Europe shattered from Narvik to Crete? Shattered. That the English, French and other Polish generals were not educated and professional? There were. They like to show the columns of Soviet prisoners, but how many documentary shootings there are of endless columns of French, Belgians, British and others ... The Greeks really just disarmed and dispersed to their homes. Yes, and Americans were taken prisoner since Africa. So, the great thing is victorious experience + skill of generals. And Zhukov, and Rokossovsky, and Vatutin ... all the generals and marshals of the Victory, passed ALL stages of the army service without skipping a single step! But the precocious Army General Pavlov, alas from the tank brigade in Spain, after a short time in the divisional commander, the head of the ABT (non-combatant position), was taken over by the front commanders. And did not pull. A good man of Pavlov, but in vain he wrote on Voroshilov, got into favorites and did not pull. as well as Kopets, and many others. Their incompetence in peacetime is not so scary, but during the war they themselves paid their lives, and dragged out millions of other lives.

[Octopus]

Quote: LeonidL

And who was able? Only nonsense.

Hmm.

And how did it happen that they managed to make 20 thousand tanks, or how many there, in the 30s, but did not have time to learn how to fight? And why do you recall the same Americans who, for the 40th year of tanks, have two Soviet brigades for the entire army?

[bk0010]

Yes, so. The next generation of military organization. Like a third against crowds of knights. Or as a linear infantry against a third. What is the difference between 20000 or 40000 tanks if there is no gas or spare parts in their surroundings? Nobody could stop Blitzkrieg then, neither the Poles, nor the French with the British, nor even the Germans themselves in 44. The cure for the Blitzkrieg - mobile defense with great difficulty pushed the way into the heads of the military, because it was too much like cowardice and alarmism: not to stand to death, and it was extremely suspicious to depart when threatened.

[Octopus]

And I'm not talking about spare parts in the environment. I'm talking about the ability to move 200 tanks to 200 kilometers. In peacetime.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Octopus

And how did it happen that they managed to make 20 thousand tanks, or how many there, in the 30s, but did not have time to learn how to fight?

But very simple. More or less in the 30s they knew how to fight at the level of a tank brigade. And even then, for the most part, as an NPP - for most of the brigades saw motorized infantry only on paper, but in fact there were bare tanks in the brigade.
And in 1940, these commanders of purely tank brigades were transferred to a completely new division-corps structure - with their own infantry, artillery, reconnaissance, communications, rear services, etc. Moreover, they stuffed this structure with personnel from other military branches and draftees, and they only promised equipment. And to prevent life from appearing like honey, they didn’t give ready-made tactical bricks to the commanders - only campaign groups, only hardcore (and what else to expect from the structure copied from the Panzerwaffe OShS in the creative arrangement of our intelligence).
And they went, burning sun... in the sense, they made plans for training BTVs before the end of 1941, in which coordination at the regiment level was already in August 1941. And so that the commanders did not relax - in September 1941 it was planned to conduct experimental exercises of the mechanized corps at the Moscow Military District, following which OShs could again overwhelm.
The end was simple - after the defeat in the border battle, the leadership of the Red Army finally realized the idea that the OShS without personnel ready to use it was worth nothing. And what an effective OSh Here and now need to do under existing staff with their level of training. The result is a transition to a brigade fire brigade, in which each brigade was separate and self-sufficient (well, in theory - in practice, with motorized infantry it did not work out).
It is usually written that the transition from tank divisions to brigades was caused by a lack of tanks in 1941. But at the same time, it is somehow forgotten that they planned to stamp over more than a hundred brigades, so that the equipment allocated for this would be enough to equip a dozen tank divisions. But it was the brigades who decided to form - for by Senka and hat.

[Octopus]

Quote: Alexey RA

for Senka and a hat.

Yes.

Quote: Alexey RA

And so that life doesn’t seem honey,

It didn’t seem.
Therefore, I am very surprised by the conversations, in particular yours, that the Soviet government did not have enough for something there for three months. As if she had not done much for the time that was enough for her, since September 39th at least.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Octopus

Therefore, I am very surprised by the conversations, in particular yours, that the Soviet government did not have enough for something there for three months. As if she had not done much for the time that was enough for her, since September 39th at least.

Not since September. Understanding that we do not have modern BTVs came only after the SPS. The first bells were in Poland, but the Soviet-Finnish one put an end to it. And they had just begun the reform - like a shit, the Panzerwaffe rolled France.
And our command decided that it was not necessary to reinvent the wheel - since it worked for the Germans, then it will work for us in the end. And we decided to make OShS BTV "German" type. And this was already the second half of 1940.
And about three months ... during this time MK even to the regiment, and even the divisions would have managed to cope. And there would have been more crews trained for new equipment.

[Octopus]

Quote: Alexey RA

but the point was set by the Soviet-Finnish.

