Military Review

Combat aircraft. Detective for the Patriarch

71
Combat aircraft. Detective for the Patriarch

The format may be somewhat unusual, but by itself история without the technical details of this aircraft is worthy of a separate story.


Many mistakenly believe (and I myself several times did not quite correctly speak out with respect to this aircraft) that the Tu-2 was adopted during the Great Patriotic War. On the one hand, this is all true, but three years have passed from the first flight to the start of full-fledged operation, which is generally a bit much.

Who's guilty? Honestly I do not know. There he turned out to be that detective, to solve it even today is not possible, because the real participants in the story have all left this world, and not call to the other world, alas.

So, excuse me, only speculations and facts that can be gleaned from the recollections of departed eyewitnesses ...

Our history begins in 1938, when the phenomenon of the Special Technical Bureau (OTB) under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was born.

The bureau was headed by the State Security Major V. A. Kravchenko, the deputy senior lieutenant of the state security G. Ya. Kutepov, later also the head of the Security Service.

Engineers of various specialties worked in the special design bureau: aircraft builders, engine engineers, artillery men, shipbuilders. In general, there will be a separate discussion about this structure, because a lot of materials have appeared, there is something to reflect on and something to discuss.

Now, by the abbreviation OTB we will understand the department that was engaged in development in the field of aviation, which was later renamed TsKB-29.

After the arrest, all aviation specialists ended up in the OTD and became a “special contingent”. Actually, nobody began to invent anything new, the bureau was divided into departments called STO (Special Technical Department) and assigned numbers to them.

STO No. 100 consisted of employees of Design Bureau Petlyakov (yes, the “100” fighter, the future Pe-2, from there), the employees of Myasishchev Design Bureau arrived second, of which STO No. 102 was created, the third were Tupolevs. They got STO number 103. The last was created STO number 101, from the Tomashevich Design Bureau. Apparently, they collected it for a long time, and the room was reserved in advance.

Each service station, as expected, became a design bureau, and quite independent. Nominally, the service station was led by chiefs with the rank of state security lieutenants, who, oddly enough, did not get into the affairs of the design bureau, since they did not understand anything in aviation technology. But they solved all the issues related to the acquisition, supply, related organizations, security and other issues.

Yes, these lieutenants signed all the technical documentation that the “special contingent” engineers were preparing. A subtle question, right? That is, in fact, these people carried all the responsibility for the equipment developed in the service station. Probably, it wasn’t the most convenient place to work for the bosses or the subordinates.

In general, there was enough madhouse, on the other hand, in this regard, we have always had complete order. But more about that below.

When the OTB grew to quite a decent size, it was transferred from Moscow to Bolshevo. And in the autumn of 1938 Tupolev was brought to Bolshevo.


From this moment on, the saying ends, and our story begins. That is the history of the Tu-2.


Initially, Tupolev had the idea of ​​a heavy attack aircraft. The project was called ANT-58 and according to the plan was supposed to have speed at the level of modern fighters, be able to dive and be able to carry bombs of the highest weight. The crew was to consist of three people. Rifle weapon a very weighty one was also planned: in the bow there was a battery of four ShKASs and two ShVAK guns in the root parts of the wings. From all this the pilot shot.


The navigator and the radar operator were also armed with machine guns to protect the rear hemisphere.


Under the cockpit was a very long bomb-gate, into which it was possible to place the largest Soviet bomb at that time, the FAB-1000. According to Tupolev’s calculations, with two engines of 1500 hp. the aircraft could reach speeds in excess of 600 km / h.

But these plans were not destined to come true. Tupolev was called to Moscow, heard his report on the ANT-58 and said something like this: all this is good, but we need another plane. And they issued the terms of reference.

The task, I must say, was terrible. PB-4, high-altitude long-range four-engine dive bomber. The adversary on which this bomber should work is Britain and its fleet.

The bomber was supposed to fly at an altitude of about 10 meters, beyond the reach of naval air defense, have a flight range of about 000 km to fly, for example, to Scapa Flow and return back. And this rather big, let’s say, plane had to be able to dive! With 6 meters, it’s virtually impossible to get into a ship with a bomb, and even more so in a maneuvering ship.

I’ll be distracted: Hitler also once had a plan in his head for something similar, huge, four-engine and dive. In general, this is a general trend such that if with bombs it should dive for accuracy. But the war showed that carpet bombing from a horizontal flight is just as productive as the point shots of dive bombers.

The Germans at one time somehow turned away from the creation of a four-engine diving monster, the same thing Tupolev had to do. The patriarch, however, was more difficult.

No matter how strange it may look, but Tupolev and his plane were saved ... by the Germans. More precisely, the Junkers team. When the Second World War began on September 1, 1939, information about the more than successful work of the Ju.87 and Ju.88 bombers immediately began to come.

The situation has changed radically. The war with Great Britain somehow faded into the background, Britain was still far away, but Germany, which had begun to actively host the European theater, somehow turned out to be very close.

Tupolev assessed the threat and began to insist on continuing work on a mass plane for action on the front line and in the immediate rear. It should not be high-altitude with a pressurized cabin, be huge four-engine, but should have a speed equal to or greater than the speed of modern fighters, i.e. about 600 km / h Of course, he must be diving. The perfect front-line bomber.


Well, in addition, you should not forget that even in the conditions of “sharaga” a twin-engine aircraft could be developed much faster than a four-engine one. And the point is too much to wind? There was only one way out - through the commissioning of the aircraft project. And over PB-4 it was possible to sit for more than one year, if that. But a small front-line bomber weighing 15-18 tons could be designed, built and tested in a year.

And in Moscow they approved the plan. The project was assigned the code "FB" and allowed to continue work in parallel with the project "PB-4", which was approved shortly before.

Demonstrative digging on the "PB" project and shock work on the "FB" began. And then Tupolev went to the trick, proposing to develop two options at once. The main one was a four-engine car, the spare one was a twin-engine one. Moreover, the design was supposed to allow the transition from the first option to the second with a slight change.

As a prototype for the main version, Tupolev decided to use the ANT-42 (TB-7) aircraft. The four-engine “PB” could become a natural modification of the TB-7.

An interesting point: in the country there were no sights at all that made it possible to conduct accurate bombing from a dive. In parallel with the creation of the aircraft, they created all the necessary equipment. And the sight was developed by the prisoner G.S. Frenkel, navigator and mathematician. He received the code PFB-100 (FB airplane sight, designed in the service station - special technical department).

The technical design of the BOP was ready, and on September 29, 1939, it was discussed at the Special Design Bureau with representatives of the Air Force and the Red Army Air Force Research Institute. Conclusion and memorandum by the head of the GUAS CA P.A. Alekseev’s narcotics defense put an end to work on the four-engine version of the “PB”.

And it was possible to focus all efforts on the FB. The idea of ​​Tupovlev, who planned to build two planes simultaneously using one base, was fully justified.

On February 1, 1940, a joint meeting of representatives of the Air Force and the NKVD Design Bureau was held to consider the first draft design of the FB dive bomber with two M-120 engines. They listened and discussed the report of A. N. Tupolev.


The reputation of the Tupolev designer gave the military every reason to trust his calculations, which spoke of the excellent flight performance of the aircraft being designed.

The breadboard commission, having examined the breadboard model of the aircraft "103", a twin-engine dive bomber with two M-120 TK-2 engines of the OTB N / S6D design, unanimously recognized that the proposed type of aircraft with the declared flight data was very relevant and necessary for the Red Army Air Force and that it was necessary to force the construction of prototypes of the aircraft for their speedy submission to state testing.

True, the M-120s were not yet ready, so the first aircraft had to be installed with the engines that were actually available. On the first copy they put AM-35, on the second - AM-37. It was generally difficult with the motors; the Central Design Bureau's management turned to the most narcotic Shakhurin with requests for the fastest possible supply of motors for testing.

Shakhurin resolved the issue, and on January 29, test pilot Nyukhtikov completed the first flight. On this day, a group of leading pest engineers, led by Tupolev, was delivered to the airport. Until the end of May 1941, factory tests took place.

In June-July, the car passed state tests, which showed that the 103 aircraft with AM-37 engines has outstanding characteristics. However, it was not possible to complete the tests - the war prevented.


Tests of the aircraft "103" showed that the car was a success. Therefore, without waiting for the end of the tests, in February 1941, without a decision from above, the Tupolev team began preparations for serial production. Of course, with the knowledge of TsKB-29, but not waiting for all permissions and approvals.

They decided to build the car in Voronezh, at the factory number 18, and they decided, again, not having received a decision in Moscow. And since the NKAP still determined which car to start building, “103U” or “103V”, the Tupolevs went to the next trick: they prepared a list of large units that go unchanged both to “103U” and “103V”.


Think for a second: June 17, 1941, five days before the outbreak of war, the NKAP order No. 533 appeared:

"In pursuance of a government decree of June 10, 1941, I order:
- to the head of the 10th Main Directorate, Comrade Tarasevich, and the director of Plant No. 18, Comrade Schenkman, to immediately begin preparations for putting the “103” aircraft into production, based on the fact that Plant # 18 should release ... in 1942 1 “000” planes and 103 Er-400 aircraft.

