Military Review

Anti-submarine defense: ships against submarines. Weapons and tactics

117

Frigate Type 26 for the Canadian Navy. Crucial for choosing this ship were its anti-submarine capabilities


Even before the first combat use of submarines, methods of dealing with them were born: ram and artillery fire. This was due to the following factors. Firstly, the very old submarines, from those times when it was more likely a dangerous attraction than a military vehicle, could not plunge deeply. The second factor was the periscope - the submarine could not attack or orient itself otherwise than with its help.

A little later, the depth factor disappeared. Even before the First World War, submarines "learned" to plunge deeper than the draft of the largest ship or ship. However, the attack was still impossible without a periscope, and he unmasked the boat. Theoretically, artillery fire with diving shells at the detected periscope was considered an effective means and, together with high speed and tack movement (anti-submarine zigzag), was supposed to protect the ships. The ram of a boat discovered by the crew of a warship in the immediate vicinity was fatal for a submarine.

The First World War immediately showed that all this is not entirely true, and the fact that the periscope of the boat was discovered does not at all make its destruction by artillery fire guaranteed. The boat could well have time to plunge at least, and then neither the ram nor the artillery could help, and the boat would have a chance for a second attack.

The need for a means to "get" the boat at a depth was obvious, and such a tool appeared - the first deep bombs became it. Depth bombs had a hydrostatic detonator with the ability to set a predetermined depth of explosion, and the attack was carried out in the likely direction of its evasion after unmasking (detecting a periscope, a boat in the water position or a torpedo shot).

Anti-submarine defense: ships against submarines. Weapons and tactics

Submarine attack with depth charges

The emergence of marine underwater weapons on surface ships


The advent of ASDIC sonars made the use of depth charges much more accurate and precise. However, the first sonar, as well as the method of using deep bombs by dropping them overboard, made the defeat of the submarine, although possible, but still not a simple matter.

Here's what the American ace anti-submarine with a major combat account D. MacIntyre recalled about battles with German submarines in the Atlantic during World War II:

The Keats, arriving at the submarine’s detection site, began a search ... made sonar contact and launched an attack.
Unfortunately, the boat commander outwitted the frigate commander, perhaps through the successful use of simulation cartridges ... they, apparently, either clung to an underwater bubble target, or after the explosion of deep bombs lost contact due to disturbance of the water.
... the ships of the 1st division approached ... we did 20 knots each - the highest speed at which sonar search is still possible. Soon a distinct sonar contact was established. This move required quick action. First, the ship had to be turned with its nose to the contact, so that it was the smallest target for a possible torpedo attack. At this stage of the attack, it is still difficult to decide who is attacking and who is dodging, and torpedoes can already be carried under water in the hope of getting into a ship if it continues on course.
At this time, you should reduce the course - give the sonar time to understand the situation, determine the course and speed of the boat, but also in order to reduce the noise of the propellers and not attract any acoustic torpedo that could already be fired.
"Bickerton" in small speed went in the direction of contact ...
“The contact is sure. It is classified as a submarine. "
"Distance 1400 meters - the inclination increases."
"The target is moving to the left."
Bill Ridley, controlling the acoustics, all absorbed in listening to the echo, showed me a thumb raised up, which meant finding a real object.
... the place of the boat was marked on the tablet. She walked in a constant course, moving at the smallest speed, and did not seem to suspect our approach, then at a distance of 650 meters the echoes subsided and soon completely disappeared.
“She's going deep, sir, I'm sure of that,” he said.
... I decided to use the creep attack method. ... one of the ships usually makes contact, holding about 1000 meters behind the stern of the German boat, and after that takes the other ship into the wake of the submarine to approach it in such a small speed that would be sufficient only to catch up with it. Then, as soon as the attacking ship is over an unsuspecting boat, twenty-six depth charges are dropped from the control ship on command ...
Walking at the slowest speed and being guided by my commands transmitted by radiotelephone, the Bly passed us and entered the wake of the boat. The voltage increased to the limit when the distance to the Bly, measured by a portable range finder, gradually began to approach the distance indicated by the sonar. But both distances coincided, and I gave the Tovs command to Cooper.
I had to skip the Bly a little further than the target in order to adjust for the time that the depth bombs were plunged to the designated depth. ... at 45 meters, the right moment has arrived. My throat was dry with excitement, and I only managed to wheeze the command “Fire!” ... I saw how the first deep bomb plopped into the water from the stern of the Bly. The first bomb exploded with terrible force near the boat, plunging it into total darkness. Cracks appeared in the hull of the boat through which water was pumping inward ... explosions were heard throughout the ship inside the hull of the boat, which was located at great depths. I realized that it was all over ....
Of course, everyone was delighted, especially me, since again, like during my first trip to the Walker, the new group “blew the enemy’s blood” upon their first outing to sea.


Dents aboard a sunken German U-534 submarine from near explosions of depth charges

It is noteworthy how difficult it was to attack the submarine using ASDIC and deep bombs dropped overboard. Once again, we look at the diagram of the sonar field of view given in the previous material: it is clear that under the ship itself there is a “blind (although, generally speaking,“ deaf ”) zone” in which the submarine is not detected. At the same time, the ship can be heard from the submarine and the boat can really evade dropped deep bombs. D. MacIntyre resolved this issue by distributing targeting equipment and weapons, and dropping depth bombs by external target designation from another ship that held contact with the enemy submarine.

This method, however, was not a panacea. Sometimes the situation did not allow to lose time. Sometimes the PLO ship could not count on the help of other ships. New means of application required weapons. And they appeared.

Bombing


In fairness, we note that the understanding that simply dropping deep bombs behind the stern is not enough appeared even during the First World War. The combat experience said that the affected area with deep bombs dropped from the stern was not wide enough and gave the submarine a good chance of survival. It was logical to expand the affected area, but for this, the deep bombs did not have to be dropped overboard, but launched, thrown at a great distance. So the first bombers appeared.

The very first such device was the Mark I Depth charge projector, also known as the Y-gun, so named because of the design similar to the letter Y. It was first adopted by the Royal Navy of Great Britain in 1918.


Y-gun


Ground tests of a bomb with mass-size models of depth charges

The new weapons made the tactics more perfect, now the width of the bombing zone from one ship turned out to be at least three times greater than before.


Schemes for the use of depth bombs using the Y-gun and the affected area

Y-gun had a drawback - it could be placed only in the center, on the so-called diametrical axis of the ship, in fact on the bow and stern. Given that there were guns on the bow, it was usually only aft. Later, “halves” of such a bomb appeared, received the slang name K-gun. They could be put on board.


First British K-gun

By the start of World War II, these bombs became the de facto standard for anti-submarine ships, and were used in conjunction with dropping depth charges from the stern. The use of such weapons significantly increased the chances of destroying the submarine, especially with sonar.

At the beginning of World War II, the “first swallows” of future weapons control systems appeared - controlling the launching of bombs from bombs from the ship’s bridge.


Features of bombing from the destroyer of the US Navy: the simultaneous use of depth bombs from aft bomb spreaders and airborne bombers to increase the "destruction band" of the submarine



K-gun of an American destroyer and a shot from it

But the problem that caused MacIntyre to work on several ships did not disappear: it was necessary to get the submarine right on the course, while the sonar “saw” it.

Such means were bombers firing directly at the rate. The first of them was Hedgehog in 1942 (“Hedgehog”, pronounced “Hedgehog” in English). It was a 24-charge bomb with small RSL, triggered only when hit in the body. To increase the likelihood of hitting a target, a salvo of deep bombs was used.


RBU Hedgehog

To increase the likelihood of defeat in 1943, the first “heavy” British RBMs of the Squid type appeared, having powerful RSL with a large explosive charge and providing guidance for their volley according to the GAS (ie, the integration of the GAS with counting devices RBU).


RBU Squid. Manual reload, semi-automatic control

Depth bombs and bombs are the main weapons of anti-submarine ships of the Western Allies during World War II. After the war, the British created a “Limbo” bomb (Mark 10 Limbo) based on Squid, which was distinguished by a control system integrated into the ship’s sonar system and automatic reloading. "Limbo" embarked on warships in 1955 and served until the end of the 80s.


RBU Limbo

It should be noted that depth bombs are still in service, including the US and British Navy (like helicopter ammunition), and on ships in several countries (for example, Sweden) also use classic depth bombs dropped from the stern of the ship.

The reason for this is the ability to effectively hit targets lying on the ground and underwater sabotage assets (ultra-small submarines, divers' transporters, etc.).

In the USSR, based on the experience of the war, they first reproduced Hedzhehog (which became our MBU-200), and subsequently a line of domestic RBUs ​​with high performance characteristics was created. The most massive of them were the long-range RBU-6000 (with the RSL-60) and the RBU-1000 with the powerful RSL-10, which had guidance and stabilization drives, a complex of mechanized feeding and reloading RBU from the cellar, and "Storm" bomb control devices (PUSB) .


RBU-6000 (with the feed system of the RSL from the cellar KMP-60) and RBU-1000

PUSB "Storm" had the means to develop the parameters of the target (submarine) motion according to the SAS and did it very accurately. From the experience of combat training of the Navy, repeated cases of direct hit of single practical RSL (training, without explosives) in submarines are known.

