Heavy forty first

- Mother wrote, was in the war?
- No, I stayed at the headquarters there, as a clerk.
From the movie "Brother"

22 June

Could my grandfather Sergei Egorovich have suggested that by the age of 28, when he has work, family, first child, a new test will fall on his lot? After all, it seems that the dispossession of the family in the late 20s and the hungry 30s in the Volga began to be forgotten.

June 22, 1941 the war began. The words of the younger brother Vasily, who served in the 92nd border regiment of the NKVD, who guarded the state border at a site of 215 km along the San river of Przemyshl, became clear. In a letter from his brother, which came a week before the start of the war, there were incomprehensible words until June 22: “Soon” B ”.”

On June 24, Sergey’s grandfather was called up to mobilize in the Red Army, 387 PAP RGK. The peaceful profession of a tractor driver, a farmer came in handy in the war.

On July 20, 1940, by order of the People’s Commissar of Defense, the 387th gun artillery regiment of the RGK was formed in Kuibyshev. It consisted of 4 fire divisions and an AIR division. The regiment was equipped with 1st year Red Army soldiers from various artillery units of the Volga Military District (3rd and 36th LAP, 64th GAP, 248th GAP and others) and new conscripts who arrived mainly from the regions of the Ukrainian SSR, TASSR and Volga Region. Command cadres were also sent from artillery units of PRIVO and arrived from artillery schools. The personnel of the regiment by age consisted of fighters and junior commanders 1919-1921. birth and from people 1913-17. p., used to this deferrals (teachers, students). The regiment was multinational - there were up to 18 nationalities. The regiment commander is Mironov Evgeny Andreevich.

Until June 28, the regiment was mobilized according to the state of wartime and the same day went to the front.

12.07.1941/21/14.07.1941, the regiment took military order on the left bank of the Dnieper in front of the city of Rogachev. The city at that time was in the hands of the Germans. The troops of the 63st Army had the task of driving the Germans out of Rogachev. On the morning of July 20.07.1941, 15, the regiment entered the battle for the first time, supporting the advance of 15 SK. The city was taken. By July 60, 7, the enemy was driven back from Rogachev for 3 km. Fire inflicted great damage on the manpower and equipment of the enemy: 3 armored vehicles were destroyed, up to 22 vehicles, XNUMX NP were destroyed, XNUMX headquarters were destroyed, XNUMX infantry battalions were scattered and defeated, XNUMX artillery and mortar batteries were crushed.

August 1941, the regiment fought in the 13th Army. Making a systematic departure, our units at numerous lines counterattacked the enemy. The regiment on August 28.08.1941, 3, consisting of three divisions, was surrounded in the district of Zapadenki, Pogarsky district, Bryansk region. The 13rd division at that time was already on the eastern bank of the river. Desna supported the defending units of the 100th Army. For two days, the regiment conducted heavy defensive battles surrounded by superior enemy forces, as a result of which up to 15 soldiers and officers were destroyed, one tank and an armored car were destroyed. Shells ran out. The enemy furiously pressed on. The material part had to be destroyed. The personnel organizedly left the encirclement in the district XNUMX km north of Novgorod-Seversky.

06.10.1941/13/200 the regiment as part of the XNUMXth army was in the rear of the enemy. The Germans were already approaching Kursk and Orel. By order of the Headquarters of the High Command, the regiment in the army was to march XNUMX km behind the enemy’s rear with the task of destroying the enemy’s communications, disrupting communications, destroying his manpower and equipment and connecting with his units. The personnel, performing the task, showed exceptional courage and heroism. Not enough ammo, food. In the conditions of autumn slush and the onset of cold weather, the enemy delivered significant blows.

09.10.41, in the village of Negino, Suzemsky district, a garrison of up to 100 soldiers and officers was defeated.

On the night of October 14.10.41, 200, the regiment suddenly attacked the enemy garrison in the regional center of Khomutovka, where the headquarters of the German division was located. As a result of the attack, up to 150 soldiers and officers were killed and wounded, 7 vehicles, 60 guns with tractors were destroyed and up to XNUMX saddled horses were captured.

Each settlement had to be fought with.

In the vicinity of the village of Teplovka, the regiment connected with the remnants of 6 SD. As a result of the attack, which went into hand-to-hand combat, the calculations of four 75-mm guns were destroyed, two armored vehicles, 40 vehicles, up to 70 cyclists were destroyed, and an ammunition depot was burned.

