“Attempt to hide from the satellite”: camouflage and space tracking systems


After the release of the first part of material on camouflage troops in modern conditions, some aspects of the topic that are of great interest to most readers have remained unsolved. First of all, the result that the commander of a unit or formation receives when conducting camouflage events is of interest.


And the second question, which was announced in the first part, is the question of the effectiveness of camouflage in the conditions of using space reconnaissance. Both of these issues are as relevant as possible today. In the context of the destruction of the political stability of the world, it is necessary to clearly understand the challenges that may have to be faced.

Is it possible to neutralize enemy intelligence


First of all, I recall the division of military intelligence. Units by goals, objectives, methods of conduct and scope are divided into strategic, operational and tactical intelligence. For ground, air, sea, special and space reconnaissance. And all the forces and means of these intelligence services will be used in units, formations and associations in different volumes. Volumes depend on the tasks of the part or compound.

Alas, even with active opposition to enemy reconnaissance, the use of all camouflage measures and other things, after 5-6 hours, reconnaissance reveals from 60 to 70% of all enemy targets to the entire depth of the defense of the formation. By the way, if these measures are not carried out or are not being fully implemented, then, as the US war against Iraq has shown, this happens after 3 and a half to 4 hours.

What does this lead to? Let’s distract from the talk of disguise. Let's look at the most effective methods of warfare in modern conditions. On how, for example, our aircraft operate in Syria. What do we see there?

The force impact, which was the main type of warfare recently, is increasingly giving way to non-contact combat methods. Modern weapons, the use of drones, high precision weapon and other achievements of military designers enable troops to strike at the enemy without direct contact.

And now let's reconcile intelligence data and the ability to strike at reconnaissance targets. We get an excellent result from the point of view of the striker. The Americans in Iraq destroyed more than 30% of enemy targets with one blow! With such losses, even an undergraduate of the military academy understands that the offensive, if a blow is inflicted on the advancing, will drown. And defense, if a blow is delivered to the defenders, becomes problematic.

Camouflage and space tracking systems


And the last question. How do space intelligence systems affect modern combat? Is it critical that the adversary “sees” our positions from outer space? Is it even possible to hide from a satellite? Attempts are being made!

I'll start with a simple one. Most readers are confident that space can only successfully conduct optical-electronic reconnaissance. Simply put, satellites have learned to see terrestrial objects well. Alas, readers must be disappointed. In addition to optoelectronic reconnaissance equipment, radar and RIRTR are actively used. I will give examples of such devices that are in service with the US Army.

A satellite of the Kihoule-11 type, one of the spacecraft of optoelectronic intelligence of the USA. It operates in the visible and infrared range in the band 1200-1300 km in single-frame and overview mode. Equipped with telephoto optical lenses. When shooting frame-by-frame (the area is 2,8 by 2,8 km), it controls up to 400 objects with a resolution of up to 0,1 m. When moving to a survey survey, the resolution drops to 0,6 m, but the shooting band increases to 90 by 120 km .

An example of radar reconnaissance will be another satellite - Lacros. Equipped with a powerful antenna with a diameter of more than 15 m. The reconnaissance is carried out in a strip of 4000 km When shooting frame-by-frame (an area of ​​2 by 3 km), it has a resolution of 1 m. When surveying, the resolution drops to 4-6 m. The system is used around the clock and does not depend on weather conditions on Earth.

Well, the satellite RIRTR. Here, almost any of the devices such as "Chalet", "Magnum", "Mentor", "Vortex". These satellites allow not only to intercept information from ground-based communications, but also to determine the coordinates of sources with an accuracy of 10 meters. But there is also a “highlight” - the satellite “Ferret”. Apparatus for a panoramic view of the territory of the enemy. The bandwidth of this satellite is 5800 km. True, the accuracy, like that of other satellites in the review cycle, leaves much to be desired: 5-10 km.

As you can see, with the existing space tracking system, hiding something is rather problematic. Stationary facilities, which are created in the interests of the Armed Forces, are monitored from the moment construction begins. That's why our potential opponents fall into hysteria over mobile strategic nuclear forces systems. That's why they are afraid of new mobile systems.

In general, I repeat, little attention is paid to modern methods of camouflage undeservedly. In a fleeting high-tech battle, time will be counted for minutes and hours. Military cunning was, is and will be one of the elements of victory. Exhaust the enemy, force them to fight according to their own rules, spend resources on destroying layouts, stretch communications ... But this is military art.
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  1. Alex Nevs 26 March 2020 11: 10 New
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    Such a "tryna" - who will deceive whom.
  2. Lopatov 26 March 2020 11: 29 New
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    Satellite intelligence essentially does not change much in terms of camouflage. Both passive and active methods are also applicable against it. In addition, satellite intelligence is very predictable.
    1. Vladimir_2U 26 March 2020 11: 37 New
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      Quote: Spade
      In addition, satellite intelligence is very predictable.
      With the advent of cheap means of launching into orbit, this drawback will decrease sharply.
      1. Lopatov 26 March 2020 11: 40 New
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        Quote: Vladimir_2U
        With the advent of cheap means of launching into orbit, this drawback will decrease sharply.