From the memories of cap. 1 rank of V. Dugints "Ship fanagoria":

- RBU charge with a practical bomb! - gave the command to Zheleznov after instructing the commander of the submarine. - Now the boat will be loaded, we will get in touch with it, and immediately we will shoot.
... the miners fiddled with the muzzle covers for a long time, which were covered with ice crust and, turning into stone, did not want to tear themselves away from the guides of the installation. Muzzle covers are canvas covers, worn directly on six trunks in front and behind the installation guides.
And if there were no covers on the trunks? Inside them there would have been ice caps or ice hummocks for a long time. Then try to charge the installation with at least one bomb, you would have to blow the trunks with superheated steam and remove this ice.
“Cut the covers between the 11th and 12th barrels and strip it off only with the 12th rail,” I gave a desperate order and sacrificed my covers to just stuff the bomb in one barrel.
The unit screeched in the cold and tipped over at a loading angle of -90 °.
... there really was something to consider in the cellar.
Frozen through the freeboard iron, which limited the space of the bomb storage, was dull silver with a real snow cover. The lanterns themselves emitted light, as if in some kind of foggy ball due to the fog standing in the room. The green sides below the waterline were covered with large drops of dew, which glittered with gold in the light of light bulbs and, straying into continuous streams, accumulated smudges of water in the recesses of the ship's bottom.
Graceful bombs, frozen in the strict rack of their mounts, glistened with paint washed by the dampness of the mist and drops of water falling from the ceiling, which at the moment served as an excellent condenser for the fog formed.
- How much is it now? I looked questioningly at the mineral.
“Plus two and a humidity of 98%,” said Meshkauskas, glancing at the instruments.
The bomb lift door slammed, and it thundered with its hinges, carrying the bomb up.
“Meshkauskas, turn on the ventilation,” I demanded, dejected by the abnormal storage conditions of the ammunition.
“Dragging the lieutenant, it will be even worse.” Everything will thaw and there will be even more water, ”the experienced miner reasonedly contradicted my instructions.
...
Simplifying to the limit all the intricacies of the attack, adjusted for severe frost, right at the foot of the ship and, without choosing an acoustic station on board, we aimed RBU at an invisible enemy.
In the frosty silence, the roll of the jet bomb shot, muffled by the cold of frosty air, thundered unnaturally quietly and the bomb, glowing with a yellow flame from the nozzle of its engine, flew away towards an underwater target.
“In such a cold weather, even a bomb rumbles somehow in a special way,” said Zheleznov. “I was still thinking - maybe it won't work at all in such a frost.”
“What will happen to her ... Gunpowder, it is gunpowder in the cold,” I reassured the commander who doubts the reliability of our weapons. ...
The boat surfaced in the southwestern corner of the landfill and immediately got in touch with an alarm message:
“Some white horseradish sticking out about 2 meters long sticks out in our fencing. It's yours? What to do with her? ” - the alarmed submariners asked, when they first saw a practical bomb on board. “She is not dangerous, throw her overboard,” Zheleznov gave to the submariners through communication.
"Wow!" Caught right in the wheelhouse. It’s good that the fuse in this bomb is not military, otherwise it would plunge all 600 grams of its charge into the submariners in the hull, they would be there in complete ecstasy.

In the 80s in the USSR, a new direction for the development of RBU was outlined - equipping their RSL with guided gravity underwater shells (GPS), which had a simple high-frequency homing system (SSN). Tests have shown their very high efficiency, reaching 11 hits in the hull of a submarine from a full 12 missile salvo RBU-6000. Moreover, the most valuable in GPS in the 80s was their very high (almost absolute) noise immunity. In the USSR Navy, there was a very acute problem of the noise immunity of the torpedo missile systems against the sonar means (SGPD) of the enemy. At the same time, the high efficiency of GGPD against torpedoes was “nullified” against GPS due to different frequency ranges and the “mutually perpendicular” orientations of their antenna patterns.

However, there were problems with GPS, for example, low ability to hit targets at shallow depths of their immersion (GPS just “slipped” in the cavitation cavity, or did not have time to work out “up” guidance).


RGB-60 launch with RBU-6000, 90R rocket and its gravity underwater projectile

Today, RBUs ​​with GPS have ships of Project 11356 (RPK-8 "West"). However, what was good in the 80s today looks like an anachronism, because at the modern technical level, GPS could and should have been equipped with small propulsion systems that dramatically increased their performance characteristics and capabilities of such weapons.

In addition, the PKK "West" has a completely insufficient range for today.

In the USSR, the main purpose of RBU was to “close” the “dead zone” of torpedoes (which, in turn, closed the “dead zone” of anti-submarine missile systems). However, now the dead zone of anti-submarine missile systems (RPK) has decreased to 1,5 km or less, and is actually absent.

At the same time, the task of hitting targets at ultra shallow depths of a place lying on the ground, underwater sabotage means (to which today combat ANPs) is still relevant. And to solve such problems, the “classic RBU” with the usual high-explosive RSL (or, in some cases, the “easy” cumulative) is appropriate.

For this reason, RBUs ​​are still used in a number of fleets (Sweden, Turkey, India, China), including on the latest ships. And that makes a lot of sense.


RBU on ships of new projects: FR project 054 (Chinese Navy) and patrol boat Tuzla (Turkey)

Once, RBU was the main weapon against submarines, but today it is a “niche” tool, but in its niche it is difficult to replace it. The fact that modern warships of the Russian Navy have no bombings at all is wrong. At the same time, it would be optimal if the “new RBUs” were universal multi-purpose launchers capable of solving a wide range of tasks (for example, not only defeating underwater targets, but also effectively setting interference in the “upper hemisphere”).

There is another possible use of bombing, which few people think about. The possibility of creating a shell-explosive sound source, which, if launched from the RBU, would provide an instant low-frequency "backlight" for the shipboard GAS, is theoretically substantiated. For some ships, such an opportunity would be very valuable.

The evolution of anti-submarine torpedoes


The "pushing" of the bombing from the position of the main anti-submarine weapon began immediately after the Second World War.

The first anti-submarine torpedoes were used aviation Allies in 1943 and had very limited performance characteristics. Given this factor. and the presence of sufficiently effective ASGs that provided target designation for deep bombs and RBUs, the first experiments on the use of anti-submarine torpedoes from ships did not become any mass during the Second World War, however, immediately after its completion, the prospects for new weapons were fully appreciated in all countries and began its intensive development.


The first ship anti-submarine torpedo Mk32 and a dropping device

At the same time, two main problems of their application were immediately identified:
- often complex hydrology of the environment (sound propagation conditions);
- sonar countermeasures (SGPD) of the enemy.

With GPA means (both mine - towed Foxer devices, and the enemy - imitation Bold cartridges), the Allies gained the first, but serious experience during World War II. This was fully appreciated, and during the 50s a series of large-scale exercises took place in the United States with the widespread involvement of anti-submarine ships, submarines, with the massive use of anti-submarine weapons (including torpedoes) and GPA.

It was found that at the existing technical level it was impossible to provide any reliable protection of autonomous torpedoes from SRS, therefore, for the submarine torpedoes it was established that telecontrol was mandatory (that is, the decision was whether the operator took aim or interference), and for ships where it was difficult - the need for a large ammunition of torpedoes (providing the ability to perform a large number of attacks).

An interesting point in the tests of the US Navy of the 50s is that often torpedo firing was carried out “on a direct hit” in the submarine’s hull, apart from “accidental” such hits during combat training.

Of memories of American submariners those years:

In the summer of 1959, “Albacore” made the transition to Key West to participate in the tests of an electric torpedo for destroyers. We had to go to sea every morning and be there a target for a torpedo (for 6-7 torpedoes), and returned by night. When a torpedo captured a target, it attacked - usually in a propeller. When hitting a screw, she bent one of the blades. We had two spare screws mounted on top of the submarine's hull. We returned from the exercises, moored and divers changed the screw. The damaged screw was delivered to the workshop where the blade ruled or all three blades were grinded. When we first arrived, all of our screws had a diameter of 15 feet, and when we went home, it was about 12 feet.

The low efficiency and reliability of American torpedoes at the beginning of World War II became the subject of a “big torpedo scandal” in the USA with hard conclusions for the future: large shooting statistics, conditions as close to real as possible, widespread use of countermeasures.


SS-490 with the Mk44 torpedo in the wheelhouse.

It was impossible to influence the second factor - hydrology (vertical distribution of the speed of sound, VSWR). It only remained to accurately measure and take it into account.

As an example of the complexity of this problem, one can cite the calculation of the “illumination” zone (target detection) of a modern torpedo in real conditions of one of the seas adjacent to the Russian Federation: depending on conditions (depth of the torpedo and target submarine), the detection range may differ by more than ten ( !) times.


The torpedo sonar lighting zone of a modern torpedo in difficult hydrological conditions

Moreover, with the competent actions of the submarine in its disguise (in the shadow zone), the response radius of the SSN does not exceed several hundred meters. And this is for one of the best modern torpedoes (!), And the question here is not “technology”, but physics, which is the same for everyone. For anyone, including the newest western torpedo will be the same.

Given the requirements of a large ammunition load of anti-submarine torpedoes, in the west there was a refusal to use 53-cm torpedoes on ships, with an almost complete transition to a small 32-cm caliber. This made it possible to sharply increase the ammunition load of torpedoes on board (more than 20 - frigates, about 40 - cruisers, and this is not counting the ammunition load of anti-submarine missile systems).

Small-sized torpedoes (electric Mk44 and thermal (with a piston power plant using unitary fuel) Mk46), compact and light pneumatic TA Mk32 and ammunition storage facilities (taking into account the unification of ammunition for torpedo tubes and helicopters - in the form of a “universal ship anti-submarine arsenal”) were developed


Mk.32 torpedo launcher on the upgraded Allen Sammner EM and arsenal on the Italian Navy frigate


Transport trolley for small-sized torpedo Mk.46 (a crane is required for our “Package”).


