"Cauldrons" of 1941. What happened

The tragedy of 1941, defeat after defeat at the beginning of the war, the defeat of armies and mechkopus, grandiose "cauldrons" of the Soviet troops, the surrender of vast territories, millions of dead, captured and under occupation. The catastrophe that befell us is astonishing and surprising. How did we manage to survive and win in such conditions? Based on an impartial analysis of those events and the archives that have opened, modern military historians try to give an objective assessment of what happened.

Now the main reasons for the tragedy are already being called: the lack of readiness of the Soviet command personnel at all levels to conduct a modern war, the miscalculations of the high command about the place of the Germans delivering the main blow, the unsuccessful formation of mechanized corpses that are cumbersome to manage and not equipped with equipment without the corresponding services for maintenance, repair, evacuation and supply of fuel and lubricants, the lack of training of personnel in the use of equipment, the unsuccessful deployment of almost all mechanized corps in the border western districts and their defeat in border battles, but thought-out counter-offensive of the mechanized corps in the early days of the war and a number of other reasons investigated by military historians.

We also need to keep in mind that we were opposed by a well-trained mobile German army, run in battles during the capture of almost all of Europe, equipped with modern weapons with well-established tactics of conducting encompassing strikes and a good school for command personnel.

All this led to the strategic defeat of the Soviet Army at the beginning of the war, the loss of almost the entire park tanks and the inability to respond to the tank wedges of the Germans, dissecting the formations of the Soviet armies. The combination of these reasons created the prerequisites for the organization by the German command in June - October 1941 of five "cauldrons" with the defeat of a number of Soviet armies, enormous irretrievable losses in personnel and the most humiliating, to the capture of almost 1,5 million Soviet soldiers and officers.

The planning and implementation of the "boilers" by the German command was carried out according to the standard scheme: on the flanks of the groups of Soviet troops breakthroughs of large tank formations were organized, extending deep into the rear of the Soviet troops and covering them with ticks on both sides. Then, the inner circle of the ring was closed and tank formations were replaced by motorized infantry, finishing the surrounded troops, further advancement of the tank wedges and the formation of the outer ring of the environment, eliminating the possibility of release.

This pattern can be traced in all five "cauldrons" of the outbreak of war: Bialystok-Minsk, Umansky, Kiev, Vyazemsky-Bryansk and Melitopol, implemented by the German command.

Białystok-Minsk boiler (June 22 - July 8)

One of the reasons for the tragedy of the Western Front under the command of Pavlov was the miscalculation of the General Staff in determining the main blow of the Germans, proceeding from the fact that it will be delivered in the Kiev military district, and not in the West. Everything turned out the other way around.

According to the directives of the General Staff, the Kiev Military District, which numbered 900 thousand people with 4900 tanks, was most seriously preparing to repel German aggression, and the Western one numbered 630 thousand people with 2900 tanks. The German group "Center", which dealt the main blow to the troops of the Western District, numbered 1,5 million people with 1700 tanks. That is, 7800 Soviet tanks were opposed by only 1900 German tanks, and German and Soviet tanks were not much different in their characteristics, while the Germans successfully organized tank mites closing the "boilers" and smashed the Soviet mechanized corps.

The main forces of the Western Front were concentrated on the Bialystok Balcony, which plunged sharply into Poland, while the enemy could cut off the balcony at the base in the north of Grodno and in the south of Brest, which happened. The main forces of the Western Front were concentrated on this balcony: the most powerful 10th army stationed in Bialystok, the 3rd army in Grodno and the 4th army in Brest, and the 13th army stationed east in the Baranavichy region. Here, five of the six mechanized corps of the district (the 6th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 17th) were stationed at the border, and the 20th mechanized corps was deployed southwest of Minsk.

On the first day of the war, the district’s troops were left without air cover, out of 409 district’s aircraft, 327 aircraft were lost mainly on the ground, only the German dominated the sky aviation.

The Germans acted with the tactics of “double ticks”, from the Suwalki region the 3rd Panzer Group of the Gotha attacked with the support of the 9th Army, from Brest the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian with the support of the 4th Army, they inflicted mainly distracting blows. Ticks were supposed to close west of Minsk.

On the second day of the offensive, the Germans took Grodno on the northern flank, attacked Belsk in the south, scattered three rifle divisions and the 13th mechanized corps, and took the city on June 24. Attempts by the Soviet command to launch counterattacks in the Grodno and Brest regions on June 23-24 were unsuccessful, German troops continued to cover the Bialystok bridgehead.

By June 25, it became clear to the Soviet command that a "boiler" was being formed. An order was given to the troops to retreat, but the Germans had already cut the main communications. With the capture of June 28, Volkovysk split the surrounded troops in two and closed a small ring in the Baranavichy area, encircling the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies. The encircled troops fought fiercely in the Zelva - Slonim region on June 29-30 in an attempt to get out of the encirclement through a few crossings on the Zelvyanka and Shchara rivers, but by superior German forces they were pressed to the banks of the rivers and defeated.

German troops continued the offensive and took Minsk on June 28, while the forces of the 4th and 9th German armies joined on July 1 and closed the outer encirclement ring, encircling the 13th army. Attempts to break out of the boiler near Minsk were also unsuccessful, only scattered army formations were able to break through, and on July 8 the "boiler" was cleaned up.

In the Białystok-Minsk “cauldron”, troops of the 3rd, 4th, 10th and 13th armies and all five mechanized corps were defeated. The 20th mechanized corps in the battles near Minsk suffered heavy losses and then took part in the defensive operations of the Western Front. The remains of the corps were encircled in the Mogilev region and on July 26, having destroyed all the equipment, they made their way in small groups from the encirclement. According to the German command, 324 thousand people were captured in the Białystok-Minsk “boiler”.

Uman's Cauldron (July 26 - August 7)

After losing the border battles, the Southwestern Front began on June 30 a retreat to the east in an attempt to gain a foothold on the old Soviet border. The front troops were pretty battered, eight front mechanized corps were defeated or suffered serious losses in border battles, there were very few tanks left. It was not possible to gain a foothold, the Germans rushed to Kiev, on July 16, a German tank wedge split the front at the White Church in two, two armies were cut off on the southern flank, the 6th under the command of Muzychenko and the 12th under the command of Ponedelin.

The Germans introduced a tank group into the gap 90 km wide north of Kiev and began to enter the rear of the 6th Army, and from the south, the German South group broke into the rear of the 12th Army, breaking through the defenses on the Dniester. In the area of ​​Vinnitsa, the 12th army stubbornly resisted, miraculously avoiding encirclement, and on July 18 began to withdraw to the Uman area.

Attempts by the front command to organize a counterattack on July 22 by forces of the 26th army from the north and the 2nd mechanized corps from the south and to eliminate the gap were unsuccessful, the Germans were pressed, but the front was not closed.

By Directive of the Headquarters on July 25, the 6th and 12th armies were transferred to the Southern Front, which led to tragic consequences. The army lost control and support of the South-Western Front aviation, and the command of the Southern Front was unable to organize control of the transferred troops, and until July 27 they did not provide real assistance. The armies were abandoned and independently tried to organize a defense in a narrowing "cauldron". Having formed the Lang mobile group, the Germans broke through the defenses of the 26th Army on July 27-12 and entered deep into the rear of Soviet waxes, as a result of which the command and control in the Uman area was disorganized.

The headquarters and command of the fronts did not timely assess the impending catastrophe and did not give a command to withdraw the troops; as a result, on July 29, the Germans closed the encirclement. The command of the Southern Front forbade the withdrawal of troops and gave the command to go north-east to join the 26th army, but it was already impossible to do this on August 1. Muzychenko decided to break through to the southeast, but here there were already dense German barriers.

The troops of the 6th and 12th armies made fierce attempts on August 3-6 to break through the encirclement ring, there was no outside help, the forces were melting, and on August 7 they were cleared in the area of ​​the Green Brahma forest, only a few scattered groups managed to escape .

Units of the 6th and 12th armies and the 2nd mechanized corps with a total number of 158 thousand people got into the Uman "cauldron", about 11 thousand people managed to escape. According to the German command, 110 thousand soldiers and commanders were captured.

Kiev boiler (August 21 - September 26)

The German command, having made a breakthrough of the Western Front to attack Moscow, was afraid of a serious Soviet ledge over their right flank in the region of Chernigov and Kiev. Hitler gives a directive on August 21 to encircle and defeat the Soviet Southwestern Front (5th, 21st, 26th, 37th, 38th armies) holding Kiev fortified area and the left bank of the Dnieper.

The breakthrough on the northern flank was to be carried out by the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian, and on the southern flank - the 1st Panzer Group of Kleist. Guderian’s group is deployed to the south, engaging in successful battles between the Dnieper and Desna rivers, in August in several places they force the Desna and try to seize bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper north of Kiev in the Oster region.

When the 5th Army was withdrawn from the Dnieper, German tank units, pursuing the retreating Soviet troops on August 23, unexpectedly capture the strategic bridge on the Dnieper north of Kiev near the village of Okuninovo and begin to form and expand the captured bridgehead. Attempts by Soviet troops with the help of aviation and Pinsk flotilla liquidate the bridgehead were unsuccessful.

There was nothing to oppose Guderian’s tank armada, almost all of the Soviet mechanized corps were defeated, and by the end of August a second tank group had prepared a bridgehead on the northern flank for striking the flank of the Soviet troops defending the Kiev fortified area.

On the southern flank, the advanced units of the 1st Kleist tank group still cross the Dnieper near Zaporozhye on August 20, capture pontoon crossings near Dnepropetrovsk, and the 17th German army captures a small bridgehead near Kremenchug. On August 27, the German command decides to deliver a tank strike from the south from the Kremenchug region and conducts distracting attacks in the Cherkassy region. On August 31, the Germans expand the bridgehead near Kremenchug and impose a pontoon crossing. Since September 6, engineer units and technical means have been secretly redeployed here from the entire Army Group “South” to build a powerful bridge across the Dnieper for the passage of tanks. The bridgehead is expanding at the same time, the Germans are advancing to the rear of the Soviet troops, seizing bridges on the river Psel and preparing to throw tanks to the north.

On September 2, on the northern flank, Guderian’s 6nd tank group strikes from the Okuninovsky bridgehead on the 5th army, which by September 10th as a combat unit ceases to exist, and from that moment on the north a right claw forms, ready to go towards Kleist’s tanks through Konotop - Romny - Lokhvitsu.

The German command on September 10 gives the order to the 1st tank group Kleist forced march to go to the Kremenchug crossing. At night in the rain, an armada of tanks crosses the Dnieper and focuses on the left bank, and in the morning of September 12, strikes towards the 2nd tank group in the direction of Pryluky - Piryatin.

The appearance of an armada of tanks on the Kremenchug bridgehead was a complete surprise to the command of the South-Western Front. On September 11, it requests a Headquarters for withdrawing troops from Kiev, but does not receive permission.

By September 13, chaos began in the front troops, huge columns trying to break through to Pyryatin and get out of the encirclement. The tank columns of Guderian and Kleist on September 14 meet in Lokhvits, close the environment and begin to form the outer ring. On September 15, an authorized Headquarters heading to front commander Kirponos was sent an oral order to retreat to the rear lines. Kirponos, without a written order, refused to do this and condemned the troops to complete destruction. On September 18, the Headquarters authorized the withdrawal in writing, but it was already too late.

The troops left the Kiev fortified area and found themselves east in the Lokhvitsa area in a double encirclement, fierce battles continued until September 27. The command of the South-West direction, instead of organizing the release of the encircled ones, launched a counterattack that ended in vain, and the Germans completed the most ambitious encirclement in stories wars

The 5th, 21st, 26th and 37th armies were defeated in the "cauldron", the personnel who were surrounded was estimated at 452 thousand people. According to German data, 665 thousand people were captured, but according to more recent studies by the Russian historian Isaev, about 430 thousand people were captured in the "boiler".

Vyazemsky and Bryansk boilers (September 30 - October 15)

After the armies of the Southwestern Front were defeated in a "cauldron" near Kiev, the German command decided to strike at the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts, surround them and liquidate them in the Vyazma and Bryansk regions and prevent them from moving to the frontiers of Moscow’s defense.

A strike was fired on the Western Front in order to encircle Soviet troops in the Vyazma region, from the north from the Dukhovschina region (3rd Gota tank group) and from the south from Roslavl (4th Gepner tank group) with a double encirclement west of Vyazma. On the Bryansk front, the 2nd tank group of Guderian from the Shostka region was hit by two claws north and south of Trubchevsk with double encirclement in the Bryansk region.

The German command conceived one of the most ambitious operations; three field armies and three tank groups were concentrated in one operational area with powerful air support from the second air fleet. The number of the advancing Army Group Center was 1,9 million, they were opposed by three Soviet fronts of 1,2 million people, while there were very few tanks in the Soviet army and they were used mainly to support the infantry. The Germans carried out a large regrouping of forces, the 4th Panzer Group was transferred from Leningrad and the 2nd Panzer Group from the south.

On the Bryansk Front, the front command erred in the direction of the main attack, they were waiting for him in the direction of Bryansk, and the Germans struck 120-150 km to the south. The Germans attacked with the 2nd Panzer Group from the Glukhov area, and towards it south of Bryansk the army corps struck. Guderian, who launched the offensive on the Bryansk Front on September 30, broke through the Soviet defenses and on October 3 captured Orel and October 6, Bryansk. Only the 4th Katukov tank brigade in the Mtsensk area was able to seriously delay the Germans' advance; in several tank battles, it practically disabled the 4th Wehrmacht tank division. The troops of the front were in the operational environment and began to take actions to exit the environment.

In the Vyazemsky direction, the Soviet command also incorrectly determined the direction of the Germans' strike, believed that they would strike Vyazma along the Smolensk-Moscow highway, and there concentrated the main forces. The Germans hit on October 2 left and right of the highway and immediately broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops and rushed to Vyazma. The advancement depth of German units in the Western Front line on October 3 was already up to 50 kilometers, and on October 7, tank mites closed to the west of Vyazma. German troops broke through the defense line of the Western and Reserve Fronts to the entire operational depth, were able to surround and destroy a significant part of the forces of the fronts and reached the Mozhaisk defense line of Moscow.

Until October 15, the encircled troops fought fierce battles and tried to break out of the encirclement, only separate scattered groups succeeded. The Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts collapsed in two weeks, there was nothing to close the gap. On October 15, the German command, regrouping the main forces, launched an attack on Moscow. It should be noted that the stubborn resistance of the troops encircled near Vyazma and Bryansk fettered significant enemy forces and did not allow him to break through to Moscow on the move.

Five Soviet armies were surrounded and defeated in the Vyazemsky “cauldron” (16th, 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies), in the Bryansk 5th and 13th armies and partially 50th I am the army. According to German data, 673 thousand people were captured, according to the studies of the Russian historian Isaev, nevertheless significantly fewer were captured, part of the troops and headquarters lost heavy weapons and managed to get out of the boiler, about 400 thousand people were captured.

Melitopol boiler (September 29 - October 10)

The events on the Southern Front in September began with the successful offensive on September 26 of the 9th and 18th armies south of Melitopol with the aim of cutting off the German group advancing from the Kakhovsky bridgehead to the Crimea, whose actions were covered by the Romanian corps. For several days, the Romanian front was broken, the Germans transferred the 49th mountain corps of Kübler to help the Germans, which stabilized the situation by September 29.

The offensive had to be stopped, since the attack on the Donbass planned by the German command began on September 29. They planned to strike from the north from near Dnepropetrovsk the 1st Panzer Group of Kleist and in the south by the strike of infantry units of the 11th Army from the Kakhovsky bridgehead to surround and defeat the armies of the Southern Front east of Melitopol. For a breakthrough in the Novomoskovsk region, a strong tank group was created, which, on September 29, broke through the defenses of the 12th Army and went deep into the rear of the Soviet troops.

The front commander Ryabyshev did not immediately realize the threat, and only on October 5 gave the order to the 9th, 12th and 18th armies to withdraw to previously prepared defense lines.

It was not possible to stop the enemy’s advance, on October 7, tankers of the 1st tank group connected in the Andreevka area with the Romanian cavalry corps, which broke through north of Melitopol and passed the SS “Leibstandart” brigade along the seashore from the south. With the help of the 49th mountain corps of the Germans, which was pressing from the west, the inner ring of encirclement was closed around the 9th and 18th Soviet armies and an outer ring was formed.

The attempts of the encircled troops to break into Volnovakha and Mariupol were largely unsuccessful; some disparate formations managed to get out with the loss of almost all of the heavy weapons. On October 9, Soviet troops pushed Semenovka to the village, and on October 10, the “boiler" was liquidated. In the open steppe area without forests and water barriers it was impossible for the surrounded troops to resist for a long time.

According to German data, they took 100 thousand prisoners. Perhaps these figures are overestimated, according to Soviet data, the irretrievable losses of the Southern Front in operations in the Donbass from September 29 to November 16 amounted to 132 thousand people, so that the German data are not far from the truth.

The unsuccessful offensive actions of the Soviet troops in the Melitopol area, which ended with the encirclement of two Soviet armies, however, did not allow the Germans to capture Crimea back in 1941 before the Primorsky Army was transferred there from Odessa.

Aftermath

In less than four months of 1941, German troops defeated Soviet troops on all fronts, organized five huge "cauldrons" in which they defeated 17 Soviet armies and 13 mechanized corps, took about 1,5 million prisoners, captured or destroyed most of the heavy weapons and technicians and occupied vast territories from the Barents to the Black Seas. The main burden of guilt for the disaster still lies with the miscalculations of the Soviet leadership and high command, which allowed the Germans to carry out their plan.

With such a catastrophic defeat, any other country would capitulate, and the Soviet Union could withstand the courage and resilience of Soviet soldiers and officers, enormous territorial and human resources, the creation of powerful mobilization reserves and the relocation of main production capacities inland. Despite all the misses of the command and the failures of the first months of the war, the country gathered forces for a decisive throw on Berlin for almost four years and won a victory, the base of which was laid by its staunchness and courage by Soviet fighters and officers who laid their heads in the "cauldrons" of the 41st the most difficult stage of the war.

Comments

[apro]

The start of the war was unsuccessful. The German army, on the one hand, was at the initial stage both more maneuverable and smarter and more organized. And Hitler set goals for the destruction of Soviet armies in border battles. And for this purpose a methodology for conducting offensive operations was developed. And the tools were ready and tested.

[Basil50]

The phenomenon of the fact that individually we know a lot is very interesting, but sometimes we don’t seem to be able to put everything together, the conclusions are too different from the usual view
In Spain, when the phalangists attacked the rear of the republican army, the Trotskyists rebelled in order to seize power and then agree with Franco on the division of Spain, or power
In 1941, Pavlov and his associates planned approximately this version of events.
And yet, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin could not directly control the RED ARMY. For this, there were both the General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief. All appointments were carried out by * personnel management *. they were the ones who were looking for suitable candidates for command posts. JOSEPH VISSARIONOVICH STALIN was represented only by the generals of the RED ARMY, and not all of them.
No wonder so thoroughly checked and the General Staff and * personnel management *. Until now, not everything is available.
I advise you to read Martirosyan’s books, he also has a video presentation on the beginning of the GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

[210ox]

But I don’t agree about Pavlov. It was just that the person was not in the right place. I was confused. However, this is my personal opinion.

[knn54]

Regarding Pavlov, I will say one fault for the Bialystok-Minsky cauldron on his conscience.
Before the war, exercises were held in the Western District, where Zhukov commanded the "blue" and Pavlov - the "red". Zhukov did what the Germans would one to one do with a ledge at the beginning of the war. Pavlov did not draw any conclusions.
Regarding the Kiev boiler, the Germans were forced to turn part of the forces of the "Center" group to the south.
This fact was important in that they survived near Moscow because the pace of German advance in the center slowed down.
But it’s worth taking into account the cowardice of senior officers and generals who have made a career on denunciations. Fortunately, there were few of them. Read Simonov and others, many captains and majors led out of the encirclement.
Another point, Zhukov’s choice for the post of chief of the General Staff was wrong.

[maidan.izrailovich]

Before the war ....

You have correctly stated everything. But they did not say the most important thing. According to Zhukov’s plan, the troops should move to other lines and thereby align the front line and avoid encirclement. But everything is beautiful on paper ... and on exercises. In fact, Stalin forbade retreat. Although Pavlov turned to the headquarters.

[Lekz]

Not to mention Stalin's guilt has already become a routine ritual. Remember the trip of the Politburo to the General Staff after the capture of Minsk. The key point is "we have no information about the situation in the troops." And an attempt to retreat "to level the front line" would simply lead to a panicky flight in a race with the tanks of Guderian and Gott with an obvious result.

[ABM]

at what speed do tanks go through Belarusian swamps? through the forest? can't move there at all? here is the answer to the question

[Operator]

It is pointless to talk about the correctness / incorrectness of the appointment of a general to a particular post in the Red Army before the war - there were no other generals in the USSR (from plows with experience in civil wars in Russia, China and Spain, or, at best, in local conflicts in the Far East and in Finland).

The Soviet generals had to gain competence during WWII.

[fk7777777]

Well, it was Zhukov who understood how to use tanks, what exactly for counterattacks, namely a tank fist, and not some kind of mythical ambush, and smearing tanks on the ground, where they could not respond in time and simultaneously to various challenges and threats. And he immediately proved it in Mongolia in 1937, having destroyed 2 thousand Japanese corps in 70 hours. So who was there to put? Rokosovsky? So he only through personal experience in the battle for Moscow realized what to do with the tanks, before that, pr .... to the Istra border, where you can simply shoot Germans from the heights. And so he also dreamed of ambushes, for a very long time. So, the question is who, if not G.K. Zhukov?

