Military Review

Take a breakthrough: Soviet submarines in the Baltic in 1942

21
Take a breakthrough: Soviet submarines in the Baltic in 1942

More than three centuries totals история Of the Baltic fleet. Many pages in it are occupied by glorious victories over the adversary, who tried with all his might to push our country from the shores of the Baltic. The Baltics defended and continue to defend the interests of Russia.


One of such glorious pages is the history of the operations of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (KBF) in the Baltic States and the Baltic Maritime Theater.

In 1942, Germany managed to capture the islands of Hogland and Big Tyuters and, thereby, create the prerequisites for creating a mine-artillery position in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. This was one of the primary tasks of the German command. The next task was to create an anti-submarine line on these two islands and thus block the Baltic Fleet in the eastern part of the Gulf with the help of antenna, bottom and anchor magnetic mines, to prevent it from coming out and creating threats to German sea lanes in the Baltic Sea. It took a breakthrough.

Candidate of historical sciences Miroslav Morozov in the studio of the program “Archival Revolution” will present unique material on which he worked for 20 years. Viewers will learn about the details of the hostilities of that period, about their results, about the efforts of the command and personnel of the KBF to prepare and conduct the 1942 military campaign.

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  1. svp67
    svp67 April 7 2020 05: 35 New
    +9
    Submariners are heroic people, and during the war, and even under such conditions, they are very, very fearless. Blessed memory to everyone who did not return from the campaign then
  2. DMB 75
    DMB 75 April 7 2020 05: 57 New
    +8
    Heroes. In such conditions, every campaign as the last, but even in such conditions, KBF submarines in 1942 sank torpedoes of 34 transport vessels (93.896 gross tons) and 1 ship, 10 transports with a total displacement of 24.330 gross tons and 1 ship became victims of mines delivered by our submariners , 3 vessels (6.304 gbt) sunk by artillery. A total of 47 sunk and 4 damaged vessels with a total displacement of 124.530 and 19.833 gt and 2 ships) Do not forget that 1942 was the most difficult and difficult year for the submarines of the Baltic Fleet, during which 12 our submarines. the memory of our submariners ...
    1. knn54
      knn54 April 7 2020 09: 05 New
      +6
      The captured ships of Denmark, Norway, France, Holland, Belgium, Poland, of which sunk1 7 or 18, were not considered by the Nazis to be losses.
  3. Amateur
    Amateur April 7 2020 06: 28 New
    +2
    Admirals from the KBF headquarters, to somehow justify their worthlessness, thoughtlessly drove boats to German anti-submarine lines.
    When trying to break through the Nashorn and Zeeigel barriers, the Shch-302, Shch-304, Shch-320, Shch-408, Shch-406, S-9 and S-12 submarines were lost. Over the entire campaign of 1943, the Baltic Fleet submarines carried out only two torpedo attacks, which were unsuccessful. (Wiki)

    The most disgusting thing is that not a single admiral or kapraz went on a campaign with the submarine crew to break through the anti-submarine lines.
    Eternal memory and glory to the Submariner Heroes and eternal shame on the staff admirals and other staff.
    "To Tributs, who commanded the fleet, Grishchenko (Submarine Commander, GSS) treated coldly and calmly:" The killer ... ".
    1. Sergey S.
      Sergey S. April 7 2020 10: 54 New
      +1
      Quote: Amateur
      Admirals from the KBF headquarters, to somehow justify their worthlessness, thoughtlessly drove boats to German anti-submarine lines.

      And what would you do, commanding the Baltic Fleet, in 1942 - 1943?
      Were there any options for not sending ships to battle with the enemy?
      Didn’t you try to realize the possibility of air cover? And you know what could be done more correctly?
      Intelligence Tributs provided subordinates Tributs. Do you know another way to obtain information about the state of anti-submarine defense, if not reconnaissance in battle?
      In the conditions of the blockade of Leningrad, could sailors sit idle in the base?