Charging a 324-mm SLT on the Lefthvich destroyer, type Springs, 1986

An example of real combat use of torpedoes is the Falkland War (1982). Detailed data from English ships is still classified, but there are quite detailed descriptions from the Argentine side. From the memoirs of the officer from the submarine "San Luis" of the frigate-lieutenant Alejandro Maegli:

At half-past seven I was about to go to bed, when suddenly the acoustics of the submarine said something that made the words in my tongue stand still: "Lord, I have sonar contact."
At that moment, he could only suspect what might happen next - twenty-three hours of fear, tension, pursuit and explosions.
On one side, they heard explosions of depth charges and the noise of helicopter propellers. We were approached by three helicopters with lowered sonars and random bombs dropping depth bombs, as soon as the analysis of sounds showed that all the helicopters had flown and started to carry out the attack (ships).
When the goal was 9000 yards, I told the commander, “Sir, data entered.” The commander shouted "Start." The torpedo carried a wire through which control was carried out, but after a few minutes the operator said that the wire was broken. The torpedo began to work independently and rise to the surface. The trouble was that it was discovered. Five minutes later, noises from absolutely all English ships and torpedoes disappeared from the acoustics.
It was not difficult for the English helicopters to calculate the location of the San Luis, and they attacked.
The commander ordered the most complete move, and at that very moment the acoustics said “a torpedo burst into the water”, I heard high-frequency sounds made by an approaching English torpedo. The commander ordered to sink and set false goals.
We began to set false goals, large pills that, when entering with water, produced a large number of bubbles and confused the torpedo. We called them Alka Zeltser. After the release of 2 LCs, the acoustics reported that "a torpedo near the stern." I thought: "We are dead." Then the acoustics said: "The torpedo goes aft."
Ten seconds seemed like a year, and the acoustics in his metallic voice said, “The torpedo has crossed over.” Silent joy and a sense of relief swept the boat. An English torpedo passed by and disappeared into the sea. She walked a stone's throw from us.
The arriving Sea King lowered the antenna and began to search for the boat. He had not yet figured out the exact position, and the San Luis went deeper and deeper. Helicopters dropped torpedoes and bombs nearby, but could not find the boat.
The submarine lay on the sandy bottom. Every twenty minutes, the helicopters changed and dropped their depth charges and torpedoes into the water. And so, replacing each other, they searched for the boat hour after hour.
For the submarine lying at a depth, torpedoes and depth charges were not dangerous, lack of oxygen was dangerous. The boat could not float under the RPD and carbon dioxide increased. The commander ordered the entire crew to leave the fighting posts, lie down in bunks and connect to regeneration in order to spend as little oxygen as possible.

Soviet experience


Unfortunately, the factor of SRS in the USSR has not been adequately assessed. The situation with our “torpedo science” back in the mid-60s, the head of the Directorate of Antisubmarine Arms (UPV) of the Navy Kostygov aptly characterized as follows:

“There are a lot of registered doctors at the institute, but for some reason there are few good torpedoes.”

The first anti-submarine torpedo was the 53-cm SET-53 torpedo with a passive SSN (based on German times of World War II). Its main drawback was absolutely analogous to German TV (with a similar in design CCH) - low noise immunity (any source of interference in the CCH range led the torpedo away). However, in general, for its time, the torpedo turned out to be successful, was very reliable (within its performance characteristics).

From the memories of the deputy. Head of the Navy Anti-Submarine Arms Directorate R. Gusev:

Kolya Afonin with Slava Zaporozhenko, the dashing gunsmiths, decided in the early sixties to “take a chance” and did not turn off the vertical path near the SET-53 torpedo. It was a naval base in the city of Poti. They fired a torpedo twice, but there was no guidance. Mariners expressed their “fe” to specialists who were preparing a torpedo. It was a shame for the lieutenants, and the next time they did not turn off the vertical path as an act of despair. As always in such cases, there were no other errors. Thank God, the strike at the stern of the boat was a sliding one. A torpedo surfaced. A boat with a frightened crew surfaced. Such firing was then rare: a torpedo had just been put into service. A special officer showed up to Kolya. Kolya got scared, began to broadcast to him about a strong signal, burnout of the fuse-link and other things at the level of household electrical equipment. It has passed. Mariners no longer complained.

Considering the small response radius of the SSN (and, accordingly, the narrow “search strip” of one torpedo), a volley firing of several torpedoes with their parallel course appeared.

At the same time, the only means of protection against interference (SGPD) was the ability to set the distance to turn on the SSN (ie, "shooting through interference").

For SET-53, it was significant that the target, evading it by reducing the course, very effectively hit the RBU, and vice versa, when the target submarine avoided the RBU attack in high speed, the efficiency of the torpedoes sharply increased. Those. torpedoes and RBUs ​​on our ships complemented each other effectively.

Small ships received 40 cm torpedoes with active-passive SSN, in the early 60s - SET-40, and in the mid-70s - SET-72. Domestic small-sized torpedoes had a weight three times that of foreign 32 cm, but they allowed to significantly increase the ammunition load on ships that had them (Project 159A - 10 torpedoes against 4 torpedoes 53 cm on a project close to displacement 1124).

The main anti-submarine torpedo of the Navy’s ships was the electric SET-65, adopted in 1965, and “formally” surpassing the American “peer” Mk37 in terms of performance characteristics. Formally ... for the considerable weight and dimensions sharply limited the ammunition of the ships, and the lack of a small-sized torpedo of 32 cm caliber, the negative attitude to the domestic copy of the Mk46 - MPT “Hummingbird”, required “pulling range” (and excluded the mass replacement of 53-cm torpedoes by at least 40 cm).

For example, in the book of Kuzin and Nikolsky "Navy of the USSR 1945-1995." there is a comparison of the armament of the ships with Asrok and SET-65 in their range (10 and 15 km), on the basis of which a "wild" and absolutely incompetent conclusion is made about the "superiority" of the SET-65. Those. The "scientific doctors" of the 1st Central Research Institute of the Navy were not aware of the concepts of "effective firing range", "time to hit a target", "ammunition," etc. for which Asrok had a clear and significant advantage.


Torpedoes SET-65, left SET-64III (with SSN Sapphire), certificate SET-65K (SSN Keramika - reproduced on the domestic SSN base of the American Mk46 mod.1 (1961))

At the same time, during the combat training of the USSR Navy on fleets learned to use the capabilities of available weapons to the maximum. Captain 1st rank, retired A.E. Soldatenkov recalled:

In the broad concept of anti-submarine defense, torpedo boats with hydrofoils were also taken into account. They themselves had sonar stations, but with a small range of detection of underwater targets, and therefore did not pose a direct threat to submarines. But there were options. Indeed, on each boat you can carry four anti-submarine torpedoes! Such boats were built by one of the Vladivostok shipyards. The receiving equipment of the group attack system was provided for them. Thus, torpedo boats could, according to data from the IPC group attacks system of pr.1124, launch an attack on a submarine! That is, the IPC could be the leader of a very serious tactical anti-submarine group. Characteristically, when moving on a wing, boats were not reachable for torpedoes from submarines of a potential enemy.


Torpedo shot from the project 206M TKA

But the problem was not in torpedo boats, but in the presence of torpedoes (anti-submarine) for them.

A little-known fact, the bet on electric torpedoes, coupled with significant restrictions on silver (loss in the 60s as a supplier of the PRC, and Chile in 1975) did not provide the necessary ammunition for anti-submarine torpedoes for the Soviet Navy. For this reason, the Navy was forced to “drag out” the obsolete SET-53 into operation and actually “halve” the already small 53cm anti-submarine torpedo ammunition load.


Loading of the torpedo SET-53M on the project 1135 TFR

Formally, the “half ammunition load” of 53-65K and SET-65 was for solving the tasks of military service and “direct tracking” of large surface ships of the US and NATO Navy (“hitting them with 53-65K torpedoes”).
In fact, the real reason was precisely the lack of anti-submarine "electric torpedoes with silver."

And all the more surprising, the fact that the practice of “half ammunition” is still present on our ships, for example, on the photo of the Admiral Levchenko BPC in combat service in the “southern seas” in the open torpedo tubes are visible two SET-65 and two anti-ship oxygen 53 -65K (which is good to carry today is dangerous).


TA BPK "Admiral Levchenko" with torpedoes SET-65 and 53-65K. Right - 53-65K torpedo shot

As the main torpedo armament of our modern ships, the “Package” complex was developed with an anti-torpedo and a small torpedo with high performance characteristics. Of course, the unique characteristic of the “Package” is the possibility of hitting attacking torpedoes with high probability. Here it is also necessary to note the high noise immunity of the new small-sized torpedo, both for the conditions of the application environment (for example, shallow depths) and in relation to the enemy’s GPA.

However, there are also problematic issues:

- lack of unification between torpedo and anti-torpedo ammunition (anti-torpedo capabilities can and must be incorporated into a single small-sized torpedo of the complex);
- effective range is much less than the range of weapons of submarines;
- significant restrictions on the possibility of placement on various media;
- the absence of the HHPD as a part of the complex (the anti-torpedo task alone cannot be solved by the PTZ, similarly the GHP cannot be solved by the same way, for a reliable and effective PTZ the complex and combined use of both AT and SGPD is required);
- the use of TPK (instead of the classic torpedo tubes) sharply limits the ammunition load, makes it difficult to reload and obtain the necessary statistics of firing during the combat training of the fleet;
- restrictions on the use at shallow depths of the place (for example, when leaving the base).


Shot of a small-sized torpedo of the package complex

However, the "Package" is in the series. At the same time, the 53 cm caliber (frigates of project 11356, BOD of project 1155, including the modernized Marshal Shaposhnikov) is surprisingly perplexing in our ships. SET-65 looked very “pale” in the ammunition of our ships back in the 80s of the last century, and even today it’s just a museum exhibit (especially considering its “American brains” from 1961). However, the attitude of the fleet to marine underwater weapons today is no secret to anyone.


