The evolution of the nuclear triad: prospects for the development of the marine component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation

As we said earlier, the historically most important component of the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) of the USSR, and then the Russian Federation, has always been strategic missile forces (Strategic Rocket Forces). In the USA, the development of strategic nuclear forces began with aviation component - strategic bombers and free-fall nuclear bombs, but they had bases in Japan and continental Europe, which allowed them to attack targets deep in the territory of the USSR. The capabilities of the USSR in this regard were much more modest, therefore, a guaranteed nuclear strike against the United States became possible only after the appearance of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on combat duty.

To this day, the Strategic Missile Forces retain a leading role in ensuring nuclear deterrence, as it is likely to remain in the medium term. The aviation component was almost always the least significant in the composition of the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR / RF, which is explained by the vulnerability of carriers - strategic bombers, missile carriers both at basing aerodromes and on extension routes to the missile launch point, as well as the vulnerability of the main weapons strategic bomber missiles - subsonic cruise missiles with a nuclear warhead (NWF). However, the use of strategic aviation as the main weaponAir Launch ICBMs maybe if it does not increase the combat stability of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces, then turn it into a serious threat to a potential enemy.

The naval component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation has always been catching up with respect to the Strategic Missile Forces. On the one hand, the ability of nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBNs) to hide in the depths of the ocean ensures their highest survival rate enemy disarming blow, which determined the role of SSBNs as a leading component of the US strategic nuclear forces, and in fact the only component of the strategic nuclear forces of Great Britain and France. On the other hand, secrecy and the presence of powerful fleetcapable of providing cover for deployment and patrol areas SSBNs. The United States, Great Britain and France have all this (but in the context of NATO), but not China, therefore, the sea component of its strategic nuclear forces, like the aviation, are extremely insignificant in comparison with the ground component.

If we talk about the USSR / Russia, then the USSR had a powerful fleet capable of providing deployment for the protection of patrol areas of SSBNs. It is believed that Soviet submarines for a long time were inferior in terms of noise to the submarines of a potential enemy, but by the mid-80s this problem was solved.

The basis of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation is currently constituted by the 667bdrm project-based SSBNs belonging to the third generation, essentially based on the second generation base

Everything is much more complicated with Russia. If the noise, as well as the capabilities of the sonar systems of the latest Russian strategic missile submarine cruisers (SSBNs) can presumably be considered acceptable, then the ability of the Russian Navy to ensure their deployment and cover patrol areas can be called into question. Nevertheless, in comparison with the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR, the relative share of nuclear warheads stationed on naval carriers has even increased.

Let us try to evaluate the consequences of this decision and the possible directions of the evolution of the marine component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces in the medium term.

Locked in the Bastions

SSBNs can be divided into two main states - when she is on combat duty, and when she is in the base. The time spent SSBNs on combat duty is determined by the coefficient of operational voltage (KOH). For American SSBNs, KOH is about 0,5, that is, a submarine spends half of its time on duty. At the USSR Navy, KOH was always lower, and most likely this situation persists at the moment. Suppose that on combat duty there is 30% -50% of the SSBN. In this case, the remaining 50-70% are in the base and can be destroyed by a sudden disarming strike, even by non-nuclear means, however, for this purpose they will not spare a dozen nuclear warheads. Now this will allow the enemy to destroy about 350-500 Russian nuclear warheads with one blow - the ratio is not at all in our favor.

Half and more SSBNs of the Russian Navy can be concentrated in permanent locations

The SSBNs on combat duty may be hiding in the depths of the oceans, but for this they must be safely deployed — leaving the base, as well as covering patrol areas. This requires a powerful surface fleet, anti-submarine aviation, as well as multi-purpose submarine hunters to accompany the SSBN. The Russian Navy has serious problems with all this. To carry out an SSBN’s entry into the sea without cover is the same as knowingly giving them to the enemy for destruction.

Another option is to create “bastions” for the SSBN - conditionally “closed” water areas tightly controlled by the Russian Navy, taking into account its limited capabilities. This immediately raises the question of how much the bastion is controlled in reality, and how quickly it can be “hacked” by the enemy. But most importantly, the adversary’s knowledge that the Russian SSBNs “graze” in these bastions will allow him to place in sufficient proximity a sufficient number of missile defense ships capable of intercepting the launch of ICBMs after them.

Possible areas of deployment of American missile defense theater

We can’t stop them. In peacetime, attacking the enemy’s fleet in neutral waters is a declaration of war, and if the enemy inflicts a sudden disarming strike, there will be no time to suppress his fleet.

Based on the foregoing, it can be assumed that the only effective use of SSBNs is to patrol them in various parts of the world’s oceans, where it is impossible to predict their appearance, and deploy missile defense ships in advance. But this brings us back to the problem of covert deployment and cover of patrol areas. It turns out a vicious circle, and is there a way out of it?

Existing reality

The naval component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation in the near future should be the SSBN of project 955 (A) Borey with ballistic missiles of submarines (SLBM) Bulava. Presumably, their characteristics make it possible to effectively hide from the enemy in the depths of the ocean, but at least this does not eliminate the problem of a safe exit from basing places.

Huge amounts of money have been invested in the Borey / Bulava program 955 (A), the total number of Boreev in the Russian Navy can be up to 12 units. Moreover, the number of multipurpose nuclear submarines (ICAPL) of project 885 (M) “Ash” is being conducted at a much slower rate. In Russia, a unique situation is emerging when the SSBN in the fleet will be larger than the ICAPL. Is it possible to build ICAPL at an accelerated pace, interrupting the construction of the SSBN? Far from a fact - different shipyards, different design bureaus. Reconfiguration to another type of submarine will require a lot of time and money.

SSBN project 955 (A) "Borey" and ITSRL project 885 (M) Ash

But there is an option - the continuation of the construction of the Boreev series in the PLARK variant - an atomic submarine with cruise missiles. Earlier we considered this option., and they saw that SSBNs can be very useful for the Russian Navy both for counteracting large carrier and ship groupings of a potential enemy, and for delivering massive strikes against the enemy’s armed forces and infrastructure. In fact, Borey-type SSGNs will be able to replace the relatively highly specialized Project 949A SSGNs at a new level (some of which will probably be upgraded to more universal 949AM SSGNs). Now we can say that the possibility of building, at least in a limited series, the SSBN of project 955K is actually being considered by the Russian Navy.

Continuing the construction of SSBNs on the basis of project 955 will not only equip the Navy with sufficiently effective combat units, but also reduce the cost of each individual submarine due to the greater serialization of construction. In addition, an important advantage of constructing SSBNs / SSBNs on the basis of one project (955A) will be the almost complete indistinguishability of their visual and acoustic signatures for the enemy. Accordingly, by organizing paired access to combat duty SSBNs and SSBNs, we double the load on the enemy’s Navy to track SSBNs. Any resources are not unlimited, and it is far from a fact that the US / NATO will have the strength to reliably track all SSRN / SSRN of the Russian Navy.

How effective is this solution? Let's face it - creating a powerful balanced fleet is better, but you have to work with what you have. The construction of the SSBN of project 955 (A) has been debugged by industry and is proceeding without delay, it can be expected that the SSBNs of project 955K will be built at no less high rates.

Another factor that can significantly increase the load on the enemy’s navy can be an increase in KOH to a level of at least 0,5. For this, it is necessary to ensure prompt maintenance and scheduled maintenance of SSBNs / SSBNs in the places of basing, as well as the presence of two replaceable crews for each submarine.

In turn, the enemy, in order to track the exit and escort of our SSBNs, will have to keep several multi-purpose submarines on duty near Russian bases all year round. In the absence of information about when and how many of our SSBNs can simultaneously go on a hike, the number of US / NATO nuclear submarines required for guaranteed support should be 2-3 times the number of our SSBNs.

If you can scrape together 14-21 submarines at 7 US / NATO SSBNs, then for 12 SSBNs you need already 24-36 submarines. In the case of the construction of submarines on the basis of the SSBN in the amount of 6/12 units, the number of nuclear submarines necessary for their support will be 54/72 - 72/96 units, which is completely unattainable. Of course, aviation and the surface fleet can also be involved in tracking SSBNs, but in this case we will at least have an understanding that the enemy’s unhealthy activity is being conducted in the area of ​​patrol of the SSBN, which will allow us to take appropriate measures.

Thus, if project 955 (A) SSBNs become the basis of the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces, then project 955K SSBNs will become an effective weapon Strategic Conventional Forceswhich, unlike strategic nuclear forces, can and should be used in current and future limited conflicts. A joint deployment of SSBN / SSBNs in combination with interchangeable crews will significantly complicate the tracking of SSBNs / SSBNs by the enemy and increase the likelihood of their successful concealment in the depths of the oceans.

Medium term

Presumably, the promising new hope for the Russian Navy should be the promising ICAPLs of the Husky project (Laika ROC), which should be issued in two versions - a hunter for enemy submarines and a carrier for cruise / anti-ship missiles.

The official image of the ICAPL project "Husky" from the developer of Design Bureau "Malachite"

Previously, information appeared periodically on the network that the Husky project would be even more universal, and not only cruise missiles, but also ballistic missiles, which would be installed on a modular basis, could be used on it.

In part, this information is confirmed now - it follows from the documents distributed at the meeting on the development of shipbuilding held in the Federation Council in 2019:
«

The Husky nuclear submarine project (Laika) will use modules with anti-ship and ballistic missiles. ”

- says the materials.
The materials do not indicate what kind of ballistic missiles they will be, possibly the “numbed” version of the Iskander complex, which has already received registration on airplanes in the form of the Dagger complex.

Logically developing the option of building a large RPKSN / PLARK series on the basis of a single project 955 (A / K), it can be assumed that an even more effective solution would be to create a single version of the ICAPL / PLARK / RPKSN on the basis of the Husky project. In this case, any Russian Navy submarine on duty can and should be considered the enemy’s Navy as a carrier of nuclear weapons. A situation of uncertainty will arise as to whether the tracked nuclear submarine is a nuclear weapon carrier or a multi-purpose hunter. With a sufficient number of universal nuclear submarines, identification of nuclear weapons carriers among them will become practically impossible.

The question arises, is it possible to make such a universal nuclear submarine, since the SSBNs are significantly larger in size than the ICLM? Let's try to consider this issue in more detail.

Missiles and dimensions

В stories The construction of NATO SSBNs and the Russian Navy can distinguish several significant projects that characterize the possibility of building SLBMs and SSBNs of various sizes.

At one end of the scale are the giant Soviet SSBNs of project 941 “Shark” (“Typhoon”) with an underwater displacement of 48 tons! Their size is not a consequence of the gigantomania of the leadership of the Navy of the USSR, but only a consequence of the inability of the Soviet industry to create at that time SLBMs with the required characteristics, in acceptable dimensions. The R-000 Variant SLBMs placed on Project 941 SSBNs had a launch weight of about 39 tons (with a launch container) and a length of about 90 meters. Moreover, the characteristics of the R-17 SLBMs are inferior to the characteristics of the American Trident-39 SLBMs, whose mass is only 2 tons with a length of 59 meters.

SSBN project 941 "Shark" at the pier next to the multipurpose submarine of project 971 "Pike"

At the other end of the scale, you can put the American Lafayette SSBNs, or rather their third iteration - the Benjamin Franklin SSBNs, with an underwater displacement of only 8 tons, which makes them smaller than most modern Soviet / Russian multi-purpose submarines, whose underwater displacement often exceeds 250 thousand tons.

Comparative dimensions of SSBN “Benjamin Franklin” with an underwater displacement of 8 tons and SSBN “Ohio” with an underwater displacement of 250 tons

If at first boats of this type carried 16 Poseidon SLBMs with a flight range of up to 4 kilometers, then they were later re-equipped with Trident-600 SLBMs, the maximum flight range of which was already 1 kilometers. The length of the SLBM Trident-7 is only 400 meters, with a mass of 1 tons. According to its characteristics, the latest Russian SLBM “Bulava” is 10,4 meters long and weighs 32 tons.

