Military Review

At gunpoint. About strategic missile submarines

79

As has been repeatedly said before, the combat stability of Russian SSBN formations is a big question. Unfortunately, our submarine missile carriers, entering military service, are targeted by enemy multipurpose atomarians much more often than we would like, and much more often than our concept of nuclear deterrence of a potential enemy permits.


What allows the US Navy and NATO to achieve such a regrettable result for us? In the previous article, the author mentioned the “four whales” on which the American and European submarine power is based: the SOSUS submarine hydrophone system, the SURTASS sonar reconnaissance system, multipurpose nuclear submarines and aerospace assets. At the same time, it is obvious that SOSUS can only be used against our submarines, seeking, or have already sailed into the ocean, and the actions of SURTASS today are largely curtailed. Nevertheless, the Americans are quite able to identify our SSBNs even when the latter have military service in the seas adjacent to the Russian Federation. And this suggests that the US space and air assets, coupled with multipurpose nuclear submarines, have sufficient potential to reveal the underwater situation in the waters, which generally should be ours.

Why is this happening? The author has already given a detailed answer to this question, so now we will restrict ourselves to a short summary. American multipurpose submarines, practically throughout the Cold War, had an advantage in the detection distance over domestic SSBNs. The situation was aggravated as a result of the collapse of the USSR: a landslide reduction in the composition of the Russian Navy greatly reduced our ability to detect and track foreign nuclear submarines and submarines even in our near sea zone.


SSN-688 Los Angeles. Terrible enemy for his time

At the same time anti-submarine capabilities aviation NATO has grown significantly compared to what they had in the past century. Judging by the available data, the Americans succeeded in a small anti-submarine revolution: if earlier the main aviation means of searching for submarines were hydroacoustics (discharged buoys, etc.), then at present it has been replaced by other, non-acoustic means. It is a matter of identifying specific waves that arise when a large underwater object is moving, which, of course, is any submarine, regardless of the type of mover, wake, or, possibly, something else. Thus, the capabilities of modern anti-submarine aviation have increased dramatically, and it is possible that today we should talk about a multiple increase in the efficiency of aviation in US and NATO PLO. Alas, the secrecy of our nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines, respectively, decreased in approximately the same proportion.

What can we contrast with all this?

The latest technology?


First of all, the latest 4th generation SSBNs of project 955A Borey-A. As mentioned earlier, the first 3 ships of the Borey type, which were part of the domestic fleet, they are rather a 3+ generation SSBN, since during their creation sections of the hull and (partially) equipment of boats of the 3rd generation were used. But it can be assumed that, starting with Prince Vladimir, the Russian Navy will receive truly modern strategic cruisers. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the serial construction of the SSBN project 955A alone will provide our SSNF units with the required levels of stealth and combat stability, and this is the point.

For more than a decade, domestic shipbuilders have been trying to catch up and overtake the United States in terms of reducing the visibility of MAPL and SSBNs. And, I must say, in this area the late USSR and the Russian Federation achieved certain results. The author will not undertake to compare the mutual detection ranges of "Prince Vladimir" and "Virginia" of the latest modifications - for this he simply does not have data. But progress is undeniable: since the 80s of the last century, the Country of the Soviets has achieved a significant reduction in the noise of its submarine fleet. In other words, it is quite possible, and even very likely, that the Americans still have not lost their leadership in the issue of who will discover whom first, but the distances of mutual detection have been significantly reduced in comparison with what it was before. And this, of course, greatly complicates the identification of domestic SSBNs with hydroacoustic means of multipurpose US nuclear submarines.

A good illustration of the above is the incident that occurred in the Atlantic on the night of February 3–4, 2009. Two foreign SSBNs clashed: the British Wangard and the French Le Triumph (forgive my French). Both boats went into operation in the 90s of the last century, and are quite modern and meeting their tasks ships, equipped, among other things, with the most powerful sonar systems. However, neither the British nor the French submariners were able to detect the dangerous proximity of SSBNs, which indicates an extremely low distance of guaranteed detection.


British SSBN "Vanguard" - a little awkward looking, but quite modern

It can be assumed that our Boreas A, especially in the conditions of the northern seas, will also be “easier to feel than to hear” - and this will greatly complicate the search for our SSBNs by American submariners.

But, unfortunately, noise reduction is just one of the components of submarine stealth. The emergence of effective non-acoustic search methods has led to the fact that patrol aircraft were able to very likely find even the quietest boat in the world. So, for example, the American Poseidon R-8 managed to detect 2 Turkish and 3 Russian submarines during just a two-hour flight over the Black Sea. We are talking, of course, about the latest diesel-electric submarines 636.3 Varshavyanka - they are really very quiet, but that did not help them.

Apparently, just by lowering the level of noise and other physical fields, a modern submarine cannot be hidden from the eyes of the enemy. Of course, I would like to hope and believe that our 4th generation submarines are less noticeable for non-acoustic reconnaissance and underwater lighting systems, but this is very doubtful. Firstly, it is completely unclear how this can be done technically - any submarine, whatever one may say, will create disturbances in the aquatic environment, which can hardly be eliminated, as, for example, from the wake track. And secondly, of course, maybe there is an opportunity to reduce the visibility of the submarine from the air. But in order to do this, it is necessary at least to acknowledge the very possibility of such a detection, then to study this “phenomenon” in as much detail as possible and, upon studying it, to look for countermeasures. At the same time, it seems that non-acoustic methods for detecting nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines by the fleet command and the leadership of the Armed Forces and the military-industrial complex were largely ignored as unscientific.

So, the author’s first and quite obvious conclusion is that just improving the design of the SSBN and its equipment can significantly reduce the probability of our ship finding an enemy submarine, but it’s impossible to solve the problem of ensuring the combat stability of the strategic nuclear forces. And what else is needed?

