Combat aircraft. Detective for the Patriarch

Combat aircraft. Detective for the Patriarch

The format may be somewhat unusual, but by itself история without the technical details of this aircraft is worthy of a separate story.

Many mistakenly believe (and I myself several times did not quite correctly speak out with respect to this aircraft) that the Tu-2 was adopted during the Great Patriotic War. On the one hand, this is all true, but three years have passed from the first flight to the start of full-fledged operation, which is generally a bit much.

Who's guilty? Honestly I do not know. There he turned out to be that detective, to solve it even today is not possible, because the real participants in the story have all left this world, and not call to the other world, alas.

So, excuse me, only speculations and facts that can be gleaned from the recollections of departed eyewitnesses ...

Our history begins in 1938, when the phenomenon of the Special Technical Law Office (OTB) under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was born.

The bureau was headed by the State Security Major V. A. Kravchenko, the deputy senior lieutenant of the state security G. Ya. Kutepov, later also the head of the Security Service.

Engineers of various specialties worked in the special design bureau: aircraft builders, engine engineers, artillery men, shipbuilders. In general, there will be a separate discussion about this structure, because a lot of materials have appeared, there is something to reflect on and something to discuss.

Now, by the abbreviation OTB we will understand the department that was engaged in development in the field of aviation, which was later renamed TsKB-29.

After the arrest, all aviation specialists ended up in the OTD and became a “special contingent”. Actually, nobody began to invent anything new, the bureau was divided into departments called STO (Special Technical Department) and assigned numbers to them.

STO No. 100 consisted of employees of Design Bureau Petlyakov (yes, the “100” fighter, the future Pe-2, from there), the employees of Myasishchev Design Bureau arrived second, of which STO No. 102 was created, the third were Tupolevs. They got STO number 103. The last was created STO number 101, from the Tomashevich Design Bureau. Apparently, they collected it for a long time, and the room was reserved in advance.

Each service station, as expected, became a design bureau, and quite independent. Nominally, the service station was led by chiefs with the rank of state security lieutenants, who, oddly enough, did not get into the affairs of the design bureau, since they did not understand anything in aviation technology. But they solved all the issues related to the acquisition, supply, related organizations, security and other issues.

Yes, these lieutenants signed all the technical documentation that the “special contingent” engineers were preparing. A subtle question, right? That is, in fact, these people carried all the responsibility for the equipment developed in the service station. Probably, it wasn’t the most convenient place to work for the bosses or the subordinates.

In general, there was enough madhouse, on the other hand, in this regard, we have always had complete order. But more about that below.

When the OTB grew to quite a decent size, it was transferred from Moscow to Bolshevo. And in the autumn of 1938 Tupolev was brought to Bolshevo.

From this moment on, the saying ends, and our story begins. That is the history of the Tu-2.

Initially, Tupolev had the idea of ​​a heavy attack aircraft. The project was called ANT-58 and according to the plan was supposed to have speed at the level of modern fighters, be able to dive and be able to carry bombs of the highest weight. The crew was to consist of three people. Rifle weapon a very weighty one was also planned: in the bow there was a battery of four ShKASs and two ShVAK guns in the root parts of the wings. From all this the pilot shot.

The navigator and the radar operator were also armed with machine guns to protect the rear hemisphere.

Under the cockpit was a very long bomb-gate, into which it was possible to place the largest Soviet bomb at that time, the FAB-1000. According to Tupolev’s calculations, with two engines of 1500 hp. the aircraft could reach speeds in excess of 600 km / h.

But these plans were not destined to come true. Tupolev was called to Moscow, heard his report on the ANT-58 and said something like this: all this is good, but we need another plane. And they issued the terms of reference.

The task, I must say, was terrible. PB-4, high-altitude long-range four-engine dive bomber. The adversary on which this bomber should work is Britain and its fleet.

The bomber was supposed to fly at an altitude of about 10 meters, beyond the reach of naval air defense, have a flight range of about 000 km to fly, for example, to Scapa Flow and return back. And this rather big, let’s say, plane had to be able to dive! With 6 meters, it’s virtually impossible to get into a ship with a bomb, and even more so in a maneuvering ship.

I’ll be distracted: Hitler also once had a plan in his head for something similar, huge, four-engine and dive. In general, this is a general trend such that if with bombs it should dive for accuracy. But the war showed that carpet bombing from a horizontal flight is just as productive as the point shots of dive bombers.