To the Director of Plant No. 156, T. Lyapidevsky, together with the Head of the NKVD Special Design Bureau, T. Kravchenko:
a) develop serial drawings for transfer to factory No. 18 between August 15 and September 15, 1941 ...
b) send to the plant No. 18 no later than October 15, 1941 a group of specialists from the NKVD Design Bureau in the amount of 20-25 people, headed by Comrade Tupolev and 40 people of civilian designers ... (hereinafter, tasks are given to many supplier plants).

Signature: Shakhurin. "

Five days later, the war began. There was nothing to think about the construction of aircraft at the plant in Voronezh. Plant No. 18 began production of IL-2 attack aircraft, and soon was generally relocated to Kuibyshev, where it continued to produce IL-2.

Tupolev to launch a series of aircraft "103U" with motors AM-37 allocated plant number 166 in Omsk. The basis for this was the order of the GKOKO USSR dated July 27, 1941 on the launch of the 103 aircraft in serial production.

The huge problem was that plant No. 166 as such existed only in projects. He simply was not there.

About the factory in Kuibyshev, where, at the cost of terrible efforts, the factory was moved from Voronezh.

But in Kuibyshev it was easier: one plant was moved there. And in Omsk something was going on in general.

Plant No. 166 in Omsk consisted of:

- employees of the plant №156;
- employees of the plant number 81 from Tushino;
- parts of the team of factory No. 288 from Kimr.

All that the Omsk regional committee had was two sites.

The first is the site of an automobile assembly plant with an area of ​​49 hectares. It had a production building of 27 square meters. m

The second is the site of the plant of trailers named after The Comintern, located at a considerable distance from the first site, an area of ​​50 hectares. Its production area was 13 square meters. m

That was all Tupolev had with his engineers. Some of them have already been released, some still spent the night in prison, under guard.

In essence - emptiness. And the enthusiasm of the Tupolev employees.

As for the fact that the Old Man / ANT / Tupolev was a peculiar and harmful person, many said. But it is unlikely that many could, having thrown themselves into the open field, begin to build a plant. More precisely, the Plant, since only production buildings required about 30 square meters. m, and also a plus of auxiliary production facilities with an area of ​​more than 000 square meters. m, and also an airfield ...

Plus, they needed living quarters for workers, heat, water, electricity, sewage, a dining room, a hospital.

A planes should be issued.

It is clear that Tupolev alone could not do this, all the members of his design bureau worked like a damn, the factory bosses, naturally, the regional party committee. In the Omsk regional committee, an aircraft construction officer was appointed, who, together with Tupolev, was at the construction site almost every day and solved all the issues that he was able to solve.


Tupolev, by the way, was non-partisan. But he was accepted in the regional committee, moreover, in spite of all the vicissitudes, the ANT was on an equal footing with all the party members.

This is a lyrical digression, excuse me, just to just give a picture that when the trouble came, do not care who you are, party, non-partisan, former convict, and so on. They did one common thing.

Yes, despite the really heroic efforts, it turned out to be impossible to fulfill the production program set by the decree of the Defense Committee.

The Defense Committee set such an amount for the release of "103": October - 10 pcs., November - 15 pcs., December - 20 pcs.

In total for the last quarter of 1941, the plant was supposed to deliver 45 cars.

But the first production vehicles "103BC" left the assembly shop in March 1942. No one was punished, no one was shot, they were not sent back to prison or sharaga. I emphasize.


In the same month, the order of the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin No. 234 of March 28, 1942 was issued:

“In pursuance of the decision of the State Defense Committee of March 26, 1942 No.1498" On the name of the aircraft DB-ZF and "103" I ORDER:
1. From now on, DB-ZF aircraft will be referred to as "IL-4"
2. The aircraft "103" henceforth referred to as "Tu-2"
People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry A. Shakhurin. "

That's how the Tu-2 appeared.

The beginning, I must say right away, was not very pleasant.

In May 1942, the first three machines were transferred to the Air Force Research Institute for testing. On May 23, airplane No. 100102, piloted by Senior Lieutenant Mayorov, crashed during a U-turn, on a run after landing. As it turned out, this was only the beginning.

The second car, driven by pilot Ishchenko, crashed on May 26 when flying a kilometer. The pilot and navigator died, the shooter was seriously injured. The emergency commission could not determine the cause of the disaster: it is possible that the left engine failed, there may have been an error in piloting.

And only the third machine continued operational tests at the Air Force Research Institute near Moscow.


In June 1942, flights to the Tu-2 had to be banned due to the frequent cases of accidents when turning, on the run after landing. They led to damage to the chassis, engine nacelles, wing consoles. Sometimes there were “successful” turns, without breakdowns, even up to 720 degrees! But something else happened. The plane piloted by the pilot Polev was crashed during a U-turn at the landing and burned down, the crew, fortunately, was saved.

During the acceptance tests on July 7 and 15, 2 Tu-2 aircraft, piloted by pilots Kotyakov and Vakin, crashed at the plant. Again, when turning on the run after landing. Both crews were not injured.

Flights and assembly were suspended, a special commission was sent to plant No. 166 to investigate.

With your permission, I will give the conclusion of this commission in full, because here we have another round of plot.

"GENERAL CONCLUSION NKAP Commission on Tu-2

The Tu-2 aircraft, designed by A. N. Tupolev, is in full-scale serial production at factory No. 166 with the release of up to 1 aircraft per day.

Based on the materials considered by the commission, it can be seen that the Tu-2 aircraft surpasses modern serial Soviet and foreign bombers in its flight tactical data.

The Tu-2 aircraft has powerful weapons of defense and attack and has a range of at least 2000 km, with a bomb load of 1000 kg.

The production of Tu-2 aircraft at the plant No. 166 is sufficiently equipped and is preparing for a larger production of serial aircraft.

In view of this, the commission believes that, in eliminating the main defects noted in its memorandum, the Tu-2 aircraft has all the data to go to supply the Air Force and successfully complete its combat missions.

Plant No. 166, from the point of view of the Commission, has every reason to expand its production capacity and to produce large series of Tu-2 aircraft.

Chairman of the Commission / POLIKARPOV / members ... "

The commission was really able to figure out the cause of the accidents. The fault was the weight distribution of the entire structure and the tail wheel, which, with a normally loaded airplane, began to “walk”.

At the request of the commission, a number of flights were carried out with the tail wheel fully locked. Flights confirmed the strong stabilizing effect of the locked wheel. The possibility of a safe landing, even with the non-synchronous action of the brakes, became clear.

A number of measures have been proposed to improve the weight distribution of the aircraft.

The commission has left. All the measures proposed by her and coordinated with the production and design bureau were quickly implemented. Accidents stopped, the release of the Tu-2 was resumed.


A small digression.

All this turned out to be simple and possible thanks to Nikolai Nikolayevich Polikarpov, who was the chairman of the commission.


Meanwhile, relations between Polikarpov and Tupolev were, to put it mildly, strained. In the early 30s, Polikarpov led the team number 3 in the Tupolev Design Bureau. The head of the design bureau pursued a tough policy on the construction of all-metal aircraft only. Polikarpov considered it more appropriate to develop mixed designs. He did not agree with Tupolev's constant intervention in design issues.

As a result of the conflict, Polikarpov was removed from the post of chief of brigade in November 1931. He was transferred to the verification of projects, the analysis of the results of static tests, that is, he was removed from the meaning of life - design. Nikolai Nikolaevich so assessed the situation: "Clamp at TsAGI, displacement in November 1931, withdrawal of the program (scouts, fighters), forced idleness until July 1932."

Could Polikarpov, in the spirit of the times, speak of Tupolev so that he would immediately be sent to prison or worse? I think he could. But Polikarpov is not just not “drowning” the former leader, but, on the contrary, is looking not for the guilty, but for ways to solve the problem. And finds.

In such a delicate situation, before Tkkalov and Gromov’s flights to America on Tupolev’s planes, pilot Levanevsky before Stalin accused Tupolev of sabotage, sabotage and the release of unreliable aircraft.

So, the Tu-2 went into the series.


At the same time, also in the spirit of the times, the OKB began the search for new weapons options. Three such proposals were submitted to the Air Force. In mid-August, the deputy commander of the SC Air Force approved one of them with some changes. It was proposed to remove the stationary machine guns in the nose of the fuselage as ineffective, not to put four RS-82 along the fuselage for firing backwards, both due to deterioration in aerodynamics, and due to the presence of three firing points for defense of the rear hemisphere.

The proposal to replace the three ShKAS machine guns defending the rear hemisphere with heavy Berezin machine guns was approved. At the same time, the Air Force was asked to remove a movable fairing from a radio operator arrow. For from the moment of take-off and to the landing, the radio operator shooter flies with an open flashlight, and his weapon is always in a fighting position. Replace the lantern with a visor that, without reducing the firing angles, would protect the radio operator from blowing and would not worsen aerodynamics.In addition, the installation should be equipped with a power drive to reduce forces when transferring a machine gun from side to side. All the wishes of the Air Force were fulfilled.

The future of the Tu-2 seemed quite clear. The plant began to produce aircraft stably. But no, fate was preparing another strike, and this strike was stronger than the line from the air cannon.

The NKAP order No. 763 of October 10, 1942 came:

“In pursuance of the GKO decree in order to increase the production of fighter aircraft, I ORDER

1. Director of the plant No. 166 comrade Sokolov:
a) to cease production of Tu-166 aircraft at plant No. 2. The equipment, fixtures and technical documentation for the Tu-2 aircraft available at the factory should be fully retained;
b) put at the factory No. 166 the production of Yak-9 aircraft.
...
6. To the director of the factory No. 381 t. Zhuravlev:
a) to cease the production of IL-381 aircraft at plant No. 2;
b) put in the factory number 381 production of La-5 aircraft.