17.10.1941/6/XNUMX, the regiment, along with XNUMX SD, approached the farm Semenovsky. On the way stood a long column of the enemy, consisting of tanks, cars and artillery. The attack was preparing for the night. It was necessary to make a huge effort to break the enemy standing in front. At night, the column was attacked, the encirclement ring was broken.

Massively began to award medals and orders during the war, mainly since 1943. Firstly, they retreated, although there were enough feats during the retreat, they died, and secondly, there was a lot of confusion and confusion. All the more valuable were the awards for soldiers received during the first years of the war.

From the award sheet of Sergey Egorovich

On October 18, the regiment and 6 SD reached the front line of our defense on the Swap River and connected with their units. Holding back the enemy, the regiment was moving east, in the direction of the city of Livny. Arriving in Livny, the regiment was sent to Vereshchagino, Molotov region for reformation, where it was from 02.12.1941/05.03.1942/XNUMX. March XNUMX, XNUMX

Ahead were still long, hot miles of war.

In March 1942, Sergei Yegorovich, as part of a regiment, arrived on the North-Western Front and participated in battles in the Demyansk area.

In December, the 1942 regiment was turned to the formation of the 76 st separate cannon artillery brigade.

He participated in defensive and offensive battles for the liberation of the city of Staraya Russa and the Starorussky district of the Novgorod region.

In December 1943, he fought in the Nevel region. In January-June 1944 he fought on the Idrinsky, Novosokolnichesky and Pustoshsky directions. In the summer and autumn of 1944, it liberated Latvia, and met the victory in the spring of 1945 in Courland.

During the war, Sergei Yegorovich was awarded the Order of the Red Star, medals "For Military Merit" and "For the Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945."

The elder brother Timothy went missing in 1943.

The younger brother Vasily died in captivity on 17.10.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX. Place of burial: Rivne.

Regiment commander Yevgeny Andreevich Mironov.

As a guard colonel, he participated in the Berlin operation as commander of the artillery of the 69th Army.

Thank you very much to our grandparents for the peaceful sky above your head!

Eternal memory to those who are no longer with us, and long happy years of life to war veterans!

Based on:
www.pobeda1945.su/division/11199
pamyat-naroda.ru

Comments

[Old partisan]

Honor and Glory to the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army!

[mitroha]

I support, I’ll just add that no less Honor, Glory and a low bow to the workers of the rear and the entire Soviet people. Who, in spite of everything, pulled out his right to life from nonhumans.

[knn54]

Saved the world from the "brown plague".

[210ox]

I bow to you, the soldiers of the 41st ... Yes, and subsequent years of World War II. On my avatar, my grandfather is 45 in East Prussia. He went through almost the entire war, also an artilleryman.

[The leader of the Redskins]

Thanks for the interesting story. The article mentions the younger brother Vasily, who served in the NKVD units in Przemysl. Surely, participated in a significant event.
It was this city that was the first to be liberated by units of the Red Army and the NKVD! June 23, 1941! Knocked out the Nazis!

[bubalik]

Surely, participated in a significant event.

,,, but someone now finds out how it was.
He died in the camp Stalag 360.

[The leader of the Redskins]

Eternal memory to him and the earth rest in peace.

[WHAT IS]

Thank you very much to our grandparents for the peaceful sky above your head!
Eternal memory to those who are no longer with us, and long happy years of life to war veterans!

A deep bow to the veterans and home front workers! We stood up and won. What kind of people were ...
"To make nails from these people:
There wouldn’t be stronger in the world of nails. "

[Alex013]

Thanks to such people, they survived

[nikon7717]

The glorious path of the artillery warrior, who came to victory! How many frosts, famines endured. How many tons of shells were carried!

[vvvjak]

2.07.1941/21/14.07.1941, the regiment took military order on the left bank of the Dnieper in front of the city of Rogachev. The city at that time was in the hands of the Germans. The troops of the 63st Army had the task of driving the Germans out of Rogachev. On the morning of July XNUMX, XNUMX, the regiment entered the battle for the first time, supporting the advance of XNUMX SK.

Sergey Egorovich fought in the places where I was born. According to the recollections of fellow countrymen, ours was very tight in 1941, but was repelled and kept for a month by Zhlobin and Rogachev, until Gudrian hit the flank. Low bow to wars.

[Pane Kohanku]

Sergei! A deep bow to your ancestors, and to all the heroes and workers of that war - for Victory! And to you - for preserving the memory! With respect, Nicholai

[Phil77]

Sergey! And I’m next to Nikolai! I join every word of him! I’ll add from myself that on our land there probably is not a single family who the Great Patriotic War would not touch! With sincere respect, I am.

