Anti-submarine defense: ships against submarines. Weapons and tactics
Even before the first combat use of submarines, methods of dealing with them were born: ram and artillery fire. This was due to the following factors. Firstly, the very old submarines, from those times when it was more likely a dangerous attraction than a military vehicle, could not plunge deeply. The second factor was the periscope - the submarine could not attack or orient itself otherwise than with its help.
A little later, the depth factor disappeared. Even before the First World War, submarines "learned" to plunge deeper than the draft of the largest ship or ship. However, the attack was still impossible without a periscope, and he unmasked the boat. Theoretically, artillery fire with diving shells at the detected periscope was considered an effective means and, together with high speed and tack movement (anti-submarine zigzag), was supposed to protect the ships. The ram of a boat discovered by the crew of a warship in the immediate vicinity was fatal for a submarine.
The First World War immediately showed that all this is not entirely true, and the fact that the periscope of the boat was discovered does not at all make its destruction by artillery fire guaranteed. The boat could well have time to plunge at least, and then neither the ram nor the artillery could help, and the boat would have a chance for a second attack.
The need for a means to "get" the boat at a depth was obvious, and such a tool appeared - the first deep bombs became it. Depth bombs had a hydrostatic detonator with the ability to set a predetermined depth of explosion, and the attack was carried out in the likely direction of its evasion after unmasking (detecting a periscope, a boat in the water position or a torpedo shot).
The emergence of marine underwater weapons on surface ships
The advent of ASDIC sonars made the use of depth charges much more accurate and precise. However, the first sonar, as well as the method of using deep bombs by dropping them overboard, made the defeat of the submarine, although possible, but still not a simple matter.
Here's what the American ace anti-submarine with a major combat account D. MacIntyre recalled about battles with German submarines in the Atlantic during World War II:
Unfortunately, the boat commander outwitted the frigate commander, perhaps through the successful use of simulation cartridges ... they, apparently, either clung to an underwater bubble target, or after the explosion of deep bombs lost contact due to disturbance of the water.
... the ships of the 1st division approached ... we did 20 knots each - the highest speed at which sonar search is still possible. Soon a distinct sonar contact was established. This move required quick action. First, the ship had to be turned with its nose to the contact, so that it was the smallest target for a possible torpedo attack. At this stage of the attack, it is still difficult to decide who is attacking and who is dodging, and torpedoes can already be carried under water in the hope of getting into a ship if it continues on course.
At this time, you should reduce the course - give the sonar time to understand the situation, determine the course and speed of the boat, but also in order to reduce the noise of the propellers and not attract any acoustic torpedo that could already be fired.
"Bickerton" in small speed went in the direction of contact ...
“The contact is sure. It is classified as a submarine. "
"Distance 1400 meters - the inclination increases."
"The target is moving to the left."
Bill Ridley, controlling the acoustics, all absorbed in listening to the echo, showed me a thumb raised up, which meant finding a real object.
... the place of the boat was marked on the tablet. She walked in a constant course, moving at the smallest speed, and did not seem to suspect our approach, then at a distance of 650 meters the echoes subsided and soon completely disappeared.
“She's going deep, sir, I'm sure of that,” he said.
... I decided to use the creep attack method. ... one of the ships usually makes contact, holding about 1000 meters behind the stern of the German boat, and after that takes the other ship into the wake of the submarine to approach it in such a small speed that would be sufficient only to catch up with it. Then, as soon as the attacking ship is over an unsuspecting boat, twenty-six depth charges are dropped from the control ship on command ...
Walking at the slowest speed and being guided by my commands transmitted by radiotelephone, the Bly passed us and entered the wake of the boat. The voltage increased to the limit when the distance to the Bly, measured by a portable range finder, gradually began to approach the distance indicated by the sonar. But both distances coincided, and I gave the Tovs command to Cooper.
I had to skip the Bly a little further than the target in order to adjust for the time that the depth bombs were plunged to the designated depth. ... at 45 meters, the right moment has arrived. My throat was dry with excitement, and I only managed to wheeze the command “Fire!” ... I saw how the first deep bomb plopped into the water from the stern of the Bly. The first bomb exploded with terrible force near the boat, plunging it into total darkness. Cracks appeared in the hull of the boat through which water was pumping inward ... explosions were heard throughout the ship inside the hull of the boat, which was located at great depths. I realized that it was all over ....