Soviet-Finnish was useful in the sense of the experience of assaulting the defense, which did not come in handy very soon (but it’s good that he was, Americans, for example, Italy and Tunisia did not teach anything, the Germans had to retrain again, first in Normandy, then on the Siegfried line ) In terms of maneuvering war, the ZV is not very relevant.

Quote: Alexey RA

And our command decided that there was no need to reinvent the wheel

If it decided not to reinvent the wheel, it would begin to break in brigades, and not invent amazing creatures.

Quote: Alexey RA

And about three months ... during this time MK even to the regiment, and even the divisions would have managed to cope. And there would have been more crews trained for new equipment.

Dead poultices.

It seems that you and I (or not you) have already discussed this topic. The Soviet leadership lived in a different world. Where there are battleships Soviet Union, 30 mechanized corps, KV-3 tanks, self-loading rifles, 5 "divisional art, equipped with a thrust, 70lb gun barrels, rocket artillery, strategic aviation, many different wonderful things.

And in practice, 3 "layered cast iron and shrapnel for blow instead of BB. This is if they brought it.

16 trunks per division. Turn around as you like.

From that world we are constantly written off by specialists who poke their fingers into a book: "Well, the T-34-76's mobility is sharply higher than that of the M24 Chaffee! The speed is the same, the power / weight and the power reserve are twice as high!"

Yes Yes. So the Soviet government was there.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Octopus

In terms of maneuvering war, the ZV is not very relevant.

And there, what was important was not maneuver war, but the experience of using tanks in general. It was at the SPF that it was suddenly discovered that a third of the tanks of the Red Army, which was part of the rifle divisions, were actually completely unworkable. After all, it came to insanity - it was necessary to form consolidated command and control regiments of the RPE from the composition of the brigade and give them to rifle divisions, whose own battalions were suitable only for the protection of headquarters, artillery positions and rear communications. And a good thought came - dispossess infantry to concentrate all tanks under a single command, providing them with qualified command, the possibility of massing and more or less normal repair.

Quote: Octopus

If it decided not to reinvent the wheel, it would begin to break in brigades, and not invent amazing creatures.

So the brigades of the 30s are not suitable for the war of the 40s. It’s necessary not to run the brigades, but to reinvent them from the ground up from scratch. For the brigade of that time is a pure RPE.
And then the neighbors demonstrate a new, field-proven and extremely effective solution. Who knew that to use it, you need 10 years of the Reichswehr's teachings, five years of the Wehrmacht, one full house, one section and one war.

Quote: Octopus

From that world we are constantly written off by specialists who poke their fingers into a book: "Well, the T-34-76's mobility is sharply higher than that of the M24 Chaffee! The speed is the same, the power / weight and the power reserve are twice as high!"

And when you poke them into the 1942 Kubinka report on transmissions of domestic tanks, they don’t believe it.
At VIF2-NE, pomnitsa, one of the participants in the discussion stubbornly did not believe in the authenticity of the scans of the copy of the report due to the presence of pencil marks on them.

[Octopus]

Quote: Alexey RA

one third of the tanks of the Red Army, which is part of the rifle divisions, is actually completely unworkable

Can not be! Under Stalin, there was order! (with).

Quote: Alexey RA

a common sense is to dispossess the infantry to concentrate all the tanks under a single command, providing them with qualified command, the possibility of massing and more or less normal repairs.

Yeah. Army MTS. Health does not happen.

Quote: Alexey RA

providing them with qualified command,

Especially funny.

Quote: Alexey RA

40s unsuitable for war

Before the war of the 40s, one still needs to live.

Quote: Alexey RA

For the brigade of that time is a pure NPP.

IF SOVIET TANKS AND INFANTRY WERE ABLE IN THE NPP!

Quote: Alexey RA

And then the neighbors demonstrate a new, field-proven and extremely effective solution.

What am I talking about? Effective solutions from effective managers.

By the way. Who says corn is not a true Stalinist decision?

Quote: Alexey RA

stubbornly did not believe in the authenticity of the scans of the copy of the report

There are no peaks that do not submit to the Communists. Here in Stalinosrach, one specialist told me that all the documents of the Armed Forces on the deportation of Chechens and Ingushs were fabricated in the 80s by Yakovlev with the goal of you yourself understand what and in the interests you yourself understand who.

[LeonidL]

In 45, they did not fight very much, alas, but they went cheerfully, but Khingan and in the deserts very soon turned sour. The last BT reached the pass and installed there. They fought there, for a very short time, T-34 and Sherman.

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[BAI]

new models - T-34 and KV. However, by the beginning of the war there was only approx. 1500 of these armored vehicles.

Not "only", but "whole"! If used correctly (5 T-34s versus 40, 1 KV-1 versus 22, they emerged victorious. If only everyone had fought like that). They could have changed the course of the war in 1941. But without trained crews, shells and inept command, they turned out to be scrap metal.

the Wehrmacht had almost 1 tanks by the reporting date June 1941, 5700, half of which belonged to the Pz.I. and Pz.II, as well as at least 572 Pz.IV tanks. For Operation Barbarossa, 3648 of these vehicles were redeployed to the eastern border of the Third Reich; the rest were used in North Africa or the Balkans.

