Military Review

Semyon Tymoshenko: there are no victories without defeats. To the 50th anniversary of the death of Marshal

146

Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko, who died 50 years ago, on March 31, 1970, is, on the one hand, as it was customary to say in his time, a “typical representative” of the brilliant cohort of Stalin's Marshals of Victory, and on the other, a figure that has a rather ambiguous interpretation in stories Great Patriotic War. Many researchers of his life’s path, by the way, to this day cannot come to the conclusion whether Tymoshenko should be considered an unconditional “lucky man” or a person who has been plagued by fatal failures for a long time.


The future marshal was born in the Bessarabian province (the territory of the current Odessa region) and was 17 in a row a child in a peasant family. He survived - it’s already luck ... Drafting into the army in 1914. Yesterday’s military laborer’s military career was quite successful. After graduating from a machine gun school, Tymoshenko fought excellently, heroically. Of all the four degrees of soldier George, only the first — the highest — did not manage to get. Surely she would have been rewarded, but the hard hot corporal had pulled to go on the physiognomy of his own company commander, who was mocking at his comrade.

For such things in wartime conditions there could be only one penalty - execution. They sentenced him to it. Saved Semyon Konstantinovich that, taking into account "outstanding feats and merits," the tribunal at the last second softened and sent the shrew not to the wall, but to hard labor. Doubtful “pardon”, but it was January 1917 in the courtyard, and there was nothing left to exist for hard labor with tribunals on Russian soil. Lucky ...

It is clear that after all this, the choice between the red and white camps for the convict freed by the revolution did not stand in principle. Tymoshenko began the civil war, as they say, “from scratch”, as an ordinary Red Guard, and ended it as commander of a cavalry division, holder of three orders of the Red Banner and winner of an honorary revolutionary weapons.

From this, in fact, moment, some of the historians begin to plant natural fiction around the fate of Semyon Konstantinovich - they say that his enchanting career rise and further elevation to the Red Army are solely due to the fact that when participating in the defense of Tsaritsyn, Tymoshenko met with the leader Stalin, who “liked” something. What can I say? Firstly, there were more civilized take-offs and faster, and secondly, it was not about dating that matter, but about the fact that after being wounded on the battlefields about five times, at least Tymoshenko had never abandoned his command or left the system . And he smashed the “whites” more than successfully. It was not without reason that the “Red cavalryman” of the Red Army subsequently called him Budenny, Tukhachevsky.

In the 30s, Tymoshenko "grew" quite intensively, passing all the necessary career steps - the commander of the corps, army, and the Kiev Military District. In 1939, he took an active part in the return of the territories of Western Ukraine and Belarus to the USSR, and a year later, perhaps, the peak moment came in Tymoshenko’s activities, as a commander — the troops of the North-Western Front under his command break through the “insurmountable” Mannerheim Line, bringing the USSR the final victory in the Winter War with Finland. Today, again, some people argue: “right” or “wrong” this operation was carried out, however, Comrade Stalin had no doubts about this. Tymoshenko receives the first Hero Star, becomes Marshal and People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.

For what deed committed in this post, he definitely should pay tribute to enormous respect, for this is a personal appeal to Joseph Vissarionovich with a report on the need for the speedy release from prison of a number of those who went there "for company" with true conspirators during the investigation of the "military case" Red Army commanders of various ranks. When discussing this point, completely abusive versions often arise that the People’s Commissar decided to do this solely because of “special proximity” to Stalin, and then almost shook with fear, expecting “whether the NKVD black car would approach” . And laughter and sin ...

The leader in such matters did not at all discount on any personal relations. It was possible to convince him only with clear arguments and a firm position. Tymoshenko succeeded. He pulled out many future creators of our Victory, including Konstantin Rokossovsky, because of the "thorn". For this alone, he bowed deeply to him. And Semen Konstantinovich was not afraid in his life of anyone and nothing - this has already been verified more than once ...

The dismissal of Tymoshenko from the post of People’s Commissar of Defense in July 1941, very soon after the start of the Great Patriotic War, some undertake to interpret as a manifestation of what Stalin “laid the blame on him for the unpreparedness of the Red Army” to the start of hostilities. More than doubtful. If so, it would not be reduced one step, but wiped off into powder. It’s just that Joseph Vissarionovich, seeing how events unfold, was forced to lock the entire leadership of the country (including the military) personally, creating the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The People's Commissar of Defense in such a situation turned into a figure of not paramount importance. And Tymoshenko was needed by the Supreme at the front.

In 1941, almost all of the activities of Semyon Konstantinovich (as, indeed, the vast majority of domestic military leaders) was reduced to the fulfillment of the simplest order: “Hold on at all costs!” Here he was definitely “lucky” to the fullest - Tymoshenko invariably finds herself in the most difficult sections, in fact, hopeless. Nevertheless, the same battle of Smolensk, even with its terrifying losses, became the guarantee that the Red Army subsequently was able to defend Moscow. It is completely incorrect to hold Tymoshenko responsible for the Kiev catastrophe - he was appointed to command the defense of the city less than a week before his forced surrender and three days later he gave the command to withdraw troops. Another thing is that some of his subordinates did not hurry to fulfill this order, which led to tragic consequences.

However, Tymoshenko managed to get even with the Nazis a couple of months later, having brilliantly carried out the Rostov offensive operation.

Having knocked out the Fritz from Rostov-on-Don, the Red Army won one of its first significant victories in that war. The real, serious defeat of Tymoshenko was the Kharkov operation, which in May 1942 resulted in a real military collapse of the Red Army - with huge losses and strategic losses. This is, perhaps, the most tragic page of the general activity of Semyon Konstantinovich, which remained an eternal pain for him. Nevertheless, even after the incident, they do not repress him, do not deprive him of ranks and the right to command - in 1942, troops led by Tymoshenko took part in the initial stage of the Battle of Stalingrad.

But after this there is a complete "excommunication" of the Marshal from the leadership of any units and formations of the Red Army. The Supreme turns him, in fact, into a controller and coordinator, a representative of the Headquarters on various fronts. With the personal participation of Tymoshenko, many offensive operations are being developed. In any case, he earned his Order of Victory honestly, like all other awards - from St. George's Crosses to the Stars of the Hero.

After the war, the fate of Semyon Konstantinovich also developed quite standardly - the command of a number of military districts, a group of General Inspectors of the Ministry of Defense, leadership of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans. He differs from many of his comrades-in-arms except perhaps by one - the marshal did not leave a single line of memoirs. He said - I’m not going to lie, but they won’t let me write the truth! Given that the proposal to "take up the pen" came to him, most likely, at the time of Khrushchev, we can assume what kind of "truth" they wanted from the marshal. The same Rokossovsky sent such messengers, persuading him to throw mud at Stalin, away. Tymoshenko simply refused to write anything at all. The same thing.

You can try to determine for a long time and meticulously: what was more in the fate of Semyon Konstantinovich - ups or downs, successes or failures ... In any case, his heroic life path indicates that there are no victories without defeats, and most importantly in soldier’s fate - this is not a calculation of the relations between them, but loyalty to the homeland and oath.
Author:
Photos used:
Wikipedia / Marshal S.K. Timoshenko
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  1. Eug
    Eug April 1 2020 18: 21 New
    +1
    Damn interesting - why didn’t leave memories?
    1. AU Ivanov.
      AU Ivanov. April 1 2020 18: 54 New
      -2
      They say that he did not want to lie to the need of Soviet official propaganda. And the truth would not be missed, it was bitter.
      1. Krasnoyarsk
        Krasnoyarsk April 1 2020 19: 59 New
        +7
        Quote: AU Ivanov.
        They say that he did not want to lie to the need of Soviet official propaganda. And the truth would not be missed, it was bitter.

        In this case, not the "official Soviet", but the Khrushchev's ANTISTALIN propaganda.
        1. AU Ivanov.
          AU Ivanov. April 1 2020 20: 20 New
          -4
          Khrushchev led the Soviet Union, sort of like. Therefore, the propaganda is Soviet.
          1. Krasnoyarsk
            Krasnoyarsk April 1 2020 22: 28 New
            +3
            Quote: AU Ivanov.
            Khrushchev led the Soviet Union, sort of like. Therefore, the propaganda is Soviet.

            Don't be stupid. Soviet propaganda aims to glorify the Soviet way of life. And anti-Stalinist, it is not against, let's say - "Soviet power", but against Stalin.
            1. AU Ivanov.
              AU Ivanov. April 1 2020 23: 35 New
              +2
              Soviet propaganda, among other things, carefully retouched its own jambs. There were whole taboo topics. Battle of Rzhev, for example. The initial period of the war. And in the memoirs it was possible to write what was approved by GlavpUR, that is, a smooth, sleek "truth about the war" Tymoshenko turned out to be an honest man and refused to write false memoirs.
              1. mat-vey
                mat-vey April 2 2020 05: 51 New
                0
                Quote: AS Ivanov.
                Tymoshenko turned out to be an honest man and refused to write false memoirs.

                Well, if the conversation is "for propaganda" - then what about "writing false memoirs refused" is there any documentary? And then all this is "false propaganda" ..)
              2. Krasnoyarsk
                Krasnoyarsk April 2 2020 10: 45 New
                +2
                Quote: AS Ivanov.
                own jambs. There were whole taboo topics. The Battle of Rzhev, for example. The initial period of the war. And in the memoirs you can

                Why would Tymoshenko write about the "Battle of Rzhev" without being a participant? This battle is entirely on the conscience of the "marshal of victory"
                1. AU Ivanov.
                  AU Ivanov. April 2 2020 11: 01 New
                  +3
                  It would not hurt Zhukov to devote more attention to the Battle of Rzhev in his memoirs - he had a direct relationship to it. But no - just a casual mention. Here we write, here we do not write, here we wrapped the fish.
        2. fuxila
          fuxila April 2 2020 08: 04 New
          +3
          If he did not want to write "Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist" writing, he would have written under Brezhnev, he died in 1970. It turns out that he did not want to write anything at all: not under Stalin, not under Khrushchev, not under Brezhnev ... then the records remained, they just lie somewhere hidden, like the recently found diaries of Serov ...
      2. Bogatyrev
        Bogatyrev April 2 2020 01: 23 New
        +2
        Not bitter, but sweet. Indeed, on the contrary, they wanted to pour dirt on Stalin.
        1. AU Ivanov.
          AU Ivanov. April 2 2020 11: 08 New
          +3
          True, in the first place, it must be objective. And whether it’s bitter or sweet, we will decide for ourselves.
          1. Bogatyrev
            Bogatyrev April 10 2020 00: 50 New
            0
            What you decide is already a priori writing that some truth was supposedly bitter, and yet there is no reason to say so.
    2. andrewkor
      andrewkor April 1 2020 19: 11 New
      +4
      Here Zhukov was literally forced into his memoirs at least a couple of lines and insert about Brezhnev. "Memories and Reflections." APN, Moscow, 1971, page 441.
      1. AU Ivanov.
        AU Ivanov. April 1 2020 20: 40 New
        +8
        Zhukov (and most quickly for him) hesitated from publication to publication of Memories and Reflections along with the party line.
      2. Krasnoyarsk
        Krasnoyarsk April 2 2020 10: 47 New
        -1
        Quote: andrewkor
        Here Zhukov was literally forced into his memoirs at least a couple of lines and insert about Brezhnev. "Memories and Reflections." APN, Moscow, 1971, page 441.

        Yeah, they squeezed the tomatoes right into the vice and forced them.
        1. ccsr
          ccsr April 2 2020 11: 49 New
          +5
          Quote: Krasnoyarsk
          Yeah, they squeezed the tomatoes right into the vice and forced them.

          No, everything is much simpler - they could not have let it through the Chief Military Censor, referring to the secrecy of some materials that Zhukov used, and would not be allowed to publish memoirs, but would offer to publish them for official use in a limited edition. But Zhukov wanted to make excuses to history and to the people for the losses that the country suffered, which is why he went to any changes in order to show himself from the best side.
  2. knn54
    knn54 April 1 2020 18: 25 New
    +6
    He tried to be of service to the motherland - as much as he could.
    1. ccsr
      ccsr April 1 2020 19: 12 New
      +7
      Quote: knn54
      He tried to be of service to the motherland - as much as he could.

      He brought especially great "benefit" when he dealt with II Proskurov for giving an objective analysis of intelligence during the Finnish period, and who rightly accused Tymoshenko of not knowing how to use intelligence materials and unable to organize reconnaissance in the district.
      And the case of aviators in 1941 also does not paint the Marshal, although he received a reprimand.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA April 2 2020 11: 08 New
        +6
        Quote: ccsr
        He brought especially great "benefit" when he dealt with II Proskurov for giving an objective analysis of intelligence during the Finnish period, and who rightly accused Tymoshenko of not knowing how to use intelligence materials and unable to organize reconnaissance in the district.

