The evolution of the nuclear triad: generalized composition of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation in the medium term

The evolution of the nuclear triad: generalized composition of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation in the medium term

In previous articles, we examined possible threats to the Russian nuclear shield that may arise as a result of the deployment of the United States global ballistic missile defense (missile defense) and their application sudden disarming strike. In this case, a situation may arise when the reaction time of the Russian missile attack warning systems will not provide the possibility of a retaliatory strike and can only be counted on a retaliatory strike.


Considered sustainability air, ground и Maritime components of the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF of the Russian Federation) to a sudden disarming strike.


The stability of the classical nuclear triad before a sudden disarming strike in the foreseeable future can significantly decrease

The materials discussed above made it possible to form an optimal look terrestrial, aerial и Maritime components of promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.

The time has come to put all this into a single system, to consider the optimal number and ratio of nuclear charges within the components and individual types of weapons of strategic nuclear forces, as well as solutions that can reduce the load on the country's economy in the course of implementing promising strategic nuclear forces.

Basic requirements for promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation


1. Creation of conditions under which an adversary’s strike at the Russian strategic nuclear forces will require him to use all available nuclear weapons without guaranteeing the achievement of the desired result (destruction of the Russian strategic nuclear forces).

2. Guaranteed retaliatory strike in the event of an enemy delivering a sudden disarming strike with overcoming existing and promising missile defense systems.

3. To unleash the offensive potential of the strategic nuclear forces in order to force the enemy to reorient the available resources for defense against a sudden decapitation strike from our side.

As a basis for calculating the required number of nuclear warheads and carriers, we initially accept the current limitations of 1550 nuclear warheads (nuclear warheads) imposed under the START-3 treaty; in the future, they can be revised with a proportional change in the composition of the strategic nuclear forces components discussed below.

The restrictions imposed by the START-3 treaty and other similar agreements on the number of carriers, camouflage means, etc. will not be taken into account, since they may contradict the current geopolitical situation and interfere with the construction of promising strategic nuclear forces capable of effectively solving nuclear deterrence tasks. Proposed decisions and quantitative characteristics can be taken into account in subsequent START treaties or other agreements, if any.

Ground component of strategic nuclear forces


Stationary ICBMs in silos


The basis for nuclear deterrence should be light intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) deployed in highly protected silo launchers (silos), since only ICBMs in silos are almost impossible to destroy conventional weapons (we do not consider anti-bunker bombs due to the fact that their carrier must fly almost close to the silo). Based on the available information, that to destroy one ICBM in a silo, with a 95% probability, two W-88 nuclear charges with a capacity of 475 kilotons are needed, the number of ICBMs in a silo should be equal to half the deployed nuclear charges of the enemy, i.e. 775 silos.


Light ICBMs in highly secure silos should become the basis of nuclear deterrence

In the comments to the material on the promising ground component, the view was expressed that the country simply would not pull such an amount of silos and ICBMs. The following data may be brought to this objection:

“In order to save time in deploying a new generation of missile systems, the USSR government decided to build mine launchers, command posts and other infrastructure elements necessary to ensure the daily activities of missile units until the missile tests are completed.
These measures made it possible to carry out rearmament in a short time and put new missile systems on alert. Between 1966 and 1968, the number of ICBMs on duty increased from 333 to 909. By the end of 1970, their number reached 1361. By 1973, ICBMs were located in 1398 silo launchers of 26 missile divisions. ”

Thus, almost 576 silos were created in the USSR over two years, and over five years their number amounted to 1028 units. In about 10 years, 1 ICBMs were put on combat duty in silos. It can be argued that Russia is not the USSR; it cannot afford such volumes. There are several objections to this: technologies, for example, drilling, the creation of silos, the dimensions of automation and power mechanisms, solid-state ICBMs are simpler and cheaper than liquid ICBMs deployed at that time.

In the comments on previous materials, as well as in some other sources, it was suggested that liquid-propellant ICBMs could be cheaper and have a longer life than solid-propellant ICBMs. The author is not a dogma, in any case, it makes sense to hold a competition between several design bureaus, for example, the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering and Makeev Design Bureau. The main criteria for a promising ICBM: minimum dimensions and weight at a given range and payload mass, maximum reliability and service life at a minimum cost and production time.

A promising light ICBM should be equipped with one nuclear warhead (NWF), with the possibility of additional installation of two more NWFs. Instead of two additional nuclear warheads, two heavy false targets should be placed, including electronic warfare means, as well as jammers in the optical and infrared wavelength ranges. The presence of two “spare places” on ICBMs will make it possible, if necessary, to promptly increase the number of deployed nuclear warheads from 775 to 2325 units.

For promising ICBMs, it is necessary to develop highly protected silos of high factory readiness when silos are fully or in the form of modules manufactured at the manufacturing plant and delivered to the installation site in this form. After installing and connecting communications, silos are filled with high-strength concrete in technological cavities and can be put into operation.


The complexity and cost of construction of facilities compared to the installation of products of high factory readiness may differ by several orders of magnitude

ShPU 15P744 of high factory readiness was manufactured back in the Soviet years for strategic missile systems RT-23. The protective device (roof) and power cup with the equipment were made at the manufacturing plants - Novokramatorsky Mechanical Plant and Zhdanov Heavy Engineering Plant, were fully equipped with the necessary components, shock absorption, electrical equipment, service platforms, tested, and transported by rail to the installation site . Installation and commissioning of silos for state tests on such technologies were carried out as soon as possible.


The construction technology of silos at the facility should be replaced by the manufacture of silos in the form of high factory readiness

There is no doubt that advances in technology and a decrease in the size of ICBMs will allow the creation of silos of high factory readiness at a lower cost, at a faster speed and in a more secure design.

Silos should also be equipped with an integrated unified command post. To reduce the number of calculations, silos with ICBMs should be combined in clusters of 10 units with the control of one calculation for the entire cluster, with automation of operations similar to that implemented in nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBNs). High reliability of communication between silos should be ensured by laying secure communication lines in horizontal tunnels of small diameter, laid between silos at maximum depth, according to the physical “grid” scheme, with a logical combination of equipment in a fully connected computer network topology (full graph). The calculation can be placed arbitrarily in one of the silos, and periodically change the dislocation within the cluster.


The organization of communication between the silos should be based on a fully connected topology of the computer network, with cabling along the channels made according to the “grid” scheme

Depending on the economic capabilities of the state, the number of silos will exceed the number of deployed ICBMs by about half. The main task of constructing an excess of silos is to reduce the likelihood of ICBM destruction by creating the uncertainty of its location in a particular silo at the current time. Inspections within the framework of contractual obligations should be carried out on the principle of clusters, including “N ICBM + Nx2 silos”, while the rotation of ICBMs within the cluster should be allowed without restrictions.

Anti-missile launchers should be deployed in silos that are not used to deploy ICBMs, designed to break through the U.S. missile defense echelon, in transport and launch containers (TPK), unified by their external dimensions and interface with the ICBM TPK.

A missile defense breakthrough should be carried out by implementing the principle of “nuclear trail” - by anticipating the undermining of nuclear warhead missiles at altitudes of 200-1000 km, and then undermining the selected number of nuclear warheads in certain sections of the trajectory.

“Launched with the help of the Tor missile, a nuclear warhead with a W49 charge of 1,44 megatons was launched at an altitude of 400 kilometers above the Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.
The almost complete absence of air at an altitude of 400 km prevented the formation of the familiar nuclear fungus. However, in a high-altitude nuclear explosion, other interesting effects were observed. In Hawaii, at a distance of 1500 kilometers from the epicenter of the explosion under the influence of an electromagnetic pulse, three hundred street lamps, televisions, radios and other electronics are out of order. In the sky in this region for more than seven minutes, a glow could be observed. He was watched and photographed from the islands of Samoa, located 3200 kilometers from the epicenter.
The explosion also affected spacecraft. Three satellites were immediately disabled by an electromagnetic pulse. The charged particles resulting from the explosion were captured by the Earth’s magnetosphere, as a result of which their concentration in the Earth’s radiation belt increased by 2-3 orders of magnitude. The impact of the radiation belt led to a very rapid degradation of solar panels and electronics in another seven satellites, including the first commercial telecommunications satellite Telstar 1. In total, the explosion disabled one third of the spacecraft in low orbits at the time of the explosion. ”

Mobile PGRK


The second element of the ground component of the promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation should be mobile ground missile systems (PGRK), disguised as civilian cargo vehicles, which should be created taking into account developments in the PGRK "Courier". The small-sized ICBM located in the PGRK should be unified with the mine version, similar to the way it was done at the Topol ICBM and the Yars ICBM.


The greatest secrecy will be possessed by PGRK disguised as civilian freight vehicles

The main problem limiting the use of PGRK is the uncertainty in understanding whether or not the enemy can track their location, including in real time. Based on this, as well as the fact that a relatively unprotected mobile complex can be easily destroyed by both conventional weapons and reconnaissance and sabotage units of the enemy, PGRC cannot act as the main element of the ground component of the promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation. On the other hand, based on the need to diversify risks, as well as to maintain competencies in this area, PGRCs can be used as the second element of the ground component of strategic nuclear forces in the amount of 1/10 of the number of ICBMs in silos, i.e. their number will be 76 vehicles. Accordingly, the number of nuclear weapons placed on them in the standard version will be 76 units, and 228 units in the maximum version.

Marine component of strategic nuclear forces


RPKSN / PLARK projects 955A / 955K


At the first stage, the configuration of the offshore component of the promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation is determined by the construction of the project 955 (A) SSBN. Since the establishment of the naval fleet (Navy), capable of providing deployment and cover of SSBNs in remote areas of the oceans, is currently considered an almost impossible task, then the best way to increase the survival of SSBNs is to increase their number, up to 12 units already planned, while increasing the operational voltage coefficient ( KOH) up to 0,5. That is, the SSBN should spend half the time in the ocean. To do this, it is necessary to reduce maintenance time between trips, as well as to ensure the availability of two interchangeable crews for the SSBN.