Of course, everyone was delighted, especially me, since again, like during my first trip to the Walker, the new group “blew the enemy’s blood” upon their first outing to sea.
It is noteworthy how difficult it was to attack the submarine using ASDIC and deep bombs dropped overboard. Once again, we look at the diagram of the sonar field of view given in the previous material: it is clear that under the ship itself there is a “blind (although, generally speaking,“ deaf ”) zone” in which the submarine is not detected. At the same time, the ship can be heard from the submarine and the boat can really evade dropped deep bombs. D. MacIntyre resolved this issue by distributing targeting equipment and weapons, and dropping depth bombs by external target designation from another ship that held contact with the enemy submarine.
This method, however, was not a panacea. Sometimes the situation did not allow to lose time. Sometimes the PLO ship could not count on the help of other ships. New means of application required weapons. And they appeared.
Bombing
In fairness, we note that the understanding that simply dropping deep bombs behind the stern is not enough appeared even during the First World War. The combat experience said that the affected area with deep bombs dropped from the stern was not wide enough and gave the submarine a good chance of survival. It was logical to expand the affected area, but for this, the deep bombs did not have to be dropped overboard, but launched, thrown at a great distance. So the first bombers appeared.
The very first such device was the Mark I Depth charge projector, also known as the Y-gun, so named because of the design similar to the letter Y. It was first adopted by the Royal Navy of Great Britain in 1918.
The new weapons made the tactics more perfect, now the width of the bombing zone from one ship turned out to be at least three times greater than before.
Y-gun had a drawback - it could be placed only in the center, on the so-called diametrical axis of the ship, in fact on the bow and stern. Given that there were guns on the bow, it was usually only aft. Later, “halves” of such a bomb appeared, received the slang name K-gun. They could be put on board.
By the start of World War II, these bombs became the de facto standard for anti-submarine ships, and were used in conjunction with dropping depth charges from the stern. The use of such weapons significantly increased the chances of destroying the submarine, especially with sonar.
At the beginning of World War II, the “first swallows” of future weapons control systems appeared - controlling the launching of bombs from bombs from the ship’s bridge.
But the problem that caused MacIntyre to work on several ships did not disappear: it was necessary to get the submarine right on the course, while the sonar “saw” it.
Such means were bombers firing directly at the rate. The first of them was Hedgehog in 1942 (“Hedgehog”, pronounced “Hedgehog” in English). It was a 24-charge bomb with small RSL, triggered only when hit in the body. To increase the likelihood of hitting a target, a salvo of deep bombs was used.
To increase the likelihood of defeat in 1943, the first “heavy” British RBMs of the Squid type appeared, having powerful RSL with a large explosive charge and providing guidance for their volley according to the GAS (ie, the integration of the GAS with counting devices RBU).
Depth bombs and bombs are the main weapons of anti-submarine ships of the Western Allies during World War II. After the war, the British created a “Limbo” bomb (Mark 10 Limbo) based on Squid, which was distinguished by a control system integrated into the ship’s sonar system and automatic reloading. "Limbo" embarked on warships in 1955 and served until the end of the 80s.
It should be noted that depth bombs are still in service, including the US and British Navy (like helicopter ammunition), and on ships in several countries (for example, Sweden) also use classic depth bombs dropped from the stern of the ship.
The reason for this is the ability to effectively hit targets lying on the ground and underwater sabotage assets (ultra-small submarines, divers' transporters, etc.).
In the USSR, based on the experience of the war, they first reproduced Hedzhehog (which became our MBU-200), and subsequently a line of domestic RBUs with high performance characteristics was created. The most massive of them were the long-range RBU-6000 (with the RSL-60) and the RBU-1000 with the powerful RSL-10, which had guidance and stabilization drives, a complex of mechanized feeding and reloading RBU from the cellar, and "Storm" bomb control devices (PUSB) .
PUSB "Storm" had the means to develop the parameters of the target (submarine) motion according to the SAS and did it very accurately. From the experience of combat training of the Navy, repeated cases of direct hit of single practical RSL (training, without explosives) in submarines are known.
From the memories of cap. 1 rank of V. Dugints "Ship fanagoria":
... the miners fiddled with the muzzle covers for a long time, which were covered with ice crust and, turning into stone, did not want to tear themselves away from the guides of the installation. Muzzle covers are canvas covers, worn directly on six trunks in front and behind the installation guides.
