The evolution of the nuclear triad: generalized composition of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation in the medium term
In previous articles, we examined possible threats to the Russian nuclear shield that may arise as a result of the deployment of the United States global ballistic missile defense (missile defense) and their application sudden disarming strike. In this case, a situation may arise when the reaction time of the Russian missile attack warning systems will not provide the possibility of a retaliatory strike and can only be counted on a retaliatory strike.
Considered sustainability air, ground и Maritime components of the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF of the Russian Federation) to a sudden disarming strike.
The stability of the classical nuclear triad before a sudden disarming strike in the foreseeable future can significantly decrease
The materials discussed above made it possible to form an optimal look terrestrial, aerial и Maritime components of promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.
The time has come to put all this into a single system, to consider the optimal number and ratio of nuclear charges within the components and individual types of weapons of strategic nuclear forces, as well as solutions that can reduce the load on the country's economy in the course of implementing promising strategic nuclear forces.
Basic requirements for promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation
1. Creation of conditions under which an adversary’s strike at the Russian strategic nuclear forces will require him to use all available nuclear weapons without guaranteeing the achievement of the desired result (destruction of the Russian strategic nuclear forces).
2. Guaranteed retaliatory strike in the event of an enemy delivering a sudden disarming strike with overcoming existing and promising missile defense systems.
3. To unleash the offensive potential of the strategic nuclear forces in order to force the enemy to reorient the available resources for defense against a sudden decapitation strike from our side.
As a basis for calculating the required number of nuclear warheads and carriers, we initially accept the current limitations of 1550 nuclear warheads (nuclear warheads) imposed under the START-3 treaty; in the future, they can be revised with a proportional change in the composition of the strategic nuclear forces components discussed below.
The restrictions imposed by the START-3 treaty and other similar agreements on the number of carriers, camouflage means, etc. will not be taken into account, since they may contradict the current geopolitical situation and interfere with the construction of promising strategic nuclear forces capable of effectively solving nuclear deterrence tasks. Proposed decisions and quantitative characteristics can be taken into account in subsequent START treaties or other agreements, if any.
Ground component of strategic nuclear forces
Stationary ICBMs in silos
The basis for nuclear deterrence should be light intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) deployed in highly protected silo launchers (silos), since only ICBMs in silos are almost impossible to destroy conventional weapons (we do not consider anti-bunker bombs due to the fact that their carrier must fly almost close to the silo). Based on the available information, that to destroy one ICBM in a silo, with a 95% probability, two W-88 nuclear charges with a capacity of 475 kilotons are needed, the number of ICBMs in a silo should be equal to half the deployed nuclear charges of the enemy, i.e. 775 silos.
Light ICBMs in highly secure silos should become the basis of nuclear deterrence
In the comments to the material on the promising ground component, the view was expressed that the country simply would not pull such an amount of silos and ICBMs. The following data may be brought to this objection:
“In order to save time in deploying a new generation of missile systems, the USSR government decided to build mine launchers, command posts and other infrastructure elements necessary to ensure the daily activities of missile units until the missile tests are completed.
These measures made it possible to carry out rearmament in a short time and put new missile systems on alert. Between 1966 and 1968, the number of ICBMs on duty increased from 333 to 909. By the end of 1970, their number reached 1361. By 1973, ICBMs were located in 1398 silo launchers of 26 missile divisions. ”
These measures made it possible to carry out rearmament in a short time and put new missile systems on alert. Between 1966 and 1968, the number of ICBMs on duty increased from 333 to 909. By the end of 1970, their number reached 1361. By 1973, ICBMs were located in 1398 silo launchers of 26 missile divisions. ”
Thus, almost 576 silos were created in the USSR over two years, and over five years their number amounted to 1028 units. In about 10 years, 1 ICBMs were put on combat duty in silos. It can be argued that Russia is not the USSR; it cannot afford such volumes. There are several objections to this: technologies, for example, drilling, the creation of silos, the dimensions of automation and power mechanisms, solid-state ICBMs are simpler and cheaper than liquid ICBMs deployed at that time.