Signature: / Shakhurin / ".

It was overwhelming. A year of work in appalling conditions, a factory built on an empty place, the streamlined release of much-needed (and, most importantly, modern) bombers ...

But orders of this level are not discussed. Tu-2 production at plant No. 166 ended in October 1942. In total, from March to October 1942, the plant produced 80 aircraft.

Tupolev was seriously worried about what was happening, tried to turn to Stalin with a proposal to organize the release of fighters in the already prepared and working area of ​​the former trailer plant.

This could save the release of the Tu-2, but Stalin, alas, did not respond to the desperate efforts of Tupolev. One gets the impression that someone intentionally created a bias towards the release of fighters. Or, as they say today, lobbied.

The question, of course, is interesting, who was this person or, most likely, a group of people.

The People’s Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin left several memories on this subject.


According to his memoirs, it turns out that the military tests were controlled by the aviation commander of the Kalinin Front and the former head of the Flight Research Institute, General M. M. Gromov. In principle, there is no better candidate. Mikhail Mikhailovich is the best person for such work as evaluating the use of a new aircraft.

Shakhurin:

“Almost every day I called the commander of the division in which the Tu-2s were tested, and found out about their participation in the battles. They answered me that the pilots spoke highly of the plane, the combat and flying qualities of the bomber were good, it not only hit targets accurately, but also successfully fought with enemy fighters.
But there were no reports to Stalin. For some reason, what I said did not convince him. The situation on the fronts at that time was acute, and as the tests dragged on, he began to insist on the removal of the Tu-2 from production. ”

Doubtful situation, right? Stalin, who does not believe the words of his people's commissar, is somehow not very. In theory, there should simply not be a more authoritative and trusted person in the NKAP. Nevertheless, Stalin does not believe the words of Shakhurin, but ... Wait until Gromov speaks out? But Gromov already reports to Shakhurin.

Strange situation. Remove Tu-2 and Il-2 from the stream, and instead begin production of the Yak-9 and La-5. Lavochkin’s candidacy for the role of a backstage schemer should not even be considered. Lavochkin was never special in favor. Yakovlev ... also doubtful. The deputy commissar was already watched in three eyes.

This is a very strange situation, and, unfortunately, it is unlikely to clarify it. The participants, you know, left us with memoirs at best. Calling the spirit of Stalin from the next world to find out why he did this - well, it's stupid!

Shakhurin:

“Tu-2 production was stopped and began to prepare for the release of fighters, as always, when there is a solution, at a very high pace. And twenty days later the act of front-line testing of the Tupolev bomber arrives - a voluminous laced book with the heading "Top Secret" ... The rating of the aircraft is very high.
At about five or six in the evening I was called to Stalin. I enter the office. Stalin is alone. On a long table covered with blue cloth, lies a copy of the test certificate Tu-2.
- It turns out praising the car. Did you read?
- Yes, I did. In vain they removed the aircraft from production. And how many reproaches I received from you.
“And yet you did the wrong thing,” said Stalin suddenly.
- In what?
“You should have complained about me to the Central Committee ... In the Central Committee, no one complained about Stalin, no one complained ...”

If I understand correctly, this is equivalent to the fact that Stalin admitted his wrong. After all, it was he who gave the order to curtail the production of Tu-2 and replace it with the Yak-9.

From the dialogue it is clear that Stalin recognized the fallacy of the decision to remove the machine from production.

Yakovlev. Deputy Shakhurin. A man who left behind a lot of memoirs. Probably, Alexander Sergeyevich can become a worthy witness.


Yakovlev:

“True, in April-May 1942, the situation with fighters began to straighten out gradually. Evacuated plants to the east increased the output of vehicles every day. In addition, our large fighter factories, located in the east of the country and which did not have to be evacuated, significantly increased aircraft production compared to the pre-war level.
But the situation with the bombers was still unimportant, since the factories releasing them, relocated to the east, had not yet restored the pre-evacuation daily production of aircraft. ”

Hmm ... But after all, they began to produce Tu-2 just in March 1942 ...


Yakovlev:

“In April 1942, the People’s Commissar, Ilyushin and me were called to the headquarters ... Stalin asked us whether it was possible to equip fighters with bomber weapons by hanging bombs under their wings. The goal was to at least temporarily fill the shortage of bombers in our aviation. ”

Good. In April, there are not enough bombers and attack aircraft, holes are shut up with the help of outdated fighters and so on. Although not. I'm wrong.

Yakovlev:
“Already in 1942, the aviation industry of the USSR surpassed the German one. In 1942, the factories of Germany produced 14,7 thousand aircraft, and the factories of the USSR - 25,4 thousand. "
“By the summer of 1943, our air forces had powerful equipment. Saturation fighter has become sufficient ... "

And here is a complete misunderstanding. If in 1942 we had 10 more aircraft produced than the Germans, the saturation of the fighters became sufficient, in April 000 there were so many fighters that Stalin proposed to adapt them for bombing. Because there are no bombers.

And in October, for a completely incomprehensible reason, instead of IL-2 and Tu-2, two plants are ordered to produce fighter jets. So, obviously, there was something to redo then into bombers. Or because these fighters disappeared somewhere.

By the way, factories No. 166 and No. 381, by no means, could have had any noticeable effect on the release of fighters by 1943. The order came in October 1942. We would not have time.

In general, Yakovlev has been caught more than once. No, not on a distortion of facts, but, as it were, on a certain understatement. Well, it’s not very logical for the deputy people's commissar, not really.

But the result I see is this: having fired 10,7 thousand more aircraft than the Germans, who fought in Africa and the Mediterranean in 1942, we suddenly experienced such a need for fighters that we decided to release from attack aircraft.

Which clearly was either stupidity, or sabotage. Whether all at once. Someone clearly “wound” Stalin, it would be interesting to know exactly who.

But, in principle, it is enough that the merits of the Il-2 in that war are not subject to criticism and that the Tu-2 was the only front-line bomber to easily take three FAB-1000s and really pose a threat to all types of ships (for example) and armored structures and objects.


Of course, the FAB-1000 could take on board the Pe-8. But I remind you that only 79 pieces were released (Tu-2 - 2257 pieces) and the use of these monsters was episodic.

Of course, the truth has triumphed, and it’s wonderful that so quickly. Waging a full-fledged war only with attack aircraft such as Il-2 (400 kg of bombs) and Pe-2 (600 kg) would be simply unrealistic, because in any case, not objects are selected for bombs, but vice versa.

Strange story, isn't it?

But you must admit, the whole history of the Tu-2 is full of oddities, incomprehensible moments and frank adventures.

Nevertheless, this aircraft fought worthily, performing tasks. And he enjoyed the love of the crews, although he probably dived not as well as the Pe-2. But comparing these machines is an interesting thing, although somewhat inappropriate. But let's take a chance.


And after the war, the Tu-2s served quite normally before being replaced by jet aircraft, not only here. The plane was good. But with a very strange fate.
Author:
71 comment
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. Trotil42
    Trotil42 21 March 2020 06: 06 New
    +2
    Thanks to the author .... captures .. better detective !!!! Want more!!!!
  2. Amateur
    Amateur 21 March 2020 07: 24 New
    +1
    When R. Skomorokhov writes about technology, it’s always interesting. Great articles!
    But when about politics - alas. Moral: Novel! Continue to write only those articles that you do excellently. And leave everything else to all echoes and jellyfish.
    1. Atilla
      Atilla 21 March 2020 11: 15 New
      -19
      That's just on the echo and jellyfish they are discussing the one that was then and now the same thing, and you dear, you are afraid of the truth, that's all.
      1. Amateur
        Amateur 21 March 2020 14: 01 New
        +13
        and you, dear, are afraid of the truth, that's all.

        I am not afraid of anything. Because
        1. Without your advice, I know what to read.
        2. If you like де feces on the echo of jellyfish, and use them yourself. I do not want!
    2. Martin
      Martin 23 March 2020 18: 36 New
      +2
      Quote: Amateur
      When R. Skomorokhov writes about technology, it’s always interesting. Great articles!
      But when about politics - alas.
      I agree with you.
      And the point is not that when describing a policy, the author “becomes stupidly stupid,” but when describing a technique, on the contrary.
      It’s just that the development of technology is subject to quite exact laws, among which the laws of physics come first. But politics has completely different laws. And we need other knowledge from experts. (I am referring to real experts, who can be counted on the fingers of the Internet and not on the masses of sofa iksperds). This time.
      And two. The technique described by Roman is retrospective. Which provides additional benefits for the study and further presentation for us. In hindsight, we are always strong, and information becomes more and more accessible every year. And political and economic forecasts are promising. Everything is much more complicated here. And they prefer to hide real information, throwing more fog into the masses.