Comparative dimensions and characteristics of American SLBMs

Comparative dimensions of SLBMs of the USA and SLBMs of the USSR / RF

Currently, the United States plans to deploy a hypersonic weapon with a conventional warhead on board the Virginia-type strike nuclear submarines (the deployment of this weapon on larger carriers, the Ohio-class submarine, was previously discussed). Upgraded Virginia-type submarines add the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), capable of accommodating up to 28 cruise missiles, increasing their total number on board the submarines to 40 units.

Multipurpose Virginia Submarine with VPM

By 2028, it is planned to deploy a CPS hypersonic complex in the VPM module, which includes a C-HGB hypersonic glider with a conventional warhead on a two-stage launch vehicle. The biconical hypersonic glider of the CPS project is also supposed to be used in the LRHW and HCSW projects of the ground forces and the US Air Force.

Layouts and images of the hypersonic complex LRHW

The estimated LRHW range can reach 6000 kilometers (according to other sources 2300 kilometers) at a block speed of more than five Machs, respectively, the Virginia CPS hypersonic complex can have a similar range.

The length of the existing anti-ship missiles (ASM) 3M55 P-800 Onyx is about 8-8,6 meters, the length of the advanced ASM 3M22 Zircon is estimated to be 8-10 meters, which is comparable to the length of the Trident SLBMs created at the end of 70 years of the XX century - more than 40 years ago.

Based on this, it can be assumed that a promising SLBM with a range of about 8000 kilometers can well be created in dimensions that can be placed on the promising universal nuclear submarines of the Husky project or even on the upgraded ICAPLs of the 885 Ash project.

Of course, the number of even small-sized SLBMs on board the ICAPL will be much less than on a specialized SSBN, presumably no more than 4-6 units. During the construction of universal nuclear submarines in a large series of 60-80 units, of which 20 units will be equipped with SLBMs of 3-6 nuclear warheads per SLBM, the total number of nuclear warheads in the marine component of the strategic nuclear forces will be about 240-720 nuclear warheads.

Conclusions
The creation of a universal nuclear submarine capable of carrying all types of weapons will make it possible to ensure maximum stability of the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces without involving additional fleet forces. None of the existing and potential adversaries will be able to physically track all the nuclear submarines on duty, and the lack of information about which of them carries SLBMs will not guarantee the destruction of them during a sudden disarming strike. Thus, the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces will make a significant contribution to deterring the likely enemy from delivering a sudden disarming strike.

An even more significant advantage of deploying SLBMs on universal nuclear submarines is the maximum realization of the offensive capabilities of the Navy. For this, a promising SLBM should be able to launch from a minimum range of about 1000-1500 km. Moreover, if the dimensions of a promising SLBM do not allow it to provide a firing range that allows shooting “from the pier”, that is, their maximum range will be, for example, about 6000 kilometers, then this is absolutely uncritical in the context of deploying such SLBMs on universal nuclear submarines. In any case, standing at the SSBN pier, not a tenant, when the enemy inflicts a sudden disarming strike, but the desire of Russian nuclear-powered submarines, equipped with SLBMs with a short flight time, to the shores of the United States, will rightly be regarded by the latter as a threat of a decapitation strike on them themselves. Accordingly, to eliminate this threat they will have to use significant anti-submarine and anti-missile forces on their own, and not on our borders. And this, in turn, will simplify the deployment of our nuclear submarines, reduce the threat of a sudden disarming strike, and reduce the threat of a missile defense system for the ground component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces.

Thus, the promising naval component of the strategic nuclear forces will not only have significantly greater survival, in the context of the possibility of an enemy delivering a sudden disarming strike, but will also allow the situation to be turned upside down, forcing the enemy to reduce their offensive capabilities, due to the redistribution of efforts on defense from a possible similar blow from our side.

Teeth for nuclear submarines

There is a possibility that an increase in the number of sensors in the oceans will cause submarines to increasingly lose their secrecy, which will require them to quickly switch from stealth mode to aggressive combat mode. Proceeding from this, it is necessary to maximize the capabilities of both the SSBN / SSBNs and the ICLM in countering surface and submarine forces, as well as enemy aircraft. This is a big and interesting topic, which we will return to in a separate article.

In the next article, we will consider the “assembly” of the ground, aviation, and sea components of promising strategic nuclear forces, the correlation of forces, and ways of saving.

Comments

[Cowbra]

In peacetime, attacking an enemy fleet in neutral waters is a declaration of war

And under water there are no agreements (c) - prove that you rammed the boat with a specialist? Or that a torpedo came when the boat then dived a couple of kilometers? And yet - one of the meanings of the "nuclear triad". It is necessary to beat everyone at once, one missed "Swan" will fire a salvo of revolving missiles for a dozen missiles - so half the states will be washed into the ocean

[Aleksandr1971]

You are obviously joking

[Cowbra]

And you. apparently, not a single ram submarine and do not remember
http://muz4in.net/news/taran_podvodnoj_lodki/2012-02-09-26731
And the clowns - they are going to the presidency, you are lost

[Aleksandr1971]

Ram in history has happened. More often there were random collisions. Our submarines were helped by the fact that they have a double hull.
But neither ramming, nor accidental collision, can be officially chosen forms of submarine tactics.

[Cowbra]

You know. about "random" - a big question. Or hobbits are not driving from the outskirts, "accidentally" to get into someone else's boat ... So here I already believed

[Per se.]

Quote: Alexander1971

More often there were random collisions. Our submarines were helped by the fact that they have a double hull.

Underwater ram or Where did you go for a walk?
Sergey Arshinov
Cases when American submarines, conducting reconnaissance, impudently climbed into our training grounds or at the very center of our exercises, or, following our boats, allowed dangerous maneuvering, when contact was lost, trying to restore it, we reduced the distance to critical, without hesitation, often even violated our territorial waters, as a result of which there were various navigational accidents, up to collisions, there were many. I don’t know, maybe our commanders as a whole are more literate and experienced, or the tactics of our submarines are so sharply and favorably different from the American, but such incidents were much less likely to be our fault. Although, unfortunately, it could not do without them.

You can also recall the tragedy with the Kursk, in August 2000, the commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Vyacheslav Popov from the TV screen to the whole country expressed his condolences to the families of the dead submariners, apologized to them and promised to look into the eyes of the one who is guilty of the Kursk tragedy ... Two years ago in the administration of Severomorsk, speaking to the families of the killed submariners of the atomic-powered submarine, Vyacheslav Alekseevich recalled: “I kept my promise, looked him in the eyes. But I cannot name this person yet ... "

[Operator]

Damn, what beautiful pictures of the holes went nonche - with the edges bent inward after the internal explosion

[Per se.]

Quote: Operator

after an internal explosion

There is such a thing as IMPLOSION, if explosion is a sharp increase in pressure and an “explosion outward”, then implosion is a diametrically opposite process: a sharp drop in pressure and an “explosion inward”. During implosion, the vacuum bubble instantly collapses to a point; the phenomenon is very similar to the cumulative effect. In a tiny bubble with lightning-fast advancement of matter toward the center, gigantic speeds and pressures inherent in scientific accelerators and nuclear explosions are locally achieved.

This is for you, as an option for an "internal explosion". This can be attributed to the detonation of the battleship "Novorossiysk", where the official version is the explosion of an old bottom mine. It is very possible that the murder of our sailors on the "Kursk" and "Novorossiysk" was the work of the Anglo-Saxons, in the first case the American "cowboys" who were grazing next to our boat in the exercise area, in the second the British, who by sabotage ruled out the exit of our squadron into the Mediterranean Sea, in a sharply aggravated situation along the Suez Canal.

[Operator]

Reduced pressure (vacuum) inside a hermetically sealed railway tank after cooling the air in the internal volume and increased pressure inside the Kursk nuclear submarine after an internal explosion of a torpedo are two different things.

If the damage to the Kursk were limited only by a break in the hull from an unexploded torpedo without other damage to the hull of the boat, you would be right. But since the head part came off the boat, I am right.

[Per se.]

Who is right, we will not soon find out, but the story is muddy, and the official version is clearly drawn out.

Quote: Operator

cooling the air in the internal volume and the increased pressure inside the Kursk nuclear submarine after an internal explosion of a torpedo are two different things.

The air does not need to be cooled, an internal explosion burns out the air inside the compartments, creates a vacuum, a huge pressure difference blurs the notches of the holes along with a powerful stream of water. As for the rest, to damage to the Kursk, which was one of the best crews in our entire fleet.

in the area of ​​the exercises are the American boats Memphis and Toledo, as well as the British submarine, the Norwegian reconnaissance vessel and spy satellites. When the Kursk prepared to launch the Flurry, Toledo carried out maneuvers in the immediate vicinity to force it to not carry out the torpedo demonstration, and Memphis was on duty nearby. During the maneuvers, the Toledo collided with the Kursk and damaged the right torpedo tube with the rudder pen. Hearing the sound of a loading torpedo tube (?!) “Kursk”, “Memphis” decided to save the “Toledo” and fired a torpedo, which hit the torpedo compartment. Damage to the Kursk was not dangerous, so its commander decided that the hole could be repaired, but the construction of the American torpedo, causing a fire, ultimately led to the death of our nuclear submarine.

Believe it or not, let everyone decide for himself, but personally to me, a collision with "Toledo", as the beginning of the tragedy, seems more likely.

[Operator]

An internal explosion primarily creates excessive pressure (otherwise it would not be an explosion), which turns the edges of the holes outward.

[Per se.]

Quote: Operator

which turns the edges of the holes out

Everything is correct, at first there is excessive pressure, and the edges of the hole are "outside", but the vacuum formed after, in the burned-out volume, gives the opposite effect, the sucked water flows, under enormous pressure, will bend the notches back, as the walls of the body themselves can be pressed inward. Of course, options are possible, not the fact that there will be just such an effect, much depends on the power and direction of the explosion, the internal structure, and other factors. Nevertheless, such a phenomenon is one of the options.

[Operator]

After depressurization (breaking through a hole), a vacuum inside is not formed by definition.

[Per se.]

Let it be so, "vacuum" is too literal, but the vacuum, the pressure difference.

[Operator]

And a vacuum too.

[Per se.]

If an overpressure is created as a result of an explosion in a confined space, everything inside burns out, then there will be a vacuum, the pressure will drop. Of course, there are skeptics that they dispute the "vacuum" from both thermobaric ammunition and the "vacuum bomb" itself. Yes, there may be no absolute vacuum, but the pressure drops. Even if I am a "lyricist" and you are a physicist, the explosion process is complex, determined by many factors. In any case, I am grateful for your attention, all the best.

[george.prokudin]

For several centuries, the seas-oceans were considered a reliable barrier protecting the states, the British from the enemy's retaliatory strike. Now, with the development of naval and missile technologies, it becomes clear that this is the "Achilles heel" of the Anglo-Saxons. Relatively small submarines and surface ships based not far from their shores, for example, in Cuba, in Nicaragua, with relatively small ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 1,5-4 thousand km, but with a short flight time they could keep the Anglo-Saxons in constant tension. For this it is not necessary to create large and expensive nuclear submarines and bases, it is enough to have a material and technical supply base, on which it was possible to have a stock of the necessary and a repair base and carry out planned replacement of crews, who would spend most of their time on combat duty. In addition, this would allow to disperse the nuclear submarines and other carriers from a possible first strike by the enemy. Let these be relatively small and not too large ships, but there must be a sufficient number of them and they could carry a sufficient number of carriers.

[Sergey Valov]

a large series of 60-80 units, of which 20 units will be equipped with SLBMs, [quote] [/ quote]
A similar series will ruin the country.