Noticed - does not mean destroyed


An axiom that Internet publications often stop paying attention to. The thing is that in modern warfare, submarines discovered and destroyed are, as they say in Odessa, two big differences.

Suppose that the American Poseidons really have the ability to detect our submarine in a submerged position with non-acoustic means with a high probability. But this will not give an absolutely accurate place, but the area of ​​its location, and in order to destroy our ship, additional efforts will be required - dumping sonar buoys, noise analysis, and finally, the attack itself. In peacetime, Poseidon can’t attack a Russian ship in any way: but if the war started, the PLO plane itself should become the target of attack. In other words, the SSBN deployment areas should be provided with means of monitoring the air situation and air defense sufficiently to guarantee and quickly destroy enemy patrol aircraft in the event of hostilities. And then scattered here, you know ...

Of course, the American patrol plane can also “put” another “pig” - having fixed the area where the domestic submarine is located, give its approximate coordinates to the command, so that, in turn, it sends a multi-purpose submarine there. Thus, the Americans could very well "sit on the tail" of the domestic SSBN in peacetime, and destroy them at the very beginning of the conflict. But here, not everything is as simple as it might seem at first glance.

Apparently, the Americans really did learn how to detect submarines using non-acoustic methods. But to believe that the same "Poseidons" are able to somehow accurately classify detected ships in such ways is much more difficult. In order for acoustics to do this, it is necessary to take a “noise portrait” of the submarine, that is, to identify the noise inherent in a particular type of nuclear submarine and diesel-electric submarine. This is possible, and it can be assumed that the waves formed by submarines in motion with different types of ships, their thermal footprint, etc. will vary. But fixing these differences and classifying the discovered target will not be so simple: it is far from the fact that the Americans today or in the foreseeable future will learn how to do this.

In other words, it is more than likely that the Americans today are able to detect our submarines from the air, but are unlikely to be able to classify them. In conditions when 1-2 submarines are in the sea at the same time for the entire fleet (including the SSBN), this is not too critical. But if at sea there are 4-5 submarines at the same time? After all, we still have to guess which one of them is the SSBN, because it will become very difficult to “run-explain” each. Especially considering ...

They could - we can too


To date, the best anti-submarine aircraft of the Russian Navy is the Il-38N with the Novella complex installed on it.


Alas, in this case, “best” does not mean “good” —the complex itself began to be developed back in the 80s of the last century, then –threw in an era of lack of funds, but, fortunately, got the Indian order on time. As a result, in the early 2000s, they delivered the IL-38SD with Novella to India, and then, when the RF Ministry of Defense had the funds, they began to bring domestic anti-submarine IL-s to the SD level. Unfortunately, the capabilities of our "newest" IL-38N go far beyond the level of the same Poseidon. But this does not mean at all that the Russian Federation is unable to create a modern anti-submarine aircraft. If the Americans have achieved great results in the field of non-acoustic search for submarines, the same is quite possible for us. Yes, it will take time and money, but the result will obviously be worth it.

The emergence of domestic "Poseidons" as part of the Russian Navy can dramatically ease the task of evading domestic SSBNs from escorting multipurpose nuclear submarines of the USA and NATO. Yes, today American submarines are superior to Russian nuclear submarines and SSBNs in the range of mutual detection (although, perhaps, Borey-A and Yasen-M will achieve parity), and the weakness of our surface and air forces does not allow us to identify and control the movement of the Virginia and so on. in our coastal waters. But if the Russian Navy gets at its disposal a trump card, which is a PLO plane, “with emphasis” on non-acoustic detection means, then this tactical advantage of foreign submarines will be largely leveled.

Indeed, if non-acoustic means become as effective as is attributed to them today, then the American Sivulfs and Virginia, waiting for the release of domestic SSBNs outside our territorial waters, will be at a glance at our anti-submariners. The low noise and the most powerful SACs of the multi-purpose nuclear submarines of the USA and NATO will not help them in this case. And we, knowing the location of the “sworn friends” submarines, will be able not only to properly shake the nerves of their crews, but also to lay the SSBN routes bypassing their positions.

And it turns out that ...


To ensure the combat stability of our SSBN compounds, we need:

1. To provide air defense of the areas of their deployment at a level that provides reliable support, and in the event of hostilities - the destruction of enemy aircraft PLO.

2. "At home - at sea." We must create a multipurpose submarine force of sufficient strength, and get them so many military services that figure out where is the diesel-electric submarine, where is the multi-purpose submarine, and where - the SSBN will become an extremely laborious task for the anti-submarine forces of the USA and NATO.

3. To develop and launch into the series an effective anti-submarine aircraft “with emphasis” on non-acoustic methods for detecting submarines of a probable enemy.

So, again, in the "bastions"? Absolutely not necessary. In the previous article, the author pointed out the need to test the capabilities of our latest submarine warships Yasen-M and Borey-A. And if it suddenly turns out that they are still able to go unnoticed into the ocean and act there - it's just wonderful!

But without A2 / AD you still can not do


The whole question is that the ability to control our air and underwater conditions at least in the near sea zone is still necessary. Firstly, in order to timely reveal the deployment of enemy submarines near our waters and not fall into their sight. Secondly, because modern military equipment has been used for many decades, and, of course, is becoming obsolete during this time. That is, if today it turns out that Borey-A is capable of carrying out military services in the ocean undetected, this does not mean at all that he will be able to do the same in 15-20 years. No admiral can never count on the fact that his fleet will consist exclusively of the latest ships, this is impossible even for the "rich" USA. And this means that the Russian Navy will necessarily contain some number of SSBNs of not the most modern projects, which will no longer be possible to be sent to the ocean - that’s why they will need “bastions”. Thirdly, it must be understood that if the third world war is destined to happen, then the beginning of the “hot” phase will be preceded by a certain period of tension, possibly measured in weeks and months. At this time, we, and the United States and NATO will increase their ship groupings, launching ships completing ongoing repairs, etc. And, since the American and European Navy are many times superior in numbers, at some point we will not be able to withdraw our ships into the ocean, they will need to be deployed already in the near sea zone. And, finally, fourthly, to identify and be ready to destroy enemy nuclear submarines in our near sea zone, one must be able to do it even without regard to the safety of the SSBN.