And if there were no covers on the trunks? Inside them there would have been ice caps or ice hummocks for a long time. Then try to charge the installation with at least one bomb, you would have to blow the trunks with superheated steam and remove this ice.
“Cut the covers between the 11th and 12th barrels and strip it off only with the 12th rail,” I gave a desperate order and sacrificed my covers to just stuff the bomb in one barrel.
The unit screeched in the cold and tipped over at a loading angle of -90 °.
... there really was something to consider in the cellar.
Frozen through the freeboard iron, which limited the space of the bomb storage, was dull silver with a real snow cover. The lanterns themselves emitted light, as if in some kind of foggy ball due to the fog standing in the room. The green sides below the waterline were covered with large drops of dew, which glittered with gold in the light of light bulbs and, straying into continuous streams, accumulated smudges of water in the recesses of the ship's bottom.
Graceful bombs, frozen in the strict rack of their mounts, glistened with paint washed by the dampness of the mist and drops of water falling from the ceiling, which at the moment served as an excellent condenser for the fog formed.
- How much is it now? I looked questioningly at the mineral.
“Plus two and a humidity of 98%,” said Meshkauskas, glancing at the instruments.
The bomb lift door slammed, and it thundered with its hinges, carrying the bomb up.
“Meshkauskas, turn on the ventilation,” I demanded, dejected by the abnormal storage conditions of the ammunition.
“Dragging the lieutenant, it will be even worse.” Everything will thaw and there will be even more water, ”the experienced miner reasonedly contradicted my instructions.
...
Simplifying to the limit all the intricacies of the attack, adjusted for severe frost, right at the foot of the ship and, without choosing an acoustic station on board, we aimed RBU at an invisible enemy.
In the frosty silence, the roll of the jet bomb shot, muffled by the cold of frosty air, thundered unnaturally quietly and the bomb, glowing with a yellow flame from the nozzle of its engine, flew away towards an underwater target.
“In such a cold weather, even a bomb rumbles somehow in a special way,” said Zheleznov. “I was still thinking - maybe it won't work at all in such a frost.”
“What will happen to her ... Gunpowder, it is gunpowder in the cold,” I reassured the commander who doubts the reliability of our weapons. ...
The boat surfaced in the southwestern corner of the landfill and immediately got in touch with an alarm message:
“Some white horseradish sticking out about 2 meters long sticks out in our fencing. It's yours? What to do with her? ” - the alarmed submariners asked, when they first saw a practical bomb on board. “She is not dangerous, throw her overboard,” Zheleznov gave to the submariners through communication.
"Wow!" Caught right in the wheelhouse. It’s good that the fuse in this bomb is not military, otherwise it would plunge all 600 grams of its charge into the submariners in the hull, they would be there in complete ecstasy.
In the 80s in the USSR, a new direction for the development of RBU was outlined - equipping their RSL with guided gravity underwater shells (GPS), which had a simple high-frequency homing system (SSN). Tests have shown their very high efficiency, reaching 11 hits in the hull of a submarine from a full 12 missile salvo RBU-6000. Moreover, the most valuable in GPS in the 80s was their very high (almost absolute) noise immunity. In the USSR Navy, there was a very acute problem of the noise immunity of the torpedo missile systems against the sonar means (SGPD) of the enemy. At the same time, the high efficiency of GGPD against torpedoes was “nullified” against GPS due to different frequency ranges and the “mutually perpendicular” orientations of their antenna patterns.
However, there were problems with GPS, for example, low ability to hit targets at shallow depths of their immersion (GPS just “slipped” in the cavitation cavity, or did not have time to work out “up” guidance).
Today, RBUs with GPS have ships of Project 11356 (RPK-8 "West"). However, what was good in the 80s today looks like an anachronism, because at the modern technical level, GPS could and should have been equipped with small propulsion systems that dramatically increased their performance characteristics and capabilities of such weapons.
In addition, the PKK "West" has a completely insufficient range for today.
In the USSR, the main purpose of RBU was to “close” the “dead zone” of torpedoes (which, in turn, closed the “dead zone” of anti-submarine missile systems). However, now the dead zone of anti-submarine missile systems (RPK) has decreased to 1,5 km or less, and is actually absent.