      Literally from school, having read for the first time about the hostilities of Baltic submariners, I considered hundreds of such questions.
      To a headache, literally to tears.

      Books of Travkin, Grishchenko, Korzh, Matiyasevich .... Tributs himself ...
      Nowhere and never have the tragedies of the Baltic people been hidden or hushed up.
      That was the war.
      The only thing the Baltic Fleet was rich in. - they were submarines, here submariners fought ... They died, but they fought ....
      And do not throw spits at the commanders.
      Tributz's ability to avoid losses was zero.

      In place.
      I heard that Oktyabrsky is to blame for the death and capture of the Heroes of Sevastopol, but I won’t even react here. - Not in the subject.

      But the questions ...
      Who should be branded for the death of the Heroes of the Brest Fortress? In Adzhimushka? In blocked Leningrad, is it tormenting from hunger? In Belarus, where every fourth died?

      War is a terrible reality, and it’s not the matter of sitting on the couch stigmatizing our ancestors.
      Everyone did. that he could ...

      As for Morozov, God is his judge. But even the most tragic facts would have to be learned to understand and tell with respect to people. By the way, if you read his books and hear enough of his speeches, you get the feeling that the heroes on the other side of the front, the winners are not ours, and ours always messed up and told the linden ...
      Expressed extremely correctly, materials based on the documents of the enemy can also be ostracized ... deprived of legitimacy due to the need of the enemy to hide crimes ... save his own skin ... become famous ...
      1. Amateur
        Amateur April 7 2020 20: 15 New
        +1
        And what would you do, commanding the Baltic Fleet, in 1942 - 1943?

        If I commanded the Baltic Fleet, then I, as a Russian officer and Soviet admiral, would have gone with the first submarine and would have died along with its crew, because I could not prove to the "genius" Kuznetsov that it was impossible to do this. So with his death, he would have saved the rest of the heroes-submariners.
        1. Sergey S.
          Sergey S. April 7 2020 23: 05 New
          +1
          Quote: Amateur
          If I commanded the Baltic Fleet, then I, as a Russian officer and Soviet admiral, would have gone with the first submarine and would have died along with its crew, because I could not prove to the "genius" Kuznetsov that it was impossible to do this. So with his death, he would have saved the rest of the heroes-submariners.

          Many commanders could and would try to do so, especially at the beginning of the war.
          Few circumstances allowed them to take the initiative and save some of their subordinates.

          But ... without the permission of the senior chief, staff law officers did not have the right to go to sea on ships.
          Only to provide young commanders, not admirals, but recent commanders, usually flagship specialists ...
          A vivid example is the northerner Kolyshkin.

          But the admiral as a provider did not happen ... and they would not have let him go ...
          And about N.G. Kuznetsova you mention in vain with such humiliation.
          He covered many from the highest anger, the sailor was real, and the leader was talented.
          It was he who saved our entire fleet from defeat on June 22, 1941.

          The combat readiness system, developed and implemented literally on the eve of the war after his return from Spain, is his doing.
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA April 8 2020 18: 09 New
        0
        Quote: Sergey S.
        And what would you do, commanding the Baltic Fleet, in 1942 - 1943?
        Were there any options for not sending ships to battle with the enemy?

        Judging by the fact that the KBF core has been in the bases since the beginning of the blockade, there were.
        In 1942, a breakthrough of the Nargen-Porkkalaudda line of the submarine was still possible. In 1943, it was no longer there: the border acquired a powerful network fence, search submarine search teams, on-duty submarines, and air cover. It was possible to work on the strength of the PLO only with Lavensaari, but the fleet simply could not push enough ships, boats and planes onto the island - there was nowhere to go. Plus, at that time even the Lavensaari-Kronshtadt highway was the scene of battle.
        After the first casualties, it was necessary to report that without establishing dominance at sea and passing passages through the NPR, the submarine’s exit to the Baltic is impossible.
        Quote: Sergey S.
        In the conditions of the blockade of Leningrad, could sailors sit idle in the base?