As you know, the Americans have long and quite successfully deployed Tomahawk cruise missiles in their submarines, and they are still quite formidable weapon. Obviously, the further we move the launch line of such missiles, the better it will be for us, and, of course, the air and underwater situation control system will greatly help us in this.

Thus, we really need "bastions", but this does not mean at all that we should concentrate, lock ourselves exclusively in them - if practice shows that our latest submarine-powered submarines are able to break into the ocean - all the better for us!

And if not?


Well, one can imagine such a hypothetical situation: full-fledged 4th generation submarines were built, modern PLO aircraft were created, but we were not able to avoid the annoying attention of NATO atomarines with the frequency we needed. What to do in this case?

The answer suggests itself. In this case, we should place the SSBNs in areas where there are no American submarines, or where they themselves will be under tight control and can be destroyed at the very beginning of the conflict.

Offhand, there are two such regions: the Black Sea and the White Sea. Moreover, the latter is of particular interest: the fact is that the White Sea has a very peculiar geographical position and bottom topography. Looking at the map, we will see that the White Sea is the inland sea of ​​the Russian Federation - it is surrounded on almost all sides by the territory of our country. It connects to the Barents Sea, but how? The throat of the Barents Sea (the so-called strait) has a length of 160 km and a width of 46 to 93 km. The greatest depth is 130 m, but basically the depths of the Throat are less than 100 m. And further, upon leaving the Throat, the depths decrease even further - there begins the shallow with depths of up to 50 m.


Obviously, at the current level of domestic anti-submarine technologies and with appropriate funding, it is quite possible to build a PLO barrier that completely eliminates the covert passage of foreign submarines into the White Sea. In addition, we should not forget that the White Sea is considered the internal sea waters of the Russian Federation, and that submarines of other countries can be there only in the surface position and under its own flag. In addition, foreign warships are only allowed to travel to their destination, but not for a long time, maneuvers, exercises, they must inform in advance about entry into inland waters, etc. In other words, any attempt to secretly penetrate a foreign submarine into the White Sea underwater is fraught with a very serious diplomatic incident.

At the same time, closer to the center of the White Sea, the sandbank gradually turns into a rather deep depression, with depths of 100-200 m (maximum depth - 340 m), where the SSBN may well hide. Yes, the deep-sea section is not so large that it is about 300 km in length and several tens of km in width, but it is very easy to "close tightly" both from PLO aircraft and from submarine hunters. And the attempt to cover the SSBN with a “square-nested” ballistic missile strike is obviously absurd - in order to “sow” the indicated water area to the state of guaranteed submarine survival, many hundreds of nuclear warheads will be needed. Our own SSBNs are quite able to hit Washington, say, from the White Sea (a distance of about 7 km).

It must also be said that our submariners already have experience in military service in the White Sea. In 1985-86. from December to June, the TK-12 was here, at the same time it started its BS with one crew, and ended with another (the change was carried out with the help of the Sibir and Peresvet icebreakers. Incidentally, we are talking about the heavy project 941 SSBN.


As for the Black Sea, everything is much more complicated here. On the one hand, to date, in theory, nothing prevents the deployment of submarines with ballistic missiles on board in this region. The U.S. atomic ship will not be in the Black Sea while the Montreux Convention is in force, the diesel submarines that Turkey has are not very suitable for escorting the SSBN, and in our coastal waters, in the event of a conflict, we are quite able to interfere with the operations of enemy aircraft. The naval power of the United States and NATO will not be able to ensure air supremacy off our Black Sea coast in wartime - it’s far to fly from the Turkish coast, and driving the AUG, even if the Turks allow it, will be uniform suicide. If, however, Turkish frigates or other non-aircraft-carrying ships venture to sink into our shores, say, of the same United States - well, anti-ship missiles at the BRAV will be enough for everyone. At the same time, the distance from Sevastopol to Washington is 8 km in a straight line, which is quite accessible for SSBN ballistic missiles.

On the other hand, it is unlikely that Turks will miss nuclear submarines from the Northern or Pacific fleets into the Black Sea, and recreate production in the Black Sea to a level that allows them to build strategic submarine missile carriers ... Of course, more modest ships than the Boreas can be dispensed with in the Black Sea. A ”, but still it will be a very, very expensive project. In addition, the Turks can get more efficient submarines with VNEU, which will expand their "hunting" capabilities. Adventures of the “Gebena” and “Breslau” types (“completely Turkish” ships of German construction and with German crews as well) cannot be ruled out. After all, no one will bother to take Turkey some submarines ... say, for rent. And no international agreement prohibits American observers from being in these submarines. And which paragraph will be violated if these “observers” turn out to be 99% of the total crew? Today, the American Navy does not make sense to resort to such tricks, but if the Russian SSBNs arise in the Black Sea, the situation may change. And the appearance of Russian naval strategic nuclear forces at the Black Sea Theater can cause such disasters in international politics that even the Montreux Convention will not survive. It is unlikely that it will be beneficial for us to remove restrictions on the presence in the Black Sea of ​​warships of non-Black Sea powers.

In other words, for a number of reasons, the deployment of submarines with intercontinental ballistic missiles on board in the same Crimea may look quite attractive. But such a decision should be made, only very well thought out and weighing all sorts of political consequences.

At the end of the section on the prospects of domestic SSBNs, several conclusions can be drawn:

1. The SSBNs have been and remain the main striking force of the Russian Navy, and ensuring their combat stability is the most important task of the general forces of our fleet.