SSBN project 955 (A) for the coming decades will become the basis of the sea component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation

The continuation of the SSBN series of project 955A with a series of nuclear submarines with cruise missiles (SSGN) of the conditional project 955K, with the visual and acoustic signature of the original project, will make it possible to impede the operation of the anti-submarine forces of the enemy, increasing the likelihood of the SSBN surviving and retaliating against the enemy.

The placement of SSBNs in closed bastions is extremely inefficient, since in any case they will be located on the very border of the country, the degree of their protection before the conflict can be estimated very conditionally, and ballistic missiles launched from under water from submarines can be hit by ships Missile defense system, in the initial phase of flight. Presumably, if there is political will, it is possible to complete the construction of the SSBN / SSBN projects 955A / 955K by 2035.

At 12 SSBNs with 12 SLBMs on board each, 432 nuclear warheads can be deployed, based on the installation of 3 nuclear warheads per 1 SLBM. Empty seats should be loaded with a set of missile defense capabilities similar to those used at mine ICBMs and ICBMs. If necessary, depending on the maximum possible number of nuclear warheads on SLBMs, which can be 6-10 units, the maximum number of deployed nuclear warheads can be 864-1440 units.

The survival of the SSBNs and SSBNs should be ensured due to the inability of the enemy to ensure the watch and tracking of all of our submarines. For the year-round expectation of going to sea, tracking and escorting 24 of our SSBNs / SSBNs, the enemy will need to attract at least 48 nuclear submarines (NPS), that is, almost their entire nuclear submarine fleet.

Husky project


At the second stage, the creation of a universal nuclear submarine in versions with ballistic missiles (SSBNs), SSBNs and a hunter submarine can be considered. To accommodate a universal nuclear submarine in the weapon compartments, a promising small-sized SLBM should be developed based on the solutions used to create a promising light mine-based ICBM and ICBM ICBM, as much as possible unified with these ICBMs. Given the smaller dimensions of the carrier - a universal nuclear submarine, its ammunition should be about 6 SLBMs with one to three nuclear warheads on each.


Creation of a hunter, SSGN and SSBN project on the basis of the nuclear submarines of the Husky project will make it possible to hide the latter as much as possible among other types of submarine forces of the Russian Navy

The construction of a universal nuclear submarine should be carried out in a large series - 40-60 units, of which 20 should be in the version with SLBMs. In this case, the total number of nuclear warheads on SLBMs will be 120 units, with the possibility of increasing to 360 units. It would seem that a clear regression, compared with the highly specialized SSBN project 955 (A)?

The alleged advantage of the Husky project’s nuclear submarine of the fifth generation should be significantly greater secrecy, which will allow them to act more aggressively, try to get as close to the enemy’s territory as possible, which will, if necessary, strike a decapitation blow from a minimum distance along the trajectory. The task of the naval component of the promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation is to exert such pressure on the enemy, in which he will be forced to reorient his resources - equipment, people, financing, to defense tasks, and not attacks.

Upon detection of a universal nuclear submarine, the enemy can never be sure that he is tracking the carrier of SLBMs, cruise missiles or anti-ship missiles, and for organizing year-round control of the exit and tracking of all 40-60 nuclear submarines, at least 80-120 multi-purpose nuclear submarines will be required, which is more than all NATO countries combined.

Aircraft component of strategic nuclear forces


The lack of stability in the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces against a sudden disarming strike, the vulnerability of carriers at all stages of the flight, as well as the vulnerability of their existing weapons - cruise missiles with a nuclear warhead, makes this element of strategic nuclear forces the least significant from the point of nuclear deterrence.

The only possible option for the practical use of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is to use it to put pressure on the enemy by threatening to advance to his borders and attack from a minimum distance. The most interesting option as an armament for the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is an air-launched ICBM, for launching which a converted transport aircraft should be used - a promising aviation ballistic missile system (PAK RB).


The most effective weapon of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is modernized transport aircraft armed with air-launched ICBMs

The advantage of this solution is the visual and radar similarity of the PAK RB with transport aircraft, as well as with other aircraft on the basis of one project - tankers, air command posts, etc. This will force the enemy air forces to react to the movement of any transport aircraft in the way they do now when a strategic bomber is detected. At the same time, financial costs will increase, the resource of enemy fighters will decrease, the load on pilots and technical personnel will increase. In fact, the launch of air-based ICBMs should be possible without going beyond the borders of the Russian Federation.

Given the novelty of the solution, the number of PAK RB should be minimal, about 20-30 aircraft with 1 ICBM air launch on each. A promising air-based ICBM should be as unified as possible with a promising silo ICBM, ICBM PGRK and a promising small-sized SLBM. Accordingly, the number of nuclear warheads will be from 20-30 units in the minimum, to 60-90 units in the maximum.

It may turn out that the implementation of the PAK RB will be too high-risk and costly, as a result of which it will have to be abandoned. At the same time, there will be little sense in the nuclear conflict from the classic cruise missile bombers. Existing, under construction and promising Tu-95, Tu-160 (M), PAK-DA can be extremely effectively used as carriers of conventional weapons, and as an element of strategic nuclear forces can be considered as a "backup plan for the backup plan." On the other hand, the inclusion of one missile carrier bomber as one nuclear charge makes their existence in the strategic nuclear forces "legally justified", allowing them to deploy 12 times more nuclear warheads than they are counted under the START-3 treaty.

Based on the foregoing, it is proposed that the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces be left unchanged, legally retained as part of the strategic nuclear forces, counting as 50-80 nuclear warheads, and in fact are used as intensively as possible for delivering conventional weapon strikes in ongoing conflicts.

Ways to save


The construction of a strategic nuclear forces is a significant burden on the country's budget. However, in a situation where the conventional forces of Russia are significantly inferior to the forces of the main adversary - the United States, not to mention the entire NATO bloc, strategic nuclear forces remain the only defense guaranteeing the sovereignty and security of the country. And of course, the more the enemy’s interest in destroying this defense.

What measures can be taken to reduce the burden on the country's budget during the construction of promising strategic nuclear forces?

1. The maximum possible unification of equipment and technology. If the “first pancake”, the unification of the Poplar and SLBM Bulava ICBMs, came out lumpy, this does not mean that the idea is vicious in principle. It can be assumed that the main obstacle to unification is not technical problems, but the competition between manufacturers, the difference in requirements and regulatory documents of different departments and types of armed forces, the inertia of continuity - “we always had that”. Accordingly, the basis for unification should be the development of unified documents and regulations, of course, adjusted for the specific activities of each type of armed forces.

In some cases, unification may be more important than lowering the cost of some products. What does it mean? For example, some equipment for the Navy requires protection from sea water and salt fog, and this requirement is not critical for ground forces. At the same time, manufacturing a product with protection against sea water and salt fog is more expensive than without it. It would seem logical to make different equipment. It is by no means a fact, it is necessary to study the issue comprehensively, to see how an increase in the number of protected products will affect their cost. It may turn out that releasing all products protected in total will be cheaper than making separately protected and unprotected equipment.

2. The inclusion in the technical specifications (TK) as the main requirements for an extended service life and minimize the need for maintenance (MOT). You can slightly sacrifice the achievement of the maximum possible characteristics, due to the extension of the service life. For example, conditionally, it is better to have a nuclear power plant with a capacity of 50 kilotons, with a service life of 30 years, than a nuclear power plant with a capacity of 100 kilotons, with a service life of 15 years. The same applies to product weight, power consumption, etc. In other words, reliability and service life without maintenance should be one of the most important requirements of TK.

3. Reducing the types of systems in service with strategic nuclear forces.

What can and should be abandoned during the construction of the strategic nuclear forces? First of all, from any exotic, to which specific complexes such as "Petrel" and "Poseidon" can be attributed. They have all the shortcomings of their carriers in the context of stability before delivering a sudden disarming strike. They are also not very suitable for applying a decapitation blow because of the low speed. In other words, the swing will be on the ruble, and the blow on the penny.


"Petrel" and "Poseidon." The costs of creating exotic solutions are high, and the benefits of deploying them are dubious

This also includes proposals for the deployment of underwater strategic systems in inland waters. For example, we deployed ICBMs in Lake Baikal. What is the guarantee that the enemy will not learn to find containers with ICBMs in the water column? How to prevent him from throwing small-sized underwater drones into Lake Baikal that can carry out an autonomous search under water for a long time? Close the whole lake? Drive into the Baikal SSBN? Not to mention the fact that in this way we put under attack the world's largest source of fresh water. And how to conduct checks on the number of deployed ICBMs under water?

It is also necessary to abandon heavy missiles, BZHRK and other monstrous complexes. All of them will be expensive and will always be the number 1 goal for the enemy in the first strike. It’s one thing to spend 2 nuclear warheads on a light ICBM with 1 nuclear warhead, it’s another thing to spend 4 nuclear warheads on a heavy missile with 10 nuclear warheads. In which case will the opponent win? The situation with the ALCM is even worse - it can be destroyed with conventional weapons, while its camouflaging capabilities are worse than that of a PGRK disguised as a civilian cargo vehicle.


The time of heavy ICBMs and BZHRK has passed, the arsenal of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation needs to be "smeared with a thin layer", and not the "Cheops pyramids" built from nuclear warheads

Ratio and quantity


Given the above points, promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation can have the following basic composition:

Strategic Missile Forces:
- 775 light ICBMs in silos with 775 nuclear warheads (up to a maximum of 2325 nuclear warheads);
- 76 PGRK disguised as civilian freight vehicles with 76 nuclear warheads (up to a maximum of 228 nuclear warheads);

Navy:
- until 2035, 12 SSBNs with 432 nuclear warheads (maximum 864-1440 nuclear warheads);
- after 2050, 20 universal nuclear submarines with 120 nuclear warheads (maximum 360 nuclear warheads);

Air Force:
- 50 existing / under construction / prospective bombers with 50-80 nuclear warheads (under the START-3 treaty), or with 600-960 nuclear warheads (in fact).