53-cm torpedo tubes on the project 1155 BOD. We pay attention to their size and the space required for placement. Their reloading at sea is excluded

Particular attention should be paid to the problem of shallow depths.

Most of the project 20380 corvettes with the Package complex are part of the Baltic Fleet and are based in Baltiysk (we will omit the fact that Baltiysk is within the reach of Polish artillery). Given the restrictions on the depth of the place when shooting, before going to great depths, these corvettes will be virtually defenseless and can be shot with impunity by enemy submarines, not being able to use their torpedoes and anti-torpedoes.

The reason is the "big bag", to reduce which (almost to zero) small parachutes are used on small-sized western torpedoes. We have such a solution is impossible because of the TPK's gas firing system.

In fact, most of the problems of the complex would be solved by abandoning the SM-588 launcher with TPK and switching to normal 324-mm torpedo tubes with pneumatic launch (see article "Light torpedo tubes. We need these weapons, but we don’t have them.") But neither the Navy nor industry raises such a question.


Shot of a small-sized torpedo "Stingray" from a ship (parachute to reduce the "starting bag")

Another interesting solution, especially for shallow depths, can be the use of telecontrol.

For the first time on ships, it was implemented on our IPC Project 1124M (TEST-71M torpedoes - a telecontrolled version of the SET-65 torpedo).

In the West, there was also a limited use of 53-cm torpedoes from TUs from ships.


Frigate "Maestrale" with 2 single-tube TA 53cm for A184 torpedoes (in addition to two 32cm torpedo tubes)

Of great interest is the Swedish PLO complex for shallow depths - the Elma RBU, remote-controlled small-sized torpedoes optimized for shallow depths and special high-frequency HAS with high resolution.


Swedish anti-submarine complex for shallow depths

The small caliber of Elma RBU does not provide reliable destruction of submarines, it is rather a “warning weapon for peacetime”, however, specialized small-sized remote-controlled torpedoes of its own design (concern SAAB) provide defeat, including lying on the ground targets.


Start SAAB Torped 45 with remote control from the ship. At the moment, the production line of the concern has more modern torpedoes.

The most theoretical possibilities of small-sized torpedoes with remote control are reflected in the presentation of the SAAB lightweight torpedo.



In addition to the technical features of the new weapon (albeit somewhat idealized), the video shows some tactical methods of anti-aircraft defense by surface ships.

Anti-submarine missiles and their impact on tactics


In the 50s in the United States began the development of a fundamentally new weapon - ASROC anti-submarine rocket (Anti-Submarine Rocket). It was a heavy rocket, which instead of the warhead had an anti-submarine torpedo and immediately threw it over a long distance. In 1961, this complex with the RUR-5 PLUR was adopted by the U.S. Navy. In addition to the usual torpedo, there was also a variant with a nuclear charge.


RUR-5 ASROC anti-submarine missile launch

The range of its application was in good agreement with the ranges of the new low-frequency sonars (SQS-23, SQS-26), and exceeded the effective range of 53 cm submarine torpedoes of the USSR Navy. Those. under favorable hydrological conditions, launching a torpedo attack, and before reaching the salvo point, our submarine received Asroka with a club in the “face”.

She had chances to evade, but Asrok’s ammunition reached 24 anti-submarine missiles (PLR), respectively, by successive attacks the enemy almost guaranteed shot our submarines (the main torpedoes of which, 53-65K and SAET-60M, were significantly inferior to Asrok’s effective range ").



Photo launcher and its scheme with a recharge system

The first such domestic system was the RPK-1 "Whirlwind" system, which was installed on heavy ships — anti-submarine cruisers of project 1123 and the first aircraft-carrying cruisers of project 1143. Alas, the system did not have a non-nuclear version of equipment — they could not put anti-submarine torpedoes on the missile in the USSR then, those. in non-nuclear conflict RPK-1 could not be applied.


Launcher RPK-1 "Whirlwind"

The "main anti-submarine caliber" of our ships was the Metel missile launcher (in modernized form, the "Bell"), which was put into service in 1973 (BOD of projects 1134A, 1134B, 1155, TFR of project 1135 and at the lead TARKR "Kirov" of project 1144) . The problem of large dimensions and the mass of the torpedo was decided by hanging it under a cruise missile delivery. As a warhead, an electric torpedo was used (first, in the Blizzard, 53 cm AT-2U (PLUR 85r), and in the "Bell" - 40 cm UMGT-1 (PLUR 85ru)).


PLRK "Metel" / "Bell", on the right - PU KT-100 BPK (mixed ammunition PLUR 85RU and 85R)

Formally, the complex "surpassed all" (in range). In fact, before the appearance of SJSC Polynom, this range not only could not be realized, but moreover, the real detection ranges of the submarine GAS Titan-2, ships of project 1134A (B) and 1135, were often located in the dead zone of the complex (i.e. That is, chasing the range, they got a large dead zone). For this reason, the TFR project 1135 received the nickname "blind with a club" in the navy, ie. the weapon "seems to be", and powerful, but it is difficult to use it.

Attempts to resolve this situation - interaction with helicopters and the IPC with the OGAS, were made, but it was a palliative.

Obviously, when creating our submarines, major conceptual errors were made, and primarily from the side of the Navy and its weapons institute (28 research institutes, now part of the 1 Central Research Institute of VK).

An attempt to create a lightweight and compact missile launcher with a small "dead zone" was the Medvedka missile launcher, but once again carried away by the distance they missed the fact that the effectiveness of an unguided missile sharply decreases there. Unfortunately, the necessity of installing an inertial control system on the Medvedka missile launcher reached the developers too late when the question arose of stopping this development.


PLR complex "Medvedka" with IPC "A. Kunakhovich ", the end of the 90s.

From the standpoint of today, this was a mistake, it was quite possible to bring the Medrelka-2 missile defense system (and most likely the Response earlier), but the weakness (suffice it to say that the observer of this development about the existence (!) Of Asrok VLA »Learned only in 2012, that is, they did not show the slightest interest in other people's experience) scientific support from the 28th research institute (and one central research institute) did not allow this to be done.

The Medvedka was closed, and instead it began the development of another PLRK - a modification of the Response submarine for surface ships.


Launch presumably PLUR "Answer" from the frigate of project 22350

According to recent media reports, as a result of long and hard work, the Response successfully flew, but in the process the possibility of its use from inclined launchers was lost, which left the main new anti-submarine ships of the Navy - Project 20380 corvettes without long-range anti-submarine weapons (with an effective range of application of a commensurate with a range of submarine torpedo weapons).

The impact on the tactics of the GAS PLO with the GPAA and the further evolution of the weapons and tactical techniques of surface PLO ships. The role of ship helicopters


From the late 70s - early 80s, there was a massive entry into the western fleets of flexible extended towed antennas (GPBA). Detection ranges increased sharply, but there were problems not only in classifying the contact (and is this target exactly on the GPAA-PL?) But also in determining the exact position of the target for its attack (up to “what is the target’s remote sensing target”, ie, error in range at the level of tens of kilometers). The problem was the big errors in determining the area of ​​the possible target position (HFCS) of the GPAA (especially at sharp angles to the antenna).


Accordingly, there was a problem of additional examination of these large HCVFs, for which they began to use helicopters. Given the fact that the primary detection of the unit was beyond the GPAA, it made sense to integrate the search and targeting system of the helicopter into ship systems in terms of processing sonar information (as far as communication facilities of that time allowed). Since the task of contact classification was now often solved by helicopter, it became logical to strike at the submarine with it.


Naval helicopters today perform the most important tasks in the fight against submarines

The classic ship of this concept was the frigates Oliver Hazard Perry (more - "Frigate" Perry as a lesson for Russia. Designed by the machine, massive and cheap. ").
The Perry had a towed gas engine and two helicopters, which made it possible to have a very high search performance of one ship. At the same time, the ship did not have anti-submarine missiles in service, but the use of helicopters as a striking means reduced the significance of this fact. In addition, “Perry” could be used as part of the search and strike groups with ships having such missiles.

The scheme had both advantages (a sharp increase in search performance) and disadvantages. The most serious one is the sensitivity of the GPAA to extraneous noise, and, accordingly, the need for a separate arrangement of their carriers from the units of warships and convoys (that is, a sort of Sheffield destroyer as a “AWACS ship,” with corresponding “potential consequences”).

For surface ships of the Navy of the USSR, which did not have a GPBA, helicopters had another, but also important. The most effective joint action is heterogeneous anti-submarine forces. At the same time, enemy submarines, evading the detection of ships, often “came across” on the intercepting barriers of the RSLA aviation. However, it was very difficult to navigate the ships according to the RSLB data, since when approaching the field of buoys they “illuminated” it with their noises. In this situation, helicopters played a large role in receiving and transmitting contact (or ensuring the use of the Metel air defense missile system).

Today, Western helicopters play a very large role in the search for submarines, especially taking into account equipping them with low-frequency OGAS, capable of “highlighting” both the field of buoys and the GAS (including GPBA) of the ship. The situation became real and probable when the ship operates secretly and has a significant lead in detecting submarines (unfortunately, this is the practice of the US Navy and NATO, helicopters of the Russian Navy do not provide this).

Given the effect of helicopters at a considerable distance from the ship, the question arises of the appropriateness of PLRK. Here you need to very clearly understand the difference between peacetime and wartime conditions: “In baseball, one team does not kill the other” (film “Pentagon Wars”). Yes, in peacetime, you can "calmly and safely" call a helicopter to produce "training attacks" on the detected submarine.