[Aleksandr1971]

That is why such figures are not possible for the Russian Navy. Already voiced thoughts about the construction of special types of non-nuclear SSBNs for placement in inland waters of Russia.

[AAK]

in the Russian Federation there are only a few reservoirs that can be classified as internal and in which the SSBN can be on alert duty - from the Caspian lakes, Baikal and to a much lesser extent Ladoga, from the seas - the White Sea (the BM was completely able to close even in the current state PLO facilities). However, Baikal is a strategic reserve of clean fresh water, Lake Ladoga is too small and shallow, plus even diesel diesel SSBNs are dragged into them - it is still a mess and there is no infrastructure for basing. In the White Sea, as far as is known, patrolling is already carried out. Theoretically, something can be deployed in the Caspian (construction of a submarine in Gorky, descent to the Caspian in pontoons or in a floating dock) but it turns out (like in Baikal) - the farthest shooting path, therefore - missiles with a range of more than 13 thousand km are needed , they are very overall, therefore the SSBN will be in a very large dimension along the lees, therefore - difficulties with basing, in general, all this is extremely expensive and impractical

[Aleksandr1971]

1. About Ladoga. The average depth is 46 m., The largest - 230 m. It is quite enough for a shallow SSBN. And you can build a place of basing. Fortunately, there is a developed transport and industrial infrastructure nearby.

2. About Baikal. Perhaps, but undesirable for political reasons. Baikal is a reserve of pure water only for the Baikal region because its water can be transported outside the region only in bottles, that is, a scanty amount when compared with current industrial and domestic consumption. Baikal turned into a sacred cow. Touch this cow, and the government of our country, if it does not fly off, it will lose much in public opinion.

3. For deployment in the Caspian, long-range missiles are needed. But it is within the power. If with the help of R-29 the satellites are put into orbit, then from the Caspian to the USA R-29 will be finished with a certain modification. In addition, a new type of missile can be built for the Caspian with minor changes. Moreover, the experience of creating partially-orbital missiles of unlimited range in the USSR has existed since the late 60s. The base point in the Caspian is definitely the city of Kaspiysk, since the infrastructure has already been partially prepared there, although for surface ships.

4. As for the counter-argument about the high price of placing the SSBN in inland waters, the price is only the creation of basing places. But there will be savings in the construction of the SSBNs themselves, which will be very cheap.

5. As for the counter-argument about the inappropriateness of placing the SSBN in inland waters - this is also not true.
It is expedient or inexpedient - this must be determined through the degree of combat stability of the SSBNs. And this stability will be the highest only in inland waters because the enemy’s PLO forces do not act there.
The only thing that the United States will be capable of against our SSBNs in internal waters is to "shoot into the white light like a pretty penny" with a nuclear strike on a reservoir. But nuclear weapons tests against naval groups in the 50s and 60s. showed that ships become incapacitated only if the explosions occurred directly near the ships (several hundred meters to km. depending on the power of the explosion and the type of ship). That is, a nuclear strike simply on a reservoir, especially on the Caspian Sea, would be completely meaningless.

In other words, the deployment of SSBNs in inland waters is the most appropriate way to protect the underwater part of the Russian strategic nuclear forces.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Sergey Valov

a large series of 60-80 units, of which 20 units will be equipped with SLBMs,

A similar series will ruin the country.

In the next article in the series, we will consider what can be saved. In fact, there is money in the country, the question is rather that they are spent nepoyimi how - all the time throwing from side to side, a lot of projects for all types of aircraft, demonization, etc.

[Sergey Valov]

It is necessary not only to build, but to build quickly, at least in 15 years, because otherwise the meaning is lost. Further, it is necessary to operate with at least 0,5 KOH. It is necessary to build a repair base, it is necessary to prepare personnel. All this in aggregate is unrealistic in principle, because besides the Navy there are other types of aircraft.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Sergey Valov

It is necessary not only to build, but to build quickly, at least in 15 years, because otherwise the meaning is lost. Further, it is necessary to operate with at least 0,5 KOH. It is necessary to build a repair base, it is necessary to prepare personnel. All this in aggregate is unrealistic in principle, because besides the Navy there are other types of aircraft.

Therefore, the task is divided into 2 stages:
1. Continuation of the construction of Boreev in SSBN and SSBN options, since this submarine is already debugged - you can just continue the construction. I think that it is quite possible to complete a batch of 24 submarines by 2035 with an even distribution of costs.
2. By 2025-2030 "Husky" can work in a universal version. At first, build them purely in a multipurpose version. And then, after the completion of the construction of the 955A / K, build a "missile" version of the "Husky" (this is if it cannot be made universal at all, when the missile compartment can change according to a modular principle - KR, SLBMs, anti-ship missiles).

[Ptolemy Lag]

Really, if not yachts for oligarchs to build, but ships for the Navy

[Cowbra]

Honestly, even the urge itself is interesting

[NEXUS]

Quote: AVM

In the next article in the series, we’ll look at how you can save

At the expense of the fact that the Boreas can be equipped with a missile defense system, the idea is quite sound. And I think the Husky project is an attempt to cross Ash with Borei in order to reach a conditionally (visually) one type of strategic class submarine. But the problem is that we need all this today, and the development of such a complex as the Husky requires at least 20 or even 30 years. Even the development of a multi-purpose nuclear submarine is comparable to flying to Pluto, in terms of work, money, effort of not one or two KB, but here is a universal platform, which increases effort by several times.

[ser56]

Quote: AVM

the question is rather that they are spent nepoyimi how - all the time throwing from side to side, a bunch of projects for all types of aircraft, demonization, etc.

yes, but a large number of nuclear submarines is again preparing for a global war, and now it’s more important to be able to show the flag and protect your interests ...

[Per se.]

Quote: AVM

In the next article in the series, we will consider what can be saved.

I will not be flattering about saving on oligarchs, but with a full-fledged fleet it is difficult to save on one without harming the other. In our case, we can only talk about what can be additionally used as an argument for deterrence. We are talking about diesel-electric submarines, especially when they are equipped with VNEU. You write " For this, a promising SLBM should be able to launch from a minimum range of about 1000-1500 km". In the fall of 2017, speaking at the Valdai club, President V.V. Putin spoke about the maximum sea-based Caliber flight range of 1400 kilometers. Our Caliber-PL can also be launched from a diesel boat, which is relatively cheap. and low-noise "black holes" can be a threat to the ocean coasts of the United States, on which a significant proportion of cities and seaports and naval bases are concentrated.

If we are talking about the area where our fleet can gain dominance, this is the Arctic, where the polar ice cap covers the submarines from the enemy surface fleet and its aviation. Our long coastline along the "northern facade" of Russia makes it possible to create bases, to exercise total control over the underwater situation, while deploying its global tracking system. By the way, the "Sharks" (Project 941) were created for patrolling under the ice of the Arctic, the mass of the boat and the reinforced wheelhouse made it possible to break through almost any Arctic ice when surfacing. Comfort for the crew on the boat also allowed long-term patrolling, the boat could simply stand under the ice at anchor for up to two months.

Diesel boats with VNEU and long-range cruise missiles as "packs of wolves" could supplement the pressure on US coastal facilities, at least in theory, let them know and be afraid. The polar cap should cover strategic boats when patrolling, with the dominance of our fleet in the region, which will provide an exit with deployment. The US and NATO navies will always dominate the Atlantic and the Pacific.

[Firelake]

Varshavyanka will not reach the launch point. When passing the straits will drown. DEPL is not a submarine

[Per se.]

Quote: FireLake

Varshavyanka will not reach the launch point. When passing the straits drown

Why will it "sink", and what dangerous straits should a boat pass in the northern seas or from the Far East? If we talk about Varshavyanka, its range is 7500 miles, or 13 kilometers. If we talk about extreme measures, and war is a last resort, a boat of this type can pose a threat to the US coast. Finally, "Varshavyanka" is already a fairly old project, you can, if you wish, return to the topic of medium-range missiles or ICBMs, on new projects, already with VNEU, placing two or three missiles in the wheelhouse, as was the case on the first Soviet boats of Project 875. Of course, to argue it's stupid, a nuclear submarine has an advantage over a diesel engine, but diesel-electric submarines have their own advantages, this is the price, shorter construction time, low noise. The main thing is that diesel-electric submarines are not an alternative, but an addition, especially when using a well-thought-out refueling and supply scheme, with the possible deployment of bases for a threatened period in Cuba or Venezuela.

[Firelake]

You think over the scheme of first refueling and supply in wartime, and then write about dizilyuhi.
What move and at what speed?
2 rockets? Now estimate the start price. We open and calculate the price of boats, then divide the price by the number of missiles on board and what do we see? Borey-A 433 million bucks.
Varshavyanka 300 million bucks. We get for 300 million 2 missiles and a boat with restrictions or for 450 16 missiles and a boat without limits in range.
You, my friend, would have ended up with such fictionalisms in the 30s as Tukhachevsky with his cannon.

[AAK]

In my opinion, 60 nuclear submarines is too much. It is quite enough and within the means even for the Russian Federation up to 45 units. (15-20 submarines with ICBMs or StrKR, 25-30 submarines - "hunters") for 20 years (construction of the first 2 + 1 boats within 5 years, then - 3 boats per year). The only question is the availability of quality designs for each type of boat.

[reader65]

Wunderwaffe type Poseidon without any series gobbled up money for a dozen apl.

[Amateur]

The basis of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation is currently constituted by the 667bdrm project-based SSBNs belonging to the third generation, in fact based on the second generation

Well, on what generation should they be based?

[Aleksandr1971]

Do not quibble. The author of the article simply stated the situation

[Amateur]

Once upon a time, my scientific chief said: "Articles should be written in such a way that even your wife would understand them." The bad habit has remained since then. Here, on a parallel branch, the author shoots from Petropavlovka through the roof of the Winter Palace along the palace embankment. I don’t even know how to characterize it censorship. And not geography, but philology.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Amateur

The basis of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation is currently constituted by the 667bdrm project-based SSBNs belonging to the third generation, in fact based on the second generation

Well, on what generation should they be based?

This means that the original 667B project belongs to the second generation, and the deep modernization of the 667BDRM seems to be a stretch of the third.

[Marine engineer]

“I mean that the original 667B project belongs to the second generation, and the deep modernization of the 667BDRM seems to be a stretch of the third.”

Modernization did not concern nuclear power plants.

[Marine engineer]

The basis of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation is currently constituted by the 667bdrm project-based SSBNs belonging to the third generation, in fact based on the second generation [/ quote] Well, on what generation should they be based?

Project 667bdrm has second-generation reactors and cannot belong to the third generation.

[pmkemcity]

It is generally necessary to refuse from the SSBN. They are all problems, the fleet is tied hand and foot by these monsters. Given the refusal of the INF Treaty, it is worth building 30-40 boats up to 5 thousand. t. with URC under RSD and KR, and deploy them in the ocean. The enemy will be a real strain.

[Aleksandr72]

The SSBN is practically the only chance to respond to the adversary when he is the first to launch a nuclear missile strike and carry out the ground component of your nuclear triad, including strategic aviation - missile-carrying bombers at air bases are more vulnerable than stationary ICBM launchers, if they do not have time to take off, then take off and for obvious reason, in the event of a surprise attack (and there won’t be another one!), nobody will give them a combat load.
RSD and KR sea-based have a relatively small firing range in comparison with SLBMs. In order to effectively use them, submarines need to get as close as possible to the targets. And given the general (and almost overwhelming) superiority of the US Navy and its allies at sea - this is practically suicide, and here no amount of submarines will help. Whereas the RPKN can comparatively safely shoot ammunition directly from almost their home harbor. After that, they will certainly be drowned. But only after - after the missiles launched by the SSBN will already fly towards the targets.