2. The main threat to the Russian SSBN is the submarines and patrol (anti-submarine) aircraft of the United States and NATO.

3. Regardless of where the SSBN combat services are carried out (ocean, “bastions”), general forces of the Russian Navy should be able to build zones of restriction and prohibition of access and maneuver (A2 / AD). The latter will be needed both for the withdrawal of strategic missile carriers into the ocean, and for covering them in the seas adjacent to our coastline.

But about where, by what forces to build these very A2 / AD zones, the author will venture to speculate in the following materials of the cycle.

To be continued ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
Marine Strategic Nuclear Forces: Weigh Pros and Cons
On the secrecy of the Soviet SSBNs
About the latest “Borea”, “Bark”, “Mace” and a little about “Borea-A”
Combat Stability of Russian Submarine Forces
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  1. tlauicol
    tlauicol 25 March 2020 18: 16 New
    +3
    But to believe that the same "Poseidons" are able to accurately classify detected ships in such ways is already much more difficult. In order for acoustics to do this, it is necessary to shoot a “noise portrait”

    And nevertheless, they identified Varshavyanka and German Turks
  2. Operator
    Operator 25 March 2020 18: 45 New
    -10
    SSBN - purely specifically cargo cult.

    His adherents got off their feet, trying to attach unnecessarily and fabulously expensive "cows" even in the White Sea (from where SLBMs at AUT will be perfectly intercepted by US sea-based SM-3 missiles).

    PLO is needed in the form of FOSS with noise pelers and anti-submarine MS-21 with quantum magnetometers and special radars.

    Low-frequency noise detectors installed on the shelf in the areas of Svalbard and on the Kuril Islands with hydroacoustic illumination from areas of intense navigation along the East and West coasts of North America will hear all NK, PL and NPS within a radius of 700 km.

    Low-frequency noise detectors SOPO in the amount of 20-30 units installed along the Northern Sea Route will control its entire length.

    And a hundred anti-submarine MS-21s (which do not need to be licensed in the West) are a cherry on the cake and a bonus to Russian aircraft / engine manufacturing.
  3. mvg
    mvg 25 March 2020 19: 03 New
    +2
    A painfully beaten topic. Even 8 Boreevs will not save the situation. On a DB usually 1-2 RPKSN, and Squids will soon end. At a rate of 2 Virginia a year, soon again will be under 50+ hunters, plus allies. It’s hard to count on anything. With a clear threat of war, a preemptive strike.
    1. alma
      alma 25 March 2020 19: 26 New
      0
      Yes, a bias in the strategists .. Which needs to be changed.
  4. Undecim
    Undecim 25 March 2020 19: 11 New
    +10
    Judging by the available data, and, possibly, something else, is not excluded, in approximately the same proportion, it can be assumed, quite possibly, and even very likely, Most likely
    This is the foundation on which the author is trying to build the doctrine of combat sustainability SSBNs. You can also attract a crystal ball.
    According to the foundation and conclusions.
    A good illustration of the above is the incident that occurred in the Atlantic on the night of February 3–4, 2009. Two foreign SSBNs clashed: the British Wangard and the French Le Triumph (forgive my French). Both boats went into operation in the 90s of the last century, and are quite modern and meeting their tasks ships, equipped, among other things, with the most powerful sonar systems. However, neither the British nor the French submariners were able to detect the dangerous proximity of SSBNs, which indicates an extremely low distance of guaranteed detection.
    This speaks first of all of the high stealthiness of British and French boats and low noise,
    since at the time of the collision the GAS of both boats worked only in passive mode, and the towed antennas were removed.
    1. frog
      frog 26 March 2020 15: 24 New
      +1
      This speaks first of all of the high stealthiness of British and French boats and low noise,

      Mill sorry, this can speak of elementary negligence. Ours also butted under water at the entrance to the base. Blaming them for "high secrecy" is pretty hard.
      1. Undecim
        Undecim 26 March 2020 16: 50 New
        +1
        Can. And about the lack of coordination of actions can.
        Well I wrote - first of all. Nevertheless, it is possible to assume that on the alert on both boats hydroacoustics slept or watched porn, but not in the first place.
        1. frog
          frog 26 March 2020 23: 46 New
          0
          Yes, anything can be. But ..... 3 episodes ..... Because it seems like you kissed Hawaii. This is one of the famous. Well, on one of our commanders scored on duties (and not only him))), let's say. And on another pelvis? And the rumors? Their watch opens in the base, EMNIP, and closes in it. Suddenly problems happened on both of them? No, I absolutely agree that everything can be, but still inclined to trivial gouging .....
  5. doktorkurgan
    doktorkurgan 25 March 2020 20: 52 New
    0
    That's interesting.
  6. Sergey Valov
    Sergey Valov 25 March 2020 21: 39 New
    +2
    A little thought. The first one. If you take the White Sea as a place to patrol the SSBN, then it means that they should also be based there.
    Secondly, why not take the SSBN on combat duty under the guise of old large-displacement civilian vessels of its own capacity to create at least wild acoustic noise. And for one boat to allocate several (the more, the better) vessels. Plus, from these vessels at some distance from the base, launch an underwater vehicle (such as a large torpedo) as a simulator for entangling an adversary. On such a vessel, there is enough space to place PLO equipment to identify the adversary’s submarines, which can very well track the exit of our boat, with the subsequent directing of the PLO’s own forces on the adversary. Naturally, it will be necessary to drive away enemy PLO aircraft, and for this the outfit of our own air defense forces must always be ready.
    1. Aleksandr1971
      Aleksandr1971 26 March 2020 04: 54 New
      -2
      The concern about the combat stability of the SSBN is well-founded. And the idea of ​​combat duty in the White Sea is sound. But taking into account the fact that even in good times, boats remained at the pier for more than 50% of the time, then just being on duty in the White Sea will not improve the situation much.

