PrSM missiles challenge Russian anti-aircraft missile forces. Daydreams of Lockheed Specialists

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While the journalists of most domestic and foreign military-analytical resources do not stop trying to predict further scenarios for the development of an operational-tactical situation in the completely unpredictable and explosive Idlib de-escalation zone, taking into account the ongoing saturation of this theater of operations with Turkish arms, information equally important for an expert assessment was published in a press release on the news portal of the military-industrial corporation Lockheed Martin on March 12, 2020 with reference to ialistov taking a direct part in throwing test of one of the copies of the prospective short-range ballistic missiles PrSM, developed as part of an ambitious project of the same name, designed to fend off potential missile opponent on critical operational areas.

Operational and tactical BR “Deep Strike” is a conceptual analogue of ATACMS with a reduced radar signature for counteracting the air defense systems of the Russian aerospace forces at the European theater of operations


According to the source, an experimental prototype of the PrSM OTBR launched on the territory of the White Sands missile range from the modified transport and launch module M269 located in the armored box farm of the M142 HIMARS MLRS mobile launcher successfully hit the conditional enemy’s ground target, breaking about 180 km. At first glance, we are dealing with a completely ordinary event, which is not the subject of increased interest of Russian and Chinese military experts; after all, the range obtained during the tests barely “covers” 50% of the same indicator of the Russian operational tactical ballistic missile 9M723-1 Iskander-M. Meanwhile, a detailed acquaintance with the tactical and technical assignment for the development of the PrSM Special Purpose Detachment, as well as with the layout and design features of the final product, can completely and completely redraw our previous ideas about the Precision Strike Missile project as an ordinary program for re-equipping US missile and artillery units with new operational -tactical BRs whose performance characteristics are only slightly ahead of the good old MGM-140B / 164B ATACMS Block IA / IIA.



In particular, unlike the ATACMS family of tactical ballistic missiles, the promising PrSM RDBs will have a total range of 500-600 km and approximately 2-3 times less effective scattering surface (0,07-0,1 versus 0,2- 0,3 sq. M, respectively) due to a 74% reduction in the diameter of the hull (from 0,61 m to 0,35 m, respectively), as well as the much wider use of composite radar absorbing materials and coatings in its design. As a result of this, the 30H6E2 illumination and guidance radars of the S-300PM1 systems will be able to "capture" the data of the American Special Purpose Detection Bureau for accurate auto-tracking at a distance of about 85-90 km, which will be completely insufficient for successful interception with the 48N6E / E2 long-range guided missiles. Indeed, literally 30–40 seconds after the “capture”, PrSM rockets moving along a quasi-ballistic trajectory at a speed of about 2000 m / s will enter the angular sectors that are not covered by the radiation pattern above the air defense systems (“dead funnels”) within a radius of 25-30 km with angles greater than 64 degrees for 30N6E type radars.

Conclusion: the successful interception of PrSM missiles by means of the S-300PM / 1/2 air defense division can only be realized on a 60-kilometer stretch of the terminal section of the trajectory, and even then, if the enemy hypothetically uses no more than 6-8 OTR in one outfit, without the latest implementation of anti-aircraft maneuvers. In the case of a massive use of Deep Strikes (10-15 or more units) on objects covered by "three hundred", the chance of a successful reflection of such an attack will be minimized; especially when performing operational-tactical ballistic missile defense PrSM anti-aircraft maneuvers with overloads of 25-30G (these flight modes are an integral software add-on for most inertial-navigation systems of promising cruise and operational-tactical ballistic missiles). Why?

As is known, missiles of the 48H6E / E2 family are equipped only with aerodynamic controls that make it possible to achieve 30–35 G overloads, which will be enough to destroy elements of high-precision weapons opponents carrying out anti-aircraft maneuvers with overloads of no more than 17 units, not to mention the sparse layers of the stratosphere (18-25 km), where this figure will decrease to 8-10G, respectively.