[Magog]

And he immediately proved it in Mongolia in 1937, having destroyed 2 thousand Japanese corps in 70 hours.

“On August 20, 1939, a decisive Soviet offensive against Japanese positions on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin-Gol began. Grigorenko described its course and outcome as follows:“ The first army group ... surrounded the units of the 6th Japanese army located on Mongolian territory. In subsequent battles, these units were completely The Japanese did not surrender, but could not break through. Firstly, because they did not have an order to withdraw from their positions. Secondly, our numerical and technical superiority was too great. But we suffered huge losses, first of all, In addition, the character of Georgy Konstantinovich, who did not know how to feel sorry for people, had an effect. I did not stay with him for long in the army, but even during this time I managed to earn his dislike with my reports to Stern. He is cruel and vindictive, so in the war I was seriously afraid of falling under his command. " Read here: https://www.google.ru/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=2ahUKEwj38OjLjOrnAhUj06YKHQTzCf4QFjACegQIARAB&url=3Fttps%2>

[Pilat2009]

Quote: knn54

Pavlov made no conclusions

The conclusions were to be drawn by the General Staff, which conducted the exercises. And who was the head of the General Staff? G.K. Zhukov

[VS]

Quote: knn54

Regarding Pavlov, I will say one fault for the Bialystok-Minsky cauldron on his conscience.
Before the war, exercises were held in the Western District, where Zhukov commanded the "blue" and Pavlov - the "red". Zhukov did what the Germans would one to one do with a ledge at the beginning of the war. Pavlov did not draw any conclusions.
P...
Another point, Zhukov’s choice for the post of chief of the General Staff was wrong.

Do not repeat the myths - from the cinema of the times of perestroika even more so - there WAS NOT such teachings)))

[Magog]

You apparently mean the "staff games" of early January 1941.

Zhukov did what the Germans did one on one with a ledge at the beginning of the war. Pavlov did not draw any conclusions.

So, at these "games" there were no scenarios of defensive battles at all in the event of a German attack. The initiative to start hostilities by the scenarios of these headquarters exercises was assumed by the Red Army, that is, we attack, and the Wehrmacht is defending ... Two options that were controversial at that time were lost: Western (for the "blue", that is, the Nazis , played Zhukov); and Southwest (for the "blue" - Pavlov). The last version of the games was obviously recognized as successful (the offensive was developed by the forces of a super-powerful KOVO through southern Poland), so Zhukov was appointed Chief of the General Staff.

[VS]

Quote: Magog

You apparently mean the "staff games" of early January 1941.

Zhukov did what the Germans did one on one with a ledge at the beginning of the war. Pavlov did not draw any conclusions.

So, at these "games" there were no scenarios of defensive battles at all in the event of a German attack. The initiative to start hostilities by the scenarios of these headquarters exercises was assumed by the Red Army, that is, we attack, and the Wehrmacht is defending ... Two options that were controversial at that time were lost: Western (for the "blue", that is, the Nazis , played Zhukov); and Southwest (for the "blue" - Pavlov). The last version of the games was obviously recognized as successful (the offensive was developed by the forces of a super-powerful KOVO through southern Poland), so Zhukov was appointed Chief of the General Staff.

do not bullshit - January KSHs were not according to the scenario - we attack FIRST ...

[Lekz]

Confused? Together with subordinates? So much so that they forgot to fulfill the directive of the General Staff of 13 (conditionally) June 1941. Removing the questions that no one can show this directive, I will give the answer of the commission of A.P. Pokrovsky. (GSh, 1953) Colonel General P.P. Poluboyarova (former head of the armored forces of the PribOVO). "On June 16, at 23:12, the command of the 23th mechanized corps received a directive to bring the formation to combat readiness. The corps commander, Major General N.M. Shestopalov, was informed of this at 17:202 on June 18 upon his arrival from the 19nd motorized division, where On June 20, the corps commander raised the formations and units on combat alert and ordered them to be withdrawn to the planned areas, and on June XNUMX and XNUMX this was done.
On June 16, by order of the district headquarters, the 3rd mechanized corps (commanded by Major General of Tank Forces A.V. Kurkin) was put on alert and concentrated in the indicated area at the same time. "And you can also read orders 00229 and 0052 of that period. ...
No, of course it can be assumed that only PribOVO was brought to the BG by alarm, that the Chekists arrested all the competent commanders, that Stalin "slept through everything," but this has nothing to do with reality. Here you can also add orders to disguise aviation and its subsequent defeat.

[ABM]

The directive was passed on 16, the troops were raised on alert 18 - they were slowly executing it, not according to the charter; passed after verification - imagine, such a non-urgent directive, apparently, there is nowhere to rush; further - why was the standard form of notification of parts not used? Why this circus with horses ("after checking 202 MSD")?

[vladcub]

There is a lot of turbidity with Pavlov. If you look immediately, everything seems to be clear.
Fate did not like Pavlov: he elevated him to the post of commander of the district, he was confused, and Stalin made him a scapegoat.
And if you look carefully, there is a lot of dark:
1) Pavlov was not a spy: Canaris would have found a dozen opportunities not to substitute him.
2) Stalin's death is interconnected with June 1941.
3) N. S. Khrushchev did a lot to add muti

[apro]

Nobody calls into question the betrayal of Pavlov and part of the generals. But if you compare the level of military thinking of the Soviet and German generals. Then the Germans unfortunately had obvious advantages ...

[fk7777777]

Well, here is treason in the form that they specifically put a person in a position that does not correspond to her. And everything fell on him, so the one who put it is the main traitor. Something like this.

[apro]

Failure to comply with the order to bring troops on alert is what? The order was given from 18/06/1941 ...

[svp67]

Quote: apro

The order was given from 18/06/1941 ...

Many talk about him, but I have not seen his text anywhere. Can you announce it?

[apro]

I, too, but they referred to him when the military activity was checked before the war. IV Stalin initiated it.

[svp67]

Quote: apro

I, too, but they referred to him when the military activity was checked before the war. IV Stalin initiated it.

Here it is. Without knowing what this Directive required, we can draw conclusions about what we managed to do?

[apro]

Yes, it’s clear that for some military men, the publication of its content casts doubt on the version of the beginning of the war. And they always knew how to clean their tails. Especially after the assassination of the Stalin

[Severomor]

At least in the Baltic VO

TsAMO, f.344, op. 5564, d.1, pp. 34-35. Script.
DIRECTIVE OF THE STAFF OF THE BALTIC SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT
18th of June 1941
With the aim of fastest alert theater of military operations of the district I ORDER:
4. The commander of the 8 and 11 armies:
a) determine the points of organization of field depots, anti-personnel mines, explosives and anti-personnel barriers on the site of each army for the construction of certain barriers specified in the plan. The specified property to be concentrated in organized warehouses to 21.6.41;
b) to set up minefields, determine the composition of the teams, where to allocate them from, and their work plan. All this through the beginning of the border divisions;
c) proceed to the procurement of scrap materials (rafts, barges, etc.) for arranging crossings across the Viliya, Nevyazha and Dubiss rivers. Crossing points set in conjunction with the operational department of the district headquarters.
The 30th and 4th pontoon regiments subordinate to the military council of the 11th Army. Shelves have in full readiness for building bridges across the river. Neman. Next to the exercises, check the condition of building bridges with these regiments, having achieved the minimum execution time;
f) the commander of the forces of the 8th and 11th armies - with the aim of destroying the most important bridges in the lane: the state border and the rear line of Šiauliai, Kaunas, p. The Neman will reconcile these bridges, determine for each of them the number of explosives, demolition teams and concentrate all means for demolition at the nearest points from them. The plan for the destruction of bridges to approve the military council of the army.
Deadline 21.6.41.
7. The commander of the army and the head of the ABTV district.
To create separate tank platoons at the expense of each vehicle, using for this purpose the installation of containers on trucks, the number of individual platoons to be created is 4. Deadline is 23.6.41 g. These separate platoons in the amount of mobile reserve should be kept: Telsai, Siauliai, Ceydani, Ionova at the disposal of army commanders.
e) Select from among the parts of the okrug (except for mechanized and aviation) gas tanks and transfer them at 50 percent. in 3 and 12 microns. Duration 21.6.41 g .;
f) Take all measures to provide each machine and tractor with spare parts, and through the head of the OST with accessories for refueling machines (funnels, buckets).
Commander Pribovo
Colonel General KUZNETSOV
Member of the Military Council of the Cabinet
Commissioner DIBROVA
Chief of Staff Lieutenant General of Maples

Source: https://liewar.ru/tragedy-22-iyunya/19-dokumenty-1941-goda.html

[neri73-r]

Quote: apro

but if you compare the level of military thinking of Soviet and German generals. then the Germans unfortunately had obvious advantages ...

By no means, they simply had more real combat experience, they already tested the blitzkrieg. As soon as the blitzkrieg failed, the chances began to be compared, ours gained experience, and then ..... and then the 1945th!

[Okolotochny]

Interesting women dancing. So Stalin has nothing to do with it? Now all dogs are hung on Putin (including VO), even on the shortage of disposable masks. But is Stalin not to blame for the failures? Interesting.

[Lekz]

On the one hand, you can agree. Yes, to blame. As well as Churchill and Daladier in the defeat near Dunkirk and the urgent surrender of Paris, like Roosevelt for the destruction of the Pacific Fleet (not only in Pearl Harbor). With another,...

[Okolotochny]

On either side, I'm right here. See an article about the Rosguard today? Opponents of the sabbath made power there. Why do you know? They simply cannot sleep peacefully with the candidacy of the leader appointed by the President. What do you think, under that power system, miscalculations with the candidates of the highest military and political leadership are directly related to Stalin? And they denied me below - why after the outbreak of war the first appeal to the people was from Molotov, and not from Stalin, not even from Kalinin, but from Molotov?

[ccsr]

Quote: Okolotochny

They simply cannot sleep peacefully with the candidacy of the leader appointed by the President.

Well, this is not the main thing for everyone - for example, I consider the detachment of explosives from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to be detrimental, because this drastically worsens the interaction of the two structures to ensure order in the country, especially in crisis situations. Well and not only that, it creates additional bureaucracy, excessive structures and confusion in solving complex issues.

[zenion]

If it were not for Zhukov, who knew ten years ahead, then misfortune would have happened. He threw and threw Red Army men and equipment so that the Germans would grind them. The Germans were killed in killing, taking prisoners, and so on. But the people in spite and contrary to Stalin began to release in an increased number of Red Army men and workers with peasants. It reminds how they fought with a Colorado potato beetle on one collective farm. Collective farm chairman: comrades collective farmers! Last year we planted 40 hectares of potatoes - the beetle ate everything. This year we planted 60 hectares of potatoes - the beetle ate everything. So let's plant 90 ha of potatoes in the coming year, he will get drunk and burst. In the same way, the Germans ate too much and burst.

[Olgovich]

Quote: apro

the German army was still at the initial stage and more maneuverable and smarter and more organized

No one and nothing prevented maneuvering, organizing, putting the troops into combat readiness, moreover, in OWN territory, to our leadership.

Moreover, we TOTAL had a lot more - (at times) and tanks, and aircraft and artillery, only ....living force Germans had more!

But here to dispose of all this ADVANTAGE competently, did not have the mind, I agree.

Recall the strategic bridges that ALL intact and instant were captured by the Nazis, about unexploded highways along which they poured inland (70 km / day to Minsk), the wild losses of aircraft destroyed on airfields, about the amazing amounts of weapons and resources in warehouses seized by the Germans due to being too close to the border, this is from the same opera ...

What the Germans still certainly won is link, with which we had an absolute seam — how many environments could have been avoided by hitting on time by wedges (there were forces!), but the leadership didn’t have information because of communication, and the armies received orders on time ...

And the author is certainly right when he writes:

The main burden of the blame for the catastrophe nevertheless lies with the miscalculations of the Soviet leadership and high command, which allowed the Germans to carry out their plan.

и

The Soviet Union survived thanks to the courage and resilience of Soviet soldiers and officers, vast territorial and human resources, the creation of powerful mobilization reserves and the relocation of the main production capacities inland.

PS It is bitter to recall countless books of the past, telling about the "multiple and overwhelming numerical superiority" in tanks and aircraft, "much superior in performance characteristics" to our "outdated" weapons ...

And do not be superior to directions of the main blows-for this, they concentrate their forces and deliver their main blows ...

[mat-vey]

Well, Olgovich, a typical representative of those who consider Stalin a god ...

Quote: Olgovich

What the Germans still certainly won is the connection with which we had an absolute seam — how many environments we could have avoided

Only God can create out of nothing so many means of communication that were needed by the Red Army so that there would be no "absolute seams". Or do you think that it is possible to create an electric lamp industry, set up factories for the production of communications equipment to train production engineers, technologists and designers in a couple of three years? Or is it the gods who just gave up on this problem?

[maksbazhin]

We still have trouble with communication, everything seems to be there, but how it is needed - no. And in Chechnya and Ossetia, there were problems with communication and in the Donbas they organized only a few years later, in Crimea there were only complaints :).
So do not talk about the gods, did not focus on her.

[mat-vey]

Quote: maksbazhin

So do not talk about the gods, did not focus on her.

Well, yes, the Germans and America bought the plants but without emphasis ..
PySy - curtailed the development and production of night-vision devices, guided anti-aircraft and cruise missiles. They could not establish the production of radars not because the radio tubes were stupidly lacking, but because the gods did not want to.

[Olgovich]

Quote: mat-vey

Well, Olgovich, a typical representative of those who consider Stalin a god ...

Quote: mat-vey

Only god can out of nothing it is possible to create as many means of communication that were necessary for the Red Army so that there would not be "absolute seams". Or do you think that it is possible to create an electric lamp industry, set up factories for the production of communication equipment in a couple of three years? just gave up on this problem?

Examine the question: https://topwar.ru/152458-proizvodstvo-otechestvennyh-sredstv-voennoj-svjazi-v-1940-1945-godah-chast-1.html
"Nothing" is the factories of Russia Erickson, Siemens-Galke and Geisler, etc.advanced before the Thief, they issued communications for the Red Army and after it.

But for the 30s they, naturally, were outdated, but they practically did not undergo modernization and ABSOLUTELY did not meet the needs of the army. Those. communications simply did not pay due attention.

They realized just a few months before the war — resolutions were adopted on the construction of new plants, etc., but time was LOST in the 1930s.

In 1941 and 1942 years front headquarters only hadabout one radio stations that did not guarantee uninterrupted radio communications with Bet.

[mat-vey]

“Despite the annual increase in the number of communications equipment supplied to the troops, the percentage of provision of communications equipment not only does not increase, but, on the contrary, decreases due to the fact that the increase in the supply of products is not proportional to the growth in the size of the army. units does not allow the creation of the necessary mobilization reserves for the first period of the war.There are no carryover reserves either in the center or in the districts.All property coming from industry is immediately sent to the troops “from the wheels”. will remain at the same level and there will be no loss of communications in property, it will take more than 5 years for a number of items to meet the full needs of NPOs without creating mobilization reserves. "
- "It was the rapid growth rates of the USSR army (from autumn 1939 to June 1941, it increased 2,8 times) that caused an acute shortage of communications in combat units."
Here’s just a reference ... Do not tell me where to take the means and resources of the earthly leaders of the state for a threefold increase in production? Well, there wouldn’t be any problems for the gods ..

[Olgovich]

Quote: mat-vey

Here is just from the reference.

And read below is not fate?
Factories-NOT modernized and not built, see article.

Do not tell me where the earthly leaders of the state means and resources to take for a threefold increase in production?

I will tell you:
1. Build fewer tanks, but CONNECTED.
2. Do not know how, do not handle!

[mat-vey]

But for construction and modernization means do not need it?
Well, on the new ones, they tried to establish the means of communication ..
You mean, all the same, you continue to deify the leadership of the USSR — well, instantly, they had to increase the army and re-equip and train, prepare ... Nothing what is needed for this time? Did something sound about 1942-43? .
And again, they didn’t upgrade it. But we bought licenses and equipment from the Americans ..

[Yamato1980]

Was the Panzerwaffe all connected?

[mat-vey]

Quote: Yamato1980

Was the Panzerwaffe all connected?

Well, many people think so .... although the same Isaev has a bunch of documents voiced ... but the Germans were already experienced and well-coordinated ..

[fk7777777]

This is the point that for a long time they did not understand that the tanks should not be smeared on the ground, but kept in a fist, and used for counterattacks, and not to wait until they were uncharacteristically ambushed after being surrounded.

[maidan.izrailovich]

... the German army was at the initial stage both maneuverable and smarter and more organized ...

Weak explanation. For high school will do. And yet they say so in textbooks.
Although in reality the Red Army was not idle. And constantly fought with someone. Tens of thousands flashed through Spain. From private to general. Halkin goal, Hassan, the war with the Finns. Experience in fighting was available. Superiority in the amount of weapons. This has been repeatedly discussed here. The numbers are all in the public domain. In some types of armaments they surpassed the Nazis by multiple.
And even more so, what experience could the Germans have with weak opponents? Such "experience" only relaxes the army.

[mat-vey]

Quote: maidan.izrailovich

And even more so, what could the experience of the Germans be with weak opponents?

To which enemy do you attribute Fancia? Well, and Poland for one?

[Maki Avellevich]

Quote: mat-vey

Quote: maidan.izrailovich
And even more so, what could the experience of the Germans be with weak opponents?

To which enemy do you attribute Fancia? Well, and Poland for one?

The French say, did not show off desire and ability to fight. considered to be the 1st army of Europe, it somehow mastered 3 weeks more than an action. and then the three with a minus. so yes, France was weak and not motivated.

[mat-vey]

Quote: Maki Avellievich

The French say, did not show off desire and ability to fight.

But it turned out only after practice. And they were preparing to fight with an equal opponent .. Moreover, the mat part was not very weak at that time.

[Maki Avellevich]

Quote: mat-vey

But it turned out only after practice. And they were preparing to fight with an equal opponent .. Moreover, the mat part was not very weak at that time.

preparation is good, but the combat experience comes only during a real massacre.

[mat-vey]

Well, the Germans got their combat experience with the not-so-weakest enemy. Plus, his materiel and industry.

[Lekz]

The French say, did not show off desire and ability to fight

Well, then, for the purity of the experiment, the British and the Americans must be added to the French. Their "motivation" and success were also bad. Until 1943.

[boris epstein]

And to this we must add the general expeditionary corps of General Gort and the Belgian army. Yes, the Anglo-French troops surpassed the Wehrmacht in tanks, but here the novelties of military science applied by the Germans came into force. The French and British evenly distributed tanks along the line, neither the French nor the British had motorized infantry and the interaction of tanks, motorized infantry and aviation. But the Germans worked on this interaction. The Germans gathered armored and motorized divisions into shock groups. The Germans had another novelty, self-propelled artillery, which no one had before the war. And another novelty. The Germans tried to avoid the use of tanks in urban battles and tank battles. This was manifested during the attempt by the tank divisions of de Gaulle and Leclerc (without motorized infantry) to surround the German strike group and in the 1941 Lvov-Brodovsk battle. Self-propelled artillery and towed anti-tank artillery were opposed divisions.

[maidan.izrailovich]

To which enemy do you attribute Fancia? Well, and Poland for one?

Learn the story. And then you will know the answer to this yourself.
From the time of Napoleon, France militarily did not represent anything special.
In World War I, Russia helped to stay afloat. Sending an expeditionary force there.
Poland, too, alone show off and ambition. Cavalrymen against tanks. Even the development trends of military science were not monitored.

[mat-vey]

Quote: maidan.izrailovich

Learn the story.

Thank you for sending. I will certainly follow your advice ..

[Nehist]

Is it Poland then? In fact, one of the few countries that had their own school of aircraft construction. And the Wehrmacht considered the Polish army a serious adversary of which they were convinced. Well, a fake about cavalry against tanks was also repeatedly discussed at VO

[mat-vey]

Quote: Nehist

Is it Poland then? In fact, one of the few countries that had their own school of aircraft construction. And the Wehrmacht considered the Polish army a serious adversary of which they were convinced. Well, a fake about cavalry against tanks was also repeatedly discussed at VO

Well, you taught history badly ... Go to the documents and scientific papers taught, and this is fundamentally wrong, at least for "Ogonyok" and Rezun, well, at least ..

[fk7777777]

Just how and what to do with the tank divisions, why do we need a tank army, that was what was important at that time. For example, the Germans in the tank division had more trucks than tanks, there were airborne reconnaissance aircraft, that is, more mobile than the Soviet one. And even more was the understanding of what to do with tanks. Although the tanks at the initial stage they were full of g ... were.

[mat-vey]

Quote: fk7777777

For example, the Germans in the tank division had more trucks than tanks

And in the USSR there simply weren’t so many trucks physically ...

[ccsr]

Quote: mat-vey

And in the USSR there simply weren’t so many trucks physically ...

So this was a miscalculation of our pre-war armed forces under the leadership of Tukhachevsky, who not only did not think about communication, but also did not create the right number of tankers for our army, did not bother to create the right amount of armor-piercing shells, etc.
That's why when they blame everything on Stalin that he allegedly did not provide for the army there, I just want to remind our accusers that the highest military leadership is responsible for all the activities of the Red Army, and it is primarily responsible for the incorrect planning of weapons programs in pre-war period.
Although, of course, I understand perfectly well that our general backwardness and the consequences of the devastation after the First World War and Civil did not give us so much financial resources and the personnel we need that we in the high-tech industries catch up with the advanced European countries.