        Hmmm ... didn’t Proskurov clash with Meretskov about not using intelligence for planning? Tymoshenko took command of the NWF only on 07.01.1940/XNUMX/XNUMX, and before that he commanded the Kiev Military District.
        Under Tymoshenko, they just recognized that the Mannerheim Line exists and engaged in reconnaissance and tying of its bunker.
        1. Pane Kohanku
          Pane Kohanku April 2 2020 11: 35 New
          +5
          Hmmm ... didn’t Proskurov clash with Meretskov about not using intelligence for planning?

          at the meeting of April 1940, following the results of the Finnish war, Proskurov looked rather pale ... True, he was bombarded with questions. Exposure:

          STALIN. How much did the intelligence of individual divisions give? (meaning the Finns - P.K.)
          PROSKurov. Up to 10 divisions and up to 30 separate battalions. Which actually happened. But the general contingent of the military trained, comrade Shaposhnikov, must show something, this can not be discarded.
          VOTE. They say that the Suomi machine gun was tested with us in 1936. Is this true or not?
          VOTE. At comrade Shestakova, we have one, these data can be obtained. He says that he tested these machine guns in 1936.
          STALIN. This means nothing. He may be famous. A 100-charge American machine gun was known, it was with the Chekists, but it was believed that it was a police weapon, that in the army this weapon had no meaning. It turned out on the contrary that for the army a machine gun was a highly necessary phenomenon, and intelligence represented it exclusively from the political side, that it was not suitable for war. Was that the case?
          PROSKurov. There were some materials about enemy tactics.
          STALIN. When was the brochure on the methods of war published?
          PROSKurov. In December.
          STALIN. She is said to have lain for 5-6 years.
          PROSKurov. There were such materials.
          STALIN. This is a brochure that came out two weeks after the war. Brochure on how to fight the Finns.
          PROSKurov. This is not the brochure that came out later.
          STALIN. This brochure was published two weeks after the war. And why couldn’t I leave in a year?
          PROSKurov. Because it was in the archive.
          STALIN. Her military attache sent.
          PROSKurov. Correctly.
          STALIN. You could not complain that the brochure was in the archive, whereas you had to take it as the head of intelligence.
          PROSKurov. There are many undeveloped valuable materials in the archive. Now we are developing, but there is a whole cellar, a huge amount of literature, on which a whole team of 15 people should work over a couple of years.
          VOTE. This literature is outdated during this time.
          STALIN. Brochure on how the Finns will fight. Is this not a mockery of everyone and the Red Army, that the pamphlet is more than a year old, 5 years old, others say, and it is printed only two weeks after the war, so that it can be used late in the Red Army?
          PROSKurov. There is no intent.


          That is .. some kind of systemic problems in preparation for the war. And not only him. In all structures. hi prepared disgustingly. And no one had enough experience ...
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA April 2 2020 11: 54 New
            +4
            Quote: Pane Kohanku
            at the meeting of April 1940, following the results of the Finnish war, Proskurov looked rather pale ..

            Proskurov, on the other hand, had a reinforced concrete argument - intelligence transmitted information, but no one got acquainted with it. He, the pomnitsa, with figures in his hands showed how many times secret and even unclassified materials were taken on foreign armies.
            1. Pane Kohanku
              Pane Kohanku April 2 2020 12: 08 New
              +5
              He, the pomnitsa, with figures in his hands showed how many times secret and even unclassified materials were taken on foreign armies.

              yes, Alexey, but still looked like a schoolboy who got a deuce .. He justified himself.
              Here - specially leave the words of Mehlis .. hi
              STALIN. Intelligence begins with the fact that official literature, operational literature must be taken from other states, military circles and given. This is a very true intelligence.
              Intelligence is not only about keeping an undercover agent who is disguised anywhere in France or England, not only that. Intelligence consists of working with clippings and reprinting. This is a very serious job. Look, now the war is on, they will criticize and expose each other, all secrets will be taken out into the street because they hate each other. It's time to cling to it and make it our property. This work is directly intelligence, the most serious. And you do not think so. There is a "Red Star", it is not a damn thing. What war newspaper is this ?!
              MEHLIS. I’ve been fighting for two years to remove the newspaper’s editor. This man is neither familiar with the military, nor with the newspaper business, but since he is flexible, they keep him, and he still sits as an editor.
              STALIN. Whoever they put! You misunderstand the contents of the newspaper. You are criticizing the command staff, and this should occupy tenth place. The main thing is to teach our people military affairs. And you write one thing today, tomorrow another, the opposite. And it all gets along.
              MEHLIS. I spoke about this and asked to change the editor at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.
              STALIN. The point is not in the person, but in the program - the military should be a newspaper or the military.
              MEHLIS. The content of the newspaper depends on the leader.
              STALIN. No, our editor does not have the right to manage the newspaper in his own way, the editor has a line, an installation. Why should this newspaper be a newspaper of the Political Administration?
              MEHLIS. She is the People’s Commissar of Defense.
              STALIN. It is very good. If the newspaper was a Political Administration, it would have shot all the commanders, it would have left some farm laborers. (Laugh)
              PROSKurov. I organized a check on how people read literature. Only the individual commanders of the central administrations, the individual senior officers of the headquarters, and only the individual employees of the grassroots apparatus are acquainted with the literature of the 5th Directorate. Some publications are kept in the safe for 3-5 months, which makes it impossible to acquaint the necessary circle of commanders with this literature. They do not read literature such as the combat manuals of France, the condition of troops, etc., not to mention literature of indirect relevance.
              STALIN. You must be able to present a dish so that a person enjoys eating.
              PROSKurov. If material gets caught, read it. It is wonderfully printed - with illustrations, with pictures.
              STALIN. (Shows a book) Is the deployment of German troops printed here?
              PROSKurov. Yes sir.
              STALIN. This cannot be printed at all.
              PROSKurov. It is impossible and secret?
              STALIN. Need to widely disseminate, what circulation?
              PROSKurov. 3 thousand. No one can buy, everything under the number is secret.
              STALIN. It is impossible to state such things, it is impossible to print at all, it is necessary to print about military knowledge, equipment, tactics, strategy, the composition of the division, battalion, so that people have an idea about the division, so that people have an idea about the parts, artillery, technology, what new parts are.
              PROSKurov. There is.
              STALIN. This is necessary for the General Staff and senior command staff.
              PROSKurov. For western counties is also necessary. Facts about the study of intelligence literature:
              1. The literature of the 5th Directorate, including purely aviation, is not read in the Main Directorate of the Air Force. For example, the experience of using the German Air Force during the period of a Polish company, the charter of the French Air Force, the charter of the German Air Force, etc. The chief of staff of the Air Force did not even see all the literature, it is kept by some minor person and is not reported. Heads of departments, people who should to take into account in their work all foreign novelties, as a rule, also do not read literature.
              2. Here is the Artillery Directorate, department heads do not read intelligence reports on foreign technology. After reviewing them by the heads of information departments, the Office sends these reports to the secret library. In the secret library, these books are lying without any movement. Books such as "Artillery of the German Army", "French Army" and others read only four people.
              MERETSKOV. There is a “classified” stamp, I can’t take a book home, but I can’t read at work, I need to do work, and therefore these books are lying without any movement, nobody reads them. I have no right to take the book home, put it in my portfolio, as it is considered a secret. The regiment commander will not take this book at all.
              STALIN. Who invented this?
              PROSKurov. There was an order of People's Commissar of Defense No. 015.
              STALIN. You yourself offered him that, he himself couldn’t come up with that.
              VOTE. This is an order for secret literature, but why should literature be secretly published?
              MERETSKOV. Then allow me to take these books for reading, but only with the caveat - do not lose or do something else so that the books do not lie in the library.
              VOTE. Books should be at headquarters.
              PROSKurov. How to explain, comrade Voronov, that of the 50 translated articles in the Artillery Directorate, only 7 articles were read by two persons. These articles are without any vultures, unclassified.
              VOTE. Where did they check it?
              PROSKurov. We have.
              STALIN. It is necessary to interest people.
              PROSKurov. And dozens more examples can be given.
              STALIN. You need to be able to present.
              PROSKurov. These reports are presented in good condition.
              STALIN. A person will look and discard this book, some introduction would have been done, or something. Need to see.
              PROSKurov. Yes, I'm listening.
              STALIN. People are overwhelmed with work, they don’t want to read this waste paper, they discard it, this number 2 does not say anything.
              PROSKurov. Maybe for this reason the headquarters of the 1st Red Banner Army kept this report for three months, did not send it in parts, believing that these reports should be reconnaissance
              send directly to the units, i.e., the Intelligence Unit must know the location of the units. I think this is wildness. Our Chekists investigated this case and informed us that they were really arguing over whom to send these reports to.
              The conclusion is clear that intelligence literature is not really studied in our country.


              Well, then he broadcasts about intelligence and inability to use it.
        2. ccsr
          ccsr April 2 2020 12: 42 New
          +3
          Quote: Alexey RA
          Hmmm ... didn’t Proskurov clash with Meretskov about not using intelligence for planning?

          Proskurov most likely clashed with Stalin, and in the report he laid out all the blunders of the leadership of the LenVO during the Finnish period, thereby showing what they stand as professionals. I think that Tymoshenko did not forgive him for this when he agreed to his arrest.
          Quote: Alexey RA
          When Tymoshenko just recognized that the Mannerheim Line exists

          This in the materials of the meeting looks different:
          MEHLIS. When was this material transferred to the General Staff?
          PROSKurov. Until October 1, 1939. By this time, it was known that the Finns were launching large construction works.
          It was known that the Finns launched large construction work in the summer of 1939. The agents reported that intensive construction was underway.
          During the summer of 1939, various reports indicated that a large quantity of various building materials was being transported. We did not have exact data in the second half of 1939.
          All available information about fortifications and barriers was developed, mapped in Leningrad and sent to military units ...
          According to various reference books that were published, we knew that Finland had 600 thousand people military-obliged. There were up to 400 thousand military-trained people.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA April 2 2020 13: 27 New
            +3
            Quote: ccsr
            This in the materials of the meeting looks different:

            So this is after the war and at the highest command level, when each tried to blame the blunders on the other. Here Meretskov also confessed that he had the Album of fortifications, but, allegedly, it did not correspond to reality.
            Specifically, your quote is Proskurov’s explanation that the intelligence knew everything and transmitted the data to the district.
            And in December 1939 in places either simply did not believe in the existence of the Mannerheim Line, or seriously underestimated it:
            On December 17, 1939, the brigade command received a combat mission: to support the advance of parts of the 50th Rifle Corps (123th and 138th Rifle Divisions) during the attack of the fortified Khottinen nodes and a height of 65,5. The chief of staff of the 138th division reported to the headquarters of the corps that "there is no fortification ahead, the enemy is running". Without checking this information, the commander of the corps, commander F. Gorlenko, ordered the cancellation of the previously assigned 5-hour artillery preparation and the attack of the infantry of the 138th division with the support of the 91st tank battalion. However, the attackers ran into a powerful fortified enemy defense strip, and came under heavy artillery and machine-gun mortar fire.

            And the whole corps and the heavy tank brigade fought against two UR, EMNIP, a week.
            However, the 20th TTBR went to zero in three days:
            December 17: out of 21 T-28s, 5 serviceable vehicles returned, the rest were either destroyed (4 burned out, 1 turned upside down, 1 captured), or require repair. The 91st tank battalion is not operational.
            December 18: it was the turn of the 90th tank battalion, in which only 7 vehicles were irrevocable.
            December 19: The 90th tank battalion, with the support of the remaining brigade battalions, broke through the Mannerheim Line, but our infantry retreated in a panic. Result - the team lost 29 T-28.
            On December 20, the brigade was withdrawn for reformation.
            1. ccsr
              ccsr April 2 2020 13: 39 New
              +3
              Quote: Alexey RA
              And in December 1939, on the ground, the Mannerheim Line either simply did not believe in the existence or was seriously underestimated:

              So Proskurov said that commanders do not know how to use reconnaissance materials and correctly organize reconnaissance during hostilities. I do not want to praise Proskurov, who was not a professional intelligence officer, but was a very honest person, and paid for it. But I consider the very role of Tymoshenko in the destruction of this commander as settling accounts and vile in fact, because in reality this person did no harm to the Motherland and served her worthily.
            2. strannik1985
              strannik1985 April 2 2020 20: 14 New
              0
              Here Meretskov confessed

              But it really didn’t correspond, in particular, Sj-4 (Fort Poppius) was only built in 1937, from the pillboxes of the new model there were only structures of the Inkil defense unit.
              1. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA April 3 2020 11: 06 New
                +1
                Quote: strannik1985
                But it really didn’t correspond, in particular, Sj-4 (Fort Poppius) was only built in 1937, from the pillboxes of the new model there were only structures of the Inkil defense unit.

                So the album was as of 1938, so the new millionaires were not included in it.
                But the UR of the main Mannerheim Line with the old bunkers in the Album were - so
                the disbelief of the Red Army commanders in its existence looks at least strange. In addition, intelligence warned that the Finns in 1938-1939. launched large-scale construction work and reinforce SD with new bunkers.
  3. ccsr
    ccsr April 1 2020 18: 42 New
    +8
    Author:
    Alexander Kharaluzhny
    In any case, his heroic life path indicates that there can be no victory without defeat, and most importantly in the soldier’s fate, this is not a calculation of the relationship between them, but loyalty to the homeland and oath.

