U.S. Navy intends to order a bomber for air defense systems

The U.S. Navy intends to conclude a contract with the American company Raytheon for the production of a fake missile that simulates combat aircraft. According to Jane's, the Miniature Air Launched Decoy - Navy (MALD-N) missile is used as a false target for enemy air defense systems.

According to the publication, the equipment placed in the rocket is programmed to create a false target for enemy enemy radars simulating a real plane. The bait rocket has a flight range of about 900 kilometers and a cruising speed of about 0,6 Mach. If necessary, the turbojet engine can accelerate the rocket to 0,9 M. Moreover, the rocket itself can be launched from the same aircraft as the AIM-120 AMRAAM, in particular, with the F / A-18E / F Super Hornet and F-35C Lightning II .

Details of the contract were not disclosed, but earlier it became known that in the years 2021-2023 it is planned to order 250 MALD-N missiles.

As stated at the Pentagon, the main task of such a missile is to simulate real combat aircraft of the US Air Force in order to confuse enemy air defense. According to the US military, the launch of false targets gives a definite advantage to real fighters and bombers in overcoming air defense systems.

Comments

[Victor_B]

Lord!
About such deceit missiles we were reported to the military commissar in 1982.
Each of them B-52 already had four pieces. (By memory)

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Victor_B

About such deceit missiles we were reported to the military commissar in 1982.

Hardly such. MALD can simulate microwave, VHF and microwave radar signatures to achieve realistic simulations of virtually any subsonic aircraft, from F-117 to B-52. The control system uses inertial and GPS navigation, a pre-programmed flight task can contain up to 256 points, however, it can be changed by the carrier operator.
In general, a rather crappy thing, which can really seriously confuse air defense calculations.

[svp67]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

In general, a rather crappy thing, which can really seriously confuse air defense calculations.

And how many can a manned airplane carry and use? And how much space will he have left for combat loading?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: svp67

And how many can a manned airplane carry and use?

Quite a lot, because the UAV itself weighs from 45 to 115-140 kg, depending on the modification.

[svp67]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Quite a lot, because the UAV itself weighs from 45 to 115-140 kg depending on the modification

This means they will look for the possibility of their identification and screening, although everything must be destroyed. No one will give assurances that even a "decoy missile" cannot have a warhead

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: svp67

So they will look for the possibility of their identification and screening

Hurry ...

Quote: svp67

although everything must be destroyed.

Just - not worth it. This missile has a weight of 95-140 kg, what warhead is there?

[svp67]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Just - not worth it. This missile has a weight of 95-140 kg, what warhead is there?

Yes, even KINETIC, the weight for this is quite normal

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

She has no guidance. And the weight largely forms the fuel that burns out in flight.
In general, select and forget. But you need to learn how to select, here I completely agree with you.

[Dog]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

In general, select and forget

Leave for cheaper near-field products.

[Zaurbek]

We'll have to leave all the goals for cheaper air defense ..... also a bad option

[Kirya]

Quote: Mishiko (Michael)

I am not leaving the topic. Changing the probing frequencies of radio pulses from period to period - according to the pseudo-random law, we give great noise immunity, and you will not be able to interfere with the radar receiver in the next repetition period of the probing pulses until you tune your transmitter, and for this you need to receive data from your receiver, which needs to be scanned a huge frequency range and find the operating frequency in a given period, the next period - the trap has to start all over again ... It takes a lot of time. Oleg was talking about a burst of pulses - the time of irradiation of the "trap" at azimuth, meaning the width of the radiation pattern in the azimuthal plane and the scanning speed (scanning frequency) in the azimuthal plane of the radar of the anti-aircraft complex. The delay time of the signal from the "trap" for example at a distance of 100 km is equal to 666,7 μs, 10 km is equal to 66,7 μs, 1 km is equal to 6,7 μs. It is unlikely that the trap will be able to adjust to the sounding frequency. That is the whole answer to your question.

"A miracle happened, a friend helped out a friend." Andrey is from Chelyabinsk, here is the specialist's answer! MALD-N is like a goat button accordionagainst anti-aircraft missile systems S-300, S-400 and ARGSN anti-aircraft missiles of Russia. She will not even be able to adjust to false interference - there will not be enough time!

[bayard]

Quote: Dog

Leave for cheaper near-field products

Yes, just treat it as a false goal, after FLC (selection of false goals), ignore it, and fight real goals.
But these will fall.

[Grigory_45]

Quote: svp67

And how many can a manned airplane carry and use? And how much space will he have left for combat loading?

enough. MALD has a weight and dimensions smaller than the UR BB AIM-120 AMRAAM
Even the ancient false target ADM-20 (GAM-72) "Quail" was relatively small.

[ltc35]

However, it will save the real aircraft and allow it to fulfill its combat mission, the value of which is much higher.