[mat-vey]

Quote: ccsr

That’s why when they blame everything on Stalin,

Well, Stalin received more or less complete control only in 1939 .. And immediately reorganization began with a general military duty, and rearmament with modernization, but time ... time .. and yet, scientific, technical and industrial backwardness with a common low level of education .. and this again is time.

[ccsr]

Quote: mat-vey

Well, Stalin had more or less complete control only in 1939 and received

Stalin was not a military specialist, but was the head of state, and simply couldn’t physically have known many weapons issues as military professionals knew — his circle of managerial tasks was higher than those solved by NGOs and the General Staff. By the way, now Putin is also swimming in military matters, because he has never been a military man and forms his point of view on the basis of the fact that some of his advisers will pour into his ears, and the example of Serdyukovism clearly demonstrated this.

Quote: mat-vey

and this again is time.

I agree - we were sorely lacking for 2-3 years, but even if we had them, the German blow would still be difficult to contain, i.e. our idea of ​​fighting in a foreign territory with little blood would also have failed.

[maidan.izrailovich]

I agree - we were sorely lacking for 2-3 years, ....

In one of your comments on this thread you lamented

And they are too lazy to do this, and in military documents they are not strong ....

So, the same can be said about you. You ignore the facts and propagate lies about the lack of time and effort.
But the facts are as follows.
The data for the USSR is only what was on the western border.
And so:
Tanks and assault guns: USSR - 15 687, Germany - 4 171.
Aircraft: USSR - 10 743, Germany - 4 846.
Guns and mortars: USSR -: 59 787, Germany - 42 601.
Personnel: USSR - 3,3 million people, Germany - 4,3 million people.
What kind of lack of time and energy can we talk about if there was no total superiority of the aggressor? Moreover, according to statistics, we exceeded the Nazis in basic criteria. And there was no surprise. Everyone admits that they were waiting for the war and understood that it would be.
The Red Army had enough forces and means to repel aggression as early as 1941.

[ccsr]

Quote: maidan.izrailovich

So, the same can be said about you. You ignore the facts and propagate lies about the lack of time and effort.
But the facts are as follows.

You cannot comprehend these facts, but you wave them as if they will prove that to everyone. For example, you write about tanks and assault guns, and you do not understand at all that, firstly, we included tankettes weighing about 3 tons, and we did not have self-propelled assault guns at all, and at the same time, the total number of armored vehicles in the Wehrmacht had over 9 thousand units along with the trophy. Secondly, the main role is always played by the training of personnel, and in this we were completely inferior to the Germans, who had combat experience, and we have a large number of tank crews descending for new T-34s to factories, where their training was maximum 30 days. And after that you will prove to me by juggling numbers that we had approximately the same army? Do you even know that before the start of the war, not a single full-scale corps exercise was conducted in mechanized corps, tk. they were not staffed with people and equipment - how can experience come from, can you tell an "expert" in army life?

Quote: maidan.izrailovich

What kind of lack of time and energy can we talk about if there was no total superiority of the aggressor?

More recently, Emelianenko showed a powerlifter, who weighed thirty kilograms more than him, that it is not the one who has more muscles that wins in the fight, but the one who is better trained in the martial art. I’m trying to explain on my fingers how everything happened at that time - I think it will be more understandable for those like you, since you have a naive idea of ​​military affairs.

Quote: maidan.izrailovich

The Red Army had enough forces and means to repel aggression as early as 1941.

In early 1941, the Red Army re-equipment program began - you are simply not in the subject of what it is and why you urgently took up it. It was supposed to end in peacetime in 1946-1947, but you still can’t connect it with the tragedy that happened in 1941.

[maidan.izrailovich]

You can’t comprehend these facts ....

You do not even try to comprehend them. Stupidly retell someone else's stupidity.
No experience? You need at least ssy in the eye - all God's dew. You have been given a bunch of examples before that The Red Army actively fought in the 30s. As for the tanks, the Wehrmacht also had tankettes included in this number (with machine gun weapons). The VO was full of articles on this topic. Not to mention the fact that the Germans did not have heavy tanks at all as a class until the end of 1942. And by the end of 1941 it was produced here. 1200 KV-1. The amount of equipment in the Wehrmacht is only an invasion. And then in the USSR, the total number of tanks was 25.
Before that, you did all the emphasis (like the official historical doctrine) on the lack of energy and time. But after being shown in numbers that this is not so, you emphasize the lack of experience. Although I do not agree with this interpretation. But let's say that it is. Then why weren't there intensive exercises? In this case, the personnel had to live at training grounds and shooting ranges. However, this was not the case. Well, let's say we met the war poorly trained. Again, I disagree. Let us suppose. And that they backed away (studied) to Moscow and the Volga? Isn't it a lot of time to "study"?

[ccsr]

Quote: maidan.izrailovich

Before that, they brought you a bunch of examples that the Red Army actively fought in the 30s.

You dreamed of it - all the pre-war conflicts were limited in terms of the number of troops used and the duration of their conduct, so no need to lie about the "activity" of military operations, "theorist".

Quote: maidan.izrailovich

And by the end of 1941 it was produced here. 1200 KV-1.

Do not engage in fraud - on the eve of the war we had only 364 kV.

Quote: maidan.izrailovich

But after you have been shown in numbers that this is not so, you focus on the lack of experience.

Firstly, you are lying in numbers, because according to the data on VO, we had all the armored vehicles, including tankettes and armored vehicles as of 1.04.41, 23815 tanks, including 364 KB and 537 T-34, and 4819 BA.
https://topwar.ru/8072-skolko-tankov-bylo-u-stalina.html

Quote: maidan.izrailovich

you emphasize the lack of experience.

Naturally - Even A.V.Suvorov taught that for one beaten two unbeaten give.

Quote: maidan.izrailovich

Then why weren’t the intensive exercises conducted? In this case, the personnel had to live at ranges and shooting ranges.

You yourself served in the army for at least a year to ask "why"?
I don’t even speak about limited motor resources and limited allocation of funds for exercises - this is a Chinese letter for you, but it was decisive at that time, because the country did not have enough money for everything.

Quote: maidan.izrailovich

Isn't it a lot of time to "study"?

If we compare with how the other countries surrendered to the Wehrmacht, we did not behave so badly in 1941, because the disruption of the Barabarossa plan became obvious to the German command in August.

[Yamato1980]

The strength of the German tank groups was that their organization and composition was much more practical than the same mechanized corps of the Red Army. For example, throughout the war, the tank units of the Red Army chronically suffered from a lack of infantry units, howitzer artillery with a caliber of more than 122 mm, and artillery transportation vehicles. At the initial stage of the war, tank units were subordinate to the army command, which disgracefully used these units (the lack of special education of army commanders affects it).

[maidan.izrailovich]

The strength of the German tank groups is that their organization and composition was much more practical than the same mechanized corps of the Red Army ....

Where have you picked up this nonsense, which requisites? Read about General Katukov. How he, with one guards tank brigade, restrained the advance of German tank units in the Moscow direction. And just the same due to skillful maneuvering.

On November 11, 1941, order No. 337 of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR appeared, in which, in particular, it was said:
“The 4th Panzer Brigade with courageous and skillful military operations from 04.10.1941/11.10.1941/3. on 4/133/49., despite the significant numerical superiority of the enemy, inflicted heavy losses on it and fulfilled the tasks set for the brigade to cover the concentration of our troops ... As a result of fierce battles, the brigades with the 8rd and 15th tank divisions and the enemy’s motodivisation lost 6 tanks , XNUMX guns, XNUMX aircraft, XNUMX tractors with ammunition, up to an infantry regiment, XNUMX mortars and other weapons. The losses of the 4th Tank Brigade are counted in units. ".

[Yamato1980]

Katukov did not use the ambush for a good life, but forcibly. They ended up at the battle of Moscow fur. the corps of the Red Army, even for the organizational unit as a division, had neither a material part nor trained crews. I had to switch to brigade formation. But the brigade does not have those means of reinforcement like a corps or division, and, first of all, with adequate infantry and artillery cover. And to bring into battle a brigade against the tank division of the Wehrmacht, it immediately put it to destruction. So the brigades did not have to counterattack on the wedged-in groups, thereby getting involved in the struggle to seize the initiative, but engaged in purely defensive functions, acting from ambush. This tactic is applicable to all armies that cannot place units with high mobility and high penetration potential on the battlefield. By the way, Katukov is probably the only such example, and then thanks to Guderian
And about the lack of means of strengthening tank units. Open the directory of the composition of the tank units of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army.

[Alekseev]

Quote: apro

the German army speaks about one thing, nevertheless, at the initial stage, it was more maneuverable and smarter and more organized.

That's right!
K.M. said approximately the same thing. Simonov in an interview with G.K.Zhukov.
The quality of the German military mechanism and state. the apparatus was better, in his words, "in all respects", although quantitatively the Soviet leadership was able to surpass Germany and the satellites. But this is an example of the fact that quantity does not always quickly turn into quality, that there are irreplaceable people and that they cannot be replaced, as often happened before the war, by people who are "ignorant" but personally devoted. Moreover, this loyalty to the party and personally also has side-altars (Gen. Vlasov and company).
As for the conclusions of the author saying that it is, they say. command is to blame for the grandiose boilers, this is nothing more than a simplification of the situation.
The Red Army command was not up to par, but not only in the General Staff and Headquarters, but also at the level from platoon and above. Out of 225 commanders of rifle regiments (70%) there was not one who graduated from the academy, and only 15% of those who graduated from normal schools, and not various kinds of courses.
Of the many examples, let us take the environment of the SWF near Kiev. After all, Stalin was informed that it was necessary to withdraw the troops and leave Kiev. But, being himself at this stage poorly competent in assessing the capabilities of the troops, he dismissed these proposals and decided to create a strong grouping - the Bryansk Front to repel Guderian. Those. formally took appropriate measures. And the appointed commander General Eremenko promised him personally "we will definitely defeat the scoundrel Guderian."
Those. for Stalin and many others, what was sudden was not the direction of the blow and the Germans' plan, but the inability of the quantitatively completely appropriate troops to complete the task. And the stupidity of staffs, too. The difference in the quality of training of the Germans and the Red Army was sudden, although not completely. There was already a Finnish lesson.
Why did this happen? Read the history of the USSR. This was the beginning of the serious deployment of the army (the formation of personnel units of constant readiness) only in 1939, when the Germans were already smashing Poland, and the inability of industry to produce high-quality military equipment in full. For example, many new KV and T-34 crashed during forced marches at the beginning of hostilities due to poor reliability and low resource of engines, transmissions and those that weren’t organized. and rear support in a non-fully formed fur. and tank corps, as well as poor training of many tankers. Here and repression, here and the general collapse of the state of the Russian Empire, the consequences of which could not be restored in the new state of the USSR in such a short historical period - only 20 years.

[Lekz]

Do not quote this fabulist. I’m no longer about the glorified commander (he also has sins of this kind), but about that (those) k wrote this nonsense in the “Memoirs” and “conversations”. We rightly noted the low quality of military equipment, but forgot to add that other quality had nowhere to come from ..

[svp67]

Quote: Lekz

Do not quote this fabulist.

Take and read "Order in the tank forces" by Ulanov and Shein, there are many interesting documents from TsAMO given. This is not a memoir

[Lekz]

Thanks of course. But I agreed with your assessment of the quality of military equipment. I was outraged by the peremptory judgment on the situation with Kiev. Front commander Kirponos and Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov objected to the withdrawal of troops from Kiev. And what should the Supreme Commander do with such recommendations? Oh yes, to do as the commander of the other front orders. His surname is Zhukov! It was this Zhukov with Eremenko who, by their inaction, allowed an entire tank group to leave the front as much as Kiev. Reporting that they had stopped Guderian, they did nothing for defense, and when Guderian returned, he easily surrounded the troops of our "directors". And here the "guilt of the" Supreme "who did not allow the withdrawal of the troops" whitewashed our seer. However ... if not Guderian near Kiev, then his tanks a month earlier near Moscow. And this is much worse strategically. So I would have waved the sword not so fiercely. Everything is more complicated than we think.

[Alekseev]

You can wave your saber, but for this you need, there’s no need to be a professor of military history, but at least have an idea of ​​the war and the army.
then it becomes clear that the 2 TGr Guderian did not leave from any front, but changed the direction of the attack to the south; the same, you see, on the fleet, to Bryansk and having raked his troops, he went to the rear of Kirponos.
A couple of days before the ring, when it was still possible to fix the glue, the NSW SWF, who was later surrounded, sent a telegram about the crashing catastrophe to Moscow, to which Stalin replied that the gene. Purkayev sent a panic telegram saying that it was necessary to make them stop retreating, etc. Perhaps the supreme thought it was possible, you just need to send strong-willed leaders and put pressure on properly. This was usually done before when solving certain state affairs. But ... hundreds of thousands of our people paid with their lives for such confidence and obstinacy.

[Lekz]

Have you decided to teach war and the army? Oh well. A bit of history. The Bryansk front was then defeated in October, after Guderian's return from Kiev. And the encirclement of our troops near Kiev ended in September. The subtlety of the situation lies precisely in the fact that Zhukov knew about the departure of 2TGr and the consequences of this for Kirponos. But he practically did nothing to shackle it with the front's military actions, even after the Stavka indicated that ("... lead desperate attacks on the Konotop enemy group in cooperation with Eremenko, concentrating nine-tenths of aviation in this area. Eremenko has already been given appropriate instructions." ). He only reported on the successful stop of the enemy and "forgot" to report that there was practically no enemy in front of him, I will leave it on his conscience.
For your reference, the army has one-man command. Everyone can have their own opinion, the decision is made by the commander. But here you are doubly wrong. A telegram with a request to allow the withdrawal of troops was sent by Budyonny (a representative of the Headquarters for the SWF) with reference to the opinion of the Military Council. And he received this permission for his telegram. Received permission from the Headquarters to withdraw troops to the defensive line along the Psel River. This is the first thing. But having learned about this permission, the Military Council of the South-Western Front repulsed its telegram to the Supreme: "We did not even have a thought about withdrawing troops until we received a proposal to give views on withdrawing troops to the east ...". They were also asked about the boundaries of the withdrawal! This is the second. And the ban on leaving Kiev was after the receipt of this telegram.
And henceforth, when discussing human lives, keep in mind that the life of one person is priceless.

[Alekseev]

Do not quote this fabulously scribe ..
Enemy voice. He is supposedly smarter than the fabulist, who was the first to defeat the Hitler Wehrmacht and signed the act of surrender.
In addition to empty indications, is it worth it to quote or not to indicate specifically who is wrong in what, where are the so-called fables?
If there is no competence, then it is better to be silent, to listen.

[Lekz]

A fragment of the conversation is a fable: "Of the many examples, let us take the encirclement of the South-Western Front near Kiev. Stalin was informed that it was necessary to withdraw the troops and leave Kiev. But, being himself at this stage, he was poorly competent in assessing the capabilities of the troops ...". I already wrote to you about how it was in reality.

[Yamato1980]

Well, about the "proposal to withdraw the troops" you said it strongly. The Bryansk Front fulfilled its task, the tank group of the fast Heinz, he basically stopped at Romny. The Kremenchug bridgehead was not taken into account from where the 1 TGR Kleist was hit. Shaposhnikov overslept this blow with reconnaissance. But the Germans must be given their due, they showed the class how to quickly and most importantly covertly maneuver large mobile formations.

[ABM]

you at least look at the map where those Romny are and where the Bryansk Front remained

[Pessimist22]

Strange, usually when they write about victories here, Stalin is mentioned about 20 times, but here not once, well, of course, the king is good, the boyars are bad.

[210ox]

This "king", in your opinion, left a gigantic country with a strong economy and nuclear weapons. And on my own behalf, a pipe and boots ... Officials ... And boyars ... Yes, they were different ... Here we recently recalled the organizer of the tank industry. We didn't have any tanks in all his jambs?

[Pessimist22]

He lived in a pipe and boots, the cottages, the Kremlin, were clearly not starving and did not suffer hardships like the people under the occupation. Yes, they say that there were tanks, even more than the Germans, but they threw everything in the boilers, the Stalin commanders threw the equipment and weapons and retreated, leaving the territories and inhabitants to be scolded by the Nazis, and it was not the soldiers and junior and middle level commanders who were to blame, it was Stalin and his generals who were to blame, and the Soviet people won the war when they saw what the Nazis were doing, not Stalin.

[210ox]

Has the economy also appeared on everything ready?

[mat-vey]

Also my personal opinion - in the tragedy of 1941, the main reason is economic. Stalin forced heavy industry that he was preparing for this war (your cap). But there was not enough time, although for me it was not enough, and deliberately did not give - the Germans they were also not ready for the war they were preparing, but the pace of the USSR was higher and they "did not keep up" and therefore they staged a "swindle" - "either pan, or disappeared" .. It looks like Hitler was still that swindler ..

[boris epstein]

100% ! New types of weapons have just begun to enter the troops-T-34, KV, Il-2, Pe-2, ZiS-3, PPD, PPSh-41, Yakovlev fighters, and Katyushas generally appeared at the front already during the battles of 1941 All this was still raw and had not been mastered by the personnel, on the stocks were unfinished battleships of the Soviet Union type, cruisers, the latest destroyers of the Ognevoy type, submarines, minesweepers ... The five-year rearmament began on December 31, 1938 and was supposed to end by 1943 Hitler was indeed a political swindler, but his swindle was based on the belief that the West, which was pushing him toward the USSR, would not stab him in the back. And to hire Canaris on two fronts.

[Pessimist22]

I know very well how under Stalin the economy appeared: According to domestic data, in 1923-1933. In the heavy industry of the USSR, 170 technical assistance agreements were concluded: 73 with German companies, 59 with American, 11 with French, 9 with Swedish, 18 with firms in other countries2. Although in the period under review there was a quantitative predominance of contracts with German companies, the country also needed industrial giants of the American type. In September 1927, under the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a permanent commission was created for technical and scientific relations with the United States. American assistance was attracted for the construction of hydropower plants, the development of the oil, mining, coal, chemical, metallurgical, and electrical industries, but primarily for the mass production of cars, tractors, aircraft engines, and other standardized products3.

The largest enterprises in Europe, such as the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station, the Stalingrad and a number of other tractor plants, the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, and the Nizhny Novgorod (Gorky) Automobile Plant, were enterprises of American type and origin. International General Electric, Radio Corporation of America, Ford Motor Company, International Harvester, Dupont de Nemours became the leading foreign partners of the USSR.

[Lekz]

Everything is correct about industrialization, only the accents of the "help" type were subdued. Delivering for gold is hardly a help. It's more of a pure mutual benefit. Moreover, it is far from equal benefit. Look at the realities of the time. The Great Depression was called. The key here is "Great". And the purchase of equipment and the involvement of specialists in the West was a salvation for the West. No, I'm not talking about the USSR saving capitalism, I'm talking about the sign of this action.

[tatra]

The enemies of the communists on the territory of the USSR are a unique phenomenon in mankind, including the fact that you present the highest demands to the Soviet communists and their supporters, reaching the point of absurdity, including the fact that they had to instantly solve the problem of the centuries-old famine in Russia, instantly and win without losses a united Europe, led by Hitler, who attacked the USSR, and not the slightest to YOURSELF, just whine cowardly 30 years after you captured the USSR, "but we have nothing to do with it, it's all the communists are to blame," and in the USSR it was, we still disentangle it. "

[mat-vey]

Quote: tatra

what do you make of the highest demands on Soviet communists and their supporters

Sometimes it seems that they simply deify Stalin))).

[Fan-fan]

No, we are far from deifying Stalin. I’ll even say more, part of the blame for our losses in 1941 lies with him. But the question is, which of the leaders in our history can be put on a par with Stalin? Who else could also how did he raise the country out of the ruins of a civil war?
They accuse Stalin of not starving. What more to blame for nothing? But did the elite of the Stalin era have palaces and yachts, have real estate abroad and so frankly spat on laws and the country?

[mat-vey]

And what have you got to do with this? Or are you also making the highest demands on the Soviet Communists and their supporters that they are not earthly people but gods? Gods who must see everything through time and space and are not burdened by any earthly material problems?

[naidas]

Quote: mat-vey

Sometimes it feels like

It will be so until they find another non-Stalinist way of developing the country at that time. So far, nothing has been devised except for blackening.

[mat-vey]

Quote: naidas

will not find another non-Stalinist way of developing the country at that time

So it’s like the story has already happened - it was like it was, you can’t go the other way.
Therefore, using the afterlife, you can build such specialists and mentors from yourself ... though that reality is absolutely considered optional to take into account.
PySy - Just about the reality .. It was remembered - the veteran of the Great Patriotic War was asked in an interview that the worst and most difficult thing was in the war - well, they say, there were bombings there, and he answered the smell of decaying dead bodies in the spring from the neutral and the thawed waste products in the trenches under legs.

[naidas]

Quote: mat-vey

So it’s like a story has already happened

"The USSR produced nothing but galoshes." V.V. Putin

[mat-vey]

And what are you talking about, or have you got hold of a time machine and can influence the "Stalinist path of development"?

[naidas]

This is for this.

Quote: mat-vey

Sometimes it seems that they simply deify Stalin))).

And there’s nothing to offer, therefore

Quote: naidas

"The USSR produced nothing but galoshes." V.V. Putin

Quote: mat-vey

So it’s like a story has already happened

The story is dynamic, it not only happened, but also an assessment of what happened.

[mat-vey]

Quote: naidas

The story is dynamic, it not only happened, but also an assessment of what happened.

Are you talking about "Russia is a country with an unpredictable history"?

[maidan.izrailovich]

.... solve the problem of centuries of famine in Russia....