Only 572 tanks could withstand the T-34. KV-1,2 - not a single one. But the result of the summer of 1941 is known to all.

[LeonidL]

Firstly, as the saying goes, "It is important not what is in the reel, but who is in the cockpit" - the training of the crews was based on the culture and quality of training of German conscripts, and they almost all underwent military training in the Hitler Youth and almost all had a secondary education. And in the USSR, many colonels could still boast of four classes of TsPSh. Secondly, you and many do not pay attention to the stubbornly pushing through - so many ones, twos, triples, fours ... German tanks. Count the number of armored trophies captured from the French, British, Poles, Danes ... Greeks and Yugoslavs, add what Hitler's satellites had. Do you think they fought with shovels? In addition, the quality of German products was at a very high level throughout the war - primarily sights, guidance, radio communication, habitability, fire-fighting equipment, infrared sights, smoothness ... controllability! So simple arithmetic doesn't work here.

[ser56]

"In addition, combat capabilities no longer met the requirements of the time."
and what does the author dislike amphibious tanks? When it was needed to force Svir - they were assembled in 1944 and used and they quite came up ...
"260 tanks were two-turret tanks, recognized as morally obsolete."
if not a secret - and the Germans T-1 morally obsolete? and there were 400 pieces. June 22 ...
"to abandon the T-28 due to the final obsolescence."
obvious nonsense from the author - T-28 fought well in the Winter War, and a year later became morally obsolete? And why is it worse than the T-3 or T-4 Germans? The gun is better, the armor of the shielded ones too ... by the way 481 pcs. T-28 is more than the Germans T-4 at the beginning of the war - 430 pcs.
in short - and repeats many nonsense ...

[bk0010]

Quote: ser56

"260 tanks were two-turret tanks, recognized as morally obsolete."
if not a secret - and the Germans T-1 morally obsolete?

T-1 - no. Everything goes from tasks, tasks of tanks of the 20s were different from tasks of tanks of the 40s. The tasks are no longer so much escorting the infantry and breaking through the defense as deep tank spans. Compare how many T-1s and our light tanks could have gone through before repairs.

Quote: ser56

obvious nonsense from the author bully - T-28 fought beautifully in the Winter War, and a year later became obsolete?

Not nonsense: he was outdated to the winter war, just the enemy did not have the opportunity to use it. T-28 and T-35 were designed in those years when anti-tank artillery was not yet plain. With the proliferation of PTA, they are outdated. If someone does not have PTA, then this is his problem.

Quote: ser56

And why is it worse than the T-3 or T-4 Germans? The gun is better, the armor of the shielded ones too ...

I repeat, everything comes from tasks. T-28 armor is bulletproof (ballistic armor is considered to be the one that holds (at least somehow) the enemy's PTA shells), which means it does not pull on the medium tank. And as a light tank for blitzkrieg is not suitable because of the small motor resources. Huge dimensions - easy to get in with mobility problems. One plus - it moves through the trenches well - very long.

[ser56]

Quote: bk0010

Compare how many T-1s and our light tanks could have gone through before repairs.

no problem - in 1939 light tank brigades made a 600km march in Mongolia to HG ... Do you think the T-1 would come? Didn't Halder call him a burden?

Quote: bk0010

it is outdated and the winter wars

than? do you have mantras? repeat:

Quote: ser56

The gun is better, the armor of the shielded ones too ...

Do you have a complaint about the L-11? Do you think a German stub is better?
"The shielding made it possible to increase the thickness of the armor of the frontal parts of the tank hull to 50-60 mm, and of the towers and the upper part of the sides - up to 40 mm." comparable to T-3 or T-4?

Quote: bk0010

T-28 armor is bulletproof (ballistic armor is considered to be the one that holds (at least somehow) the shell

you do not know the subject well - see above ... T-28E is booked better than T-34 ...

Quote: bk0010

And as a light tank for blitzkrieg is not suitable because of the small motor resources.

another nonsense of an amateur ...

[bk0010]

Quote: ser56

no problem - in 1939 light tank brigades made a 600km march in Mongolia to HG ... Do you think the T-1 would come? Didn't Halder call him a burden?

Well, he got to Moscow.

Quote: ser56

than? do you have mantras? repeat:

Quote: ser56

The gun is better, the armor of the shielded ones too ...

Do you have a complaint about the L-11? Do you think a German stub is better?
"The shielding made it possible to increase the thickness of the armor of the frontal parts of the tank hull to 50-60 mm, and of the towers and the upper part of the sides - up to 40 mm." comparable to T-3 or T-4?