[pmkemcity]

Quote: Alexander72

Whereas the RPKN can comparatively safely shoot ammunition directly from almost their home harbor.

They will be covered first, in the "home harbor". The flight time of the KR from American submarines and ships grazing at our bases is minutes. Only those who are in the BS area will be able to shoot, and these are only a few. The entire fleet is tailored for these pelvis. 5000 km for the Kyrgyz Republic and MRBM is enough to create a headache not only for Europeans and Japanese, but also for Americans.

[Aleksandr1971]

I agree. It is pointless to place our nuclear submarines with the KR and BR off the coast of the enemy. They will simply not be allowed to shoot back in conflict

[SHOPPING MALL]

If it is:

Quote: Alexander72

The SSBN is practically the only chance to respond to the adversary when he is the first to launch a nuclear missile strike and carry out the ground component of your nuclear triad, including strategic aviation - missile-carrying bombers at air bases are more vulnerable than stationary ICBM launchers, if they do not have time to take off, then take off and for obvious reason, in the event of a surprise attack (and there won’t be another one!), nobody will give them a combat load.

This and that will not be:

Quote: Alexander72

Whereas the RSPKN can comparatively safely shoot ammunition directly from almost their home harbor. After that, they will certainly be drowned. But only after - after the missiles launched by the SSBN will already fly towards the targets.

The SSBNs will not shoot anywhere from the pier. They are the most desirable target for the enemy - huge, unprotected (unlike mines), stationary (near the pier), located on the edge of the country (not in depth, like the Strategic Missile Forces) and carry a lot of nuclear warheads.

[ZEMCH]

Quote: AVM

The SSBNs will not shoot anywhere from the pier. They are the most desirable target for the enemy - huge, unprotected (unlike mines), stationary (near the pier), located on the edge of the country (not in depth, like the Strategic Missile Forces) and carry a lot of nuclear warheads.

What makes you think that they will be in the database ?! When the level of combat readiness is "Military danger", all NK and submarines leave for the places of dispersal. those. that they will not be able to go out, they will not be able to shoot, if you served, you must know the degree of BG. Or do you think that we are not tracking the enemy ... Damn, everyone is so naive !!!!

[CTABEP]

They will be covered in the harbor. For the cost of SSBNs stationed in the harbor, you can put on alert a couple of Yars battalions, which are driving somewhere through the forest-fields. Bombers agree, they will not help from the word at all (therefore, the meaning in all these new Tu-160s escapes me personally - Tu-95s, which are much cheaper in operation, can also fire off missiles), therefore, in fact, all our strategic deterrence is the Strategic Missile Forces, which has an opportunity to strike back at the saddest breakdown. Taking into account the fact that even according to START-3 our stock of carriers and warheads has not been selected, instead of building huge series of SSBNs that are not able to quietly go to sea, it is better to strengthen this component of the strategic nuclear forces. This does not mean that we need to abandon SSBNs, but building them in such numbers without being able to provide access to the ocean is not a good idea, especially given the country's financial problems.

[Firelake]

Readiness of strategists about a day. These are not fighters. I think they won’t take off anywhere. Boats at the pier are nonsense. I agree.
Better yars ride.

[Aleksandr1971]

It is impossible to refuse from the SSBN because it is the weapon of the second strike. And these weapons must be preserved from the first surprise attack. It is possible to save only if the SSBNs will be in the area of ​​military patrols, or in inland waters.
After the start of the nuclear conflict, all land-based ICBMs, both mine and GRK, will either be used up or destroyed. But after the initial exchange of blows there will still be a need: 1) to achieve the remaining goals of the enemy; 2) to have trump cards for negotiations in order to obtain acceptable peace conditions; 3) have protection against those countries that initially did not participate in the war and therefore retained their armed forces. Accordingly, such countries may pose a threat to Russia, weakened after the initial nuclear strikes. And the SSBNs will deter them from aggression.

[pmkemcity]

Quote: Alexander1971

It is possible to save only if the SSBNs will be in the area of ​​military patrols, or in inland waters.

You yourself answered your opus. Why build SLBMs and a whole fleet for them, if these boats are in the base? In this case, it is better to deploy an ICBM division in Kamchatka or Chukotka, and assign other tasks to the fleet. Although, I believe that ICBMs should be based "in the depths of Siberian ores" in order to exclude a sudden strike. In half an hour of flight time, it will be possible to make an adequate decision. And at the moment, how many warheads can be disabled by one (!) CD with nuclear warheads? MRBM and KR are much lighter, smaller and, accordingly, the boat can take on board much more of them. The list of targets will increase, the variability of the use of warheads. The main thing is that the fleet will go to the ocean, and the American fleet will leave our shores behind it.

[Aleksandr1971]

Theoretically, you can decide on a retaliatory strike in half an hour. But in practice - this is in question. And all the same, land-based ICBMs, even at the border, even in Siberia, will disappear in the first hours of the great war. Therefore, SSBNs are necessary for the tasks I have previously listed.

In your thesis that, instead of building an SSBN, it is better to build nuclear submarines with the Kyrgyz Republic or with the ballistic missile defense system, I will say that, unlike the author of the article, I think that it is impossible to build unified nuclear submarines.
The SSBN has its own tasks. ICAPL has others. In addition, letting ICAPL escort the SSBN is too costly. Let ICAPL be on duty at Norfork or Everett or San Diego. A purely strike submarine should accompany the SSBN in the area of ​​combat duty. Accordingly, I agree with you at the moment that ICAPLs are needed, but only at the same time do not have to abandon the SSBN

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Alexander1971

Theoretically, you can decide on a retaliatory strike in half an hour. But in practice - this is in question. And all the same, land-based ICBMs, even at the border, even in Siberia, will disappear in the first hours of the great war. Therefore, SSBNs are necessary for the tasks I have previously listed.

They will disappear in the first minutes.

Quote: Alexander1971

unlike the author of the article, I think that it is impossible to build unified nuclear submarines.

And why? The construction of such unified nuclear submarines is essentially the construction of SLBMs that can be placed in the minimum size. How realistic is this? Trident 1 was built in the last century. ICBMs of this size or a little less can be installed in universal compartments. If the United States supplies gliders to Virginia and the range will actually be 6000 km, then this will in fact be the SSBN described in the article.

[SVD68]

Quote: AVM

They will disappear in the first minutes.

There is generally a fundamental dispute. You essentially offer the concept of a glut of anti-submarine counter-force (USA). Your opponent stands for the idea of ​​placing the SSBNs where they are fundamentally inaccessible to enemy PLOs (on internal lakes).

[Aleksandr1971]

It is not possible to oversaturate US PLO forces either now or never.
The SSBN, built for inland waters, will be 5 times cheaper than the Borey. There will be no need for a nuclear power plant, torpedoes and counter-torpedoes, GAK, there will be no need to lay strength under depths of 400, 500, 600 meters. There will be no problems with communication with the crew. There are also suitable reservoirs. The available depths of the Caspian Sea near the Derbent basin are from 0 to 788 meters. On Lake Ladoga - 230 m and Lake Onega - 127 m.
And most importantly - there will be no problems with enemy PLO forces.

[pmkemcity]

Quote: Alexander1971

And all the same, land-based ICBMs, even at the border, even in Siberia, will disappear in the first hours of the great war.

Yes, they will disappear, but only by starting in the direction of the United States. But the SLBMs are now in the bases and the so-called "areas" (in American on reservations). Enemies and happy - with a small detachment of forces graze the base and the launch area of ​​the BR. They can calmly shoot at launching ballistic missiles and destroy the naval base.

[Aleksandr1971]

If the ICBMs quickly disappear, and the SSBNs are completely absent, then what do you think - what will Russia defend after the initial exchange of nuclear strikes?
Indeed, 1550 warheads will not be enough to completely kill all NATO forces (even if all warheads take off, which I doubt very much). In addition, those countries that are not involved in the conflict at first, but then see that Russia was left without weapons, can also be used against Russia.

[pmkemcity]

Quote: Alexander1971

Indeed, 1550 warheads will not be enough to completely kill all NATO forces

These 1550 warheads are not aimed at NATO's military forces, but at its infrastructure, industrial and human potential. There are other special ammunition for the "armed forces".

[Aleksandr1971]

Other special ammunition - do you mean tactical nuclear weapons?
But the territory of the United States, and perhaps the territory of most of the countries of Europe, will not be reached because our armed forces will be greatly weakened by the first strike and will not be capable of offensive actions. And if such actions will be committed, then only as a clear suicidal attack. For us, tactical nuclear weapons are a short-range defense tool.

It is the SSBNs, if they continue after the first surprise attack, that is a guarantee of the possibility of striking NATO at its entire strategic depth after the disappearance of ground ICBMs. And such a guarantee cannot be refused. It must be protected, including costly methods. Through the strengthening of military guard, through an increase in combat tension.
Or the second option is to abandon the START treaty and build the previous number of warheads for land-based ICBMs, namely up to 50 thousand pieces. This is enough to destroy the population of NATO and their armed forces. Then the SSBN will not be needed.
But something tells me that the START treaty will be extended (despite the obvious delay in the start of negotiations on the part of the United States). Therefore, the second option does not work.

[pmkemcity]

Quote: Alexander1971

But the territory of the United States, and perhaps the territory of most of the countries of Europe, will not be reached because our armed forces will be greatly weakened by the first strike and will not be capable of offensive actions.

The road will be mastered by the walking one. We will slowly break through first to the Channel, and then to the Potomac. By that time, the "progressive American public" will be preoccupied with the confrontation with zombies - we will send a dozen planes with a brigade of "infectious disease", and they will restore order.

[Aleksandr1971]

I do not understand your statement that it is necessary to build 30-40 boats up to 5 thousand? Do you mean the need to build 5000 submarines?

[pmkemcity]

Quote: Alexander1971

I do not understand your statement that it is necessary to build 30-40 boats

Spell it. And the numbers are the same.

[Aleksandr1971]

To be understood, you need to invest in your messages not only numbers and letters, but also the meaning

[soul]

I do not understand your statement that it is necessary to build 30-40 boats up to 5 thousand? Do you mean the need to build 5000 submarines?

It's about displacement.

[Aleksandr1971]

If you think that the construction of 30-40 nuclear submarines with the KR and a displacement of up to 5 thousand tons will save money compared to the construction of 12 SSBNs, you are mistaken.
For example, the construction of the Project 955 Borey nuclear submarine is three times cheaper than the Yasen project 885 nuclear submarine. Although the displacement of Ash is three times less than that of Borey. Ash's combat resistance is certainly much higher than that of Borey. But 30-40 Ash trees will ruin the country.

[pmkemcity]

Quote: Alexander1971

30-40 Ashes will ruin the country.

"Ash tree stump"! Only you forget about the additional infrastructure of the fleet, which is necessary to impart combat stability to SLBMs, and the ballistic missiles themselves are o-ho.

Quote: Alexander1971

30-40 Ashes will ruin the country.

I think that the Americans will be forced to go broke even more to counter multi-purpose submarines.

[2 Level Advisor]

And we have that budgets are comparable to minke whales, so as to compete financially with them?

[pmkemcity]

Quote: Level 2 Advisor

And we have that budgets are comparable to minke whales, so as to compete financially with them?

That is why it is not worth blindly copying the American Navy.

[Nemchinov Vl]

Quote: pmkemcity

I think that the Americans will be forced to go broke even more to counter multi-purpose submarines.

I would add, - "ate MCSPL, in sufficient quantity" ...

[Nemchinov Vl]

Quote: Alexander1971

If you think that construction 30-40 nuclear submarines with CD and displacement up to 5 thousand tons will be a money saving compared to the construction of 12 SSBNs, you are mistaken.

is not a fact !!! "just there the dog is buried" in displacement / size.

Quote: Alexander1971

For example, the construction of the Project 955 Borey nuclear submarine is three times cheaper than the Yasen project 885 nuclear submarine.