The Germans at one time somehow turned away from the creation of a four-engine diving monster, the same thing Tupolev had to do. The patriarch, however, was more difficult.

No matter how strange it may look, but Tupolev and his plane were saved ... by the Germans. More precisely, the Junkers team. When the Second World War began on September 1, 1939, information about the more than successful work of the Ju.87 and Ju.88 bombers immediately began to come.

The situation has changed radically. The war with Great Britain somehow faded into the background, Britain was still far away, but Germany, which had begun to actively host the European theater, somehow turned out to be very close.

Tupolev assessed the threat and began to insist on continuing work on a mass plane for action on the front line and in the immediate rear. It should not be high-altitude with a pressurized cabin, be huge four-engine, but should have a speed equal to or greater than the speed of modern fighters, i.e. about 600 km / h Of course, he must be diving. The perfect front-line bomber.

Well, in addition, you should not forget that even in the conditions of “sharaga” a twin-engine aircraft could be developed much faster than a four-engine one. And the point is too much to wind? There was only one way out - through the commissioning of the aircraft project. And over PB-4 it was possible to sit for more than one year, if that. But a small front-line bomber weighing 15-18 tons could be designed, built and tested in a year.

And in Moscow they approved the plan. The project was assigned the code "FB" and allowed to continue work in parallel with the project "PB-4", which was approved shortly before.

Demonstrative digging on the "PB" project and shock work on the "FB" began. And then Tupolev went to the trick, proposing to develop two options at once. The main one was a four-engine car, the spare one was a twin-engine one. Moreover, the design was supposed to allow the transition from the first option to the second with a slight change.

As a prototype for the main version, Tupolev decided to use the ANT-42 (TB-7) aircraft. The four-engine “PB” could become a natural modification of the TB-7.

An interesting point: in the country there were no sights at all that made it possible to conduct accurate bombing from a dive. In parallel with the creation of the aircraft, they created all the necessary equipment. And the sight was developed by the prisoner G.S. Frenkel, navigator and mathematician. He received the code PFB-100 (FB airplane sight, designed in the service station - special technical department).

The technical design of the BOP was ready, and on September 29, 1939, it was discussed at the Special Design Bureau with representatives of the Air Force and the Red Army Air Force Research Institute. Conclusion and memorandum by the head of the GUAS CA P.A. Alekseev’s narcotics defense put an end to work on the four-engine version of the “PB”.

And it was possible to focus all efforts on the FB. The idea of ​​Tupovlev, who planned to build two planes simultaneously using one base, was fully justified.

On February 1, 1940, a joint meeting of representatives of the Air Force and the NKVD Design Bureau was held to consider the first draft design of the FB dive bomber with two M-120 engines. They listened and discussed the report of A. N. Tupolev.

The reputation of the Tupolev designer gave the military every reason to trust his calculations, which spoke of the excellent flight performance of the aircraft being designed.

The breadboard commission, having examined the breadboard model of the aircraft "103", a twin-engine dive bomber with two M-120 TK-2 engines of the OTB N / S6D design, unanimously recognized that the proposed type of aircraft with the declared flight data was very relevant and necessary for the Red Army Air Force and that it was necessary to force the construction of prototypes of the aircraft for their speedy submission to state testing.

True, the M-120s were not yet ready, so the first aircraft had to be installed with the engines that were actually available. On the first copy they put AM-35, on the second - AM-37. It was generally difficult with the motors; the Central Design Bureau's management turned to the most narcotic Shakhurin with requests for the fastest possible supply of motors for testing.

Shakhurin resolved the issue, and on January 29, test pilot Nyukhtikov completed the first flight. On this day, a group of leading pest engineers, led by Tupolev, was delivered to the airport. Until the end of May 1941, factory tests took place.

In June-July, the car passed state tests, which showed that the 103 aircraft with AM-37 engines has outstanding characteristics. However, it was not possible to complete the tests - the war prevented.

Tests of the aircraft "103" showed that the car was a success. Therefore, without waiting for the end of the tests, in February 1941, without a decision from above, the Tupolev team began preparations for serial production. Of course, with the knowledge of TsKB-29, but not waiting for all permissions and approvals.