        EM, LD, KR and LK were sitting the same.
        Quote: Sergey S.
        By the way, if you read his books and hear enough of his speeches, you get the feeling that the heroes on the other side of the front, the winners are not ours, and ours always messed up and told the linden ...

        Simply Morozov needs to be read and watched after reading domestic memoirs and reports.
        How many sunken ships do Travkin have there according to reports, and how much - documented? EMNIP, the ratio of 14 to 1. wink
        1. Sergey S.
          Sergey S. April 8 2020 19: 15 New
          +1
          Quote: Alexey RA
          Simply Morozov needs to be read and watched after reading domestic memoirs and reports.
          How many sunken ships did Travkin report, and how many were documented? EMNIP, the ratio of 14 to 1.

          Everything is read.
          And even Platonov with his "complete statistics".

          But for some reason, German sources are recognized as reliable, and ours allegedly lie and attribute ...
          And so with some authors in everything and everywhere.

          I would have looked at Morozov when witnesses of those events were alive ...

          Lunin did not see the hits in Tirpitz, but there were no bombs, but the crew heard torpedoes.
          Marinesco attacked a well-guarded ship, not a defenseless ship. In the late 1970s, attended a meeting with the crew of the S-13. There were about 15 of them. Almost everyone spoke. And each one said something different, it was clear that it was being retrieved from memory, but was not played up on the instructions of the political officer.
          Impression for life.
          I had other meetings with the legends of naval history, and I have no reason not to believe the officers who were present or worked in the relevant situation review commissions.
          It turns out strange, but their opinion almost always diverges from what rushing from behind the hill.
          And in the 1990s, in our society of shipbuilders, a sad author appeared on the history section, who, on the basis of German data, says that Marinesco drowned women and children ... In fairness, he did not write him down as criminals, but Wilhelm’s military appointment denied completely. Good. that one of our old submariners was in a museum in Hamburg, and saw a plate with the names of more than 150 German submariners drowned by Marinesco. In general, we kicked this author out without understanding the need for mutual forgiveness ... Then we find out he received a grant from the Germans, writes a book about the horrors of war ...
          The most unpleasant thing is that he was so confident in his position that he still went to the Central Naval Museum - he also performed ... And there again veterans came, - they kicked him.

          Eye to eye, these authors are not in a position to resist the domestic history in the person of specialists and the public. But they are printed much more often, with beautiful bindings and large print runs ...
          Draw conclusions.

          And further. Calculate how many losses the Germans recognize from the actions of our fleet and aircraft, you might be surprised ... In 1945, their bases would have to be crowded with ships and ships ....
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA April 8 2020 19: 33 New
            -1
            Quote: Sergey S.
            Lunin did not see the hits in Tirpitz, but there were no bombs, but the crew heard torpedoes.

            And no one else. Neither the crews of the entire German ship group, nor the informants in these crews, nor the English agents in the base — no one saw or heard explosions and did not observe their consequences.
            Quote: Sergey S.
            Marinesco attacked a well-guarded ship, not a defenseless ship.

            Well guarded Is this one Löwe destroyer in an escort?
            Quote: Sergey S.
            In the late 1970s, attended a meeting with the crew of the S-13. There were about 15 of them. Almost everyone spoke. And each one said something different, it was clear that it was being retrieved from memory, but was not played up on the instructions of the political officer.

            You know, human memory is a tricky thing. And after a quarter of a century, a person can even remember what was not there.
            Participants of the SFV talked and wrote about rubber pillboxes and multi-storey cannon DOS. After the war, the tankers blamed Lend-Lease "coffins" - they say, "Valentine" had weak armor. And what eyewitnesses recalled about the battles in the Gulf of Riga in 1941 ...
            1. Sergey S.
              Sergey S. April 8 2020 20: 54 New
              0
              Quote: Alexey RA
              You know, human memory is a tricky thing. And after a quarter of a century, a person can even remember what was not there.
              Participants of the SFV talked and wrote about rubber pillboxes and multi-storey cannon DOS. After the war, the tankers blamed Lend-Lease "coffins" - they say, "Valentine" had weak armor. And what eyewitnesses recalled about the battles in the Gulf of Riga in 1941 ...