At the same time, the task of hitting targets at ultra-shallow depths of a place lying on the ground, underwater sabotage means (to which combat AUVs have been added today) remains relevant. And for solving such problems, the “classic RBU” with the usual high-explosive RSL (or, in some cases, “light” cumulative) turns out to be very appropriate.
For this reason, RBUs are still used in a number of fleets (Sweden, Turkey, India, China), including on the latest ships. And that makes a lot of sense.
Once, RBU was the main weapon against submarines, but today it is a “niche” tool, but in its niche it is difficult to replace it. The fact that modern warships of the Russian Navy have no bombings at all is wrong. At the same time, it would be optimal if the “new RBUs” were universal multi-purpose launchers capable of solving a wide range of tasks (for example, not only defeating underwater targets, but also effectively setting interference in the “upper hemisphere”).
There is another possible use of bombing, which few people think about. The possibility of creating a shell-explosive sound source, which, if launched from the RBU, would provide an instant low-frequency "backlight" for the shipboard GAS, is theoretically substantiated. For some ships, such an opportunity would be very valuable.
The evolution of anti-submarine torpedoes
The "pushing" of the bombing from the position of the main anti-submarine weapon began immediately after the Second World War.
The first anti-submarine torpedoes were used aviation Allies in 1943 and had very limited performance characteristics. Given this factor. and the presence of sufficiently effective ASGs that provided target designation for deep bombs and RBUs, the first experiments on the use of anti-submarine torpedoes from ships did not become any mass during the Second World War, however, immediately after its completion, the prospects for new weapons were fully appreciated in all countries and began its intensive development.
At the same time, two main problems of their application were immediately identified:
- often complex hydrology of the environment (sound propagation conditions);
- sonar countermeasures (SGPD) of the enemy.
With GPA means (both mine - towed Foxer devices, and the enemy - imitation Bold cartridges), the Allies gained the first, but serious experience during World War II. This was fully appreciated, and during the 50s a series of large-scale exercises took place in the United States with the widespread involvement of anti-submarine ships, submarines, with the massive use of anti-submarine weapons (including torpedoes) and GPA.
It was found that at the existing technical level it was impossible to provide any reliable protection of autonomous torpedoes from SRS, therefore, for the submarine torpedoes it was established that telecontrol was mandatory (that is, the decision was whether the operator took aim or interference), and for ships where it was difficult - the need for a large ammunition of torpedoes (providing the ability to perform a large number of attacks).
An interesting point in the tests of the US Navy of the 50s is that often torpedo firing was carried out “on a direct hit” in the submarine’s hull, apart from “accidental” such hits during combat training.
Of memories of American submariners those years:
The low efficiency and reliability of American torpedoes at the beginning of World War II became the subject of a “big torpedo scandal” in the USA with hard conclusions for the future: large shooting statistics, conditions as close to real as possible, widespread use of countermeasures.
It was impossible to influence the second factor - hydrology (vertical distribution of the speed of sound, VSWR). It only remained to accurately measure and take it into account.
As an example of the complexity of this problem, one can cite the calculation of the “illumination” zone (target detection) of a modern torpedo in real conditions of one of the seas adjacent to the Russian Federation: depending on conditions (depth of the torpedo and target submarine), the detection range may differ by more than ten ( !) times.
Moreover, with the competent actions of the submarine in its disguise (in the shadow zone), the response radius of the SSN does not exceed several hundred meters. And this is for one of the best modern torpedoes (!), And the question here is not “technology”, but physics, which is the same for everyone. For anyone, including the newest western torpedo will be the same.
Given the requirements of a large ammunition load of anti-submarine torpedoes, in the west there was a refusal to use 53-cm torpedoes on ships, with an almost complete transition to a small 32-cm caliber. This made it possible to sharply increase the ammunition load of torpedoes on board (more than 20 - frigates, about 40 - cruisers, and this is not counting the ammunition load of anti-submarine missile systems).
Small-sized torpedoes (electric Mk44 and thermal (with a piston power plant using unitary fuel) Mk46), compact and light pneumatic TA Mk32 and ammunition storage facilities (taking into account the unification of ammunition for torpedo tubes and helicopters - in the form of a “universal ship anti-submarine arsenal”) were developed
An example of real combat use of torpedoes is the Falkland War (1982). Detailed data from English ships is still classified, but there are quite detailed descriptions from the Argentine side. From the memoirs of the officer from the submarine "San Luis" of the frigate-lieutenant Alejandro Maegli:
At that moment, he could only suspect what might happen next - twenty-three hours of fear, tension, pursuit and explosions.