      Therefore, Roman, thank you for your “Combat ...” cycles. Very interesting.
  3. svp67
    svp67 21 March 2020 08: 06 New
    +30
    Remove Tu-2 and IL-2 from the stream and instead launch Yak-9 and La-5. Lavochkin’s candidacy for the role of a backstage schemer should not even be considered.
    Rummaged here in the history of the plant No. 381 of the NKAP, it is interesting that this is the plant that was evacuated to Nizhny Tagil on the Uralvagonzavod square ...
    Here are the numbers on it:
    In total, the aircraft plant number 381 was released 27 IL-2 in 1941, and 243 attack aircraft in 1942.
    This is taking into account the fact that he was redirected to the production of fighters by the order of the GKO on October 7, 1942. Agree the factory worked without any particular results. Apparently because of this, they decided to transfer it to the production of fighters, which the plant did not cope well with the production of attack aircraft, a more complex machine. And the plant actually switched over to the production of fighters after the re-evacuation to Moscow.
    Our history begins in 1938, when the phenomenon of the Special Technical Law Office (OTB) under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was born.
    The bureau was headed by the State Security Major V. A. Kravchenko, the deputy senior lieutenant of the state security G. Ya. Kutepov, later also the head of the Security Service.
    Not certainly in that way...
    The first materials on the creation of special technical offices in the Central Office of the NKVD refer to August 1938. They were not given the task of replacing the existing design bureaus. They did not have a project initiative of their own production; they were called upon to supplement with their activity industrial design bureaus and factories of a corresponding profile.

    The organization of the work unit with the use of imprisoned specialists was entrusted in 1938 to Mikhail Arkadyevich Davydov - a qualified engineer and experienced production manager at a number of leading enterprises in the country who worked as director of the Kirovsky plant in Leningrad, then Deputy Commissar of Mechanical Engineering of the USSR, from October 21 1938 - temporarily Acting Head of the 4-th Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR. From January 15 1939 he is already Deputy Head of the Special Technical Bureau of the NKVD of the USSR, from April 20 1939 onwards - First Deputy Head of the NKVD OTB of the USSR, and from September 4 on the NKVD of the USSR. The military rank from 1939 February 25 of the year is a major of state security. However, on October 1939 of 8 of the year he was arrested, on July 1939 of 7 of the year convicted and sentenced to death and 1941 of August 27 of the year was shot. He was rehabilitated only 1941 January 16 of the year.

    In August and September of 1938, under the leadership of Mikhail Davydov, lists of convicts and specialists under investigation were compiled. With the leadership of the NKVD discussed topics of future work. The structure of the department, the principles of its functioning were developed, a draft Regulation on the department was developed, premises for the accommodation of people were looked for, a long-term plan of work was drawn up. All this is reflected in the sequential output of a number of orders.

    Note that the 4 Special Branch of the Special Design Bureau (OKB) was formed specifically for the use of labor by imprisoned engineering specialists and scientists, by order No. 00641 from 29 September 1938. In October, 1938 was canceled due to the reorganization (Order No. 00698 of October 21 of 1938 of the year). In accordance with the ciphering of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of 07.01.1939, No. 47 / b, the Council of People’s Commissars decided to restore the 4-th special department, and 10 of January 1939, by order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 0021, instead of a department, the OTB of the USSR People's Commissar of Internal Affairs was created to use prisoners with special technical knowledge. The number of Special Technical Bureau - 72 person.

    Valentin Aleksandrovich Kravchenko was appointed the head of the bureau, about which I would like to say a few words. He was a well-educated, capable engineer and communications specialist. In the NKVD, he was sent to the party mobilization (the so-called party call) to work in the laboratory of radio transmitting devices engineering-technical Academy. Podbelskogo. Kravchenko was born in the town of Kryukov, Kremenchug district, Poltava province. He graduated from the Odessa Telecommunications Institute in 1933, after which he entered the graduate school and until the 1935, he was the dean of the radio faculty of the Odessa Institute. In October 1937, he was seconded to the NKVD of the USSR and in 1939, he became the chief engineer of the 6 section of the 2 10th special department of the NKVD of the USSR. From 14 in November 1939 of the year - Head of the Special Technical Bureau of the NKVD / Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, from 31 July 1941 of the year - Head of the 4-th Special Department of the NKVD / Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. In April 1947, he is appointed deputy chairman of the Committee for Inventions and Discoveries at the USSR Council of Ministers. From January 1948, he is already the head of the group of control and special orders at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, from May 1949 of the year - head of the 4, and since March 1953 - the head of the 5 of the special department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. In November, 1953 of the Year - Head of the Construction Department No. 304 and correctional labor camps of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Military ranks - State Security Commissioner, then Major General.
    These are such "enkavedeshniki" entirely with engineering education
    In parallel with the creation of the aircraft, they created all the necessary equipment. And the sight was developed by the prisoner G.S. Frenkel, navigator and mathematician. He received the code PFB-100 (FB airplane sight, designed in the service station - special technical department).

    There were two novelties in the project, which had never been seen before in domestic aircraft construction.

    The first concerned the design of the bomb bay. Its shape, calculated by the arresting member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR A.I. Nekrasov, ensured the free (non-compulsory) exit of bombs of any caliber with deep dive. He calculated the movement in space diving at an angle of 75 degrees to the horizon of the aircraft and the bomb detached from it. It turned out that, thanks to the presence of lifting force, the plane is, as it were, removed from the bomb. In motion relative to the aircraft, the center of gravity of the bomb departs from the aircraft at an angle of 60-65 degrees to the aircraft construction axis.

    This meant that if the bomb bay was given a bevel of 65 degrees along the front wall, and the bomb ears could be pulled forward at an angle of 65 degrees on bomb locks, then the bomb could be dropped from the compartment during a dive in the same way as in horizontal flight. Prior to this, it was believed that for bombing from a dive, bombs had to be suspended either from outside the aircraft, or a system of forced withdrawal of bombs from the compartment like a pendulum or catapult (for example, was done on Ar-2 dive planes).

    The second innovation related to equipment. There were no sights in the country allowing accurate bombing from a dive. In OTB, such a sight was created by the prisoner G.S. Frenkel, navigator and mathematician. He received the code PFB-100 (FB airplane sight, designed in the service station - special technical department).

    It is very indicative of the spirit of the prisoners - dull, unbroken - they instantly invented a decryption of the abbreviation SPS. First-class specialist A.V. Nadashkevich, who, incidentally, was sitting for the second time, was in charge of all military affairs at the Military Security Service. He wore a goatee - goatee. Employees among themselves called him "Beard". And the PFB immediately got everyone the name they liked - Frenkel’s Gift to Borodushka.

    And last, many thanks to Tupolev and his entire team, for this aircraft created in such difficult conditions, but also a special thank you to Polikarpov, for remaining people devoted to aviation to the end
    1. vladcub
      vladcub 21 March 2020 13: 40 New
      +2
      Sergey, it’s a pity that 2 + is impossible. Good detailed comment. Next + follow me
    2. Looking for
      Looking for 21 March 2020 15: 58 New
      +4
      the bomb bay is the only new thing that I learned from the article and all the comments.
      1. dauria
        dauria 21 March 2020 16: 48 New
        +7
        the bomb bay is the only new thing that I learned from the article and all the comments.

        See Aviation And Cosmonautics 1997 09.
        There, and about the bomb bay, and about special anti-ship bombs, and about the whole story of those who were sitting, arrested and other, other .... Even this is there. Lies here https://royallib.com/book/avtor_neizvesten/aviatsiya_i_kosmonavtika_1997_09.html If Skomorokhov simply gave links without his thoughts, it would be better.
  4. andrewkor
    andrewkor 21 March 2020 08: 07 New
    0
    I remember that after the war, Tu-2 tried to convert to turbojet engines, following the example of the Yak-15 from the Yak-3.
    Who is in the know, enlighten!
    1. Sergey Valov
      Sergey Valov 21 March 2020 09: 55 New
      +2
      To get started, take Shavrov. There, briefly, but very qualified.
    2. Aleksandr72
      Aleksandr72 21 March 2020 10: 32 New
      +11
      Shavrov V.B. wrote about him: In 1947, on one of the serial copies of the Tu-2, instead of the standard AS-82FN, 2 turbojet Rolls-Royce Nin-1s purchased in England were installed in the same places. Full tests were not conducted and flight data was not recorded. It was a purely experimental aircraft to test the possibility of installing jet engines. At the same time, the Tupolev Design Bureau developed an experienced bomber “77” (aka Tu-12), which was a redesigned Tu-2, the wing of which was taken unchanged, and the fuselage in the bow was elongated and increased by 0,5 m in height - for installation new nose wheel chassis. Engines are the same Rolls-Royce Nin-1. 27.07.47/12/03.08.47 the first flight of the Tu-783 took place, and on 564/1/23. two of these aircraft took part in the air parade in Tushino. Maximum speed - 2 km / h, cruising - 1 km / h, armament - 3 NR-2 gun and 14 UBT machine guns, bombs - 1-16 tons (like the Tu). In general, the plane turned out to be successful, but unpromising and did not go into the series. But taking into account the development experience, the small-series Tu (with two VK turbojet engines) was created first, and then the famous Tu.
      I did not find a Tu-2 photo with two turbojet engines, but a Tu-12 photo here:
      1. andrewkor
        andrewkor 21 March 2020 11: 08 New
        +3
        Thank you, Alexander! And then some send far, but there is no time to go!
  5. Ros 56
    Ros 56 21 March 2020 08: 17 New
    +2
    For me, for about 40 years, the ambiguous fate of the Tu-2 remains an incomprehensible mystery.
  6. Hermit21
    Hermit21 21 March 2020 09: 30 New
    +2
    It is a pity that it did not work out to establish a truly mass release. As a front-line bomber, the Tu-2C was much preferable to the Pe-2
    1. Looking for
      Looking for 21 March 2020 16: 00 New
      -1
      how much do you know? Fly on both. Compare?
  7. Ivan Tartugai
    Ivan Tartugai 21 March 2020 09: 54 New
    -2
    Quote from the article:
    “The NKAP order No. 763 of October 10, 1942 came:
    “In pursuance of the GKO decree in order to increase the production of fighter aircraft, I ORDER: ..”