Where in your head this delirium flew about the "centuries-old famine in Russia"?

[tatra]

Do you still believe delusional perestroika myths that before the Communists Russia was so rich, prosperous, produced so much food that the whole world fed surpluses? For only 20 peaceful years, with Nicholas II praised by the enemies of the Communists, there were 8 hungry years.

[naidas]

Quote: maidan.izrailovich

Where did this nonsense fly into your head about "the centuries-old famine in Russia"?

Probably from here: Famine was noted, for example, in 1024, 1070, 1092, 1128, 1215, 1230-1231, 1279, 1309 and 1332.

In 1121, in Novgorod, "Yadyahu people leaf of lindens, birch bark, and inini moss, horsemeat." It was also in 1214–1215, and in 1230–1231, “they are a simple offspring of living animals and poison, and the dead animals are dead meat and corpses are pruning venom, and other horses, dogs, cats.”

Since Alexander 3, prison is mentioned for famine. Under Nicholas 2 since 1905. the law remained, but it was not so severely applied.

[maidan.izrailovich]

Probably from here: Famine was noted, for example, in 1024, 1070, 1092, 1128, 1215, 1230-1231, 1279, 1309 and 1332.

Periods of famine were everywhere and among all peoples.
If I start listing years between years indicated by you, then there will be an order of magnitude more such years. And they were not all hungry.
You read carefully what angered me. Namely, the phrase about "centuries of famine." I translate for those who do not understand Russian well. That is, the Russian people have been starving for many, many centuries, without interruption. But this is not so. This is how nonsense about our history is born.

[naidas]

Quote: maidan.izrailovich

I translate for those who do not understand Russian speech. That is, the Russian people starved for many, many centuries, without interruption.

Well, what are you doing, you have been shown hunger by the sign of Russia since the shaggy year. Now they began to put in conditions that were not originally set by their conditions. Hunger and the Bolsheviks were not without a break.

[Sugar Honeyovich]

Quote: maidan.izrailovich

this nonsense has flown about "centuries-old famine in Russia"?

The truth about the centuries-old famine in Russia is reported by VERY many testimonies of contemporaries.
Nonsense takes place today - as if there was no centuries-old famine in Russia ...

[Olgovich]

Quote: tatra

The enemies of the Communists in the USSR are a unique phenomenon in humanity

Enemies of the enemies of the Communists in the territory b. THE USSR - the most unique the phenomenon of mankind: from day to day, from the first to the last instant of the USSR, they unceasingly trumpeted about their tremendous achievements and successx, which led, for some reason .... to a deficit of everything and disaster 91 г - with FULL, by the way ... indifference of the enemies of the enemies of the Communists.

At the same time, the enemies of the enemies of the Communists will never say how the enemies of the enemies of the Communists ... were defeated by the long-defeated enemies of the Communists, despite the fact that ALL power, GREAT successes and HUGE support of the whole people were precisely ... enemies of the enemies of the Communists

The enemies of the enemies of the Communists ALWAYS and EVERYTHING someone else is to blame only not they, fluffy-white, touching-naive, offended and bent by all, crystal-clear, unthinkable, crazy-witted enemies of the enemies of the Communists.

[tatra]

In short, your comment, claiming to be ironic, is that the ideology of the enemies of the communists is that you always have nothing to do with everything. And you always respond to all accusations against YOU on the principle of "defending yourself by attacking others",

[Olgovich]

Quote: tatra

In short, your pretending to be ironic comment is that the ideology of the enemies of the Communists is that you always have nothing to do with everything "

Those. you, enemies of the enemies of the communists, for VERDICT activities your authorities-disaster 91 g.....do not answer! Rt

ps And about the famine under Nicholas II: there were hunger years, but there wasn’t even a trace (even during the World War) of terrible millions of victims with cannibalism (unprecedented anywhere else in the world!), as with yours in PEACE years, 32-33, 47, 22 years

But people with you were starving to death in 1924, 1925 and even ... in the year of BUILT socialism in 1937!, and they could eat, as in 1913, only through FORTY YEARS (Report of the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR 55g).

The result of Nicholas is the population of Russia grown by FIFTY PERCENT, the result is your-Russian Cross.

These are just FACTS.

[naidas]

Quote: Olgovich

And about the famine under Nicholas II: there were hunger years, but there wasn’t even a trace (even during the World War) of terrible millions of victims with cannibalism

there were no millions of victims of cannibalism, but given the fight against hunger in the Republic of Ingushetia with Alexander 3, we can assume there were millions of victims and cannibalism.

[Olgovich]

Quote: naidas

there were no millions of victims of cannibalism, but given the fight against hunger in the Republic of Ingushetia with Alexander 3, we can assume there were millions of victims and cannibalism.

was not, but ... was: is it HOW?

Unlike the USSR, in RI who wanted to study FREE, went hungry. areas, wrote about the famine, incl. AUTHORITIES: There is no evidence like the Soviet:

Special communication of the secret political department of the OGPU about food difficulties in certain regions of the North Caucasus region (mortality, cannibalism, corpse eating).
7 March 1933 city
TSA FSB of the Russian Federation. F. 2. Op. 11. D. 42. L. 62, 63, 64

YEY DISTRICT. The village Dolzhanskaya - the 22 / II food assistance commission, having examined, established that tr. G **** had eaten the corpse of the dead sister's owl. During interrogation, G **** stated that for a month she ate various garbage, not even having vegetables, and that eating the human corpse was caused by hunger.

In the same village it was established that group D ***, remaining after the death of his father and mother with young sisters and brothers, ate the meat of brothers and sisters who died of starvation.

Station Novo-Shcherbinovskaya. In the 3rd brigade of the collective farm, E *** hacked and ate her 3-year-old child, E ***'s family consists of 8 people who eat various substitutes (rape, silage, etc.) and meat from cats and dogs.

The cemetery found up to 30 corpses thrown out during the night, part of the corpses bitten by dogs. The corpse of the collective farmer REZNIK was cut in half, without legs, and several coffins were found there, from which the corpses disappeared.

In the 3rd brigade, the wife of C *** drags the corpses of children from the cemetery and eats them. A search of the apartment and interrogation of S *** children revealed that several corpses were taken from the cemetery for food.
A girl’s corpse was found in the apartment with her legs cut off and boiled meat was found.

[naidas]

Quote: Olgovich

in RI who wanted to study FREE

It’s written to you from Alexander 3 — for such a prison, bring the official message about the famine — they aren’t, only public, since 1905 they appear official but in the Duma, in the USSR the state was interested and reacted to hunger, as an example your references (you won’t get any such links ). In the 19th century, people ate from hunger and you can write as much as you like, that with an increase (how much Olgovich has 50% under Nikolay2) the population in the 20th century did not die of such hunger. For those who did not fit into the market, it was to blame. .

[Olgovich]

Quote: naidas

It’s written to you from Alexander 3 - for such a prison,

And in Russian?

Quote: naidas

they are not there, only public, from 1905 official ones appear but in the Duma,

No, because there were no deaths, public ones were checked, and again NOTHING, only rumors.

Let me remind you that even SOVIET scientists, NO WORDS, spoke of mass proportions after 1891.

Quote: naidas

USSR state was interested and reacted to hunger as an example your links

I was interested in what I DONE with my mediocrity? ! and SILENT about the most terrible disaster of the country in history

Quote: naidas

(you won’t get any from RI)

In RI, this was not the same in MIND, as in the WORLD

Quote: naidas

(you won’t get any from RI)

There was nothing to wait for.

Quote: naidas

19th century people ate from hunger

Impudent FALSE, mass cannibalism was under YOUR, in the center of Europe, in the middle of the 20th century, wild game is utter

Quote: naidas

On the 20th century, RI did not die of such hunger. With RI, those who did not fit into the market were to blame. .

In Russia, as "wealthy people" in the USSR, they did not die in MILLIONS for several months from hunger.

[naidas]

Quote: Olgovich

And in Russian?

in Russian, you are Olgovich like an Uzbek in the Soviet army, when you need to understand, when it is not profitable you don’t understand. In you: Gruzenberg "Yesterday" p.27
- Emperor Alexander III was annoyed by press references to “hunger,” as a word invented by those who have nothing to eat. - He commanded the highest to replace the word "hunger" with the word "wickedness." The Press Directorate sent out a strict circular immediately.

At the same time, on your favorite topic of Jews in the revolution: p. 28
- In vain are the politicking fools and bigots trying to portray the Russian revolution as foreign.
- The Russian revolution is the most national of the national ones and its severity is also national. Wherever tears pour for a long time, an inevitable retribution -
blood.

And there’s at least some explanation that in the first half of the 19th century people ate hunger, and in the second half and at the beginning of the 20th century, with the same plow, on the same lands with a rapid increase in the number of edibles — silence. The most effective struggle is to ban hunger. Therefore and we learn not as in 1932 from the archives of public services, but from diaries, memoirs of citizens visiting villages. And from 1905, and from liberal newspapers.

[Olgovich]

Quote: naidas

in Russian, you are Olgovich like an Uzbek in the Soviet army, when you need to understand, when it is not profitable you don’t understand. In you: Gruzenberg "Yesterday" p.27
- Emperor Alexander III was annoyed by press references to “hunger,” as a word invented by those who have nothing to eat. - He commanded the highest to replace the word "hunger" with the word "wickedness." The Press Directorate sent out immediately strict circular.

1. The circular is on the table, not the load carriers
2. And what?
Deaths from starvation and cannibalism after 1891-NO

Quote: naidas

At the same time to your beloved the topic of the Jews in Revolution: p. 28
- In vain are the politicking fools and bigots trying to portray the Russian revolution as foreign.
- The Russian revolution is the most national of the national ones and its severity is also national. Wherever tears pour for a long time, an inevitable retribution -
blood.

Where?!

Quote: naidas

And at least some explanation is that in the first half of the 19th centuryand ate people, and in the second half and at the beginning of the 20th century, with the same plow, on the same lands with a rapid increase in the number of editors - silence.

Did not eat. and when they ate were terrified: in the 1880s there were two cases of cannibalism in TUNDRA by people who were rubbed there, about whom the newspapers of Russia wrote with horror, it was so wild for Russia ..

People in the CENTER of Russia ate only WHEN YOU, in 20th century

Quote: naidas

Therefore, we learn not only in 1932 from the archives of public services, but from diaries and memoirs of citizens visiting villages. And from 1905, and from liberal newspapers.

Let's give "diaries", "townspeople" and liberal newspapers "with SURNAMES, PLACES and TIME, and not with a liberal visage, as here

6
YEY DISTRICT. The village Dolzhanskaya - the 22 / II food assistance commission, having examined, established that tr. G **** had eaten the corpse of the dead sister's owl. During interrogation, G **** stated that for a month she ate various garbage, not even having vegetables, and that eating the human corpse was caused by hunger.

In the same village it was established that group D ***, remaining after the death of his father and mother with young sisters and brothers, ate the meat of brothers and sisters who died of starvation.

Station Novo-Shcherbinovskaya. In the 3rd brigade of the collective farm, E *** hacked and ate her 3-year-old child, E ***'s family consists of 8 people who eat various substitutes (rape, silage, etc.) and meat from cats and dogs.

[naidas]

Quote: Olgovich

Let's get "diaries", "townspeople" and liberal newspapers "

Tolstoy vol. 29: The farther into the depths of Bogoroditsky district and closer to Efremovsky, the worse and worse the situation ... Almost nothing was born on the best lands, only seeds returned. Almost everyone has bread with a quinoa. Quinoa here is unripe, green. The white nucleolus, which usually occurs in it, is not at all, and therefore it is not edible.
Korolenko "In a hungry year": He has already experienced this, he was already horrified twenty years ago, had been ill, boiled over, calmed down ... Typhus? Why, this is always with us! Quinoa? Yes, we have this every year! I had the hope that when I manage to announce all this, when I loudly tell the whole of Russia about these Dubrovtsy, Pralevtsy and Petrovtsy, about how they became "undead", as in Lukoyanov himself a little girl asks her mother to "bury her alive in the land". In fact, the most difficult time was approaching with spring. Their bread, which the "deceivers" sometimes knew how to hide from the watchful eye of the police officers, from zealous paramedics, from "searches and seizures," has completely disappeared almost everywhere. "
Dr. Emil Dillon: The Russian peasant lives mainly on black bread and potatoes. Lives? He is starving to death due to the lack of them. ”
agronomist A.N. Engelhardt: A person from an intelligent class simply cannot believe how people live like this, without eating. And yet this is indeed so. It’s not that they weren’t eating at all, but they were malnourished, they were starving, they were eating all kinds of rubbish.
Now (1906--7), in starving areas, fathers sell daughters to merchants of live goods. The progress of Russian hunger is obvious. ”
The Russian Word newspaper dated March 30 (17), 1907: The Chelyabinsk Migration Board registered 20 walkers in February, most of the starving provinces. There are only six dining rooms from Penza to Manchuria. ”
Here is an overview of the famine in the 1913 Encyclopedic Dictionary:

[Olgovich]

Quote: naidas

Tolstoy vol. 29: The farther into the depths of Bogoroditsky district and closer to Efremovsky, the worse and worse the situation ... Almost nothing was born on the best lands, only seeds returned. Almost everyone has bread with a quinoa. Quinoa here is unripe, green. The white nucleolus, which usually occurs in it, is not at all, and therefore it is not edible.

And?

Quote: naidas

Korolenko “In a hungry year”: He had already experienced this, he was horrified twenty years ago, had been ill, boiled over, had calmed down ... Typhoid? But this is n

And?

Quote: naidas

Dr. Emil Dillon: The Russian peasant lives mainly on black bread and potatoes.

And?

Quote: naidas

agronomist A.N. Engelhardt: A person from an intelligent class simply cannot believe how people live like this, without eating. And yet this is indeed so. It’s not that they weren’t eating at all, but they were malnourished, they were starving, they were eating all kinds of rubbish.

And?
WHERE IS MASS DEATH from starvation and mass cannibalism, how in the years 22,33,47?!, And even in .... in the middle of the 20th century ?!
No? So admit and do not write nonsense anymore.

[naidas]

Quote: Olgovich

1. The circular is on the table, not the load carriers

Then you need to buy the book "Collection of circulars and orders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs", for enough eyewitness accounts.

[Olgovich]

Quote: naidas

Then you need to buy the book "Collection of circulars and orders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs", for enough eyewitness accounts

There is a lot of "evidence" of devils on a squirrel chandelier called, yes ....

[naidas]

Olgovich from me +, these enemies of the Communists got along with the Communists.

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

Enemies of the enemies of the Communists in the territory b. The USSR is the most unique phenomenon of mankind: from day to day, from the first to the last instant of the USSR, they constantly trumpeted their tremendous achievements and successes, which led, for some reason ... to a deficit of everything and a catastrophe of 91 g

You have been living there in Moldova for about thirty years "uniquely" without the CPSU, and so far no one has heard about your successes, except for the achievements of the Moldovan workers of the panel. Well, you have become the most impoverished republic in Europe - again the CPSU is to blame for this, or your plakhatnyuk? And the USSR did not trumpet - it was the second economic power in the world, and it is unlikely that we will be able to repeat this on our land, and this is very sad for us.

[Alex Nevs]

You are famously Moldavian.

[Olgovich]

Quote: ccsr

You have been living there in Moldova for about thirty years "uniquely" without the CPSU, and so far no one has heard about your successes, except for the achievements of the Moldovan workers of the panel.

1. Bessarabia is a part of RUSSIA, which YOU are criminal, turned against the will of the inhabitants in ... Moldova.

2. Yes, you SO did a lot of things that could not be fixed, I think, never before: Everything was fine before you

Quote: ccsr

Well, have you become the most impoverished republic in Europe - is the CPSU again to blame for this, or your platnyuki?

see above

Quote: ccsr

But the USSR did not blow - he was the second economic power in the world, and it is unlikely when on our land we can repeat this, and it is very sad for us.

Second-in consumption FOOD?
CLOTHES?
HOUSING?
Or do you eat cast iron, dress like a rocket and sleep under a Christmas tree?

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

. Bessarabia is a part of RUSSIA, which YOU are criminal, turned against the will of the inhabitants in ... Moldova.

They started to go astray - Stalin should be blamed, not us today, so you better manage to spit on our past.

Quote: Olgovich

Yes, you SUCH a lot of things that can’t be fixed, I think, never before: Everything was fine before you

But why haven’t they begun to live normally without us?
How long to wait - two hundred years?

Quote: Olgovich

The second is by eating FOOD?
CLOTHES?
HOUSING?

By GDP - however, you do not know what this means for any country. I hope in Moldova there is enough hominy and enough wine to make you feel happy? I do not perceive it in this plane, so that our idea of ​​happiness diverges from yours - you see not that passionarity ...

[Olgovich]

Quote: ccsr

They started to go astray - Stalin should be blamed, not us today

Are you ... giving up Steel?

Quote: ccsr

But why haven’t they begun to live normally without us?

And WHAT did you leave: awkward, backward, useless industry, disfigured poisoned rural households, demographic catastrophe, it’s very difficult to deal with it

Quote: ccsr

By GDP - however, you do not know what this means for any country.

You ate GDP, dressed GDP and lived in GDP, I ask again?
And with this, your rulers for the people are full of seams!

Quote: ccsr

I hope in Moldova there is enough hominy and enough wine to make you feel happy? I do not perceive it in this plane, so that our idea of ​​happiness diverges from yours - you see not that passionarity ...

Oh, the sun eater showed up!
Let me remind you that the Bolsheviks in the Thief promised not "passionarity", but GREAT, CLOTHING and HOUSING-kommray, and in real life they fed ...

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

Are you ... giving up Steel?

On the contrary - I consider him a great historical figure, associated with the Soviet Union, and whom you hate equally.

Quote: Olgovich

And WHAT did you leave: awkward, backward, useless industry, disfigured poisoned rural households, demographic catastrophe, it’s very difficult to deal with it

There is a good proverb about a bad dancer - this is just the case for your case.

Quote: Olgovich

Let me remind you that the Bolsheviks in the Thief promised not "passionarity", but GREAT, CLOTHING and HOUSING-kommray, and in real life they fed ...

So they gave all this, only for some the throats turned out to be wider than their labor successes, so the USSR collapsed, to my great regret and to the joy of people like you.

[Olgovich]

Quote: ccsr

On the contrary - I consider him a great historical figure associated with the Soviet Union,

you offered to blame him, not you, i.e. take yourself away from him
Those. You do not approve of his transformation of Russian Bessarabia into .... Moldavia of the nationals in 1940?

Quote: ccsr

There is a good proverb about a bad dancer - this is just the case for your case.

Nope, this is YOU - with such a wonderful people that you captured, with that gorgeous science of Russia before the Thieves, with the resources of Russia .... you created a vain c / farm, you’re not able to feed the country and industry that wasn’t able to put it on and settle in housing.

It's just FACTS

Quote: ccsr

So they gave all this, only for some the throats turned out to be wider than their labor successes,

Nope, they promised to give, but did not give.
That

Quote: ccsr

the collapse of the USSR

Quote: ccsr

to my great regret and to the joy of people like you.

what joy from the collapse of your country, are you out of your mind?
I did ALL I could forI save her (at the same time, I didn’t give a damn about the Bolsheviks), unlike you, who didn’t even lift a finger

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

you suggested blaming him

No, you just misinterpreted my words.

Quote: Olgovich

Those. You do not approve of his transformation of Russian Bessarabia into .... Moldavia of the nationals in 1940?

I was not at his post, and therefore I can’t say why he made such a decision, but in any case, I think that it was justified.

Quote: Olgovich

Nope, they promised to give, but did not give.

You are lying, as always - the Bolsheviks gave the people practically everything that the country produced and didn’t appropriate anything for themselves, so your illiterate lie can impress only narrow-minded people.

Quote: Olgovich

I did everything I could to save it

You didn’t do anything, since you hated the Bolsheviks so much, and most likely helped to destroy the USSR. And now you’re just lying, to somehow justify your worthless existence, because you haven’t achieved anything, and now look for the guilty ones.

[Olgovich]

Quote: ccsr

No, you just misinterpreted my words.

Lying:

ccsr-Stalin must be blamed, not us

.

Quote: ccsr

I was not at his post, and therefore I can’t say why he made such a decision, but in any case, I think that it was justified.

1. he had no post of the head of the country and it was not for him to decide for the millions of people who lived there
2. justified by stupidity.

Quote: ccsr

You are lying, as always - the Bolsheviks gave the people practically everything that the country produced and didn’t appropriate anything for themselves, so your illiterate lie can impress only narrow-minded people.

NOT fed, NOT clothed, NOT lodged, liar: EVERYTHING is in wild deficit, after continuous "successes" and "achievements"

Quote: ccsr

You didn’t do anything, since you hated the Bolsheviks so much, and most likely helped to destroy the USSR.

Do I sneeze on faith, disbelief?

Quote: ccsr

now you’re just lying to somehow justify your worthless existence, because you haven’t achieved anything, and now look for the guilty ones.

[Squelcher]

As always, in a burst of speech, the Communists pour slop on the history of Russia, and what do the dry figures say?
Let’s look at the population of the country to the world in dynamics?

[Pauladin]

And where such statistics come from, especially for the 19th century

[chenia]

Quote: Pessimist22

The pipe and boots, he lived at the ready, cottages, the Kremlin, clearly did not starve and did not suffer hardships, like the people under occupation

Clever, and as evidence. Should Stalin starve?

Quote: Pessimist22

this is Stalin and his generals

Stalin overwhelmed the army with equipment, and the generals combat training.
Well, who is to blame?