Well, and I repeat. Obsolete in that, being a medium tank, he (unlike the T-34) did not hold Pak 36 even with his forehead. And then what's the use of this shielding? He held bullets without screens.

Quote: ser56

you do not know the subject well - see above ... T-28E is booked better than T-34 ...

So what? Useless from this?

Quote: ser56

Quote: bk0010

And as a light tank for blitzkrieg is not suitable because of the small motor resources.

another nonsense of an amateur ...

Yes, a bunch of pictures not with black ones, but with abandoned T-28s are hallucinations. At least you go to the wiki, you’re our expert:

Quote: Wikipedia

For example, the “Report on the combat activity of the 10th Panzer Division on the front of the fight against German fascism for the period from June 22 to August 1, 1941” contains the following data on the T-28, which was part of the division: [L 35]

In terms of their technical condition, T-28 tanks had an average range of up to 75 hours. For the most part, they demanded replacement of engines and in their technical condition could not be used in a long operation. By June 22, there were 51 T-28 tanks, of which 44 vehicles were withdrawn by alarm. The almost complete lack of spare parts immediately adversely affected during the hostilities. Machines often failed due to the slightest technical malfunction.

According to this document, out of 51 T-28 tanks that were lost on the 10th TD of the 15th mechanized corps for the indicated period, only 4 vehicles were hit in battle, 4 more were out of order during the performance of the combat mission, 4 were left operational Due to the lack of fuels and lubricants, 3 went missing and 2 got stuck on obstacles. The remaining 32 tanks failed for technical reasons and were abandoned. [L 36]

[ser56]

Quote: bk0010

Well, he got to Moscow.

not an argument - dragged - Halder knows better ...

Quote: bk0010

So what? Useless from this?

Quote: bk0010

that as a medium tank he (unlike the T-34) did not even hold his Pak 36 forehead.

do you understand yourself Is your T-34 not average? Or is his armor thicker than that of the T-28E?

Quote: bk0010

, a bunch of pictures not with black ones, but with abandoned T-28s are hallucinations.

So what? the mess was at the beginning of the war ... read the memoirs of Slyusarenko http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/sljusarenko_zk/index.html, how he lost his battalion in the HF near Brody ...

Quote: bk0010

You are our expert:

no need to show a poor knowledge of history and technology

Quote: bk0010

T-28s had an average power reserve of up to 75 hours.

75 * 10 km / h = 750 km ...

Quote: bk0010

44 machines

full-fledged brigade of the Second World War ...

Quote: bk0010

4 were left intact due to a lack of petroleum, 3 were missing and 2 were stuck on obstacles.

are the tanks to blame?

Quote: bk0010

The remaining 32 tanks failed for technical reasons and were abandoned.

what prevented the repair? A mess, not a technique ... see how the Germans repaired pantets ...

[bk0010]

Quote: ser56

do you understand yourself bully you t-34 is not average? Or is his armor thicker than that of the T-28E?

The T-34 is quite average: the Pak-36 had real problems with it (did you hear about the mallet?). But I did not hear about the problems of the Pak-36 with the T-28, despite the screens and the total thickness of the armor. Accordingly, the T-28 medium tank does not pull. But the German T-3 until September (or October) 41 could very well have played the role of a medium tank (a cannon pumped up: you won’t make out of a 37-mm bunker): at first, our magpie didn’t take it, the armor was thin, but hardened.

Quote: ser56

what prevented the repair? A mess, not a technique ... see how the Germans repaired pantets ...

If the resource were normal, repair would not be required.

[ser56]

Quote: bk0010

The T-34 is quite average: the Pak-36 had real problems with it

those. tank classification goes on problems Pak-36

Quote: bk0010

I did not hear

this is an important criterion for the strength of armor ...

Quote: bk0010

Accordingly, the T-28 medium tank does not pull.

only for you...

Quote: bk0010

If the resource were normal, repair would not be required.

I ran out of patience for your nonsense - good luck ...

[bk0010]

those. tank classification goes on problems Pak-36

By resistance to the effects of anti-tank artillery of the enemy. Do you prefer the American classification (up to 20 tons - light, 20-40 medium, more than 40 heavy)?

Quote: ser56

this is an important criterion for the strength of armor ...

Important enough. If you had data refuting my position on this issue, then you would have brought them.

Quote: ser56

I ran out of patience for your nonsense - good luck ...

Chao

[EvilLion]

The American classification, in principle, makes sense, especially in terms of logistics.

[ser56]

Quote: EvilLion

makes sense oh

had now the lungs have become medium, and the heavy ones have become the main ones by weight ...

[EvilLion]

Do you know that the Germans considered the Pz-IVD to be difficult?

The rest are hit by armor, not by classification. As for the Pz-III, then 50 mm was set even after the French. companies, at the beginning of the Second World War 37 mm models were no longer produced. That is, it was exactly nothing like the Pz-III anti-tank weapon, although the T-34 was maintained until the 42nd in 5-6 hits until it failed. This in the 45th became 1.8 hits on a knocked out tank.