    Usually, in such strategically important orders of the people's commissars, where whole types of weapons, in this case Tu-2 and Il-2 attack aircraft, are completely withdrawn from production at factories, they refer not only to the decision of the State Defense Committee, but also indicate number of its registration and date of publication of this resolution of the GKO USSR.
    In the same order this is not.
    And the People's Commissar Shakhurin at that time was already a very experienced official-administrator and could not automatically sign a very important order without noticing such an omission.
    In addition, at a meeting of the GKO of the USSR, they would surely be interested not only in the opinion of the production workers, but most importantly in the opinion of the Red Army Air Force command, i.e. the opinion of direct customers, because it was for them that this equipment was developed and produced, namely, specifically the opinion of the commander of aviation of the Kalinin Front and the former head of the Flight Research Institute, General M. M. Gromov, where Tu-2 bombers passed final military tests.
    It is not necessary that MM Gromov would have been personally summoned to a meeting of the GKO of the USSR, they could at least simply request a written document from him about the expediency of further production of the Tu-2.
    Further, some high-ranking official should have brought up this issue, about the removal from production of Tu-2 and Il-2 planes for consideration by T-bills. The authors of the memoirs are silent about this person. If this question had been raised and put forward by Stalin IV, then Shakhurin and Yakovlev would have noted this, they say the stupid Chairman of the USSR State Defense Committee, who did not listen to us professional aviators, introduced this question, but this information is also missing.
    The fact that the People’s Commissar Shakhurin writes that they say "What I said didn’t convince him for some reason." It looks like babble, childish excuses, and he allegedly said this to Stalin IV in private conversations, without witnesses, and without presenting any documents and feedback from military pilots.
    From this we can conclude that there was no such GKO decree on the discontinuation of Tu-2 and Il-2 aircraft.
    Those. to remove from production Tu-2 bombers at plant No. 166 and Il-2 attack aircraft at plant No. 381 is an initiative of Shakhurin himself.
    1. svp67
      svp67 21 March 2020 10: 20 New
      +6
      Quote: Ivan Tartugay
      From this we can conclude that there was no such GKO decree on the discontinuation of Tu-2 and Il-2 aircraft.

      GKO Decree No. 2378-ss of October 7, 1942 "On increasing the production of fighter aircraft,"
      In order to increase the production of fighter aircraft, the State Defense Committee DECIDES:
      1. To oblige the People's Commissariat of Industry - Comrade Shakhurin, Director of Plant No. 166 - Comrade Sokolov:
      a) stop production of Tu-166 aircraft at plant No. 2. The equipment, fixtures and technical documentation for the Tu-166 aircraft available at Plant No. 2 should be fully retained;
      b) to put at the factory No. 166 the production of Yak-9 aircraft, setting the reversal of the production and production of Yak-9 aircraft in the following terms:
      in December - 10 aircraft
      in January - 25 - "-
      in February - 50 - "-
      in March - 75 - "-
      and in April 1943 to go on the release of 6 aircraft per day.
      2. To oblige the director of the factory No. 153 - Comrade Romanov, the chief designer - Comrade Yakovlev to transfer from the factory No. 153 to the factory No. 166 by October 20 of this year. drawings of the Yak-9 aircraft, drawings of fixtures and accessories and all the necessary technological documentation for the production of the Yak-9 aircraft, and also to transfer 166 Yak-5 aircraft in parts and assemblies to plant No. 10 until November 9.
      3. To allow the plant No. 166 in order to use the existing backlog of the Tu-2 aircraft in modular workshops, to release 10 Tu-2 aircraft by November 15 this year.
      4. The chief designer of the Tu-2 aircraft, Tupolev t., With the design bureau, should be transferred to Plant No. 288, leaving 166 design engineers and draftsmen from the design bureau of Tupolev at Factory No. 150 to organize the serial design bureau for the Yak-9 aircraft at the factory number 136.
      Oblige comrade Tupolev continue to work on fine-tuning and ensuring complete reliability in the operation of the issued Tu-2 aircraft.
      5. To oblige the People's Commissariat of Industry - Comrade Shakhurin, Director of Plant No. 381 - Comrade Zhuravlev:
      a) to cease the production of IL-2 aircraft at plant No. 381;
      b) to put La-381 aircraft production at plant No. 5, setting the production turn-around and La-5 aircraft production program in the following terms:
      in December - 10 aircraft
      in January - 25 - "-
      in February - 50 - "-
      in March - 75 - "-
      and in the month of April 1943 to go on the release of 5 aircraft per day.
      6. To oblige the director of the factory No. 21, t. Agadzhanova, the chief designer, t. Lavochkin, to transfer from factory No. 21 to factory No. 381 by October 25 of this year. drawings of the La-5 aircraft, drawings of fixtures and accessories and all the necessary technological documentation for the production of La-5 aircraft, and also to transfer 381 La-5 aircraft in parts and assemblies to plant No. 10 until November 5.
      7. To allow the plant No. 381 in order to use the existing backlog of the IL-2 aircraft in modular workshops, to release 40 IL-2 aircraft by November 15 this year.
      8. To oblige the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR — Comrade Zvereva — to allocate 166 million rubles each to the production of fighter aircraft production for plants No. 381 and 3,5.

      CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE
      DEFENSE COMMITTEE I. STALIN

      To send:
      tt Molotov, Malenkov, Shakhurin, Novikov - that's it.
      Sokolov (dir. Plant No. 166, Omsk) - 1, 2, 3, 4, 5;
      Romanov, Yakovlev - (plant number 153 Novosibirsk) - 2;
      Tupolev (zd No. 166, Omsk) - 4;
      Zhuravlev (conductor No. 381, N. Tagil) - 5, 6, 7;
      Agadzhanov (building No. 21, Gorky) - 6;
      Zverev - 8.
      1. Ivan Tartugai
        Ivan Tartugai 21 March 2020 16: 38 New
        +2
        Thank you.
        Good info if not fake.
        Really detective situation.
        The incomprehensible behavior of the People’s Commissar Shakhurin, he is personally interested in and receives daily reports from Gromov on the progress of the final military tests of Tu-2 bombers, i.e. receives positive reviews from the pilots, but Stalin IV did not say a word about them. It is silent about it.
        However, Stalin had an IV, also a deputy for aviation from the People’s Commissar of Defense, General Novikov, and he also said nothing about the good reviews of his subordinates about the Tu-2 bombers in the final military tests.
        As written in the article:
        “But the result I see is this: having fired 10,7 thousand more planes than the Germans who fought in Africa and the Mediterranean in 1942, we suddenly felt such a need for fighters that we decided to launch airplanes at the expense of attack aircraft.
        Which clearly was either stupidity, or sabotage. Whether all at once. Someone clearly “wound” Stalin, it would be interesting to know exactly who».

        It turns out that if someone explicitly “wound” Stalin’s IV and GKO members so that they issued a resolution “On increasing the production of fighter planes,” then it was not without the help of the People’s Commissar Shakhurin and the Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense for General Novikov’s Aviation.
        Those. not "cheated", but "cheated" IV Stalin.
        They convinced members of the GKO of the USSR, namely, Stalin IV, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, Beria, Voznesensky, Mikoyan, Kaganovich that the front, the troops desperately needed more fighter aircraft than any other type of aircraft.
        The decision is very carefully worked out literally to the smallest detail. Such a decision will not be prepared directly for the meeting. This was previously prepared by specialists from the NKAP led by Shakhurin, together with aviation generals led by Novikov.
  8. Fitter65
    Fitter65 21 March 2020 10: 24 New
    +5
    Pe-8. But I’m reminding you that only 79 pieces (Tu-2 - 2257 pieces) and the use of these monsters was episodic.