    I do not presume to judge the marshal himself, but this question is still not clear to me in the actions of Tymoshenko, and to which none of the historians gives a reasonable answer. Why didn’t he personally insist before Stalin on June 21 that he would give a short order in the okrug about the introduction of cover plans, but agreed to the transfer of the b / n Directive, which was differently accepted by the troops and the result of which led to some parts being caught sleeping. Any competent military specialist understands that if all our troops were to cover the state border at least an hour before the attack on the positions according to the cover plan, and the whole war from the first day would go according to a different scenario. That’s what I think he could never forgive himself, that’s why he refused to write his memoirs, because it was his personal fault, and he would not be able to transfer arrows to Zhukov for this mistake.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. Sergey Valov
      Sergey Valov April 1 2020 18: 57 New
      -12
      Why didn’t he personally insist on Stalin on June 21 [quote] [/ quote] - because he wanted to live. Stalin was unshakably convinced that the Germans would not attack on June 22, and it was mortally dangerous to contradict him.
      1. fk7777777
        fk7777777 April 1 2020 20: 00 New
        12
        Firstly, it’s after knowledge, and you don’t need to ascribe it to Stalin, otherwise it’s just bullshit; secondly, are you in that situation that you would tell Stalin? Hitler several times postponed the date of the offensive, this is a fact, and what to do ... It is your way to deliver a thermonuclear strike to the supersat, and then suddenly something ... So in advance, so what?
        1. Sergey Valov
          Sergey Valov April 1 2020 21: 00 New
          -9
          “Hitler several times postponed the date of the offensive, this is a fact, and how to be” - it is true, but the USSR did not know this. Stirlitz was only with Yu. Semenov.
          “You are in that situation that you would say to Stalin” - in that situation I definitely would not have access to Stalin. My character is not suitable for this position. But Zhukov, heading the General Staff, was also unable.
        2. Reptiloid
          Reptiloid April 1 2020 22: 53 New
          0
          It mattered who the first to start the war, and now it is important. Otherwise, there would be no attempt to rewrite history now
          Quote: fk7777777
          Firstly, it’s after knowledge, and you don’t need to ascribe it to Stalin, otherwise it’s just bullshit; secondly, are you in that situation that you would tell Stalin? Hitler several times postponed the date of the offensive, this is a fact, and what to do ... It is your way to deliver a thermonuclear strike to the supersat, and then suddenly something ... So in advance, so what?

          Zinoviev A.A. which was subjected, said to himself that he was a staunch anti-Stalinist (already in 1938) and criticized Soviet society, wrote that he remembered that already in 1933 when he was a student, they were constantly told that it would be necessary to defend the homeland from world imperialism, there would be war. ... Pre-war schoolchildren were ready to defend the gains of the Socialist Revolution. A.A. Zinoviev wrote very memorable and interesting memoirs.
          He has about the beginning of the war. A few days before 22.06/XNUMX they were given dry rations, tokens ..
      2. Krasnoyarsk
        Krasnoyarsk April 1 2020 20: 04 New
        +5
        Quote: Sergey Valov
        Stalin was unshakably convinced that the Germans would not attack on June 22.
        laughing
        And they will attack on June 23. Did I understand your point correctly?
        1. Sergey Valov
          Sergey Valov April 1 2020 20: 51 New
          -2
          Wrong
      3. AU Ivanov.
        AU Ivanov. April 1 2020 20: 26 New
        +5
        Stalin was fully confident that Hitler would attack in 1941. He did not know the exact date. Soviet plans for the evacuation of industrial enterprises even included the evacuation of Moscow factories. That is, it was assumed that the enemy could reach Moscow. The situation and condition of the Soviet armed forces were evaluated objectively.
        1. Sergey Valov
          Sergey Valov April 1 2020 20: 54 New
          -6
          There were no evacuation plans before the war, all of them impromptu. In no crazy dream the Germans were allowed to appear near Moscow.
          1. Aviator_
            Aviator_ April 1 2020 21: 38 New
            +3
            There were no plans for evacuation before the war, all of them impromptu.

            Preparation for the evacuation of the Mariupol Metallurgical Plant to the Urals began on June 24, 1941
          2. Alexander Greene
            Alexander Greene April 1 2020 22: 01 New
            +4
            Quote: Sergey Valov
            There were no evacuation plans before the war, all of them impromptu.

            Impromptu not to evacuate such a number of plants. It was planned in advance and how many trains to allocate, and where to evacuate, and the packaging material was stored in warehouses ..
          3. Reptiloid
            Reptiloid April 1 2020 22: 26 New
            +3
            A lot has been written on the topic of evacuation and preparation for it, including the article by Shpakovsky V.O.
            Quote: Sergey Valov
            There were no evacuation plans before the war, all of them impromptu. In no crazy dream the Germans were allowed to appear near Moscow.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA April 2 2020 11: 24 New
              +1
              Quote: Reptiloid
              A lot has been written on the topic of evacuation and preparation for it, including an article by V.O. Shpakovsky before.

              Basic work on evacuation planning in the USSR - Melia A.A. Mobilization training of the national economy of the USSR.
              Lies on Militer.
              1. Reptiloid
                Reptiloid April 2 2020 11: 39 New
                0
                Quote: Alexey RA
                ..... Basic work on the topic of evacuation planning in the USSR - Melia A.A. Mobilization training of the national economy of the USSR.
                Lies on Militer.
                Thank. Speaking of evacuation planning, one cannot but say about the railways of the USSR. There were articles and wonderful comments by Amurts-Nikolai. All this was done in advance.
          4. AU Ivanov.
            AU Ivanov. April 1 2020 22: 56 New
            +4
            Can you imagine the volumes of evacoplanes? In which they are described in detail: in what order, at what time, on how much rolling stock, in what order and on which sites the equipment of the enterprise will be relocated. In what order will it be mounted and what communications will be connected in the new place. This is the development of more than one pre-war year, in no way an impromptu, as well as mobile plans. And our retreat, with its hopeless counterattacks, throwing divisions like a firebox, is, among other things, covering the evacuation, winning valuable time. The main thing was not the preservation of territories and not even the personnel - the main thing was the preservation of industry.
          5. ccsr
            ccsr April 2 2020 10: 59 New
            +5
            Quote: Sergey Valov
            In no crazy dream the Germans were allowed to appear near Moscow.

            And the developed plan for the construction of the third line of the Rzhevsk-Vyazma URs, which in May 1941 was prepared to assimilate Tymoshenko, is this understood?
          6. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA April 2 2020 11: 23 New
            +2
            Quote: Sergey Valov
            There were no evacuation plans before the war, all of them impromptu. In no crazy dream the Germans were allowed to appear near Moscow.

            Read Melia - "Mobilization preparation of the national economy of the USSR".
            Evacuation planning began immediately after the Civil. And all pre-war time was spent with the annual adjustment of evacoplanes - within starvation strategies, dominating the leadership of the country and the army. And the evacuation areas were regularly reviewed towards expansion, despite all the propaganda about "low blood, mighty blow". As Melia pointed out venomously:
            It should be noted that the propaganda speeches of political and military leaders contained somewhat different tasks than the military plans developed under their leadership. So, in 1936, K. Ye. Voroshilov proclaimed the slogan that the Red Army would wage war "with little blood and on foreign territory." But this statement did not prevent the approval of the next year’s plan of evacuation from areas that may be occupied by the enemy, and the next norms of losses for the year of the war, which had very little in common with the mentioned slogan. Therefore, when analyzing preparations for war, it is very important to separate political propaganda from the real direction of military planning.

            As of 1928, evacuation plans were compiled, for example, for the entire right-bank Ukraine and the Leningrad region west of Volkhov.
          7. Sugar Honeyovich
            Sugar Honeyovich April 2 2020 17: 37 New
            0
            "6. In case of a forced withdrawal, develop, according to special instructions, a plan for the evacuation of factories, plants, banks and other economic enterprises, government agencies, warehouses, military and state property, liable for military service, means of transport, etc." (No. 481. DIRECTIVE TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS ZAPOVO No. 503859 / ss / ov [no later than May 20, 1941])
      4. ccsr
        ccsr April 2 2020 10: 55 New
        +3
        Quote: Sergey Valov
        Stalin was unshakably convinced that the Germans would not attack on June 22,

        You read the Directive b / n - it was signed on June 21 and the date of the attack on June 22-23 is indicated there. Do you think it was sent to the troops without agreement with Stalin? Oh well...
    3. Operator
      Operator April 1 2020 19: 18 New
      +2
      Tymoshenko, among other things, was a qualified official (in the good sense of the word) - an apparatchik and never opposed his superiors.
      1. Sugar Honeyovich
        Sugar Honeyovich April 2 2020 17: 24 New
        +1
        "" Timoshenko is assessed completely incorrectly in some of her works, they are portrayed almost as a man weak-willed and ingratiating before Stalin. It is not true. Timoshenko is an old and experienced military man, a persistent, strong-willed man ... and he was the one who never fawned over Stalin "(G.K. Zhukov).
        1. Operator
          Operator April 2 2020 17: 48 New
          0
          Listing and fawning are different things.
    4. Krasnoyarsk
      Krasnoyarsk April 1 2020 20: 06 New
      +2
      Quote: ccsr
      intelligible answer. Why didn’t he personally insist before Stalin on June 21 that he would give a short order in the okrug about the introduction of cover plans, but agreed to the transfer of the b / n Directive, which was differently accepted by the troops and the result of which led to some parts being

      Without knowing the ford, do not poke your nose in the water.
    5. Alekseev
      Alekseev April 1 2020 20: 07 New
      -3
      Quote: ccsr
      I can not judge

      On the one hand, it’s hard for us to judge a person of this magnitude, we don’t know much, we didn’t serve together either when he was a machine gunner or when he became a marshal. But, on the other hand, it’s easier for us. we know the results of his activities and feedback on S.K.Timoshenko of his associates.
      In particular, G.K. Zhukov considered S.K. "serious military". In contrast to many ignorant bosses, the same Voroshilov, etc., by the will of a historical moment, who fell into positions before the war.
      But if A.V. Suvorov "did not lose the battles", then Tymoshenko had to drink this cup in full. Those. he was not a military talent, like the same K.K. Rokossovsky or G.K. Zhukov. Stalin understood this that, they say honest, loyal to the homeland and to him personally marshal, but you can’t trust him to command an army or front, and it’s somehow inconvenient, politically harmful, to give the division to the marshal.
      Semyon Konstantinovich was not shot after the Kharkov catastrophe and the retreat right up to the Volga because by this time Stalin clearly knew that Timoshenko, Khrushchev and other officials of the South-Western Front did everything they could, they simply could not do better, and "We have no Hindenburgs in reserve ". And the Supreme Commander knew that in the catastrophic failures of the Red Army in 1941-42. there is also a significant amount of his fault. Repressions similar to those used by General Pavlov and the command staff of the Western Front could only cause a decline in the spirit of commanders and troops, panic rumors of treason, as in the years of the First World War.
      1. Krasnoyarsk
        Krasnoyarsk April 1 2020 23: 01 New
        +2
        Quote: Alekseev

        In particular, G.K. Zhukov considered S.K. "serious military". Unlike many ignorant bosses, the same Voroshilov, etc., by will

        And so it was like splashing shit in Voroshilov.
        Being the commander-in-chief of the North-West direction, by the way, the commander-in-chief of the South-West direction was Tymoshenko, not Zhukov, Tymoshenko (!), Didn’t allow a single boiler and severely battered Leeb. He did not allow the Germans to take a single division from Leeb to help their central group of forces. He was recalled from the post of commander of the Leningrad Front for wounds.
        Zhukov, after 41, did not command a single front until 45. Stalin made Zhukov the "Marshal of Victory".
        1. Alekseev
          Alekseev April 2 2020 07: 37 New
          +3
          Quote: Krasnoyarsk
          splashed shit at Voroshilov.

          He splashed into himself, for which he was replaced from the posts of people's commissar of defense, commander near Leningrad, and no longer worked in such positions.
          Quote: Krasnoyarsk
          Tymoshenko (!), Did not allow a single boiler and firmly patted Leeb.

          When you write like that, it seems like you are raving.
          Quote: Krasnoyarsk