[bubalik]

Fil77 (Sergey) Pane Kohanku (Pane Kohanku)

Welcome
Here you read the ZhBD, operational reports ,,, well, nothing happened in 1941. the Germans have an easy walk. How persistently our people defended their land!

[Phil77]

Exactly! Like Vysotsky:
* From the border we turned the earth back.
there was a time, however.
But our battalion commander turned it back
having kicked off the Urals. *

[Caretaker]

Quote: Phil77

Exactly! Like Vysotsky:
* From the border we turned the earth back.
there was a time, however.
But our battalion commander turned it back
having kicked off the Urals. *

More precisely:
"We turned the Earth back from the border -
It was the case, first.
But our battalion commander twisted it back,
Kicking off from the Urals. "

[Phil77]

I wrote as a keepsake, so ... Thanks for clarifying!

[vvvjak]

Quote: bubalik

Well, it wasn’t in 1941. the Germans have an easy walk.

They themselves admitted that during the first months of the Second World War they lost more than for the entire European company.

[Tuzik]

Quote: bubalik

Here you read the ZhBD, operational reports ,,, well, nothing happened in 1941. Germans have easy walks

As you explain the entry in Halder's diary: "In general, now we can already say that the task of defeating the main forces of the Russian ground army in front of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper has been completed ... Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia was won within 14 days." ??

[bubalik]

I agree that the first days of the war inspired the German military. But the same Halder understood that not everything was finished and that it could turn in different ways:

When we force the Western Dvina and the Dnieper, we will not so much talk about defeating the enemy’s armed forces, but rather about taking away their industrial areas from the enemy and not giving them opportunities, using the gigantic power of their industry and inexhaustible human reserves, to create new armed forces

[Tuzik]

Thanks for the sensible answer. Not in the "they are dumb" style. Another question, if possible, how, in your opinion, should the Red Army have acted in order to avoid a border defeat?

[bubalik]

Tuzik
Today

Not knowing all the intelligence of that period, one can only speculate. Indeed, despite the many publications of historians about the pre. and the initial period of the war, many documents are most likely still classified. I do not understand too

cross-border defeat

if even ordinary border guards, as you read from the article, no longer doubted that there would be a war. Maybe the entirety of the information did not reach the center? Or in a distorted form?

[Tuzik]

Most likely they could not, firstly, correctly understand that heap of information. Secondly did not provide options. Well, who is more guilty of the General Staff or political leadership here is still not clear. Historians shared, with Isaev, for example, Zhukov, the best commander of the Second World War (Manstein didn’t lie nearby), Martirosyan had Stalin, and the generals failed him.

[mat-vey]

Quote: Tuzik

how do you think the Red Army should have acted to avoid cross-border defeat?

In those political, economic conditions this could not be avoided.

[Tuzik]

I do not agree. The Red Army was a huge force. With skillful leadership of the troops, the Dnieper would be the limit for the Germans.

[mat-vey]

And they would deliver the fuel and shells with teleports ... though the shells still had to be made - armor-piercing ...

[Tuzik]

The management and the General Staff had time to solve all this type of problem. Two years watched the modern war. And even trained at Khalkhin Gol and Finns.

[mat-vey]

The General Staff may have had it, but the industry and transport haven’t. Or, by your stupidity and laziness, could you bring fuel from the Caucasus, arrange the production of shells, walkie-talkies, etc., etc.?

[Tuzik]

And how do you think we have lost half the country with such problems won?

[mat-vey]

Quote: Tuzik

And how do you think we have lost half the country with such problems won?

How, how - Fully won ... Because the management really assessed the situation and took adequate measures.

[Tuzik]

Here, we learned from our mistakes, of which there were many 41st. I speak for them.

[mat-vey]

Quote: Tuzik

Here, we learned from our mistakes, of which there were many 41st. I speak for them.

Hindsight bias (English hindsight bias; the spelling “hindsight” is common in Russian literature) (other names: the phenomenon “I knew this from the very beginning” / “I knew that” / “I knew that!” knew-it-all-along), retrospective judgment, retrospective determinism, retrospective distortion, after-knowledge) is the tendency to perceive events that have already occurred, or facts that have already been established, as obvious and predictable, despite the lack of sufficient initial information for their prediction. Hindsight error can lead to distortion of memory processes, in particular, processes of restoration and reproduction of past experience, leading to false theoretical conclusions. Thus, this effect can cause serious methodological problems at the stages of analysis and interpretation of experimental research results.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Tuzik

And how do you think we have lost half the country with such problems won?