However, in a combat situation, delaying an attack by a submarine is fraught not only with the fact that it can slip away, but also with the fact that it will have time to strike first (anti-ship missiles or torpedoes, which most likely are already approaching the ships). The possibility of delivering an immediate strike on a detected submarine is a decisive advantage of a missile defense system over a helicopter.

conclusions


The full-fledged anti-submarine weapons complex of modern ships should include modern RBUs ​​(multi-purpose guided launchers), torpedoes and anti-torpedoes, anti-submarine missiles and aircraft (ship's helicopter).

The presence of any one means (usually torpedoes) dramatically reduces the capabilities of the ship against the submarine, essentially turning it into a target.

As for tactics, the key to success is the close interaction between the ships in the group on the one hand and the ship's helicopters on the other.
Author:
Photos used:
https://ussslater.org, Lockeed Martin Canada, corporalfisk, Wikipedia commons, seaforces.org, SAAB-Bofors
Articles from this series:
Anti-submarine defense: ships against submarines. Hydroacoustics
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  1. tlauicol
    tlauicol 30 March 2020 08: 37 New
    +8
    Very interesting and sensibly written!
    A couple of questions :
    1.universal 533mm torpedoes? why did they abandon these weapons almost everywhere?
    2. The use of RBU for clearing minefields hi
    1. DMB 75
      DMB 75 30 March 2020 09: 17 New
      +7
      RBU can also be used to defeat low-flying anti-ship missiles. There is a missile trajectory, the place of detonation is calculated (taking into account the time of the flight of the bombs and their immersion to a given depth), the direction, distance, depth of detonation is given to the RBU and before the missile (or behind it, or on the side) there is a wall (not continuous) of water. Let it be a small but at least some chance to beat off a rocket ..
      1. mr.ZinGer
        mr.ZinGer 30 March 2020 09: 33 New
        +5
        April 1 the day after tomorrow
        1. Elturisto
          Elturisto 30 March 2020 12: 24 New
          0
          Does he train, chotakova?
      2. venik
        venik 30 March 2020 21: 57 New
        0
        Quote: DMB 75
        RBU can still be used to destroy low-flying anti-ship missiles.

        ========
        Well, my friend, you are a "fantastic" !!! ..... And the fact that many anti-ship missiles, when approaching the target, make a slide "loading the target into the deck, do you take into account?
        PS By the way, but as an anti-torpedo weapon RBU-6000 seems to be used!
      3. Fizik M
        Fizik M April 1 2020 18: 55 New
        0
        This was relevant and practiced on old ships of the Navy of the USSR, which had no other effective anti-missile defense facilities.
    2. timokhin-aa
      30 March 2020 09: 35 New
      +6
      The universal 533 mm torpedoes were not abandoned in the submarine, and the Physics and Ichthyosaurus on telecontrol could be used as Mk48 even against submarines, even against NK, the question is that we have a normal TU sabotaged (although an experimental batch of equipment for TU received a "serial" letter and was quite at the world level).

      But they refused on the ships because of the range and speed of the torpedo - while the ship’s torpedo goes to another ship, it can deploy dozens of missiles. Remained anti-submarine, well, or again it is necessary TU, then anti-submarine can be made universal (but not necessary).

      But against the RBU mines so-so, it was considered, incl. Klimov personally at one time, the power of ammunition is fatally insufficient and this is not offset by quantity.
      1. tlauicol
        tlauicol 30 March 2020 10: 04 New
        +1
        landing ships and transports are easier to break with a torpedo than poking out of a little gun or spending rockets. And against the submarine, a heavy torpedo is smarter than a small one. Plus range speed power request

        those. experience with mines was? hi
        1. timokhin-aa
          30 March 2020 10: 28 New
          +9
          So you can evade the torpedo, take it away to interference, plus there is a time factor, the price of the torpedo, and the dimensions of the TA on the ship - 53 cm TA on the ships just take a breakthrough and can not be recharged into the sea.
          Therefore, everyone came up with a combination of a PLUR helicopter and small torpedoes. Well, along the bottom and "point-blank" still need a bomb.

          As for the real shooting from RBU in mines I will not say, but the calculations were made and the conclusions were disappointing. One full salvo per mine will have to be laid.
          1. tlauicol
            tlauicol 30 March 2020 10: 35 New
            0
            weird. IMHO against acoustic mines it normally smells, and in shallow water mines along with soil will be thrown out and destroyed (cord charges on minesweepers again)
            1. timokhin-aa
              30 March 2020 10: 38 New
              +7
              Modern acoustic systems are designed for a specific noise band. The charge is small, in the water the affected area is small, meters.

              In short, if Klimov looks out of quarantine, then he will unsubscribe with specific numbers, everything is clear there.
              1. tlauicol
                tlauicol 30 March 2020 10: 55 New
                +1
                Thank you for the clarification
            2. Fizik M
              Fizik M April 1 2020 18: 57 New
              0
              Explosion resistance of non-contact equipment of modern mines is close to those for the hull
    3. venik
      venik 30 March 2020 21: 54 New
      0
      Quote: Tlauicol
      1.universal 533mm torpedoes? why did they abandon these weapons almost everywhere?

      =======
      So the authors have already written that the 53 cm is terribly bulky and heavy, which significantly limits the ammunition and makes it impossible to reload at sea.
      -------
      Quote: Tlauicol
      The use of RBU for clearing minefields

      ========
      So the question is that the article is not about mine action, but about anti-submarine defense! In general, the scope of RBU is wide enough, which the authors noted.
      1. tlauicol
        tlauicol 31 March 2020 09: 42 New
        0
        So there was a choice: two dozen light torpedoes on board and the calculation of multiple attacks, or four or six heavy, but smart. Range speed power speed detection radius. Plus a bonus against surface targets.
        Those. heavy torpedoes with a large guarantee of destruction, or many light with less (in the calculation of the transition from quantity to quality)
        1. venik
          venik 31 March 2020 12: 03 New
          +1
          Quote: Tlauicol
          So there was a choice: two dozen light torpedoes on board and the calculation of multiple attacks, or four or six heavy, but smart. Range speed power speed detection radius.

          =======
          Ivan! No offense - but it looks like you not very carefully read the article! I agree - the authors are too "spread out in thought along the tree", which significantly complicates the perception of the material (for A. Timokhin - this is generally characteristic, about which I am now writing to him in a "personal"). But nevertheless - the authors gave clear and well-reasoned[/ b] the answer to your question. Namely: the dimensions (caliber and mass-dimensional h-ki) of the torpedoes - [b] do not render significant on the PROBABILITY of hitting the target: i.e. if the torpedo UGST (534,4 mm) weighs 1.8 - 2.2. tons (depending on the presence of a wire coil), and an MTT torpedo (324 mm) weighs only 400 kg, this does not mean at all that the probability of a UGST torpedo being hit by a torpedo will be 5 times higher !!! Just not! It is different, at best - by interest!
          The fact is that in "large" torpedoes - the "lion's share" of the weight falls on a huge engine providing a huge range! But here lies the problem: the maximum range of the UGST is as much as 50 km (!!!) .... But! Travel speed ha maximum range of only 35 knots !!! Those. If we shoot at a distance of, say, 40 km, then the torpedo will reach the target ...... almost 40 minutes !!!! ( request ). During this time, the submarine crew will have time not only to prepare to repel the attack (maneuver into the acoustic shadow, shoot the imitators, etc.) and not only counterattack (for example, using their own torpedoes or anti-ship missiles), but also "drink some coffee" ( laughing ).
          Another thing is PLUR, when the booster stage throws a small-sized torpedo exactly into the “target square” in a matter of minutes, and the torpedo itself “flops” into the water just a few hundred meters from the submarine - there is a MINIMUM left for counteraction! If at all ...
          Well, at short distances: that "big" torpedo, that "small" - a special "piano" does not play! The probability is comparable, and the ammunition load of the "small-sized" ones is much greater! What the authors actually tried to convey to the "audience"! hi
          1. tlauicol
            tlauicol 31 March 2020 12: 51 New
            +1
            I agree, shooting at a 40km torpedo on a submarine is long and difficult. But at effective distances for 324 mm torpedoes, the heavy one is capable of supporting max. speed will see the target earlier, distinguish it from a false one, will reach it faster, will switch to homing earlier. The engine is overall, but the volume of equipment, by analogy with the warhead, is six times more. She is clearly smarter and more sighted.
            1. venik
              venik 31 March 2020 14: 45 New
              +1
              Quote: Tlauicol
              The engine is overall, but the volume of equipment, by analogy with the warhead, is six times more. She is clearly smarter and more sighted.