      Then I agree with Sergey Valov that then the submarine base must also be transferred to the White Sea. There it will be much more secure than near Murmansk. However, in Murmansk, the bays are not freezing, in contrast to the White Sea. And besides, the White Sea is by no means more protected than inland waters. Not to mention the Black Sea.
      If there are no NATO PLO forces in the Black Sea yet, then as soon as our SSBNs appear there, as the author of the article said, then PLO enemies will also arise there. The throat of the White Sea is easier to protect from the invasion of hostile nuclear submarines, it is even easier to protect from hostile aircraft. But it is even better that there is no need for such protection at all. And this is not the White Sea, much less the Black Sea.

      Therefore, the author’s idea of ​​strengthening our PLO aviation is very sound. This is necessary to ensure the validity of our ICAPL. But although the White and Black Seas are better than the Arctic Ocean and the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, they are still bad compared to inland waters.

      I repeat once again that Ladoga and the Caspian are the only reliable reservoirs for the placement and on duty of our SSBNs.
  7. xomaNN
    xomaNN 25 March 2020 21: 47 New
    +3
    If our submarines are already being driven into inland seas, then it’s cheaper to return to the unrealized Soviet project. Those. autonomous rocket launchers with a missile launcher in advance to be installed under a layer of water in internal lakes such as Lake Baikal, Ladoga ... And figs who will get them there wassat
    1. Aleksandr1971
      Aleksandr1971 26 March 2020 05: 29 New
      0
      Your idea is good, only contrary to our agreements with amers regarding autonomous platforms. Accordingly, we need not crewless platforms, namely the SSBN. The difference between them will only be that in the platform, so that it turns into an SSBN, you need to put at least one person and put at least a weak, but the engine.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 26 March 2020 13: 45 New
      +2
      Quote: xomaNN
      If our submarines are already being driven into inland seas, then it’s cheaper to return to the unrealized Soviet project.

      If our submarines are already being driven into inland seas, then it’s cheaper to score at all on the SSBN. And instead of them, order ordinary PGRK, which, by now, has stealth and vitality much higher. Moreover, unlike the SSBN with its single PU unit, the PGRK regiment can disperse even individual PUs - and for their failure a disproportionate number of UBCs will be needed.
      1. Aleksandr1971
        Aleksandr1971 26 March 2020 18: 20 New
        0
        Other articles have repeatedly argued that the PGRK is significantly less tenacious compared to the SSBN, provided that the SSBN is on combat duty with good guard. The mine ICBM will live a few minutes after the outbreak of war; the PGRK will live 15-30 minutes longer. And the task of the SSBN is to save itself for further actions after the initial exchange of blows - at least for a day, at least for half a year.

        Just check out previously published articles on this topic on the same site.
  8. SovAr238A
    SovAr238A 25 March 2020 21: 48 New
    +4
    The White Sea is an extremely compact military service area.
    It’s already dangerous to place 3-4 SSBNs there for their joint maneuvering during combat service.

    In addition, you can not discount mines "Captor", LSM, SubStrike and others. The same SiWulf class boats are capable of sowing our combat service area with a couple of hundreds of Captors in half a year without bothering much.
    For SiWulf - far superior to any of our means PLO for the next 20 years ...
    Knowing that Nakhimov is already close in costs to 6-8 billion dollars, and there the grass has not yet grown, you understand that there will be no PLO for normal money.
    The Black Sea is not an option at all. Turkey will deploy as many frigates as it needs, and all NATO will pay for it, the construction of these and the maintenance ...

    It is real to admit that there is a technological lag.
    And it is the strongest.
    The difference in decibels - the sofa expert can be understood if he wants to see that non-linearity between a whisper and an ops level for his ears ... Just as an example.
    There, “the battle for decibel units is underway” and a couple of decibel improvements are the result of a whole technological revolution worth billions and trillions of dollars. For to improve the boat in terms of noise, you need new reactors, new units, new materials, new design.
    To create the latest glue that meets the needs, it is necessary to re-equip chemists, oil refining under 6 technological order. Computer simulation is appropriate.
    And so in everything.
    In materials science. In acoustics, in GAS production technology. They need official signal processors, the experience of which without a "quantitative parameter will never go into quality" ...
    And so in every little thing.

    If you do not have an industry that meets the latest technologies, if you don’t get mad, you won’t create anything. You can spend trillions, but if there is no industry point, the effect is zero.
    With an ax, plants could be cut 100 years ago.
    Now, to build the site of a modern plant. without a bulldozer with GPS - you can’t do it ... and so on.
  9. SVD68
    SVD68 25 March 2020 22: 02 New
    -1
    The idea of ​​deploying an SSBN in water areas inaccessible to US PLOs seems to be the most promising. But in this sense, Ladoga is better than the White Sea, and the Caspian is better than the Black Sea.
    1. svoit
      svoit 26 March 2020 00: 15 New
      -1
      Quote: SVD68
      and the Caspian - the Black Sea.

      It’s interesting the better, the Americans also feel at ease, our former republics with great pleasure will provide them with all the opportunities for reconnaissance on an ongoing basis (they will also line up)
      1. Aleksandr1971
        Aleksandr1971 26 March 2020 05: 36 New
        -1
        You svoit are wrong.

        Regarding the Caspian, there is an agreement of the Caspian states that non-Caspian states are not allowed in the Caspian. Iran definitely does not need a US presence in the Caspian. But Russia has leverage over other Caspian countries to force them to fulfill the treaty. And even in the long term, it is not obvious that the situation will change exactly the opposite, although with a 100% probability the future cannot be guaranteed.
        Therefore, the Caspian as a region of the deployment of the SSBN is the most successful option.