As we see, in the proposed version, the minimum number of nuclear warheads is even less than that stipulated by the START-3 treaty. The difference can be offset by the installation of additional nuclear warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, or, much better, an increase in the number of ICBMs in silos.

The total number of nuclear warheads that we must be ready to make in the START-4 conditional agreement should be calculated on the basis of the total number of nuclear warheads that must survive in the event of a sudden disarming strike by the enemy, the nuclear warheads spent from them needed to break through the missile defense "nuclear path", and the remaining nuclear warheads necessary to cause unacceptable damage to the enemy.

Again. The basis of the strategic nuclear forces should be the lightest and most compact ICBMs placed in highly protected silos of high factory readiness. Only they can hold the blow of non-nuclear high-precision weapons, which the enemy can rivet with tens of thousands, using it not only himself, but also arming them with allies.

The number of ICBMs in a silo should be equal to ½ NWB deployed by the enemy. The silos with ICBMs should be supplemented with reserve silos, in the event of a sharp increase in the number of deployed nuclear warheads by the enemy (for example, due to the return potential), or an increase in the characteristics of the enemy’s nuclear warheads, which will allow him to hit one ICBM with his own nuclear warhead with an acceptable probability. In the event of an enemy delivering a sudden disarming strike, he will have to hit all silos, since the location of a real ICBM inside a silo cluster will not be determined.

All other strategic nuclear weapons components can be built optionally - PGRK, SSBNs, missile-carrying bombers, etc. Their significance for nuclear deterrence, subject to the implementation of the previous paragraph, will be substantially less important.

A bit more stories to understand what volumes were within the forces of the USSR:
“By the second half of 1990, the Strategic Missile Forces were armed with 2500 missiles and 10271 units of nuclear weapons. Of this number, the main part was intercontinental ballistic missiles - 1398 units with 6612 charges. In addition, in the arsenals of the USSR there were warheads of tactical nuclear weapons: ground-to-ground missiles - 4300 units, artillery shells and mines up to 2000 units, air-to-ground missiles and free-fall bombs for air force aviation - more than 5000 units, winged anti-ship rockets, as well as depth charges and torpedoes - up to 1500 units, coastal artillery shells and coastal defense missiles - up to 200 units, atomic land mines and mines - up to 14 units. A total of 000 nuclear charges. "


conclusions


The promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation, implemented on the basis of light ICBMs in silos, will be most effective as a means of nuclear deterrence in the context of the possibility of an adversary delivering a disarming strike under cover of a global missile defense system, until the enemy begins mass deployment space weapon systems capable of ensuring the defeat of highly protected silos without the use of nuclear charges.

In this case, the strategic nuclear forces will have two ways. The first is a dead end, when in the absence of comparable space technologies it is necessary to implement an extensive development path - a quantitative increase in all components of the strategic nuclear forces by 2–3 times, i.e. the total number of warheads can be about 3000-4500 units or more, up to the level of the USSR. But this will gobble up all the resources of the economy - we will turn into North Korea.

And on this basis, in the most distant future, after 2050, the second, intensive path of development will be effective - the space expansion of the strategic nuclear forces. This is a long and difficult path, but the groundwork for it must be created now.


The launch of strategic nuclear forces into space. Most likely, this is the inevitability of a distant future.

What problems might stand in the way of the US desire to deliver a sudden disarming strike under the guise of a global missile defense system? First of all, this is a problem of large and complex systems. It is impossible to be 100% sure that all systems on Day D and hour H will work and will work with the required efficiency. And taking into account the rates in the nuclear missile confrontation, it is unlikely that anyone will decide to rely on "maybe".

On the other hand, there is a risk of an escalation of any conflict or the emergence of such an external or internal situation in the United States itself, when their leadership considers the risk acceptable, therefore, it cannot be completely ruled out that the “face” command will be given. The only solution remains the creation of such a nuclear missile shield, which the enemy will not dare to try for strength in any situation.
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  1. NEXUS 31 March 2020 15: 19 New
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    We examined the stability of the air, land and sea components of the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF of the Russian Federation) to a sudden disarming strike.

    Are we ready for a sudden disarming infection? It is clear that in the nuclear version no one will fight with us, but it is easy to infect, in some parts of the country, more than the coronovirus. And in a week the whole country will be on its knees. SNF is good, but only, as it turned out, our health care is no less important in importance. And with this we have a complete, excuse my ass for today, not an example of strategic nuclear forces.
    1. Imperial Technocrat 31 March 2020 19: 33 New
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      And with this we have a complete, excuse my ass for today

      Another liberal from parallel reality. Practice has shown that our healthcare is much better than in the same blessed west
    2. Sailor 31 March 2020 21: 31 New
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      I completely agree, I am surprised by the behavior of our leadership with their bare ass in medicine, there are no drugs or equipment to treat their citizens, so it is trying to help everyone, Italy, USA, well done, the Chinese refused. And so at all times it was not in vain that Leskov in Levsha described our servility to the West, and they most likely laugh at us and announce sanctions.
    3. bk0010 31 March 2020 21: 36 New
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      Quote: NEXUS
      .And here it is easy to introduce infection in several parts of the country, and more honestly than coronovirus.
      Easily. But we still need to create conditions so that she herself does not rest. And if there are conditions, then you don’t need to enter it especially - it will multiply itself.
  2. Svarog 31 March 2020 15: 20 New
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    The nuclear triad is over, the main component in the country's defense .. but watching what the same coronavirus can do .. you involuntarily think that bacteriological weapons are no less dangerous .. and most importantly, as long as you understand where it came from, you can’t give an answer either ..
    1. Sergey Valov 31 March 2020 15: 46 New
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      Bacteriological weapons, this is a separate song. It has one unpleasant property - after being used against the enemy, it can hit you too no less, because not only bombs, but also animals can be its peddlers.
      1. Svarog 31 March 2020 15: 47 New
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        Quote: Sergey Valov
        Bacteriological weapons, this is a separate song. It has one unpleasant property - after being used against the enemy, it can hit you too no less, because not only bombs, but also animals can be its peddlers.

        I agree, but if the aggressor state is prepared ... and let's say it vaccinates its population?
        1. Sergey Valov 31 March 2020 15: 54 New
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          This cannot be done quietly, and in case of detection, numerous variants of “warning” the adversary are possible. Please note that no one dared to use chemical weapons in WWII, even during the phase of complete collapse.
          1. Svarog 31 March 2020 15: 58 New
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            Quote: Sergey Valov
            This cannot be done quietly, and in case of detection, numerous variants of “warning” the adversary are possible.

            I don’t see the difficulty of doing this unnoticed. It’s enough to make a virus and a vaccine .. then, under the pretext of coronavirus, make everyone get vaccinated .. and whoever doesn’t get vaccinated, it's not my fault .. Well, it’s even easier to infect someone .. it all started an apocalypse .. but not for everyone ..
            1. Sergey Valov 31 March 2020 16: 03 New
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              A practically unrealizable theory, in practice no one will risk it. ("Not noticeable" in this context is written together).
          2. The comment was deleted.
        2. Ezekiel 25-17 31 March 2020 16: 29 New
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          Mass vaccination in the country of the likely adversary will be noticed and may result in a preventive strike.
      2. NEXUS 31 March 2020 15: 50 New
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        Quote: Sergey Valov
        Bacteriological weapons, this is a separate song. It has one unpleasant property - after applying to the enemy, it can hit you no less strongly.

        No one will use bacteriological weapons without an antidote. And while the country in which these weapons were used will frantically invent an antidote, there will be a lot of people there, plus panic, fear, etc. inside the country. This is cleaner than any massive missile attack on our territory.
        1. Sergey Valov 31 March 2020 15: 58 New
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          Bacteriological weapons will not necessarily be directed against people, it can destroy both crops and domestic animals. The result, ultimately, is the same - the death of civilization.
          1. NEXUS 31 March 2020 16: 05 New
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            Quote: Sergey Valov
            Bacteriological weapons will not necessarily be directed against people, it can destroy both crops and domestic animals. The result, ultimately, is the same - the death of civilization.

            You did not understand the idea at all. Bacteriological weapons, which are much cheaper than expensive missiles, ships, planes, etc. Why soil the invader if you can sweep away the power of a country that is objectionable by introducing several types of different viruses into different regions of the country, while having an antidote to this infection and prudently instilling the population of your country (under the guise of mandatory flu vaccination, for example) . While the authorities of that country will sort out where it came from and look for a vaccine, more than one virus brought in, half the country there will crawl. In such circumstances, an unwanted government can be removed simply by waiting for the population to take to the streets in fear, panic and hopelessness to sweep away the government.
            1. Sergey Valov 31 March 2020 16: 35 New
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              I understood. For some reason, you completely exclude the reaction of the rival state. Firstly, the enemy’s scientific developments have always been and are being monitored. Secondly, it is secretly impossible to make a vaccine on an industrial scale, and not to spread it quietly around the country. Thirdly, either all the allies are crushed, or they have to be warned and vaccinated, and this is even more difficult to imperceptibly do. I’m generally silent about neutrals, it’s possible to kill three quarters of a ball. You can’t exclude traitors among your own, but there are also warmed tundbergs of all colors and shades. I’m silent about the possible “self-infection”, which may well kill the own population. And this is the first thing that comes to mind. So the answer will arrive necessarily, and completely unpredictable.
              Bacteriological weapons, of course, are cheaper than nuclear weapons, but incomparably unpredictable.
              1. NEXUS 31 March 2020 16: 43 New
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                Quote: Sergey Valov
                For some reason, you completely exclude the reaction of the rival state.

                This reaction will be definitely belated.
                Quote: Sergey Valov
                Firstly, the enemy’s scientific developments have always been and are being monitored.