              =======
              Ivan! all this is correct .... WAS! Once upon a time!
              When, in the early 80s, I was called up with a "jacket" for an "urgent", we got a NEW - a company-battalion-level radio station (it seems the R-159 was called) - it provided a stable connection (in "telephone mode") about 10 km -12, and even then "on level ground" and under good weather conditions .... And this "miracle of technology" weighed - somewhere approx. 15 kg! Our radio operator "got tired" to drag her "hump" (cursing "what the light is" Soviet microcircuits - "the LARGEST microcircuits in the world!") .... Today - stations with the same parameters (or even better) can be worn in shirt pocket!
              This is the first!
              And the second - small-sized torpedoes just need not super-powerful seeker that allows you to find targets at a distance of tens of kilometers! This is an EXCESSIVE parameter for shooting at 8-10 km! And at long distances the PLUR will work, which the accelerating stage will very quickly deliver directly to the target area! Also a kind of "redundant" function .....
              And what about the charge power - with precise aiming - and 60 kg of plastic is "more than enough" to crack a submarine propeller or create holes in a solid case!
              1. tlauicol
                tlauicol 31 March 2020 15: 01 New
                0
                well, if everything is so rosy, it turns out that the commander of each corvette / frigate of the PLO hopes to meet and sink 20-25 boats with small-sized PMTs. Or not ? He just thinks that he will surely lubricate it about fifteen times and drag another ten very strong, but light (like a hedgehog) torpedoes
                1. venik
                  venik 31 March 2020 22: 07 New
                  +1
                  Quote: Tlauicol
                  He just thinks that he will surely lubricate it about fifteen times and drag another ten very strong, but light (like a hedgehog) torpedoes

                  ========
                  Yes, here, my friend, too much depends on hydrology! A friend (he served as an "emergency" acoustician at the IPC) said that there were cases when it was impossible to keep stable contact with the submarine .... That is, it is, it suddenly disappears, and it seems that they have already gotten very close, but there is no way to launch a torpedo it doesn't work: one was allowed in, and then the contact was gone ... That's it - the torpedo is lost! .... The second was allowed - again a miss! And their total xnumx pieces on the IPC was .... Those very healthy "bandUR" at 533 mm! Everything - the end of the teachings, with the subsequent "separation" from the authorities ...
                  And this - notice healthy torpedoes (with powerful ones like GOS) were launched from a relatively short distance!
                  So think after that: WHAT is better than 4-6 hefty "fools" (which just as dashingly "smear" on the target, as well as smaller brothers) or 10-15 small "hedgehogs" ???
                  1. tlauicol
                    tlauicol April 1 2020 05: 42 New
                    -1
                    Here's just your example, my friend, speaks about the wretchedness of our PLO systems specifically, and not about the lesser likelihood of being hit by a heavy torpedo (324mm on the IPC did not exist at all and still does not exist) - "the largest microcircuits in the world." In this example, 4 torpedoes are better than ZERO lungs.
                    I am still inclined to believe that the probability of defeat in 533mm torpedoes is much higher
        2. Fizik M
          Fizik M April 1 2020 19: 00 New
          0
          Italians who return caliber 53 put both 32 and 53
    4. Fizik M
      Fizik M April 1 2020 18: 52 New
      +1
      1 mass, dimensions, ammunition
      However, new Italian frigates 53cm TA with remote-controlled Black Balls appeared in addition to 32cm TA. It should be understood that the characteristics of powerful SSNs, for example Astra BS, have a detection range of more than 5 km, that is, it is not only a means of destruction, but also an additional search for submarines in complex hydrology
      2 zone of destruction of a modern mine even the most powerful warhead RSL10 a few meters
      1. venik
        venik April 2 2020 13: 55 New
        0
        Quote: Fizik M
        However, new Italian frigates 53cm TA with remote-controlled Black Balls appeared in addition to 32cm TA.

        ======
        That's right! Here's just one BUT! On the PPA, the placement of PLUR is not provided (by and large, there is nowhere to stick them, except instead of the RCC), and therefore, in the complete minced meat configuration, the installation of 2 x 1-mm TA as a "long arm" of the PLO (more precisely , to somehow "lengthen" this "arm"!).
  2. rudolff
    rudolff 30 March 2020 08: 42 New
    11
    A good series of articles is obtained. Alex and Maxim respect!
    "A full-fledged complex of anti-submarine weapons of modern ships should include modern RBU (multipurpose guidance launchers), torpedoes and anti-torpedoes, anti-submarine missiles and aircraft (ship helicopter)."
    This is all good, of course, but not every project will fit such a kit. On ships of small displacement, and in corvettes, you have to choose.
    1. timokhin-aa
      30 March 2020 09: 37 New
      +7
      It seems to me that this is a design issue. Look at the "Karakurt" - there is Pantsir and the UKSK, and a good radar system, a 76-mm cannon, six-seater cabins for sailors, four-seater for warrant officers, empty decks, and all this in less than 900 tons.

      You can design this set of weapons, especially if there is a small RBU.
      1. rudolff
        rudolff 30 March 2020 09: 50 New
        +7
        If we talk about anti-submarine weapons, how can we do without the GAK? If you put GAK / GAS plus RBU and other buns on Karakurt, this is already far beyond 1000-1500 tons / and will pull. That is the minimum corvette. Or a frigate, if we talk about a complete "stuffing". Or save on something else and make a specialized IPC, an OVR corvette.
        1. tlauicol
          tlauicol 30 March 2020 10: 06 New
          +4
          the Finns on a missile boat and air defense systems in the UVP and RBU and PLO-torpedoes. It's just that "our chips are the largest chips in the world." And design ...
        2. timokhin-aa
          30 March 2020 10: 25 New
          +8
          I may have expressed it inaccurately - our engineers won’t cram into the small building and the place remains. There will be a task to make a 1000-ton corvette with this set of weapons and the HOOK - they will.
          1. rudolff
            rudolff 30 March 2020 10: 40 New
            +3
            Well, this is if you redesign the Package, replacing the launcher with conventional TA, abandon the helicopter ... anyway, it will fail for 1000 tons.
            1. timokhin-aa
              30 March 2020 10: 47 New
              +6
              Well yes. On the other hand, a small RBU can also be put on a hypothetical redesigned corvette 20385, at least in those places where salute guns are placed. Or where else.
              There is something to reduce.

              The point is that if we again take up the PLO, then on the newly designed or redesigned ships at least a small bomb will fit.
              1. rudolff
                rudolff 30 March 2020 10: 52 New
                +6
                Well, I don’t argue here. The 85th can be further polished, the potential is good. And they hastened to refuse from RBU, I agree.
                1. Boa kaa
                  Boa kaa 30 March 2020 17: 09 New
                  +6
                  Quote: rudolff
                  And they hastened to refuse from RBU, I agree.

                  Rudolph, hello! hi
                  About RBU. The car was good for its time, when there was no PTZ complex — to shoot, to scare the boat off (although who will let you in at 5400?) But the probability of defeating submarines at RBU-6000 is only 0,16%. I remember it well ...
                  Therefore, PTZ passed to the Package. And what about TPK, so it is - protection from "craftsmen" with playful little hands. (To prevent argon from being released by digging a hole in the TPK, and the M-15 electronics were in the microclimate in terms of humidity and pressure) yes
                  But for some reason the authors do not write about the breakthrough of the PLC system with the use of TO ... Somehow it turns out poorly: where is the "dueling situevina"? They have a PLC - a hunter, and a boat - a game ... In reality, it will most likely be reversed.
                  But AvPLO is a problem. Especially if she uses non-acoustic means of detecting submarines. That's where the problem is all 155%! And these bastards also TSU can issue PLC ...
                  So, anti-submarine ships are good, but the main threat to submarines is still AvPLO and submarines. And this is not taking into account the MZM (A) -PLO, protected by PBA and controlled by the BSOPL. am
                  1. rudolff
                    rudolff 30 March 2020 17: 46 New
                    +5
                    Hello, Boa constrictor! The package is good, but it is too bulky. He would have to change the launcher to something similar to conventional TA.
                    And with aviation PLO, we are not at all having fun. The helicopter is somewhere at the stage of research (if they did not cover the topic), and the plane in general is in erotic fantasies. Maybe someday, maybe ... based on the Tu-204. Or maybe not.
                    1. Boa kaa
                      Boa kaa 30 March 2020 18: 44 New
                      +6
                      Quote: rudolff
                      And with aviation PLO, we are not at all having fun.

                      There is such a thing ..
                      Ka-62 "Lamprey" seems to be rubbing at the exit, but something is not very actively pushing it into production.
                      The PLO GK decided to build a medium-sized aircraft on the basis of Il-a, take 214 cars from the carcasses and make a wunderwaffe out of it. The MS-21 would be much better, but, apparently, taking illiquid assets at a cheap price is more convenient for the country's defense and "fully meets" the interests of the Navy. Such are our drivers now by hand.
                      Yeah, ah! (with)
                      1. Cympak
                        Cympak 31 March 2020 00: 49 New
                        +1
                        I'll correct a little: the Ka-62 is not a promising Lamprey. This is a civilian helicopter based on the Ka-60 "Kasatka" with American engines. The new Lamprey is still very, very far away, and taking into account the unification of Mi and Ka into a single company, even more so
                      2. Boa kaa
                        Boa kaa 31 March 2020 12: 39 New
                        +1
                        Thanks for the clarification. Ka-65 "Lamprey". According to him, buying info. It is only known:
                        that the creation of a promising marine helicopter for the Russian Navy is being carried out by Kamov JSC as part of the Minoga-EP design bureau under a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense dated November 28, 2014. The helicopter should be equipped with 2 TV7-117ВК max turbo-engines. 3000 hp take-off (short-term emergency power - 3750 hp) developed by Klimov JSC.
                        The first mention of the car dates back to 2015. Then the commander of the MA of the Navy of the Russian Federation Igor Kozhin said that the Navy could get the car by 2020. Later, in 2016, the gene. Dr. Mikheev, JSC Kamov, made a clarification in an interview with TASS - it could take about 10 years to develop.
                        https://naukatehnika.com/ka-65-perspektivnyj-palubnyj-vertolet-minoga.html

                2. Fizik M
                  Fizik M April 1 2020 19: 07 New
                  0
                  At RBU1000, in one gulp it is close to 1 at the control center from Polynomat
                  About the little arms of drugs you just need to teach him, and not cut the combat capabilities of the ship
            2. venik
              venik 30 March 2020 22: 29 New
              0
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              The point is that if we again take up the PLO, then on the newly designed or redesigned ships at least a small bomb will fit.