On one side, they heard explosions of depth charges and the noise of helicopter propellers. We were approached by three helicopters with lowered sonars and random bombs dropping depth bombs, as soon as the analysis of sounds showed that all the helicopters had flown and started to carry out the attack (ships).
When the goal was 9000 yards, I told the commander, “Sir, data entered.” The commander shouted "Start." The torpedo carried a wire through which control was carried out, but after a few minutes the operator said that the wire was broken. The torpedo began to work independently and rise to the surface. The trouble was that it was discovered. Five minutes later, noises from absolutely all English ships and torpedoes disappeared from the acoustics.
It was not difficult for the English helicopters to calculate the location of the San Luis, and they attacked.
The commander ordered the most complete move, and at that very moment the acoustics said “a torpedo burst into the water”, I heard high-frequency sounds made by an approaching English torpedo. The commander ordered to sink and set false goals.
We began to set false goals, large pills that, when entering with water, produced a large number of bubbles and confused the torpedo. We called them Alka Zeltser. After the release of 2 LCs, the acoustics reported that "a torpedo near the stern." I thought: "We are dead." Then the acoustics said: "The torpedo goes aft."
Ten seconds seemed like a year, and the acoustics in his metallic voice said, “The torpedo has crossed over.” Silent joy and a sense of relief swept the boat. An English torpedo passed by and disappeared into the sea. She walked a stone's throw from us.
The arriving Sea King lowered the antenna and began to search for the boat. He had not yet figured out the exact position, and the San Luis went deeper and deeper. Helicopters dropped torpedoes and bombs nearby, but could not find the boat.
The submarine lay on the sandy bottom. Every twenty minutes, the helicopters changed and dropped their depth charges and torpedoes into the water. And so, replacing each other, they searched for the boat hour after hour.
For the submarine lying at a depth, torpedoes and depth charges were not dangerous, lack of oxygen was dangerous. The boat could not float under the RPD and carbon dioxide increased. The commander ordered the entire crew to leave the fighting posts, lie down in bunks and connect to regeneration in order to spend as little oxygen as possible.
Soviet experience
Unfortunately, the factor of SRS in the USSR has not been adequately assessed. The situation with our “torpedo science” back in the mid-60s, the head of the Directorate of Antisubmarine Arms (UPV) of the Navy Kostygov aptly characterized as follows:
The first anti-submarine torpedo was the 53-cm SET-53 torpedo with a passive SSN (based on German times of World War II). Its main drawback was absolutely analogous to German TV (with a similar in design CCH) - low noise immunity (any source of interference in the CCH range led the torpedo away). However, in general, for its time, the torpedo turned out to be successful, was very reliable (within its performance characteristics).
From the memories of the deputy. Head of the Navy Anti-Submarine Arms Directorate R. Gusev:
Considering the small response radius of the SSN (and, accordingly, the narrow “search strip” of one torpedo), a volley firing of several torpedoes with their parallel course appeared.
At the same time, the only means of protection against interference (SGPD) was the ability to set the distance to turn on the SSN (ie, "shooting through interference").
For SET-53, it was significant that the target, evading it by reducing the course, very effectively hit the RBU, and vice versa, when the target submarine avoided the RBU attack in high speed, the efficiency of the torpedoes sharply increased. Those. torpedoes and RBUs on our ships complemented each other effectively.
Small ships received 40 cm torpedoes with active-passive SSN, in the early 60s - SET-40, and in the mid-70s - SET-72. Domestic small-sized torpedoes had a weight three times that of foreign 32 cm, but they allowed to significantly increase the ammunition load on ships that had them (Project 159A - 10 torpedoes against 4 torpedoes 53 cm on a project close to displacement 1124).
The main anti-submarine torpedo of the Navy’s ships was the electric SET-65, adopted in 1965, and “formally” surpassing the American “peer” Mk37 in terms of performance characteristics. Formally ... for the considerable weight and dimensions sharply limited the ammunition of the ships, and the lack of a small-sized torpedo of 32 cm caliber, the negative attitude to the domestic copy of the Mk46 - MPT “Hummingbird”, required “pulling range” (and excluded the mass replacement of 53-cm torpedoes by at least 40 cm).