                Seriously? And the developments that are being conducted in secret laboratories, too? wassat
                Quote: Sergey Valov
                Secondly, it is secretly impossible to make a vaccine on an industrial scale, and not to spread it quietly around the country.

                It’s also debatable, since to build a plant somewhere in a secret facility underground and to make an antidote in full secrecy, as needed, is not such a big problem. We somehow managed to hide the existence of Baikonur for so long ...
                Quote: Sergey Valov
                I’m silent about the possible “self-infection”, which may well kill the own population. And this is the first thing that comes to mind.

                This will be written off to the obligatory and expected victims of the war.
                You alone do not understand that the main thing is to spit deeply on the population of your country, not to mention the country that decided to launch such a massive bacteriological attack. Strongly the United States worried that 2 million Iraqis died in that war? Or, say, in Vietnam? They care about the result, the achievement of their goals, and it doesn’t matter how much they feed the people.
                1. Sergey Valov 31 March 2020 17: 16 New
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                  “The main thing is to spit deeply on the population of your country” - spit something, but it makes no sense to be king without subjects. Let's finish, I'm not interested anymore.
            2. Oden280 31 March 2020 18: 27 New
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              You completely disregard such a thing as mutation of an infection. And artificially derived viruses and bacteria are very prone to this. So. that as a result of the use of these diseases, no vaccination can save. The dream of all virologists is a genetic virus, but fortunately it is only a dream so far.
    2. BREAKTHROUGH READY 31 March 2020 18: 58 New
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      And what can the coronavirus do so terribly, except for freeing the country's budget of the probable adversary from the “social burden” of pensioners and invalids?
      There is much more panic with the help of which those in power promote their interests than real harm to the economy (one’s, someone else’s, any other)
      1. Operator 31 March 2020 20: 24 New
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        Specifically, in the USA, the coronavirus will cause the second Great Depression amid the continued growth of the Chinese economy, which will take first place in the world with a new reserve currency, the RMB.
        1. BREAKTHROUGH READY 31 March 2020 21: 01 New
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          Why should the coming “depression” strike the United States, and not China, which is much more dependent on exports?
          China's economy, which will take first place in the world with a new reserve currency, the renminbi.
          do you believe it yourself? And when, in your opinion, will we move to the yuan in international trade? Just don’t write “soon”, you are interested in a specific period of time.
          1. Operator 31 March 2020 22: 01 New
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            You actually watch TV / Internet - in China the epidemic is over, all enterprises operate at 100 percent or more, in the USA, enterprises are quarantined and this is only the beginning. Already, China has begun to seize empty markets.

            Why do you need the exact dollar devaluation date - do you play on the exchange? laughing
  3. Peter Tverdokhlebov 31 March 2020 15: 30 New
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    The article says that for serious false purposes, interference directors in the optical and infrared range will be placed, what kind of directors are they?
    1. Shopping Mall 31 March 2020 21: 46 New
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      Quote: Peter Tverdokhlebov
      The article says that for serious false purposes, interference directors in the optical and infrared range will be placed, what kind of directors are they?


      I would suggest something like the "President" complex, which includes laser emitters to suppress GOS missiles.
  4. Amateur 31 March 2020 15: 38 New
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    Read
    And on this basis, in the most distant future, after 2050, the second, intensive path of development will be effective - the space expansion of the strategic nuclear forces. This is a long and difficult path, but the groundwork for it must be created now.

    And a strange association arose:
    1. Shopping Mall 31 March 2020 21: 44 New
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      Quote: Amateur
      Read
      And on this basis, in the most distant future, after 2050, the second, intensive path of development will be effective - the space expansion of the strategic nuclear forces. This is a long and difficult path, but the groundwork for it must be created now.

      And a strange association arose:


      Read Raymond Kurzweil’s forecasts for technology development, and how many percent of them came true. Any attempt to predict is a risk and assumptions.
      1. ccsr April 1 2020 11: 05 New
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        Quote: AVM
        Any attempt to predict is a risk and assumptions.

        In 1986, listening to Gorbachev’s speeches, I couldn’t assume that in eight years I would see the drunk president of the country conducting a German orchestra and the USSR would disappear from the map. So your forecasts for 30 years are smacked of Manilovism - there is no real historical perspective behind them, just a game of imagination and nothing more.
  5. Odysseus 31 March 2020 16: 08 New
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    In general, an explanatory article. Thanks to the author. Huge work has been done, everything is very correctly and in detail set out.
    And if you take a purely military component, in my opinion everything, or almost everything is true. Unless I would reduce the sea component, and increase the ground component even more. Especially regarding PGRK.
    But, alas, this is all a spherical horse, all military calculations are subject to political calculations. And based on the current realities of the Russian Federation, all these calculations have nothing to do with reality. There will be no 775 light ICBMs in the silos, or 12 12 SSBNs with KOH -0,5 and the corresponding fleet forces to support their activities.
    It is beautiful, but utopian. It could be characterized — as it would have been right if everything had not been so wrong.
    1. bk0010 31 March 2020 21: 43 New
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      No, not sensible. Hiding a light ICBM in a mine is expensive. You won’t get the mine ready for work: the characteristics of the mine are determined not so much by the size of the rocket as by the required resistance to external influences. The number of ICBMs in a silo should be determined by the number of targets requiring an accurate hit, and not be equal to ½ NWF deployed by the enemy. A mobile rocket unified with a mine rocket will not fit into a truck: at a mine rocket, the hull must be designed for overloads during the passage of the shock wave during a disarming strike by the enemy and there must be means of passage through the mushroom cloud. And a lot more.
      1. Odysseus 31 March 2020 22: 54 New
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        Quote: bk0010
        No, not sensible.

        In this difficult moment for Russia, I wanted to praise the author smile
        And then we all scold. Yes criticized. And he did a great job. One can argue about individual details. For example, the idea with an ICBM on a transporter seemed to me wrong too.
        Quote: bk0010
        A mobile rocket unified with a mine rocket will not fit into a truck: at a mine rocket, the hull must be designed for overloads during the passage of the shock wave during a disarming strike by the enemy and there must be means of passage through the mushroom cloud.

        But this I did not know. Thank.
    2. Boa kaa April 1 2020 00: 29 New
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      Quote: Odyssey
      if you take a purely military component, in my opinion everything, or almost everything is true.

      Colleague, let me disagree with you!
      1. The author takes the figure of 1550 charges on carriers. But this is only the so-called deployed charges ... And how many of them are at the bases in the arsenals? At the beginning of 2018, the Yankees had 3 of them, and here they say that 668 thousand units (including tactical ones);
      2. The author fantasizes on the subject of silos-ICBMs on the principle of the American MX mobile underground basing. But even the rich States did not draw this imagination. And the author - easily! He is so naive that he suggests placing anti-missile defense batteries in empty silos.
      3. The lightweight ICBM is certainly tempting, but the question is: do you have enough energy to fly to the United States? And one BB on the carrier is a gift for the US missile defense. Better and hard to come up with - no need to select the LC!
      4. KP in one of the silos? If only I would look at amov, or something. Their KP is located outside the BB fall field at a distance of 10-22 km from the silos. and there are 2 of them, with each of them you can launch 50% of the Minimum squadron.
      5. The idea of ​​a nuclear trail is good, but it is not the only way to overcome missile defense. Our bid hy hypersonic BB (product 15Y71).
      6. I have written below about PGRK by colleagues; I will not repeat it.
      7. The author writes about the g / a signature of the PLA, without even realizing that each unit has an acoustic portrait.
      8. Why does the author believe that there will be 12 rather than 16 silos at future SSBNs / SSBNs? Did he confuse us with the British? And why only 3 BB, and where to put heavy LCs on the "light" standardized ICBMs / SLBMs? And why does Husky have 6 silos, and not 8 as in the picture? After all, volley shooting is just 4 products in a series. But the author does not know this; he is above this. He is broadcasting the truth!
      9. On the quantitative composition of the submarine fleet of the future.
      Where does it come from that we need 1 United States strike submarines for 2 of our rpkSN? Why do we need a 40-60 submarine of the 5th generation ... (I would like to ask: will the navel of the economy not get loose?)
      10. It is not clear why the author does not put Poseidon and the Petrel penniless? "Pilots" on Sarmat? Does he consider himself smarter than the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the ATS designers? Why could the USSR hide the BZHRK, and today, with a decrease in ICBMs (RS-24), and consequently “wagons,” we will not be able to hide it in the increased flow of railway traffic?
      You can ask many more questions for which the author has no intelligible answers. But he has the right to his opinion, and I respect him. But, sorry, I can not agree with him. Education does not allow.
      AHA.
  6. Alexey RA 31 March 2020 16: 11 New
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    Thus, almost 576 silos were created in the USSR over two years, and over five years their number amounted to 1028 units.

    And what class of protection did these silos have? wink
    The second element of the ground component of the promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation should be mobile ground missile systems (PGRK) disguised as civilian cargo vehicles, which should be created taking into account developments in the PURK Courier.

    Not take off. In the sense that MOBD, communications and other escorts will give PGRK more abruptly than Shtirlitsa - a budennovka, a walkie-talkie and a parachute dragging behind his back. smile
    And unaccompanied to release a wagon with SBC on our roads ... what will happen to ICBMs if another wagon or tonar with rubble flies into the wagon? For the latter, traffic rules are not written, read or understood at all - they only have a plan.
    If the “first pancake”, the unification of the ICBMs “Topol and SLBM Bulava, came out lumpy, this does not mean that the idea is vicious in principle

    Actually, this is the second pancake. The first approach to the unification shell was when creating the P-39. As a result, it turned out that for the Navy the unified missile is too heavy, and for the Strategic Missile Forces - too "close-range".
    I met references that the MIT sheep, when agreeing on the Mace, had to prove that it was not a missile unified with Topol at all, but only a missile created using the Topol developments. For the naval, after R-39, looked at a unified missile as Lenin looked at the bourgeoisie. smile
    1. Wasilii 31 March 2020 17: 39 New
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      Well, if she had the characteristics of a second trident, then, for sure, they would have looked more fun.
      1. Alexey RA 31 March 2020 18: 47 New
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        Quote: Wasilii
        Well, if she had the characteristics of a second trident, then, for sure, they would have looked more fun.