Well, you exaggerated ... about 2,2 times ...

Quote: Alexander1971

Although the displacement of Ash is three times less than that of Borea. The fighting stability of Ashen is certainly much higher than that of Borea.

and exaggerated here ... also ... underwater VI "Yasen-M" (13800 tons.), "Boreya" (24000 tons.) - i.e. less than twice? !!! ... But the price of "Ash-M" is just insanely expensive, because of the large number of TLUs for the Kyrgyz Republic !!! And most importantly, you completely forgot about the displacement for the ICAPL (desirable for the mass building of hunter boats) see above - 5000 tons. !!! Do not need "overweight their cost - TLU for a large number of RC" !!! Especially in an age when even from a TA diesel "Varshavyanka" you can use both torpedoes and winged "Caliber / Onyx" !!! These are precisely such submarines (about the size of "Barakuda", or even smaller, are needed. Yes, with a modern GAK, possibly a more compact reactor, a water cannon, not overdone by all sorts of VPU for the Kyrgyz Republic) will be cheaper than "Borey", and is built faster (eating less resources), and will allow faster holes in the PLO in the Pacific Fleet and Northern Fleet to patch up (that is, to cover the deployment areas, and to make / control the communications of rivals) ...

[pmkemcity]

Totally agree

Quote: Vl Nemchinov

These are precisely such SSNS, (about the size of "Barakuda", or even smaller, are needed.

[pmkemcity]

Quote: alma

I do not understand your statement that it is necessary to build 30-40 boats up to 5 thousand? Do you mean the need to build 5000 submarines?

It's about displacement.

Bravo!

[SVD68]

All ballistic missiles in submarines with a range of over 600 km are classified as SLBMs, and not RSD or ICBMs.

[pmkemcity]

Quote: SVD68

All ballistic missiles in submarines with a range of over 600 km are classified as SLBMs, and not RSD or ICBMs.

If a pawn moves like a queen, then do not call it, it will still be a queen. From the love of long and incomprehensible words, as well as to various abbreviations, the people who introduce this into circulation do not look smarter. Do not be like them.

[SVD68]

No, if you call SLBMs, it will be governed not by the discontinued INF Treaty, but by the START treaty. And the placement of missiles with reduced range on the submarine will adversely affect the potential of the strategic nuclear forces.

[pmkemcity]

Quote: SVD68

No, if you call SLBMs, it will be governed not by the discontinued INF Treaty, but by the START treaty. And the placement of missiles with reduced range on the submarine will adversely affect the potential of the strategic nuclear forces.

What is the problem then? Call Trump and withdraw from START. Total business. To this and goes.

[Zaurbek]

It's time to make drums and MC boats according to the most unified projects. And it’s easier to teach and produce people. And the topic with tabs in the mines of the BR for 3-4 pieces of KR is very interesting. You can rearm the old projects in the Kyrgyz Republic and get a floating arsenal.
And so, nose and feed are the same, it is quite possible to do.

[Aleksandr1971]

Is your idea of ​​unification, Zaurbek, justified by you only by the convenience of teaching people how to use and manufacture? In this case, it is necessary to produce a single sample of small arms, a single sample of artillery, a single sample of aviation and armored vehicles.
Really bad thought.

The author of the article justifies the need for unification only by the need to save money on production. Only such unification will not lead to the solution of the task - ensuring the combat stability of the underwater part of the strategic nuclear forces. So this unification is not needed

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Alexander1971

The author of the article justifies the need for unification only by the need to save money on production. Only such unification will not lead to the solution of the task - ensuring the combat stability of the underwater part of the strategic nuclear forces. So this unification is not needed

This is not entirely true. Just unification is needed to increase the combat stability of the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces due to camouflage of nuclear weapons carriers among all nuclear submarines based on a single project.

It is unrealistic to build 60-80 units, and 40 is not bad. Try to track down all 40 nuclear submarines and understand which one of them is SLBM, and which one has gone hunting? The appearance is the same, the thermal trace, isotopic, acoustic noise, too.

The basis of this solution is the creation of a compact submarine, which can fit into the dimensions of a universal nuclear submarine. This is achievable, as the experience of previous years shows - the American SSBN Benjamin Franklin is smaller than our 971 Pike or 885 Ash SSBNs. I think that by 2035, our industry may well create SLBMs less than 10 meters long, less than 2 meters in diameter, with a range of about 8000 km.

Reducing the cost of building unified nuclear submarines is a side benefit.

Another plus can be the unification of shipyards producing one type of nuclear submarine. If now, having stopped building the 955 Borei, we cannot quickly increase the production of more 885 Ash, the shipyards that build the Borei will have to be trained and rebuilt (equipment, etc.). And the components are different.
In the case of the construction of a universal nuclear submarine, it is possible to flexibly change the number of different types of nuclear submarines under construction. All subcontractors will be focused on the supply of unified equipment. For manufacturing enterprises, a large series is like fresh air.

[Nemchinov Vl]

Andrew !! Thank you for the article, of course, but ...

Quote: AVM

This is not entirely true. Just unification is needed to increase the combat stability of the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces due to camouflage of nuclear weapons carriers among all nuclear submarines based on a single project.

I'm sorry of course, , but this will again lead to an attempt to "tie the elephant and the quivering doe" together, and therefore something like an over-expensive "Ash-M" .
The only thing that probably makes sense is 4-5 pr. 955K (to replace the "Batons" 949A). Yes this is an option !!

Quote: AVM

It is unrealistic to build 60-80 units, and 40 is not bad. Try to track down all 40 nuclear submarines and understand which one of them is SLBM, and which one has gone hunting? The appearance is the same, the thermal trace, isotopic, acoustic noise, too.

But even 40 "giants" will not work - it will be too expensive !! The main part (quantitative) should be small SSA hunters. I repeat -

Quote: Vl Nemchinov

... that you completely forgot about the displacement for the ICAPL (desirable for the mass construction of hunter boats), see above - 5000 tons. !!! and there is no need to "overweight their cost - TLU for a large number of RC" !!! Especially in an age when even from a TA diesel "Varshavyanka" you can use both torpedoes and winged "Caliber / Onyx" !!! These are precisely such submarines (about the size of the "Barakuda", or even smaller, are needed. Yes, with a modern GAK, possibly a more compact reactor, a water cannon, not overly sophisticated by all sorts of TLUs for the KR) will be cheaper than "Borey", and build faster (consuming less resources), and will allow faster holes in the PLO in the Pacific Fleet and Northern Fleet to patch up (that is, to cover the deployment areas, and to make / control the communications of rivals) ...

Quote: AVM

Another plus can be the unification of shipyards producing one type of nuclear submarine. If now, having stopped building the 955 Borei, we cannot quickly increase the production of more 885 Ash, the shipyards that build the Borei will have to be trained and rebuilt (equipment, etc.). And the components are different.
In the case of the construction of a universal nuclear submarine, it is possible to flexibly change the number of different types of nuclear submarines under construction.

And now, excuse me, besides Sevmash, someone is building nuclear submarines ?!

Quote: AVM

I think that by 2035 our industry may well create SLBMs with a length of less than 10 meters, a diameter of less than 2 meters, with a range of about 8000 km.

-

Quote: Nikolai-1970

You are a dreamer.
First you need to get out of the crisis.

and add it ...

[Zaurbek]

And why is there fundamentally different? Mover? Reactor? Chopping? The nose part? KR, too (as I understand it) is more convenient to start from vertical standard installations, like onyx and zircon. Here, let them differ in the middle part.

[Aleksandr1971]

The article is good, thoughtful. But one can hardly agree with the author’s idea of ​​building nuclear submarines unified under ICBMs and under the functions of a hunting boat. The SSBN is structurally designed for covert watch. As a hunter, he will immediately find himself. At the same time, the strike submarine is not designed to accommodate ICBMs and has too little internal volume. The creation of something average will lead to the fact that both tasks of both the SSBN and the ICAPL will be extremely weakened.

[sanek45744]

Here you are all write your arguments. And someone served in submarines or even in the Navy. I just want to know your competence in this matter. And then I will insert my 2 kopecks in this topic.

[Aleksandr1971]

Unfortunately no. Although interest arose from the stories of his uncle, who served in D. Vostok. He served the power plant on the nuclear submarine, but not on board as part of the crew, but at the locations in Mali Ulysse and Bolshoi Kamen. But formally was assigned to a ship repair plant in Sov.Havani. He died of leukemia in the late 90s.

[pmkemcity]

Quote: sanek45744

Here you are all write your arguments. And someone served in submarines or even in the Navy. I just want to know your competence in this matter. And then I will insert my 2 kopecks in this topic.

OK, yes, even a ruble.

[Pavel57]

A competent look at the need to rethink the rhodium marine component of the strategic nuclear forces.

[Operator]

Domestic SSBNs are purely specifically a product of the cargo cult.

The vast territory of the USSR / RF allows deploying in-country silo launchers of ICBMs, the minimum flying time to which enemy ballistic missiles will be at least 10 minutes from anywhere in neighboring territories or waters. This is quite enough to launch an ICBM retaliatory strike, taking into account their constant minute readiness and the layered warning system for a nuclear missile attack, the ground component of which in the person of the ZGRLS detects the launch of enemy missiles within a few seconds after their launch.

The time of readiness for launching missiles aboard the SSBN is measured in one hour, and at the same time no more than 2/3 of submarines, at best, can carry simultaneous combat duty, including at piers. At the same time, the flight time of medium-range ballistic missiles in the form of SM-3 Block IIA anti-ballistic missiles with a 200-Kt warhead W81 on board, placed on board enemy surface ships (USA, other NATO countries and Japan) in the amount of several hundred units will be from 6 minutes .

SSBNs at sea are easily detected by anti-submarine aircraft using special radars, quantum magnetometers, as well as sound direction finding from the side of enemy strike boats, constantly on duty at the exit from the SSBN bases.

For the combat deployment of an SSBN it is necessary to have powerful coastal bases, a whole fleet of strike nuclear submarines and surface cover ships, even within the framework of the so-called bastions in the Barents and Okhotsk seas.

At present, Russia has its own strategic alternative to SSBNs in the person of the Poseidon NPA, whose displacement and visibility in the field of hydroacoustics and magnetometry are two orders of magnitude less than submarines, and the maximum speed and depth of submersion are three times higher than those of the latter.

Then why do we need hemorrhoids with SSBNs and SLBMs, the production and operation of which per one missile is much more expensive than ICBMs in silos?

[sanek45744]

After you wrote about the readiness to start at 1 hour, you can no longer read.

[Aleksandr1971]

Our leadership does not have the guts to decide on a retaliatory strike within 10 minutes or an hour. But even if it’s enough, all the same, the first unexpected blow to Russia will be the most devastating. In this case, only a small part of the land-based ICBMs will launch against the enemy (primarily ground-based missile systems). Mine will be destroyed (and perhaps a significant part of the country's leadership, too).

You have already been told many times that ground-based ICBMs disappear in the first hours, if not minutes of a big war. But after the first exchange of nuclear strikes, it is necessary to “beat” the enemy with something: for the remaining goals, or for pliability in the negotiations. In addition, countries remain unaffected by the initial strikes. And these countries can suddenly become aggressive against the weakened bear. Therefore, SSBNs are needed.

The SSBN is by no means so easily detected if it is on combat duty and not at the base. And it is especially difficult to detect them with good military security, or a special water area. It is clear that boats are more expensive than land-based ICBMs. But the boats have slightly different, but also important tasks. And it is necessary to spend money on the construction and protection of the SSBN. This is the military security of the country.

[Operator]

Quote: Alexander1971

In this case, only a small part of the land-based ICBMs will launch against the enemy (primarily ground-based missile systems). Mine will be destroyed

Yes, yes - you’ve already been told that ICBMs will start within one minute of fixing the ballistic missile launch of the enemy with a flight time of at least 10 minutes (at the same time, the ICBM will take 5 minutes to pass the active section of the trajectory before separating the warheads).