        Cheap means bring to low orbits. Where satellites are vulnerable to weapons.
        1. Snail N9 26 March 2020 12: 30 New
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          The Chinese are digging tunnels under their own country and in places where they have bases, since they have long understood that only underground 100% masking from satellites.
          1. Lopatov 26 March 2020 12: 38 New
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            Quote: Snail N9
            The Chinese are digging tunnels under their own country and in places where they have bases, since they have long understood that only underground 100% masking from satellites.

            You have been misled.
            There is no "100% disguise"
            1. Snail N9 26 March 2020 12: 44 New
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              100% disguise seems, already, not anywhere else. And what is “visible” from what is “underground” from a satellite?
              1. Lopatov 26 March 2020 15: 13 New
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                Quote: Snail N9
                And what is “visible” from what is “underground” from a satellite?

                The tunnels themselves
        2. Vladimir_2U 27 March 2020 03: 18 New
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          Quote: Spade
          Cheap funds take to low orbits

          Quite right, but cheap tools allow you to bring out cheap satellites and a lot, and more importantly, quickly. I’ll supplement the thought: an inexpensive satellite with the possibility, albeit a one-time (to throw out anyway wink ), significantly change the orbit, will sharply increase the suddenness of the passage over the area.
    2. Chaldon48 26 March 2020 16: 47 New
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      You need to hide deeper underground and then no satellite can see what you are doing there.
      1. Snail N9 26 March 2020 17: 31 New
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        The tunnels themselves

        And how are they visible? How are they identified? Lidar? Temperature gradient?
        No, tunnels from the satellite are not visible if they pass at depths of more than 30 meters.
        1. Lopatov 26 March 2020 17: 46 New
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          Quote: Snail N9
          How are they identified? Lidar?

          Radar, known as a "ground penetrating radar" It is also a "radar subsurface sounding"
          Plus gravity. At one time, the Americans created a very detailed gravitational map of the moon. I am sure that this has been done with the Earth. And not just the Americans.
          1. Operator 26 March 2020 19: 35 New
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            When developing the US missile-based missile defense system, the main solution competing in silo launchers was a system of near-surface tunnels in the desert zone. The tunnel was a shallow reinforced concrete pipe, consisting of separate sections cut horizontally into two halves.

            MX wheel missiles continuously moved through the tunnel system. In the case of receiving a start command, the conveyors stopped anywhere in the tunnel, the jacks installed on each conveyor dismantled the upper half of the pipe section along with the soil poured on it, after which the rocket was put into a vertical state and launched.

            The tunnels were visible on the ground penetrating radar, but missile transporters were not.
      2. uizik 28 March 2020 16: 53 New
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        Good camouflage and reliable protection against weapons is what you need!
  3. Evgeny Suslin 26 March 2020 11: 54 New
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    Of course, the era of corner reflectors is long over, but science in conjunction with manufacturers does not stand still. "Capes" on the technique is even nothing, it would still mask traces of technology deshovymi, but reliable means.
    1. Lopatov 26 March 2020 12: 30 New
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      Quote: Eugene Suslin
      Of course, the era of corner reflectors is long over

      ??
      They work great. Like thermal simulators and emitters
  4. Radikal 26 March 2020 12: 18 New
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    The topic is not disclosed from the word - "completely." For example, the state of camouflage measures for the locations of airborne forces, air defense positional areas on the territory of the Russian Federation and beyond, camouflage, and the dispersal of equipment in positions — what is the state of this issue in units and formations? sad
    1. Lopatov 26 March 2020 12: 23 New
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      Quote: Radikal
      The topic is not disclosed from the word - "completely." For example, the state of camouflage measures for the locations of airborne forces, air defense positional areas on the territory of the Russian Federation and beyond, camouflage, and the dispersal of equipment in positions — what is the state of this issue in units and formations? sad

      Pal Andreich, are you a spy? (with)
      1. Igor Aviator 26 March 2020 15: 56 New
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        Quote: Spade
        Pal Andreich, are you a spy? (with)

        What are you ?! How could you think?
        employee!! Either MI-6 or CIA. Or maybe this and that part-time .. laughing
    2. Waddimm 26 March 2020 12: 30 New
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      Quote: Radikal
      The topic is not disclosed from the word - "completely."

      I agree. A set of stamps, which, in due time, was remembered by each cadet / student of any higher educational institution.
    3. domokl 26 March 2020 19: 18 New
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      laughing
      Quote: Radikal
      For example, the state of camouflage measures for the locations of airborne forces, air defense positional areas in the Russian Federation and beyond

      I didn’t set myself such a task. And the locations of the VKS are known to the Americans in exactly the same way as the American places to us. Stationary air defense are perfectly visible from space even when using nets and simulators. Another question is whether they can be covered with one blow or not. Just because there are mobile air defense
  5. Radikal 26 March 2020 12: 24 New
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    Quote: Spade
    Quote: Radikal
    The topic is not disclosed from the word - "completely." For example, the state of camouflage measures for the locations of airborne forces, air defense positional areas on the territory of the Russian Federation and beyond, camouflage, and the dispersal of equipment in positions — what is the state of this issue in units and formations? sad

    Pal Andreich, are you a spy? (with)

    You see ... Yura .... lol
  6. Den717 26 March 2020 12: 42 New
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    even an undergraduate at the military academy understands that the offensive, if a blow is inflicted on the attacking, will be drowned. And defense, if a blow is delivered to the defenders, becomes problematic.