        For this, the Makeyevites took another ten years and two “temporary” missiles - and still they didn’t have time with the “Bark”.
        However, they didn’t have time with the original P-39 either - the first SSBN pr. 941 was adopted by the fleet a year before the adoption of its SLBM.
    2. Shopping Mall 31 March 2020 21: 42 New
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      Quote: Alexey RA
      Thus, almost 576 silos were created in the USSR over two years, and over five years their number amounted to 1028 units.

      And what class of protection did these silos have? wink


      Different. Basically much weaker than now. But the technologies are different.

      Quote: Alexey RA
      The second element of the ground component of the promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation should be mobile ground missile systems (PGRK) disguised as civilian cargo vehicles, which should be created taking into account developments in the PURK Courier.

      Not take off. In the sense that MOBD, communications and other escorts will give PGRK more abruptly than Shtirlitsa - a budennovka, a walkie-talkie and a parachute dragging behind his back. smile
      And unaccompanied to release a wagon with SBC on our roads ... what will happen to ICBMs if another wagon or tonar with rubble flies into the wagon? For the latter, traffic rules are not written, read or understood at all - they only have a plan.


      Presumably - a convoy of 4 cars. Two trucks. One with ICBMs, the second - security. + two cars disguised, but with the ability to include special signals. Wagons go right up to the side, and cars with removal permissions, according to the situation.
  7. Pavel57 31 March 2020 16: 49 New
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    At present, strategic nuclear forces are 50% (or even more) a psychological deterrent. It was always - the enemy was afraid to get even a 10% response from his strike.
  8. AAK
    AAK 31 March 2020 17: 07 New
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    The state of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation in the near future, which the author sees, on the one hand has the right to admission, on the other hand, it brings a number of problems from complex to very simple and even a little comical.
    1. When using PGRC on the basis of vans, no one takes into account such interference and a source of information for enemy intelligence as ordinary greedy and talkative traffic police officers. It is no secret that they "raise" most of the left-wing earnings precisely from truckers. And here’s the situation, a truck with a rocket slows down, drivers or guards from a minibus or a shift following a truck put a “gibbon” under the nose of an “all-terrain vehicle” - the memory will turn on immediately (remember the external signs of the car and drivers, believe me, they have a “scent” everything is in order ...), plus it will start chatting anywhere: the whole privacy mode is covered with a copper basin;
    2. The manufacture of a large number of SSBNs and "station wagons" with SLBMs to the detriment of nuclear submarines - to "hunters" is unacceptable, already now we have 971 project boats of at least 667/955, and even worse. 949A and 885 as anti-submariners are very doubtful, 949 are too noisy and clumsy, and 885 are very expensive, and also not small ... Plus the station wagons planned by the author are not very fast and not very agile due to their size, as a result, dueling situations will lose even to “improvised Elks”. Therefore, for the reliable protection of their SSBNs and the fight against unfolding enemy SSBNs (and this is no less important), reincarnation of the 705 project (something like the Russian Barracuda) is necessary, but with simpler structural solutions and construction technology. In my opinion, the following approximate proportions in the construction of boats should be observed in the submarine fleet: 1 SSBN 995A, 1 PALKR 885A, 2-3 Lira 2.0., Plus 1-2 diesel-electric submarines with VNEU or a battery system like Soryu;
    3. To allocate 30 transporters for an “air launch” is a direct squander in the face of an acute shortage of the BTA fleet, there’s nothing to comment on;
    4. I won’t say anything about the “petrel”, in my opinion it’s a bigger threat to the launching than to the “target”, you can play with the “Poseidon” (let’s just walk around the seas for two years without a charge, let's see how the equipment behaves ), then it is possible to conduct R&D on the results of large submarine drones-"hunters" of other nuclear submarines on the results ..
  9. Operator 31 March 2020 17: 19 New
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    There is a logical error in the article - if you stamp a lot of light single-shot ICBMs (and even with a large number of false mine heads), then why then the PGRK, the SSBN, and, especially, strategic aviation?

    On the topic of the article

    First, strategic weapons include not only strategic nuclear forces, but also SPRNs. To consider the first without the second is counterproductive - for example, why did the author not like the current state of affairs with the domestic SPRN, layered already in three independent components (ZGRLS, satellite constellation, NGLS)?

    Secondly, a light single-shot ICBM is an analogue of the Soviet Courier or American Midgetman with a launch weight of 15-17 tons, and not the average Soviet RT-23 ICBM with a launch weight of 106 tons. Therefore, the size, weight and, most importantly, the cost of silos of high factory readiness for the Russian light single-shot ICBMs will be an order of magnitude cheaper than for the RT-23.

    Thirdly, the cost of building one silos under a light single-shot ICBM will be two orders of magnitude cheaper than building a missile nuclear submarine per one launcher. Then why pay 100 times more?

    Fourth, now PGRK even in protected areas move only accompanied by a dozen mine defense vehicles, anti-sabotage protection, etc. If you let this entire column onto public roads (with the risk of accident or terrorist attack), it will unambiguously illuminate the nature of the cargo carried (plus neutron radiation from the warhead, which is easily detected by simple sensors and damages the health of neighboring drivers, passengers and pedestrians). Because the Americans and we abandoned this kind of ICBMs.

    Fifth, with the presence of the X-102 and Burevestnik cruise missiles, strategic aviation as such becomes redundant, and with a large number of light single-shot silo-based ICBMs disguised as false mines with real heads, the airborne SSBNs and airborne ICBMs on transport aircraft become redundant .

    Conclusion: the strategic forces of the sample of 2050 should consist of a layered SPRN and light single-shot ICBMs with a short autopilot in a silo.
    Well, about a hundred NPOs Poseidon with a 100-MT warhead on board as a guarantee of a mortal strike even in the event of failure of all echelons of SPRN (in fact, Poseidon is an ideal means of deterring / preventing nuclear war).

    PS The deployment of nuclear weapons in space is not considered due to the reasons for its longer flight time than ground-based ballistic missiles, and the high vulnerability to the "nuclear path", which the author of the article mentioned.
    1. Peter Tverdokhlebov 31 March 2020 17: 46 New
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      What do you think, "Poseidons" are best placed on nuclear submarines in the amount of six to eight pieces or on diesel-electric submarines in the amount of one?
      If you place a large number of "Poseidons" on a nuclear submarine, then this is "too many eggs in one basket", and besides, if you take the nuclear submarines as carriers of the Poseidon, they are noisier compared to the diesel submarines!
      1. Operator 31 March 2020 18: 41 New
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        Placing Poseidon NPOs on Belgorod-class submarines (in the volume between light and strong hulls) is used to mask the NPO launch point (not at the base exit, but on the route) and for returning NPOs to the base. Therefore, the noise of the nuclear submarines will not affect the noise of the NPA after their transition to independent navigation. At low speed, the noise of 44-ton anti-aircraft guns will be less than the noise of diesel-electric submarines with a displacement of 1000 tons or more.

        In the self-propelled mode, the Poseidons will move within the technical resource of their systems (for several years): lie down at the bottom up to a depth of 1500 meters, drift along the coast of potential opponents along the Gulf Stream type, approach the terraces in slow motion, move under the keel of commercial vessels, take up positions for an attack under the guise of sunken boats, etc.

        The translation of the NPA into the state of attack of coastal targets at shallow depths with a maximum speed of 360 km / h will be carried out remotely using the code command from the Zeus microwave transmitter located on the Kola Peninsula.
  10. Wasilii 31 March 2020 17: 37 New
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    The apotheosis of senility. The author at the very beginning of the opus refers to the quantitative limit of 1550 warheads, which is determined by the START treaty, but ignores the quantitative restrictions on silos for ICBMs (no more than 100 pieces in reserve relative to the number of deployed ICBMs). A separate song is an aviation-based ICBM, which is also banned under the START treaty. The strategic effectiveness of Petrel and Poseidon is simply zeroed out masterfully - I said a point. With mobile ICBMs, the author at least a little ceremonies, and then immediately at a cost. In general, MEGAGEOSTRATEGY in the style of highly effective Putin’s managers. We can sell furniture, we can forge a nuclear missile shield.
    1. Amateur 31 March 2020 18: 10 New
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      In general, MEGAGEOSTRATEGY in the style of highly effective Putin’s managers. We can sell furniture, we can forge a nuclear missile shield.

      And by what criteria did you attribute Mr. Mitrofanov to “Putin’s managers”. Or do you feel a "soul mate"?
  11. ser56 31 March 2020 18: 26 New
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    You can argue in detail, but I would note 3 drawbacks in general, not a bad job:
    1) at least reference points for the cost of various options for solving the strategic nuclear forces program,
    2) is it possible to use the backlog of mines since the times of the USSR ....
    3) the effectiveness of the use of local air defense and missile defense ...
    And most importantly - the changing role of China in the balance of nuclear forces ...
    1. Operator 31 March 2020 18: 52 New
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      For our part, China's strategic nuclear forces are balanced by the deployment of the three planned Container ZRLSs in the Asian part of Russia and the adoption of the nth number of Pioneer-type mobile ballistic missiles with a range of 5500 km (according to the number of Chinese nuclear carriers).

      With the further buildup of the BMD as China's strategic nuclear forces grow, naturally.
    2. Shopping Mall 31 March 2020 21: 37 New
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      Quote: ser56
      You can argue in detail, but I would note 3 drawbacks in general, not a bad job:
      1) at least reference points for the cost of various options for solving the strategic nuclear forces program,
      2) is it possible to use the backlog of mines since the times of the USSR ....
      3) the effectiveness of the use of local air defense and missile defense ...
      And most importantly - the changing role of China in the balance of nuclear forces ...