          Zhukov, after 41, did not command a single front up to 45
          fool
          The same end in the same place. And who commanded the Ukrainian Front in 1944, and since the fall of 1944 the Belarusian Front during the Wisla-Oder operation?
          If you disagree on something, then don’t need shit, but specify specifically, if you know, of course, what the opponent is wrong.
          1. Krasnoyarsk
            Krasnoyarsk April 2 2020 10: 36 New
            +1
            [quote = alexeyev] He splashed into himself, for which he was replaced from the post of People’s Commissar of Defense, [/ quote]
            In this case, it must be added - And appointed a member of GKO!
            [quote = alekseev] When you write this, it seems that you are raving. [quote = Krasnoyarsk]
            As soon as you learn to read your "impressions" will evaporate. As I understand it, - the meaning of a sentence in which more than three words are beyond your reach?
            [quote = alexeyev]
            If you don’t agree on something, then don’t need shit, but specify specifically, if you know, of course, what the opponent is wrong about. [/ Quote]
            So you point to Voroshilov’s miscalculations in the command of the North-Western direction.
        2. Aleksandr72
          Aleksandr72 April 2 2020 08: 44 New
          +1
          Zhukov G.K. commanded the fronts:
          Reserve (August - September 1941)
          Leningradsky (mid-September - October 1941)
          Western (October 1941 - August 1942)
          1st Ukrainian (March - May 1944)
          1st Belorussian (from November 1944 until the end of the war).
          In addition, being a member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and then Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Zhukov G.K. as a representative of the Supreme Command headquarters, he coordinated the actions of the Soviet fronts in several strategic operations, such as the unsuccessful and notorious Rzhev-Sychevskaya Mars in December 1942, Iskra and the Battle of Kursk, as well as Chernigov-Poltava in 1943, Bagration in 1944 year. On January 18, 1943, Zhukov was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. He became the first marshal of the USSR since the beginning of the war. On April 10, 1944, Marshal G.K. Zhukov was awarded the highest military award - the Order of "Victory" - the first among those awarded this order. You believe that this title, this award, as well as the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (twice - in 1944 and in 1945) Zhukov G.K. Were you supreme just to make him the "Marshal of Victory"?
          All this is well known, I see no reason to list all the merits of Zhukov G.K.
          As for the talents of Voroshilov K.E. as a commander and generally military, it was enough for me to read the Act on the admission of the People’s Commissariat of Defense of the USSR Union comrade Timoshenko S.K. from comrade Voroshilova KE, where all the flaws in the preparation of the army are painted, and in almost all sectors. Which in my opinion explains a lot in the catastrophic defeat of the Red Army in 1941-1942. But Voroshilov K.E. In fact, he was the Commissar of Defense from November 6, 1925 to May 7, 1940, i.e. almost 15 years. Voroshilov had enough time to put things in order in preparing the army and navy for a future war. The result of his work is well known. It was not without reason that after 1941 Stalin did not trust Voroshilov to command the fronts, although it should be noted that Voroshilov coordinated the actions of the fronts on the Volkhov and Leningrad directions in 1942. Then he was appointed commander of the partisan movement. And from April 5, 1943 - the chairman of the Trophy Committee. Then, in 1943-1944, Voroshilov coordinated the actions of a separate Primorsky Army in the Crimean offensive operation, not of a direction or even of a front, but of an army, albeit a separate one. Those. Stalin soberly assessed the ability of Voroshilov K.E. and he was no longer allowed to organize, plan, and all the more carry out strategic operations on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. All this is also well known.
          And Timoshenko S.K. for that year, with a little that remained with him before the start of World War II, he did everything he could to improve the general condition of the USSR armed forces. And he deserved his orders in the war honestly.
        3. fk7777777
          fk7777777 April 2 2020 09: 23 New
          0
          Wow, why didn’t you answer Stalin’s simple question when the front collapsed and the troops began to roll back to Stalingrad, where 100 people? He never answered, good commander, huh?
        4. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA April 2 2020 11: 39 New
          +2
          Quote: Krasnoyarsk
          And so it was like splashing shit in Voroshilov.
          Being the commander-in-chief of the North-West direction, by the way, the commander-in-chief of the South-West direction was Tymoshenko, not Zhukov, Tymoshenko (!), Didn’t allow a single boiler and severely battered Leeb.

          No one?
          The groups of General Astanin, who departed for the Siverskaya division of the Luga (renamed to the South), were surrounded on August 26. The 70th, 90th, 111th, 177th and 235th rifle divisions, the 1st and 3rd DNDs, and the 24th Panzer Division were in the "boiler".

          Plus a cut in half of the 8th army with a boiler in Tallinn.
          Well, do not forget about the main boiler - blocked Leningrad.
      2. ccsr
        ccsr April 2 2020 11: 11 New
        0
        Quote: Alekseev
        In particular, G.K. Zhukov considered S.K. "serious military". In contrast to many ignorant bosses, the same Voroshilov, etc., by the will of a historical moment, who fell into positions before the war.

        In this case, his military leadership talents are not important to me - I’m interested in how the country's most important military man could not convince Stalin’s civilian leader that it was necessary to introduce the PP in the first place, all the more so since Golikov at 20.00:21 on June 21 owed that the war would begin in a few hours . Was he so cowardly that he was afraid to directly insist on the immediate introduction of a cover plan for at least four border districts before the outcome of June XNUMX?
        I know the story of the dismissal of Army General Snetkov, who directly refused Gorbachev to lead the withdrawal of troops from the GSVG, and this is an example of decency for any commander. Didn’t Tymoshenko understand that the war would start any minute - and only think about his career at that time?
    6. fk7777777
      fk7777777 April 1 2020 20: 12 New
      0
      Well, firstly, according to the same cover plan, there were three echelons of cover and the Germans simply beat them in parts, and secondly, the Germans ran their blitz krieg, the tactics of tank wedges, which broke through the defenses in narrow places and went far ahead, smashing the enemy's rear and arranging the encirclement of enemy units ... Third, in the USSR, they did not really understand how to properly use tanks in defense (for example, for a counterattack, and not pack them up in ambushes) and offensive. One hemorrhoid only with pto, what it cost, and hemorrhoid with IL-2, the management did not have a complete understanding of how and for what to use this or that remedy, etc. ... So, according to your scenario, I would simply last longer in " boilers "and there would be fewer civilian casualties, and that's it ...
      1. ccsr
        ccsr April 2 2020 11: 17 New
        +2
        Quote: fk7777777
        So, according to your scenario, I would simply last longer in the "boilers" and there would be fewer civilian casualties, and that's it ...

        In fact, some light-weapon border guards without parts of the spacecraft cover held Germans until 11-12 a.m. on June 22, and this best proves that if we took positions at least an hour or half an hour before the Germans attacked, some boilers could would not be.
        Quote: fk7777777
        Well, firstly, according to the same cover plan, there were three echelons

        The point is not in the plan itself, which might not have been fully implemented, but in the fact that it should have been introduced immediately after the meeting with Stalin, and not the Directive sent, especially since even with its sending it was dragged on for an unreasonably long time.
    7. Lekz
      Lekz April 1 2020 21: 03 New
      +6
      Reports of the commanders of the General Staff Commission, 1953 (these are not memoirs, but reports of a higher authority).
      "Colonel-General of Tank Forces P. P. Poluboyarov (former chief of the armored forces of the PribOVO). On June 16, at 23:12, the command of the 23th Mechanized Corps received a directive to put the formation on alert. The corps commander, Major General N. M. Shestopalov, was told about this at 17:202 on June 18, upon his arrival from the 19nd motorized division, where he conducted a mobilization readiness check.On June 20, the corps commander raised the formations and units on a combat alert and ordered them to be withdrawn to the planned areas. was done.
      On June 16, by order of the district headquarters, the 3rd mechanized corps (commanded by Major General of Tank Forces A. V. Kurkin) was put on alert and concentrated in the indicated area at the same time. "
      "Lieutenant General P.P.Sobennikov (former commander of the 8th Army). ... The commander of the district troops decided to go to Taurage and bring the 11th rifle corps of Major General M.S.Shumilov on alert there, and I We sent the Chief of Staff of the Army Major General GA Larionov back to Jelgava and received the task of bringing the headquarters to the command post.
      By the end of the day, oral orders were given to concentrate troops on the border. On the morning of June 19, I personally checked the progress of the order. Units of the 10th, 90th and 125th Rifle Divisions occupied trenches and wood-earthen emplacements, although many of the structures were not yet completely ready. Units of the 12th mechanized corps on the night of June 19 were withdrawn to the Siauliai area, and the army headquarters arrived at the command post at the same time. "
      Try to answer what other plans have not been implemented. And what does "any competent military specialist" think about the scenario of the combat operations of these units? And last but not least, the words of the Directive w / n "bring all units to combat readiness" also applied to the troops of the Moscow district, the border ones were already there (to the best of the command's diligence).
      1. Aviator_
        Aviator_ April 1 2020 21: 48 New
        +3
        Quite right, the directive on putting troops on alert was issued on June 16, so that Oktyabrsky would not write later in his memoirs in Khrushchev’s time (as he had personally given such an order to the Black Sea Fleet on June 22, and the fleet had time to prepare for the attack, and the ground forces - supposedly not). But Pavlov got what he deserved - why were our troops, numbering about 4 thousand people, in the Brest Fortress, in this mousetrap, at 7 o’clock in the morning? Of course, they defended themselves heroically, but the Germans went around the fortress and occupied Minsk in a week. All districts steadfastly defended and retreated, and only in Belarus there was a failure.
      2. Krasnoyarsk
        Krasnoyarsk April 1 2020 23: 06 New
        0
        Quote: Lekz

        "Colonel-General of tank forces P. P. Poluboyarov (former chief of the armored forces of the PribOVO). On June 16, at 23:12, the command of the XNUMXth

        And only the "innocently killed" General Pavlov did nothing of this. Why?
        1. Lekz
          Lekz April 2 2020 00: 09 New
          -1
          But Pavlov’s explanations do not suit you?
          No. 4. Protocol of interrogation of the arrested Pavlov Dmitry Grigoryevich.
          Pavlov D.G., born in 1897, a native of the Gorky Territory, Kologrivsky District,
          village Smelly, Russian, Mr. USSR, ex. member of the CPSU (b) since 1919, until the arrest of the commander of the Western Front, army general.

          July 11, 1941 Interrogation started at 13 p.m. 30 minutes.
          "Question: During interrogation on July 9 th [current] year [ode], you pleaded guilty to defeat on the Western Front, but concealed your conspiratorial connections and the real reasons for the heavy losses suffered by the Red Army in the first days of the war with Germany. testimony about their enemy connections and treasonous deeds.
          Answer: Indeed, the main reason for the defeat on the Western Front is my treacherous work as a participant in a conspiratorial organization, although other objective conditions, which I showed during interrogation on July 9 this year, contributed significantly to this.
          Question: At the previous interrogation, you denied that you belonged to an anti-Soviet organization, and now you declare your connection with the conspirators. What evidence should be considered correct?
          Answer: Today I am giving correct testimony and I do not want to hide anything from the investigation. I admit that in February 1937, by the former senior adviser in Spain, Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov, I was involved in a military conspiratorial organization and subsequently carried out enemy work in the Red Army ... ".

          But from the protocol of the interrogation of the chief of communications of the Western Front A. G. Grigoriev.
          "ORLOV. On ld 79, volume 4, you gave the following testimony: “Leaving Minsk, the commander of the communications regiment reported to me that the chemical troops department did not allow him to take gas masks from the NZ. The district artillery department did not allow him to take cartridges from the NZ, and the regiment had only a guard norm of 15 pieces of ammunition per soldier, and the transfer and clothing department did not allow to take field kitchens from the NZ. Thus, even in the afternoon of June 18, the content departments of the headquarters were not oriented that the war was close ... And after the telegram from the chief of the General Staff on June 18, the district troops were not put on alert.
          GRIGORIEV. All of this is true. ”
          1. Grim Reaper
            Grim Reaper April 2 2020 01: 39 New
            +4
            When the liver is injected, you still can’t say that. Do not believe?
            1. Lekz
              Lekz April 2 2020 11: 39 New
              +2
              We can assume the work of organs with the liver. It’s difficult, but with imagination you can. I agree a lot can be signed. But when neighboring districts are put on alert and take places according to the cover plan, I want to understand why Pavlov did not do this. Really forgot? But he was reminded that three divisions should be withdrawn from the fortress. One can also assume that the General Staff (Zhukov) ordered to raise PribOVO, KOVO by alarm before the war, but forgot about ZAPOVO. Can. But not one forgetful Zhukov served in the General Staff. Have the others forgotten too?
              1. Grim Reaper
                Grim Reaper April 2 2020 11: 44 New
                +2
                I'm not talking about the mistakes that Pavlov made. And about his "confession" Well, I can't believe it ....
                1. Lekz
                  Lekz April 2 2020 12: 13 New
                  +1
                  And what did someone say about faith? If Pavlov received the order (and there is no doubt about it), then he does not fulfill it, because he is too lazy to give the command to prepare his order to the subordinate troops or does not want to (but here it is more difficult with the reasons). And where is the mistake here? About laziness another time, and if he doesn’t want, then why? After all, he knows the consequences, both for himself (here you can recall the liver) and for the subordinate troops (this is clearly not about humanism).
      3. ccsr
        ccsr April 2 2020 11: 29 New
        +3
        Quote: Lekz
        Try to answer what other plans were not implemented.

        A district cover plan was not introduced - and this is Tymoshenko’s biggest mistake, which led to the tragedy of the first months of the war.
        Quote: Lekz
        ... And what does "any competent military specialist" think about the scenario of the combat operations of these units?

        This is an example of several divisions, and it is not clear to what extent the activities of the entire district were carried out, not to mention who was on the positions according to the PP on June 22nd.
        Quote: Lekz
        And last but not least, the words of the Directive w / n "bring all units to combat readiness" also applied to the troops of the Moscow District,

        In fact, the Moscow District was not listed in the mailing list of the Directive - did you ascribe this yourself?
        Cipher. Decrypt immediately
        Military Councils of the LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, ODVO
        Copy of the People's Commissar of the Navy
        1. Lekz
          Lekz April 2 2020 12: 36 New
          +1
          I would like to understand why an official crime - not fulfilling the General Staff’s telegram about putting the district’s troops on combat alert of June 18 (see the protocol of Grigoryev’s interrogation) is cute called a mistake?
          If you look closely, it is not "several divisions" that are mentioned, but three corps. And this is in the reports of only two military leaders. Orders for the same district 0052 and 00229 can supplement your impressions, there are already talking about two border armies and other troops of the district.
          And with the latter, I agree, got excited.
    8. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 2 2020 11: 13 New
      +1
      Quote: ccsr
      Any competent military specialist understands that if all our troops were to cover the state border at least an hour before the attack on the positions according to the cover plan, and the whole war from the first day would go according to a different scenario.

      To do this, the order must be given at least a week in advance. Because the same divisional artillery, due to the lack of training grounds near the division’s battlefield, could have left to study for the old border, where the training grounds were. Plus, the lack of transport and traction in the non-mobilized units forced the same artillery to advance in stages, and transport the rear supplies in parts.
      1. Lekz
        Lekz April 2 2020 12: 38 New
        0
        To do this, the order must be given at least a week in advance.

        So they surrendered, both for a month, and for a week, and the day before. Different events were foreseen at different times.
      2. ccsr
        ccsr April 2 2020 12: 59 New
        +2
        Quote: Alexey RA
        To do this, the order must be given at least a week in advance.