              ========
              good The absence of RBU on frigates 22350 was quite surprising; there seems to be a place to squeeze it in and he wouldn’t hinder it!
  3. Nemchinov Vl
    Nemchinov Vl 30 March 2020 18: 41 New
    +1
    Quote: rudolff
    A good series of articles is obtained. Alex and Maxim respect!
    I join yes
    Quote: rudolff
    This is all good, of course, but not every project will fit such a kit. On ships of small displacement, and in corvettes, you have to choose.
    Well, if they suddenly bring the 16SD-500, and start mass production ... "Quadruple" (by analogy with DDA-12000) of them, the GEM will easily fit in 11664 (even if it has to be increased in length by 10-12 meters). .. And even then, it will be possible to put in it both RBU-6000, and the "Package-NK" proposed by Alexander (perhaps even consisting not of TPK, but really rechargeable TA), and part of the UKSK for PLRK to use, and the helicopter will fit .. 24 cells 3s-90 "Calm-1" ... Can you get a good escort (and suitable for PLO / OVR), in sizes even less than 11356 R / M ?!
  4. Fizik M
    Fizik M April 1 2020 19: 04 New
    0
    On small, everything rises except for the helicopter. But as they say, you can’t cancel physics
  • Demagogue
    Demagogue 30 March 2020 08: 53 New
    +5
    For this reason, RBUs ​​are still used in a number of fleets (Sweden, Turkey, India.


    The Swedes did not put a visitor to Visby.
    1. timokhin-aa
      30 March 2020 09: 38 New
      +7
      There are light torpedoes with TR, they can be triggered on the bottom target. There is a video in the text, the old "Torpedo 45" also works, just worse.
    2. Fizik M
      Fizik M April 1 2020 19: 10 New
      0
      There are good remote-controlled torpedoes on Visby plus the ability to put a powerful explosive charge from the Double-Needle on a submarine lying on the ground
  • Vladimir_2U
    Vladimir_2U 30 March 2020 08: 57 New
    +4
    I could be wrong, but
    long-range RBU-6000
    had a MLRS regime along the coast.
    1. Boa kaa
      Boa kaa 30 March 2020 17: 15 New
      +3
      Quote: Vladimir_2U
      had a MLRS regime along the coast.

      Did not have. The RSL-60 fuse has a hydrodynamic and powder path. But, if it really wanted, why not pull something? laughing
  • Aviator_
    Aviator_ 30 March 2020 10: 00 New
    +4
    Good article. Respect to the authors.
  • Alexy
    Alexy 30 March 2020 10: 47 New
    +4
    As far as I remember from the BSF course (I am not Romanian), the use of RBUs ​​in modern conditions has become ineffective and they have gradually been abandoned.
    1. timokhin-aa
      30 March 2020 10: 54 New
      +6
      Not that inefficient, just more effective remedies have appeared. But RBU has a niche that cannot be occupied with anything, a complete rejection of them is a mistake.
      1. Alexy
        Alexy 30 March 2020 11: 38 New
        +1
        I’ve been off topic for a long time, but I think you're right
      2. Romario_Argo
        Romario_Argo 30 March 2020 14: 18 New
        -6
        all these funds will become obsolete very soon - in relation to our submarines
        because will appear on submarines by past anti-ship missiles, SLCMs, PLUR, PTZ - also medium-range missiles (!)
        1. TPKs are being developed for firing at 533 mm TA - with 9M317 or 9M96E2 anti-aircraft missiles with ARGSN - from a submarine in underwater position
        * the project is similar to that of the Germans
        2. PLURA and RCC border destruction of ships from 150km at PLURA to 600km at RCC
        3. The project Package-PL for submarines is being worked out. on-board placement of PU with retractable semi-rounded blades - to protect anti-torpedoes from the oncoming water flow
        * the project is also similar to German
        Question:
        how will you drown the submarine that sees you and you are not yet (?)
        in this case, the Premier League / DEPL will be able to proactively destroy:
        PL-plane / helicopter, sink the destroyer or destroy the enemy submarine.
        1. SovAr238A
          SovAr238A 30 March 2020 20: 48 New
          +3
          Quote: Romario_Argo

          TPKs are being developed for firing at 533 mm TA - with 9M317 or 9M96E2 type anti-aircraft missiles with ARGSN - from a submarine in underwater position
          .
          how will you drown the submarine that sees you and you are not yet (?)
          in this case, the Premier League / DEPL will be able to proactively destroy:
          PL-plane / helicopter, sink the destroyer or destroy the enemy submarine.



          Well, tell us all how a stealthy nuclear submarine will detect a long-range airplane / helicopter, while remaining stealthy until it launches a medium-range missile ...
          In a spherical vacuum?
          Well, there are radar sizes, radar signal strength, radio horizon line - do you know such concepts?

          Or will you again be talking about having no analogy in the world and in universal secret knowledge?
          Reptilians brought, huh?
          1. Romario_Argo
            Romario_Argo 31 March 2020 13: 38 New
            0
            The adoption of anti-aircraft missile submarines will change the balance of naval forces
            There is an excellent article on VO to fill in the gaps of February 21, 2012.
            [media = https: //topwar.ru/11548-vooruzhenie-podlodok-popolnitsya-zenitnymi-raketami.html]
            1. timokhin-aa
              31 March 2020 14: 45 New
              0
              After a year, the keen eye will notice that his link is already 9 years old ...
              And besides IDAS, there is still nothing in service, maybe only the Americans will finish their missile in the foreseeable future and that’s all.
          2. Fizik M
            Fizik M April 1 2020 19: 15 New
            0
            You better ask this addict about the magnitude of the opening of the GOS 96 machine;)
            1. Mordvin 3
              Mordvin 3 April 1 2020 19: 19 New
              +2
              Quote: Fizik M
              You better ask this addict

              Lyokha Aleshkina? Right now ...
        2. The comment was deleted.
      3. BREAKTHROUGH READY
        BREAKTHROUGH READY 30 March 2020 14: 29 New
        +1
        There is no such niche, therefore all fleets with the technical ability available for that refuse them. A torpedo with remote control will solve the same problems no worse.
        1. timokhin-aa
          30 March 2020 16: 57 New
          +3
          There is also a reaction rate and the price of ammunition. If you spotted the GAS signs of a diesel engine lying at the bottom right at a half mile course, then the bomb will work on it faster than a torpedo with a TU that you still drive under water to hit the target in the CLS.

          Although I do not argue that it is possible and a torpedo.
          1. BREAKTHROUGH READY
            BREAKTHROUGH READY 30 March 2020 18: 30 New
            0
            I think that the diesel engine lying at the bottom will still be sank in 4 minutes after detection or in 5, but the clutter of the ship with unnecessary weapons brings obvious problems.
            “Ammunition price” is inextricably linked with the cost of operation, specifics of use, frequency of use and consumption.
            If a training torpedo with an electric motor can be launched at least every day to practice skills, the launch of a disposable rocket is a whole event.
            If one or two pieces are enough for the sinking of a submarine with torpedoes, then for the sinking of bombs you will have to spend the entire package.
            1. timokhin-aa
              30 March 2020 19: 00 New
              +2
              A boat can preempt with launch.
              1. BREAKTHROUGH READY
                BREAKTHROUGH READY 30 March 2020 19: 21 New
                0
                Again, there is no difference of 4 minutes or 5 for “preemptive start-up”,
                if he shoots, then immediately, as she is identified and the case smells of kerosene.
      4. Boa kaa
        Boa kaa 30 March 2020 17: 26 New
        +3
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        But RBU has a niche that cannot be occupied with anything, a complete rejection of them is a mistake.

        Alexander, what kind of niche are we talking about? from 300 to 5800m in range and from 15 to 350m in depth? And what kind of infection will climb to a depth of less than 40 m? If only 212 projects with self-propelled firing of torpedoes ... But for this you need to be at least Alexander Ivanovich Marinesko! or Gunther Prin !!!
        1. timokhin-aa
          30 March 2020 17: 31 New
          +5
          And what kind of infection will climb to a depth of less than 40 m?


          It’s immediately seen from atomic people laughing
          Seriously, that is the Baltic, where in my opinion a 51 meter maximum and still Gunter Pryns are found at 212. And the Poles with their Cobbens.

          There is one more nuance. It looks like Americans are climbing into the White Sea. They write a bunch of different things about the acoustic portrait of Borey at home, claiming that they wrote it 2018 during missile launches.
          And they were in the White Sea.

          Something like this. Well, about the possible ambushes of Norwegian diesel engines in the north, we also do not forget.
          1. Boa kaa
            Boa kaa 30 March 2020 18: 35 New
            +2
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            And what kind of infection will climb to a depth of less than 40 m?

            Seriously, that is the Baltic, where in my opinion a 51 meter maximum and still Gunter Pryns are found at 212. And the Poles with their Cobbens.
            Well, about the possible ambushes of Norwegian diesel engines in the north, we also do not forget.

            Alexander, the maximum lumpiness in the Baltic is 459 meters (Landsport depression north of the island of Gotland), although there is another infa: "There are several basins in which depths reach 200 meters. The deepest basin is Landsort (58 ° 38 ′ N 18 ° 04 ′ E) with a maximum sea depth of 470 meters. In the Gulf of Bothnia, the maximum depth is 293 meters, in the Gotland Basin - 249 meters. " And 51 m is the average depth ...
            Second. Polish Cobens do not go to sea. They stand at the wall for blistering, that is, they are listed in the Navy. And they successfully burned 877E. They say that they will restore, but when they do not say. So it turns out that ambition is ambition, but in fact - "the great snipe is empty!"
            1. timokhin-aa
              30 March 2020 19: 00 New
              +2
              Nevertheless, it is impossible to exclude that you have to fight in the Baltic, I lay in depths, but basically it’s shallow there.
              1. venik
                venik 30 March 2020 22: 57 New
                +2
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                Nevertheless, it is impossible to exclude that you have to fight in the Baltic, I lay in depths, but basically it’s shallow there.