              This is clear...
              But the enemies have the same processes ...

              Plus, attempts to hide real losses from all our enemies.
              It seems that our participants in the events are the most frank, even taking into account journalistic corrections.

              There were books that sinned by exaggerating victories ... But even in them, if you deeply understand, you could always find the frank truth that explains where this very "story" came from. Here's an example:
              Question about the number of German tanks in Crimea.
              Naval scouts who were not experts in tank troops found that on the eve of the first assault of Sevastopol, the Germans in the depths of defense drove a small number of tanks in different constructions in the ring, so that they crawled over the hill ...
              From a distance it seemed that the column was large.
              And in this book there is a fantastic episode of how scouts seized and disarmed a battery of siege mortars that coastal artillery could not cover ...

              Now we read about how the leaders of the defense of Sevastopol lied to the headquarters on German tanks ...
              But in fact, they knew about the Germans' attempts to confuse their heads ...

              And such cases the number is infinite.

              By the way, there was not one destroyer near Gustlov, but several groups of ships in the immediate vicinity: a group of minesweepers provided a channel, ships of another convoy joined the rescue ...

              Sam N.A. Lunin (lucky, I saw him from a distance in the garage) never said that Tirpitz torpedoed. And in the report he did not report it. But the attack, the explosions of torpedoes, the reduced course of Tirpitz, the further stillness of Tirpitz ... it was all.
              And, frankly, personally, I am inclined to the version that the Germans hid the results of the attack of N.A. Lunin. Moreover, after its sinking, the real ends literally into the water.
              1. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA April 9 2020 14: 13 New
                0
                Quote: Sergey S.
                But the attack, the explosions of torpedoes, the reduced course of Tirpitz, the further stillness of Tirpitz ... it was all.

                I highly doubt that the Germans would continue the operation after damaging the flagship with a sharp decrease in speed. But the detachment turned only after another three hours.
                As for immobility, this is a common misfortune of all the "big pots" of the Reich - the Germans were simply afraid to let them out of the base. And the larger the "pot" was, the more they feared. And, judging by the fate of the Scharnhorst, this fear was well founded. smile
                Yes, and fuel for the operation of such units was required a lot.
                Quote: Sergey S.
                By the way, there was not one destroyer near Gustlov, but several groups of ships in the immediate vicinity: a group of minesweepers provided a channel, ships of another convoy joined the rescue ...

                Let’s then record all ships within a radius of one hundred miles, including those standing in port. smile The ships indicated by you approached "Gustlov" after the attack. And before that, they performed their tasks in their areas.
                By the way, how many of these ships were there? Only MM T36 is mentioned in Hipper's escort. And they mention TSC only in the context of "on the "Gustlov" they turned on the running lights in order to disperse from the TSC, which in fact were not there".
                On top of everything else, GAS did not work at Löwe either. The German Ordnung in all its glory - if the Germans really like something, then they do it enchantingly.
                1. Sergey S.
                  Sergey S. April 9 2020 22: 09 New
                  0
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  I highly doubt that the Germans would continue the operation

                  In particular, you are right, but all these facts do not add up to the final result ...

                  Read Manstein ... Even the title "Lost Victories" ...
                  Here I trust Suvorov, Alexander Vasilievich more.

                  Once happiness, twice happiness - have mercy on God! It’s necessary sometime and a little skill.
    2. Sergey S.
      Sergey S. April 7 2020 10: 59 New
      +2
      Quote: Amateur
      The most disgusting thing is that not a single admiral or kapraz went on a campaign with the submarine crew to break through the anti-submarine lines.