        In theory, yes, but in practice, when there are only a few hours left before the attack, the most important thing is to withdraw the troops from the RPD and take up positions according to the cover plan. This alone would allow our troops to help the border guards hold back the first strike of the German troops, even if they didn’t have all the artillery available.
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Plus lack of transport and traction in non-mobilized parts

        I am talking about those shelves of cover that were directly supposed to occupy positions near the border, and which, as is known from some reports regarding staffing, were combat-ready.
        It would not have been so easy for the Germans if they had encountered on the border with the regular parts of the spacecraft at 04.00:22.00, in addition entrenched. But if Tymoshenko and Zhukov insisted on entering the BCP with a short signal, as provided, then the implementation of the plan could begin already at 22.30-XNUMX, and our troops would not have died in the barracks or on the march. It is difficult to understand the logic of these two military leaders, as if they did not understand the current situation, and how their directive would be received in the troops.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA April 2 2020 13: 37 New
          +2
          Quote: ccsr
          In theory, yes, but in practice, when there are only a few hours left before the attack, the most important thing is to withdraw the troops from the RPD and take up positions according to the cover plan.

          The ambush is that in a couple of hours only personnel can be brought into the field. Artillery and the rear did not have time to get out. And this reduces the firepower of the division to the battalion.
          Quote: ccsr
          This alone would allow our troops to help the border guards hold back the first strike of the German troops, even if they didn’t have all the artillery available.

          The basis of the firepower of the rifle division is artillery. If the SD doesn’t have enough, or it doesn’t have enough ammunition, then the Germans will break through our defenses, crushing the infantry with unpunished artillery and mortar fire.
          What is the rifle unit even with a 45-mm anti-tank vehicle, but without normal artillery, against the Germans with artillery, the battle of Kim’s battalion near Krichev showed well: after three hours, the battalion fired by artillery was forced to leave its position.
          1. ccsr
            ccsr April 2 2020 13: 55 New
            +2
            Quote: Alexey RA
            The ambush is that in a couple of hours only personnel can be brought into the field.

            If the signal about the introduction of the PP arrived in the districts at 23.00, I assure you, not only would the personnel of the infantry regiments take positions by 04.00, but they would also deliver all the available material, up to the field kitchens.
            Quote: Alexey RA
            If the SD doesn’t have enough, or it doesn’t have enough ammunition, then the Germans will break through our defenses, crushing the infantry with unpunished artillery and mortar fire.

            And how did the border posts stay where where, apart from rifles and machine guns, was there nothing at all?
            Quote: Alexey RA
            What is a rifle unit even with a 45 mm anti-tank gun,

            You forget that in addition to the guns there are engineering ammunition and the personnel had grenades. So to knock out the entrenched rifle regiment is only theoretically simple, but in reality, as the experience of the war showed, skillful commanders frustrated the pace of German advance in the very first hours. There are a large number of declassified documents, where the Germans reported that they encountered strong defense and could not move on and asked for support from the aircraft.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA April 2 2020 17: 37 New
              +1
              Quote: ccsr
              If the signal about the introduction of the PP arrived in the districts at 23.00, I assure you, not only would the personnel of the infantry regiments take positions by 04.00, but they would also deliver all the available material, up to the field kitchens.

              Take the compounds stationed in the Brest Fortress:
              i) the 42nd page division, 30 hours after the announcement of the combat alert, occupies the Brest UR and positions of field reinforcement along the state border at the front of Buyaki, Melnik, and Orel;
              j) The 6th page division, 3-9 hours after the announcement of combat alert, occupies the Brest UR and positions of field reinforcement along the state border at the front of Ogorodniki, Brest-Litovsk, Zakazanka;

              In five hours, the same divisional artillery will be able to cover 12-15 kilometers. Materiel simply will not give more - an agricultural tractor in the role of traction.
              Quote: ccsr
              And how did the border posts stay where where, apart from rifles and machine guns, was there nothing at all?

              "Survivors' mistake" - memoirs were written by those who survived and were able to move away (that is, from those outposts that the Germans did not really storm). But there were many outposts that fell completely on the very first day
              Schantze had a quote from the historical form of the 17th Red Banner Izmail border detachment named after F. E. Dzerzhinsky (Brest border detachment):
              https://wolfschanze.livejournal.com/348303.html
              9 out of 20 outposts were lucky - the Germans threw at them groups of the company-battalion (with the corresponding heavy and group), so that the outposts lasted half a day or a day and moved away. But the remaining 11 out of 20 border guard outposts simply disappeared:
              The fate of 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18 linear outposts, 1st and 2nd reserve outposts, headquarters of the 1st border commandant’s office is not known.

              Quote: ccsr
              You forget that in addition to the guns there are engineering ammunition and the personnel had grenades.

              You know, the German infantry is not a crowd of drunk machine gunners walking all over the field and watering from the hip. No engineering ammunition (battalion of sappers for the division) and grenades will help, if from 3-7 km our positions begin to shoot 7,5 cm, 10,5 cm and 15 cm guns.
              Once again - watch the battle of Kim’s battalion. German intelligence flew out in front of the positions of the staffed infantry battalion, got it, moved away - and began adjusting the fire of unfolding artillery at identified firing points. And with impunity the battalion being shot was forced to withdraw.
              1. ccsr
                ccsr April 2 2020 19: 54 New
                0
                Quote: Alexey RA
                Take the compounds stationed in the Brest Fortress:

                You take the ALL connection, which, after 3-9 hours, is obliged to leave the PDP along with your club, a field bakery and other household services. But in reality, the first reinforcement battalions leave the military towns after 45 minutes and after 30-60 minutes arrive on the state border by march - this was laid down in the cover plans:
                3. The readiness of the parts for the performance is established:
                a) for rifle and cavalry units - in the summer 2 hours, in the winter 3 hours; duty units after 45 minutes;

                The rest of the regiments arrived a little later, but not after 9 hours. The 42nd page division was of a reduced composition, which is why it has a different standard of readiness, and the remaining 3–9 hours.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                9 out of 20 outposts were lucky - the Germans threw at them groups of the company-battalion size (with the corresponding heavy and group), so that the outposts lasted half a day or a day and departed. But the remaining 11 out of 20 border guard outposts simply disappeared:

                They did not disappear, but simply perished on the spot, having fulfilled their duty. And this happened in particular through the fault of those who at the wrong time brought a signal to the allocation of reinforcement battalions to the frontier guard regiments. By the way, shelves were supposed to die, but in the trenches, and not in the barracks and on the march - that was how it should have been, it was prescribed them.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                You know, the German infantry is not a crowd of drunk machine gunners walking all over the field and watering from the hip.

                I know very well that the German infantry on June 22 was the best in the world, but even they immediately lay down, having met resistance. And this gave us the most important thing - time gain, and this was necessary for the deployment of our connections.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                if from 3-7 km our positions begin to shoot 7,5 cm, 10,5 cm and 15 cm guns.

                In fact, you must first conduct reconnaissance and adjust the shooting, i.e. and the Germans also need time. But the most important thing at that moment was that any delay of the Germans at the border did not allow them to enter new units into the battle, which began to be pulled to the border, and this would lead to a confusion of troops, and became a good target for our aviation. Of course, all this is in the ideal case, but the Germans’s plans would have flown on the first day if our cover regiments had been laid down in positions, and not on the march.
            2. VS
              VS April 5 2020 09: 59 New
              +1
              Quote: ccsr
              If the signal about the introduction of the PP arrived in the districts at 23.00, I assure you, not only would the personnel of the infantry regiments take positions by 04.00, but they would also deliver all the available material, up to the field kitchens.

              That’s why Tymoshenko said later - and THANKS TO GOD THAT they did not enter THIS PP in advance! Why?! EVERYTHING IS SIMPLE - according to TOMU PP at the BORDER sd, they WOULD stretch up to 40 km and there would be less SHOULDER from those sd but they would be surrounded, for sure - ALL 42 pieces in the very first hours))
              Take a look at Abramidze’s answer - he wrote that thank God that he was given the command NOT to occupy the borders themselves but to keep the regiments in heaps in the camps))
              1. ccsr
                ccsr April 5 2020 13: 32 New
                0
                Quote: V.S.
                So that's why Tymoshenko said later

                Yes, they had to make excuses for the pogrom, so they sculpted everything so that direct guilt would not fall on them.
                Quote: V.S.
                Take a look at Abramidze’s answer - he wrote that thank God that they gave him the command NOT to occupy the borders themselves but to keep the regiments in crowded camps

                It is not necessary to judge by one answer how everything would have turned out in the border districts, if our troops occupy positions according to the cover plan at 03.00:22 on June XNUMX.
  4. 210ox
    210ox April 1 2020 18: 44 New
    +5
    Just a Russian soldier ... With his glory and his grief. What memoirs?
  5. Oleg Zorin
    Oleg Zorin April 1 2020 20: 00 New
    +2
    Why doesn’t it happen? Suvorov was not defeated. Although, of course, where Suvorov and where Tymoshenko
    1. cost
      cost April 2 2020 01: 08 New
      +5
      In my opinion - we underestimate this marshal! In fact, it was Timoshenko in 1941 who was a real "firefighter" for us - where it was really bad - he was sent there, and he corrected the seemingly hopeless situation! So, at the very beginning of the war, the Western Front was smashed to pieces - Tymoshenko does the almost impossible - literally gathers it piece by piece and quite adequately conducts the Smolensk battle! The South-West Front is broken - it is also restoring it, so much so that even before our counteroffensive near Moscow Rostov is beating it off! Only now I do not agree with the role of Tymoshenko, according to what is written in the article, as the "savior" of the repressed generals. They proved their innocence in Beria's department, from there they passed the list to the People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko, since the generals belonged to his department, he, according to his official duties, handed this list "up" - to Stalin! (Source of information - portal History.RF, https://histrf.ru/biblioteka/b/narkom-siemien-timoshienko-marshal-kotoryi-slishkom-mnogho-dumal)
      1. Krasnoyarsk
        Krasnoyarsk April 2 2020 11: 03 New
        +2
        Quote: Rich
        In my opinion - we underestimate this marshal!

        Totally agree with you.
        After all, pay attention - it was Stalin who entrusted Timoshenko with the leadership of the South-Western direction, far from Moscow, where information was received, say, not very quickly. And he kept Zhukov next to him, in the West. where Stalin himself could control the situation at the front. And controlled! Over the head of Zhukov. And when it became very difficult, he takes away from Tymoshenko his only striking force, the cavalry corps Belov. And, despite this, Tymoshenko is conducting counter-attacks. And read Zhukov's memoirs, - all the time: - "But Stalin did not give reserves", "Headquarters did not give reserves"
        Rokossovsky has no such words in his memoirs.
      2. ccsr
        ccsr April 2 2020 12: 02 New
        +3
        Quote: Rich
        In my opinion - we underestimate this marshal! In fact, it was Tymoshenko in 1941 who was a real "firefighter" for us -

        The people's commissar of defense should be a strategist, not a firefighter, which is why we had such a situation in 1941 that Tymoshenko was weak at the post of people's commissar, so I had to use it for other purposes. No wonder Shaposhnikov in July was returned to the post of the National High School - it was a strategist, and such in wartime were worth its weight in gold.
  6. bubalik
    bubalik April 2 2020 10: 28 New
    +5
    ,,, and why only the Baltic region took some measures?




  7. VS
    VS April 2 2020 10: 36 New
    +3
    As the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Tymoshenko bears DIRECT responsibility for the tragedy of the beginning of the war! And that is precisely why he did not write his memoirs - it would have been possible for HIM for the pre-war smooth General Staff that led to the defeat of the Red Army and which he called "an illiterate scenario for entering the war" - to shoot in the end ... and 25 years later ..
    1. aglet
      aglet April 2 2020 14: 38 New
      +1
      In general, all claims in this regard are against Zhukov. although yes, Tymoshenko should have controlled him
    2. Serg koma
      Serg koma April 5 2020 06: 37 New
      +1
      Quote: V.S.
      Tymoshenko bears as Minister of Defense of the USSR

      If the minister begins to engage in uniforms, then there are no other problems. That at the time of Tymoshenko, that at the time of Serdyukov - a trend however, with the same result ...
      In the summer of 1940, new sleeve insignia were introduced for the command of the Red Army, combining scarlet and gilded (galloon) squares. In November 1940, there were changes in ranks and insignia for the junior command staff.

      Tymoshenko No. 0362 "On changing the order of service for junior and middle commanding personnel in the Air Force of the Red Army."
      at the end of 1940 People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko issued an Order - to graduate from flight schools with the rank of “sergeant”. Of course, we all were indignant, were extremely unhappy, then that was all over.
      Those who completed the full course the day before and received the rank of ml were especially upset. lieutenant, lieutenant. They were demoted and assigned the military rank of "sergeant" and they were transferred to the barracks.
      Hero of the USSR, Kazachuk V.A.
      I was a graduate of the pre-war “unlucky” graduation of pilots, when the people's commissar of defense Semyon Tymoshenko gave the order to release pilots not as lieutenants, but as sergeants. So I came to the aviation regiment as a sergeant in an ordinary soldier's overcoat and a cotton tunic instead of a leather raglan.
      I looked rather miserable, and when I got on the plane, the technician simply drove me out of the car and did not allow me to the plane. I prove to him that I am a pilot, and he told me:
      “What a pilot you are! Sergeant!"
      It was a shame to tears ...
      Twice Hero of the USSR V.I. Popkov
      At the beginning of 1941, the movement of young pilots, especially family ones, from apartments to barracks had a stunning effect and caused a dull murmur. V. Yakovlev, one of the pilots of the 55th regiment, in a conversation with G. Rechkalov frankly:
      "And they drove us into the barracks, like a soldier, and in general aviation became a stepchild ...".
      The prestige of flight service has decreased, and the composition of cadets-draftees has deteriorated qualitatively.