[EvilLion]

In order to provide repairs, first of all, people who can repair are needed. You simply do not imagine the level of illiteracy in a country in which universal education was introduced only a generation ago. Even the 60s in this regard is a completely different era.

[ser56]

Quote: EvilLion

In order to provide repair, first of all, people who know how to repair are needed.

no - we need engineers ... so examples6
1) in RI, general education was formally worse than in the USSR, but the engineers themselves designed LK, KR and EM, and in the USSR they bought drawings ... But experienced engineers and other managers in the USSR did not spare either in the Civil War or in the Industrial Party ...
2) RIA was able to create a sane officer corps, which at the beginning of WWI fought on equal terms with the Germans, and the top leadership was able to ensure the entry of troops into the battle without a catastrophe ..
So the problems of the Red Army is not the formation of soldiers and commanders, but the formation of the highest command staff and the country's leadership ..

[EvilLion]

And come on, you won’t write enchanting nonsense and understand a bit of equipment. For example, you will learn how the Republic of Ingushetia bought ships and how it was with the production of figs with them with battleships, ordinary cars, tanks and planes. Stunning discoveries await you.

As for the experienced engineers, the Industrial Party’s affair is an excellent indicator of how people with technical qualifications, but with brains like Sakharov’s, were protected, despite the fact that they created idiotic conspiracies and earned a tower for themselves. They kept it almost at the resort, gave it to do their favorite work, and then gave Stalin's prizes. And do not tell me that there was no conspiracy. At that time there were former people who were bored about past goods above the roof, and these comrades could well share ministerial portfolios. What to do, engineering education does not mean that a person is not. And conspiracies, or work for the former owners of the enterprises remaining in Russia among those. specialists were commonplace.

As for the beginning of the WWII, in the east the Germans never held more than a third of their forces there. And in the conditions of endless positional lines of defense and the lack of means and tactics for their quick breakthrough, everyone then stomped on the spot. Comparing this to the pace of World War II, where the winner came to light very quickly and inflicted a crushing defeat on the loser, is simply incorrect. So, I couldn’t blow RI quickly in WWI in principle. And the Red Army in the 41st did absolutely right that it did not attach extra-large importance to the infantry divisions at the border, they would not be able to win the war quickly, much worse than the fur. units that just arrived just before the attack. If Russia received an invasion of the 41st year model, having an economy, as in the Republic of Ingushetia, then the Russian army, which even in those greenhouse conditions had purged the war, would have fled to the Urals.

Well, the statement about the battle between RI and Germany in the first months on an equal footing is just ridiculous. Yes, damn it, while the mob. there were supplies, the battle was going on, and even well, we still had personnel, despite the fact that the army was degrading, and whom Germany beat there, well, in the 1870th, the French were dealt with, and the Germans in tactics of ours in 1914- om not exceeded. They surpassed ours in economics, so that in the course of the war, their saturation with artillery per division increased, while ours decreased. And with the end of the mob. our stocks went badly.

As for the formation of senior management, then no smart lieutenants will win the war if the colonels and generals are stupid. The king-priest Vissarionych did not leave general education. On the contrary, when the country collapsed, many of those that were fled to Paris.

[ser56]

Quote: EvilLion

And come on, you won’t write enchanting nonsense

that you are badly brought up, I realized - do not pedal it ...

Quote: EvilLion

For example, you will learn how the Republic of Ingushetia bought ships and how it was with the production of figs with them with battleships, ordinary cars, tanks and planes. Stunning discoveries await you.

I know very well that RI did not purchase a single dreadnought: request, but it built as many as 7 on its projects, moreover, there was at least a couple more in good readiness ... can’t you name at least the buildings of Soviet LCs launched into the water? And I also remember that it was RIA that had the most aircraft in service at the beginning of WWI, that in 1 1916 automobile plants were incorporated in RI — for you there will be a revelation where!

Quote: EvilLion

but with brains like Sakharov’s

you never get to the level of academician Sakharov

Quote: EvilLion

despite the fact that they staged idiotic conspiracies and earned a tower for themselves.

you are illiterate in the history of the USSR, or rather you are familiar with it in the Short Course ...

Quote: EvilLion

They kept it almost at the resort, gave it to do their favorite work, and then gave Stalin's prizes.

Benefactors ... you have vertuhai logic ...

Quote: EvilLion

And do not tell me that there was no conspiracy

I don’t see the point, but Polikarpov said that there was no Industrial Party ... I believe him, you don’t ..

Quote: EvilLion

As for the beginning of the WWII, in the east the Germans never held more than a third of their forces there.

which speaks of the wisdom of senior management of RI

Quote: EvilLion

And in the conditions of endless positional lines of defense and the lack of means and tactics for their quick breakthrough, everyone then stomped on the spot.

are you talking about the autumn of 1914?