      1. Too everything is secret and stretched out in time. In the article about the ground component, I tried to correlate the cost of Yars and Sarmat based on the cost of launch insurance, but these systems are too different stages of readiness. Now, if you knew the cost of launching Satan regarding Yars or Poplar ...

      2. Unfortunately, I don’t even know how many of them are whole by now, and how many were poured with concrete in the 90s. Most likely, silos relative to modern systems can be brought to a single standard.

      3. If we are talking about a sudden strike by the enemy, then, PMSM, their effectiveness will tend to zero.

      PMSM China can behave completely unpredictably, in the case of an exchange of nuclear weapons between the US and the Russian Federation, "fuck" by the one who is still stronger, or finish off the weak, or even use the "historical chance", and get even with Japan, or with India to close.

      On the other hand, I do not think that the exchange of nuclear strikes between the United States and the Russian Federation will not affect China. Surely both sides do not want to leave candidates for leadership. Let's sit down we’ll lie down.
      1. ser56 April 1 2020 16: 04 New
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        Quote: AVM
        It's too secret

        so the area is .... request without even indicative data - this is a conversation for nothing ... request
        Quote: AVM
        If we are talking about a sudden enemy strike, then, PMSM, their effectiveness will tend to zero.
        strike on strategic nuclear forces will be a priori sudden-see. 41g request as for efficiency - you are too categorical - if a part takes on painful duty, then air defense / missile defense also - so that surprise cannot be a priori ... request

        Quote: AVM
        PMSM China can behave completely unpredictably,

        you yourself set out the options - there are not many of them .... hi
        but to build a strategic nuclear forces without taking into account the factor of China is no longer possible .... repeat
        in any case - thanks for the analysis - the big picture appeared ... hi
  12. ccsr 31 March 2020 18: 54 New
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    Author:
    Andrey Mitrofanov
    The author is not a dogma,

    The author, of course, is not dogmatic, he is just a big dreamer on military subjects, and he wants to ascribe some kind of scientificness to his visions, although it is clear that this is all profanity, if you describe the 2050s.
    I remind the author that even in Soviet times the main cycle of weapons programs was 10 years and this cycle was absolutely justified by the scientific work of not only the specialized research institutes of the Moscow Defense Ministry, but also the academic science of the USSR. Even then, people understood that in a decade fundamentally new weapon systems could be created that would change the armament program itself - for example, now this is observed in relation to strike UAVs, the development of which only 15 years ago, few predicted.
    That is why forecasting what our strategic nuclear forces will look like by 2050 can be compared with fortune telling on coffee grounds. I do not see a rational grain in this, and I think the author simply does not understand that this is stupid, especially given the new challenges for our country, including demographic ones.
    1. Shopping Mall 31 March 2020 21: 29 New
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      Quote: ccsr
      Author:
      Andrey Mitrofanov
      The author is not a dogma,

      The author, of course, is not dogmatic, he is just a big dreamer on military subjects, and he wants to ascribe some kind of scientificness to his visions, although it is clear that this is all profanity, if you describe the 2050s.
      I remind the author that even in Soviet times the main cycle of weapons programs was 10 years and this cycle was absolutely justified by the scientific work of not only the specialized research institutes of the Moscow Defense Ministry, but also the academic science of the USSR. Even then, people understood that in a decade fundamentally new weapon systems could be created that would change the armament program itself - for example, now this is observed in relation to strike UAVs, the development of which only 15 years ago, few predicted.
      That is why forecasting what our strategic nuclear forces will look like by 2050 can be compared with fortune telling on coffee grounds. I do not see a rational grain in this, and I think the author simply does not understand that this is stupid, especially given the new challenges for our country, including demographic ones.


      Why bother with different topics? What does the demographic problem have to do with it? So you can get to global warming - they say soon the ice age, all the end. Or to assume that the Yellowstone volcano will cover America - you can disarm.

      We are talking about a specific problem - nuclear deterrence. And it will be relevant only if there is no fundamental leap in space flights, nanotechnology (in the sense in which Eric Drexler considered them), or fundamental physical breakthroughs. But it is one thing to assume that such breakthroughs will be - then it is clear that all theories and forecasts must be corrected. It’s another matter to rely on them - then you can stop the forecasting of the development of traditional weapons altogether, and sit in a "lotus position", wait for scientific miracles.

      For 30 years since the collapse of the USSR, no technology has abolished the value of a nuclear shield. And in the context of my assumptions, the best solution from the beginning of the 2000s would be to build a huge Topol and Yars series with the 1st ballistic missile defense in silos, and with missile defense breakthrough means, and about no disarming strike, or cover RPKSN and would not have to think.
      1. ccsr April 1 2020 10: 58 New
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        Quote: AVM
        We are talking about a specific problem - nuclear deterrence.

        Are you sure that in thirty years they will not find a new type of weapon that will fundamentally change the idea of ​​war - for example, climate or at the genetic level? Who could have thought in 1940, participating in a parade on carts on Red Square, that in 1949 we would no longer have them, and nuclear weapons would appear? And in a decade, ballistic missiles will appear that can hit the enemy at enormous distances. Only twenty years have passed. and you swung at the thirties - isn’t it too reckless for the present time?
        Quote: AVM
        It’s another matter to rely on them - then you can stop the forecasting of the development of traditional weapons altogether, and sit in a "lotus position", wait for scientific miracles.

        If you now begin to prove to everyone that your fantasies are a real future, then believe most practitioners will look at you as a person whose opinion can be neglected, due to an inadequate perception of reality.
        Quote: AVM
        For 30 years since the collapse of the USSR, no technology has abolished the value of a nuclear shield.

        By the way, for thirty years we have not created a full-fledged missile defense system for the whole country because of the high cost of such a system - this is the answer to you why they will look for other ways to protect our population. Including creating such means of defeating the enemy, because of which he generally does not want to use his nuclear missile weapons.
        Quote: AVM
        And in the context of my assumptions,

        If you were to talk about at least the next decade, I might still take something seriously. But when you talk about the years 2050 - I'm sorry, but I do not think that you can be seriously listened to in this case.
        1. ser56 April 1 2020 16: 15 New
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          Quote: ccsr
          Who could have thought in 1940, participating in a parade on carts on Red Square, that in 1949 we would no longer have them, and nuclear weapons would appear?

          in fact, the chain reaction on uranium by 1940 has already been calculated .... request
          Quote: ccsr
          And in a decade, ballistic missiles will appear that can hit the enemy at enormous distances

          rockets with LRE have already been created ... request
          Quote: ccsr
          and you swung at the thirties -

          compare the development of strategic nuclear forces since 1990 - is there a big difference? Progress in each area is fast at first, and then slows down - compare the IL-14 and Tu-154 with the MS-21 ... request
          Quote: ccsr
          we have not created a full-fledged missile defense system for the whole

          do not voice the country where it is? hi
          Quote: ccsr
          You can seriously listen.

          they force you? maybe instead of emotions a little specificity? repeat
          1. ccsr April 1 2020 18: 11 New
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            Quote: ser56
            in fact, the chain reaction on uranium by 1940 has already been calculated ....

            I also hear from the sixties about controlled thermonuclear poisoning - how many doctors and academics have made a career on this subject, and things are still there.
            Quote: ser56
            compare the development of strategic nuclear forces since 1990 - is there a big difference?

            In Soviet times, we overtook the whole world, and only the collapse of the USSR stopped our science in creating new weapons systems. After the mess of the nineties, we still cannot recover - this is the answer to your question. Nevertheless, new systems are appearing - I hope you will not deny it, especially since the president spoke about them.
            Quote: ser56
            do not voice the country where it is?

            Now it’s not yet, but it’s not in vain that the Americans have been working with the ship component of this system for many years - I think they plan to create such a missile defense system, and for us this will be a big nuisance.
            Quote: ser56
            maybe instead of emotions a little specificity?

            What more specifics do you need if in thirty years we may not have a common territory, or the economy will decline from death during epidemics. And then what kind of kokretik do you want to know if thirty years ago the USSR was the second power in the world, and now it does not exist at all?
            1. ser56 April 1 2020 18: 19 New
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              Quote: ccsr
              And nothing has changed.

              not at all - ITER is being built ....
              Quote: ccsr
              only the collapse of the USSR stopped our science in creating new weapons systems

              and so many were needed?
              Quote: ccsr
              Nevertheless, new systems appear

              Do they differ fundamentally? the last significant difference is shared by BCH ...
              Quote: ccsr
              - I think they plan to create such a missile defense, and for us it will be a big nuisance.

              they and SOI planned where it? hi
              Quote: ccsr
              if in thirty years we may not have a common territory, or the economy will decline from death during epidemics

              Hmm, you have something hysterical ... request
              Quote: ccsr
              was the second power of the world, and now it is not at all?

              just a fact - any analysis goes by linear approximation request There will be jumps - the analysis is done anew ...
              1. ccsr April 1 2020 18: 50 New
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                Quote: ser56
                not at all - ITER is being built ....

                Sixty years have passed - and is it still under construction? When the real way out is - do not tell me?
                Quote: ser56
                they and SOI planned where it?

                It was a bluff - they did not plan anything, but there was a disinformation stuffing, about which our political leadership was immediately warned. Now, something I don’t hear.
                Quote: ser56
                Hmm, you have something hysterical ...