      Three times Hero of the USSR A.I. Pokryshkin
  8. VS
    VS April 2 2020 10: 38 New
    +1
    Quote: bubalik
    ,,, and why only the Baltic region took some measures?

    the same thing was KOVO and OdVO in the pre-war days .. Just the docks in the Baltic states fell in the 50s in the publication and although they were closed - but they are known today))
    1. bubalik
      bubalik April 2 2020 10: 50 New
      +4
      V.S. (Vasily) Today, 11: 38

      That's interesting, why not declassify them? as in the App.
  9. The comment was deleted.
  10. VS
    VS April 2 2020 10: 51 New
    +2
    Quote: ccsr
    Author:
    Alexander Kharaluzhny
    In any case, his heroic life path indicates that there can be no victory without defeat, and most importantly in the soldier’s fate, this is not a calculation of the relationship between them, but loyalty to the homeland and oath.

    I do not presume to judge the marshal himself, but this question is still not clear to me in the actions of Tymoshenko, and to which none of the historians gives a reasonable answer. Why didn’t he personally insist before Stalin on June 21 that he would give a short order in the okrug about the introduction of cover plans, but agreed to the transfer of the b / n Directive, which was differently accepted by the troops and the result of which led to some parts being caught sleeping. Any competent military specialist understands that if all our troops were to cover the state border at least an hour before the attack on the positions according to the cover plan, and the whole war from the first day would go according to a different scenario. That’s what I think he could never forgive himself, that’s why he refused to write his memoirs, because it was his personal fault, and he would not be able to transfer arrows to Zhukov for this mistake.

    Tymoshenko later, being a com of BelVO, Stadnyuk said - and thank God that they didn’t have time to introduce the PP
    It is not clear yet - why he was glad that the PP did not enter before the attack?)))
    Everything is simple - those BCPs with full execution of them - would lead to a terrible pogrom - because then the SDs on the border would be exactly stretched at their borders and in THIS case - with a band up to 40 km against SD German Germans, these SDs would have passed without noticing them)))

    Entering the PP and entering the full b ... g in the FIRST hours gives the SAME effect - the troops must be raised according to the BATTLE alarm!
    Order for full bg came to the county at 1.30. and after HOUR the order for opening the PACKAGE came!
    What do you think - in time something would accelerate if you would give IMMEDIATELY at 1 o'clock an order for a package?)) Hardly))
    So it’s not THIS one who needs to make a complaint to the Minister of Defense, but that he took part in a suit with the plans of the General Staff in case of war — he didn’t realize Shaposhnikov’s plans, but he was seduced by the fool Meretskov’s nonsense with his preventive strikes .. then, Zhukov ... what realized these fantasies of Meretskov as immediate retaliatory strikes ..
    1. Serg koma
      Serg koma April 5 2020 06: 46 New
      0
      Quote: V.S.
      Everything is simple - those BCPs with full execution of them - would lead to a terrible pogrom - because then the SDs on the border would be exactly stretched at their borders and in THIS case - with a band up to 40 km against SD German Germans, these SDs would have passed not noticing them

      And what prevented the People's Commissar of Defense from rectifying the situation with the PP, if he was such a "visionary" and knew the situation with the "liquid" PP in June 1941 so well?
  11. VS
    VS April 2 2020 10: 52 New
    +3
    Quote: Sergey Valov
    Why didn’t he personally insist on Stalin on June 21
    - because he wanted to live. Stalin was unshakably convinced that the Germans would not attack on June 22, and it was mortally dangerous to contradict him.

    and WHO told you this DUKE - that Stalin did not expect an attack on June 22? Someone told you this nonsense or did they come up with?
  12. VS
    VS April 2 2020 10: 53 New
    0
    Quote: fk7777777
    Firstly, it’s after knowledge, and you don’t need to ascribe it to Stalin, otherwise it’s just bullshit; secondly, are you in that situation that you would tell Stalin? Hitler several times postponed the date of the offensive, this is a fact, and what to do ... It is your way to deliver a thermonuclear strike to the supersat, and then suddenly something ... So in advance, so what?

    yes damn .. where do you get all this stupid things ?? Yes, Hitler did not carry over the attack on the Soviet Socialist Republic - NEVER !!!)))
  13. VS
    VS April 2 2020 10: 58 New
    0
    Quote: AU Ivanov.
    Stalin was fully confident that Hitler would attack in 1941. He did not know the exact date. Soviet plans for the evacuation of industrial enterprises even included the evacuation of Moscow factories. That is, it was assumed that the enemy could reach Moscow. The situation and condition of the Soviet armed forces were evaluated objectively.

    Yes, I knew .. Stalin knew the date of the attack) KNEW May 2-3 for sure)))

    On April 30, Hitler FOR THE FIRST TIME - ORIGINALLY - HEARED the date of the attack on the USSR at an extended meeting of the military and the Foreign Ministry of Germany)) And on May 1 he repeated it to the General Staff of the Wehrmacht)) And the beginning of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht was an English agent) And Stalin had Cambridge) )) MORE THAN NEVER Hitler HAS DEFERRED THE DATE - on June 10 he signed an order for the Wehrmacht and this order also became known to Stalin - that the attack would be at 3 o’clock on June 22)))
  14. VS
    VS April 2 2020 10: 59 New
    0
    Quote: Sergey Valov
    There were no evacuation plans before the war, all of them impromptu. In no crazy dream the Germans were allowed to appear near Moscow.

    finally that MAY 17 signed CARDS and estimates for the construction of UROV near Moscow)))
  15. VS
    VS April 2 2020 11: 03 New
    0
    Quote: Grim Reaper
    When the liver is injected, you still can’t say that. Do not believe?

    Do you believe that they beat him?)))
  16. VS
    VS April 2 2020 11: 15 New
    +1
    Quote: bubalik
    V.S. (Vasily) Today, 11: 38

    That's interesting, why not declassify them? as in the App.

    and who needs it?))) again - there are well-established myths about the causes of the tragedy - well, to hell with the authorities to ruin them if they are convenient)) And the same Isaev will tell you that they did it in Pribovo because they waited for a type of unrest these days from the Lithuanian corps and the like, and the defeat of the Red Army happened because Stalin later pressed the red button and directly to the BORDER, so the army did not have time to leave the internal districts of the RGK army and therefore they were at the border stretched up to 40 km .. And when I forgive YEAR Isaev show the plans of the General Staff where it would be spelled out what the armies of the RGK should have been transferred directly to the border, then it starts up bubbles and bans if my questions can him)))
    1. strannik1985
      strannik1985 April 2 2020 11: 24 New
      +1
      but who needs it?)))

      Nobody, given that the cars in the 12th MK was about half of the regular number, i.e. to bring the MK into combat readiness you need to get equipment from the national economy, i.e. to carry out mobilization, which was not there.
      But who needs such details? wink
  17. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA April 2 2020 11: 51 New
    +1
    Despite everything, Tymoshenko should not be smeared with exclusively black paint. He did the main thing - brought the Red Army out of the lethargic dream in which it was under Voroshilov. The results of this army pastime are recorded in the Act on the transfer of non-profit organizations and in the materials of the Conference on the results of the Socialist War - the USSR in 1940 does not have a modern army.
    It was under Tymoshenko that the practice of full exercises and full checks began, when the entire formation was raised - and not a consolidated unit of the best fighters and commanders, according to which the formation was credited. It was under Tymoshenko that really sudden inspections began - as a result of which, in particular, they decided to drive the pilots into the barracks, because it was considered unacceptable to assemble an air regiment on alarm for half a day. And it was under Tymoshenko that the "field commanders" began to report the real picture of the combat readiness of their units and formations, and at the meetings of the senior command personnel they began to talk not only about achievements and successes, but, for example, that only 6 (six !) shells for training and for test shooting, or that the Air Force of the LVO has been sitting on the ground all summer without gas.
  18. Grim Reaper
    Grim Reaper April 2 2020 11: 59 New
    0
    Quote: V.S.
    Quote: Grim Reaper
    When the liver is injected, you still can’t say that. Do not believe?

    Do you believe that they beat him?)))

    Maybe they didn’t beat. Enough to intimidate.
  19. VS
    VS April 2 2020 12: 20 New
    +2
    Quote: strannik1985
    but who needs it?)))

    Nobody, given that the cars in the 12th MK was about half of the regular number, i.e. to bring the MK into combat readiness you need to get equipment from the national economy, i.e. to carry out mobilization, which was not there.
    But who needs such details? wink

    it wasn’t the mobilization — it wasn’t the reason for the defeat of the Red Army in the very first hours ...
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 2 2020 13: 40 New
      +3
      Quote: V.S.
      it wasn’t the mobilization — it wasn’t the reason for the defeat of the Red Army in the very first hours ...

      Well, try to fight, having traction in the artillery regiment for one division and reduced rear areas. Statutory defense bands, statutory norms of the march are designed specifically for the mobilized wartime division.
  20. VS
    VS April 2 2020 12: 21 New
    0
    Quote: Grim Reaper
    Quote: V.S.
    Quote: Grim Reaper
    When the liver is injected, you still can’t say that. Do not believe?

    Do you believe that they beat him?)))

    Maybe they didn’t beat. Enough to intimidate.

    what kind of Sykuns they were in the army (((and why didn’t they promote Rokossovsky for recognition? or Gorbatov or others (((
  21. VS
    VS April 2 2020 12: 23 New
    0
    Quote: Alexey RA
    Despite everything, Tymoshenko should not be smeared with exclusively black paint. He did the main thing - brought the Red Army out of the lethargic dream in which it was under Voroshilov. The results of this army pastime are recorded in the Act on the transfer of non-profit organizations and in the materials of the Conference on the results of the Socialist War - the USSR in 1940 does not have a modern army.
    It was under Tymoshenko that the practice of full exercises and full checks began, when the entire formation was raised - and not a consolidated unit of the best fighters and commanders, according to which the formation was credited. It was under Tymoshenko that really sudden inspections began - as a result of which, in particular, they decided to drive the pilots into the barracks, because it was considered unacceptable to assemble an air regiment on alarm for half a day. And it was under Tymoshenko that the "field commanders" began to report the real picture of the combat readiness of their units and formations, and at the meetings of the senior command personnel they began to talk not only about achievements and successes, but, for example, that only 6 (six !) shells for training and for test shooting, or that the Air Force of the LVO has been sitting on the ground all summer without gas.

    Tymoshenko’s guilt in that he did not oppose the stupidity of the Meritskov-beetle bugs with their bad plans in case of war)) And the reforms in the RCA, and even more so after the Finnish one, so Stalin personally steered this process)))
  22. aglet
    aglet April 2 2020 14: 06 New
    0
    Quote: ccsr
    just to show himself from the best side.

    fortunately did not work
  23. aglet
    aglet April 2 2020 14: 19 New
    +2
    Quote: ccsr
    In fact, some border posts with small arms without parts of the spacecraft cover kept the Germans until 11-12 a.m. on June 22, and this best proves

    it best proves that until 11-12 hours they were not taken seriously
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 2 2020 17: 46 New
      +1
      Quote: aglet
      it best proves that until 11-12 hours they were not taken seriously

      More precisely, that through their positions they did not initially intend to seriously attack. They allocated a company-battalion, they first tried to capture the outpost on a ball, ours repulsed the attack, the Germans rolled back and with their own forces simply blocked the outpost.
      And in the areas where the Germans were seriously advancing, the outposts simply went missing in full force. In the Brest border detachment, 11 of the 20 linear outposts disappeared this way:
      The fate of 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18 linear outposts, 1st and 2nd reserve outposts, headquarters of the 1st border commandant’s office is not known.
    2. ccsr
      ccsr April 2 2020 20: 02 New
      +2
      Quote: aglet
      it best proves that until 11-12 hours they were not taken seriously

      This is nonsense - it’s just that the Germans could not attack in all sectors with the main forces, but this does not mean that they were not tasked to go deeper into our territory in other areas, breaking down the resistance of the border guards. And if the German infantry did not have the opportunity to break through the defenses of the border guards, this does not mean that they fought for fun. By the way, there is a wonderful example from the present -
      The 12th Sari-Gor border outpost was part of the Moscow border detachment of the Group of Border Troops of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Tajikistan.

      https://topwar.ru/153430-stojali-do-poslednego-kak-srazhalas-12-ja-pogranzastava.html
  24. aglet
    aglet April 2 2020 14: 21 New
    0
    Quote: fk7777777
    He never answered

    Was this question asked in your presence?
  25. aglet
    aglet April 2 2020 14: 33 New
    -2
    Quote: ccsr
    No wonder Shaposhnikov in July was returned to the post of NGSH

    what does Tymoshenko have to do with it? ngsh bugs was, the marshal of victory, as he called bishop
    1. ccsr
      ccsr April 2 2020 20: 06 New
      +3
      Quote: aglet
      what does Tymoshenko have to do with it? ngsh bugs was