Quote: EvilLion

So, I couldn’t blow RI quickly in WWI in principle.

I recommend that you familiarize yourself with Schlieffen’s plan and why it was not implemented in reality ... your illiteracy goes off scale ...

Quote: EvilLion

much worse fur. parts that just arrived just before the attack

I recall that in the Red Army there were many times more mechanical units and tanks ... the result under Brody was the loss of 2000 and 200 tanks ..

Quote: EvilLion

If Russia received an invasion of the 41st model, having an economy, as in RI,

propaganda delirium ...

Quote: EvilLion

Yes, damn it, while the mob. there were supplies, the battle was on, and even good,

What am I talking about? compare the first 3 months of the war and the results: for the Red Army - a catastrophic defeat, the loss of a cadre army with all the equipment, for the RIA - approximately equal losses with the enemy, against the AB even better ... and most importantly - the war was transferred to a long stage, which is fatal for Germany ...

Quote: EvilLion

then no smart lieutenants will win the war if the colonels and generals are stupid

Quote: ser56

So the problems of the Red Army is not the education of soldiers and commanders, but the formation of the highest command staff and the country's leadership

a teacher to understand what is read ...

Quote: EvilLion

On the contrary, when the country collapsed, many of those that were fled to Paris.

from red terror, if you forgot ... for example Sikorsky - remember this? in the United States alone, up to 200 people of its level ... Zavorykin, etc.

[EvilLion]

The hinged shield is noticeably worse than solid armor and is quite easily destroyed. Not all T-28s were completely welded, and the rivet is not armor, it is a bullet inside the tank. In addition, welding of thick armor plates in itself is still a task, and it was solved, it seems, on an experienced T-46. That is, the quality of the T-34 and T-28 armor is a separate issue, the T-28 used what can be used. At the same time, among the same Germans, the "Hetzer" armor was considered the equivalent of half-thickness German armor. That is, the difference can be monstrous, not to mention the formation of fragments on impact. We didn't seem to respect American armor. Although mm were there.

[ser56]

Quote: EvilLion

The hinged screen is noticeably worse than solid armor and is quite easily destroyed. Not all T-28s were completely welded, and a rivet is not armor, it is a bullet inside the tank.

Screens are the usual solution - see Germans, that before rivets - then tanks Prague is 20% at the beginning of the war .. Fighting with those weapons that are and which allows you to kill the enemy well ... T-28 is noticeably better than Prague or T-3, it’s just ridiculous to talk about T-1 / T-2 ..

Quote: EvilLion

That is, the quality of the T-34 and T-28 armor is a separate issue,

Quote: EvilLion

even T-34 even in the 42nd, with 5-6 hits, was kept up to failure.

you understand yourself ...

[EvilLion]

Well, they didn’t know how to cook, so they riveted. The Germans did not hang screens from a good life.

[ser56]

Quote: EvilLion

The Germans did not hang screens from a good life.

So the Germans can, but we don’t?

[Skif_S]

An outdated tank is a rather vague definition. I want to outline some of the nuances.
1. Tracked tracks. Almost no one writes about this. It's all about the fingers. They were made of simple metal and until iron carbide was sprayed onto the surface of the fingers with a plasma torch, the mileage was about 200-300 km.
2. Tape brakes. Here everyone writes about it.
3. Oil filters. They were invented by our Jew after the motorization of the spacecraft.
4. Candles. Tank engines sprayed them with oil.
5. The gun is a projectile. The quality of the projectile and the low initial velocity of the projectile did not penetrate the armor; the explosive effect was weak.
Etc.

[EvilLion]

A low resource of a large-caterpillar caterpillar, a small-caterpillar went and 2500.

You don’t want to talk about the high explosive effect of a 50 mm shell of a Pz-III gun?

[UA3QHP]

Quote: Alf

And this is in a country in which the radio industry appeared in the 19th (!) Century. As the saying goes, "who else is the redhead should be seen."

Yes?? Can’t you name the date ?. Between 1895 and 1900.

[UA3QHP]

Quote: LeonidL

In addition, the demobilization of retired old-timers who had not only good special training, but also the experience of the Polish campaign and the Finnish war, sharply reduced the training of tank crews.

There was no demobilization in 39 g. In September 39, service life was increased and no one was demobilized.

[EvilLion]

Right? There were plans for a delay in the service, but there was no point in keeping everyone, especially since the appeal should be trained. It was the commanders who were detained, starting with sergeants.

[Dzafdet]

Spent a lot of time and material resources. They produced 25 pieces of scrap metal. The Germans rolled it out in three months. Unreliable gearboxes, engines, on-board friction clutches, weak guns Poor optics, lack of radio communications, inability to manage units in battle and interact with infantry. That was the 500 Stalinist army. As a result, the loss of all tanks and a retreat to Moscow ..