They decided to build the car in Voronezh, at the factory number 18, and they decided, again, not having received a decision in Moscow. And since the NKAP still determined which car to start building, “103U” or “103V”, the Tupolevs went to the next trick: they prepared a list of large units that go unchanged both to “103U” and “103V”.

Think for a second: June 17, 1941, five days before the outbreak of war, the NKAP order No. 533 appeared:

"In pursuance of a government decree of June 10, 1941, I order:
- to the head of the 10th Main Directorate, Comrade Tarasevich, and the director of Plant No. 18, Comrade Schenkman, to immediately begin preparations for putting the “103” aircraft into production, based on the fact that Plant # 18 should release ... in 1942 1 “000” planes and 103 Er-400 aircraft.

To the Director of Plant No. 156, T. Lyapidevsky, together with the Head of the NKVD Special Design Bureau, T. Kravchenko:
a) develop serial drawings for transfer to factory No. 18 between August 15 and September 15, 1941 ...
b) send to the plant No. 18 no later than October 15, 1941 a group of specialists from the NKVD Design Bureau in the amount of 20-25 people, headed by Comrade Tupolev and 40 people of civilian designers ... (hereinafter, tasks are given to many supplier plants).

Signature: Shakhurin. "

Five days later, the war began. There was nothing to think about the construction of aircraft at the plant in Voronezh. Plant No. 18 began production of IL-2 attack aircraft, and soon was generally relocated to Kuibyshev, where it continued to produce IL-2.

Tupolev to launch a series of aircraft "103U" with motors AM-37 allocated plant number 166 in Omsk. The basis for this was the order of the GKOKO USSR dated July 27, 1941 on the launch of the 103 aircraft in serial production.

The huge problem was that plant No. 166 as such existed only in projects. He simply was not there.

About the factory in Kuibyshev, where, at the cost of terrible efforts, the factory was moved from Voronezh.

But in Kuibyshev it was easier: one plant was moved there. And in Omsk something was going on in general.

Plant No. 166 in Omsk consisted of:

- employees of the plant №156;
- employees of the plant number 81 from Tushino;
- parts of the team of factory No. 288 from Kimr.

All that the Omsk regional committee had was two sites.

The first is the site of an automobile assembly plant with an area of ​​49 hectares. It had a production building of 27 square meters. m

The second is the site of the plant of trailers named after The Comintern, located at a considerable distance from the first site, an area of ​​50 hectares. Its production area was 13 square meters. m

That was all Tupolev had with his engineers. Some of them have already been released, some still spent the night in prison, under guard.

In essence - emptiness. And the enthusiasm of the Tupolev employees.

As for the fact that the Old Man / ANT / Tupolev was a peculiar and harmful person, many said. But it is unlikely that many could, having thrown themselves into the open field, begin to build a plant. More precisely, the Plant, since only production buildings required about 30 square meters. m, and also a plus of auxiliary production facilities with an area of ​​more than 000 square meters. m, and also an airfield ...

Plus, they needed living quarters for workers, heat, water, electricity, sewage, a dining room, a hospital.

A planes should be issued.

It is clear that Tupolev alone could not do this, all the members of his design bureau worked like a damn, the factory bosses, naturally, the regional party committee. In the Omsk regional committee, an aircraft construction officer was appointed, who, together with Tupolev, was at the construction site almost every day and solved all the issues that he was able to solve.

Tupolev, by the way, was non-partisan. But he was accepted in the regional committee, moreover, in spite of all the vicissitudes, the ANT was on an equal footing with all the party members.

This is a lyrical digression, excuse me, just to just give a picture that when the trouble came, do not care who you are, party, non-partisan, former convict, and so on. They did one common thing.

Yes, despite the really heroic efforts, it turned out to be impossible to fulfill the production program set by the decree of the Defense Committee.

The Defense Committee set such an amount for the release of "103": October - 10 pcs., November - 15 pcs., December - 20 pcs.

In total for the last quarter of 1941, the plant was supposed to deliver 45 cars.

But the first production vehicles "103BC" left the assembly shop in March 1942. No one was punished, no one was shot, they were not sent back to prison or sharaga. I emphasize.

In the same month, the order of the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin No. 234 of March 28, 1942 was issued:

“In pursuance of the decision of the State Defense Committee of March 26, 1942 No.1498" On the name of the aircraft DB-ZF and "103" I ORDER:
1. From now on, DB-ZF aircraft will be referred to as "IL-4"
2. The aircraft "103" henceforth referred to as "Tu-2"
People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry A. Shakhurin. "

That's how the Tu-2 appeared.