    List of produced Pe-8
    Year Serial Number Comment Qty
    1936 4201 First prototype: AM-34FRN → AM-34FRNB → AM-34FRNV and 1 × ACN (M-100) 1
    1938 4202 (385Д) The second prototype (backup aircraft): AM-34FRNV and 1 × ACN (M-100A); adopted as a reference for the construction of the 1st series. 1
    1939 4211 - 4214 4 × AM-34FRNV and 1 × ACN-2 (M-100A), converted AM-35A 4
    4215 AM-35, converted AM-35A 1
    4216 4 × AM-34FRNV and 1 × ACN-2 (M-100A), converted AM-35A 1
    1940 4217 - 4222 AM-35, converted AM-35A 6
    4223, 4224 AM-35A 2
    4225 M-40, converted AM-35A 1
    4226 AM-35A 1
    4227 M-40, converted AM-35A 1
    42015 AM-35A, assault transport option 1
    1941 42025, 42035 M-40F, converted AM-35A 2
    42045 M-40F 1
    42055, 42016
    42026, 42036
    42046, 42056 M-30 6
    42066, 42076
    42086, 42096
    42106 M-30, converted AM-35A 5
    42017, 42027
    42037 AM-35A 3
    1942 42047 M-82 ← for flight tests 1
    42057, 42067
    42077, 42087
    42097, 42107
    42018, 42028 AM-35A 8
    42038 ACh-30B 1
    42048 AM-35A 1
    42058 M-82 ← for flight test behavior 1
    42068, 42078
    42088, 42098
    42108, 42019 AM-35A 6
    42029, 42039 ACh-30B 2
    1943 42049, 42059
    42069, 42079
    42089, 42099
    42109, 42110
    42210, 42310 M-82, from number 42049 with a new nose of the fuselage and a Well-134 turret. 10
    42410 ASH-82FN, aircraft of reinforced construction, with an increased maximum bomb load from 4000 to 7000 kg 1
    42510, 42610
    42710, 42810
    42910, 421010
    42111 ASH-82 7
    1944 42211, 42311
    42411, 42511
    42611, 42711
    42811, 42911
    421011, 42112, 42212
    42312, 42412
    42512 ASH-82 14
    42612, 42712 ACh-30B, in the modified version: "special purpose aircraft" Pe-8ON 2
    42812, 42912 ACh-30B 2
    Total: (including 2 prototypes) 93
    1. Operator
      Operator 21 March 2020 15: 45 New
      0
      Pe-8 until the end of the war remained undeclared - most of the aircraft that tried to use in raids on Germany returned to airfields or fell to the ground due to numerous equipment failures. As a result, all the remaining Pe-8s were joked until the end of the war, and then disposed of.
      1. Fitter65
        Fitter65 22 March 2020 09: 01 New
        +1
        Quote: Operator
        Pe-8 until the end of the war remained undeclared - most of the aircraft that tried to use in raids on Germany returned to airfields or fell to the ground due to numerous equipment failures. As a result, all the remaining Pe-8s were joked until the end of the war ...

        I recommend reading for general development

      2. Dmitry V.
        Dmitry V. 23 March 2020 13: 31 New
        +2
        Quote: Operator
        Pe-8 remained unfinished until the end of the war


        Mostly there were problems with motors.
        What can I say, even if in the super-responsible flight of Pusep with Molotov to the UK, one engine had to be turned off halfway - the oil was knocked out.
        When landing in Washington, the motors at a decrease and at 35 degrees outside air - overheated so that two out of four had to be turned off.
        It was similar during take-off - in order not to overheat the engines during take-off in Washington, they were allowed to cool the taxiing field on the runway. And still, when taking off, they overheated and the aircraft had to be taken away with difficulty to an altitude of 3 km, where the air was cooler and the motors stopped warming.

        Takeoff in Greenland in calm weather, was very critical (I barely assembled the aircraft parking), low thrust-to-weight ratio when fully loaded with fuel.
        This can be found in Pusep’s memoirs.

        Pusep Endel Karlovich
        On long airways
        http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/pusep_ek1/index.html
  9. Fitter65
    Fitter65 21 March 2020 10: 34 New
    +6
    I recommend for reading



    Well, that’s already so, for fun

  10. Sergey Valov
    Sergey Valov 21 March 2020 12: 07 New
    +6
    “Probably, Alexander Sergeyevich can become a worthy witness” - people who worked in the aviation industry in the 50-60s told me that it’s hard to say that Yakovlev did more for the domestic aircraft industry — harm or benefit. As an adult, I once again reread Yakovlev’s memoirs and it became noticeable how much they weren’t lying, no, they just can’t be blindly trusted, practically everything needs to be double-checked. For example, this - “In 1942, German plants produced 14,7 thousand aircraft” Yakovlev in 1942 could not know in principle.
  11. sevtrash
    sevtrash 21 March 2020 12: 09 New
    +5
    Tupolev with his experience, knowledge, intuition apparently immediately realized the impossibility of creating a four-engine heavy dive in the conditions of the USSR, at least. Heinkel did it all the same. And with the cancellation of production - Tu2 was not needed "... like bread, like air ...", and Pe2 was already, maybe worse, but it was produced. Fighters were extremely important, Pe2 was, Bostons and B25 arrived, and since 1942, Soviet pilots rated them quite highly in terms of their aerobatic qualities and equipment.
    1. Alf
      Alf 21 March 2020 21: 10 New
      +2
      Quote: sevtrash
      the Bostons and B25 arrived,

      Here are just supplies from overseas characterized by irregularity and lack of need.
  12. dgonni
    dgonni 21 March 2020 12: 45 New
    +3
    Everything was simple there. Mikulin beat pots with Polikarpov and put with the device on the refinement of AM-37. That is, in fact, the Tupolev bomber remained the engine of the engine. ASH-82 was also in limbo. Therefore, such a decision was made.
    Yakovlev there well put pens while lobbying his interests. In fact, the Perm factory for the production of Shvetsov engines from reprofiling on the M-105 was saved at the last moment.
    P.S. According to the memoirs of those flying on pawns and blunt, tupolej had a bad view from the side due to ASH motors.
    1. Alf
      Alf 21 March 2020 21: 13 New
      +2
      Quote: dgonni
      Mikulin beat pots with Polikarpov and put with the device on the refinement of AM-37.

      And at what plant would the AM-37 be manufactured? Remind the reason for removal from the MIZ-3 series, in addition to altitude?
      1. dgonni
        dgonni 21 March 2020 21: 52 New
        +2
        On the same as the 35th. In fact, the motors 90% had a similar design. The 37th was simply equipped with intermediate cooling of the inflated air. Here is this unit and it was necessary to make friends with 35a. And for this it was necessary to conduct bench and flight tests for calibrating boost and carburetors. What Mikulin put.
        P.S. With a 37m migrant and at low heights, he would give a thrush to any F and G Deutsche. But history does not tolerate compulsive declension.
        The fact that humpbacks riveted a lot during the war. So this is from hopelessness in the initial period of the war and the unwillingness to break the process technology in the middle.
        The same 37th was to be delivered at the end of the 1940th year. But ambition.
        1. Alf
          Alf 21 March 2020 22: 39 New
          +3
          Quote: dgonni
          With a 37m migrant and at low heights, he would give a thrush to any F and G Deutsche.

          If he would have found pilots of the appropriate class.
          Quote: dgonni
          What Mikulin put.

          What a bad Mikulin ... I didn’t want to finish the motor. And why then the M-120 was not allowed into the series? And the M-106? And M-107 did not really reach? They were all stupid, probably..A Shvetsov, a female dog, didn’t file a normal ASH-82 right away ..
          1. dgonni
            dgonni 21 March 2020 23: 41 New
            +1
            Migar was no more coherent in piloting for that de lagg-3. So with the pilots would grow together.
            M-120 was immediately stillborn. For a stupid increase in displacement based on Spanish technology required overmap research and development. What the Soviet school did not have at that time. With regards to the m-106, then again they ran into the ceiling of the level of knowledge of the Soviet school. The central office did not manage to bring to mind. Although its application promised a significant gain in performance. Even an experimental batch was produced and yaks with such a motor were built. The results obtained were embodied in m-105pf / pf2 and m-107a.
            If for me, then trying to stick the fluid coupling into the m-105 was that stupid thing. For the entire Klimovskaya series was notable for the elevated temperatures of mum and water. And a sharp drop in oil pressure when rising to a height. Perhaps it would have worked for Mikulin. But he did not get involved.
            With regards to the m-107 in the form of a modification, it was hardly completed by the end of 1944. Again, on the basis of m-106. At the same time, with a wild perversion in terms of powering the engine with the fuel mixture.
            There were 2 intake tracts. In one carba, a strongly pre-enriched mixture was fed along the second branch, there was just air from the monitoring station. Otherwise, it was impossible to ensure normal filling of the cylinders and obtaining the planned power.
          2. irontom
            irontom 22 March 2020 13: 49 New
            +3
            The difficulty in piloting the MiG-3 was possessed by the MiG of the first series of the most massive, with a large fuel cell fuel tank, which caused the aircraft to center back. This problem was solved by reducing the tank and putting slats, and even the little things - by blowing in the wind tunnel. These machines went mainly to air defense where they flew until the 44th.
            There are flying restored MiGs and the Novosibirsk Aviation Restoration of just the latest series with normal alignment, and a test pilot with unique experience in real flights on historical aircraft, director of SibNIIA Vladimir Barsuk.
            In his interviews (I managed to communicate with him on the network), Badger dispels the MIF about the difficulty of piloting a MiG.
        2. irontom
          irontom 21 March 2020 23: 50 New
          +6
          You have a strange idea about motors. AM-37 delivered an Intercooler which increased the bulk density of fuel assemblies (fuel-air mixture) in the cylinders, which gave an increase of two hundred horses, then a banal compromise began, the engine did not digest this power, because of which it had to be redesigned and amplified, they could only do this by the end On the 41st. Further there was an evacuation and Mikulin was left without a base, plus he had to set up AM-38 at the evacuated enterprises, to AM-39 (AM-37 with a two-speed supercharger) Mikulin returned only at the end of the 42nd.
          It was easier with the AM-38 - to fly high at the AM-35A, the monitoring station took high power from the shaft to the propeller for charging, while the single-speed monitoring station consumed this power regardless of height, the adjustable blades at the input of the monitoring station helped a bit, but not much. As a result, having set up a monitoring station with a smaller impeller, reducing the altitude, we got a redistribution of power, although the motor had to be changed as well.
          For example, the experimental MiG-3U was AM-35 converted from AM-38.
          If you are wondering why AM-37 didn’t work out and what Mikulin did, an article from the “Engine” magazine Lev Berne, Vladimir Perov ALEXANDER MIKULIN, MAN - LEGEND
  13. Alex
    Alex 21 March 2020 12: 47 New
    +3
    Originally 103 was a 3-seater - a pilot in the front cockpit, a navigator and a gunner in the rear cockpit behind the center section. In the spring of 1941, it was converted into a 4-seater (103U) - the pilot was moved to the front cockpit to the pilot, a shooter was put in his former place. LTX decreased slightly.
    In October 1941, the production of AM-37 (as well as AM-35) was discontinued in favor of the AM-38, put on the IL-2. On the third instance (103V) ​​M-82 1700 hp was installed, flight data decreased. For example, the maximum speed decreased to 528 km / h at an altitude of 6200 meters versus 610 km / h at an altitude of 7800 meters for an understudy and 640 km / h for the first instance.
    Serial production was resumed in the fall of 1943 - Tu-2S ASh-82FN 1850 hp
  14. Undecim
    Undecim 21 March 2020 14: 16 New
    +1
    Initially, Tupolev had the idea of ​​a heavy attack aircraft. The project was called ANT-58 and according to the plan was supposed to have speed at the level of modern fighters, be able to dive and be able to carry bombs of the highest weight. The crew was to consist of three people. Small arms were also planned to be very weighty: in the bow there was a battery of four ShKAS and two ShVAK guns in the root parts of the wings. From all this the pilot shot.
    The history of the creation of the Tu-2 is indeed, if I may say so, "multivariate." And then the author decided to perpetuate his name by creating another one, having mixed up the designations of the projects and the sequence of their creation.
    But these plans were not destined to come true. Tupolev was called to Moscow, heard his report on the ANT-58 and said something like this: all this is good, but we need another plane. And they issued the terms of reference.
    The task, I must say, was terrible. PB-4, high-altitude long-range four-engine dive bomber. The adversary on which this bomber should work is Britain and its fleet.