In the comments on previous materials, as well as in some other sources, it was suggested that liquid-propellant ICBMs could be cheaper and have a longer life than solid-propellant ICBMs. The author is not a dogma, in any case, it makes sense to hold a competition between several design bureaus, for example, the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering and Makeev Design Bureau. The main criteria for a promising ICBM: minimum dimensions and weight at a given range and payload mass, maximum reliability and service life at a minimum cost and production time.
A promising light ICBM should be equipped with one nuclear warhead (NWF), with the possibility of additional installation of two more NWFs. Instead of two additional nuclear warheads, two heavy false targets should be placed, including electronic warfare means, as well as jammers in the optical and infrared wavelength ranges. The presence of two “spare places” on ICBMs will make it possible, if necessary, to promptly increase the number of deployed nuclear warheads from 775 to 2325 units.
For promising ICBMs, it is necessary to develop highly protected silos of high factory readiness when silos are fully or in the form of modules manufactured at the manufacturing plant and delivered to the installation site in this form. After installing and connecting communications, silos are filled with high-strength concrete in technological cavities and can be put into operation.
The complexity and cost of construction of facilities compared to the installation of products of high factory readiness may differ by several orders of magnitude
ShPU 15P744 of high factory readiness was manufactured back in the Soviet years for strategic missile systems RT-23. The protective device (roof) and power cup with the equipment were made at the manufacturing plants - Novokramatorsky Mechanical Plant and Zhdanov Heavy Engineering Plant, were fully equipped with the necessary components, shock absorption, electrical equipment, service platforms, tested, and transported by rail to the installation site . Installation and commissioning of silos for state tests on such technologies were carried out as soon as possible.
The construction technology of silos at the facility should be replaced by the manufacture of silos in the form of high factory readiness
There is no doubt that advances in technology and a decrease in the size of ICBMs will allow the creation of silos of high factory readiness at a lower cost, at a faster speed and in a more secure design.
Silos should also be equipped with an integrated unified command post. To reduce the number of calculations, silos with ICBMs should be combined in clusters of 10 units with the control of one calculation for the entire cluster, with automation of operations similar to that implemented in nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBNs). High reliability of communication between silos should be ensured by laying secure communication lines in horizontal tunnels of small diameter, laid between silos at maximum depth, according to the physical “grid” scheme, with a logical combination of equipment in a fully connected computer network topology (full graph). The calculation can be placed arbitrarily in one of the silos, and periodically change the dislocation within the cluster.
The organization of communication between the silos should be based on a fully connected topology of the computer network, with cabling along the channels made according to the “grid” scheme
Depending on the economic capabilities of the state, the number of silos will exceed the number of deployed ICBMs by about half. The main task of constructing an excess of silos is to reduce the likelihood of ICBM destruction by creating the uncertainty of its location in a particular silo at the current time. Inspections within the framework of contractual obligations should be carried out on the principle of clusters, including “N ICBM + Nx2 silos”, while the rotation of ICBMs within the cluster should be allowed without restrictions.
Anti-missile launchers should be deployed in silos that are not used to deploy ICBMs, designed to break through the U.S. missile defense echelon, in transport and launch containers (TPK), unified by their external dimensions and interface with the ICBM TPK.
A missile defense breakthrough should be carried out by implementing the principle of “nuclear trail” - by anticipating the undermining of nuclear warhead missiles at altitudes of 200-1000 km, and then undermining the selected number of nuclear warheads in certain sections of the trajectory.
“Launched with the help of the Tor missile, a nuclear warhead with a W49 charge of 1,44 megatons was launched at an altitude of 400 kilometers above the Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.
The almost complete absence of air at an altitude of 400 km prevented the formation of the familiar nuclear fungus. However, in a high-altitude nuclear explosion, other interesting effects were observed. In Hawaii, at a distance of 1500 kilometers from the epicenter of the explosion under the influence of an electromagnetic pulse, three hundred street lamps, televisions, radios and other electronics are out of order. In the sky in this region for more than seven minutes, a glow could be observed. He was watched and photographed from the islands of Samoa, located 3200 kilometers from the epicenter.