The beginning, I must say right away, was not very pleasant.

In May 1942, the first three machines were transferred to the Air Force Research Institute for testing. On May 23, airplane No. 100102, piloted by Senior Lieutenant Mayorov, crashed during a U-turn, on a run after landing. As it turned out, this was only the beginning.

The second car, driven by pilot Ishchenko, crashed on May 26 when flying a kilometer. The pilot and navigator died, the shooter was seriously injured. The emergency commission could not determine the cause of the disaster: it is possible that the left engine failed, there may have been an error in piloting.

And only the third machine continued operational tests at the Air Force Research Institute near Moscow.

In June 1942, flights to the Tu-2 had to be banned due to the frequent cases of accidents when turning, on the run after landing. They led to damage to the chassis, engine nacelles, wing consoles. Sometimes there were “successful” turns, without breakdowns, even up to 720 degrees! But something else happened. The plane piloted by the pilot Polev was crashed during a U-turn at the landing and burned down, the crew, fortunately, was saved.

During the acceptance tests on July 7 and 15, 2 Tu-2 aircraft, piloted by pilots Kotyakov and Vakin, crashed at the plant. Again, when turning on the run after landing. Both crews were not injured.

Flights and assembly were suspended, a special commission was sent to plant No. 166 to investigate.

With your permission, I will give the conclusion of this commission in full, because here we have another round of plot.


The Tu-2 aircraft, designed by A. N. Tupolev, is in full-scale serial production at factory No. 166 with the release of up to 1 aircraft per day.

Based on the materials considered by the commission, it can be seen that the Tu-2 aircraft surpasses modern serial Soviet and foreign bombers in its flight tactical data.

The Tu-2 aircraft has powerful weapons of defense and attack and has a range of at least 2000 km, with a bomb load of 1000 kg.

The production of Tu-2 aircraft at the plant No. 166 is sufficiently equipped and is preparing for a larger production of serial aircraft.

In view of this, the commission believes that, in eliminating the main defects noted in its memorandum, the Tu-2 aircraft has all the data to go to supply the Air Force and successfully complete its combat missions.

Plant No. 166, from the point of view of the Commission, has every reason to expand its production capacity and to produce large series of Tu-2 aircraft.

Chairman of the Commission / POLIKARPOV / members ... "

The commission was really able to figure out the cause of the accidents. The fault was the weight distribution of the entire structure and the tail wheel, which, with a normally loaded airplane, began to “walk”.

At the request of the commission, a number of flights were carried out with the tail wheel fully locked. Flights confirmed the strong stabilizing effect of the locked wheel. The possibility of a safe landing, even with the non-synchronous action of the brakes, became clear.

A number of measures have been proposed to improve the weight distribution of the aircraft.

The commission has left. All the measures proposed by her and coordinated with the production and design bureau were quickly implemented. Accidents stopped, the release of the Tu-2 was resumed.

A small digression.

All this turned out to be simple and possible thanks to Nikolai Nikolayevich Polikarpov, who was the chairman of the commission.

Meanwhile, relations between Polikarpov and Tupolev were, to put it mildly, strained. In the early 30s, Polikarpov led the team number 3 in the Tupolev Design Bureau. The head of the design bureau pursued a tough policy on the construction of all-metal aircraft only. Polikarpov considered it more appropriate to develop mixed designs. He did not agree with Tupolev's constant intervention in design issues.

As a result of the conflict, Polikarpov was removed from the post of chief of brigade in November 1931. He was transferred to the verification of projects, the analysis of the results of static tests, that is, he was removed from the meaning of life - design. Nikolai Nikolaevich so assessed the situation: "Clamp at TsAGI, displacement in November 1931, withdrawal of the program (scouts, fighters), forced idleness until July 1932."

Could Polikarpov, in the spirit of the times, speak of Tupolev so that he would immediately be sent to prison or worse? I think he could. But Polikarpov is not just not “drowning” the former leader, but, on the contrary, is looking not for the guilty, but for ways to solve the problem. And finds.

In such a delicate situation, before Tkkalov and Gromov’s flights to America on Tupolev’s planes, pilot Levanevsky before Stalin accused Tupolev of sabotage, sabotage and the release of unreliable aircraft.

So, the Tu-2 went into the series.