    According to the registry of A.N. Tupolev Design Bureau, it was the 57th project (aircraft "57", ANT-57, Tu-57).
    Here is the result.

    And the plan of the “58” plane appeared already during the work on the 57th project, and when it was ready, they made up and signed by A.N. Tupolev and managed to send a letter to I.V. Stalin justifying the proposal for the “FB” aircraft.
    In general, if someone is really interested in the history of the creation of the Tu-2, it is best to read the "TUPOLEV TU-2 BOMBERS" - Vladimir Rigmant and, as an addition to the "Unknown Tupolev" Saukke. And this article is for very weak in terms of information search, "victors - amateurs."
  15. Operator
    Operator 21 March 2020 15: 36 New
    +2
    The author of the article walks around and around - the main culprit in disrupting the production of Tu-2 was Stalin's adviser Yakovlev, who had the right to directly report to his boss.

    In truth, Tu-2 (unlike Pe-2) was de facto just a dive-free bomber because of the glider’s insufficient strength (Tupolev outwitted himself in this matter).
    1. Sergey Valov
      Sergey Valov 21 March 2020 16: 39 New
      -1
      Somewhere like that. But de facto the pawn was just a bomber, for the pilots who knew how to bomb with a dive were almost nonexistent.
      1. Operator
        Operator 21 March 2020 17: 05 New
        +1
        The German "thing" was automated to exit the dive, so it could be operated in this mode by less trained and physically developed pilots.
        1. Alf
          Alf 21 March 2020 21: 23 New
          +2
          Quote: Operator
          The German "thing" was automated to exit the dive, so it could be operated in this mode by less trained and physically developed pilots.

          On the PE-2, too, there was an automatic output from diving.
          1. Operator
            Operator 22 March 2020 01: 13 New
            0
            The AP-1 dive machine was a copy of the Yu-88, and not the Yu-87, the last was taken out of the dive absolutely automatically at a given height by the aneroid, and the first was manually piloted by pressing one of the two keys on the helm: "reset bombs "or" dive withdrawal without reset ".

            The height of the bomb drop (1800 meters) was determined by Pe-2 pilots by eye, so only specially trained pilots were involved in the dive. Since the AP-1 was failing, the pilots were also selected according to the criterion of endurance to overloads for manual withdrawal from a dive.
    2. Ivan Tartugai
      Ivan Tartugai 21 March 2020 17: 16 New
      +3
      "... the main culprit in disrupting the production of Tu-2 was Stalin's adviser Yakovlev, who had the right to directly report to his boss."

      Yakovlev, he is an adviser on the development and design of new types of aircraft. He is more a technical adviser.
      And here the bomber has already been developed, constructed, manufactured and the last military tests are being completed directly at the front, in combat conditions.
      Here is the fault of the military, the fault of the generals because they are the customers of the bomber, for the army, for the Air Force, it was created.
      The generals should have said they needed a Tu-2 or not. Looks like they felt that they needed fighter aircraft than bombers.
      As written in the article:
      But the result I see is this: releasing 10,7 thousand more aircraft than the Germans, who in 1942 fought in Africa and the Mediterranean, we (more precisely, our generals) suddenly felt such a need for fighters that they decided to release from due to attack aircraft.
      Which clearly was either stupidity, or sabotage.
      Whether all at once.

      Someone clearly “cheated” Stalin; it would be interesting to know exactly who.
  16. vladcub
    vladcub 21 March 2020 16: 52 New
    +1
    Stalin usually listened to the opinion of experts. And Shakhurin was one of those people whose opinion he was considered. If only what Shakhurin wrote was, but I think that Shakhurin is not lying. That decision to curtail the production of Tu-2 Stalin could take only on the advice of a person to whose opinion he was listening. Will there be many people so that Stalin recognizes him? There will be 2 such: Yakovlev and M. M. Gromov. The first was already noted for abusing his position. So that it could very well be him.
    Yakovlev was in favor after Stalin, and naturally Shakhurin didn’t agree
  17. Operator
    Operator 21 March 2020 18: 15 New
    -2
    Quote: Ivan Tartugay
    The generals should have said they need a Tu-2 or not.

    The aviation generals in the person of Gromov spoke out unambiguously, but Yakovlev, as always, played a trick.
    1. Ivan Tartugai
      Ivan Tartugai 22 March 2020 10: 21 New
      +2
      Quote: Operator
      The aviation generals in the person of Gromov spoke out unambiguously, but Yakovlev, as always, played a trick.

      I looked at the journal of visits to Stalin IV. So in October, when the Tu-2 was removed from production, it turns out that the designer Yakovlev did not have IV of Stalin.
      The head of the tests, General Gromov, was also not at the reception of Stalin IV and naturally there was nothing to tell Stalin IV for the Tu-2 bomber.
      He reported to his immediate superiors General Novikov, and shared information with the manufacturer of the Tu-2 bomber, People's Commissar of the NKAP Shakhurin.
      The test report of the Tu-2 did not get to the Stalin IV through Gromov.
      But the deputy commissar of defense for aviation, General Novikov, was at the Stalin IV in October 1942 six times.
      People's Commissar Shakhurin was at the reception of Stalin IV twice and both times with Novikov. They went in together and went out together.
      According to Shakhurin’s memoirs, he stubbornly and heroically defended the IV production of the Tu-2 before Stalin. And it turns out that General Novikov, who was present at that time in Stalin’s office, didn’t support the People’s Commissar of the aviation industry, at best he simply kept quiet, and he was a high-ranking customer representative and couldn’t just sit out in the corner of his office.
      It turns out that General Novikov expressed his opinion - either “for” or “against”.
      General Novikov was not in favor, otherwise Shakhurin would have noted in his memoirs that even the military and the bomber’s customers were for continued production of the Tu-2and the stupid Stalin IV was against it.
      Mean deputy defense commander for aviation, General Novikov was against production for the Red Army Air Force, for the front of the world's best Tu-2 bombers.
      In October 1942, Stalin IV had other aviation generals Rudenko, Falaleev, Sudets, Ryazanov, Polbin, Golovanov in his office, as well as high-ranking military men every day - generals and marshals Shaposhnikov, Zhukov, Vasilevsky and others, and none of them hinted, that they say we need a Tu-2 strike bomber for the front, which, as the front-line tests show, i.e. tests in real combat conditions, is by its characteristics the best in the world.
      The fact that the excellent Tu-2 combat vehicle was discontinued is the fault of our generals and marshals.
      1. Operator
        Operator 22 March 2020 10: 27 New
        -1
        What about the Stalin telephone conversation magazine in October 1942? laughing
    2. Ivan Tartugai
      Ivan Tartugai 22 March 2020 13: 51 New
      +2
      Quote: Operator
      The aviation generals represented by Gromov unequivocally spoke out ...