Quote: Pessimist22

and the Soviet people won the war,

You can not continue further, such an argument is overconvincing.
At how much the consciousness of the people increased under Stalin. For the tsar-father in three years they could not cope with secondary German troops (consciousness was not enough). in the end, in general, the people (and how does the people not only win the war, but also create the revolution) dared the autocracy.

Well, if people are everywhere, it means that both there and there are self-organizing forces (I feel, for the latter case. You will insist on the passive role of the people). .

[fk7777777]

The State Bank of the country, stability in the economy, decline in imports from 80% to 17%, confirmation of the purchasing power of the ruble, provision of goods and services of the national currency, setting the exchange rate of one ruble to four dollars was exchanged for 1947, the transition to the gold standard in 1950 ( it was precisely for this that both Stalin and Beria were killed), at least this is enough to understand the greatness of man. I hope you regularly see price reductions in stores, do you see the national currency rate one to four? But it seems like we didn’t fight after the World War, did we?

[Pessimist22]

The organizer of the tank industry, whose comrades-in-arms shot without trial, like a mad dog?

[210ox]

No, they just deprived the membership card

[maidan.izrailovich]

This "king", in your opinion, left a gigantic country with a strong ...

Well, she’s already tired of your mantras.
I have nothing against Stalin.
But it turns out all of our ancestors clawed soup. And the Georgians taught them all without education.
You yourself are not offended by the ancestors?

[Okolotochny]

And I have a question without any conclusions - why was the first appeal to the people after the outbreak of war made by Molotov, not Stalin?

[210ox]

My parents, who lived in the Smolensk region at that time, told how many echelons with equipment and people went to Belarus all winter and spring of the 41st. The country was preparing for war. Dear author, the enemy was too strong and catastrophic miscalculations of our command. However, the heroism of our a soldier and the entire Soviet people, who broke the ridge of the Nazis and their minions.

[maksbazhin]

Quote: 210ox

. The country was preparing for war

Yeah, they were only preparing to fight in someone else's territory :(

[210ox]

Rezun read? Preparing for war does not mean you have to start first

[Fan-fan]

Rezun, not Rezun, but the question is open - why did the bulk of our troops end up dangerously close to the border?

[210ox]

Certainly a command error.

[Lekz]

why did the bulk of our troops end up dangerously close to the border?

This is not true. There are a lot of materials, why is it necessary to repeat visiting fables, and not turn to documents? The Red Army troops had three echelons: 56 divisions in the first echelon, 52 in the second and 62 divisions in the reserve. The general ratio of forces is 1: 3, in the directions of the main attacks of the Wehrmacht up to 1:10. And when you read about the number of troops by district, keep in mind that our districts are the size of France. But it was precisely this arrangement of troops that did not allow the Germans to solve the main task of the "Barbarossa" - the encirclement and destruction of the Red Army troops near the border.

[ccsr]

Quote: Lekz

Full of materials, why do you need to repeat visiting fables, and not turn to documents?

And they are too lazy to do this, and they are not strong in military documents, that’s why their gum is replicated for any reason, without even delving into what is already available in the public domain.

[ABM]

if placed in five echelons, it would have been even more fashionable. What's the point? achieve triple superiority of the Wehrmacht over each echelon?

[Yamato1980]

Where should she be? For example, followers of Rezun constantly refer to the Brest Fortress, such as drove so many troops to the very border, so they were preparing to invade. But a small excursion to the BVI documents suggests that everything is much more prosaic. It was just that there was nowhere to station troops, and in Brest there were old royal barracks and the necessary infrastructure. So, something like that.

[mat-vey]

Quote: Yamato1980

For example, the followers of Rezun constantly refer to the Brest Fortress.

The question is rhetorical - if the followers of "Brest Fortress" have a fortress, and not a toponym, then what size is the church in "Belaya Tserkov"?

[Sugar Honeyovich]

However, the Red Army also took the Germans into the "cauldrons", starting in 1941 ...

[don-1500]

In the year 41 there was no Soviet Army, there was a Red Army. The article is written in general phrases, beaten with cliches .. The Germans seized the initiative held it while ours corrected all the mistakes, set up the Stavka, engaged in the evacuation of industry, etc. But then everything fell into place, as it should have been. It was a very difficult time, a low bow to all who survived.

[icant007]

According to the directives of the General Staff, the Kiev Military District, which numbered 900 thousand people with 4900 tanks, was the most seriously prepared to repel German aggression, and the West had 630 thousand people with 2900 tanks. The German group "Center", which dealt the main blow to the troops of the Western District, numbered 1,5 million people with 1700 tanks. That is, 7800 Soviet tanks opposed only 1900 German

It is strange why the author, comparing the Western District and the Army Group "Center", adds to the heap the tanks of the Kiev District?
And then he writes 1700 German tanks, and then 1900.

Some kind of confusion with numbers.

[svp67]

"What happened?"

It is already known and more or less clear, it remains to answer another question:
"Why did this happen?" That the Red Army was poorly mechanized? No. The border troops had a high level of mechanization. Was the Red Army inferior to the quality of weapons? Also no. The armament of the same units was at the level of the Wehrmacht, in some way surpassing in some way inferior, but equivalent. Did our soldiers lack determination? With that, everything was the same normal.
Our failures are the consequences of the poor theoretical preparation of our high command for this war. Alas, but there was no, at that moment we have military theorists capable of not only developing a theory similar to the German "blitzkrieg", but even thoroughly understanding how the Germans fight, how they win, and most importantly how to counteract this. Our mechanized corps were heavily overloaded with tanks and could not solve the tasks that were solved by the German tank divisions and groups, which had a more balanced character. The military leaders tried to catch the spearhead of the blow, instead of "chopping" their supply routes, so moreover, our military leaders did not work out well the plans for covering the borders, as a result of which there were congestions at many crossroads due to the cross movement of troops, and most stocks of fuels and lubricants, the same Western VO, ended up in the foothills of the Caucasus, in warehouses, respectively, failing to supply the troops in time.
In short, they were very poorly prepared for the "meeting"

[strannik1985]

What was the Red Army poorly mechanized?

Actually, yes, almost all the compounds of the western military units required replenishment by people and equipment.

Our failures are the consequences of a weak

Warlords do not declare the mobilization and concentration of troops. Tell us how you are going to fight having an army of peacetime and a ratio of 1: 2-1: 4 (estimated, in divisions) in the areas of attack.

[svp67]

Quote: strannik1985

Actually, yes, almost all the compounds of the western military units required replenishment by people and equipment.

People were replenished by these compounds as a result of ongoing covert mobilization, under the guise of exercises, and their level of mechanization was high. It is another matter that part of the formations and associations, the same mechanized corps, were in a state of formation.
But this is not the main thing. You could not understand, and I apparently explain to you, that the fact is that, without good theoretical training, the top leadership of the RKKA allowed what you are talking about. And without the announcement of mobilization, it was possible to have units and formations of the maximum complete composition in the border districts, and to concentrate them, so that to effectively counter the Blitzkrieg strategy. The mere fact that the main blow was not delivered where we expected it says a lot. And in this, in particular, the fault of the general, at that time, Zhukov G.K.

[strannik1985]

mechanization level

In the KOVO rifle formations, the number of vehicles ranged from 63 to 62 SD 5 A to 395 159 SD 6 A with a full-time 558 vehicles, more or less complete MKs were generally 2 for the entire army: the 4th and 6th. At the same time, according to BUS-1941, 1 cars were attracted throughout the country (and 680 horses, with the need of more than 57 thousand MP-500).

But this is not the point

You do not understand, see the materials of the all-army meeting of the command staff of the Red Army in December 1940 on the army defensive operation and "considerations ..." from 1938 (Shaposhnikov), 1940 (Meretskov), 1941 (Zhukov). They all presuppose an offensive after concentration, you cannot assemble in advance, without knowing the exact date of the attack, the troops are on the border, they need to conduct combat training, there will be nowhere to study. Therefore, they were going to attack as the first signs of preparation for an attack would be determined.

[svp67]

Quote: strannik1985

Therefore, they were going to attack as the first signs of the preparation of the attack were determined.

The configuration of the troops does not speak of our readiness for delivering the first strike, for defense, active, but not for the offensive

[strannik1985]

Troop configuration

She does not say anything at all, peacetime, that is, on the basis of the barracks and the educational and material base, and not the solution of military tasks.

[svp67]

Quote: strannik1985

She does not say anything at all, peacetime, that is, on the basis of the barracks and the educational and material base, and not the solution of military tasks.

Most of this on the western borders was simply not there, not the barracks, not the UMB, everything was created, by the hands of the same soldiers. Parts were housed where intended by the deployment plan.

[strannik1985]

Most of this

You can live in dugouts / wards / buildings of prisons / synagogues, etc., but for the landfill / tankodrome / shooting range / VAP you need an "ownerless" area, most of them were WP facilities, all the rest of the land was used in one way or another. And so they crammed them beyond measure, the tank divisions of the spring 1941 formation consistently lacked them.

[VS]

Quote: svp67

the laval strike was not done where we were waiting for it says a lot

nonsense - KNEW in the General Staff WHERE WHERE WILL BE A MAJOR strike)))

[svp67]

Quote: V.S.

nonsense - KNEW in the General Staff WHERE WHERE WILL BE A MAJOR strike)))

You know, your words are just words. And there are documents ...
Especially important
Top secret
Only personally
The instance is unique.
Central Committee of the CPSU (b)
comrade STALIN
comrade MOLOTOV
In connection with the major organizational measures being carried out in the Red Army in 1941, I am reporting to you an updated plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East:
... III. PROBABLY OPPOSIVE OPPOSITION PLANS
The General Staff does not have documentary data on the operational plans of potential adversaries both in the West and in the East.
The most likely assumptions about the strategic deployment of potential adversaries may be:
In the West.
Germany is likely to deploy its main forces. in the southeast from Siedlec to Hungary in order to strike at Berdichev, Kiev to capture Ukraine.

This strike, apparently, will be accompanied by an auxiliary strike in the north from East Prussia to Dvinsk and Riga or by concentric attacks from the side of Suwalki and Brest to Volkovysk, Baranovichi ...
...
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR
Marshal of the Soviet Union
__________________WITH. Tymoshenko
Chief of General Staff K.A.
army General
__________________ G. ZHUKOV
.
Executor
major general (signature) VASILEVSKY
11.3.41

Everything turned out exactly the opposite.

[Strashila]

The Soviet command assumed such a development of events, taking into account the experience of the civil war. The military was trained, but in practice, everything turned out differently, they were mentally not ready to fight in the encirclement.

[bubalik]

,, I would like to note that the mobilization activities with the outbreak of war were carried out at a high level. Using the example of yesterday’s article, the regiment was deployed in less than a week across the state and departed for the front. And in fact, reservists retreating with battles all 1941 restrained the enemy.

[itarnmag]

One of the main reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the first period of the war was the lack of modern communications. Neither tanks, nor aircraft, nor other military units of the middle or lower echelon had radio communications. The German general Mellentin claimed that a tank with radio communications was ten times more efficient than a tank without radio communications. In addition, literally on the eve of the war, the Germans sent sabotage groups to our territory for the sole purpose of cutting off telephone lines, which was successfully done. And remember Konstantin Simonov, when he wrote how our signalman crawls with a large coil of telephone cable, and a German bastard with a small coil

[ccsr]

Quote: itarnmag

. Neither tanks, nor aircraft, nor other military units of the middle and lower echelon had radio communications.

This is not entirely true, because transceiver radios were available in command tanks and on some aircraft. But in general, the means of communication were catastrophically lacking, and this was a mistake in the pre-war planning of our armed forces, and first of all Tukhachevsky, who did not understand what problems would arise when managing a large number of mobile equipment during a maneuver war in the absence of means of communication.

Quote: itarnmag

The German general Mellentin claimed that a tank with radio communications was ten times more efficient than a tank without radio communications.

This is of course a figurative comparison, but the essence is correctly noted - it was the developed radio communications that allowed the Germans to organize joint actions of the ground forces and German reconnaissance aircraft in real time, which we practically did not have until the end of the war.

Quote: itarnmag

literally on the eve of the war, the Germans sent sabotage groups to our territory for the sole purpose of cutting off telephone lines, which was successfully done.

Here I think that there is some incorrect assessment of the actions of German intelligence, which was specially distributed by the Beria department to hide the failure of our counterintelligence activities on the eve of the war. Actually, the agents that acted on our territory, and not the groups, saboteurs, abandoned on the eve of June 22, did more harm to us, although they did us much harm.

Quote: itarnmag

And remember Konstantin Simonov, when he wrote how our signalman crawls with a large coil of telephone cable, and a German bastard with a small coil

This is also an exaggeration, because our coils were not much heavier than the German ones. But we experienced a shortage of field cable and wires, and our quality was worse than German, which is why the signalmen tried at the first opportunity to use the captured German field cable, which our signalmen specially hunted for.

[Yamato1980]

Yes, with radio communications, everyone had problems, including the Wehrmacht.

[svp67]

Quote: Yamato1980

Yes, with radio communications, everyone had problems, including the Wehrmacht.

But at that time the Wehrmacht had no radio fear, and in the Red Army such a phenomenon was noted when radio stations were simply not used because of the fear that the Germans would open fire on their signal with artillery or bombers arrive. There was a special Bet order on this.

[sevtrash]

The reason for such defeats is clear and understandable - the full qualitative, somewhere quantitative, advantage of the German army. Based on a higher educational level of the population, the quality of vocational training, the experience of military operations.

[Lekz]

The reason for such defeats is clear and understandable - the full qualitative, somewhere quantitative, advantage of the German army.

I would write differently. "... a complete quantitative, somewhere qualitative, advantage of the German army." We are talking about quantitative superiority here and now. Not at all.

[BREAKTHROUGH READY]

The reason for such defeats is clear and understandable - the full qualitative, somewhere quantitative, advantage of the German army.

This is the catch, neither quantitatively nor qualitatively, the Red Army was not inferior to the Wehrmacht, and the fleet did have an advantage in the region. It seems to me that the main trouble was in the general unsatisfactory level of training: starting from ordinary tankers, many of whom simply did not know how to fire from a cannon (the command saved shells and motor resources), and ending with the supreme commander-in-chief, who repressed the scouts who carried the "bad news about the coming war. "

[mat-vey]

Quote: READY FOR BREAKTHROUGH

starting from simple tankers, many of whom simply did not know how to fire from a cannon (the command saved shells and motor resources)

And what do your circles say about this? What did these Herods save?

[chenia]

The main reason is the lack of BP (due to constant reorganizations). moreover, in the most technologically difficult branches of the armed forces.
The number of prisoners is significant. there were 4 times more of them over the given period. than in 1942 (also not very successful). It shows. that we didn’t have any platoons, mouth. battalions (as combat teams).
We had to throw at the Germans essentially new recruits, with unfamiliar people in units. Units and units of the NKVD with better training were the most combat-ready, and shot down in combat units.
As soon as divisions appeared in the divisions with 3-4 months training, an offensive near Moscow happened.
In 1942, German operations were of a similar nature, but they had already met with resistance from more trained units, which did not even crumble around (and this was not in a wooded area, but in the steppes where it is more difficult to secretly leave the environment than in the forests of Belarus and northern Ukraine.

All other reasons (from the unsuccessful operational formation of troops to radio) are of a secondary nature.

[Angrybeard]

In principle, the work of the historian Isaev and other documents made it possible to take a sober look at the causes of the disaster 41. But the question is different, why the hell already knows how long Russia allows the West to achieve technological and organizational advantages, allowing over and over again not only to think but to actually invade a huge country. To blame everything on tyrants for tyrants or sanctions is possible but one must also learn from their mistakes, otherwise the cover.
Engines from Mann and Ukraine, space is simply littered with managers from God, their own processors are riveted in Taiwan where everything can end with one shout from behind a puddle, with such baggage entered the 21st century and could not change much from the age of 14 when it became completely understandable that a fight is inevitable .

[WayKheThuo]

The article is very good - it clearly shows the severity of the first months of the war, the colossal miscalculations of the military leadership of the USSR and Stalin personally in preparation for the war.
Although, when we, such smart ones, talk about "miscalculations", it is necessary to understand that what is now seen as obvious and simple was not at all so in 1941 and, making remarks about the USSR's unpreparedness for war, we must keep in mind that we , ordinary people who do not really want to disassemble the archives of the Ministry of Defense will never realize either the entire complexity of the pre-war situation, a faint glimpse reflected in the archival documents, or experience the severity of decision-making on such a scale on their own skin.
One note:

Despite all the misses of command and the failure of the first months of the war, the country gathered forces for a decisive throw on Berlin for almost four years and won ...

The author, formulate your thought, please, more clearly. What do you mean, "4 years of gathering forces to throw on Berlin"? From this phrase it follows that somewhere near Moscow until 1944 they were gathering forces, and then in 1 year they reached Berlin. This is not the case.
I think so.

[Force multiplier]

the unpreparedness of the Soviet command personnel of all levels to conduct a modern war, the miscalculations of the high command about the place of the Germans delivering the main blow, the unsuccessful formation of mechanized corps cumbersome to manage and not equipped with equipment without the corresponding services for maintenance, repair, evacuation and supply of fuel and lubricants, the lack of training of personnel in using equipment, unsuccessful deployment of almost all mechanized corps in the western border districts and their defeat in border battles, ill-conceived counter-offensives of mechanized corps in first days of war and a number of others

This is a standard and fundamentally wrong explanation. All the same, the book "Icebreaker" left a strong imprint on the consciousness of the masses. For some reason, it is generally accepted that the task of the mechanized corps was to go almost to the English Channel and they needed "the appropriate services for maintenance, repair, evacuation and supply of fuels and lubricants." And what if we assume that the goal of forming the MC was different and the tasks were different. To solve which they, quite by accident, of course, found themselves with the beginning of the war just at the right time in the right place. And these MKs come in very handy (what a coincidence) were not burdened with cumbersome logistic services, which in June 1941 would simply paralyze traffic on all roads in the border areas, which in turn would make it impossible for Soviet troops to withdraw from the border in an organized manner.

The main burden of guilt for the disaster nevertheless lies with the miscalculations of the Soviet leadership and high command, which allowed the Germans to carry out their plan

The plan was to destroy the main forces of the Red Army west of the Dnieper, the Germans failed to carry out, because the task was impossible in principle. It is thanks to the strategic decisions of the Soviet leadership

[mat-vey]

Quote: Force Multiplier

But what if we assume that the goal of forming the MK was different and the tasks were set for them by others.

Not a single building has been fully formed. You ask what was planned for the state and what was in reality.

[victor50]

Quote: Force Multiplier

And these MKs, by the way (what a coincidence) were not burdened with bulky rear services, which in June 1941 would simply paralyze traffic on all roads in the border regions, which in turn would make the organized departure of Soviet troops from the border impossible

In your opinion, they did not need the rear at all? How should they be provided with ammunition and fuel?

[Force multiplier]

Let's imagine. MK is fully equipped, new tanks from the factory, the service life and technical condition are in order, the hulls have full rear services and will be able to get to Berlin. Comes on June 22nd. How will the fate of such an MC differ in this situation from the fate of real MCs? Nothing. But the bulk of the lost tanks would not have been worn-out junk but new vehicles from the factory. And full-fledged rear services in the process of advancing and deploying corps block the roads, making movement impossible. Given the development and condition of the road network, this would have disastrous consequences for the 1st echelon troops. That is, the result is even worse than with "incomplete" cases. And so it turns out that those same "incomplete" MKs were in the right place, had the required number of combat-ready vehicles with an optimal ratio of their types, with the necessary motor resource, fuel and ammunition reserves for the border battle. That is, precisely for the situation in which they found themselves in reality. An amazing coincidence, especially in light of the stories that the Soviet top military leadership was "wrong", "did not understand modern warfare", "corps are overloaded with tanks", etc.

[mat-vey]

Quote: Force Multiplier

A full-fledged rear services in the process of extension and deployment of buildings block roads, making movement impossible.

Why do they do this? Who taught them how to block the road? And for what purpose?

[Octopus]

Quote: Force Multiplier

Conceived - to destroy the main forces of the Red Army west of the Dnieper, the Germans failed to implement,

Just succeeded beyond all expectations.

But they did not know that the USSR was ready for a total war, so this army was not his last. They generally did not understand well about the total war in the 41st.

[faterdom]

Apparently the propaganda apparatus was not effective either. After all, among other things - 1,5 million prisoners - they almost all believed that they were saving their lives ...
But in fact, if they knew the truth, there would not have been so many in captivity, and the Germans would have had much more problems. Imagine a million "Roman Filippovs", all the more organized after all, and representing controlled units - the Germans would have felt in July that everything was going very wrongly (they actually understood this in the fall). Something, but they could then defeat communications, certainly no worse than the partisans of 44.
But this, as an additional factor, the main one, of course, is the complete loss of control and communication by Pavlov and his staff (in my opinion, such a formulation of his accusations, and not at all treason), the fear and inability of the commanders to command, to take responsibility for their decisions. Simonovsky "Serpilin" was not a frequent exception at that time in such positions.

[Operator]

The main reason for the 1941 boilers was the panic of the Soviet command of the front-line level at any breakthrough of the enemy on the flags. After the first news of such an event, immediately (or with a slight delay) an order was given to retreat instead of delivering statutory / planned attacks on the attacking flanks.

Parts of the Red Army threw heavy weapons that weighed on them and tried to retreat on foot (there weren’t enough vehicles for everyone), but they didn’t have time and stumbled on the enemy’s motorized units, which closed the encirclement.

A textbook example is the boiler in the Bialystok ledge: instead of striking the flanks of the wedges of the Germans (provided for in the pre-war documents and worked out at the command and staff exercises), the commander of the Western Front Pavlov ordered the retreat. On foot marching on foot without equipment, ammunition and food, they were expectedly captured.