For example, in the book of Kuzin and Nikolsky "Navy of the USSR 1945-1995." there is a comparison of the armament of the ships with Asrok and SET-65 in their range (10 and 15 km), on the basis of which a "wild" and absolutely incompetent conclusion is made about the "superiority" of the SET-65. Those. The "scientific doctors" of the 1st Central Research Institute of the Navy were not aware of the concepts of "effective firing range", "time to hit a target", "ammunition," etc. for which Asrok had a clear and significant advantage.
At the same time, during the combat training of the USSR Navy on fleets learned to use the capabilities of available weapons to the maximum. Captain 1st rank, retired A.E. Soldatenkov recalled:
But the problem was not in torpedo boats, but in the presence of torpedoes (anti-submarine) for them.
A little-known fact, the bet on electric torpedoes, coupled with significant restrictions on silver (loss in the 60s as a supplier of the PRC, and Chile in 1975) did not provide the necessary ammunition for anti-submarine torpedoes for the Soviet Navy. For this reason, the Navy was forced to “drag out” the obsolete SET-53 into operation and actually “halve” the already small 53cm anti-submarine torpedo ammunition load.
Formally, the “half ammunition load” of 53-65K and SET-65 was for solving the tasks of military service and “direct tracking” of large surface ships of the US and NATO Navy (“hitting them with 53-65K torpedoes”).
In fact, the real reason was precisely the lack of anti-submarine "electric torpedoes with silver."
And all the more surprising, the fact that the practice of “half ammunition” is still present on our ships, for example, on the photo of the Admiral Levchenko BPC in combat service in the “southern seas” in the open torpedo tubes are visible two SET-65 and two anti-ship oxygen 53 -65K (which is good to carry today is dangerous).
As the main torpedo armament of our modern ships, the “Package” complex was developed with an anti-torpedo and a small torpedo with high performance characteristics. Of course, the unique characteristic of the “Package” is the possibility of hitting attacking torpedoes with high probability. Here it is also necessary to note the high noise immunity of the new small-sized torpedo, both for the conditions of the application environment (for example, shallow depths) and in relation to the enemy’s GPA.
However, there are also problematic issues:
- lack of unification between torpedo and anti-torpedo ammunition (anti-torpedo capabilities can and must be incorporated into a single small-sized torpedo of the complex);
- effective range is much less than the range of weapons of submarines;
- significant restrictions on the possibility of placement on various media;
- the absence of the HHPD as a part of the complex (the anti-torpedo task alone cannot be solved by the PTZ, similarly the GHP cannot be solved by the same way, for a reliable and effective PTZ the complex and combined use of both AT and SGPD is required);
- the use of TPK (instead of the classic torpedo tubes) sharply limits the ammunition load, makes it difficult to reload and obtain the necessary statistics of firing during the combat training of the fleet;
- restrictions on the use at shallow depths of the place (for example, when leaving the base).
However, the "Package" is in the series. At the same time, the 53 cm caliber (frigates of project 11356, BOD of project 1155, including the modernized Marshal Shaposhnikov) is surprisingly perplexing in our ships. SET-65 looked very “pale” in the ammunition of our ships back in the 80s of the last century, and even today it’s just a museum exhibit (especially considering its “American brains” from 1961). However, the attitude of the fleet to marine underwater weapons today is no secret to anyone.
Particular attention should be paid to the problem of shallow depths.
Most of the project 20380 corvettes with the Package complex are part of the Baltic Fleet and are based in Baltiysk (we will omit the fact that Baltiysk is within the reach of Polish artillery). Given the restrictions on the depth of the place when shooting, before going to great depths, these corvettes will be virtually defenseless and can be shot with impunity by enemy submarines, not being able to use their torpedoes and anti-torpedoes.
The reason is the "big bag", to reduce which (almost to zero) small parachutes are used on small-sized western torpedoes. We have such a solution is impossible because of the TPK's gas firing system.
In fact, most of the problems of the complex would be solved by abandoning the SM-588 launcher with TPK and switching to normal 324-mm torpedo tubes with pneumatic launch (see article "Light torpedo tubes. We need these weapons, but we don’t have them.") But neither the Navy nor industry raises such a question.
Another interesting solution, especially for shallow depths, can be the use of telecontrol.