                No, it’s rather a pragmatic approach - I’ve seen enough of everyone’s life, including the unfortunate theoreticians.
                Quote: ser56
                just a fact - any analysis

                Answer without any wisdom - do you really believe that now we can accurately predict the prospects of the Russian strategic nuclear forces to choose the path of their construction?
    2. ser56 April 1 2020 16: 09 New
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      Quote: ccsr
      our strategic nuclear forces by 2050 can be compared to fortune telling on coffee grounds.

      project 955 is being actively built, the corps will serve at least 40 years, so part of the triad is understandable by 2050 ... request
      Quote: ccsr
      for example, now this is observed in relation to strike UAVs, the development of which only 15 years ago, few predicted.

      in the area of ​​strategic nuclear forces there is nothing fundamentally new for a long time - hyper-warhead is just a development .... request
      Quote: ccsr
      understands that this is nonsense

      enlighten us sinners ... hi
      1. ccsr April 1 2020 18: 23 New
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        Quote: ser56
        enlighten us sinners ...

        I enlighten the inexperienced - the West will not conquer Russia by military means, but most likely will use methods of destabilizing society, through information warfare at the initial stage, and then using various methods of waging chemical and bacteriological warfare. All this can happen against the backdrop of global cataclysms with climatic shocks that will lead to mass migration of people from backward countries. Then we will definitely understand that a nuclear shield will not save us from this locust, and this will be a good lesson, especially for those who believe in universal values.
        Quote: ser56
        in the area of ​​strategic nuclear forces there is nothing fundamentally new for a long time

        Hurricane Katrina 15 years ago brought such a shock to America that some areas still cannot get rid of the consequences. So it can be with other regions of the Earth.
        1. ser56 April 1 2020 18: 54 New
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          Quote: ccsr
          but most likely use

          1) tooth date? bully
          2) maybe because of the fact that there will be effective strategic nuclear forces?
          Quote: ccsr
          Then we will definitely understand that a nuclear shield will not save us from this locust, and this will be a good lesson, especially for those who believe in universal values.

          the last couple of years you do not watch TV? if you give out a picture for insight? hi
          Quote: ccsr
          So it can be with other regions of the Earth.

          and did someone do Katrina? bully
          Quote: ccsr
          Enlighten the inexperienced

          I answer the expert - from you the conclusion is that it is necessary to reduce the strategic nuclear forces ... hi you are not on a salary from the State Department? repeat
          1. ccsr April 1 2020 19: 02 New
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            Quote: ser56
            maybe because it won’t be, there are effective strategic nuclear forces?

            I do not believe that Western civilization will abandon its plans to destroy the strategic adversary represented by Russia.
            Quote: ser56
            and did someone do Katrina?

            I do not think so, but research on the creation of climate weapons began back in the days of the Vietnam War.
            Quote: ser56
            I answer the expert - from you the conclusion is that it is necessary to reduce strategic nuclear forces ..

            I did not say this - I, unlike the author, simply can not guarantee that the current situation will continue after 2050, if only because the two countries will have more than 2 billion people - China and India, and which can set themselves the task of non-military way of squeezing out us part of the territory.
            Quote: ser56
            you are not on a salary from the State Department?

            No, I, unlike you, are a sane person and am not inclined to believe in any nonsense.
            1. ser56 April 1 2020 20: 10 New
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              Quote: ccsr
              I do not believe that Western civilization will abandon its plans to destroy the strategic adversary represented by Russia.

              a stream of consciousness has gone ... who cares about your faith? The West is not homogeneous - see modernity and we must not allow it to organize against us, the USSR did it best of all by creating NATO ... request Let me remind you that there was no united West against RI - there were always allies or neutrals from the great powers ...
              Quote: ccsr
              I do not think, but investigated

              then what are you talking about? bully Want to replace real threats with imaginary ones? you are definitely not an agent of the State Department? repeat
              Quote: ccsr
              I did not say that -

              it follows from your reasoning ...
              Quote: ccsr
              and who can set themselves the task by non-military means of squeezing part of our territory from us.

              what nonsense ... hi
              Quote: ccsr
              I, unlike you, are a sane person

              you overestimate yourself ....
              1. ccsr April 2 2020 10: 49 New
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                Quote: ser56
                a stream of consciousness has gone ... who cares about your faith?

                Do you think that someone here is interested in your opinion?
                Quote: ser56
                The USSR did best of all by creating NATO.

                This is a lie - the USSR itself wanted to join NATO, and it really didn’t stand on its side to create it.
                Quote: ser56
                you are definitely not an agent of the State Department?

                Are you paranoid Then this is not for me - there are several people with a medical background, contact them for help.
                Quote: ser56
                it follows from your reasoning ...

                Can you guarantee that this is impossible in principle? If you can, then give at least the basis for your fantasies.
                Quote: ser56
                you overestimate yourself

                Compared to you hardly.
                1. ser56 April 2 2020 15: 25 New
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                  Quote: ccsr
                  This is a lie - the USSR itself wanted to join NATO, and it really didn’t stand on its side to create it.

                  you are ridiculous in your belief in the ideas of Agitprop ... request NATO was created to consolidate Western Europe against the USSR ... the question - why it became possible - here were coalitions against RI, but not polls .... request

                  Quote: ccsr
                  Is anyone interested in your opinion here?

                  at least you, just read ... hi
                  Quote: ccsr
                  You are paranoid

                  no, just if I write honestly about you - they’ll ban ... repeat
                  Quote: ccsr
                  You can guarantee that this is impossible in principle

                  I can hi ahead of you question - this was not done even in the early 90s, think, maybe you will understand why ... request

                  Quote: ccsr
                  Compared to you hardly.

                  as there is a classic in the fable Elephant and pug - remember? bully
                  1. ccsr April 2 2020 19: 28 New
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                    Quote: ser56
                    you are ridiculous in your belief in the ideas of Agitprop ...

                    Study VO materials - they did not appear in Soviet times:
                    Back in 1949, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky expressed interest in one of the notes by the proposal of the head of the British diplomatic department Ernst Bevin on the establishment of the Western Union Defense Organization (a direct predecessor of NATO). It was proposed to discuss the possibility of cooperation with this structure of the Soviet Union, and even the participation of the USSR in it.

                    https://topwar.ru/137631-ssha-ne-dali-sssr-vstupit-v-nato.html
                    Quote: ser56
                    NATO was created to consolidate Western Europe against the USSR ...

                    And was the USA also in Western Europe?
                    Quote: ser56
                    no, just if I write honestly about you - they’ll ban ...

                    Do not come up with cheap excuses when essentially you can’t say anything.
                    1. ser56 April 2 2020 20: 24 New
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                      Quote: ccsr
                      and even the participation of the USSR in it.

                      it's just sad with you ... request do not confuse politics and propaganda - in the USSR they did it ...
                      Quote: ccsr
                      And was the USA also in Western Europe?

                      they still hold troops in it and are not going to leave ... how do you like it?
                      Quote: ccsr
                      Study VO materials - they did not appear in Soviet times:

                      bully

                      Quote: ccsr
                      Do not invent cheap excuses

                      you are funny ... I have a red square with a number ... hi in general, remember Lavrov ... repeat
                      1. ccsr April 2 2020 20: 40 New
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                        Quote: ser56
                        it's just sad with you ...

                        Quote: ser56
                        you are funny ...

                        You already decide to start, so that the clown himself does not look.
                      2. ser56 April 2 2020 20: 52 New
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                        Quote: ccsr
                        You already decide to start

                        if for you laughter through tears is news, then you are again sorry for the emotional underdevelopment ... hi
                        Quote: ccsr
                        the clown himself does not look.

                        in my status it’s not scary ... repeat I’m not afraid to be funny for simpletons for a long time ... wink
                      3. ccsr April 2 2020 21: 06 New
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                        Quote: ser56
                        if laughter through tears is news to you,

                        I understand - your ignorance also led to the fact that you cried from powerlessness, but as a true clown you had to completely portray laughter.
                        Quote: ser56
                        I’m not afraid to be funny for simpletons for a long time ...

                        This is the lot of all carpet.
                      4. ser56 April 3 2020 16: 37 New
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                        Quote: ccsr
                        This is the lot of all carpet.

                        are you so serious it is from a lack of irony over oneself, which means the mind ... request
                        Quote: ccsr
                        your ignorance has led you to cry from impotence

                        what passions.... laughing
  • BREAKTHROUGH READY 31 March 2020 19: 12 New
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    Overall, a very robust article with a good one.
    But the conclusions are too monstrous.
    There is also no consideration of the possibilities of an asymmetric response to the emerging threats, without a proportional buildup of the nuclear missile arsenal.
    1. Shopping Mall 31 March 2020 21: 21 New
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      Quote: BREAKTHROUGH READY
      Overall, a very robust article with a good one.
      But the conclusions are too monstrous.
      There is also no consideration of the possibilities of an asymmetric response to the emerging threats, without a proportional buildup of the nuclear missile arsenal.


      Arsenals are reduced minimally by the START treaties, therefore they are a reference point. For decades, this topic has explored everything that is possible. Even if an alternative solution appears, it cannot be taken as a reference point due to possible risks (any weapon should be “run-in”).

      PMSM the most reliable is precisely this probabilistic advantage - light ICBMs in silos. The enemy knows where they are (if there are no reserve mines). But it will not be able to cover them with one blow - it will remain without a nuclear arsenal, and the result is not guaranteed.

      This advantage is due precisely to the agreements on the restriction of carriers and UHF. Without contracts, other solutions will be needed.
  • Imperial Technocrat 31 March 2020 19: 24 New
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    Based on the available information, to destroy one ICBM in a silo, with a probability of 95%, two W-88 nuclear charges with a capacity of 475 kilotons are needed

    What kind of nonsense? Just explode the head not at a height of a couple of kilometers, but several tens of meters from the silos, and a thermonuclear explosion simply evaporates it
    1. Operator 31 March 2020 20: 33 New
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      The KVO of uncontrolled combat units of Trident-2 with astro-orientation of the breeding stage is 120 meters.
      1. Shopping Mall 31 March 2020 21: 17 New
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        Quote: Imperial Technocrat
        Based on the available information, to destroy one ICBM in a silo, with a probability of 95%, two W-88 nuclear charges with a capacity of 475 kilotons are needed

        What kind of nonsense? Just explode the head not at a height of a couple of kilometers, but several tens of meters from the silos, and a thermonuclear explosion simply evaporates it


        Quote: Operator
        The KVO of uncontrolled combat units of Trident-2 with astro-orientation of the breeding stage is 120 meters.