[Kirya]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Hardly such. MALD can simulate microwave, VHF and microwave radar signatures to achieve realistic simulations of virtually any subsonic aircraft, from F-117 to B-52.

Andrey from Chelyabinsk (Andrey), everything you wrote is simply not real! The development of artificial intelligence is parallel to the field of air defense and missile defense, as well as ARGSN. At different radar distances from the target, when flying an anti-aircraft missile with an ARGSN, the deception is revealed and the real target (carrier) is most likely to be hit!

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Kirya

Andrey from Chelyabinsk (Andrey), everything you wrote is simply not real!

Alas, more than real.

Quote: Kirya

At different radar distances from the target, when flying an anti-aircraft missile with an ARGSN, the deception is revealed and the real target (carrier) is most likely to be hit!

I would really advise you to study the materiel before writing this. Firstly, there will be no retargeting of a missile with an AGSN (more precisely, this will be possible in 5% of cases), and secondly, a missile with an AGSN will not reveal anything on its own in a difficult jamming environment - God forbid that it clings to anything at all. Thirdly, the basis of air defense of the Russian Federation for today is missiles with semi-active or radio command guidance

[Kirya]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

I would really advise you to study the materiel before writing this. Firstly, there will be no retargeting missiles with AGSN (more precisely, this will be possible in 5% of cases), secondly, a missile with an AGSN will not reveal anything on its own in difficult jamming environments - God forbid that even attached to at least something. Thirdly - The basis of the Russian air defense today is missiles with semi-active or radio command guidance

This is for you, Andrei from Chelyabinsk (Andrei), you need to learn the materiel and read carefully what I wrote - there was no talk about retargeting ARGSN in my expression. For a conversation, repeat the topic about ARGSN resolution and algorithms of work. Leave your ignorance about electronic warfare as a panacea for everything. It’s not for you to judge the basis of Russia's air defense — the favorite topic of the "all-fledged" air defense forces. Everything flows and everything changes ...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Kirya

This is for you, Andrey from Chelyabinsk (Andrey), you need to learn the materiel and read carefully

Well :))) You wish to live in a fantasy world - your right.

[Kirya]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Well :))) You wish to live in a fantasy world - your right.

In a world of fantasies and assumptions, you live without understanding the physics of the work of the ARGSN and ZRS.

[Dog]

Quote: Kirya

The development of artificial intelligence is underway

Have you heard about the incident when one specially modified pixel deprived the neural network of the ability to correctly identify the picture?
Today, AI differs from what it was in the 20th century, only in the power of the iron on which it is deployed. We remembered the old developments, put them on modern iron, got the result - and again ran into the border, which so far cannot be overcome.

[Starover_Z]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

In general, a rather crappy thing, which can really seriously confuse air defense calculations.

Confused and not weak in real cases, but also when jamming. And the calculation of the consumption of missiles of air defense systems.
And we started to make our own imitators a little earlier.

And who whom ?! Who has better shutter speed.

[Liam]

Quote: Starover_Z

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

In general, a rather crappy thing, which can really seriously confuse air defense calculations.

Confused and not weak in real cases, but also when jamming. And the calculation of the consumption of missiles of air defense systems.
And we started to make our own imitators a little earlier.

And who whom ?! Who has better shutter speed.

And how will these inflatable mock-ups cheat HARMs?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Liam

And how will these inflatable mock-ups cheat HARMs?

Easy. For they, like MALD, imitate, including thermal and other signatures of real military equipment

[Liam]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Easily

Even too Easily. MALD is not a rubber product, but a mini-rocket in "hardware" that really flies and is stuffed with electronics and I suspect with a hefty cost. To argue that an inflatable rubber model can reproduce the work of a modern air defense system's combat radar is great ... optimism. Moreover, the deployment of a modern air defense system consisting of dozens of multi-ton trucks with the appropriate dimensions are troublesome and easily observed by all means of reconnaissance and it is impossible to recreate such a process with rubber models.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Liam

.MALD is not a rubber product, but a mini-rocket in the "hardware" really flying and stuffed with electronics and I suspect with a rather high cost.

Yeah. From 45 to 322 thousand dollars. That is, not much more expensive than a set of JP ES-guidance for an unguided bomb.

Quote: Liam

To claim that an inflatable rubber mockup can reproduce the work of a combat radar of a modern air defense system is a big ... optimism

M-dya, it is infinitely difficult to expect something like that even from you. WHY does the breadboard simulate the operation of a real radar? :))))) Do you think that the HARM is used exclusively according to the scheme "We flew, the enemy turned on the LMS radar and we blasted HARM on it"? :))))))))

Quote: Liam

Moreover, the deployment of a modern air defense system consisting of dozens of multi-ton trucks with the appropriate dimensions is troublesome and easy to observe by all means of reconnaissance and it is impossible to recreate such a process with rubber models.