Future boilers came mainly from those who had access to scarce vehicles, which allowed them to move faster than German tanks.

[chenia]

Quote: Operator

The main reason for the 1941 boilers was the panic of the Soviet front-level command during any breakthrough of the enemy on the flags.

Not. Panic was present among the generals in 1943 (Kursk Bulge), but the Germans were "cooked".
I have already said a thousand times about the absence of a power supply. And that means we had no platoons, companies, and battalions.
But in 1943 units could already fight (and did not break up), which allowed them to gain time. Mass formations (like combat teams) of the lower level appeared at the end of 41. Already in 1942 we had four fewer prisoners (in the given time interval), and this despite the schools of large bosses.

[Operator]

Low combat training of the Red Army, lack of experience in conducting large-scale military operations, undeveloped cover army (sic!), The withdrawal of military formations and the removal of rear services to the state border, the disarmament of the capital defense line on the old border, the lack of new models of tanks and aircraft, the scant amount of radio communications and unwillingness to use it, etc. etc. - all this was available.

But this does not abolish alarmism at the level of command of the Red Army fronts - the main reason for the boiler completion of each operation of the Wehrmacht army groups in 1941.

[chenia]

Quote: Operator

lack of experience in conducting large-scale military operations,

Our military art was not inferior to German, and sometimes ahead of (in the middle of the war, operational and operational-tactical even surpassed). Of course, our big bosses (and these are the divisional commanders and brigade commanders) did not yet know how to set up the machine as a front and control it.
But the schools of the commanders of 1942 (and significant) did not lead to such losses in the troops (they lost territories. There was a case), as it was in 1941

Quote: Operator

the bias of military formations and the removal of rear services to the state border,

Yes. I agree. But this is the loss of the first operational echelon. And then things didn’t get better with us?

Quote: Operator

disarmament of the capital defense line on the old border,

Well, on Baloton, no one built defensive reinforced concrete structures (an ordinary echeloned defense. And not the steepest front (3rd UV, one TC and 2 MK) "calmed" two Wehrmacht tank armies (6 TA SS rolled into needles). that trained troops. it is quickly occupied and improved.

Quote: Operator

the lack of knowledge of new models of tanks and aircraft, the meager amount of radio communications and their unwillingness to use it, etc. etc.

And it was. But when you find out. how many equipment (including new) got to the Germans you understand that something is not right. But the NKVD troops with the worst (light) weapons fought better).

I do not deny the reasons you have sounded above, but the main thing is the lack of elementary training of troops, and hence the confusion and uncertainty at the level of platoons, companies and battalions.

And there, no matter how brilliant the commander and his staff were (though such commanders do not have such troops), he will not succeed.

[Operator]

In general, I agree with your theses, except for the latter - specific 1941 boilers are a direct derivative of the alarmism of the Red Army comforters.

[chenia]

Quote: Operator

specific 1941 boilers are a direct derivative of the alarmism of the Red Army comforters.

Correctly. And not only boilers. But already an offensive in the South. went according to another scenario. Generality then too. as always (here you are right). but the commanders withdrew their companies and battalions. The Germans were then surprised (there were still many who were in the first battles of 1941), that with the same scale of encirclement there were few prisoners.
Poorly trained and unfamiliar people simply can not stand up to war. And this is what we started the war with before the Moscow battle.

[naidas]

Quote: chenia

I have already said a thousand times about the absence of a power supply. And that means we had no platoons, companies, and battalions.

And did the Kwantung Army have BP? The defeat was less than a month and captured 600 thousand.

[chenia]

Quote: naidas

The defeat in less than a month and captured 600 thousand

And you only confirm my thesis. Well, we would have lost 600 thousand in 1941, we would have stopped the Germans on the Dnieper and in the forests of Belarus. Here you still need to know, Kwantung was cut. blocked. cut off from communications and lost control, but she surrendered by order of the emperor. And to knock out (or rather kill) them from the fortified areas (and partly had to. To do this) would have to take longer). Well, the Red Army of 1945, this is not the Wehrmacht 1941.

[naidas]

Quote: chenia

And you only confirm my thesis.

Quote: chenia

I have already said a thousand times about the absence of a power supply.

And what I confirm the absence of BP in the Kwantung army created since 1919.

[chenia]

Quote: naidas

And what I confirm the absence of BP in the Kwantung army created since 1919.

What are you talking about? The Kwantung army surrendered by order. And so it would have fumbled in our rear areas. And ours in 1941 unfortunately surrendered, sometimes and often. on his own initiative. The confusion among our generals was also present in 1942, but the units knew their task. were trained and shot down in combat teams, and they completed tasks regardless of the absence of orders from their bosses (prisoners lost four times less in the given time period) ..
Here you should read the thoughts of Momysh-Ula on this subject.

[naidas]

Do not jump, you write about the lack of power supply in 1941. the Red Army, respectively, and boilers and defeats.
Since 1919, the Kwantung Army also did not have a BP, since it was a defeat. That's right.

[Octopus]

Quote: naidas

Were the Kwantung army BP?

No. The Kwantung army arr of the summer of the 45th is a collective farm.

Quote: naidas

The defeat in less than a month and captured 600 thousand.

On August 9, the USSR began hostilities, the second bomb flew in the same day, the next day the Japanese Foreign Ministry announced its readiness to surrender, on the 14th an order was issued. What you call a "rout" is the gathering of units of the surrendered army, the fight against unorganized resistance from individual units.

Quote: chenia

RKKA sample 1945, this is not the Wehrmacht 1941.

Not even close to the Wehrmacht 41.

[naidas]

I agree. Just

Quote: chenia

I have already said a thousand times about the absence of a power supply.

It’s just not the point.

[chenia]

Quote: Octopus

Not even close to the Wehrmacht 41.

That's for sure. Had a blow to Mech. The hulls at the beginning of the Second World War were carried out by the Red Army of the sample 1944-1945. .that we would be at least on the Vistula, and the maximum on the Spree.
In 1941, the Wehrmacht was completely empty - stuffed with shitty weapons. and implementing stupid tactics of battle groups.

[Octopus]

Quote: chenia

In 1941, the Wehrmacht was completely empty - stuffed with shitty weapons.

Do not understand. You Red Army of the 41st want to give IS / ISU / SU-100?

I'm talking about the relative strength of the army and its opponents.

[chenia]

Quote: Octopus

I'm talking about the relative strength of the army and its opponents.

And I'm talking about the absolute.

.

Quote: Octopus

Do not understand. You Red Army of the 41st want to give IS / ISU / SU-100?

Equipment and weapons were enough then. And if it is in the hands of trained fighters, led by experienced commanders, with a command able to carry out appropriate events, and normal rear services

[Evgeny Goncharov (smoogg)]

Had a blow to Mech. The hulls at the beginning of the Second World War were carried out by the Red Army of the sample 1944-1945.

It’s a pity that there is no way to get along without the fellow soldiers.

[chenia]

Quote: Evgeny Goncharov (smoogg)

It’s a pity that there is no way to get along without the fellow soldiers.

Actually, this is an argument in terms of the importance of BP.
It’s hard for you to see. I'll try it easier.
For example, a person who was only explained how to drive a car, immediately put behind the wheel and on the road. in the big city and rush hour. Continue to continue, or do you allow yourself?

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

That's for sure. Had a blow to Mech. The hulls at the beginning of the Second World War were carried out by the Red Army of the sample 1944-1945. .that we would be at least on the Vistula, and the maximum on the Spree.

You started it up and very much - in 1941 we didn’t have field communication facilities to control troops over long distances, and some radio stations in cavalry divisions were still transported by carts. The prewar rate on the People’s Commissar of Communications put an end to our ability to command troops far from our borders. I’m far from exaggerating the role of Lend-Lease and speculation around its scale, but I note that the Americans helped us seriously in equipping the communications forces with at least cable and wires. By the way, we worked with special teams that shot German radio stations and put them on our equipment. This was also the case with the communication technology supplied by the Americans - it was put instead of ours.
In general, we would hardly have succeeded in what you dream of.

Quote: chenia

In 1941, the Wehrmacht was completely empty - stuffed with shitty weapons. and implementing stupid tactics of battle groups.

Completely unfounded conclusion. On the contrary, in 1941 no one was taken to the Wehrmacht, in general, these were the best men in Germany who had behind them the experience of several companies, were distinguished by their training and endurance, as well as smelling gunpowder. The same can be said about the command staff, trained in the Reichswehr and well versed in military affairs. It is precisely this combination that was the key to their successful actions during the initial period of the war against the USSR. Problems with the personnel began already by the summer of 1942, when some commanders began to note the poor preparedness of the reservists arriving at the front — at least I read it in some reports that are on the network.

[chenia]

Quote: ccsr

You started it up and very much - in 1941 we didn’t have field means of communication,

At that level of professionalism at all levels of the Red Army arr. 1944, the means of communication were with the head. And in armament in 1941. we excelled the german.

Quote: ccsr

overall, these were the best men in Germany who had the experience of several companies

Experience (two months) against an unstable opponent. This did not teach, but corrupted the Wehrmacht. In the operational plan, they generally stopped in development (in the main form of a DB offensive). 1942 in this peak of the Wehrmacht in every way.

Quote: ccsr

some commanders began to note the poor preparedness of the reservists

Well, it was necessary to justify some failures (even in offensive operations), although it was clear that the Red Army had changed. Well, their stupid tenacity to rely on the tactical level, where much depends on the level of commanders to the battalion (maximum regimental level).

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

At that level of professionalism at all levels of the Red Army arr. 1944, the means of communication were with the head.

Everything is not so brilliant, because throughout the war we lagged behind the Wehrmacht in communications. For example, the first hardware long-distance communications with us appeared only in 1942, and we had no radio relay stations at all.

Quote: chenia

And in armament in 1941. we excelled the german.

I won’t convince you of anything, but there is one fact that explains a lot - about 34 design changes were made to our best T-800 tank during the four years of the war, and this tells a lot to specialists with what equipment we entered the war.

Quote: chenia

Well, their stupid tenacity to rely on the tactical level, where much depends on the level of commanders to the battalion (maximum regimental level).

In fact, the war was won not by generals at the level of front-line commanders, but namely company and battalion commanders, who were supposed to realize the plans of the command in combat operations of the units entrusted to them. You simply do not know how the training of troops is given, unlike the training of military leaders - these are completely different tasks.

[chenia]

Quote: ccsr

the best T-34 tank in four years of the war made about 800 changes

Of course. But that amount of technology. moreover, not only tanks, and the level of training was able to defeat the entire strike force. And a more professionally prepared battle, and from not very reliable equipment, will squeeze out as much as possible.

1945 Balaton. one field and two tank armies against the secondary 3 UV (such a strike previously brought down a whole direction). The front had 1 TC (in the state of 1940 it is essentially a little more than TD) and 2 MK). Purely defensive event. The result is known. And for example, instead of ZIS-2, for example, we will have F-22 which is T-2, T-3 in the forehead and at the limit with the removal of the engine, and T-4 (of that modification), too, but without removal.

Quote: ccsr

namely, the commanders of companies and battalions, which were to realize the plans of the command in combat operations of the units entrusted to them.

It’s not strange that I just emphasized the importance of the level of units, and suddenly I declare the opposite.
Just a measure. For example, as gunners (and I’m just from this opera), the Germans were stronger than us. But in terms of organization, two heads lower. I will not subtleties-long). Our organization (tactics of the division level and beyond) allowed us to essentially exclude most artillery from tedious calculations (the level of preparation of com.batteries was low). Some overspending, yes. but the pace of attack during the breakthrough of layered defense is higher. Here would be the ability to massage artillery, and about the artillery attack. Yes, it's a long time.
The Germans' BG (reinforced infantry regiment) is obliged (with its headquarters) to delay the task of the day of the division. Our joint venture closest task is the first position (and even the first line, well, from the nature of the enemy’s defense), and then almost all the dowry is taken away. (Well, it remains for some secondary tasks to facilitate the fulfillment of the immediate task of the older formation). Next, the next regiment pulls the strap. and with a new gain.
The Germans’s firepower is spread across units (well, what about the platoon soul of the battle, and as a conductor, he must control both machine gun flutes and a tank and one or a couple of mortars. And it’s not necessary to take them away. To the regimental level.
And at the winged. even battalion artillery (second tier) can perform tasks in the interests of the neighboring unit. Fire support and escort is mainly a headache for a senior boss. The transfer of fire (even forbidden at the level of divisions) of the early art division at the request of the combined arms chief (usually KP and above).

Quote: ccsr

You just don’t know how military training is given

Yes, where are we with two floats.

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

Yes, where are we with two floats.

Something I doubt that you graduated from the General Staff Academy - my horizons are somehow limited.

Quote: chenia

Of course. But that amount of technology. moreover, not only tanks, and the level of training was able to defeat the entire strike force. And a more professionally prepared battle, and from not very reliable equipment, will squeeze out as much as possible.

What are you saying - apparently, even during the ascent of the units, they did not see how the faulty equipment was being towed in tow from the park in order to achieve a treasured mark for the state of equipment and weapons. To whom are you telling all this that a fighter can squeeze something out of a broken equipment if there is no sensible zampotech nearby? Don’t tell me, I’ve been involved in the entire service with equipment and weapons, which is why I understand the reasons for the situation with our personnel army in June-August 1941.

[chenia]

Quote: ccsr

I'm that you graduated from the GSh Academy -

Have you graduated from military school with the VU badge? Happenes.
Well, what about the horizons that I know. about that and know
And I’m not trying to fantasize, because I threw the old one (65 years old) and boots with a sword belt for several decades into the closet.

Quote: ccsr

apparently, even during the lifting of the parts, they did not see how the faulty equipment was being pulled from the park in tow,

In. just an indicator of the coherence of the unit. The malfunctions of the battle group, as a rule, are insignificant - the fuel system, battery, compressed cylinder are clogged. and the little things. But this is not a reason to throw equipment on the side of the road units, or even parts.

Quote: ccsr

Do not tell me, I’ve been involved in the entire service with equipment and weapons, which is why I understand the reasons

And here I am more and more with people (although there was also enough technology). and I know very well how much time it takes to make a combat-ready unit (and basically a platoon, company, even a battalion, this is essentially an addition of quantities). Even trained fighters, this is not yet a combat team, must undergo an internal crystallization, as if an unregistered hierarchy (whom to rely on. Who to hope for, who to support). Not this, everything crumbles. everyone is going to survive alone.
An indicator of this is the number of prisoners (not dead who fought even on faulty equipment). when there was even a working equipment with full BC.

And under the same conditions in 1942, our people lost just four less prisoners (the equipment didn’t get much better. Along with radio. And other technical reasons).
I do not deny. that a lot of factors were superimposed, but the main thing I indicated.
ALL.

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

Have you graduated from military school with the VU badge? Happenes.

No, I studied for five years. But this is not the point, but how you were able to use the knowledge gained.

Quote: chenia

An indicator of this is the number of prisoners (not dead who fought even on faulty equipment). when there was even a working equipment with full BC.

It is rather an indicator of poor preparation of the command line, or lack of commanders in general, because personnel should always know that they are controlled by a competent commander, otherwise they will be lost in a difficult situation.

Quote: chenia

And under the same conditions in 1942, our people lost just four less prisoners

This is natural - the year of the war taught our fighters a lot. But not only that - the Germans themselves suffered such losses that they could no longer have full-blooded units with well-trained reservists, and naturally the combat readiness of their units became lower than in 1941.

Quote: chenia

I do not deny. that a lot of factors

And I do not deny it, but the main thing of course was the combat experience we got.

[chenia]

Quote: ccsr

No, I studied for five years.

Military engineering school (maybe even an academy).

Quote: ccsr

poor command team training,

Do you think. That the pre-war KV (with 2-year training at the Higher Military School) is weaker than ml.L-ta with a six-month training in wartime. You studied for 5 years, and you will say that you can train an engineer in 1,5 years (there aren’t unique ones, but in large numbers).
The pre-war scale of the reorganization of the Armed Forces completely excludes the concept of BP.
And then I know what I'm saying. Several times participated in both the deployment and the redeployment of the unit. Moreover, this is not all from scratch, and with a constant and experienced team of commanders. Half a year leaves. in order to somehow establish a more or less high-quality PSU (especially if previously there was a part of a. other kind of troops) .. When deploying, it’s easier to prepare for six months., three weeks of torment. But this is a regiment base. where the park and all the equipment was in the boxes and the whole set from gas station, PTOR, warehouses, battery room and to water heating. Training classes. training fields, shooting ranges. screw range, etc. and all this is.

And if on a bare spot, and if the commanders, then they arrive, then they constantly decrease. And you change too. not yet accustomed to the previous place of service (and with an increase not yet accustomed to the previous position, 3-4 times in two years).

Yes, at that pace. you won’t even know the names of your subordinates and commanders.
Well, what you had to do, you as a military should know.
And be the most excellent technique. the result would be the same.

Quote: ccsr

the Germans themselves suffered such losses that they could no longer have full-blooded units with well-trained reservists,

But of course not without it, but in this regard it was even worse in this regard.

Quote: ccsr

became our combat experience.

Experience can be gained when you already have an idea about the subject of activity.
And if not. or minuscule, then experience is lost with doom or captivity. Yes, we slowed down the Germans (with huge losses of practically untrained and unfamiliar fighters), until more trained formations appeared, which could perceive experience.)

And after Moscow, the Germans became more experienced and smarter (no longer impudent). Oh, how could
Guderian's punishment in 1941 is only a pity to no one. But under Rostov it turned out.

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

Do you think. That the pre-war KV (with 2-year training at the Higher Military School) is weaker than ml.L-ta with a six-month training in wartime.

No I do not think so.

Quote: chenia

The pre-war scale of the reorganization of the Armed Forces completely excludes the concept of BP.

This is also extreme, because you should be well aware that the question of artillery, which appeared at the training grounds on the eve of the war, was asked by Pokrovsky:

4. Why was most artillery located in training centers?

Although it’s foolish to deny that the equipment of the new state border distracted personnel from combat training, when one of the battalions (divisions) of the regiment went to build URs.

Quote: chenia

And be the most excellent technique. the result would be the same.

Here I cannot agree, because too many non-combat losses of our armored vehicles occurred in the first months of the war. According to some sources, we lost up to 40% of equipment not in battle, but simply because of breakdowns, inept driving and lack of fuel.

Quote: chenia

but it was even worse in this regard.

We had a greater human resource, and moreover, we were able to organize a large-scale partisan movement in the occupied territory, which is not always remembered.

Quote: chenia

And after Moscow, the Germans became more experienced and smarter (no longer impudent).

So we learned something - after all, it’s not in vain that they think in a war for three years that training goes faster.

[chenia]

Quote: ccsr

which ended up on the eve of the war,

Camp artillery gathering (and I’m just an artilleryman) is an event from the time of the king. Why didn’t I understand what Pavlov (Kirponos, the general deployment began at the end of the first decade of June) in August (as the commander could with a slight movement of the pen) is not clear to me? In terms of BP artillery has always been a special plan. For troops of constant readiness, a field exit is almost complete readiness.
But first of all, they’re located, hell knows where (and this is up to 200 km. Or even more) from the places where their formations and units are concentrated, which have advanced according to the cover plan.
Secondly, it is necessary to return (at least partly) in order to pick up BC and property from turnover warehouses and refueling facilities, which is necessary in the transport units.
Thirdly, to carry out domobilization (the state is peaceful 70%), but this can be done along the way and redirected to the area of ​​concentration.

Quote: ccsr

Here I can’t agree

If we are talking about a more experienced army, this also applies to the rear services and technical support. Yes, and military units know what is needed first. Harnessed with transport, then the main capacity (if for fuel) and military equipment. GPZ and avant-garde in lightweight, the rest with manat. The plot of the battle (and the experienced will not show the enemy, the Vanguard binds. The others throw off the embarrassment and turn around.

And here in 1941, not only combat operations, but even the organization of the march at all levels could not be carried out (not providing the most minimal, no cover), complete chaos.

Quote: ccsr

So we learned something

Undoubtedly.
You understand, I do not deny the reasons for the failures that you have listed, I just emphasize the main thing.
Where is the reason for such a low resistance of our army at the beginning of the war?
Yes, individual units and subdivisions were on top. But in general.
Although the NKVD units and border guards (who were less affected by the reorganization and had shot down collectives), although they had light weapons, were once the most staunch formations of the outbreak of war.

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

Camp artillery gathering (and I’m just an artilleryman) is an event from the time of the king. Why didn’t I understand what Pavlov (Kirponos, the general deployment began at the end of the first decade of June) in August (as the commander could with a slight movement of the pen) is not clear to me?

Actually, the combat training plans of the districts are approved by the People’s Commissar (Minister) of Defense in the fall of the previous year and at least a GS directive is required to change them. So the commanders of the districts have no right to change them - you simply do not know, but I know that. So they carried out these plans, although of course it was necessary to change them, but not all commanders were eager to do this, if only because the use of polygons was planned in advance. And for disrupting the combat training plan, one can fly off one’s post - that’s why they didn’t rush to report to the addict. I admit that they should have taken the initiative in Moscow, but it seems that they themselves really did not know what to do.

Quote: chenia

And here in 1941, not only combat operations, but even the organization of the march at all levels could not be carried out (not providing the most minimal, no cover), complete chaos.