      But the Specialists then went ....
      This should be enough for you.
      1. Amateur
        Amateur April 7 2020 20: 19 New
        +1
        But the Specialists then went ....

        And what about the Specialists? Are they in the CPU standing behind the commander with a machine gun ?. How many admirals died in battle? (As a reference: in the battle 2 com.
        1. Sergey S.
          Sergey S. April 7 2020 23: 10 New
          0
          Quote: Amateur
          How many admirals died in battle?

          This is not an argument at all.
          Moreover, the admirals did not have the right to leave command posts and headquarters for the direct management of small military means.
          You should get acquainted with the Charter.
          1. Amateur
            Amateur April 8 2020 09: 22 New
            0
            the admirals did not have the right to leave command posts and headquarters for the direct control of small military means.
            You should get acquainted with the Charter.

            Cowards always find a reason either in the higher authorities, or in the Charters.
    3. Sergey S.
      Sergey S. April 7 2020 11: 03 New
      +2
      Quote: Amateur
      Eternal memory and glory to the Submariner Heroes and eternal shame on the staff admirals and other staff.

      Headquarters to disperse right now?
      Do we manage without staff?

      Oh, these cliches ....
    4. Sergey S.
      Sergey S. April 7 2020 11: 12 New
      +1
      Quote: Amateur
      ... shame on staff admirals ...
      "To Tributs, who commanded the fleet, Grishchenko (Submarine Commander, GSS) treated coldly and calmly:" The killer ... ".

      Peter Denisovich Grishchenko is the most worthy commander!
      But ... not a Hero of the Soviet Union ...
      I respect him for his real merits, but ... he could say anything in haste.
      The character was complicated.

      By the way, he was one of those who had a negative attitude towards A.I. Marinesco
      The topic is similar, and I do not want to continue, and it makes no sense.
      People ... Characters ... Circumstances ...

      And how did the above statement become known? P.D. Grishchenko in public is unlikely to have allowed himself such a thing ... And in this case, a document is needed. And not from Morozov.
      As far as I remember, Grishchenko, having left the fleet, worked as a teacher in Kaliningrad. Can living witnesses respond?
  4. NF68
    NF68 April 7 2020 17: 42 New
    +1
    Somewhere I came across the evidence that after the Germans thoroughly blocked the Gulf of Finland with mines and other barriers, the probability of a breakthrough of Soviet submarines in the Baltic was approximately 30%. The probability of going back was hardly more than the same 30%. If we consider that the submarine could have been damaged even when breaking through to the west, then the chance to go back was very small.
  5. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA April 8 2020 17: 49 New
    +2
    In 1942, Germany managed to capture the islands of Hogland and Big Tyuters and, thereby, create the prerequisites for creating a mine-artillery position in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland.

    Hogland was taken by the Finns. In 1941-1942 he changed hands several times.
    Ours left him for the first time on 07.12.1941/02.01.1942/27.03.1942 - and the Finns settled on the island. 488/191/08 Gogland was taken by an attack by a detachment of Colonel Barinov (on ice). But on 13.04.1942/XNUMX/XNUMX the Finns launched an offensive and the next day they knocked out our garrison from the island. Of the XNUMX of our fighters, only XNUMX were able to retreat to Lavensaari. Attempts to return the island for the third time - on XNUMX and XNUMX, were unsuccessful - the marines did not reach the island.
    The funny thing is that in 1944 the Germans tried to drive the Finns out of Gogland - the operation Tanne Ost. But the German landing party failed - the Finns were traditionally strong in defense on the islands (especially with the support of Soviet aviation). smile

    With Big Tyuters the picture is similar: ours left it on 31.10.1941/30.12.1941/28.03.1942, re-occupied it on 08/13.04.1942/XNUMX, but on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX they were forced to leave the island, which was occupied by the Germans and Finns. Attempts to return the island for the third time - on XNUMX and XNUMX, were unsuccessful - the attackers were repelled. But on this island the Germans commanded.