An order of magnitude higher combat stability in this situation will be possessed by the S-350 Vityaz and Buk-M3 anti-aircraft missile systems that are currently being armed with the airborne combat units of the airborne forces and air defense forces of Russia, the ammunition of which is represented by anti-aircraft guided missiles interceptors 9M96E / DM and 9M317MA. Thanks to equipping these missiles with active radar seekers of the “Shale” type, capable of detecting targets with an image intensifier of 0,07 square meters. m at a distance of 20 km, the Vityaz and Buk-M3 complexes can easily process the approaching Deep Strike even at the time of diving at critical angles of more than 80 degrees, inaccessible to 50H6A and 9C36M guidance radars: the air defense data will be delivered once and for all point on the issue of eliminating the "dead craters" characteristic of domestic anti-aircraft missile systems with a semi-active radar guidance system.

The “twist” of PrSM missiles at the time of the latest anti-aircraft maneuvers will be achieved using the 9M96E / DM and 9M317MA antiaircraft engines of the PIF-PAF type torque transverse control and a gas-jet thrust vector deflection system (along with the classic aerodynamic rudders), which bring the available missiles to overload 65 units and providing the ability to maintain high flight performance in the upper layers of the stratosphere.
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24 comments
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  1. +4
    March 17 2020
    Mdaaa what the race of rocket technologies is in full swing ... here you have the improvement of both the bogus missiles and the OTDB ... and our military-industrial complex must go to a new level of rocket technologies ... the enemy is trying to catch up at an accelerated pace.
    1. -1
      March 17 2020
      Quote: The same LYOKHA
      our military-industrial complex must also go to a new level of rocket technology ..

      That's it. And then conversion, conversion ...... (and GDP also popped, alas)
    2. +6
      March 17 2020
      So far, as far as Iskander, they are like China ... Crawling ... 5 swings versus 6.3, OTDR versus combined launch of OTDB and lionfish ... Plus, they are one against the other in the system - after all, we have something to knock down, they have nothing to do with it.
      1. The comment was deleted.
    3. +5
      March 17 2020
      Our defense industry, yes. First, persuade words to persuade to learn, it may turn out to be a smart one. What new level, lol? Russia, and so on, is ahead of the rest in rocket technology. Ballistic for sure. We don’t need to go out somewhere, but those who scratched eggs for 30 years
      1. +3
        March 17 2020
        You might think you have a lot of mind ... that you can’t see success in space with our rocket technologies ... and the Americans are not sitting idly by ... rushed into the battle to catch up with us ... and underestimate their adversary is the height of frivolity and stupidity.
        1. -3
          March 17 2020
          Have you read carefully? Do you know how to understand what you read? I’m not talking about space, but about the military commissar. And an article about military missiles, if ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles, rocket launchers - who has it better than ours?

          I have long been amused by this fawning-lackey about underestimation. Like "Well, they are doing something, which means they need to be afraid." Assessment of the opponent's capabilities should come from objective factors and prerequisites, not personal judgments. It's like Tyson Fury began to fear the gopar from the backyard. Because he twists on the horizontal bar
    4. -1
      March 17 2020
      PANCAKE, AGAIN "DAMANTS" !!! The name is already a common noun, the famous all-consuming!
      The conclusions are sucked from the finger, knowledge of the construction of air defense, zero. An example of an air defense complex, which is not in the direction of the possible use of the PrSM Missile, is taken. There have long been more advanced and by the way who gave him such performance characteristics of our rocket? It's just funny, using missiles of earlier modifications, we had better results.
    5. 0
      March 24 2020
      Combat lasers, beam weapons, will put an end to this fight. After all, as if the attacking rocket was not showing off, the speed of light is faster.
      But on the other hand, fog, cloud cover artificial smoke .. :)
  2. +11
    March 17 2020
    with reference to specialists directly involved in throwing tests ... MLRS M142 HIMARS, successfully struck