For the first time on ships, it was implemented on our IPC Project 1124M (TEST-71M torpedoes - a telecontrolled version of the SET-65 torpedo).
In the West, there was also a limited use of 53-cm torpedoes from TUs from ships.
Of great interest is the Swedish PLO complex for shallow depths - the Elma RBU, remote-controlled small-sized torpedoes optimized for shallow depths and special high-frequency HAS with high resolution.
The small caliber of Elma RBU does not provide reliable destruction of submarines, it is rather a “warning weapon for peacetime”, however, specialized small-sized remote-controlled torpedoes of its own design (concern SAAB) provide defeat, including lying on the ground targets.
The most theoretical possibilities of small-sized torpedoes with remote control are reflected in the presentation of the SAAB lightweight torpedo.
In addition to the technical features of the new weapon (albeit somewhat idealized), the video shows some tactical methods of anti-aircraft defense by surface ships.
Anti-submarine missiles and their impact on tactics
In the 50s in the United States began the development of a fundamentally new weapon - ASROC anti-submarine rocket (Anti-Submarine Rocket). It was a heavy rocket, which instead of the warhead had an anti-submarine torpedo and immediately threw it over a long distance. In 1961, this complex with the RUR-5 PLUR was adopted by the U.S. Navy. In addition to the usual torpedo, there was also a variant with a nuclear charge.
The range of its application was in good agreement with the ranges of the new low-frequency sonars (SQS-23, SQS-26), and exceeded the effective range of 53 cm submarine torpedoes of the USSR Navy. Those. under favorable hydrological conditions, launching a torpedo attack, and before reaching the salvo point, our submarine received Asroka with a club in the “face”.
She had chances to evade, but Asrok’s ammunition reached 24 anti-submarine missiles (PLR), respectively, by successive attacks the enemy almost guaranteed shot our submarines (the main torpedoes of which, 53-65K and SAET-60M, were significantly inferior to Asrok’s effective range ").
The first such domestic system was the RPK-1 "Whirlwind" system, which was installed on heavy ships — anti-submarine cruisers of project 1123 and the first aircraft-carrying cruisers of project 1143. Alas, the system did not have a non-nuclear version of equipment — they could not put anti-submarine torpedoes on the missile in the USSR then, those. in non-nuclear conflict RPK-1 could not be applied.
The "main anti-submarine caliber" of our ships was the Metel missile launcher (in modernized form, the "Bell"), which was put into service in 1973 (BOD of projects 1134A, 1134B, 1155, TFR of project 1135 and at the lead TARKR "Kirov" of project 1144) . The problem of large dimensions and the mass of the torpedo was decided by hanging it under a cruise missile delivery. As a warhead, an electric torpedo was used (first, in the Blizzard, 53 cm AT-2U (PLUR 85r), and in the "Bell" - 40 cm UMGT-1 (PLUR 85ru)).
Formally, the complex "surpassed all" (in range). In fact, before the appearance of SJSC Polynom, this range not only could not be realized, but moreover, the real detection ranges of the submarine GAS Titan-2, ships of project 1134A (B) and 1135, were often located in the dead zone of the complex (i.e. That is, chasing the range, they got a large dead zone). For this reason, the TFR project 1135 received the nickname "blind with a club" in the navy, ie. the weapon "seems to be", and powerful, but it is difficult to use it.
Attempts to resolve this situation - interaction with helicopters and the IPC with the OGAS, were made, but it was a palliative.
Obviously, when creating our submarines, major conceptual errors were made, and primarily from the side of the Navy and its weapons institute (28 research institutes, now part of the 1 Central Research Institute of VK).
An attempt to create a lightweight and compact missile launcher with a small "dead zone" was the Medvedka missile launcher, but once again carried away by the distance they missed the fact that the effectiveness of an unguided missile sharply decreases there. Unfortunately, the necessity of installing an inertial control system on the Medvedka missile launcher reached the developers too late when the question arose of stopping this development.
From the standpoint of today, this was a mistake, it was quite possible to bring the Medrelka-2 missile defense system (and most likely the Response earlier), but the weakness (suffice it to say that the observer of this development about the existence (!) Of Asrok VLA »Learned only in 2012, that is, they did not show the slightest interest in other people's experience) scientific support from the 28th research institute (and one central research institute) did not allow this to be done.
The Medvedka was closed, and instead it began the development of another PLRK - a modification of the Response submarine for surface ships.