The explosion also affected spacecraft. Three satellites were immediately disabled by an electromagnetic pulse. The charged particles resulting from the explosion were captured by the Earth’s magnetosphere, as a result of which their concentration in the Earth’s radiation belt increased by 2-3 orders of magnitude. The impact of the radiation belt led to a very rapid degradation of solar panels and electronics in another seven satellites, including the first commercial telecommunications satellite Telstar 1. In total, the explosion disabled one third of the spacecraft in low orbits at the time of the explosion. ”
The almost complete absence of air at an altitude of 400 km prevented the formation of the familiar nuclear fungus. However, in a high-altitude nuclear explosion, other interesting effects were observed. In Hawaii, at a distance of 1500 kilometers from the epicenter of the explosion under the influence of an electromagnetic pulse, three hundred street lamps, televisions, radios and other electronics are out of order. In the sky in this region for more than seven minutes, a glow could be observed. He was watched and photographed from the islands of Samoa, located 3200 kilometers from the epicenter.
The explosion also affected spacecraft. Three satellites were immediately disabled by an electromagnetic pulse. The charged particles resulting from the explosion were captured by the Earth’s magnetosphere, as a result of which their concentration in the Earth’s radiation belt increased by 2-3 orders of magnitude. The impact of the radiation belt led to a very rapid degradation of solar panels and electronics in another seven satellites, including the first commercial telecommunications satellite Telstar 1. In total, the explosion disabled one third of the spacecraft in low orbits at the time of the explosion. ”
Mobile PGRK
The second element of the ground component of the promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation should be mobile ground missile systems (PGRK), disguised as civilian cargo vehicles, which should be created taking into account developments in the PGRK "Courier". The small-sized ICBM located in the PGRK should be unified with the mine version, similar to the way it was done at the Topol ICBM and the Yars ICBM.
The greatest secrecy will be possessed by PGRK disguised as civilian freight vehicles
The main problem limiting the use of PGRK is the uncertainty in understanding whether or not the enemy can track their location, including in real time. Based on this, as well as the fact that a relatively unprotected mobile complex can be easily destroyed by both conventional weapons and reconnaissance and sabotage units of the enemy, PGRC cannot act as the main element of the ground component of the promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation. On the other hand, based on the need to diversify risks, as well as to maintain competencies in this area, PGRCs can be used as the second element of the ground component of strategic nuclear forces in the amount of 1/10 of the number of ICBMs in silos, i.e. their number will be 76 vehicles. Accordingly, the number of nuclear weapons placed on them in the standard version will be 76 units, and 228 units in the maximum version.
Marine component of strategic nuclear forces
RPKSN / PLARK projects 955A / 955K
At the first stage, the configuration of the offshore component of the promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation is determined by the construction of the project 955 (A) SSBN. Since the establishment of the naval fleet (Navy), capable of providing deployment and cover of SSBNs in remote areas of the oceans, is currently considered an almost impossible task, then the best way to increase the survival of SSBNs is to increase their number, up to 12 units already planned, while increasing the operational voltage coefficient ( KOH) up to 0,5. That is, the SSBN should spend half the time in the ocean. To do this, it is necessary to reduce maintenance time between trips, as well as to ensure the availability of two interchangeable crews for the SSBN.
SSBN project 955 (A) for the coming decades will become the basis of the sea component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation
The continuation of the SSBN series of project 955A with a series of nuclear submarines with cruise missiles (SSGN) of the conditional project 955K, with the visual and acoustic signature of the original project, will make it possible to impede the operation of the anti-submarine forces of the enemy, increasing the likelihood of the SSBN surviving and retaliating against the enemy.
The placement of SSBNs in closed bastions is extremely inefficient, since in any case they will be located on the very border of the country, the degree of their protection before the conflict can be estimated very conditionally, and ballistic missiles launched from under water from submarines can be hit by ships Missile defense system, in the initial phase of flight. Presumably, if there is political will, it is possible to complete the construction of the SSBN / SSBN projects 955A / 955K by 2035.
At 12 SSBNs with 12 SLBMs on board each, 432 nuclear warheads can be deployed, based on the installation of 3 nuclear warheads per 1 SLBM. Empty seats should be loaded with a set of missile defense capabilities similar to those used at mine ICBMs and ICBMs. If necessary, depending on the maximum possible number of nuclear warheads on SLBMs, which can be 6-10 units, the maximum number of deployed nuclear warheads can be 864-1440 units.