And you still hang noodles about super-duper SSBNs firing from the pier (after being destroyed by sea-based ballistic missiles in 6 minutes) or located in "bastions" (where they are grazed by enemy nuclear submarines immediately after leaving the base).

[sanek45744]

You don’t understand what the SSBNs are for.

[Operator]

So what about the hourly readiness to launch SLBMs from the pier?

Nikolay-1970: "20-22 minutes to pass the signal and command. Another 20 to prepare for launch. This is if they switch to a permanent communication session. If for 30 minutes during the threatened [period], the time is longer. Up to an hour, if all worked normally and the boats IMMEDIATELY received a signal and confirmation. And maybe more "(C)

[sanek45744]

Are you an adequate person? Tell me, do you think that the boats will be in the bases during some serious conflict. Yes, even before this period they will go to the areas of combat patrol. The task of the SSBN is in the absence of a retaliatory strike.

[Operator]

Boats are standing at the pier because of technical unavailability (planned or unplanned). They cannot go to sea at the click of a finger.

And how do you know that a serious period has already begun - right now, for example, a serious period or not?

[sanek45744]

Ahahah damn what nonsense. You amuse me straight today. And where are the ships based then discover the secret. ?
And on the second there is a general headquarters for this.

[Odysseus]

Quote: sanek45744

Are you an adequate person? Tell me, do you think that the boats will be in the bases during some serious conflict?

The operator, in this case, is absolutely right. The enemy will not call you and speak, attention, attention begins a serious conflict. You have a day to prepare
In such a question as a nuclear strike, surprise is the main factor. And you will learn about the war when you see a nuclear mushroom above your base.

[sanek45744]

LLC one more. What day though? Who told you that who will look at the blow.

[Odysseus]

Quote: sanek45744

LLC one more. What day though?

This is called irony. The word day is not used in the literal sense, but as an indicator of exceptional naivety, even childishness, of your ideas about the "threatened period", "general staff", thanks to the wise perspicacity of which you will be able to take all the boats located at the bases "to the areas of combat patrol".

[sanek45744]

Boats go for a long time to the combat patrol area. Or do you think there are no signs in the preparation of the enemy for a nuclear war?

[Odysseus]

Quote: sanek45744

Boats go for a long time to the combat patrol area. Or do you think there are no signs in the preparation of the enemy for a nuclear war?

In theory, there is, in practice now, no, there will be no external signs. Nuclear war is not a joke, there can only be one chance and preparation for it will be thorough.
1) Plans are prescribed in advance. Moreover, they are spelled out in such a way that there will be minimal time between the political decision and the implementation. And the number of knowledgeable people is extremely small.
2) The problem is that NATO is many times superior to us in material means, but the bigger problem is that their bases are located directly near our borders. That is, their strength and resources are already here, they can easily build them up, and we can’t control them in any way. In relation to the maritime theater, they are watching our submarines immediately after leaving the base, and we are not watching them at their bases.
3) In a nuclear war, surprise is generally a major factor. And the one who struck the first blow has a tremendous advantage. It will be delivered at the most unpleasant moment for us, that is, at the moment when the reaction of the political leadership will be the slowest. And the blow will be combined in time and place. Submarines on duty is the first target, they will be hit suddenly without any warning. Missiles at the base will arrive in a maximum of 10 minutes.
4) What you write about the inevitability of a retaliatory strike is the Soviet concept of the 70-80s, it was based on the fact that we lots of boats. Namely, 62 only SSBNs. At that level of technological development it was really impossible to intercept everything. Now both the technology has gone ahead and we have 7 times fewer boats. Whether boats on duty will be able to evade the enemy and strike with the whole set is a moot point. But those who are on the base ..... They have very few chances.
Only the Strategic Missile Forces are now suitable for a retaliatory strike. But if we strike first, then the SSBNs will be of great importance. Although it’s more difficult to deploy them covertly than the ground component.

[sanek45744]

Okay, I understand you, bye.

[Local from the Volga]

Do you have any idea how much work needs to be done to deliver a massive nuclear strike ?! even Mongolian intelligence will notice it in a month! and no need for the 41st!

[Aleksandr1971]

Dear, Operator (Andrey), first of all, I never hang noodles on anyone’s ears. Secondly, I have never written anywhere that the SSBN can shoot from the pier. On the contrary, if I touched on this issue somewhere, I wrote about the fact that the SSBN would in no case be shot during the great war because it would be destroyed in the first place. If you can find such a phrase with me, then drop a quote in the same thread.

[Operator]

I wrote, and before me, there are a lot of people, including the commanders-in-chief of the USSR / RF Navy.

[Aleksandr1971]

You probably also from this worthy company of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy of the USSR / RF?

[Operator]

No, I'm on the hardware and software line.

[Odysseus]

Quote: Alexander1971

You have already been told repeatedly that ground-based ICBMs disappear in the first hours, or even minutes of a major war.

Strange thesis. And the submarines standing at the pier will not disappear? In reality, now, in the event of a nuclear war (and the enemy will strike at the most unpleasant time for us), all SSBNs will be destroyed without any sense. Most are in bases, 1-2 are on duty. Submarines on duty will be attacked long before the command is received from the leadership, they will be the first to attack when the enemy launches missiles.

Quote: Alexander1971

But it is necessary to "hit" the enemy with something after the first exchange of nuclear strikes: for the remaining goals, or for pliability in the negotiations

In fact, if by a miracle at least one SSBN remains, then after receiving the command it will immediately shoot. There will be no "reserve" here. And no one will wait for a "second exchange of blows."

[5-9]

They wrote a thousand times that the SM-3 cannot in any way be an infantry fighting vehicle, because this requires a completely different characteristic of the operation of solid fuel engines, i.e. essentially a completely new rocket. Well, the United States does not have ownerless warheads and is not expected, especially the semi-mythical W81.

[Operator]

Quote: 5-9

SM-3 can in no way be a BRDS, because for this we need a completely different characteristic of the operation of solid fuel engines ... and the United States has no orphaned warheads and is not expected, especially the semi-mythical W81

Share your knowledge about the SM-3 Block IIA's "Other Solid Propellant Engine Performance" for the UKV Kinetic Interceptor

W-80 and W80-1 were produced in the amount of 2017 units, of which 1400 were installed on the AGM-86 and AGM-129 cruise missiles, the remaining 617 are in storage.

[5-9]

The launch of a tiny and light contraption into space with the highest possible speed and the delivery of a few hundred kilogram NFC to the maximum range require completely different engines. Even in GBI, which is a type of Minuteman without one stage, it is stupid to put a nuclear warhead without replacing engines - it is impossible.
If you do not know that the AGM-129 is rotten and decommissioned as much as in 2012, and the AGM-86 is less than 600, then what can I argue with you?

[Operator]

UKV interceptor and W80 warhead weigh the same - 130 kg.

Missiles and special warheads are two different things: if the former are gradually disposed of, the latter are sent for storage.

[Tests]

Dear author! There are really a lot of KB. But the trouble is - there is only one manufacturer of nuclear submarines in the Russian Federation - SEVMASH. About the timing of the repairs of the SSNN for the Northern Fleet at Nerpa (today a branch of Zvyozdochka) and at Zvyozdochka itself, about the repairs of boats for the Pacific Fleet in the Far East, they wrote on the site many, many times. The site has been written about the deadlines for the new nuclear submarines at SEVMASH many, many times. Considering that it seems that only the Supreme Commander, the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Industry and Trade believe in what they say about the enterprises of the defense industry of the Russian Federation, the deadlines for the delivery of boats (both new and repaired) in the next 3-5 years will not be reduced ... And Another bell is not the most pleasant. With the pension reform, the captains came to SEVMASH, who worked at the radar station on Sredny Island on Severnaya Zemlya. They served the minimum pension (including Syria) and for civilian life. Rumors that the former military will be paid a pension from the age of 55 or from the age of 60, they finished off the men, plus the cubs of the growing up - it's time to send a normal school to school. Do you know what they regret - that the majors retired with them - true Professionals, could still serve and serve, but today a pension of 35-40 is better than in 15-20 years ... And we are a NATO country, Italy we save from the virus. Russia is a generous soul ... Maybe better Ostrovnaya (Gremikha) will be brought into a divine form? From the main bases of the Northern Fleet nuclear submarine near Murmansk to Ostrovnoye to the east, about 280 km, it is increasingly easier for boats to go to Novaya Zemlya from the pier, and there are fewer NATO eyes and ears ...

[sanek45744]

That's honestly why here in shoving Italy explain to me please.

[Romario_Argo]

the remaining 50-70% are in the base and can be destroyed by a sudden disarming strike even by non-nuclear means

Now this will allow the enemy to destroy about 350-500 Russian nuclear warheads with one blow - the ratio is not at all in our favor

article is just complete nonsense
SF and Pacific Fleet cover 7 S-400 air defense systems (230 zur per salvo),
also primarily deployed S-500 will cover the naval base and silos
- even 2 S-500 3 zrd air defense missiles - 120 PR
+ on the SF and Pacific Fleet there are MiG-31 interceptors up to 70 units with R-33/37 (240)
Total: 590

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Romario_Argo

SF and Pacific Fleet cover 7 S-400 air defense systems (230 zur per salvo),

I’m directly seeing a volley of 220 unguided anti-aircraft missiles.
The number of missiles "in a salvo" is determined by the channel of the air defense missile system for the target and the missile defense system. And until the channel is free, the next target cannot be fired upon. Moreover, the cycle of firing at the target "detection - capture - tracking - launch - missile defense to the target - defeat / miss - restart" takes a certain time. And with proper planning of the raid wave, it may well happen that those covering the object simply do not have time to hit all the targets before they pass to the object.

Quote: Romario_Argo

on the SF and Pacific Fleet there are MiG-31 interceptors up to 70 units with R-33/37 (240)

The fleet has two combat-ready squadrons of MiG-31. The rest are interceptors of the air force of the airborne forces, which will be spread throughout the country.

[Romario_Argo]

volley of 220 unguided anti-aircraft missiles

The number of missiles "in a salvo" is determined by the channel of the air defense missile system for the target and the missile defense system

count - since you have a lot of math
7 air defense missile systems are 7 illumination and guidance radars 30N6E2 at 36 TsU
= 252 TsU at 224 missiles - not even enough (!)

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Romario_Argo

7 air defense missile systems are 7 illumination and guidance radars 30N6E2 at 36 TsU

Mistake 36 channels for the target and 72 channels for missiles have not a divisional radar, but a regimental command post of the 83M6E2 control system. More precisely, the combat control center (PBU) 54K6E2, which is part of it:

The composition of the KP SU 83M6E2 includes:
- combat control point (PBU) 54K6E2. PBU 54K6E2 automatically determines: parameters of the trajectory of movement (range, speed, altitude, direction), nationality, type and degree of danger of an air object, firing conditions for each fire division, the optimal distribution of targets in the fire divisions for their destruction, taking into account the firing conditions and the position ammunition. PBU 54K6E2 is capable of controlling the S-300PMU-2, S-300PMU-1, S-300PMU, S-200VE air defense systems in any combination. PBU 54K6E2 provides simultaneous firing of up to 36 targets with guidance of up to 72 missiles on them. The number of simultaneously detected targets is up to 300, the number of simultaneously tracked targets is up to 100.

And this KP / PBU is one in six divisions.

The composition of the air defense system C-300PMU-2 includes:
command post control system 83M6E2
up to six anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) 90ZH6E2.
anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) 48N6E2;
hardware support similar to the S-300PMU-1 air defense system.

Highlighted in bold - this is precisely the division.