According to recent media reports, as a result of long and hard work, the Response successfully flew, but in the process the possibility of its use from inclined launchers was lost, which left the main new anti-submarine ships of the Navy - Project 20380 corvettes without long-range anti-submarine weapons (with an effective range of application of a commensurate with a range of submarine torpedo weapons).
The impact on the tactics of the GAS PLO with the GPAA and the further evolution of the weapons and tactical techniques of surface PLO ships. The role of ship helicopters
From the late 70s - early 80s, there was a massive entry into the western fleets of flexible extended towed antennas (GPBA). Detection ranges increased sharply, but there were problems not only in classifying the contact (and is this target exactly on the GPAA-PL?) But also in determining the exact position of the target for its attack (up to “what is the target’s remote sensing target”, ie, error in range at the level of tens of kilometers). The problem was the big errors in determining the area of the possible target position (HFCS) of the GPAA (especially at sharp angles to the antenna).
Accordingly, there was a problem of additional examination of these large HCVFs, for which they began to use helicopters. Given the fact that the primary detection of the unit was beyond the GPAA, it made sense to integrate the search and targeting system of the helicopter into ship systems in terms of processing sonar information (as far as communication facilities of that time allowed). Since the task of contact classification was now often solved by helicopter, it became logical to strike at the submarine with it.
The classic ship of this concept was the frigates Oliver Hazard Perry (more - "Frigate" Perry as a lesson for Russia. Designed by the machine, massive and cheap. ").
The Perry had a towed gas engine and two helicopters, which made it possible to have a very high search performance of one ship. At the same time, the ship did not have anti-submarine missiles in service, but the use of helicopters as a striking means reduced the significance of this fact. In addition, “Perry” could be used as part of the search and strike groups with ships having such missiles.
The scheme had both advantages (a sharp increase in search performance) and disadvantages. The most serious is the sensitivity of the GPBA to extraneous noise, and, accordingly, the need for a separate location of their carriers from detachments of warships and convoys (i.e. a kind of destroyer "Sheffield" as an "DRLO ship", with the corresponding "potential consequences").
For surface ships of the Navy of the USSR, which did not have a GPBA, helicopters had another, but also important. The most effective joint action is heterogeneous anti-submarine forces. At the same time, enemy submarines, evading the detection of ships, often “came across” on the intercepting barriers of the RSLA aviation. However, it was very difficult to navigate the ships according to the RSLB data, since when approaching the field of buoys they “illuminated” it with their noises. In this situation, helicopters played a large role in receiving and transmitting contact (or ensuring the use of the Metel air defense missile system).
Today, Western helicopters play a very large role in the search for submarines, especially taking into account equipping them with low-frequency OGAS, capable of “highlighting” both the field of buoys and the GAS (including GPBA) of the ship. The situation became real and probable when the ship operates secretly and has a significant lead in detecting submarines (unfortunately, this is the practice of the US Navy and NATO, helicopters of the Russian Navy do not provide this).
Given the effect of helicopters at a considerable distance from the ship, the question arises of the appropriateness of PLRK. Here you need to very clearly understand the difference between peacetime and wartime conditions: “In baseball, one team does not kill the other” (film “Pentagon Wars”). Yes, in peacetime, you can "calmly and safely" call a helicopter to produce "training attacks" on the detected submarine.
However, in a combat situation, delaying an attack by a submarine is fraught not only with the fact that it can slip away, but also with the fact that it will have time to strike first (anti-ship missiles or torpedoes, which most likely are already approaching the ships). The possibility of delivering an immediate strike on a detected submarine is a decisive advantage of a missile defense system over a helicopter.
Conclusions
The full-fledged anti-submarine weapons complex of modern ships should include modern RBUs (multi-purpose guided launchers), torpedoes and anti-torpedoes, anti-submarine missiles and aircraft (ship's helicopter).
The presence of any one means (usually torpedoes) dramatically reduces the capabilities of the ship against the submarine, essentially turning it into a target.
As for tactics, the key to success is the close interaction between the ships in the group on the one hand and the ship's helicopters on the other.
- Maxim Klimov, Alexander Timokhin
- https://ussslater.org, Lockeed Martin Canada, corporalfisk, Wikipedia commons, seaforces.org, SAAB-Bofors
- Anti-submarine defense: ships against submarines. Hydroacoustics
Information