    Another set of phrases from the text generator "E. Damantsev"
    If the tests are "Throwing", then the rocket will not fly at any target. And if it flies and hits, then this is NOT a THROWING test.
  3. +1
    March 17 2020
    I remember at school I hated to read L. Tolstoy, his "War and Peace" sentence is half a page, but damn it Eugene you surpassed him, even though the meaning was laid and great.
    The beginning of the article is the first sentence of 10 lines. About what?
    Further. 2 paragraph still divided into three sentences. Well and further in the same vein.
    Eugene, well, where did you get this craving for clever words that you insert in the case and not in the case. All these terminal sections, precise auto tracking, and elevated sectors not covered by the radiation pattern.
    Elimination of "dead" funnels, but where did you dig this nonsense from? How can a dead funnel be eliminated in general, which, by definition, cannot be eliminated, for one reason, the rocket needs to gain speed for control and it cannot be less than 2 km.
    Cleverly written article. Very smart. It’s not clear what, but clever. It seems that the author takes the articles creatively processes them by inserting wise words.
  4. +3
    March 17 2020
    So the time has come when I'm not going to criticize Damantsev! Of course, if you really want to, then you can find an excuse .... (!) As the Fritzes said near Moscow in 41m ....: The devil is not so terrible. like his little one! "But now, thanks to Damantsev, again there is a reason for me to once again" voice the theses "about the" inevitable obsolescence "of the zur in the concept," dominant "at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries! Alas, but 48N6 missiles, 9М317 are already outdated ... "The situation in the world" is now very "muddy" and therefore, remembering: "the delay of the present is like death ...", it is necessary to urgently take measures to re-equip the air defense forces ... (both territorial and " combined arms "...). Moreover, it is worth relying not only on the" already available "zuru types 9M96, 9M317MA and the like; but it is necessary to develop on the basis of the mentioned products and" new "modifications with increased characteristics! the characteristic features of which are: 1. "autonomous" (or better, combined ...) GOS; 2. the presence of transverse control motors (DPU): 3. the presence of torque control of the main engine thrust (it is possible that "in a compartment" with the DPU ) ... 4.Equipment of ramjet sustainer stages .... (not an exception It is possible to use solid propellant rocket engines, liquid propellant rocket engines with a repeated cycle "on-off" ...) 5. (optional): replacement of the explosive charge with an additional detonating solid propellant rocket ... 6. optional): multiple warhead with several "last mile interceptors" or warhead controlled and directed ("sniper") detonation; 7. PU "increased capacity" (which means the development of air defense systems of different weight and dimensions than "until recently" ...): 8. unification of air defense missile systems, air defense units into single (!) "Network-centric networks"; 9. mandatory multifunctional radar with AFAR + "built-in" means of self-defense ... Some of the above is beginning to be implemented, but the "situation" is still at the beginning of "perestroika"!
    PS Such an "argument" as the development of missiles, "hunters" for PrSM ....
  5. +1
    March 17 2020
    PrSM missiles challenge Russian anti-aircraft missile forces. Daydreams of Lockheed Specialists

    That's interesting, but those who write devastating articles against our Armed Forces, they realize that their new products, which are "killers" of something unas, will calmly let us kill something ???
    If the shooting goes, then it’s not like on the firing range and in return will arrive no less slaughter and reasoned ... maybe vigorous!
    So they croak, they croak, in their swamp, piling their own ... but if you leave your swamp in real life, nothing special.
  6. +1
    March 17 2020
    "due to a 74% reduction in body diameter (from 0,61 m to 0,35 m, respectively)"
    And how did this turn out 74%? 26 divide by 61, multiply by 100, get 43%, not 74% ...
    1. -3
      March 17 2020
      Quote: Sergst
      26 divided by 61, multiplied by 100, we get 43%, not 74% ...

      Hand-face ... Exams passed?
      1. 0
        March 17 2020
        God was merciful
        1. 0
          March 17 2020
          Quote: Sergst
          God was merciful

          I doubt that otherwise they would have received a difference of 67%, not 74% of course, but the diameter is incorrectly written in the text, not the area, which implies the meaning of what was written above.
  7. +2
    March 17 2020
    Again Damantsev with a ruler .. Well, suppose .. this SRZO fires at 300 km .. yes the EPR was reduced .. I don’t understand the only air defense installation in the RF Armed Forces that all American MLRS will fire at? Ie there are no air defense batteries? Ie the ranking in the air defense of the FR also not? Before this missile reaches a long-range complex, it will have to be on the sights of a dozen types of systems at a lower rank .., here it’s not up to the cone ..
    1. +1
      March 17 2020
      Quote: dvina71
      Again Damantsev with a ruler .. Well, suppose .. this SRZO fires at 300 km .. yes the EPR was reduced .. I don’t understand the only air defense installation in the RF Armed Forces that all American MLRS will fire at? Ie there are no air defense batteries?