        Only to build ICBMs for the Caspian SSBNs is necessary partially orbital. Previously, this type of ICBM was banned, but now there are no restrictions. An additional plus from partially orbiting ICBMs is the possibility of attacking the territory of the United States not only through the pole, but also from all over the world. This will greatly weaken the capabilities of the US missile defense, which have protection only from the North.
    2. Grits
      Grits 26 March 2020 05: 22 New
      0
      Quote: SVD68
      But in this sense, Ladoga is better than the White Sea, and the Caspian is better than the Black Sea.

      Then Baikal is even better. But the SSBNs themselves need to be delivered there somehow ....
      1. Aleksandr1971
        Aleksandr1971 26 March 2020 05: 41 New
        -2
        It is quite possible to deliver the SSBN there because the depths of the Yenisei are enormous. But the Angara would have to tinker with: it is necessary to build barges and load on them SSBNs and transport them in a period of high water. Such a period can either wait for the flood, or artificially caused by lowering the water from the Irkutsk hydroelectric station.
        But I would not recommend transferring the SSBN there without a situation of sharp deterioration in the international situation. I think that the rating of the country's leadership will suffer greatly from the militarization of Lake Baikal.
        1. Grits
          Grits 26 March 2020 09: 47 New
          +1
          Quote: Aleksandr1971
          But with the Angara would have to tinker:

          Especially at the Bratsk and Ust-Ilim HPPs.
          1. Aleksandr1971
            Aleksandr1971 26 March 2020 11: 01 New
            -3
            These hydropower plants have ship-hoists. When the Boguchanskaya hydroelectric power station is also commissioned, then the problem with the deployment of the SSBN to Baikal will disappear altogether because ALL shallow areas of the Angara will be flooded.
      2. Nemchinov Vl
        Nemchinov Vl 26 March 2020 11: 54 New
        +4
        Quote: Gritsa
        Then Baikal is even better. But the SSBNs themselves need to be delivered there somehow ...
        Though do not climb into Baikal, with your progress, technology, and weapons ... Leave a supply of clean water !!!!
  10. Operator
    Operator 25 March 2020 22: 33 New
    0
    Quote: sanek45744
    Enough for a start

    Amen.
  11. Podvodnik
    Podvodnik 25 March 2020 23: 34 New
    +4
    "Peacocks, you say?" (c) In the sense of non-acoustic aircraft search tools.

    Of course, I quit a long time ago. But like "Beasts" are still alive, but "hands remember." It is clear that radar is also neoacoustics. I’m afraid I don’t seem polite, but something looks like a fantasy.

    Aircraft immediately five submarines at a time? Well, we also handed over tasks in the water position, ironing landfills back and forth. And the Orions circled. There is no miracle. In a surface submarine, it is as easy to detect as a diesel engine.

    Speak on the trail? What is it for? Wake? We had a non-acoustic complex. Saw and touched. I know the principle of work. In short and unclassified: To find a trace (indignation) you need to know "not a trace". Ie ordinary sea with currents and other things. How will an airplane do this? Than?

    Any other waves from the Premier League? Gravity? Cool. With what?

    Measure the hydrodynamic pressure from the air? Cool. Than?

    Satellite speak? What is it like? Surveillance Intelligence? And how many days does it take to take a picture of the Barents Sea and view (analyze) and conduct detailed reconnaissance? Do you think that having cast a glance all over the sea, the satellite will see everything? And reads newspapers?

    The topic deserves interest. But where is the evidence? Some assumptions and reasoning. Cartoons do not count.
    Maybe behind the times? Or maybe as in a joke: A man comes to the doctor: “Well, I can’t do it so much. Doctor:“ I mean? ”. The neighbor says that ... if he can.
  12. Avior
    Avior 25 March 2020 23: 35 New
    0
    I think that it’s not worth seriously discussing the appearance of the SSBN in the Black Sea.
    The Turks won’t let them in, they don’t even need to make particularly scandalous decisions - the convention leaves the sanitary rules to the Turks, if they decide to ban the passage of ships from nuclear weapons for environmental safety reasons, no one will be indignant, this is a pretty good reason, the passage goes right in the middle Istanbul
    1. svoit
      svoit 26 March 2020 00: 21 New
      -1
      Quote: Avior
      which is not worth seriously discussing

      But still, let’s try ... And what if on the Volga-Don, but most likely in the surface position, then the draft will go no more than 10 m.?
      (if the bullshit is frozen, do not hurt)
      1. Avior
        Avior 26 March 2020 01: 34 New
        +1
        I doubt that there is such an opportunity.
        But, I think, in this case, this is fraught with a subsequent expanded interpretation of the convention by the potential adversary. smile
        For example, the provision by Ukraine of the States base in Ochakova for a 99-year lease and the transformation of the States into a Black Sea power with all the consequences.
        In general, a strong round of both tension and the arms race.
        There is one more problem
        The Black Sea is not very large, and BRs on take-off are quite vulnerable
        Wouldn’t it turn out that there is a technical possibility to shoot down on the take-off area?
        It is even easier then to place specially constructed simplified boats in a purely inland water body like Lake Baikal.
        In any case, the USSR did not try to do this, although there were more opportunities then.
        hi
        1. Grits
          Grits 26 March 2020 05: 36 New
          +1
          Quote: Avior
          It is even easier then to place specially constructed simplified boats in a purely inland water body like Lake Baikal.