      In his memoirs, Gromov MM writes:
      “The flight range and range of our bombers and attack aircraft did not allow us to use them fully to other important objects, for example, to strike at enemy airfields at the desired scale, industrial centers, clusters of military equipment in the rear, etc.
      The Nazis kept their aircraft, especially bomber, with large formations at air hubs, heavily protected by anti-aircraft artillery, sometimes covered by fighters. They could afford it, since the range of their bombers exceeded the range of the Pe-2.
      Our excellent Tu-2 bomber for reasons unknown to me, he appeared at the front only at the very end of the war. Although 2 Tu-2 aircraft were sent to me on the Kalinin Front for a trial combat test back in 1942. After applying them in a combat situation, I gave an assessment about them, as about airplanes that are much more promising in comparison with the Pe-2 in terms of speed, bomb load, and flight qualities.
      I myself flew the Tu-2 with great pleasure.
      I provided the characteristics of this aircraft to the authorities, including A.I. Shakhurin.
      And the replacement in the production of Tu-second Yakami-7 was wrong. This major mistake was obviously explained by trust in authorities, not experts. ”

      Gromov MM is a performer, he faithfully completed the work entrusted to him, conducted the tests in full, gave an objective assessment of the aircraft, wrote a report, signed and handed it over to his higher authorities.
      Gromov MM didn’t report to Stalin; I did not speak at a meeting with members of the USSR GKO. He did not speak out for aviation generals.
      Our senior aviation generals decided differently, namely that "the front fighters are more needed than the world's best Tu-2 bomber."
      1. Operator
        Operator 22 March 2020 14: 15 New
        -1
        I had in mind Stalin's telephone conversations with his adviser Yakovlev.

        On the other hand, the Tu-2 was not needed by the Red Army from the word at all:
        - the poorly poorly diving Pe-2 with a standard bomb load at a short flight range from 800 to 1000 kg completely satisfied the Air Force, and nobody wanted to change the spent and cheap in production to a new expensive soap;
        - Tu-2 could not dive due to the low strength of the glider;
        - in the USSR, front-line bombers A-20 Boston, which exceeded the Tu-2 in operational qualities, were already supplied through the Lend-Lease line.
  18. Elturisto
    Elturisto 22 March 2020 10: 26 New
    0
    The author once again lies. The shutdown of the TU-2 production was caused by the unavailability of the aircraft and the power plant, as well as weapons systems and other things. All this was finalized and was ready by 1944.
    In addition, the matter was complicated by the lack of aircraft engines M-82 and AM-37. The Soviet leadership faced a serious problem in 1942 - the lag of the M-105 from its German counterparts (this lag remained until the end of the war). The output was the installation of the M-82 on the LAGG and the Yak ( canceled later).
    In general, a manic desire to blame the damned commies, can cause nothing but disgust ...
    1. Chukcha Alexander
      Chukcha Alexander 22 March 2020 18: 04 New
      -7
      And the fact that before the terrible war, almost all the leading designers of bombers in the USSR spent two years in prisons, and then they tried to do something in sharashka not the commies?
      1. Elturisto
        Elturisto 22 March 2020 18: 28 New
        +4
        Ilyushin, Myasischev, Petlyakov, Yakovlev, Tairov, Bolkhovitinov, everyone was sitting ... right?
        1. Very smart Chukchi
          Very smart Chukchi 24 March 2020 12: 45 New
          -1
          And Myasischev and Petlyakov and Bartini with Korolev sat together with Tupolev. And who is still to blame for the fact that the USSR fought almost the entire war without a normal day bomber? Fire alteration of a fighter into a Pe-2 bomber recalls a phrase from the song "We blinded him from what was"Range of 1 km, normal bomb load of 200 kg. To perform the same combat mission, the required outfit of Tu-400 forces was required three times less than for the Pe-2. And this is with weaker defensive weapons. And given that the Pe-2 is on one engine didn’t fly at all (see memoirs of one of the best pilots of the Pe-2 Rakov), how many of our pilots, navigators and gunners-radio operators laid their heads on this “front-line bomber”? Read the Kerber’s memoir under what conditions did these designers work in sharaga. "It's amazing that they managed to do something worthwhile. And who is to blame? Churchill?
          1. Elturisto
            Elturisto 24 March 2020 17: 58 New
            -2
            You? M-82A by the end of 1943 was barely working for 50 hours! What kind of Tu-2 production could you talk about? Stop talking about Myasischev and Petlyakov. Tupolev is a patented bastard, as did Polikarpov. Both sculpted impossible projects, delaying the necessary resources from the young and promising - Petlyakov, Yakovlev, Myasishchev, Ilyushin, Lavochkin, Sukhoi, Tairov.
            1. Very smart Chukchi
              Very smart Chukchi 25 March 2020 00: 41 New
              -1
              Are we already on you? And the small resource ASH-82 did not interfere in the successful fighting of La-1943 in 5?
              And what is the "nonsense" about Myasishchev and Petlyakov? "Young" Petlyakov, Ilyushin and Sukhoi in 1939 were 46, 45 and 44 years old, respectively. In your judgment of Tupolev and Polikarpov, it’s immediately obvious that we have before us a “solid Marxist-Iskrovets”
              1. Elturisto
                Elturisto 25 March 2020 11: 21 New
                -1
                Any anti-Soviet, rubbish man. Once again, the resource M-82 in 1943 -50 hours. For a bomber, this is not acceptable. What production of the Tu-2 in 1941 could there be any talk about?
                I wrote -young and promising aerospace engineers, can't you read? Or Sukhoi isn’t promising?
                1. Very smart Chukchi
                  Very smart Chukchi 25 March 2020 17: 05 New
                  -1
                  Well, of course, any communist (especially in the XNUMXst century) is a genius in all areas and an example of high morality and humanism! About such people, a very smart person said for a long time: "They have not forgotten anything and have not learned anything." There is no point in leading a further discussion with a person who is obviously brought up in some kind of stable. I wish you happiness and long life!
                  1. Elturisto
                    Elturisto 25 March 2020 21: 00 New
                    -1
                    Stop bragging already ... It was said by Tyleran about the Bourbons ... I wanted to trump ... it didn’t work ... how do you know how to educate in a stable? From personal experience? And you don’t get sick, read Shavrova, not degenerates. ..different ...
                2. KERMET
                  KERMET 27 March 2020 22: 43 New
                  0
                  Regarding the unacceptability of the M-82 for a bomber because of its resource - read the report on military tests of the Su-2 with the M-82
                  1. Elturisto
                    Elturisto 28 March 2020 09: 18 New
                    -1
                    And ...? What's with the resource?
                    1. KERMET
                      KERMET 28 March 2020 12: 13 New
                      0
                      In short, there are no complaints about the resource, a conclusion from military tests:
                      " 1. Motors M-82 produced by the factory No. 19 named Stalin's tests in combat conditions passed GOOD.
                      2. Operation has shown that the M-82 engine is one of the best and most powerful engines in the arsenal of the Red Army.

                      But it’s better for you to re-read it yourself, everything has already been chewed up to us:
                      http://www.airpages.ru/mt/mot45.shtml
                      in the same place, a little further there is a description of the operation report on La-5, here the conclusions are somewhat different and at the same time explained for what reasons.
                      1. Elturisto
                        Elturisto 28 March 2020 20: 34 New
                        -1
                        What does it mean, well, what kind of resource? in 1941? Why was the M-82A taken in the series?
                      2. Elturisto
                        Elturisto 28 March 2020 21: 05 New
                        -1
                        Thanks for the link. The truth on the topic did not find anything there.
    2. Amateur
      Amateur 23 March 2020 19: 06 New
      0
      In addition, the matter was complicated by the lack of aircraft engines M-82

      Lies! The Perm plant made the M-82 (later Al-82) “at the warehouse”, as there was no plane under it. There was a question about the conversion of the plant from air-cooled engines to water-cooled engines. Almost all aviation design bureaus were given the task of developing an aircraft under the M-82. It turned out only with S.M. Lavochkin - La-5.
      And how it happened. that the aircraft engine factory produced unnecessary motors, and the minaviaprom did not have an airplane under it - I could not find anywhere. Neither in Yakovlev’s memoirs, nor in Shakhurin’s memoirs. Perhaps for this, too, after the war he also "sat down."
      1. Elturisto
        Elturisto 23 March 2020 21: 14 New
        -3
        stop already fucking ... The question of reprofiling was raised in connection with the difficulties of production of the M-82. In addition, the requirements for engine reliability in a fighter and a bomber are different. La chose to set the stars for completely different reasons - Yak showed acceptable characteristics with the M-105 and LaGG is not. Surprisingly, everything else you stated is a wonderful result - 100% ... you have reached the limit of perfection ....
        1. Very smart Chukchi
          Very smart Chukchi 24 March 2020 12: 49 New
          -1
          The issue of reprofiling was raised in connection with the difficulties of production of the M-82 Quote to the studio! Or is it again the author’s judgment?
          1. Elturisto
            Elturisto 24 March 2020 17: 50 New
            -1
            Forward your question to the amateur ... It was he who advanced the thesis ...
  19. smaug78
    smaug78 23 March 2020 11: 19 New
    0
    http://alternathistory.com/pb-4m-105tk-ant-57-pikiruyushhij-bombardirovshhik-s-chetyrmya-motorami-proekt-tupolev-sssr-1939g/ без конспироложевства о АНТ-57
  20. smaug78
    smaug78 23 March 2020 11: 22 New
    0
    Think for a second: June 17, 1941, five days before the outbreak of war, the NKAP order No. 533 appeared:
    What to think about?
    1. Elturisto
      Elturisto 24 March 2020 17: 51 New
      -1
      Have a rest. Until we meet again, bot ...
  21. kig
    kig April 28 2020 12: 20 New
    0
    firing 10,7 thousand more aircraft than the Germans, who in 1942 fought in Africa and the Mediterranean, we suddenly experienced such a need for fighters that we decided to release from attack aircraft. - And what were the losses of the fighters in 1942?
  22. IL-64
    IL-64 7 May 2020 07: 31 New
    +1
    To understand: the rank of lieutenant of state security roughly corresponded to the rank of army captain. The difference was two ranks