A lot of blood. And with some help - copper, gunpowder, gasoline and trucks.
With armor-piercing shells, by the way, the problem was not solved during the war - in the reports on the shelling of the first and second "tigers" it is noted that domestic BBS are inferior in armor penetration to Lend-Lease. With the first "tiger" it was generally inconvenient - the F-34 did not even pierce it with the regular BBS, and the American 75-mm not only did it, but the deformation of the projectile after breaking through the armor was minimal.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Tuzik

The management and the General Staff had time to solve all this type of problem.

And how to solve the problem of 76-mm armor-piercing shells if the NKBP thwarted the main and additional production plans?

On the issue: production of 76-mm armor-piercing shells.
The order of NGOs for 76-mm armor-piercing shots in 1940 was disrupted by the People’s Commissariat of Ammunition. Of the ordered 150, 000 were completed. The situation with the fulfillment of the order in 28 did not improve.
So far, 100 shell shells manufactured in 000–1939 have not been equipped, and up to 1940% of them require re-sending to mechanical plants to replace ballistic caps due to clogging of the latter at the shell factories.
The equipment of 60 suitable buildings is extremely slow, and in the course of work, a complete lack of attention of the NKB to this shot is revealed.

© Marshal Kulik
From 1936 to early June 1941, the industry produced 118 000-mm AP rounds of all types. Of the 76 planned. Moreover, according to the NII-400 report, the situation did not improve in 000 - the main BBS was "shrapnel for a blow".
Of the three possible manufacturing technologies for BBS, two domestic industries could not physically master:
- super-alloyed BBSs modeled on the USA are impossible; there aren’t so many dopants;
- a welded head on the model of Germany - a failure to master, only copper soldering, which makes the shells gold and small series.
Uneven hardening remained. With its marriage of up to 80% and the cracking of even conditional shells on cemented armor: instead of destroying the surface hardened layer of armor, the head of the shell simply broke off.

[Tuzik]

There is always something shortage during a war. You, like Matvey, like the good historian Isaev, and like many others, focus on the shortcomings of the spacecraft in comparison with the Wehrmacht. There are historians who stick out the shortcomings of the Wehrmacht in comparison with the Red Army. It’s interesting to read you all!
Here I see in your quote from Kulik the conclusion: "... and in the course of work, a complete lack of attention of the NKB to this shot is revealed." Is this a human factor or an economic factor?
Then you have: "Moreover, according to the report of the Research Institute-48, and in 1942 the situation did not improve" But by the beginning of the 42nd we stopped the Germans! And they went on the offensive along the entire front. Unsuccessful. Who underestimated the enemy and believed in the success of this widespread offensive?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Tuzik

There is always something shortage during the war

Not during the war, but even before the war. The USSR of the 30s was a poor country, both in terms of resources and personnel.
If it weren’t for the resources, the same Russian sub-caliber projectile would have been ready back in 1941. But developers, even in the first half of 1942, were forced to spend time and resources to try and reject all possible options for the caliber projectile without tungsten.
The reason is simple:

1) we do not have tungsten reserves and therefore, even if favorable results are obtained, such shells will not have further practical introduction into production;
2) the manufacture of such cores can only be carried out on grinding wheels, i.e. on equipment that is available in a few factories.
(...)
... head of the special laboratory of the Institute, Comrade V. Raskin at the same time explained at what price the alloy would be obtained. And the price is as follows. To produce just one core for a 76 mm projectile requires such an amount of alloy that will deprive at the same time 30 aircraft industry machines it will be victorious for the entire service life of these cutters!

Quote: Tuzik

Then you have: "Moreover, according to the report of the Research Institute-48, and in 1942 the situation did not improve" But by the beginning of the 42nd we stopped the Germans!

At the cost of the loss in 1941 of twelve thousand "forty-five" (out of fourteen thousand pre-war) and almost six and a half thousand three-inch (out of eight and a half thousand pre-war). Including because the "forty-five" projectile pierced no more than 40 mm of KC armor with a conditioned projectile, and from only 150 m, and a three-inch gun - no more than 30 mm KC from 250-300 m (because instead of a BR it had a USH).
The leadership of the Red Army knew about the problems with the BBS since 1940, but the NKBP was able to partially solve them with the "forty-five" only in November 1941, and with the "three-inch" - only in 1943.