      So Stalin himself became the People's Commissar of Defense, and in theory Tymoshenko was supposed to become the chief of the General Staff, like his right hand, but did not trust him with such a post - that means they did not believe in his military talent.
  26. aglet
    aglet April 2 2020 14: 41 New
    0
    Quote: V.S.
    those BCPs, if fully executed, would have led to a terrible pogrom - because then the SDs on the border would have been stretched at their borders and, THIS case, if the Germans had a band of up to 40 km against SDs, the Germans would have passed these SDs without noticing them

    and what, did the Germans notice a lot of them?
  27. aglet
    aglet April 2 2020 14: 44 New
    -1
    Quote: V.S.
    what kind of sykun they were in the army

    Well you, of course, Dartanyan, and all in white
  28. Sugar Honeyovich
    Sugar Honeyovich April 2 2020 17: 23 New
    0
    Rokossovsky was released two months before Tymoshenko became a people's commissar.
  29. Force multiplier
    Force multiplier April 2 2020 18: 56 New
    +2
    Regarding Semyon Konstantinovich and his role in the events of June 22, 1941
    I wrote a lot of this at different times, but it will not be superfluous to recall. Back in May 1941, German intelligence recorded the evacuation of food supplies and livestock from Z. Ukraine and Bessarabia. It was noted that equipment is being dismantled and evacuated from the Drohobych oil fields. In the second decade of July 41, the Germans seized a curious document 12 A, according to which the damaged BTs were to be sent to the plant in Kharkov. But the damaged T-34s were to be sent immediately to Chelyabinsk. A very interesting document. Especially if we compare it with the chronology of the deployment of the T-34 production in Chelyabinsk according to the official version. Baltics. KTB (zhbd) German 18 A, entry at 6.10 on 22 June. Results of interrogation of a prisoner identified as "russische Ordnungspolizei". That is, clearly not the kind of person who would be privy to the content of secret plans and directives. And so he tells the Germans that the attack on June 22 was expected. And he also says that the Soviet troops, with the exception of weak forces, left Kretinga on June 18.
    In the comments, opinions are expressed regarding Directive No. 1. They say it was necessary earlier to send and withdraw troops to the border and give the Germans a battle there. But the main meaning of Directive No. 1 is political. In a purely military plane, its content is just a yellow traffic light. Obviously, the troops (the Polar Fleet disaster is a separate topic) were withdrawn long before this directive. But not to the border. And absolutely right. If the bulk of the Soviet 1st echelon troops entered the battle on the border, it would be shackled by the battle with the German infantry formations and surrounded by the breakthrough German tank wedges. Defense on the border would only play into the hands of the Germans. The task of the Soviet command was just to ensure the withdrawal of Soviet infantry formations of the 1st echelon from the border inland. It was this task that the mechanized corps of the Red Army were engaged in, which allegedly "ill-considered" counterattacks made it possible for the Soviet infantry to get out of contact with the enemy and begin a systematic withdrawal. And these supposedly "understaffed" MKs were perfect for this particular task - they had the necessary motor resource, fuel and ammunition reserves and were able to operate relatively close to their permanent deployment sites, their "understaffed" rear services did not overload the undeveloped road network and their hull advancement did not paralyzed traffic on the roads in the front-line areas. The opinion is often expressed that not all the strikes were inflicted on the German motorized equipment, and that the infantry was also attacked, they say, "ill-considered." Counterstrikes were needed not only to slow down the advance of German tank wedges and knock out the maximum number of German equipment. After all, it was necessary to give an opportunity to those infantry formations that had already been in contact with the enemy since June 22, to break off contact and begin to withdraw. And to ensure this withdrawal, attacks were made on the German infantry. Example - the actions of the mechanized corps of Comrade Vlasov in the Lvov area
    1. ccsr
      ccsr April 2 2020 20: 20 New
      +1
      Quote: Force Multiplier
      In the comments, opinions are expressed regarding Directive No. 1. They said it was necessary to send and withdraw troops to the border earlier and give the Germans a battle there. But the main point of Directive No. 1 is political.

      If the Directive were political, then it would be transferred to all law enforcement agencies, and not to the five border districts and in a copy of the NKVMF.
      Quote: Force Multiplier
      In a purely military plane, its content is just a yellow traffic signal.

      In that situation, green had to be given very quickly.
      Quote: Force Multiplier
      If the bulk of the Soviet troops of the 1st echelon entered the battle on the border, it would be constrained by battle with German infantry formations and surrounded by erupted German tank wedges.

      Since the tanks could break through, if they would first need to restore the bridges (they were destroyed by combat engineer units) to cross over under our fire, break through the deployed regiments if at 23 hours on June 21 the districts would receive a signal to enter cover plans.
      Quote: Force Multiplier
      And to ensure this withdrawal, strikes against the German infantry were also dealt.

      I don’t know how much you have studied military science, but initially the task of cover regiments was to quickly take up positions and die without any departure — this is the ABC of military affairs when a country does not have a mobilized army, and this takes time. The same was put to the shelves of cover and 40 years after the war — I know this very well.
      1. Force multiplier
        Force multiplier April 3 2020 00: 59 New
        0
        The directive did not apply to all law enforcement agencies. There, how exactly the troops of the border districts should meet the beginning of the war.
        Do you think that it was necessary to blow up bridges on the border with the state with which the non-aggression treaty is in force before the outbreak of hostilities? Do you understand the political implications of this decision? That is the purpose of Directive No. 1 and was to prevent such events, and at the same time to notify the troops that military operations will begin in the coming hours. A bridge or ferry crossing is a matter of several hours. And the Germans planned to enter the bulk of the tanks for solving operational tasks only when their infantry succeeded, breaking through the defenses, it just happened in the very first hours, when it became clear that the main forces of the western districts were not occupying fortifications along the border. No one was going to destroy the same 6 A in the Lviv ledge without any departure. Such a decision would open the Germans in the first week or two to the Dnieper and to the rear of the Law Firm. Pavlov was shot just because he lost control and allowed the encirclement and death of troops
        1. ccsr
          ccsr April 3 2020 10: 33 New
          +1
          Quote: Force Multiplier
          The directive did not apply to all law enforcement agencies. There, how exactly the troops of the border districts should meet the beginning of the war.

          In a situation when it became reliably known that the war will begin in the next few hours, you need not send out directives, but give a command to enter cover plans:
          2. The cover plan is put into effect upon receipt of a coded telegram signed by the People's Commissar of Defense, a member of the Main Military Council and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, with the following content: "TO START IMPLEMENTING THE COVER PLAN OF 1941".

          This immediately mobilizes troops and eliminates delays in bringing orders to NPOs.
          Quote: Force Multiplier
          Do you think that it was necessary to blow up bridges on the border with the state with which the non-aggression treaty is in force,

          This is not what I think, but it was so stipulated in the PP:
          17. The plan for the protection and defense of facilities of state and operational significance, on 13 pages.

          If it is not possible to defend an object, it is undermined.
          12. The calculation of the destruction of the railways. Nodes on 1 sheet.



          Quote: Force Multiplier
          A bridge or ferry crossing is a matter of several hours.

          This watch was just not enough to organize a reflection of the German strike. And under fire it is not so easy to build bridges - this is known from the experience of the whole war.
          Quote: Force Multiplier
          And the Germans planned to enter the bulk of tanks for solving operational tasks only when their infantry succeeds, breaking through the defenses, it just happened in reality in the very first hours,

          Here I am about the fact that our rifle regiments could destroy the advancing German infantry in battles at the border if they all took up positions according to the PP.
          1. Force multiplier
            Force multiplier April 3 2020 13: 36 New
            +2
            The purpose of Directive # 1 is to ensure that the German attack is unexpected and treacherous. You are writing about a scenario (to introduce a cover plan) that automatically translates the war into a "fight between two predators" who did not share something there. Moreover, the USSR would have fired the first shot in this "battle of predators".
            our infantry regiments could destroy the advancing German infantry in battles at the border if they all took up positions according to the PP

            No, that would not have happened. In the worst case, everything would be as it happened in reality in Brest. And at best, the Germans would simply have tied the Soviet units in battle, and their erupted tank formations would go behind the Soviet units and not surround them. Judging by the documents of 1 Tgr, 17 A, the Germans themselves did not hope that the Red Army forces in the outlying districts would play giveaways and defend themselves at the border. They correctly determined that the Soviet troops would retreat under the cover of rearguards and counterattacks, and the Germans aimed to prevent this retreat
            1. ccsr
              ccsr April 3 2020 18: 47 New
              0
              Quote: Force Multiplier
              The aim of Directive No. 1 is to make the German attack unexpected and treacherous.

              This is a controversial statement, if only because if cover plans were introduced, it would not mean mobilization in the country, which means that formally there would be no threat to Germany.
              Quote: Force Multiplier
              In the worst case, everything would be as it happened in reality in Brest.

              If all the troops were held in Brest, then the German scenario would have collapsed immediately.
              1. VS
                VS April 5 2020 10: 48 New
                +2
                Quote: ccsr
                if cover plans were introduced, this would not mean mobilization in the country, which means that formally there would be no threat to Germany.

                the introduction of PP in the border districts did START just the mobilization! THAT'S WHY Stalin answered Tymoshenko and Zhukov on June 9 - you cho - with your directive that you carry me every day - you want to start MOBILIZATION INPUT PP! ?? Do you want to put the USSR as an aggressor? !! But at the same time, he also gave them permission to withdraw troops under the control point — angrily cutting the control points with official orders — (how could there not be a combat alert in the 12th military unit on June 18 in PribOVO, but to display the combat alert out of combat alert?)) )) from June 8-11 already))

                Quote: ccsr
                If all the troops were held in Brest, then the German scenario would have collapsed immediately.

                yes there was no heroic defense of Brest)) The Germans stupidly went around him and left them to clean the FORTRESS - where three days of all the remnants of those divisions and units of the 4th Army fought - - their rear division)))
            2. VS
              VS April 5 2020 10: 42 New
              +1
              Quote: Force Multiplier
              The purpose of Directive # 1 is to ensure that the German attack is unexpected and treacherous. You are writing about a scenario (to introduce a cover plan) that automatically translates the war into a "fight between two predators" who did not share something there. Moreover, the USSR would have fired the first shot in this "battle of predators".

              at 2 o'clock Schulenburg began to search for Molotov, and Stalin told him - until the military reported from the border about the invasion - NOT to take the Germans in their hands !!)) But prp this, it is AUTHORITY, at 2.30 this directive 1 went to the okrugs - to enter the PP )) and at 4 o’clock she was sent in writing - AFTER the attack that had already taken place))

              Quote: Force Multiplier
              our infantry regiments could destroy the advancing German infantry in battles at the border if they all took up positions according to the PP

              No, that would not have happened. In the worst case, everything would be as it happened in reality in Brest. And at best, the Germans would simply have tied the Soviet units in battle, and their erupted tank formations would go behind the Soviet units and not surround them.

              according to TEMP - it would be worse - sd stretched up to 40 km stupidly TG Germans slip and our sd in the rear remain with the Germans - ALL 42 pieces (((
              Quote: Force Multiplier
              the goal of the Germans was to prevent this departure

              despite the fact that there was no waste in the plans of the General Staff .. ONLY its retaliatory offensive is immediate (((
    2. Serg koma
      Serg koma April 5 2020 07: 56 New
      +1
      Quote: Force Multiplier
      I wrote a lot of this at different times, but it will not be superfluous to recall. As early as May 1941, German intelligence recorded the evacuation of food supplies and livestock from Z. Ukraine and Bessarabia. It was noted that equipment is being dismantled and evacuated from the Drogobych oil field. In the second decade of July of the 41st, the Germans seized a curious document 12 A, according to which the damaged BTs were to be sent to the factory in Kharkov. But the damaged T-34 should have been sent immediately to Chelyabinsk. Very interesting document.

      Those. the evacuation plan was, they knew about the beginning of the war, they were preparing for the upcoming retreat in advance.
      The loss of weapons and ammunition reached large proportions in the first months of the war. In only three border districts (PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO), during the 10 days of the war, several thousand wagons of artillery property concentrated in district warehouses were lost and destroyed when our troops left. The surviving documents indicate that only 17 undermined warehouses of these districts contained 6838 weapons and ammunition wagons, including 442 wagons of artillery materiel, 5814 wagons of ammunition, 181 wagons of small arms, 401 wagons of various artillery.

      What about ammunition? Throw / destroy? Do you think oil equipment comes out with more valuable tangible property in the frontline zone than ammunition and shells? And if as a version put forward the transfer of oil equipment to other fields (more promising) in connection with the depletion of oil production in Drogobych? About document 12A, if possible in more detail, because It’s quite interesting whether this is based on any domestic plans / documents, or only in a single copy from the Wehrmacht intelligence.
    3. VS
      VS April 5 2020 10: 32 New
      +1
      Quote: Force Multiplier
      The main meaning of Directive No. 1 is political. In a purely military plane, its content is just a yellow traffic signal.

      Here it is necessary to look HOW UNDERSTAND E WHO WHO received it that night and understood it as a deer. ABOUT GIVING- TRANSFER of all troops, air force, air defense and fleets - to FULL bg)))

      Quote: Force Multiplier
      If the bulk of the 1st-echelon Soviet forces entered the battle on the border, it would be constrained by battle with German infantry formations and surrounded by erupted German tank wedges. The border defense would only be in the hands of the Germans.

      not so)) THIS would be if the troops had withdrawn, managed to withdraw along the BCP and stretched them out at the border - 42 frontier guards)) But if they had lanes according to the charter - no more than 10 km in quite calculable directions of TG strikes Germans of which I KNOW was quite like the strike force of the Germans, plus URA, then the Germans would have so easily broken through the DEFENSE on time ... But SO it could have been only according to the Shaposhnikov Plan and not according to the plans of Timoshenko-Meretskov (((

      Quote: Force Multiplier
      The task of the Soviet command was just to ensure the withdrawal of Soviet infantry formations of the 1st echelon from the border inland. It was this task that the mechanized corps of the Red Army were engaged in, which allegedly "ill-considered" counterattacks made it possible for the Soviet infantry to get out of contact with the enemy and begin a systematic withdrawal.