        One is just a consequence of the other. In the USA, they are not fools, they understand that in a real situation it is impossible to achieve a guaranteed hit of nuclear warheads, therefore they consider the probability based on the accuracy-power parameters. I won’t be surprised that less power is needed now, for example, 100 kilotons due to increased accuracy. The catch is in another. And if the silos are close enough for the explosion of one nuclear warhead to deflect the neighboring enemy’s nuclear barrels, but not close enough to the neighboring silos of this single nuclear warhead are hit. It is unrealistic to synchronize the strike with hundreds of ICBMs and nuclear warheads, some will arrive a little earlier, some a little later, because of the "playing out of time", the whole "orchestra" may screw up.
        1. Operator 31 March 2020 22: 17 New
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          In the United States, uncontrolled warheads with a W76 charge of 100 Kt are specialized for counter-force strike on silos (14 units each on Trident-2 SLBM). To guarantee the defeat of a high-security silo tip, two warheads with a 120-meter air defense are required. One warhead from different SLBMs is aimed at the head. The interval between the arrival of the BB to the area of ​​one tip is several seconds - i.e. a distance of about 25 km (which allows not to deflect another BB with an explosion of one BB).
          1. Shopping Mall April 2 2020 11: 19 New
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            Quote: Operator
            In the United States, uncontrolled warheads with a W76 charge of 100 Kt are specialized for counter-force strike on silos (14 units each on Trident-2 SLBM). To guarantee the defeat of a high-security silo tip, two warheads with a 120-meter air defense are required. One warhead from different SLBMs is aimed at the head. The interval between the arrival of the BB to the area of ​​one tip is several seconds - i.e. a distance of about 25 km (which allows not to deflect another BB with an explosion of one BB).


            But what if we have a cluster of mines, at a distance of 1000-2000 meters each from each other? Then, in order to hit these silos, the warheads should fall pretty close.

            Stretching everything in time will be difficult. On the one hand, a strike on one silo will not damage the second one, in 1000-2000 meters, and on the other hand, a nearby explosion will be able to deflect a nearby JBF falling nearby. Because of this, the total probability of mine damage in the cluster may still decrease.
            1. Operator April 2 2020 11: 31 New
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              This option was considered for basing the MX ICBMs, but the Americans abandoned it because of the possibility of delivering a so-called blocking strike in this case - simultaneous air blasting over the base area of ​​multiple BBs at the time the “beam” of ICBMs passed the active part of the trajectory.
              1. ser56 April 3 2020 16: 39 New
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                Quote: Operator
                simultaneous air blasting over the basing area of ​​many BBs at the time of passage

                It’s not possible to provide such synchronization! Yes, and missiles can be launched with an acceleration of the duration of the active site request and modern ones can go through the cloud of JV products hi
                1. Operator April 3 2020 16: 55 New
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                  The coordinates of the area of ​​the compacted silos of the ICBMs would be known in advance; AUTO ICBMs when flying to targets on the territory of the main enemy - too; SLBM flight paths (participating in a preventive blocking strike) —parameter set before launch and widely adjustable when firing the SSBNs at medium distances, several SLBMs would be fired at once (in order to parallelize missile launches).

                  Therefore, it is not difficult to synchronize the flight time and the place of the blocking detonation of the SLBM BB. The radiation resistance of on-board electronics and multifunctional coating of ICBM cases has objective limitations on the radiation power.

                  In any case, the compacted location of the silos of ICBMs even at the stage of assessment lost their distributed location, which I mentioned.
                  1. ser56 April 3 2020 17: 05 New
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                    Quote: Operator
                    Therefore, it is not difficult to synchronize the flight time and the place of the blocking detonation of the SLBM BB.

                    You are mistaken ...
        2. ser56 April 1 2020 16: 18 New
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          Quote: AVM
          for example, 100 kilotons due to increased accuracy.

          they reduce the power of nuclear warheads to units of ct-a flag in their hand .... in my opinion - strategic nuclear forces are a threat and nuclear warheads should be the maximum possible power ... request
  • Imperial Technocrat 31 March 2020 19: 31 New
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    2050 is not medium-term, but long-term. By 2030, the wangyu will be something like this: Sarmatians with ordinary heads and Vanguards, Stiletto with Vanguards, Yars stationary and mobile, probably with ordinary heads, Boreas / A with Clubs, Tu-160M2 and Pak Da with X-102. Well, Poseidons
  • Imperial Technocrat 31 March 2020 19: 45 New
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    in conditions when the conventional forces of Russia are significantly inferior to the forces of the main adversary - the United States

    As if the author had overslept for the past 8 years
    This is no longer the case.
    1. Shopping Mall 31 March 2020 21: 10 New
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      Quote: Imperial Technocrat
      in conditions when the conventional forces of Russia are significantly inferior to the forces of the main adversary - the United States

      As if the author had overslept for the past 8 years
      This is no longer the case.


      It would be interesting to get your opinion on the ratio of US / RF forces in the field of the Air Force, Navy and high-precision weapons.
    2. agond 31 March 2020 21: 31 New
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      If the general trend in the development of weapons systems is the creation of unmanned vehicles, air, space, ground, surface, then Poseidon naturally has the right to exist as an underwater drone, all the more it is much easier to do with a nuclear installation than say Petrel, the only problem is support with communication, but if he is such that you can’t keep track of him, then he could periodically pop up for a communication session. And then Posedon can be used not only as a weapon carrier, but also for reconnaissance, and for communication with other submarines and simply with objects lying on the ocean floor.
  • mik193 31 March 2020 22: 23 New
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    It seems to me that the unification of sea and ground-based missiles will not lead to anything good. Too different conditions of use. It’s another matter to unify the types of land and sea complexes as much as possible (and not so when in Soviet times a new project of the strategic missile system was built for each new missile in the fleet).
    I’m not sure that a cargo vehicle will pull a ballistic missile, especially in the conditions of our roads. It turns out that it is too early to abandon railway complexes.
    The creation of a universal submarine - if the RPK SN and the plank can still be somehow unified, the construction on the same base of a multipurpose submarine (as it is called here, a hunter boat) will only increase its size and, accordingly, increase its visibility and reduce stealth.
    I can’t say anything about the air component. I’m afraid that he can do little in modern conditions, if he only works on duty aircraft in the air.
    Well, and accordingly, attention must be paid to the comprehensive defense of basing points and launchers.
  • max702 April 1 2020 16: 39 New
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    As for me, all SSBNs ... multi-purpose submarines of one project, strategic nuclear forces do not particularly invest in what is enough, the main emphasis on the Strategic Missile Forces ... silos are better because they respond most quickly to the threat, I don’t believe in the tale about what they unexpectedly took and destroyed (there is no reason for this) the preparation for this will be revealed even at the stage of decision-making and development of plans, respectively, silos with a reaction speed of 2-3 minutes will have time in any case, and the size of the country will make simultaneous destruction impossible .. PGRK can be driven underground like it with elal China (though again at any point of our size have this). And the most important thing is the cosmos .. It is there that the most promising area of ​​strategic nuclear forces will develop .. In addition to this, space is precisely that hi-tech that will pull everything else, it’s just beneficial for the country, it’s not in vain that our partners sought to destroy this industry of our production ..
  • silberwolf88 April 1 2020 18: 29 New
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    There are too many errors of various kinds in the article, a sort of claim in your own opinion until 2050 is different from the one already accepted and being implemented ... we can say that the claim did not take place
    I don’t know what kind of author is related to the subject of strategic nuclear forces ...
    The master phrases about the naval experience of managing a large number of launchers in one submarine))) are just ridiculous when you know that in the 70s heavy missile divisions there were already 10 launcher regiments with one control ... that you can launch a division from any control of a position area ... CP / ZKP Army ... GSH ... VS and that the CBU system is somewhat more complicated than the fantasies outlined ... that the tactics and strategy of application are generally different (the Sphere and Barrier plans are just about different things) ...
    And fantasies about a preemptive disarming strike of the enemy in the conditions of restoration of fields and grouping of SPRN satellites ... missile defense systems covering individual directions of strikes ...
    I don’t want to seriously write about frivolous material with an economic / managerial bias ...
    I can’t say much about the components of the Navy and the Air Force (there are specialists inside who understand the topic without me) ... they are definitely necessary and each has its own role ...
    Filling space with weapons ... an unpleasant topic ... for no one is safe from a collision with debris and an accident ... but the descent of a warhead from orbit ... in fact an attack and a declaration of war ...
    The sediment from the article is unpleasant ... the waste of time spent searching for some meaning ...
  • Operator April 2 2020 11: 25 New
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    Quote: AVM
    if the silo is close enough that the explosion of one nuclear warhead deflects the adjacent enemy’s nuclear warheads

    The distance between the silos of ICBMs is about 10 km, which guarantees the non-deviation of one AP (aimed at one mine) by the explosion of another AP (aimed at another mine) with a capacity of 100 Kt.
    1. agond April 2 2020 12: 44 New
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      Quote: mik193
      It seems to me that the unification of sea and ground-based missiles will not lead to anything good.

      Quite right, universalization is a tempting thing, but impossible in principle, for example, everyone prefers to work with narrowly specialized wrenches, for example, a bolt of 17 means a wrench of 17, but they don’t want to unscrew the universal (adjustable) wrenches. or for example, a universal doctor, a general practitioner is not suitable for heart surgery, and even a cardiologist is not suitable for neurosurgery. Therefore, any attempts to create a universal, unified weapon for all cases, it is in vain.
  • Diverter April 2 2020 21: 33 New
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    The idea is interesting in some ways. But how did Vysotsky sing, where is the money, Zin ???