I do not deny that our army was weak compared to the German one, but I can’t understand why at the beginning of the war our top military leadership could not at least completely withdraw the border units from the PPS and send them to positions according to the PP of the districts. After all, if we compare the actions of Zakharov and the sailors, then for some reason they had minimal losses, and as it turned out, primarily because they had withdrawn troops and ships from the first strike. It turns out that organizational confusion has come to us so sideways that you will think about whose fault it took place and why our generals do not like to remember about it.

[chenia]

Quote: ccsr

Actually, the combat training plans of the districts

In fact, they are too general in terms of activities and deadlines. Of course there is .. to strengthen .. to pay attention,. To get, hold .. - where more or less specific. And the event is periodic from ... to (interval a couple of months).
Much more important, more accurate and more specific are the district’s BP management plans for study periods (six months). And this is determined by the commander.

Quote: ccsr

So the commanders of the districts are not entitled to change them - you simply don’t know

The commander (in my time) is independently entitled to declare FULL combat alertness (although most likely he will not risk it).

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

In fact, they are too general in terms of activities and deadlines.

This is not so, because a large number of troops must be moved, and in order not to create problems for the national economy, they try to not all troops to study at the same time. At least in my time it was so, and I remember only once that the KSH was canceled, and even then in connection with the withdrawal of troops from the group. Detailing, of course, takes place in the district, but they cannot change the terms without instructions from the General Staff.

Quote: chenia

The commander (in my time) is independently entitled to declare FULL combat readiness

In fact, the enemy’s attack on the district, he is simply obliged to take such a decision - just like any commander of the ship who in this situation opens fire to defeat.

[Yamato1980]

You should at least study why Pavlov gave the order to retreat, and when studying it turns out that the rockers from the Guderian group sowed operational documents of his group. Documents were delivered to Pavlov only a day later (well done too) and when he saw that a tank group was operating in the Brest direction, and not individual tanks as he was informed, he immediately made the only right decision to cancel the planned attack and give an order for an urgent withdrawal to the Minsk UR line . If the order went at least a day earlier, there were chances to jump out of at least a bottleneck near Lida-Novogrudok. By the way, Pavlov, unlike Kirponos, is distinguished in a positive way by the fact that he made decisions independently, without coordination with Moscow. Not afraid to take responsibility.

[Jarserge]

To consider the defeat of the 1941 Red Army without analyzing the defeats of France and England is illogical and generally wrong. The picture looks almost the same. All that pseudo-historians and liberals have wound up is simply idiocy. Losses are greater for two reasons, we resisted, and the Germans did not count us as people and treated accordingly.

[Yeti suvorov]

The causes of the lesions have already been well studied and are known.
But after such articles it’s becoming more and more difficult to understand: why did ours win, despite all these reasons? ...

[BREAKTHROUGH READY]

What is there to understand, even despite the victory of the OSI in the early years of the war, the economy, the level of production and reserves of the anti-Hitler coalition still exceeded their indicators by several times. German and Japanese blitzkriegs failed, and in a protracted war, strategic initiative was on the other side.

[Octopus]

Quote: Yeti Suvorov

why did our win, despite all these reasons? ...

This is also well known. The Germans brilliantly performed the blitzkrieg, but they did not have a plan B. And the blitzkrieg was not what failed, it just wasn’t enough.

The allies in France faced the same situation and made the same mistake. Their blitzkrieg reached the Rhine in a month and that’s all, he got up for six months.

[Charlie]

The author, why were four armies and five mechanized corps assembled in the Bialystok ledge? What plans did they have in case of increased combat readiness and warfare, if necessary? Directly, the plans of these associations were apparently captured by the Germans, or destroyed by our commanders under the threat of capture, and we will never know about those plans. But no one captured the plans of the General Staff. Archives say open. Familiarized with the plans in our open archives. Well, they would.

[Lekz]

Why were four armies and five mechanized corps assembled in the Bialystok ledge?

As the classic used to say, "It's all about the nuances ...". On my own I will add in arithmetic with geography. There were two mechcorps, 6mk and 11mk. Moreover, the latter is rather conditionally mechanized corps, for example, a division with worn-out light tanks. And there are also two armies, 3A and 4A. About the ledge itself - it has the dimensions of the floor of Poland.
We can agree that there are few combat documents of the Zapovo. But for an example you can get acquainted with orders 0052 and 00229 from June 15 and 19, 1941 of the neighboring, PribOVO.

[xomaNN]

The victory took place on May 9 already in 1945. And if there weren't those tragic "cauldrons" of 1941? They "cooked" hundreds of thousands of regular soldiers of the Red Army. And to replace them, untrained recruits went to the front. And the lost strategic weapons depots, abandoned thousands of tanks without fuel and lubricants and shells? Such is the price of the monstrous strategic and tactical mistakes of the vertical of command from the company to the supreme ...
If there were only half of them, the red banner was erected over the Reichstag in May 1943 or 1944. So I really hope that the current leadership is introducing Suvorov's principle - "To fight not by numbers, but by skill (... I will add ... and modern weapons)"
--------
In our family, my parents went through the war from the age of 15-16 in partisans and besieged Leningrad. And the grandfather, the order-bearer, the commander of the partisan unit, died in battle in 1943.

[Lekz]

We can agree with you. How can one agree with the fact that if there were no catastrophic defeats between the French and the British in 1940, the war ended in 1940. Or do you think that there were no "strategic and tactical monstrous mistakes of the vertical of command from the company to the supreme ..."?

[victor50]

Quote: maidan.izrailovich

experience with Germans with weak opponents

Is France weak?

[faterdom]

Maybe he couldn’t get it right, but again: our 1,5 million prisoners (except those who were unconscious or incapable) hoped to survive in captivity.
Then they realized that they were mistaken, and no longer thought so in droves. And did not give up en masse.
Why do our leaders now think that surrendering to the West we will cause them a surge of sympathy and humanism? We will not challenge, and it’s time to understand this already, both for our oligarchs and the people who make decisions.
Our oligarch for the West is an Indian who has a lot of beads and fiery water. And nothing more.

[Sugar Honeyovich]

Quote: faterdom

Then they realized that they were mistaken, and no longer thought so in droves. And did not give up en masse.

Or maybe the reason is different - have learned to fight?

[Ivan Tartugai]

Quote from the article:

“One of the reasons for the tragedy of the Western Front under the command of Pavlov was miscalculation of the General Staff in determining the main blow of the Germans, proceeding from the fact that it would be delivered in the Kiev military district, and not in the Western. Everything turned out the other way around. "

The four-time Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, in an interview with writer Simonov, said:
“I still commanded the Kiev military district, when in December 1940 we held a big military game. In this game, I commanded the "blue", played for the Germans. And Pavlov, who commanded the Western Military District, played for us, commanded the "Reds", our Western Front. On the Southwestern Front, Stern played along with him. Taking the real initial data and the forces of the enemy - the Germans, I, commanding the "blue", developed operations Namely in those areas in which their Germans were developing.
He delivered his main blows where they then applied them. Groupings formed approximately as they later formed during the war. The configuration of our borders, the terrain, the situation - everything prompted me exactly such decisions, which they then prompted to the Germans.
The game lasted about eight days. The management of the game artificially slowed down the pace of advancement of the “blue”, held it. But the "blue" on the eighth day advanced to the Baranavichy District, and, I repeat, with an artificially slowed pace of progress. "
Those. great and brilliant, then being still only the commander of KOVO Hero of the Soviet Union Army General Zhukov already in December 1940 knew exactly where the Wehrmacht would be doing its main blow.
However, as soon as the Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General Zhukov became the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army for some reason forgot everything, it flew out of his head and where the Wehrmacht would attack, and where it would deliver the main blows.
Inexplicably, inexplicably, already in the post of chief of staff of the Red Army Army Hero Zhukov, a hero of the Soviet Union, suddenly began to assume that the Germans would strike the main blow with their most powerful force, not in the western direction, but precisely in the south-western direction.

[Yamato1980]

Zhukov it is certainly good, only one small nuance. The game took place only in one direction and in one district. In 1941, the General Staff had the entire border from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and it was a pleasure to guess where the cunning Fritz would deliver his main blow. All the calculations of intelligence, the actions of the Wehrmacht in other theaters, said that Ukraine is the most likely theater for the main blow.

[BREAKTHROUGH READY]

the General Staff had the entire border from the Baltic to the Black Sea and it was a pleasure to guess where the cunning Fritz would deliver his main blow.

during the threatened period, at least some sane command would have prepared defense lines in strong positions, raised the army on alert and deployed troops in the operational depths. In the middle of the 20th century, it was believed that for a successful offensive the ratio of attackers to defenders should be at least 3 to 1, and in 1941 having approximately equal forces with the enemy, the Red Army had every opportunity to break off the Wehrmacht’s teeth on the first day of the war.

All the calculations of intelligence, the actions of the Wehrmacht in other theaters, said that Ukraine is the most likely theater for the main blow.

The calculations were different, there were those who accurately indicated the time and place of the strikes. But the leadership of the country not only did not react to this information, the informants themselves were also repressed. Of course, in such conditions, there was no question of any competent construction of the country's defense.

[Yamato1980]

I would like to see how many of the thousands of field reports would choose that gold one. In 1943, having accurate data on the attack on the Kursk ledge, they even missed the definition of the main strike.
So the milestones were prepared, only they didn’t give much to fill the milestones. In general, it was such a thing to spread the troops evenly along the front, and the General Staff was well aware of this, for this the deployment of huge mechanized corps was started, because only by constantly counterattack could we count on if not stopping the attack, then at least slowing down the advance of the enemy.

[mat-vey]

Quote: Yamato1980

I would like to see how many of the thousands of field reports would choose that gold one.

So I already said-they hold the leadership of the USSR for the gods ..

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: READY FOR BREAKTHROUGH

In the middle of the 20th century, it was believed that for a successful offensive the ratio of attackers to defenders should be at least 3 to 1, and in 1941 having approximately equal forces with the enemy

When it comes to people that this ratio should be in the point of offense, and not at the front as a whole. If you and the enemy have a front of 100 divisions, and you remove 15 divisions for an offensive, then 85 against 100 will remain, that is, an enemy offensive on the entire front is impossible. But having strengthened the corresponding direction with these 15 divisions, you will gain superiority THIS DIRECTION three times or more, and will break through the enemy’s front with the introduction of divisions to its rear

[Ivan Tartugai]

Quote: Yamato1980

Zhukov it is certainly good, only one small nuance

Zhukov, of course, neither of which is good, because there is another small nuance,
namely around the same time that he was giving an interview to Simonov, where he said that knew exactly where and how the German would advance, i.e. will strike its main blows, so at the same time he was completing the writing of his memoirs, which were published in 1969.
So in his lifetime memoirs, those. he wrote them himself, signed for them himself and received a fee for them, and so in them he already wrote the following:

“More than once mentally returning to the first days of the war, I tried to comprehend and analyze the errors of an operational-strategic nature made by the military itself — the People’s Commissar, the General Staff and the command of the districts — on the eve and at the beginning of the war. And so what conclusions have I come to.
A sudden transition to the offensive on such a scale, moreover, immediately by all the forces having and deployed in advance on the most important strategic directions, that is, the nature of the attack itself, by all forces having and deployed in advance on the most important strategic directions, that is, the nature of the attack itself, in its entirety was not provided by us.
Neither the People's Commissar, nor I, nor my predecessors B.M. Shaposhnikov, K.A. Meretskov, nor the leadership of the General Staff calculated that the enemy will concentrate such a mass of armored and motorized troops and throw them on the very first day with powerful compact groups in all strategic directions with the aim of delivering devastating cutting strikes. ”

Those. according to his lifetime memoirs, Zhukov had no idea what and what forces, and when, and where the German would go on the offensive.
Those. according to the memoirs of Zhukov, the former chief of staff of the Red Army, neither he, the General Staff headed by him, nor the People’s Commissariat of Defense of the USSR headed by Tymoshenko, nor the command of the border districts at all, owned the situation on the border with Hitler's Reich.

[Catfish]

Yes, but what can you say - to wave a saber, this is not to command tank corps. And the doctrine "With little blood on someone else's territory" backfired by two hundred percent. If it were not for the size of the country's territory and the will of the people, the catastrophe would have been worse. Yes, thanks also to Japan for not stabbing in the back, well for that they had their own problems.

[strannik1985]

Yes, and the doctrine "With little blood in someone else's territory" backfired by two hundred percent

There was no such doctrine, you confuse official propaganda and preparation for war, industrial evacuation plans were developed back in the 20s and were updated annually.
Hence the size of the army, the number of tanks and other weapons, counted on heavy losses.

[Lekz]

The doctrine "With little blood on someone else's territory" is quite sound, and takes place in all armies of the world. An alternative to such a doctrine - see the history of the Second World War.

[Catfish]

Yeah, out of four years of World War II, where was this blood mostly shed?
The minus is not mine.

[Octopus]

Quote: Lekz

The doctrine "With little blood on someone else's territory" is quite sound, and takes place in all armies of the world.

Only here in the Red Army such a doctrine was only in songs. In real life, they were preparing for a long war and evacuation. Sucks prepared, but prepared.

Only this saved.

[Lekz]

Do not simplify. At the head of the state were realists. They understood the difference between I want and I can. Distract and imagine that the French company would go the way they should have gone - fiercely, with big losses in resources ... since it was seen in 1939. After all, the British and the French could persuade Stalin to enter the war on the side of democracies. And then ... And in the doctrine itself there is nothing wrong.

[Octopus]

Quote: Lekz

After all, the British and the French could have persuaded Stalin to join the war on the side of democracies.

Why would this be? Comrade Stalin counted on this, and did in 39-40 years what he was doing. Dunkirk was a damn unpleasant surprise for the USSR too.

[Alexander Greene]

Doubts about the number of prisoners in the boilers

I think that the scale of the "catastrophes" of the first period of the Great Patriotic War is greatly exaggerated. Starting with Goebbels and Khrushchev, the numbers of prisoners grow exponentially every year ...

Today, a figure is given for almost all publications in the Kiev boiler 665 thousand, True, the author in the article cited a new figure by the historian Isaev that he was captured 430 thousand, but, I believe, that this figure is also incorrect.

So how many were captured?
Well, it’s not at all 665 thousand or even 430. Even the Germans in 1941 called a smaller figure - 380 тыс.

Let's try to rely on the data of Krivosheev, given in the “Book of losses”. There he points out: that the number of troops of the Southwestern Front is 627 thousandirretrievable losses 531 thousand. This does not mean that all of them were captured.

At first, by the end of the operation, only in the front formations, which were not surrounded (the 38th and 40th armies, many front units, a significant part of the front lines, armies and others), there were more than 150 thousand people.

Second, the during the defense of Kiev there were fierce battles, which lasted all September, in which the front troops suffered heavy losses, 54 thousand were wounded alone. + 54 + 627) = 369 тыс.

Thirdly, no less fierce battles took place in the environment, часть died часть broke out of the ring of surroundings, часть switched to guerrilla action часть captured.

As you can see, all the circle can be divided into 4 parts certainly not equal, but Kiev historians, for example, in the book “Kiev Red Banner” estimate the number of prisoners to be less than one third of those who were surrounded. According to my calculations, this is all from 100 to 120 thousand

So the numbers 665 thousand 430 thousand and even 380 thousand prisoners in the boiler do not dance ...

[chenia]

Quote: Alexander Green

prisoners in the boiler do not dance

There is a nuance, there were a lot of just called up and only in teams.

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: chenia

There is a nuance, there were a lot of just called up and only in teams.

The nuance was, the Germans considered prisoners and civilians detained in the fighting area.

[Yamato1980]

Irrecoverable losses include prisoners. Roughly speaking, irretrievable losses are those whom after a certain period of time cannot be returned to service. And yes, I will most likely agree with the prisoners.

[ABM]

3,35 million prisoners correlated in 1941? the wounded from the Kiev boiler were not taken out. 665 thousand include operations that took place a little earlier.

[fk7777777]

There were three echelons of defense of the country, echelons of cover, and here the Germans smashed them piecemeal. Having an understanding of what to do with tanks.

[strannik1985]

There were three echelons

Not defense, but the location of the army in peacetime military operations, they could not physically be assembled in one echelon near the border.

[CRN]

They wrote about this more than once. The tactics of luring the enemy deep into the territory, stretching the front. In another way, it would not have been possible to achieve this, which is why they lured the enemy with boilers and retreats to Moscow.

[Whirlwind]

Let's not forget the significant fact that on June 22 the USSR was attacked not by Germany, but by the European Union of that time, led by Germany, and these are two big differences ...

[faterdom]

Quote: Sugar Honeyovich

Quote: faterdom

Then they realized that they were mistaken, and no longer thought so in droves. And did not give up en masse.

Or maybe the reason is different - have learned to fight?

Unfortunately, they got into the boilers more than once. They perished by entire armies - it happened (Myasnaya Bor, Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge, for example), but did not surrender by the same whole armies.
And this, you see, is different, and for the enemy too.
But when the Germans surrendered in armies (Paulus) - it had a stunning effect, both for us, for the whole world, and for Germany with its allies.

[Piotr L]

I could not stand it, I registered. With the qualifications of the command of the Red Army in the initial period of the war, it is clear - not up to par. And now about those who fought. My grandfather died in July 1941 north of Kiev. Directly for July, there are no documents on his unit, but there is a Brief Combat Characteristics of 330 ORB 195th Rifle Division for the withdrawal period of 21.08-26.08.1941 ("People's Feat" site), written on some paper in hot pursuit. It's creepy to even read, and people fought and died. From village to village, 3 fighters were lost there, 2 there, 2 more there, took one prisoner, shelling - no car and 6 fighters. Another collision and 20 people disappeared somewhere, etc. etc. The headquarters company commander abandoned the fighters and galloped forward, out of 22 of his fighters there were 9. As a result, 5 people left in 56 days of retreat, of whom -3 were killed, 7 were wounded, 20 did not return from the battle, 12 fell behind on the way, deserters - 14. But the battalion, as a combat unit, exists and is ready to continue to carry out combat missions.
But such reports can now be raised a lot. So draw conclusions who and what is to blame, and whether to blame.

[Operator]

Quote: Yamato1980

[Pavlov] immediately makes the only right decision

... to drape (and not to strike at the flanks of the enemy, as the pre-war plan and operational order of the High Command ordered him).

[Yamato1980]

Retreat is the most difficult type of battle, not Pavlov’s fault, but his tragedy that he was not able to systematically withdraw the troops. About the drape. Do you think that the Wehrmacht in Operation Buffel was draping too?
In general, there are not so many examples of successful troop withdrawal, and here the Model still needs to pay tribute.
So he prepared the counterattack on the Grodno direction and even started to produce it, but here’s the cant, that about Guderian’s group, vaunted reconnaissance was not a dream before the war, and in the sense that if 2 TGR rush at full speed to Minsk, the counterattack by dad Gotu already lost all meaning and only worsened the situation which was already bad out of hand.

[Operator]

Do you understand the difference between "following orders to inflict flank attacks" and "retreating in violation of orders"?

[Yamato1980]

Therefore, Pavlov as a commander is higher than Kirponos. He did not hesitate, corresponded with the general staff, give arguments, evidence to cancel the order of the counterattack, and made a decision on his own, reasonably believing that he knew better what kind of operational situation was developing right here and now. Kulik, Boldin, Kuznetsov and the units entrusted to them should be grateful to him for this.
These commanders were not enough in 41 years.

[VS]

"" Now the main reasons for the tragedy are already being named: the unpreparedness of the Soviet command staff at all levels to wage a modern war, the miscalculations of the high command about the place of the main attack by the Germans, the unsuccessful formation of mechanized corps, cumbersome in management and not provided with equipment, without appropriate maintenance, repair, evacuation and supply services Fuel and lubricants, lack of training of personnel in the use of equipment, unsuccessful deployment of almost all mechanized corps in the border western districts and their defeat in border battles, ill-conceived counterattacks by mechanized corps in the first days of the war and a number of other reasons investigated by military historians. .. One of the reasons for the tragedy of the Western Front under the command of Pavlov was the miscalculation of the General Staff in determining the main attack of the Germans, proceeding from the fact that it would be delivered in the Kiev military district, and not in the Western one. Everything turned out the other way around. "" Complete nonsense)))
PERFECTLY in our general staff our strategists KNEW WHERE WILL BE THE BIGGEST blow of the Germans !! the author - read something like the work of the officers of the VNU General Staff and IVI "1941 - lessons and conclusions" and do not talk your nonsense)))

[VS]

Quote: strannik1985

Yes, and the doctrine "With little blood in someone else's territory" backfired by two hundred percent

There was no such doctrine, you confuse official propaganda and preparation for war, industrial evacuation plans were developed back in the 20s and were updated annually.
Hence the size of the army, the number of tanks and other weapons, counted on heavy losses.

alas - it was precisely THIS that our strategists tried to apply on June 22)))

[VS]

Quote: maidan.izrailovich

You have correctly stated everything. But they did not say the most important thing. According to Zhukov’s plan, the troops should move to other lines and thereby align the front line and avoid encirclement. But everything is beautiful on paper ... and on the teachings

cho for nonsense)) Zhukov was not going to go anywhere)) HE TURNED BACK and - caught up)))

“The Western Front was rapidly retreating; these armies, which were intended for us, went to the Western Front ... In previous days Zhukov visited the South-Western Front, in the very first days, organized an offensive there with the slogan: “Hit the roots! ”To Lublin. Nothing came of this offensive. Many troops died, we failed. Zhukov went to Moscow. True, he later said that this attack was organized by order of Stalin ... "(" Conversation of K.M. Simonov with the former chief of staff of the Western and Third Belorussian Fronts, Colonel General Pokrovsky Alexander Petrovich. Recorded May 26, 1968. Recording of the conversation printed according to the original, which is in the archive of K. M. Simonov, in his family, with all the features of the speech of Alexander Petrovich preserved. ”Posted on the website - http://rkka.ru/memory/pokrovskiy/main.htm) ...)