[Skif_S]

The author of the previous post leaves all that is called knowledge. The most boring Russophobic post and not the topic. Uninformative. A lot of tanks and equipment

[Skif_S]

So the USSR was preparing for a protracted war of attrition. Coalition. Doctors do not know. That no country was able to reflect the first strike. What ammunition for new types of weapons is 25%. What is not a loan? What is the general mobilization and deployment of armies and fronts. Mobilization of industry and national economy. The whole article is about tank building and the comments are dumped and dangled into the void.

[hohol95]

Spent a lot of time and material resources. They produced 25 pieces of scrap metal.

Do you like the products of the French and British (cruising tanks) tank industry more?

[EvilLion]

You would, of course, do better.

[Dzafdet]

Quote: hohol95

Spent a lot of time and material resources. They produced 25 pieces of scrap metal.

Do you like the products of the French and British (cruising tanks) tank industry more?

Read the works of V.I. Lenin: better is less, but better ...

[EvilLion]

The plan for the T-34 in the 1940th year was 1000 units. But you continue to run into Putin, Shoigu and others, for whom everything allegedly breaks down, and everything supposedly worked in the holy USSR. The genius of Stalin and his managers is that in fact having a country - a large village, they managed to realize something at all. Still, one lion can competently ordering to organize 10 sheep.

In general, the level of idiocy and frankly farmstead ideas, such as multi-turret tanks, or the use of a tank at the same time as a tractor for a cannon and transport for infantry. Oh well. Even a towed gun in practice requires at least 2 tractors, one takes the actual gun and the crew, the second loads the shells. MTLB in the years of the Second World War would not really hurt ... But why, when there is "innocently repressed" Tukhachevsky with his ideas about 50 thousand light tanks. As for the T-28, the irony is that the USSR could have received its Pz-IV weighing 30-18 tons already in the early 20s, which would critically increase its reliability and service life. In general, in the conditions of a weak design school, something extremely simple must be done; the presence of a couple of additional shooters in the tank certainly did not affect its ability to fight from the main weapon.

In principle, about the units of the 1st level of damage like T-26 and BT, we can only say that BT became unnecessary after the emergence of high-resource fine-tracked tracks. 500 km of the resource was somehow not serious. And we could not carry tanks in trucks, as they did in the world then. Before the construction of KAMAZ there were another 30 years. But there already A-20, A-32 began to drive up to give the T-34.

In general, according to the state of the armored forces before the Second World War, E. Prudnikova spoke best of all: "With 2% availability of spare parts, it can be argued that we do not have armored forces." She also correctly notes that the idea of ​​recruiting mechanized drivers from collective farm tractor drivers is so-so, because the tractor drivers only plowed, they were not required to repair the equipment, for this there were MTS, and the mechanic driver must be able to eliminate at least those faults that are feasible to eliminate in the field.

In fact, the Soviet armored forces were formed on the principle that there are factories that send everyone who has a technical education, because there is a shortage of specialists, the factory makes tanks, because there is a concentration of sensible personnel, it’s more or less it turns out. Then the tanks go to the units, and then there will be logistics with spare parts, which are already in short supply, and young guys from collective farms, who, perhaps, knew how to drive a tractor before the army. They quickly make tanks, repairing in parts is obviously not very good, because techies are in factories. Well, after the start of the war, many cars will simply be thrown.

It is possible that the Union should have built fewer tanks, just like ready-made vehicles, increasing the production of spare parts. But then again, with the guys from the collective farms after the 7-mile, you won’t cook porridge here. So the factories are forced to take on the maximum, i.e., make more finished tanks. B-2 at the beginning of the Second World War is a well-known glitch.

What were the neighbors, partners in the political process? Well, the Germans were limited for a long time, and it’s so scary to imagine what would happen if the Germans rolled out some Pz-IIIJ in the 37th, and in the 39th put Pz-IVG into production. With a good 75 mm cannon, a walkie-talkie, well-functioning motors and other nishtyaks, which in the real 41st, the Germans did not yet have in one bottle and the brute force of the T-34 with the KV-1 did not always have something to answer.

The rest did the same nonsense as ours, but did not do the right things, which they nevertheless did with us. So if our military programs were carried out through a well-known place, then there they simply broke down. Result - The Germans organized a parade in Paris.

[Dzafdet]

Quote: EvilLion

You would, of course, do better.

Are we already on you? Of course I would. And there is experience, and education, both civilian and military.

[Dzafdet]

Quote: EvilLion

The plan for the T-34 in the 1940th year was 1000 units. But you continue to run into Putin, Shoigu and others, for whom everything allegedly breaks down, and everything supposedly worked in the holy USSR. The genius of Stalin and his managers is that in fact having a country - a large village, they managed to realize something at all. Still, one lion can competently ordering to organize 10 sheep.