                ======
                Well, there is also the Barents Sea (in the central and southern parts - depths of up to 350 m) .... There is the White Sea (max. Depth - 340 m, but mostly - 100-150).
                So apply RBU - WHERE IS!
          2. The comment was deleted.
        2. venik
          venik 30 March 2020 23: 04 New
          +1
          Quote: Boa constrictor KAA
          Alexander, what kind of niche are we talking about? from 300 to 5800m in range and from 15 to 350m in depth?

          ====
          Generally, the system of PLO and PTZ "Udav-1" (RBU 12000) has a depth reach - up to 600 m !!! Not every nuclear-powered ship can work at such depths !!!
          1. Fizik M
            Fizik M April 1 2020 21: 25 New
            -1
            600m is trash and crap of Korshunov
            1. venik
              venik April 1 2020 21: 36 New
              0
              Quote: Fizik M
              600m is trash and crap of Korshunov

              ========
              I do not know who Mr. Korshunov is - from the word "generally I have no death" .... The figure was taken from fairly authoritative sources (different) ....
              If you have experience with this complex or reliable information refuting these data: Pli-and-out! Figures for the studio, and if - NO and it's just: "bla-bla-bla ....", then it's better: No.
              1. Fizik M
                Fizik M April 1 2020 23: 00 New
                0
                Rear Admiral, Head of the Torpedo Directorate 28NII.
                According to the delusional dissenter of whom this Boa constricted.
                An extremely simple question - the time of immersion of the RSL Udava at 600m? I don’t say where the target will go during this time.
        3. Fizik M
          Fizik M April 1 2020 19: 17 New
          0
          Just the enemy’s submarines climb to shallow depths, including submarines.
          I raised this problem in an article on the Arctic
  • Nazaroff
    Nazaroff 30 March 2020 11: 54 New
    +4
    Thanks for the interesting article! I read it with pleasure good
  • Elturisto
    Elturisto 30 March 2020 12: 23 New
    -3
    Excellent article. Respect to the authors. The authors just did not indicate a promising new weapon - holy water and chandeliers, which, as you know, give special power to the God-loving army and protect against adversaries ...
  • Foxnova
    Foxnova 30 March 2020 14: 27 New
    0
    Not a word about the waterfall
    1. timokhin-aa
      30 March 2020 16: 59 New
      +2
      This is a system for submarines in theory.
      1. Foxnova
        Foxnova 31 March 2020 09: 20 New
        0
        It was developed as universal. For her, they left 533 mm on the parachutes
        1. timokhin-aa
          31 March 2020 11: 21 New
          0
          No, she was forced to adapt to NK.
          A 53 cm TA on NK is unsuitable for a waterfall, where special equipment is needed.
          1. Foxnova
            Foxnova 31 March 2020 11: 45 New
            0
            Very fit
            1. timokhin-aa
              31 March 2020 14: 47 New
              0
              Why then do you need specialTA for it, you can ask?
              1. Foxnova
                Foxnova 31 March 2020 15: 15 New
                0
                I don’t know what is special. That on NK for a waterfall but there is a photo of its use with NKK
                1. timokhin-aa
                  31 March 2020 20: 32 New
                  0
                  The use of PLUR from the Waterfall with the CTA-53 is not technically possible, it is necessary to put the TA structurally similar to that of the submarine.
                  1. Foxnova
                    Foxnova 31 March 2020 20: 50 New
                    0


                    What then is it



                    Shooting with Chabanenko whose CTA-53-1155
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      31 March 2020 21: 03 New
                      0
                      Start PLUR Waterfall.
                      TA is not there -

                      but such
                      1. Foxnova
                        Foxnova 31 March 2020 21: 05 New
                        0
                        Such on hawks 11540

                        Even the photo shows that the start comes from a regular pipe

                        It's just that Chebanenko’s TA is not open on deck, but closed with a bulwark with a cutout for him

                      2. Fizik M
                        Fizik M April 1 2020 19: 34 New
                        0
                        Once again, at 11540 and 11551 RTPU and not TA
                  2. timokhin-aa
                    31 March 2020 21: 19 New
                    0
                    At Peter and Chabanenko RTPU TP203 / 5

                    Pipes and piping are the same as in photo 11540 on a swivel base from PTA-53.

                    In general, I suggest you stop here.
          2. Fizik M
            Fizik M April 1 2020 19: 24 New
            0
            With WHT53, it is impossible to shoot Waterfall DNA.
            Need RTPU.
            And there are differences not only in data entry, but also in the internal geometry of the pipes
      2. Fizik M
        Fizik M April 1 2020 23: 04 New
        0
        The waterfall was designed as a boat. The universal modification of Waterfall is already much later.
        On one of my units, the Waterfall description was 1974. editions when they were just thinking about the NK variant
  • Fizik M
    Fizik M April 1 2020 19: 21 New
    0
    The waterfall will be in the article on the submarine. Here are the volume limits
  • xomaNN
    xomaNN 30 March 2020 15: 51 New
    +3
    Applaud quote
    “There are a lot of registered doctors at the institute, but for some reason there are few good torpedoes.”


    It was our St. Petersburg "Gidropribor" that developed all our Soviet torpedoes. And the personnel for him was "forged" by the PF LCI, where I also learned the torpedo wisdom. But not everything is so gloomy. In the fleets, I just had to work with the PLUR "Blizzard". The system for checking the missiles of this PLO complex on the BOD 1134A, 1135 .. So with pleasure in the article I saw a photo of our "axillary" KT-100 with open lids and "products" loaded in them winked
    Thank! I read thoughtful material with interest.
    1. timokhin-aa
      30 March 2020 17: 01 New
      +1
      You are welcome. Glad to try. Your comments are also valuable.
  • dgonni
    dgonni 30 March 2020 19: 36 New
    +3
    Respect. Explanatory article. It is necessary to fix and recommend to the divinely sailors to read in advance before posting comments.
  • Alceers
    Alceers 30 March 2020 21: 56 New
    0
    Quote: timokhin-aa

    There is one more nuance. It looks like Americans are climbing into the White Sea. They write a bunch of different things about the acoustic portrait of Borey at home, claiming that they wrote it 2018 during missile launches.
    And they were in White.

    They lie. Judging by the nuances of those applications. Tofov boreas wrote
    1. timokhin-aa
      30 March 2020 22: 44 New
      +1
      A long preparation for launch is approved - 20 minutes, noisy operation of the rudders and hydraulics before the start, and according to the source, it was written during the May tests of weapons in 2018.
      Of course, I don’t know how it really was there.
      But with the Pacific Fleet they still didn’t shoot rockets even once.
    2. Fizik M
      Fizik M April 1 2020 19: 26 New
      0
      There are specific suspicions about the entry of the submarine into BM.
      Hello to Zarenkov.
  • Alceers
    Alceers 30 March 2020 22: 48 New
    0
    Quote: timokhin-aa
    Long preparation for launch is approved - 20 minutes,

    Yeah. And this nonsense is one of the main anichea.
    1. Fizik M
      Fizik M April 1 2020 19: 29 New
      0
      I believe that not nonsense. The question is what is meant by this. The fact that solid-fuel technical time parameters are radically less is a fact, but there are organizational ones, including those just used to it. Already only reaching the starting depth significantly increases the noise
  • Demagogue
    Demagogue 31 March 2020 10: 23 New
    0
    Quote: timokhin-aa
    There are light torpedoes with TR, they can be triggered on the bottom target. There is a video in the text, the old "Torpedo 45" also works, just worse.


    I have a suspicion that it was not delivered because of the noise of the application. Stealth after all. Stealthily go on water cannons, so that later from the "Katyusha" they start firing ...
  • Demagogue
    Demagogue April 1 2020 22: 37 New
    0
    Quote: Fizik M
    There are good remote-controlled torpedoes on Visby plus the ability to put a powerful explosive charge from the Double-Needle on a submarine lying on the ground


    The Swedes initially introduced the RBU as a means of ousting foreign ships from the tervod. Read ours. They did not even have bombs "lethal" for the RBU for a long time. As a result, they came to the conclusion that it is dangerous to shoot in battle from such an inaccurate thing, which still unmasks the ship flat. You miss, and an adult otvetka will arrive. Therefore, torpedoes with the one for sure.
    1. Fizik M
      Fizik M April 1 2020 23: 08 New
      0
      RSL60 with 23,5 kg of explosives is also difficult to attribute to slaughter means.
      Against the background of the rest, the "unmasking" from RBU is the most recent
  • Demagogue
    Demagogue April 2 2020 11: 28 New
    0
    Quote: Fizik M
    RSL60 with 23,5 kg of explosives is also difficult to attribute to slaughter means.
    Against the background of the rest, the "unmasking" from RBU is the most recent


    In torped 45 cc, a maximum of 2 times more. The Swedes, in general, initially shot a grenade from Karl Gustav cumulative from the RBU. The whole grenade 3 kg. And 23 kg of explosives is a large-caliber mine, 280 mm or so. You can’t even compare. It’s like a toy gun with pistons and makarov.
    1. Fizik M
      Fizik M April 2 2020 11: 43 New
      0
      In Tr45, more is enough, plus small torpedoes and GPS PLR 90R came to the directional warhead type
  • Demagogue
    Demagogue April 2 2020 12: 04 New
    0
    Quote: Fizik M
    In Tr45, more is enough, plus small torpedoes and GPS PLR 90R came to the directional warhead type


    130 kg cc at torped 45 ... With a smart blast under the keel, it’s quite normal. But to say that 25 kg is nothing, is also impossible. There is a volley.
    1. Fizik M
      Fizik M April 2 2020 13: 52 New
      0
      Severe damage - yes, but the rugged case will not break.