The survival of the SSBNs and SSBNs should be ensured due to the inability of the enemy to ensure the watch and tracking of all of our submarines. For the year-round expectation of going to sea, tracking and escorting 24 of our SSBNs / SSBNs, the enemy will need to attract at least 48 nuclear submarines (NPS), that is, almost their entire nuclear submarine fleet.
Husky project
At the second stage, the creation of a universal nuclear submarine in versions with ballistic missiles (SSBNs), SSBNs and a hunter submarine can be considered. To accommodate a universal nuclear submarine in the weapon compartments, a promising small-sized SLBM should be developed based on the solutions used to create a promising light mine-based ICBM and ICBM ICBM, as much as possible unified with these ICBMs. Given the smaller dimensions of the carrier - a universal nuclear submarine, its ammunition should be about 6 SLBMs with one to three nuclear warheads on each.
Creation of a hunter, SSGN and SSBN project on the basis of the nuclear submarines of the Husky project will make it possible to hide the latter as much as possible among other types of submarine forces of the Russian Navy
The construction of a universal nuclear submarine should be carried out in a large series - 40-60 units, of which 20 should be in the version with SLBMs. In this case, the total number of nuclear warheads on SLBMs will be 120 units, with the possibility of increasing to 360 units. It would seem that a clear regression, compared with the highly specialized SSBN project 955 (A)?
The alleged advantage of the Husky project’s nuclear submarine of the fifth generation should be significantly greater secrecy, which will allow them to act more aggressively, try to get as close to the enemy’s territory as possible, which will, if necessary, strike a decapitation blow from a minimum distance along the trajectory. The task of the naval component of the promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation is to exert such pressure on the enemy, in which he will be forced to reorient his resources - equipment, people, financing, to defense tasks, and not attacks.
Upon detection of a universal nuclear submarine, the enemy can never be sure that he is tracking the carrier of SLBMs, cruise missiles or anti-ship missiles, and for organizing year-round control of the exit and tracking of all 40-60 nuclear submarines, at least 80-120 multi-purpose nuclear submarines will be required, which is more than all NATO countries combined.
Aircraft component of strategic nuclear forces
The lack of stability in the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces against a sudden disarming strike, the vulnerability of carriers at all stages of the flight, as well as the vulnerability of their existing weapons - cruise missiles with a nuclear warhead, makes this element of strategic nuclear forces the least significant from the point of nuclear deterrence.
The only possible option for the practical use of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is to use it to put pressure on the enemy by threatening to advance to his borders and attack from a minimum distance. The most interesting option as an armament for the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is an air-launched ICBM, for launching which a converted transport aircraft should be used - a promising aviation ballistic missile system (PAK RB).
The most effective weapon of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is modernized transport aircraft armed with air-launched ICBMs
The advantage of this solution is the visual and radar similarity of the PAK RB with transport aircraft, as well as with other aircraft on the basis of one project - tankers, air command posts, etc. This will force the enemy air forces to react to the movement of any transport aircraft in the way they do now when a strategic bomber is detected. At the same time, financial costs will increase, the resource of enemy fighters will decrease, the load on pilots and technical personnel will increase. In fact, the launch of air-based ICBMs should be possible without going beyond the borders of the Russian Federation.
Given the novelty of the solution, the number of PAK RB should be minimal, about 20-30 aircraft with 1 ICBM air launch on each. A promising air-based ICBM should be as unified as possible with a promising silo ICBM, ICBM PGRK and a promising small-sized SLBM. Accordingly, the number of nuclear warheads will be from 20-30 units in the minimum, to 60-90 units in the maximum.
It may turn out that the implementation of the PAK RB will be too high-risk and costly, as a result of which it will have to be abandoned. At the same time, there will be little sense in the nuclear conflict from the classic cruise missile bombers. Existing, under construction and promising Tu-95, Tu-160 (M), PAK-DA can be extremely effectively used as carriers of conventional weapons, and as an element of strategic nuclear forces can be considered as a "backup plan for the backup plan." On the other hand, the inclusion of one missile carrier bomber as one nuclear charge makes their existence in the strategic nuclear forces "legally justified", allowing them to deploy 12 times more nuclear warheads than they are counted under the START-3 treaty.
Based on the foregoing, it is proposed that the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces be left unchanged, legally retained as part of the strategic nuclear forces, counting as 50-80 nuclear warheads, and in fact are used as intensively as possible for delivering conventional weapon strikes in ongoing conflicts.