In general, the level of idiocy and frankly farmstead ideas, such as multi-turret tanks, or the use of a tank at the same time as a tractor for a cannon and transport for infantry. Oh well. Even a towed gun in practice requires at least 2 tractors, one takes the actual gun and the crew, the second loads the shells. MTLB in the years of the Second World War would not really hurt ... But why, when there is "innocently repressed" Tukhachevsky with his ideas about 50 thousand light tanks. As for the T-28, the irony is that the USSR could have received its Pz-IV weighing 30-18 tons already in the early 20s, which would critically increase its reliability and service life. In general, in the conditions of a weak design school, something extremely simple must be done; the presence of a couple of additional shooters in the tank certainly did not affect its ability to fight from the main weapon.

In principle, about the units of the 1st level of damage like T-26 and BT, we can only say that BT became unnecessary after the emergence of high-resource fine-tracked tracks. 500 km of the resource was somehow not serious. And we could not carry tanks in trucks, as they did in the world then. Before the construction of KAMAZ there were another 30 years. But there already A-20, A-32 began to drive up to give the T-34.

In general, according to the state of the armored forces before the Second World War, E. Prudnikova spoke best of all: "With 2% availability of spare parts, it can be argued that we do not have armored forces." She also correctly notes that the idea of ​​recruiting mechanized drivers from collective farm tractor drivers is so-so, because the tractor drivers only plowed, they were not required to repair the equipment, for this there were MTS, and the mechanic driver must be able to eliminate at least those faults that are feasible to eliminate in the field.

In fact, the Soviet armored forces were formed on the principle that there are factories that send everyone who has a technical education, because there is a shortage of specialists, the factory makes tanks, because there is a concentration of sensible personnel, it’s more or less it turns out. Then the tanks go to the units, and then there will be logistics with spare parts, which are already in short supply, and young guys from collective farms, who, perhaps, knew how to drive a tractor before the army. They quickly make tanks, repairing in parts is obviously not very good, because techies are in factories. Well, after the start of the war, many cars will simply be thrown.

It is possible that the Union should have built fewer tanks, just like ready-made vehicles, increasing the production of spare parts. But then again, with the guys from the collective farms after the 7-mile, you won’t cook porridge here. So the factories are forced to take on the maximum, i.e., make more finished tanks. B-2 at the beginning of the Second World War is a well-known glitch.

What were the neighbors, partners in the political process? Well, the Germans were limited for a long time, and it’s so scary to imagine what would happen if the Germans rolled out some Pz-IIIJ in the 37th, and in the 39th put Pz-IVG into production. With a good 75 mm cannon, a walkie-talkie, well-functioning motors and other nishtyaks, which in the real 41st, the Germans did not yet have in one bottle and the brute force of the T-34 with the KV-1 did not always have something to answer.

The rest did the same nonsense as ours, but did not do the right things, which they nevertheless did with us. So if our military programs were carried out through a well-known place, then there they simply broke down. Result - The Germans organized a parade in Paris.

The problem was that the Stalinist regime destroyed specialists, or sent them abroad. As a result, stupid copying of French, English or American designs. All this is heavily involved in the idea of ​​gigantomania. About supplying troops with spare parts, fuel. nobody ever thought about repairing. And only having received a kick in the ass in 1941, Stalin and his clique remembered the specialists and began to involve them in solving problems. but they could more or less rake only by the summer of 1944 ..

[EvilLion]

When I read people like you, I understand that comics should be prohibited because people grow up, but continue to believe in evil villains who specifically destroy everything.

What kind of specialists could Stalin destroy, having received a ruined country with 90-95% of the peasant population, I’m even afraid to ask.

[Kostadinov]

Everything is already repeatedly commented. There were a lot of flaws - from the quality and condition of the tanks to the tactics of their use.
But with all their shortcomings, I think that it is better to have one T-26 and BT-7 than several infantry with a rifle.

[Dzafdet]

Quote: EvilLion

When I read people like you, I understand that comics should be prohibited because people grow up, but continue to believe in evil villains who specifically destroy everything.

What kind of specialists could Stalin destroy, having received a ruined country with 90-95% of the peasant population, I’m even afraid to ask.

And I'm even afraid to imagine that you were finishing. In 1926, 26 million people lived in cities of the USSR, and about 120 million in rural areas. What kind of 95% percent are you talking about? in 1940: 56 million in cities, 130 million in rural areas ....
Of those who left: Sikorsky, Zvorykin .... And almost everyone was sitting with us .. There was such a marshal Kulik in the leadership. It was because of this leader that we had neither anti-tank nor zent artillery ... And there were darkness of such waders in the leadership ....

[Cer59]

Mill people, the T-28 was superior to the T-34 in terms of its capabilities and reliability. question what bastard, stabbed his modernization? in particular shielding? the t-34 was a mediocre tank, with no combat losses of up to 70% of production. and this is at the beginning of 1942. stop lying it's time to call the truth the truth.