          Thought is good. But only for this purpose it will be necessary to build from scratch something like a shipyard and base. Can you imagine how much it will cost? And even more will be a squeal and a stink. Greta Tumberg that, in general, hanged himself from anger and hopelessness.
          1. Aleksandr1971
            Aleksandr1971 26 March 2020 08: 08 New
            -2
            Our permanent leader loves to be loved by the people, and regularly checks this on social issues. It is clear that social polls will show a decrease in love for the leader if Baikal is militarized. Therefore, the SSBN in Baikal will not appear.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 26 March 2020 17: 45 New
              +1
              Quote: Aleksandr1971
              It is clear that social polls will show a decrease in love for the leader if Baikal is militarized

              It depends on how to formulate survey questions. smile
          2. Avior
            Avior 26 March 2020 09: 32 New
            +1
            I didn’t mean to seriously let Baikal go, I’m just for comparison with the consequences of putting strategists into the Black Sea
            In reality it will be very expensive, from scratch a project and so on
            But keep in mind that in Baikal boats can be relatively cheap non-nuclear, slow and noisy - they don’t face the task of contact with the enemy
            hi
          3. Nemchinov Vl
            Nemchinov Vl 26 March 2020 12: 03 New
            -1
            Quote: Gritsa
            But only for this purpose it will be necessary to build from scratch something like a shipyard and base. Can you imagine how much it will cost? And even more will be a squeal and a stink. Greta Tumberg that, in general, hanged himself from anger and hopelessness.
            Well, To decide to make a mess of your own Baikal, initially, you need to have a brain, many times less than that of Greta Tumberg !!!
        2. Aleksandr1971
          Aleksandr1971 26 March 2020 07: 11 New
          -2
          The Constitution of Ukraine prohibits the deployment of foreign bases on its territory. The exception was only for the Crimean base of the Black Sea Fleet.
          1. Avior
            Avior 26 March 2020 09: 33 New
            +3
            How long does it take to amend the Constitution?
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 26 March 2020 17: 47 New
              +1
              Quote: Avior
              How long does it take to amend the Constitution?

              That can not be changed. There, the Profesoru was impeached in violation of the Constitution - and nothing, everything suited everyone.
              1. Avior
                Avior 26 March 2020 19: 29 New
                +1
                Formally, they didn’t formalize impeachment; they did it differently
                But you are right, if you want to make a basis, then a formal ban in the Constitution is not an obstacle to this.
                There is always one way or another.
    2. Aleksandr1971
      Aleksandr1971 26 March 2020 05: 46 New
      -2
      You can hold the SSBN to the Black Sea through the Volga, Don, Volga-Don Canal. On a barge with shallow draft. It is possible to raise the water level by means of a system of backwater and, conversely, by draining water from reservoirs. But the Caspian, as the base of the SSBN, is better than the Black Sea.
      1. Avior
        Avior 26 March 2020 09: 34 New
        0
        The Russian part of the Caspian is not the Deepest; will satellites not see boats?
        1. Aleksandr1971
          Aleksandr1971 26 March 2020 10: 55 New
          -3
          There is a Derbent Depression in the Russian part of the Caspian. Depth 788 m. - No SSBNs can yet reach that depth. Only the unlucky Komsomolets once could.
  13. Tests
    Tests 25 March 2020 23: 57 New
    +4
    Andrei, dear, tell me, please, where did you find the rare Soviet "for spies" card? On the shore of the Mezen Bay, the village of Yazhma was noted - for a long time, from the beginning of the 70s, a dead abandoned village. The Siskin - which all submariners know - to the north, and Nes - to the south. On the shores of the Northern Dvina, all settlements are marked incorrectly. From the Kem River to the Onega River - Pomeranian coast, and on the map - "Pechora". To the south is shown Windy Ridge; it has always been Windy Belt. For some reason, in Karelia, instead of the village of Borovoy, "Kostomushka".
    1. Avior
      Avior 26 March 2020 01: 46 New
      0
      https://www.google.com/amp/s/arhlib.ru/2019/03/portret-belogo-morya/amp/
      The map is known and is often found on the network.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      26 March 2020 06: 16 New
      +1
      It’s impossible to joke :))))
  14. Operator
    Operator 26 March 2020 00: 32 New
    +1
    Quote: Podvodnik
    "Peacocks, you say?" (c) In the sense of non-acoustic aircraft search tools.

    In calm (sea waves not more than 3 points) at depths of not less than 600 meters, airborne radar with special software detects moving underwater objects the size of a whale and more on concentric surface waves moving with the object.

    Optical reconnaissance satellites do not fundamentally detect any concentric surface waves. The optical reconnaissance satellite sees only the submarines themselves underwater in calm at a depth of no more than 30 meters in tropical seas with visibility of at least 30 meters - naturally, provided there is no cloud cover and only in the viewing range with a width of about 5 kilometers.
    1. Aleksandr1971
      Aleksandr1971 26 March 2020 05: 48 New
      -2
      I agree with you. Therefore, the SSBN needs to be transferred to places where there is no US PLO aviation.
  15. Catfish
    Catfish 26 March 2020 01: 50 New
    0
    Andrey, greetings from Kot s-Ryazan. drinks Here without anyone, forgive my brother, the most relevant article for today is to get fucked up. By the way, neither the boats, nor their crews (this is their business) absolutely fuck me. Maybe it’s worth talking about how we all get out of the shit that we anyway fall into because of the care of our beloved government.
    Andrei, I'm sorry, but I have completely different concerns now, and the boats, let the commanders themselves decide how to survive with the crews and their families. This is not a panic on my part, I just know well what is happening in Ryazan and in Moscow.
    1. Svlad
      Svlad 26 March 2020 02: 15 New
      +1
      What do you have in Ryazan?
      1. Catfish
        Catfish 26 March 2020 02: 55 New
        0
        Nothing special, the people foolishly swept the groats off the shelves in Auchan, but there were no problems.
    2. Golovan Jack
      Golovan Jack 26 March 2020 02: 28 New
      0
      Quote: Sea Cat
      I just know well what is happening in Ryazan and in Moscow

      It's funny My friend is currently working in Ryazan, and I am in Moscow. And neither he nor I know anything "of this". Really - expanders? Do not abuse, it is fraught ... sideways yes

      Quote: Sea Cat
      This is not a panic on my part

      My doubts.
      1. Catfish
        Catfish 26 March 2020 02: 52 New
        +1
        With you, the question is initially clear. But whoever let you into Moscow is already interesting. There, and without you, there is enough.
        1. Golovan Jack
          Golovan Jack 26 March 2020 02: 56 New
          -3
          Quote: Sea Cat
          But who let you into Moscow, it’s already interesting

          I, my friends, work there. It's been a long time since years since 1996 ...