Ways to save
The construction of a strategic nuclear forces is a significant burden on the country's budget. However, in a situation where the conventional forces of Russia are significantly inferior to the forces of the main adversary - the United States, not to mention the entire NATO bloc, strategic nuclear forces remain the only defense guaranteeing the sovereignty and security of the country. And of course, the more the enemy’s interest in destroying this defense.
What measures can be taken to reduce the burden on the country's budget during the construction of promising strategic nuclear forces?
1. The maximum possible unification of equipment and technology. If the “first pancake”, the unification of the Poplar and SLBM Bulava ICBMs, came out lumpy, this does not mean that the idea is vicious in principle. It can be assumed that the main obstacle to unification is not technical problems, but the competition between manufacturers, the difference in requirements and regulatory documents of different departments and types of armed forces, the inertia of continuity - “we always had that”. Accordingly, the basis for unification should be the development of unified documents and regulations, of course, adjusted for the specific activities of each type of armed forces.
In some cases, unification may be more important than lowering the cost of some products. What does it mean? For example, some equipment for the Navy requires protection from sea water and salt fog, and this requirement is not critical for ground forces. At the same time, manufacturing a product with protection against sea water and salt fog is more expensive than without it. It would seem logical to make different equipment. It is by no means a fact, it is necessary to study the issue comprehensively, to see how an increase in the number of protected products will affect their cost. It may turn out that releasing all products protected in total will be cheaper than making separately protected and unprotected equipment.
2. The inclusion in the technical specifications (TK) as the main requirements for an extended service life and minimize the need for maintenance (MOT). You can slightly sacrifice the achievement of the maximum possible characteristics, due to the extension of the service life. For example, conditionally, it is better to have a nuclear power plant with a capacity of 50 kilotons, with a service life of 30 years, than a nuclear power plant with a capacity of 100 kilotons, with a service life of 15 years. The same applies to product weight, power consumption, etc. In other words, reliability and service life without maintenance should be one of the most important requirements of TK.
3. Reducing the types of systems in service with strategic nuclear forces.
What can and should be abandoned during the construction of the strategic nuclear forces? First of all, from any exotic, to which specific complexes such as "Petrel" and "Poseidon" can be attributed. They have all the shortcomings of their carriers in the context of stability before delivering a sudden disarming strike. They are also not very suitable for applying a decapitation blow because of the low speed. In other words, the swing will be on the ruble, and the blow on the penny.
"Petrel" and "Poseidon." The costs of creating exotic solutions are high, and the benefits of deploying them are dubious
This also includes proposals for the deployment of strategic submarine systems in inland waters. For example, we deployed ICBMs in Lake Baikal. Where is the guarantee that the enemy will not learn to find containers with ICBMs in the water column? How to prevent him from throwing small-sized submarines into Baikal dronescapable of autonomous search underwater for a long time? Shut down the whole lake? Drive SSBNs into Baikal? Not to mention that in this way we expose the world's largest source of fresh water. And how to conduct checks on the number of deployed ICBMs under water?
It is also necessary to abandon heavy missiles, BZHRK and other monstrous complexes. All of them will be expensive and will always be the number 1 goal for the enemy in the first strike. It’s one thing to spend 2 nuclear warheads on a light ICBM with 1 nuclear warhead, it’s another thing to spend 4 nuclear warheads on a heavy missile with 10 nuclear warheads. In which case will the opponent win? The situation with the ALCM is even worse - it can be destroyed with conventional weapons, while its camouflaging capabilities are worse than that of a PGRK disguised as a civilian cargo vehicle.
The time of heavy ICBMs and BZHRK has passed, the arsenal of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation needs to be "smeared with a thin layer", and not the "Cheops pyramids" built from nuclear warheads
Ratio and quantity
Given the above points, promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation can have the following basic composition:
Strategic Missile Forces:
- 775 light ICBMs in silos with 775 nuclear warheads (up to a maximum of 2325 nuclear warheads);
- 76 PGRK disguised as civilian freight vehicles with 76 nuclear warheads (up to a maximum of 228 nuclear warheads);
Navy:
- until 2035, 12 SSBNs with 432 nuclear warheads (maximum 864-1440 nuclear warheads);
- after 2050, 20 universal nuclear submarines with 120 nuclear warheads (maximum 360 nuclear warheads);
Air Force:
- 50 existing / under construction / prospective bombers with 50-80 nuclear warheads (under the START-3 treaty), or with 600-960 nuclear warheads (in fact).