[Romario_Argo]

you just have a different reading. once again read and compare with other sources - conduct an analysis, but only on the S-400 - and you will realize that you are mistaken

[Aleksandr1971]

The article is not nonsense because its author logically tries to prove the correctness of his theses, which one cannot always agree with. But if it’s not nonsense, then it’s for sure naivety of the belief that the S-400 and so far no existing S-500 will protect the submarine bases.

[ser56]

In principle, reasonable theses, and most importantly the fleet is moving away from pure defense ...

[Odysseus]

The concept of building up the naval component of strategic nuclear forces in the USSR was based not on the idea of ​​"shooting from bases", but on the opposite idea of ​​"bringing a pistol to the temple of America", and it was created at a time when the enemy's anti-submarine defense was technically easier to overcome, and the characteristics of the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces were much lower. That is, then it made sense, although even then the whole idea looked extremely controversial and costly.
Now, let’s tell you directly, in the marine components of the strategic nuclear forces for Russia it just doesn't make sense. More precisely, it is only in one case, the RF is going to start a global nuclear war first. Then this weapon can be used. In any other cases, it is useless.
In order for him to make sense again, you need to build a huge fleet like the USSR had, that is, as the author suggests building boats in series of 60-80 pieces (with all the associated elements), or gain allies around the world with the corresponding naval base.
Or, look for other ways — the simplest and most inexpensive — to maximize the ground component.
PS The idea of ​​building small submarines for inland waters under the BRSD is, in principle, not bad. But this can be used as an alternative to strategic aviation against Europe and China.

[5-9]

We can’t stop them. In peacetime, attacking the enemy’s fleet in neutral waters is a declaration of war, and if the enemy inflicts a sudden disarming strike, there will be no time to suppress his fleet.

Everything is as usual in such articles ... the dastardly adversary wants to unleash a world war with MRYAU and pulls his dark forces to our borders, brings a pistol to our temples ... and ours close their eyes and say "if only there was no war" they are afraid to even look into him side ....
Yes, during the threatened period, these Burkes are not like the anti-ship missiles with special warheads, the BR will not regret if their SM-3s can really shoot down our missiles on OUT ... and there is no MRNU (sinking of 5-10-20 ships) from the side The United States will not provoke this .... well, they will declare war, so they will declare it ... but "no one wants war," in the sense of the MRNU and tens of millions of victims on each side ... therefore they will swallow .... because the alternative for us is with their MRYAU and lose the potential of a retaliatory strike ... so their ships near our borders are a declaration of war .... no one will be criminating .... and they and we understand this.

[Aleksandr1971]

Of course, the United States is unlikely to strike a nuclear strike on Russia tonight.

But not only intentions are important. Opportunities are even more important.

And the truth is that our capabilities are much less than those of the enemy. Therefore, you need to choose the best solution with a minimum of funds to ensure your safety from a possible threat. Therefore, the marine component of the strategic nuclear forces is needed.

[5-9]

Strategically, our capabilities are no less than those of the enemy. In the maritime component - yes (although what about the Ohio volley fire ??? more than 2 missiles, how many will they launch? How many hours are all 20 ??? what does it look like against the background of our first strike ???). In the ground ... 420 monoblock ancient (albeit modernized) missiles at only 3 bases in rather vulnerable mines are not even ours, with enormous problems with combat readiness and personnel (it has repeatedly splashed onto the pages of the most democratic press in the world), where a few years ago 7,75 inch drives were used (if you remember such things were, in 1990 in the USSR there were already 5,25 inch computers that replaced 6,25 inch .... and about the presence of 7,75 of the beginning of the 80s, I learned only from an article about the Minuteman base). There is a paradoxical situation in aviation when our strategic aviation is stronger than the American one ... they only have 37 B-52Ns, the newest of which is 1968. with the ancient AGM-86s with a range of only 2500 km (we have 3500 and 5000 km) ... and that’s all ... The V-2A carries only cast-iron nucleotides, i.e. against us is practically useless for a first or retaliatory strike. Their missiles do not carry the PCB ABM, and the horse did not roll on this subject. They do not have a workable missile defense system (we can at least protect the Moscow industrial district), 30 GBI units with a controversial kinetic interception ... well, 10-15 targets will be intercepted from which it is not clear how many LCs will be.
Well, our overwhelming 10-fold superiority in tactical nuclear weapons and qualitative in its carriers.

So if you are an American patriot and with all this in mind, imagine that tomorrow "ze rasskiz" will be inflicted with a sudden MRYAU, then there is also why to worry ...

This is called parity and MUD

[Aleksandr1971]

Do not expand the theme indefinitely. Now we are talking about the marine component of the strategic nuclear forces. The author of the article spoke on this subject. There are also good comments above, for example, Odyssey comments.

Want to talk about ground-based strategic nuclear forces or aviation? - Ok, open a new branch, or continue the discussion on existing branches.

[5-9]

What nonsense is it to evaluate one of the components of the strategic nuclear forces in isolation from the potential of the triad as a whole?

[Aleksandr1971]

Good. Open a new branch on the relationship between the components of strategic nuclear forces.

But any discussion has its own framework, so as not to become a discussion about everything and little by little. The narrower the topic, the more detailed it is possible to discuss its components. Reread the author’s article again and try not to leave the marked canvas.

[Alien From]

Thanks to the author for the article) and conclusions ..... as usual ....... I want to believe .....)

[agond]

On the issue of deploying ballistic missile submarines in inland waters, since they all freeze except for the Caspian, and if ice is still not an obstacle, then why climb into inland waters if we have a coastline of 38000 km, fifty small cheap diesel submarines with horizontal by placing one, but a large missile, and capable of not only moving under water, but lying at the bottom in our territorial waters, you can even change the crew at the duty station and bring diesel fuel with products overland. And once again, it's time to abandon the dogma of the vertical installation of missiles on a submarine (for example, neither Topol nor Yars carries a rocket vertically)

[Aleksandr1971]

Our current basing areas - the Arctic Ocean and the Sea of ​​Okhotsk - freeze even harder than inland waters. The cabin and strong hulls of our submarines are therefore designed to break ice up to 2,2 m thick.

But you repeat the thesis that we have a large sea coast. This coast is not safe, because over the entire space from leaving the base at the duty station, our submarine will be controlled by US PLO forces. And it doesn’t matter how much shore we have because the tail of two or more enemy submarines will fit behind our submarine. Which will keep our submarine on the fly all 100% of the time of its combat duty with a minute readiness to fire.
That is why I expressed the thesis about the advisability of deploying SSBNs in lakes where there are no enemy PLO.

About building diesel SSBNs for the ocean - I have not yet read more nonsense from any of the participants in the discussion. A diesel submarine should, once every 3-7 days, if not float, then at least use a snorkel (RDPV). Accordingly, such a boat is immediately unmasked. In wartime conditions, this is death and not the fulfillment of a combat mission. In peacetime conditions, this is the appearance of a "tail" from enemy submarines, if such a tail did not exist before.
But if you place a diesel SSBN in the lake, then the problem of unmasking disappears due to the absence of enemy PLO in the lake.

Build one separate boat for a separate rocket - enchanting nonsense. Even if the boat is reduced in size, then its cost will not be reduced as much as the displacement will decrease. The cost of production costs (except for materials) is approximately the same regardless of displacement. And you want to build fifty submarines.
How much does a rocket cost and how much does a submarine cost? And spend money on one missile on one submarine ?! A submarine is much more expensive than a rocket. So the diesel-electric submarine "Varshavyanka" - $ 300 million or 24 billion rubles. Multiply by 50. = 1,2 trillion rubles. And count the money in the Russian budget. RF budget expenditures in 2018 16 trillion rubles. With such an expense, our people will live like in North Korea (just ask you not to reveal this topic as well).

As for the advice to place the ICBMs horizontally in the submarine - what do you think? ICBMs are not a torpedo. For breaking stereotypes, you recommend placing the ICBMs in the submarine nose down.

[magadan72]

Indeed, there is logic in the deployment of SSBN boats in our inland seas. But there is still a minus during launches from the Caspian and Baikal, a much longer flight time. Really the best and even the best area for military patrols is the White Sea, and the base is being repaired nearby (Severodvinsk). Surely the throat of the White Sea is blocked by PLO. And the enemy’s bases are far from Norway, unlike the bases near Murmansk. The chances of destroying them and boats in the parking lot with simple tactical weapons are great. There is also the Gulf of Ob Yenisei. From which it’s not far to America to block air defense and anti-aircraft missile defense is relatively simple, and base somewhere there. Only boats need special flattened like flounder and rocket mines in the wheelhouse, so that ice can be broken or shot from under the ice. Boats will be cheaper, you don’t need a powerful HOOK less requirements for autonomy and noise. And boats to cover areas less need.

[Aleksandr1971]

Your idea of ​​combat duty in the White Sea has the same drawback as the SSBN’s duty in the Arctic Ocean. And by the way, the White Sea - this is one of the areas of combat duty of the SSBN (if this duty is carried out in our time at all).
The fact is that 70-90% of the time our SSBNs spend on base. If something changes for the better, then the time at the base will be approximately 50%. And in the event of a conflict, the boat at the base, and on the outskirts of the country near the enemy’s boats, near the US fleet and the US bases in Norway, the boat will not live for 3 minutes.
Consequently, the base of the submarines should be away from the enemy.

Duty in the White Sea, the Ob or Yenisei Bay will not give an advantage to our SSBNs because it will not be possible to create a combat outpost there. It would seem a narrow throat at the White Sea, at the Ob and Yenisei Guba. But we have almost no security. There is in the Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy only one "Ash" and one updated piece "Pike-B". The rest of the SSNNs will not cope with the protection of SSBNs, of which we have 9 pieces.
And the Americans have 33 Los Angeles for our SSBNs, 17 Virginias, 3 Sivulfs, that is, 6 of their hunters for each of our SSBNs. Although, of course, they will not throw 6 pieces on the hunt. Enough and 1 - 2 hunters for one victim. The rest of the US nuclear submarines will be engaged in other matters during the war.
Only in the White Sea it is theoretically possible to look for enemy submarines of our aviation PLO, but only on condition that our SSBN is on duty there, and not at the pier.

Therefore, the only alternative to transferring the SSBNs to inland waters is the death of the SSBNs during the great war, with no chance of a shot. Here, and on other branches, the idea was repeatedly expressed that supposedly our SSBNs would have time to shoot from the pier at the beginning of the war. - Do not have time. Look for this detailed arguments in other posts.

[Operator]

Quote: Nikolai-1970

If the boat is on duty

More than 6 minutes - do not go to a fortuneteller.

A separate question: why keep a combat-ready boat on duty at the pier - like, will we depict very expensive silos / ICBMs from the SSBN / SLBM?

[Aleksandr1971]

Just read the e-book of A. Semenov. link from Nikolai-1970. (probably this link will be deleted soon)

The book proves once again that even in Soviet times, when we had an absolute quantitative superiority over the SSBN and ICAPL, even the commanders of our submarines recognized the impossibility of a successful mission against the United States due to the technical superiority of the enemy.

What can we say about the current situation, when the enemy has superiority not only qualitative, but also quantitative .... Our naval part of the strategic nuclear forces in the conflict will be smashed to pieces.

Since it will probably never be possible to create effective combat protection of our SSBNs due to lack of finances, the only way to ensure the combat stability of the sea component of our strategic nuclear forces is to transfer them to inland waters.