At the same time, also in the spirit of the times, the OKB began the search for new weapons options. Three such proposals were submitted to the Air Force. In mid-August, the deputy commander of the SC Air Force approved one of them with some changes. It was proposed to remove the stationary machine guns in the nose of the fuselage as ineffective, not to put four RS-82 along the fuselage for firing backwards, both due to deterioration in aerodynamics, and due to the presence of three firing points for defense of the rear hemisphere.

The proposal to replace the three ShKAS machine guns defending the rear hemisphere with heavy Berezin machine guns was approved. At the same time, the Air Force was asked to remove a movable fairing from a radio operator arrow. For from the moment of take-off and to the landing, the radio operator shooter flies with an open flashlight, and his weapon is always in a fighting position. Replace the lantern with a visor that, without reducing the firing angles, would protect the radio operator from blowing and would not worsen aerodynamics.In addition, the installation should be equipped with a power drive to reduce forces when transferring a machine gun from side to side. All the wishes of the Air Force were fulfilled.

The future of the Tu-2 seemed quite clear. The plant began to produce aircraft stably. But no, fate was preparing another strike, and this strike was stronger than the line from the air cannon.

The NKAP order No. 763 of October 10, 1942 came:

“In pursuance of the GKO decree in order to increase the production of fighter aircraft, I ORDER

1. Director of the plant No. 166 comrade Sokolov:
a) to cease production of Tu-166 aircraft at plant No. 2. The equipment, fixtures and technical documentation for the Tu-2 aircraft available at the factory should be fully retained;
b) put at the factory No. 166 the production of Yak-9 aircraft.
6. To the director of the factory No. 381 t. Zhuravlev:
a) to cease the production of IL-381 aircraft at plant No. 2;
b) put in the factory number 381 production of La-5 aircraft.

Signature: / Shakhurin / ".

It was overwhelming. A year of work in appalling conditions, a factory built on an empty place, the streamlined release of much-needed (and, most importantly, modern) bombers ...

But orders of this level are not discussed. Tu-2 production at plant No. 166 ended in October 1942. In total, from March to October 1942, the plant produced 80 aircraft.

Tupolev was seriously worried about what was happening, tried to turn to Stalin with a proposal to organize the release of fighters in the already prepared and working area of ​​the former trailer plant.

This could save the release of the Tu-2, but Stalin, alas, did not respond to the desperate efforts of Tupolev. One gets the impression that someone intentionally created a bias towards the release of fighters. Or, as they say today, lobbied.

The question, of course, is interesting, who was this person or, most likely, a group of people.

The People’s Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin left several memories on this subject.

According to his memoirs, it turns out that the military tests were controlled by the aviation commander of the Kalinin Front and the former head of the Flight Research Institute, General M. M. Gromov. In principle, there is no better candidate. Mikhail Mikhailovich is the best person for such work as evaluating the use of a new aircraft.


“Almost every day I called the commander of the division in which the Tu-2s were tested, and found out about their participation in the battles. They answered me that the pilots spoke highly of the plane, the combat and flying qualities of the bomber were good, it not only hit targets accurately, but also successfully fought with enemy fighters.
But there were no reports to Stalin. For some reason, what I said did not convince him. The situation on the fronts at that time was acute, and as the tests dragged on, he began to insist on the removal of the Tu-2 from production. ”

Doubtful situation, right? Stalin, who does not believe the words of his people's commissar, is somehow not very. In theory, there should simply not be a more authoritative and trusted person in the NKAP. Nevertheless, Stalin does not believe the words of Shakhurin, but ... Wait until Gromov speaks out? But Gromov already reports to Shakhurin.

Strange situation. Remove Tu-2 and Il-2 from the stream, and instead begin production of the Yak-9 and La-5. Lavochkin’s candidacy for the role of a backstage schemer should not even be considered. Lavochkin was never special in favor. Yakovlev ... also doubtful. The deputy commissar was already watched in three eyes.

This is a very strange situation, and, unfortunately, it is unlikely to clarify it. The participants, you know, left us with memoirs at best. Calling the spirit of Stalin from the next world to find out why he did this - well, it's stupid!