      The GOAL in the plans of the General Staff was - not a withdrawal and provision of a withdrawal, but - its immediate response to the offensive in Lublin and Suwalki - with mechanized corps !!))) THESE objectives are completely stated in the Considerations of August 40th May 41st)) which was published long ago)))

      Quote: Force Multiplier
      Counterattacks were needed not only to slow the progress of German tank wedges and to knock out the maximum number of German equipment. After all, it was necessary to give the opportunity to those infantry formations that had already been in contact with the enemy since June 22 to break off contact and begin to withdraw. And to ensure this withdrawal, strikes against the German infantry were also dealt. An example is the actions of the mechanized corps of Comrade Vlasov in the Lviv region

      they started to do this after they crap one's pants on the offense by deer. 3 as it was - an attempt to implement the Pre-war plans about which Zhukov himself wrote in draft copies)))
  30. nekromonger
    nekromonger April 4 2020 19: 07 New
    +1
    I wonder how after the Kharkov disaster he generally remained in the army. There wasn’t enough to shoot himself.
  31. VS
    VS April 5 2020 09: 53 New
    0
    Quote: ccsr
    A district cover plan was not introduced - and this is Tymoshenko’s biggest mistake, which led to the tragedy of the first months of the war.

    He later admitted that if TOT PP were introduced in advance, then there would be more pogrom ...
  32. VS
    VS April 5 2020 09: 56 New
    +1
    Quote: ccsr
    if Tymoshenko and Zhukov insisted on entering the BCP with a short signal, as provided, the implementation of the plan could begin already at 22.00-22.30, and our troops would not die in the barracks or on the march. It is difficult to understand the logic of these two military leaders, as if they did not understand the current situation, and how their directive would be received in the troops.

    I’m afraid you don’t understand why Stalin did not give permission to order the introduction of software, but only to bring it into full use. at first..

    After all, and so and so the military on a combat alert would have to be raised)))
  33. VS
    VS April 5 2020 10: 02 New
    +1
    Quote: aglet
    In general, all claims in this regard are against Zhukov. although yes, Tymoshenko should have controlled him

    in May, Tymoshenko tried to resist stupidity about reinforcing KOVO excessive and his colleagues there just did not surrender to the NKVD - they say he was trying to weaken Ukraine)))
  34. VS
    VS April 5 2020 10: 05 New
    +1
    Quote: Serg Koma
    If the minister begins to engage in uniforms, then there are no other problems.

    Baghramyan described - for a week orders came to layoffs at district headquarters - in the OPER department
    special !! In the Air Force, he cut the spring of the 41st TECHNICIANS - a group of technicians not ONE plane began to serve and THREE - link)))
  35. VS
    VS April 5 2020 10: 09 New
    0
    Quote: Serg Koma
    Quote: V.S.
    Everything is simple - those BCPs with full execution of them - would lead to a terrible pogrom - because then the SDs on the border would be exactly stretched at their borders and in THIS case - with a band up to 40 km against SD German Germans, these SDs would have passed not noticing them

    And what prevented the People's Commissar of Defense from rectifying the situation with the PP, if he was such a "visionary" and knew the situation with the "liquid" PP in June 1941 so well?

    and he tried in May - his fellow servicemen and non-commissioners were accused of wanting to surrender Ukraine (((
    And on the other hand, it was Tymoshenko in August 40 who was the initiator of the bad idea Offensive in response - if the enemy attacks with the main forces north of Polesie, then we will smash our main forces in response to the south of Polesie .. And it’s exactly under THESE plans and tasks of the PP in the districts and then they painted .. With the border sd stretched up to 40 km along the border !! This was described by Baghramyan well) - as under these tasks the General Staff assigned him the tasks of Kirpanos in January 41))
  36. The comment was deleted.
  37. VS
    VS April 5 2020 10: 18 New
    0
    Quote: aglet
    Quote: V.S.
    what kind of sykun they were in the army

    Well you, of course, Dartanyan, and all in white

    in any case, but he was not a sykun, and if necessary, he could send commanders))) At the same time, he retired as a major not because he was too greyhound but because he preferred to leave under the so-called reduction in 38 years and not serve further and grow to the underground))
  38. VS
    VS April 5 2020 10: 22 New
    +1
    Quote: aglet
    those BCPs, if fully executed, would have led to a terrible pogrom - because then the SDs on the border would have been stretched at their borders and, THIS case, if the Germans had a band of up to 40 km against SDs, the Germans would have passed these SDs without noticing them

    and what, did the Germans notice a lot of them?

    hu so I say - with the introduction of the PP they would have been stupidly taken prisoner at once, but they would have at least somehow fought - besides the ZAPOVO, they fought everywhere and caused damage to the Germans ... But if Shaposhnikov’s plan were realized rather than Tymoshenko’s, it would be at the border WOULD NOT be exactly stretched - in the directions of the main strikes, in PribOVO and ZAPOVO and there the Germans would have been kept for sure))) Especially if not only in PribOVO and KOVO they began to withdraw their border cross-border SD on PP from June 18, but also in ZapOVO too )))
  39. VS
    VS April 5 2020 10: 37 New
    0
    Quote: ccsr
    In a situation when it became reliably known that the war will begin in the next few hours, you need not send out directives, but give a command to enter cover plans:

    the order for the package - to enter the PP was given at 2.30, and if the troops were already awakened by the BATTLE alarm and were not in tents, then in this case it would also not be a problem to occupy the trenches! BUT - If your border crossroads has up to 40 km and in June 18 stands a CAMP in its defense zone, but it needs a few hours to draw one line to the trenches, then it’s not that they entered the border guard at not at 22.20 but at 2.30! the matter is in the GSH PLANS already - where our SDs up to 40 km were stretched to the BORDER))) Plus - REALLY the troops began to wake up at least 3 hours in ALL districts except OdVO - even though at 1 o'clock EVERYTHING read the order about full bg !!!
    1. ccsr
      ccsr April 5 2020 13: 48 New
      0
      Quote: V.S.
      the order for the package - to enter the PP was given at 2.30 and if the troops were already awakened by the BATTLE alarm and were not in tents, then in this case it would also not be a problem to occupy the trenches!

      And how then did it happen that they slept in the Brest Fortress, and in some parts of the ZAPOVO, according to the recollection of veterans, they learned about the beginning of the war from Molotov’s speech? Read carefully how the rifle regiment was just starting to unfold after the Germans launched an artillery strike:

      And if the regiment took up positions on the border, it would be unlikely that the people would rush about like that. And this regiment did not stand at any 40 km - they were at the very border, once immediately came under artillery fire.
      1. VS
        VS April 6 2020 18: 34 New
        0
        Quote: ccsr
        And how then did it happen that they slept in the Brest Fortress, and in some parts of the ZAPOVO, according to the recollection of veterans, they learned about the beginning of the war from Molotov’s speech?

        and why do you think Pavlov-Korobkovyh shot?
        Pavlov at 1.30 already wrote his order No. 1 - to enter the complete b..g, sent it with encryption at 2.25 but the troops themselves were sleeping with him EVERYWHERE)) After all, at 1.30 he gave the command to raise the army headquarters ONLY by alarm .. Like in Pribovo by the way)))
        Quote: ccsr
        if the regiment took up positions on the border, it would be unlikely that the people would rush about like that.

        WHAT is the division?


        Quote: ccsr
        this regiment did not stand in any 40 km - they were at the very border, once immediately came under artillery fire.

        this regiment was APARTED where it was lodged)))
        And - not at the regiment, but at DIVISION was up to 40 km))
        But if specifically - then in the 49th SD there were about 20 km and the 42nd SD in Zapovo had up to 20 km)))
        This is not 40 km as in PribOVO and KOVO - against the 3rd 4-1 and 1st TG, but one damn thing is not according to the charter)) although - there was UR Brestsky and as Lukin showed from Brest - if they were taken out by PP in advance for a day at least - hell would Guderian pass))
        The 49th was stationed in the 42nd defense zone and the 42nd was sticking out in Brest itself))) Now it’s clear - WHY it is about this area that from June 18, NO ANY of their border cross-border units were deduced by BCP?)))
        1. ccsr
          ccsr April 6 2020 19: 43 New
          0
          Quote: V.S.
          and why do you think Pavlov-Korobkovyh shot?

          We have discussed this for a long time and you yourself know that I think that is deserved. The question concerns Tymoshenko - why he did not insist on the introduction of a cover plan. Can you answer this yourself?
          Quote: V.S.
          WHAT is the division?

          This is not indicated in the memoirs of a radio scout, but if you really want to, you can find Lyuboml and Rymachi yourself and tie them to the division that had a regiment there.
          Quote: V.S.
          But if specifically - then in the 49th SD there were about 20 km and the 42nd SD in Zapovo had up to 20 km)))

          This was the headquarters of the division - the shelves were usually located in the vicinity of the border at distances of 5-10 km, if conditions allowed. This is the norm, so that they can provide support to border guards.
  40. VS
    VS April 5 2020 10: 51 New
    0
    Quote: nekromonger
    I wonder how after the Kharkov disaster he generally remained in the army. There wasn’t enough to shoot himself.

    Stalin’s translator Berezhkov showed Stalin’s attitude to this sheep - meeting in the corridors of the Kremlin he asked the marshal - why weren’t you shot in the 37th ?? Or - haven’t you been shot yet? (((
  41. VS
    VS April 6 2020 18: 17 New
    0
    Quote: ccsr
    It is not necessary to judge by one answer how everything would have turned out in the border districts, if our troops occupy positions according to the cover plan at 03.00:22 on June XNUMX.

    STRETCH the 1st echelon division ON THE BORDER along the border crossing point - and HOW will they keep the German TGs all the more?
    1. ccsr
      ccsr April 6 2020 19: 47 New
      0
      Quote: V.S.
      STRETCH the 1st echelon division ON THE BORDER along the border crossing point - and HOW will they keep the German TGs all the more?

      In any case, the troops are obliged to have time to take up positions on the cover plan so that they do not destroy the erupted enemy on the march.
  42. VS
    VS April 8 2020 18: 38 New
    0
    Quote: ccsr
    Tymoshenko - why he did not insist on the introduction of a cover plan. Can you answer this yourself?

    it’s kind of answered already)) at 22.00 it was dangerous to introduce the PP - it was necessary to pull to the last, otherwise we are an AGGRESSOR who WITHOUT the threat of war begins MOBILIZATION because the introduction of PP is the beginning of mobilization!
    Stalin date the command - enter not n PP but FULL bg
    And you should know that - that when you enter the full b..d that when you enter the PP - the FIRST actions are IDENTICAL! This is a climb on a BATTLE alarm and exit to the area of ​​gathering or concentration! further = when entering the entry point, the exit begins in the area along the entry point - either take up defense at the border or - to the waiting area for the next teams, wait if this is the 2nd echelon and reserves.
    And now look - at 1.30 full bg is introduced, and at 2.30 - there is a command to open the red packets, i.e. - in the fulfillment of the first position - ascent on combat alert, packets were opened further and were already operating according to the BCP.
    Another thing is that the order for full b..g was signed at 22.20 and the order for combat alert went to the okrug - only after TWO HOURS! That is - if at 2.30-2.40 they would start sending from wheels = as Zhukov Vatutin writes, IMMEDIATELY rushed to the General Staff to send this directive to full bg. - then in the districts the alarm would not have been played at 3 a.m. in the end, but - at 23. o’clock yet! and would wait for the order for the package))
  43. VS
    VS April 8 2020 18: 43 New
    0
    Quote: ccsr
    in the 49th SD, it was about 20 km and the 42nd SD in ZAPOVO was up to 20 km)))

    This was the headquarters of the division so the shelves were usually located in the vicinity of the border at a distance of 5-10 km, if conditions allowed.

    moreover, here are the headquarters if the defense zone is given to the Fighters and it is up to 40 km near the SD at the border and in THIS case, if TAM is rushing TG with 600 tanks, then it is better if this SD is not stretched in advance into a thin strip at the border along the BCP, but sticks out like the same Abramidze heaped - shelves and in anticipation - WHERE specifically Germans will trample))
  44. VS
    VS April 8 2020 18: 46 New
    0
    Quote: ccsr
    STRETCH the 1st echelon division ON THE BORDER along the border crossing point - and HOW will they keep the German TGs all the more?

    In any case, the troops are obliged to have time to take up positions on the cover plan so that they do not destroy the erupted enemy on the march.

    but you never know what you want if it was IMPOSSIBLE to introduce the PP until the last ... Schulenburg began to search for Molotov at 2 o’clock and Stalin told Molotov - until the military reports on the invasion - Do not pick up the note ..
  45. EVDmitri
    EVDmitri April 23 2020 21: 28 New
    -1
    The mere fact that the marshal resisted Khrushchev's "requests" for memoirs does him credit. He and Rokossovsky, that's all who did not bend under Khrushchev.
  46. Jmbg
    Jmbg 16 May 2020 11: 46 New
    0
    Suvorov:
    - No defeats, no victories? Oh well...