[agond]

I agree that the idea of ​​a small submarine with a ballistic missile is far-fetched, although it is not difficult to build a diesel submarine not for long-distance navigation on the oceans, but for lying under its own shore, by the way, the entire coast of the Arctic and the Sea of ​​Okhotsk is shallow, for a hundred kilometers or more, depths are often 20- 50 m, and there are not any enemy submarines there, and there will not be, since this is too much business to rummage around on a large nuclear submarine. between the ice and the ground. On the issue of autonomy, if the boat is lying on the ground, then it has energy costs only for lighting and ventilation-air regeneration, so it can last a month, especially if the crew is reduced ... and the attraction for the ears is that if you leave the container with a rocket at the bottom, then you can do without the submarine, that is, one container has been laid, followed by the next. and no one will ever be able to trace the path of a small boat pulling a container with a rocket on a rigid coupling. you can only trace a large missile carrier "underwater airship" heading for the oceans, and every year it becomes easier and more reliable.

[Aleksandr1971]

About the container, or it can also be called an autonomous missile platform, they have already written here repeatedly. And in February of this year it seems about 4 or 5 years ago in great detail. Autonomous platforms with ICBMs are prohibited by contract. This is beneficial for Russia because the Americans will be able to cook them up more than we can. And Americans can overtake the Russian coast with such platforms even easier.

[qaz]

Well, the author was smart ... I mixed everything in one heap, and he knows the cost of the nuclear submarine, and he knows the cost of the nuclear submarine, and it is also expensive to accompany the Borea Ashes, and he also knows the pace of construction ... I myself am from Sevmash and about the pace. I don’t know, Ash trees are accompanying the Boreas anyway - this is one of their tasks, and the cost of building Ash is 3 (!) times more expensive - well, this is generally a laugh, as well as about displacement. And as for the fact that the Americans will confuse strategists with tacticians only because of their appearance (!) - this is a laughing matter. Yeah, right now, the Americans are looking at what comes out of the base and are like "Aha! What kind of boat is this ?! Like that, but like this, it's unclear." Yeah, boats are classified in this way, in appearance :-))) Signature of signals like the last century, right? ALL boats are recorded in the memory of GAKs, not just TYPE, but which EXACT boat is on patrol. Horror, not an article.

[agond]

Quote: Alexander1971

This is beneficial for Russia because the Americans will be able to cook them up more than we can. And Americans can overtake the Russian coast with such platforms even easier.

They can make it up, but it makes no sense where they can lay their autonomous platforms, in the shallow water in the Baltic or in the Big Sea, or somewhere offshore in the Arctic, so you can find them there, only the Barents Sea remains, and then how to communicate with them, from Washington, and why do they need all this when ordinary Virginia is full, but on the contrary it’s convenient for us since we can do what we want at our side in our territorial waters.
And if the problem of parity is solved once and for all, then such autonomous containers (with the option of self-propelled) should be laid at the bottom off the coast of the adversary, where their shelf ends, that is, outside the economic zone of the zone, and let them look for them there at depths of 4 -5 km, and communication with the platforms is carried out via nuclear submarines of minimum size, with a minimum crew and possibly even without weapons, but with a repeater.

[3danimal]

With containers - not serious. What degree of reliability of equipment and organization do you need? With our "maybe" and "and so come down"? ...
And their effectiveness is also doubtful. Also, if detected, will the USAF have the right to undermine or seize them (in your opinion)? And this is the loss of special warheads.
It is simpler and more reliable to use soil mobile complexes. Actually, with such empty territories - the best way out.

[Lekz]

Smiled. I liked the picture of an American rocket in a container with a tractor. My 80s diploma. Main conveyor Sovtransavto (if anyone remembers). This is what I was thinking. SSBN troublesome business, quite vulnerable and expensive to operate. Maybe a barge (conditionally) with container (modular) ICBMs with transportation by inland waters, and there are plenty of large rivers in Russia. Of course there are problems - winter, ice (the peasant triumphs). But false goals can be done from the heart.

[3danimal]

So there are mobile soil complexes, to focus on them. Let them ride along the empty plains.

[Angry]

Good explanatory article. What should we do? Firstly: it is necessary to expand the geography of the BS to our strategic nuclear forces. Of course, there are weaknesses, in particular with a high probability they can all be detected by the enemy. Therefore, those pursuing our SSBNs should be detected and destroyed using underwater drones, which should be on all of our submarines. Secondly: it is necessary to increase the number of nuclear submarines of SLBM carriers. This can be done by turning part of the VPU pr.885 under SLBMs. Probably it makes sense to modernize part of our MTSAL Ave. 971 by inserting a missile compartment, say at 4-8 VPU. Thirdly: it is necessary to develop light SLBMs with an average range of 65 cm. SLT, which could start, both from SLTs and VPU nuclear submarines. Fourth: it is necessary to develop small-sized nuclear super-powerful warheads. not 100 kt and not 200 kt, but a megaton class, so that they understand that it will be very painful ..

[3danimal]

Megaton warhead will always be larger than 100 kiloton. Well, or throw off the whole world on antimatter
Previously, high power compensated, above all, low accuracy.
So “it doesn’t hurt” is the wrong criterion.

[3danimal]

Immediately we can say about the series in 60-80 more designed "Husky": a very unrealistic figure in the next 20-30 years. The pace of construction ... is not impressive and there is no reason (at present) to believe that the situation will change.

[agond]

Quote: 3danimal

The pace of construction ... is not impressive and there is no reason (at present) to believe that the situation will change.

You should not build submarine cruisers, especially "underwater airships" 150-170 m long, it is time to realize that the century of large submarines is irrevocably gone, submarines (namely boats) with a length of less than 100 m should be built, then the construction time will be reduced, as well it's time to abandon the double-hull scheme familiar to our fleet for two reasons
1 it greatly increases the dimensions of the submarine
2 in the underwater position, the zero buoyancy of such a boat is ensured by the positive buoyancy of the strong hull which should be sufficient to compensate for the negative buoyancy of the structures of the outer light hull, and it has a large surface and consists of many elements, and as a result is very heavy, therefore, it is impossible to simply take and increase the thickness of the walls of the durable housing without increasing its internal volume.
The only way out of this situation is to apply a thick plastic coating with a filler of glass microspheres from the outside onto a solid body, according to the "float" principle of deep-sea vehicles.

[3danimal]

As I understand it, the nuclear submarine owes its size and propulsion. In addition, a smaller GAS, fewer missiles and SLTs will fit in the small case.
On the other hand, with Severodvinsk and Comrades, the military and designers turned out to be megalomancers. If you look, you could do even more by putting 130mm AU and SAM

[Vladimir SHajkin]

This requires a powerful surface fleet, anti-submarine aircraft, as well as multi-purpose submarine hunters to accompany the SSBN. The Russian Navy has serious problems with all this. To carry out an SSBN’s entry into the sea without cover is the same as knowingly giving them to the enemy for destruction.

I wanted to object, saying that all this is correct for the previous century, but although I have read a long article, I agree with the conclusions.

[agond]

Quote: 3danimal

Nuclear submarine owes its size and propulsion

For example, the nuclear submarine "Rube" France is quite small, the surface displacement of 2410 tons is underwater 2607 tons, that is, 8% of ballast, and for comparison, our diesel "Varshavyanka" is surface 2350 tons of underwater 3950 tons of 41% of ballast, while despite the large buoyancy under the ice of the Arctic she has nothing to do, she will not break them when surfacing, that is, the designers simply "pour water" into the projects of submarines of any type and naturally there is not enough space for weapons, everything takes up ballast and again it is necessary to increase the dimensions, a vicious circle.

[3danimal]

In the presence of a huge number of empty territories, it is more reliable and efficient to bet on mobile soil complexes. Potentially enemy forces will not be able to accompany them, as well as determine the exact location of most of them.
Then why bother with the SSBN? There will be 5 and 10 ICAPL for escort (which will still have to be built).

[Mino]

When designing our submarines, there are parameters of surface unsinkability, including stock of buoyancy. They are embedded in the TOR; designers have no way to change these parameters

[Newone]

the ability of nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBNs) to hide in the depths of the ocean ensures their highest survival rate before a sudden disarming strike by the enemy,

Rave. Submarines in modern conditions are the most vulnerable part of the nuclear triad.
1. PL-based locations are 12 nautical miles from the border with which they can be attacked in peacetime. This is the minimum distance for the entire nuclear triad.
2. Even during combat duty, submarines can be accompanied by an adversary almost everywhere except for the 12 mile zone. In this case, the enemy can use almost all available methods of search and tracking of submarines.
3. A submarine can be attacked by an adversary secretly ie we may not know that the submarine was generally attacked for quite some time.
4. The system for issuing indications of an attack for submarines is the least fast-acting and the most vulnerable of all.

[agond]

Quote: agond

The only way out of this situation is to apply a thick plastic coating with a filler of glass microspheres from the outside onto a solid body, according to the "float" principle of deep-sea vehicles.

Everything is not so gloomy if we abandon the usual schemes of our submarines when the solid hull is inside the lung, although it is not as light as we are told because it covers the entire boat from all sides (it would be interesting to know its share in the total weight.) And cover the durable the hull is lightly absorbing non-compressible material from the outside, this will greatly facilitate the design of the boat and will increase the thickness of the walls of the durable hull, which will significantly increase the depth of immersion. And most importantly, it is necessary to drastically reduce the size of submarines to a minimum, for this you should abandon the vertical launch of ballistic missiles with submarines, it is time to stop building underwater airships,

[Zementbomber]

2. Even during combat duty, submarines can be accompanied by an adversary almost everywhere except for the 12 mile zone. In this case, the enemy can use almost all available methods of search and tracking of submarines.

Only not under the arctic ice and not in the White Sea and Okhotsk "bastions".

[strannik1985]

And what will prevent the American SSNS from passing to the White and Okhotsk seas?

[Zementbomber]

Just read the military-hydrographic descriptions of the Kuril straits and La Perouse ave. And especially - the Girl of the White Sea.

[agond]

Quote: Mino

When designing our submarines, there are parameters of surface unsinkability, including stock of buoyancy. They are embedded in the TOR; designers have no way to change these parameters

This is some kind of strange parameter that was invented, such as a submarine that has received damage that has surfaced and is going to follow its base in the surface, it is probably good for peacetime, but for the military, and for some reason only our designers have such a parameter

[Zementbomber]

Only two water areas can serve as "natural bastions" for the NSNF of the Russian Navy: the White Sea of ​​the Arctic Ocean and the Sea of ​​Okhotsk in the Pacific Ocean. The rest is 146% pure speculation of pro-fantasy from technique and tactics.

[9lvariag]

As we said earlier, the historically most important component of the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) of the USSR, and then the Russian Federation, has always been strategic missile forces (Strategic Rocket Forces). In the United States, the development of strategic nuclear forces began with the aviation component — strategic bombers and free-fall nuclear bombs — but they had bases in Japan and continental Europe, which allowed them to attack targets inland from the USSR. The capabilities of the USSR in this regard were much more modest, therefore, a guaranteed nuclear strike against the United States became possible only after the appearance of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on combat duty.

In fact, with the advent of liquid-propellant rocket engines, the USAF has an acute problem of the so-called. "SBS mega tonnage being thrown into the USSR" and the USAF did not help here, but rather interfered with their lobbying and war frenzy after WWII. It was then that John Craven, the creator of essentially submarines with SLBMs, appeared. This made it possible to remove stages with hazardous and toxic fuels from the United States. Well, to increase the number of carriers of strategic nuclear forces by bringing them closer to the territory of the USSR.

[9lvariag]

The aviation component was almost always the least significant in the USSR / RF strategic nuclear forces, which is explained by the vulnerability of carriers - strategic missile-carrying bombers both at home airfields and on the routes of advance to the launch point of missiles, as well as the vulnerability of the main weapon of strategic missile-carrying bombers - subsonic cruise missiles with a nuclear warhead (YABCH). However, the use of air-launched ICBMs as the main weapon of strategic aviation may, if not increase the combat stability of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces, then turn it into a serious threat to a potential adversary.

There was such a case on the An-22R with 9Zh18 (R-27M) and it was ditched by Tupolev. It has been suggested more than once to experience this, incl. senior officers of the DBA RF. The cart is still there.