“Tu-2 production was stopped and began to prepare for the release of fighters, as always, when there is a solution, at a very high pace. And twenty days later the act of front-line testing of the Tupolev bomber arrives - a voluminous laced book with the heading "Top Secret" ... The rating of the aircraft is very high.
At about five or six in the evening I was called to Stalin. I enter the office. Stalin is alone. On a long table covered with blue cloth, lies a copy of the test certificate Tu-2.
- It turns out praising the car. Did you read?
- Yes, I did. In vain they removed the aircraft from production. And how many reproaches I received from you.
“And yet you did the wrong thing,” said Stalin suddenly.
- In what?
“You should have complained about me to the Central Committee ... In the Central Committee, no one complained about Stalin, no one complained ...”

If I understand correctly, this is equivalent to the fact that Stalin admitted his wrong. After all, it was he who gave the order to curtail the production of Tu-2 and replace it with the Yak-9.

From the dialogue it is clear that Stalin recognized the fallacy of the decision to remove the machine from production.

Yakovlev. Deputy Shakhurin. A man who left behind a lot of memoirs. Probably, Alexander Sergeyevich can become a worthy witness.


“True, in April-May 1942, the situation with fighters began to straighten out gradually. Evacuated plants to the east increased the output of vehicles every day. In addition, our large fighter factories, located in the east of the country and which did not have to be evacuated, significantly increased aircraft production compared to the pre-war level.
But the situation with the bombers was still unimportant, since the factories releasing them, relocated to the east, had not yet restored the pre-evacuation daily production of aircraft. ”

Hmm ... But after all, they began to produce Tu-2 just in March 1942 ...


“In April 1942, the People’s Commissar, Ilyushin and me were called to the headquarters ... Stalin asked us whether it was possible to equip fighters with bomber weapons by hanging bombs under their wings. The goal was to at least temporarily fill the shortage of bombers in our aviation. ”

Good. In April, there are not enough bombers and attack aircraft, holes are shut up with the help of outdated fighters and so on. Although not. I'm wrong.

“Already in 1942, the aviation industry of the USSR surpassed the German one. In 1942, the factories of Germany produced 14,7 thousand aircraft, and the factories of the USSR - 25,4 thousand. "
“By the summer of 1943, our air forces had powerful equipment. Saturation fighter has become sufficient ... "

And here is a complete misunderstanding. If in 1942 we had 10 more aircraft produced than the Germans, the saturation of the fighters became sufficient, in April 000 there were so many fighters that Stalin proposed to adapt them for bombing. Because there are no bombers.

And in October, for a completely incomprehensible reason, instead of IL-2 and Tu-2, two plants are ordered to produce fighter jets. So, obviously, there was something to redo then into bombers. Or because these fighters disappeared somewhere.

By the way, factories No. 166 and No. 381, by no means, could have had any noticeable effect on the release of fighters by 1943. The order came in October 1942. We would not have time.

In general, Yakovlev has been caught more than once. No, not on a distortion of facts, but, as it were, on a certain understatement. Well, it’s not very logical for the deputy people's commissar, not really.

But the result I see is this: having fired 10,7 thousand more aircraft than the Germans, who fought in Africa and the Mediterranean in 1942, we suddenly experienced such a need for fighters that we decided to release from attack aircraft.

Which clearly was either stupidity, or sabotage. Whether all at once. Someone clearly “wound” Stalin, it would be interesting to know exactly who.

But, in principle, it is enough that the merits of the Il-2 in that war are not subject to criticism and that the Tu-2 was the only front-line bomber to easily take three FAB-1000s and really pose a threat to all types of ships (for example) and armored structures and objects.

Of course, the FAB-1000 could take on board the Pe-8. But I remind you that only 79 pieces were released (Tu-2 - 2257 pieces) and the use of these monsters was episodic.

Of course, the truth has triumphed, and it’s wonderful that so quickly. Waging a full-fledged war only with attack aircraft such as Il-2 (400 kg of bombs) and Pe-2 (600 kg) would be simply unrealistic, because in any case, not objects are selected for bombs, but vice versa.

Strange story, isn't it?

But you must admit, the whole history of the Tu-2 is full of oddities, incomprehensible moments and frank adventures.

Nevertheless, this aircraft fought worthily, performing tasks. And he enjoyed the love of the crews, although he probably dived not as well as the Pe-2. But comparing these machines is an interesting thing, although somewhat inappropriate. But let's take a chance.

And after the war, the Tu-2s served quite normally before being replaced by jet aircraft, not only here. The plane was good. But with a very strange fate.
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