Tell this to the Americans who confused a tank column and a passenger train in Yugoslavia.
In fact, with the correct deployment of the air defense system, it can generally be seen only very accidentally. Revealing it and destroying it is still a hassle. And if reconnaissance means find a part of the complex ready for battle, located on "quiet" combat alert, then they will hammer on it with a probability of 95% (unless there are already no resources for swotting). And here the party using the mock-ups has many interesting options - from a simple exchange of mock-ups for cruise missiles, to the formation of traps for aviation strike groups.

[Liam]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

WHY do the mock up simulate the work of a real radar? :)))))

))) I'll try again .. easier)
The purpose of the layout is to deceive the enemy, to make him work on a false goal.
To make the plane use the HARM model, it must detect itself, otherwise the plane will simply fly by and go to the real goal, and in this case, the layouts are just wasted money.
Here flies a group of attack aircraft covered as expected by EW and HARM aircraft.
Realistically explain how the layout works and what happens next.

[akarfoxhound]

It has already been worked out, 15 years ago, at least. The layout is not a "rubber swindle" in itself, other goodies come with it and the emitter blocks in the kit. And dear ones are bought, even warned about cardboard fools, they are bought ...
And I didn’t read it on the Internet That's all

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Liam

Here flies a group of attack aircraft covered as expected by EW and HARM aircraft.
Realistically explain how the layout works and what happens next.

It's not hard. So, there is a region, say, of the concentration of troops of the Russian Federation (or there is an important transport hub) which, in theory, should be covered by Russian air defense systems. Suppose, even, an air patrol, which was located not far from this area, was fired upon by missiles from the ground, although unsuccessfully.
The Americans localize the deployment area, carefully study satellite intelligence data - and find the positions of air defense systems and radar. They are well hidden - but not so good as not to be noticed. The satellite data are being verified by radio engineering and some other intelligence (for example, a group of green berets, or there UAVs with a good radar) - it turns out that the appearance and infrared singing (heat of warmly heated engines) are quite consistent with the domestic S-300 and the shell that covers it or something similar. SAM and radar in positions, maintenance personnel - to the best of fuss, conducting ongoing maintenance of complexes ...
The Americans do not need it, and they plan an air operation to destroy the air defense systems. At the same time, since they are far from stupid, they competently calculate the approach routes of shock groups and cover groups, etc. etc.
And here the band finally comes on the stage, recommending you. Competently approaches the goal, turns around ... and sadly reveals herself as "ande attack" forces, where as superior to those that she expected to meet here. And she, by the way, has assigned targets - the positions of the detected air defense systems, which she will try to storm, while they have not yet been blasted off. As a result, the enemy's losses are noticeably greater than he expected, ours are noticeably less, and even those half consist of inflatable models.

[sivuch]

I would also add competent radio exchange - both through open channels and by telecode. Otherwise, they will not believe.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Of course. I think there are others besides radio. You understand very well that there is a whole range of events, and as a layman, I can only talk about the most obvious ones.

[sivuch]

I am in the same position.
Now try to convince your opponent that it’s not just that some people are inflating rubber products.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

I won’t even try :)))) In his universe, NATO aircraft do not take into account air defense systems at all, but simply kill them with one missile when they turn on the radar. That is, a person never read about the anti-air defense system waged by the same Israelis that they achieved success only thanks to effective reconnaissance and excellent planning of operations to destroy the Arabs' ground air defense ... And that’s all happened

[Liam]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

In his universe, airplanes

In my universe, no serious army cuts the state budget for inflatable balloons, develops for this purpose MALD-N and not rubber products in the form of airplanes. It’s because Israel itself is seriously engaged in reconnaissance to combat air defense systems, even the bright Arabs had no idea the idea is to rely on inflatable props.

[sivuch]

Firstly, these mockups are a much more serious product than just a rubber toy (if anything, this is not for you, but for people who can perceive information)
Nobody spoke about the layouts of the aircraft except you. And are you sure that no one is developing or using mock-ups of military equipment?

[Liam]

Quote: sivuch

not just some inflate rubber products.

If rubber products are inflated in the Russian army, then someone needs this)
And you don’t have to be seven spans in your forehead to understand exactly who. How is it called LLC producing this inflatable garbage?
PRR is not the only way to combat air defense systems, but it is the most obvious way to demonstrate all the senselessness and unscrupulousness of all this venture with balloons. Because in the case of PRR it is impossible to fantasize and pull an owl on the globe with hallucinations about deceiving the AGSN by some imitators. In a real air defense system there are so many technically and visually unmasking factors that cannot be reproduced with inflatable products — that it’s never a matter of launching any missiles on them.