[Yamato1980]

Zhukov did what was most needed in that period, won time. It is necessary to treat memoirs with great caution, the person is weak, susceptible to temptations, and sometimes memory makes such tricks that sometimes one wonders, the example of Rokossovsky with the Istra border speaks quite eloquently about this.

[Nikolai Kotsofana]

You read the comments and remember the words of Shota Rustaveli, written back in the 12th century, "Everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the outside."

[VS]

Quote: READY FOR BREAKTHROUGH

neither quantitatively nor qualitatively the Red Army was inferior to the Wehrmacht, and the fleet did have an advantage in the region. It seems to me that the main trouble was in the generally unsatisfactory level of preparation:

so it is, QUALITY of the army)))

[VS]

Quote: Ivan Tartugay

Quote from the article:

“One of the reasons for the tragedy of the Western Front under the command of Pavlov was miscalculation of the General Staff in determining the main blow of the Germans, proceeding from the fact that it would be delivered in the Kiev military district, and not in the Western. Everything turned out the other way around. "

The four-time Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, in an interview with writer Simonov, said:
“I still commanded the Kiev military district, when in December 1940 we held a big military game. In this game, I commanded the "blue", played for the Germans. And Pavlov, who commanded the Western Military District, played for us, commanded the "Reds", our Western Front. On the Southwestern Front, Stern played along with him. Taking the real initial data and the forces of the enemy - the Germans, I, commanding the "blue", developed operations Namely in those areas in which their Germans were developing.
He delivered his main blows where they then applied them. Groupings formed approximately as they later formed during the war. The configuration of our borders, the terrain, the situation - everything prompted me exactly such decisions, which they then prompted to the Germans.
The game lasted about eight days. The management of the game artificially slowed down the pace of advancement of the “blue”, held it. But the "blue" on the eighth day advanced to the Baranavichy District, and, I repeat, with an artificially slowed pace of progress. "
Those. great and brilliant, then being still only the commander of KOVO Hero of the Soviet Union Army General Zhukov already in December 1940 knew exactly where the Wehrmacht would be doing its main blow.
However, as soon as the Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General Zhukov became the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army for some reason forgot everything, it flew out of his head and where the Wehrmacht would attack, and where it would deliver the main blows.
Inexplicably, inexplicably, already in the post of chief of staff of the Red Army Army Hero Zhukov, a hero of the Soviet Union, suddenly began to assume that the Germans would strike the main blow with their most powerful force, not in the western direction, but precisely in the south-western direction.

so he NEVER thought that the main blow would be south of Polesie))) And about KShI he lied to Simonov))) It wasn’t there)))

[VS]

Quote: Yamato1980

I would like to see how many of the thousands of field reports would choose that gold one. In 1943, having accurate data on the attack on the Kursk ledge, they even missed the definition of the main strike.
So the milestones were prepared, only they didn’t give much to fill the milestones. In general, it was such a thing to spread the troops evenly along the front, and the General Staff was well aware of this, for this the deployment of huge mechanized corps was started, because only by constantly counterattack could we count on if not stopping the attack, then at least slowing down the advance of the enemy.

calm down - ALL the necessary data about the attack knew))) but KOLI are you ready to quote THOUSANDs of false ones - a great committee)) And it is in the plans of the General Staff that they spread the 42 divisions and the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army ..

[VS]

Quote: Yamato1980

Zhukov did what was most needed in that period, won time. It is necessary to treat memoirs with great caution, the person is weak, susceptible to temptations, and sometimes memory makes such tricks that sometimes one wonders, the example of Rokossovsky with the Istra border speaks quite eloquently about this.

Zhukov did EVERYTHING to ruin the pre-war Red Army - with his stupid pre-war plans when, instead of preparing the defense against the German TG, he decided to defeat the Wehrmacht with a counter-strike - from KOVO to Lublin, from PribOVO to Suvalki and Pavlov was also supposed to help these blows! At the same time, the non-starter knew EXCELLENT WHERE the Germans' main strike will be !!!

[Yamato1980]

You accidentally have a surname not Rezun

[Ivan Tartugai]

Quote from the article:

“Now the main causes of the tragedy are already called:
unavailability of the Soviet command staff at all levels to the conduct of modern warfare;
miscalculations of high command about the place the Germans struck the main blow;
...

Quote from the article:

“On the Bryansk front, the front command erred in the direction of the main attack, they were waiting for him in the direction of Bryansk, and the Germans struck 120-150 km to the south.”

Quote from the article:

“In the Vyazemsky direction, the Soviet command also incorrectly determined the direction of the German strike, believed that they would strike Vyazma along the Smolensk-Moscow highway, and there concentrated the main forces. The Germans hit on October 2 left and right of the highway and immediately broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops and rushed to Vyazma. ”

For example, in the Vyazemsky disaster on all three fronts, namely the Western, Reserve and Bryansk command under the leadership of of our illustrious commanders, namely, Colonel General Konev, Marshal of the Soviet Union Budenny, Colonel General Eremenko was wrong, the direction of the main attacks of the Wehrmacht was erroneously determined.
Those. where the Wehrmacht actually dealt its three main blows with three tank groups, the Soviet troops were at a minimum, since our illustrious commanders supposedly thought that the Wehrmacht would not strike here.
So, for example, the main attack of the 3rd tank army of Goth was supposed to reflect the 30th army of Khomenko from 4 divisions, covered the front of 50 km, against 300 tanks Goth had one anti-tank battery of 45 mm cannons. There were no tanks at all in the 30th Army.
The commander of the Army Group Center Field Marshal von Bock wrote in his diary:

“October 2, 1941
Army Group went on the offensive in full accordance with the plan. The offensive goes with such EASYthat one involuntarily wonders if the enemy has already escaped. ”

And where the Wehrmacht did not strike, our illustrious commanders of the Soviet troops were set to the maximum, which fell into the Vyazemsky and Bryansk cauldrons of encirclement. So, for example, the 19th Army of Lukin defended already 25 km, having 3 divisions in the first echelon and 2 in the second. The 19th Army had 338 guns 76 mm and higher, plus 90 pieces. 45 mm anti-tank guns, about 30 anti-tank batteries, as well as 56 - 85 mm anti-aircraft guns.
But the Wehrmacht did not advance in the direction of the 19th army, but surrounded it along with 20A, 24A, 32A, which ended up in encirclement boilers.
From Halder's diary:

"October 4, 1941, the 105th day of the war
Operation Typhoon is developing almost classically.
Guderian’s tank group, advancing through the Eagle, reached Mtsensk without encountering any resistance.
Göpner’s tank group quickly broke through the enemy’s defenses and reached Mozhaisk.
Goth’s tank group reached the Hill, thus approaching the upper reaches of the Dnieper, and in the north advanced to Bely.
The enemy continues to hold on to un attacked sections of the front,
as a result of which, in the future, a deep environment of these enemy groups is planned. "

Moreover, the Germans acted on the same old pattern, as the article says:

The planning and implementation of the "cauldrons" by the German command was carried out according to the standard scheme: breakouts of large tank formations were organized on the flanks of the groups of Soviet troops, extending deep into the rear of the Soviet troops and covering them with ticks on both sides.

Quote from the article:

The main burden of the blame for the catastrophe nevertheless lies with the miscalculations of the Soviet leadership and high command, which allowed the Germans to carry out their plan.

Only courage, steadfastness, self-sacrifice of ordinary soldiers of the Red Army, as well as junior and middle-level commanders, saved the entire Soviet-German front from complete defeat.

[IC]

The course of the hostilities that led to the disaster in 1941 is described in detail. The reasons lie on the surface, as all documents and materials are available, many of which were hidden earlier for well-known reasons. However, it is extremely strange to read the comments of people with brains obscured by propaganda and lies. Some fossils, illiterate judgments of complete ignoramuses.

[Almaty1982]

I think our command needed to stretch the enemy and still see how the German machine works.

[Glory60]

Still, from this material it is not entirely clear why the Red Army soldiers surrendered so massively. The spiteful critics explain this by their unwillingness to fight for Soviet power. Mikhalev S.N. more lucidly explained this. During the breakthroughs of German tank groups, the rear of the armies, who did not have the skills to conduct combat, and the military builders, of whom there were many and who did not even have weapons, were surrounded. The loss of command and control of troops also affected. For example, in the Uman cauldron, one army commander was killed, the other was captured. But up to a certain point, when there were still opportunities for resistance, and sometimes when there were none, the Red Army soldiers fought very stubbornly. R. Kershaw in his book "1941 through the eyes of the Germans ..." recalls the memories of German soldiers, how the Red Army men desperately tried to break out of the encirclement.
As for the directive of June 18, or even of the 16th, it was already too late. Even if she had been transferred to all districts, and not just to the Military District, she would not have changed anything. At the front of 30 km per division, instead of the 10-12 km laid down, the troops at the border had no chance to stay.

[Yamato1980]

You're right. The bulk of the prisoners are the rear units, which are least organized due to the specifics of their service. First-line troops were mostly captured by the wounded, sick, etc.

[Dzafdet]

Each German platoon had a walkie-talkie. Plus, the commander himself could make decisions on the situation .. But we had the dominance of commissars, there were no radio stations, the command personnel with combat experience was destroyed in 1937-38 ...

[chenia]

Quote: Dzafdet

German platoon had a walkie-talkie. Plus, the commander himself could make decisions on the situation.

In, in this they ruined. It was necessary for them to change something in the operational-tactical and operational, and they all relied on the tactical level (their platoon and company should have pulled).

Quote: Dzafdet

We had the dominance of commissars

Which first perished, and raised in attack.

Quote: Dzafdet

command personnel with combat experience was destroyed in 1937-38 ...

Nevertheless, our command staff by 1943 learned to beat the German. (and the question is, what kind of combat experience was before 1938?)

[ecolog]

Quote: Dzafdet

We had the dominance of commissars

A logical question arises, why then did the Germans actively seek and shoot them? On the contrary, they should have been released, so that the commanders would not be able to command further. Apparently they felt a threat from them.
among other things, the commissioner conducted reports on his own line, which made it possible for the leadership to have a more complete picture of what was happening and to somewhat restrain the flight of fantasy of combat commanders, which the Germans did not have.
The tsarist army, and especially the fleet, didn’t have the analogue of commissars, they were partly replaced by priests, but without apparent benefit. This, of course, would not solve all the problems, but at least the soldiers would have understood at least a little what they were fighting for. In the Navy, with its closed caste of combat officers, even more so.

[ccsr]

Quote: ecolog

The tsarist army, and especially the fleet, didn’t have the analogue of commissars, they were partly replaced by priests, but without apparent benefit.

Not everything is so simple - on the ship during the battle the priest had to be a doctor's assistant and help him conduct operations. This was the responsibility of the ship priest; according to the battle schedule, he was assigned to the infirmary to help the doctor and receive the communion of the dying.

[ecolog]

in battle, and the commissar pushes no speech, not before. Most of the service is routine.
In fact, no one was involved in explanatory work with the rank and file personnel, and indeed did not treat them like people. Especially in the navy, where the personnel work with complex equipment and are, for the most part, more literate than in the army and are aware of this. And what is the answer? Standing in frunt with bulging eyes, the restaurant menu of the company's cabins with ice cream and veal fillets against the tank system - one tank for seven without plates (although the ration was better than the army one), non-commissioned teeth, and in the library of the ship's life of the saints. And all this is multiplied by the closed caste of combat officers - it is impossible for the worker-peasant who released them to enter the Marine Corps either through financial or estate channels. In exceptional cases, it was possible to become an officer "in the admiralty", the so-called. "birch officers", but not to go to the frontline. Unlike the same officers of mechanical engineers, who were closer to the sailors and interacted more with them. It is no coincidence that when a wave of officers' killings swept through the fleet, the overwhelming majority of those killed were from the combatant officers of large ships.

[ccsr]

Quote: ecolog

And all this is multiplied by a closed caste of combat officers - it was impossible to get them to the Marine Corps to the peasant workers, neither through financial nor estate channels.

I do not dispute the injustice of that society, but if you lived then and were fortunate enough to be born into a nobleman’s family, you probably would have looked differently at the world order. My ancestors from peasants are in order to avoid unnecessary discussion. By the way, A.I.Denikin's grandfather was a serf, and his father received an officer rank for personal courage, and he was not a hereditary nobleman.

[ecolog]

You can watch it as you like, but then you shouldn't be surprised that the officers are for the war to the bitter end, and the soldiers are the sailors for "bayonets in the ground." The army of the nobles simply cannot be attacked, but taking into account the losses of the level of PMA, even more so. The very cream of the nobility served in the Guards, the fleet did not need many thousands of officers, so they nodded in themselves. Even among the officers there was an inequality, emphasized by external attributes.

"The professional qualification was of the greatest importance - the father's belonging to the category of naval officers, and the class qualification was additional. The son of a hereditary nobleman who was not a combat officer was guaranteed admission to the corps only on condition of brilliant passing of the entrance exams (in the top five), otherwise places However, there was still the possibility of admission "self-employed", that is, with a tuition fee. For this it was enough just to pass the exam. Thus, the estate-professional qualification for admission to the corps was not canceled, but the qualification of knowledge could be Note also that the sons of officers who served in the navy, but did not have the honor of being combat officers, for example, mechanical engineers or officers of the admiralty, could enter the corps only if their fathers were hereditary nobles, and not from other estates. "
The degree of prestige of these categories was not the same. The highest prestige was enjoyed by professional combat officers. Only they could command ships and formations of ships, be senior officers, commanders of combatant companies on a ship. They performed the duties of the watch commanders, navigators, controlled the artillery and torpedo armament of the ships. Less prestigious was the group of cadre mechanical engineers (who had the right only to control ship engines and hold spaces), shipbuilders and hydrographs. Admiralty officers stood still lower, usually serving on the shore. The lowest level was occupied by reserve officers, despite the fact that they could fulfill the duties of combat officers or mechanical engineers. The situation of naval aviation officers did not have time to determine, since this category appeared only during the First World War. The status of officers of various groups was emphasized externally. For example, on large ships, where the wardrooms were large, mechanical engineers, doctors, priests and reserve officers dined at a table separate from the combatant officers.

https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/padenie-barierov-na-puti-k-ofitserskomu-chinu-ofitserskiy-korpus-russkogo-flota-nakanune-i-v-gody-pervoy-mirovoy-voyny

[Kushka]

"tested in battles during the capture of almost all of Europe"
It’s not clear to me, maybe someone knows the question better - I
read that as part of the troops that went on the offensive
22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, the percentage of experience in battles in the West
was very small.

[ecolog]

as I understand it, there was a stretch of divisions along the front and crushing armies along the echelons. The Germans could concentrate superior forces in the areas of main attacks, plus well-established interaction with aviation, plus high-speed tractors for artillery in mechanized units. Plus a balanced composition of tank divisions - there were plenty of motorized infantry and anti-tank artillery. This made it possible to quickly break through the thin front of our extended defense divisions and to deflect mobile counterattacks from the mechanized corps, especially with the bulletproof T-26 BTs operating in isolation from their artillery.
In the 44th, we also crushed the Germans with artillery, and massaged tanks and motorized infantry. And their front was also successfully torn.

[Dzafdet]

Quote: chenia

Quote: Dzafdet

German platoon had a walkie-talkie. Plus, the commander himself could make decisions on the situation.

In, in this they ruined. It was necessary for them to change something in the operational-tactical and operational, and they all relied on the tactical level (their platoon and company should have pulled).

Quote: Dzafdet

We had the dominance of commissars

Which first perished, and raised in attack.

Quote: Dzafdet

command personnel with combat experience was destroyed in 1937-38 ...

Nevertheless, our command staff by 1943 learned to beat the German. (and the question is, what kind of combat experience was before 1938?)

Our Germans both in 1944 were hollowed out, and in 1945. One Korsun-Shevchenkovskaya operation is worth what. They wanted to surround, but the Germans built a fist and broke through the ring. With discipline and controllability, they had order in the troops until the very end.
And since 1943, they fought mainly. jackets, that is, persons released for accelerated training, who survived the 1941-42 massacre. The professional army of the Germans by that time was completely destroyed.

[Kostadinov]

The blame for the withdrawal and loss of the Red Army in 1941 did not have Nicago since the German army beat harder in 1941.
And it hit harder because: in the first, the Soviet army inevitably lagged behind in mobilizing its resources and in the second, the USSR did not have time to completely eliminate the huge gap in technology and education in comparison with Germany, which it inherited from tsarist Russia. He reduced the gap, but could not eliminate it.
Of course, now you can come up with some better or worse scenarios for both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, but there will be no municipal difference.

[IC]

Explanatory professional article with maps and documents. Rare in our time. Against her background, the statement of the modern Foreign Ministry regarding the MP pact looks extremely ridiculous. It turns out that diplomacy won in 1939, and the military all forgave ... in 1941. A strange result of victory is obtained.

[VS]

Quote: ABM

The directive was passed on 16, the troops were raised on alert 18 - they were slowly executing it, not according to the charter; passed after verification - imagine, such a non-urgent directive, apparently, there is nowhere to rush; further - why was the standard form of notification of parts not used? Why this circus with horses ("after checking 202 MSD")?

so maybe in dir. The General Staff was not indicated - bring to b..g IMMEDIATELY)) but the date was exactly - to execute on such and such a date, on such and such a date)))

[Alexander Sosnitsky]

Now the main reasons for the tragedy are already being called: the lack of readiness of the Soviet command personnel at all levels to conduct a modern war, the miscalculations of the high command about the place of the Germans delivering the main blow, the unsuccessful formation of mechanized corpses that are cumbersome to manage and not equipped with equipment without the corresponding services for maintenance, repair, evacuation and supply of fuel and lubricants, the lack of training of personnel in the use of equipment, the unsuccessful deployment of almost all mechanized corps in the border western districts and their defeat in border battles, but thought-out counter-offensive of the mechanized corps in the early days of the war and a number of other reasons investigated by military historians.

This alone indicates the absence of Stalin’s plans to attack Germany.

[Narak-zempo]

We are waiting for an analysis of the summer campaign of 1942 with a detailed analysis of how the Soviet offensive on Kharkov began near Barvenkovo ​​and ended on the banks of the Volga.

[Yuri Apukhtin]

https://topwar.ru/162588-harkovskoe-srazhenie-janvar-1942-obrazovanie-barvenkovskogo-vystupa.html
https://topwar.ru/162801-harkovskoe-srazhenie-maj-1942-goda-barvenkovskij-kotel.html

[VS]

Quote: svp67

Quote: V.S.

nonsense - KNEW in the General Staff WHERE WHERE WILL BE A MAJOR strike)))

You know, your words are just words. And there are documents ...
Especially important
Top secret
Only personally
The instance is unique.
Central Committee of the CPSU (b)
comrade STALIN
comrade MOLOTOV
In connection with the major organizational measures being carried out in the Red Army in 1941, I am reporting to you an updated plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East:
... III. PROBABLY OPPOSIVE OPPOSITION PLANS
The General Staff does not have documentary data on the operational plans of potential adversaries both in the West and in the East.
The most likely assumptions about the strategic deployment of potential adversaries may be:
In the West.
Germany is likely to deploy its main forces. in the southeast from Siedlec to Hungary in order to strike at Berdichev, Kiev to capture Ukraine.

This strike, apparently, will be accompanied by an auxiliary strike in the north from East Prussia to Dvinsk and Riga or by concentric attacks from the side of Suwalki and Brest to Volkovysk, Baranovichi ...
...
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR
Marshal of the Soviet Union
__________________WITH. Tymoshenko
Chief of General Staff K.A.
army General
__________________ G. ZHUKOV
.
Executor
major general (signature) VASILEVSKY
11.3.41

Everything turned out exactly the opposite.

This document is historical garbage))) It was not considered and was not implemented)) This is well shown in Gorkov’s work))) Read the work of the VNU General Staff “1941 lessons and conclusions” - appendices 15 and 16 - it is shown there according to the work plans of the General Staff - WHERE it was expected The main blow of the Germans is actually)))

[Alexey Gorshkov]

I am a historian by training, moreover, I specialized in the history of the Great Patriotic War, moreover, I wrote my thesis at the beginning of the war, so “on topic”... I can’t agree with much in the article - for example, the concept of the “Bialystok-Minsk cauldron” ". The Bialystok cauldron is one thing, the Minsk cauldron is another... It is also unclear why the largest Smolensk cauldron is not mentioned, but place is given to some Melitopol cauldron, which, frankly speaking, I am hearing about for the first time... I have the most complete information about the Belarusian cauldrons, since I was writing my thesis on border battles, and on the Bryansk and Vyazemsky cauldrons, I studied them closely as a student, since I was a member of the “Snow Landing” - a university organization that at that time dealt with just these cauldrons. What’s interesting is that both in Belarus in June 1941 and near Vyazma in October of the same year, so-called counterattacks were sent. Boldin's operational groups... Their composition, naturally, was different, but both were led by General Boldin... For some reason, where he acted, ours were surrounded and destroyed! An accident or some kind of oversight by the special services? Meanwhile, in the most odious NGO Order No. 270, which was essentially devastating, it was Boldin who was shown as a role model! I am interested in this question, which concerns both the Kyiv and Bryansk “cauldrons”. Guderian’s troops played a special, if not the main role there, first transferred from the Moscow direction to the Kiev direction, and then returned back. It turns out that TWO times Guderian’s flank swept past the Bryansk Front of General Eremenko. On the way to Kyiv they tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to hit Guderian, AND ON THE WAY BACK?