As we see, in the proposed version, the minimum number of nuclear warheads is even less than that stipulated by the START-3 treaty. The difference can be offset by the installation of additional nuclear warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, or, much better, an increase in the number of ICBMs in silos.
The total number of nuclear warheads that we must be ready to make in the START-4 conditional agreement should be calculated on the basis of the total number of nuclear warheads that must survive in the event of a sudden disarming strike by the enemy, the nuclear warheads spent from them needed to break through the missile defense "nuclear path", and the remaining nuclear warheads necessary to cause unacceptable damage to the enemy.
Again. The basis of the strategic nuclear forces should be the lightest and most compact ICBMs placed in highly protected silos of high factory readiness. Only they can hold the blow of non-nuclear high-precision weapons, which the enemy can rivet with tens of thousands, using it not only himself, but also arming them with allies.
The number of ICBMs in a silo should be equal to ½ NWB deployed by the enemy. The silos with ICBMs should be supplemented with reserve silos, in the event of a sharp increase in the number of deployed nuclear warheads by the enemy (for example, due to the return potential), or an increase in the characteristics of the enemy’s nuclear warheads, which will allow him to hit one ICBM with his own nuclear warhead with an acceptable probability. In the event of an enemy delivering a sudden disarming strike, he will have to hit all silos, since the location of a real ICBM inside a silo cluster will not be determined.
All other strategic nuclear weapons components can be built optionally - PGRK, SSBNs, missile-carrying bombers, etc. Their significance for nuclear deterrence, subject to the implementation of the previous paragraph, will be substantially less important.
A bit more stories to understand what volumes were within the forces of the USSR:
“By the second half of 1990, the Strategic Missile Forces were armed with 2500 missiles and 10271 units of nuclear weapons. Of this number, the main part was intercontinental ballistic missiles - 1398 units with 6612 charges. In addition, in the arsenals of the USSR there were warheads of tactical nuclear weapons: ground-to-ground missiles - 4300 units, artillery shells and mines up to 2000 units, air-to-ground missiles and free-fall bombs for air force aviation - more than 5000 units, winged anti-ship rockets, as well as depth charges and torpedoes - up to 1500 units, coastal artillery shells and coastal defense missiles - up to 200 units, atomic land mines and mines - up to 14 units. A total of 000 nuclear charges. "
Conclusions
The promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation, implemented on the basis of light ICBMs in silos, will be most effective as a means of nuclear deterrence in the context of the possibility of an adversary delivering a disarming strike under cover of a global missile defense system, until the enemy begins mass deployment space weapon systems capable of ensuring the defeat of highly protected silos without the use of nuclear charges.
In this case, the strategic nuclear forces will have two ways. The first is a dead end, when in the absence of comparable space technologies it is necessary to implement an extensive development path - a quantitative increase in all components of the strategic nuclear forces by 2–3 times, i.e. the total number of warheads can be about 3000-4500 units or more, up to the level of the USSR. But this will gobble up all the resources of the economy - we will turn into North Korea.
And on this basis, in the most distant future, after 2050, the second, intensive path of development will be effective - the space expansion of the strategic nuclear forces. This is a long and difficult path, but the groundwork for it must be created now.
The launch of strategic nuclear forces into space. Most likely, this is the inevitability of a distant future.
What problems might stand in the way of the US desire to deliver a sudden disarming strike under the guise of a global missile defense system? First of all, this is a problem of large and complex systems. It is impossible to be 100% sure that all systems on Day D and hour H will work and will work with the required efficiency. And taking into account the rates in the nuclear missile confrontation, it is unlikely that anyone will decide to rely on "maybe".
On the other hand, there is a risk of an escalation of any conflict or the emergence of such an external or internal situation in the United States itself, when their leadership considers the risk acceptable, therefore, it cannot be completely ruled out that the “face” command will be given. The only solution remains the creation of such a nuclear missile shield, which the enemy will not dare to try for strength in any situation.
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