    Somehow you walked very “casually” over “academics”. Undergraduates of the military academies of the ground forces are, at a minimum, the commanders of small and medium businesses and military personnel. People who are literate and who have experience, sometimes fighting. I think you should not align them with the "hedgehog", which something is clear ....
    1. Glory1974 27 March 2020 09: 09 New
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      Undergraduates of the military academies of the ground forces are, at a minimum, the commanders of small and medium businesses and military personnel.

      from the post of battalion commander, they enter the academy. And in the senior year it is already the commanders of regiments and brigades.
      1. Den717 27 March 2020 09: 44 New
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        Quote: glory1974
        And in the senior year it is already the commanders of regiments and brigades.

        In fact, they become the commander of a regiment or brigade after graduation from the academy after enrollment in the staff of the compound and appointment. Those. not at all in the senior year ...
        1. Glory1974 27 March 2020 11: 43 New
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          it is clear that they are prescribed after release. But in the senior year, the regiment commanders are almost ready, and they are studying the subjects of a higher rank.
          Therefore, with a pure heart, we can say that this is no longer a battalion.
          1. Den717 27 March 2020 12: 45 New
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            Quote: glory1974
            But in the senior year, the regiment commanders are almost ready, and they are studying the subjects of a higher rank.

            I agree....
  7. Undecim 26 March 2020 14: 38 New
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    As usual, this author is about nothing. Neither about satellites, nor about countermeasures. So, a set of common phrases.
    1. Igor Aviator 26 March 2020 16: 01 New
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      and you want all the trump cards to be revealed to you, all the ins and outs (TTX) of our (secret) camouflage complexes published, and even laid out the methodology for their use and effectiveness? Knowledge multiplies sorrow !. (with)
  8. knn54 26 March 2020 14: 45 New
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    -allow not only to intercept information from ground-based communications ...
    The parameters of the orbit and the time of flight of the spies are known .. Therefore, put objects of interest to the adversary in silent mode.
    -Because of this, they are afraid of new, mobile systems.
    BZHRK is simply necessary.
    Countermeasures such as “jammers”, especially when spies need repeaters (outside the zone of direct communication with the control center) have been known for a long time. The truth needs additional stations, lasers.
    And it’s not in our competence.
  9. Operator 26 March 2020 14: 53 New
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    Optical reconnaissance satellites are blind like moles - the width of the viewing band with a resolution of 0,1 meters (necessary to detect the Yars PGRK) is from 2 to 3 km. Since the moment of passage of satellites over a certain part of the earth’s surface is known, PGRK advance in advance from the field of view a few kilometers to the right / left, making them invulnerable to a sudden missile strike.

    In other words, optical reconnaissance satellites are only suitable for tracking stationary objects and even in cloudless weather.

    Radar reconnaissance satellites with a minimum resolution of 1 meter from mobile objects can detect only surface ships (PGRK detection is excluded due to the mass of false targets from corner reflectors).
  10. fk7777777 26 March 2020 20: 32 New
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    Only pioneering methods will help. Guderian did what in Africa, because the desert is all around, and how to hide tanks from the British air reconnaissance? I just disguised them as trucks, and trucks as tanks, ...
  11. Knell wardenheart 26 March 2020 23: 50 New
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    The combination of a satellite array and an array of data from them with a well-trained and powerful neural network is the main problem in my opinion. Masking issues during the implementation of such measures by the enemy - will also need a thorough and large-scale overall plan - because if we cannot economically deceive the enemy somewhere in a particular place, we can comprehensively deceive his algorithms and mislead him about the plans as a whole . Although for now, probably, it will be enough just to qualitatively approach the array of creating a "linden" and a fairly good study of the "proper picture" in place.
  12. Glory1974 27 March 2020 09: 37 New
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    with active opposition to enemy reconnaissance, the use of all camouflage measures, and after 5-6 hours, reconnaissance reveals from 60 to 70% of all enemy targets to the entire depth of the defense of the formation. By the way, if these measures are not carried out or are not being fully implemented, then, as the US war against Iraq has shown, this happens after 3 and a half to 4 hours.

    Rumors of this are greatly exaggerated. The Americans themselves admit that billions spent on intelligence do not always bring the expected result.
    So it was in Yugoslavia, when the difference between destroyed according to reports and really lost equipment reached hundreds of units.
    So it was in Iraq, when Saddam hid the SCAD installation from the United States.
    Well, let’s recall the Crimean spring when the appearance of “polite people” came as a complete surprise.