[vindigo]

Why then didn’t they switch to cumulative ones? Even the Japanese had cumulative ammunition. No need precious tungsten used. Made a cumulative funnel and all.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: vindigo

Why then didn’t they switch to cumulative ones? Even the Japanese had cumulative ammunition. No need precious tungsten used. Made a cumulative funnel and all.

Do you propose to arm the Red Army fighters with a pole mine?
Work on cumulative BP has been going on in the USSR since 1938. Moreover, it was not Sharashkin’s offices that conducted them, but four specialized research centers: the Leningrad Chemical-Technological Institute, the Artillery Academy of the Spacecraft, Research Institute No. 6 and the Ostekhbyuro NKV. Result: as of 03.04.1942/XNUMX/XNUMX an attempt to reproduce a German patent and special work carried out for almost three years did not lead to positive results (Source - "Help on the issue of armor-burning shells"). That is, the work on the "papers" gave nothing at the end.
In March 1942, a German cumulative shell for a 78,5 cm tank gun fell into our hands. And the work went on with the support of "hardware". But the results were not particularly encouraging. In mid-1942, a domestic cumulative projectile pierced less caliber. And when the issue with the geometry of the funnel and the distance of detonation was solved, problems began with the fuse: when firing a "godfather" from a "division", the shell exploded in the barrel. It took another year of work.
As a result, in 1943, regiments and howitzers could shoot "godfathers". There were even iptap on the regiments - the initial speed is small, but you can safely work with cumulants.

[vindigo]

OK. Clear.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Alexey RA

In March 1942, the German cumulative shell for 78,5 cm tank gun.

7,5 cm, of course.

[vindigo]

I read about this episode, about the first capture of anti-aircraft guns with ammunition of armor-burning shells. They stormed a village there and unexpectedly lost a lot of tanks. From the first hit, the T-34 burned. So the problem was with the fuses. Small cumulative bombs hung on attack aircraft. And yes, I remember also talking about sensitive fuses on these bombs. The Germans stretched the net over the tank and the bomb exploded harmlessly.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: vindigo

So the problem was with the fuses.

The main problem was that before the "iron" sample of the armor-burning projectile was obtained, our design bureaus did not work out anything worthwhile - according to bare theory, we could not make a working cumulative projectile.
And then there were three problems: explosives, funnel geometry + detonation distance, fuse. For their decision, they demanded two years.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Tuzik

The management and the General Staff had time to solve all this type of problem. Two years watched the modern war. And even trained at Khalkhin Gol and Finns.

As for fuel and lubricants, the army lacked three things: the fuel itself, storage facilities, and delivery and refueling facilities.
Only B / KB-70 was abundant in fuel. Which the Air Force was no longer needed, and in the army of its consumers (T-26, BT. T-28) also began to write off. The situation with gasoline was such that Beria had already written about the situation with him. Diesel fuel even according to the plan should have supplied less than 50% of the volume of peacetime consumption. The grimaces of a planned economy: the mass production and delivery of diesel tractors to the army (it was they who consumed 95% of diesel fuel) was ahead of fuel production.
Storage facilities are the problem with the production of tanks: industry has traditionally not kept pace with the growth of fuel storage in the army. All she could do was provide refinery capacities, where, as a result, the army stock was kept.
Gasoline tankers - a song without words ... censored. Firstly, there is no chassis for them - the release of the ZIS-6 is several times less than the needs. Secondly, refueling equipment is manufactured in a small series due to technical complexity and the small number of trained personnel, and costs accordingly. As a result, one BMZ cost a little less than the BT-7 tank.

[Ros 56]

Low bow to the soldiers.

[parusnik]

Eternally living, those who did not return ... A low bow to all ...

[avia12005]

Something came into my eyes ... Great generation, great people. Thanks for the memory.

[Charlie]

For ten days did the regiment leave the encirclement and did not lose the materiel? And there were plenty of shells? And from the air they were not stolen? Taking into account the dominance of German aircraft in the air. Regiment RGK is a 152 mm gun. This is not a magpie that you can dive through the bushes. Than dragged. Tractors or horses? It was still necessary to eat. Everyday. Have they thrown food from the air? This is considering what else to blame on time after each shooting at a German. I do not know. The memory is of course eternal to all the fallen in that war. Only additions to the war were also in abundance

[Caretaker]

Quote: Charlie

For ten days did the regiment leave the encirclement and did not lose the materiel? And there were plenty of shells? And from the air they were not stolen? Taking into account the dominance of German aircraft in the air. Regiment RGK is a 152 mm gun.