      Well, let's say they will not shoot at the installation of air defense in this way, they will fire on the object (s) that this air defense covers. And the whole question will be in accordance with the "performance" of the MLRS and the air defense system, if the latter is enough for the processing speed of targets and ammunition, then the object will survive, if something is not enough, there will be a defeat accordingly.
      Do you think that any air defense has at least some chance if the Gradov division works out in its area?
      1. +1
        March 17 2020
        Quote: JD1979
        Do you think that any air defense has at least some chance if the Gradov division works out in its area?

        It all depends on the density of anti-aircraft weapons .. and who is more likely to recharge .. In general, we are discussing a horse in a vacuum .. There are no single anti-aircraft defense and MLRS ... and come to discuss their full-time confrontation .. this is close to delirium ..
      2. 0
        March 17 2020
        Quote: JD1979
        Quote: dvina71
        Again Damantsev with a ruler .. Well, suppose .. this SRZO fires at 300 km .. yes the EPR was reduced .. I don’t understand the only air defense installation in the RF Armed Forces that all American MLRS will fire at? Ie there are no air defense batteries?

        Well, let's say they will not shoot at the installation of air defense in this way, they will fire on the object (s) that this air defense covers. And the whole question will be in accordance with the "performance" of the MLRS and the air defense system, if the latter is enough for the processing speed of targets and ammunition, then the object will survive, if something is not enough, there will be a defeat accordingly.
        Do you think that any air defense has at least some chance if the Gradov division works out in its area?

        There is echeloned air defense, there is reconnaissance, etc. etc. What is the "Spherical horse in a vacuum" again?
    2. 0
      March 18 2020
      Quote: dvina71
      Ie the ranking in the air defense of the FR also not? Before this missile reaches a long-range complex, it will have to be on the sights of a dozen types of systems at a lower rank .., here it’s not up to the cone ..


      Did you watch the OTR flight path?
      The maximum height of fire as you put it A dozen types of air defense systems of lower rank - watched?
      So how?
      What do you get?
  8. 0
    March 17 2020
    Quote: JD1979
    Quote: Sergst
    God was merciful

    I doubt that otherwise they would have received a difference of 67%, not 74% of course, but the diameter is incorrectly written in the text, not the area, which implies the meaning of what was written above.

    In the text, 74 percent is obtained as dividing 26 by 35, which is fundamentally wrong. The area will be other numbers. So do not hesitate.
  9. +1
    March 17 2020
    First, OTR does not happen in nature (only OTR exists).

    Second, the PrSM is nothing more than a short-range ballistic missile - an analogue of the Iskander-M.

    Thirdly, why shoot down PrSM with the S-300, and even on the active leg of the trajectory, when there are Buk-M3 and S-350 with no "dead funnel" and much cheaper anti-missiles designed to intercept medium ballistic missiles at the terminal section of the trajectory.

    A much more dangerous weapon is the already adopted American medium-range ballistic missiles based on SM-3 Block IIA interceptors, with the replacement of the UKV heavy kinetic interceptor with the 170-ktn W-81 warhead. The maximum range of the SM-3 Block IIA in the IRBM version is 3500 km, the speed is 5,4 km / s, the basing method is the Mk41 universal launchers mounted on the American destroyers "Arlie Burke" and missile bases in Poland and Romania.
  10. +1
    March 18 2020
    How much nonsense have you written ...

    operational tactical ballistic missile defense PrSM anti-aircraft maneuvers with overloads of 25-30G (these flight modes are an integral software add-on for most inertial-navigation systems of perspective cruise and operational-tactical ballistic missiles).


    Where did this come from?
    What sore mind?
    25G for a thin-walled case with a 30-cm diameter?
    And how will OTR receive information that here and here right now - it is necessary to do anti-aircraft maneuver? If we don’t even have a single aircraft equipped with automatic anti-aircraft maneuvering systems ...
    How do you come up with such nonsense?


    The Prism is dangerous because the MLRS carries 4 missiles in two containers. HIMASR - Carries 2 missiles in one container.
    They are very fast.
    It’s just a fraction of the price of its competitor.

    Small-sized.
    Many times.
    Its dimensions: 4m in length and 0,3m in diameter.
    The size of the competitor in the form of Iskander is 7m in length and almost 1 meter in diameter.
    At one firing range of 500km.
    Comparison in whose favor is that?
    0,3 cubic meters of volume against 4,6 cubic meters.

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