          But we were distracted: what is so enticing that you know about Moscow and Ryazan, that you started to make excuses?

          Quote: Sea Cat
          This is not a panic on my part

          Sing, light, pooh ... voice, plz, be ... trustworthy wink

          There, and without you, there is enough

          Chew, I hear a bird ... however, I am complacent today. Settled work, now I can’t sleep.

          Yes, there are enough morons in Moscow ... however - and not only in Moscow, my friend, as an example, told me a lot about Ryazan yes
          1. The comment was deleted.
    3. The comment was deleted.
    4. Aleksandr1971
      Aleksandr1971 26 March 2020 05: 52 New
      -2
      Dear sea cat. For cereals, please communicate on another site. This is the Military Review site. Or if you consider my proposal to you impolite, then think that following your logic all the media should abandon their topics and switch to the topic of cereals.
  16. Grits
    Grits 26 March 2020 05: 20 New
    +1
    Quote: SovAr238A
    It’s already dangerous to place 3-4 SSBNs there for their joint maneuvering during combat service.

    Although, I think, one SSBN in the White Sea on the database would definitely not hurt. Some very "explosive" and very old (the benefit of the repair base at hand) It just seems that there is nowhere to turn around. In the 90s, I visited the BDRM every year there - there is enough space.
  17. Cowbra
    Cowbra 26 March 2020 05: 39 New
    -1

    Soviet mountain shooters in Afghanistan. Recalls Dmitry Kleimenychev. Part of the first
    1. Cowbra
      Cowbra 26 March 2020 07: 27 New
      -1
      By the way, I recommend looking at the patch over the upper right pocket
  18. Protos
    Protos 26 March 2020 13: 06 New
    -2
    Quote: Aleksandr1971
    The Constitution of Ukraine prohibits the deployment of foreign bases on its territory. The exception was only for the Crimean base of the Black Sea Fleet.

    When was this opinion of the slaves interested in the master ?! lol
  19. Protos
    Protos 26 March 2020 13: 11 New
    -4
    Quote: Sea Cat
    Nothing special, the people foolishly swept the groats off the shelves in Auchan, but there were no problems.

    Are you surely a way to ryachan and not a way to Ternopil ?! bully
  20. g1v2
    g1v2 27 March 2020 00: 33 New
    0
    Upon detection by Poseidon of our submarines in the World Cup there are no specifics. In what place, when, and exactly were these our submarines? Maybe they were on the surface or in general he found them at the pier in Sevastopol or passing through the Bosphorus? PM without any supporting and explanatory information - this is chatter. Although he could of course - this is his work all the same, but again without specifics there is nothing to talk about. request
    To bring strategists to the World Cup, where there are ships of as many as three NATO countries and two countries hostile to us? Moreover, one of them can easily be in the Sea of ​​Azov, which is the internal waters of our two countries and pass through the Kerch Strait. You’ll not create any bastion here — unless you launch bases from the water area, and what for then a submarine at all? belay It’s easier to put an extra regiment of yards on duty.
    On the White Sea. Well, a couple of strategists can be placed there, but for the rest there is neither a place nor a sense of finding. It’s easier to strengthen the Bastion in the Barents Sea. To order pieces of 12 corvettes 2038x, the same number of drops. And start ordering planes based on il114 or be-200. Close The Bastion is a solvable task, and not so expensive. Cruisers and apl for this are not needed and redundant.
    With American buoys, you can also cheat. In vain the guys from the GUGI do they get stars? Hack a few pieces and make them stop noticing our submarines. Thus, provide several ways to access the operational space. The task is difficult, but clearly solvable. In the end, you can use the means of the reb and clog their data channels. Again, you have to throw your buoys around the bastions and in narrow places - the throat of the White Sea, the straits between the Kuril Islands and so on. They can even be powered and cabled to land to increase their lifespan and safety. request
    Well, and most importantly in my opinion - it's time to start developing and putting submarine-launched missiles on submarines. To the submarine ceased to be a plane easy prey for the aircraft. The same Poseidons conduct patrols at a relatively low altitude and not very fast. A couple of cells with SAM missiles will greatly complicate the life of the enemy. Guidance can be implemented in various ways - via satellite, drone, buoy. It is possible to make the rocket, after launch, search for a target in the zone itself. In general, all these are resolved issues.
  21. Dzafdet
    Dzafdet 27 March 2020 17: 47 New
    0
    Quote: Sea Cat
    Nothing special, the people foolishly swept the groats off the shelves in Auchan, but there were no problems.

    What about salt? How in the early 2000s? If they start to buy salt and kerosene, then the war is near .. laughing wassat
    1. agond
      agond April 1 2020 23: 52 New
      -1
      Interestingly, the noise of our submarines cannot be lowered, since we are behind, do not catch up, it sounds like an excuse for retarded designers, or they adapted to pour water into submarine projects, otherwise how to explain the presence of 41% of the ballast in Varshavyanka, probably the payment for the designers depends on the displacement so they fan it up and come up with underwater airships for us, but if the payment depended on noise ...
      1. agond
        agond April 2 2020 13: 31 New
        0
        Here they wrote about the gravitational method of detecting submarines, an amateurish question - if, by the condition of the problem, submarines have zero buoyancy, then logically such an object is no different from the homogeneous environment in which it is located, therefore it should not change the gravitational field of the Earth even during rest, nor during the movement however we are told that our underwater facility is hundreds of meters !!! detects a gravitometer mounted on an airplane !!! how is this possible ?