They bombed mercilessly.
The comment below is a link.

"The RGK consisted of two types of cannon artillery regiments: a standard one, consisting of four divisions with twelve 122-mm guns in each, that is, having 48 guns per regiment, and a heavier one, with four divisions of six 152-mm howitzer-guns in each , only 24 guns per regiment. As of June 22, 1941, the military structure of the RGK included 13 cannon artillery regiments of 122-mm guns and one artillery regiment of 152-mm guns. "

On the photo in the article - 203mm howitzer B-4

[bubalik]

Thanks for the link. And as I wrote above

vvvjak
Today, 11: 42

battles in those places were stubborn. In early September, the materiel was already destroyed when the first time they were surrounded. But the second time the grandfather barely left: and the group was small (the checks passed, the most decisive fact was that with weapons and insignia) and were emaciated: the horses killed, the bark from the trees was eaten. In the infirmary for almost a month they were fed.
In the photo I wanted to show the ChTZ "Stalinets" tractor.

[evgen1221]

Well, of course, they blame me for a moment, But isn’t our one-sided propaganda too clumsy, clumsy and head-on, exploiting the exploits of our grandfathers (which can’t be taken away), but they absolutely don’t pay attention to morality, public sentiment, the faith of every described Red Army man in the battle for a just cause ( only priests where it is necessary and inappropriately do not weave, caustic isolated cases, although they helped with the common cause, but not just prayer on the parade ground like propaganda rubs us in the movies) .Where the emphasis on this aspect of victory is just as successful Ivan the Terrible took Kazan for 20 years Amy forgetting everything else. Freshly and clumsy it all looks, In the style of kindergarten, another group came to us to play war games and we won, And everything, absolutely everything, there is no sensible coverage in the media of the work of the rear, villages, and other things, there is no reflection in the media of the spirit and IDEAS for which they went to die.

[Caretaker]

On the morning of July 14.07.1941, 63, the regiment entered the battle for the first time, supporting the advance of XNUMX SK. The city was taken.

Some more details here http://forum.patriotcenter.ru/index.php?topic=35303.0
Perhaps this material will help you and other participants in the discussion.

... 14.07.1941
Battle report No. 2. Headquarters 387 hap 11.00 Eastern edge of the grove forest 1,5 km west of Tursk.
By 11.00:1,5, the regiment concentrated in the forest west of 5 km Tursk. During the movement of the columns, the materiel of the columns was subjected to 3-fold air bombardment by enemy aircraft. 22 tractors damaged, repaired on the way. Brody for crossing mat.chasti, as well as other means of crossing there. I ask for your order to build a bridge for crossing the materiel weighing up to XNUMX tons, or to equip rafts.
387 hap also received instructions to prepare for the crossing on the right bank of the Dnieper. For its crossing, it was necessary to build a bridge with a carrying capacity of over 22 tons, and such a bridge was built by sappers, despite the bombing and shelling of enemy aircraft (TsAMO fund 63 ck inventory 388835 case 1 sheet 34) ....

[3x3zsave]

Thank you, Sergey! Wonderful article!
And yet, I want to note that you have a rather rare ability to work with documents.

[bubalik]

Anton
,,, so nowadays, without

Where are the proofs, Billy?

in no way

[3x3zsave]

"What is your evidence?" (FROM)

[Stas57]

06.10.1941/13/XNUMX the regiment as part of the XNUMXth army was in the rear of the enemy. The Germans were already approaching Kursk and Orel.
------------
the eagle is already youk, another month to Kursk

[bubalik]

Stas57
Today

,,, completely agree on this issue with you , but the article under the heading "75 Years of Victory" is written more as a fictional sketch than a historical research.

[Nike]

09.10.41, in the village of Negino, Suzemsky district, a garrison of up to 100 soldiers and officers was defeated.
A breakthrough in Negino was carried out by the NKVD border regiment (main force), it was broken through twice, and for the third time there were not enough forces. Other parts (there were a lot of them, Dad told) helped.
At one time, for ignorance of these fights I cursed the Russian border guards deployed in Suzemka, their colleagues folded their heads, and they didn’t even bring a wreath to the grave (he shamelessly shouted at the checkpoint). cleaned around the burial.

[bubalik]

A breakthrough in Negino was carried out by the NKVD border regiment (main force), it was broken through twice, and for the third time there were not enough forces. Other parts (there were a lot of them, Dad told) helped.

Good afternoon Thanks for the interesting details.