[Liam]

)))

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

the positions of the detected air defense systems, which she will try to storm

To storm? On a shaving flight with free-falling cast iron? Do you live in 2020 or in 1941?
HARM is triggered by the "beam" of a combat radar, which operates in a certain frequency range with a certain power. Not on the appearance of inflatable models, not on heat sources and other garbage, but on radio waves with a certain power and characteristics embedded in the rocket's brain. And it will do it with distances of tens of kilometers.
Where did you get such radars in inflatable mockups?
The modern object of the S-300/400 air defense system is a complex economy of dozens if not hundreds of cars with hundreds of people worth billions of dollars in personnel, with sophisticated logistics and long periods for deployment. They are produced in pieces to protect critical city objects, industrial objects, air bases, etc. Their movement is not one week and suddenly out of nowhere do not appear at the edge of the forest.
In this air defense system, there are more than one radar, but dozens of sources that create such radar "noise and din" and consume so much energy that in order to "recreate" a similar plausible picture with rubber models and microwave ovens, as forum comrades like to paint these cases, you will have to spend amounts comparable to deployment This is not counting the fact that in order to turn on all this props, you need to have a real combat radar from the S-300/400 nearby, integrated with rubber dummies, which can detect the moment of approach of aviation and, alas, get your own personalized and not fake HARM as soon as it turns on. This is not counting the fact that it is necessary to turn American green berets from professional scouts into idiots who cannot distinguish a combat vehicle from an inflatable model swaying under the pressure of the wind.
And all these passions, so that 1 of the dozens of HARMs that are used when attacking an air defense system goes into layout? For after the explosion of the first HARM giving a cloud of fragments of thousands of square meters from your entire inflatable props, there will be no wet trace

[sivuch]

Their movement is not a matter of one week and suddenly out of nowhere do not appear at the edge of the forest.
You didn’t confuse this with the S-200? The S-400 has a shorter coagulation time and more than fifty of them, not counting the remaining S-300. .
And you do not need to deploy a real radar. Have you heard about Doubler-75/125 or OU-1 products? Or about the same advertised newspaper. Of course, rubber products are not required for the classic HARM, but for AARGM, which has both an active and a passive head

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Liam

To storm? On a shaving flight with free-falling cast iron?

To storm - yes, but about the iron I wrote where?

Quote: Liam

Where did you get such radars in inflatable mockups?

They do not need them. Layouts are required for other purposes, which I described above. HARM against layouts is completely useless.

Quote: Liam

The modern object of the air defense system a la S-300/400 is the most complicated economy of dozens if not hundreds of cars with hundreds of people worth billions of dollars. They are released in pieces to protect critical city objects.

Do not write nonsense, please. Today in Russia we have 125 S-300 divisions with 1500 starting divisions, and S-400 - more than 50 divisions. A billion dollars today is S-400 POLK, and not for the native army, but for export. A regiment is 2 divisions, each division is an independent combat unit with a general-view radar, an SUO radar and launchers, and so on.

[Liam]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Layouts are required for other purposes, which I described above. HARM against layouts is completely useless

For which (except RosPil), if they are absolutely unsuitable against mainly anti-air defense systems of weapons, namely HARMs? Or do you think someone will spend time "storming" fake launchers that do not show any radar activity and no missile launches are observed despite the "attack" that has begun?) ... Are you seriously holding amers for such idiots?
The release of 4 regimental complexes a year is piece production. All places of dislocation of these air defense systems are known, their movements are carefully monitored and linden rubber products that appear from nowhere are unable to deceive anyone.
PySy and the developers (budget saws) who flush this garbage produce inflatable barracks, tents and other infrastructure of the military camp, as well as inflatable figures of hundreds of soldiers scurrying at the positions of air defense systems, checkpoints, sentries, canteens, cars, field kitchens, etc. or these are actors from extras will do)

[sivuch]

In my opinion, you simply do not read the answers, otherwise you would not ask the second time. And, perhaps, it will be a surprise for you, but PRR is only one of the means of fighting radar, and the most hemorrhoids. The number of PRR launches on not-so-modern radars is two orders of magnitude greater than the number of radars destroyed.

[Liam]

Quote: sivuch

To my mind

In my opinion, you are writing unscientific garbage. Radar-brain and heart of the air defense system. Without it, everything else is a pile of useless metal. Therefore, the destruction of the air defense system is the destruction of its radar with anti-radar missiles, and not the "attack" of fake launchers. The pilot does not see your inflatable products with his eyes to "buy" them. He flies far and high and his weapon is triggered by the beam of the combat radar and missiles are automatically launched from the source of this beam. You can inflate the dummies even to blue in the face, the plane and the rocket do not will see and will not react in any way. They will react only to a real radar. Unless these figures sawmakers come up with inflatable radio waves S, X and other ranges of combat radars.
In what other serious armies do they spend money on inflating rubber air defense systems?

[sivuch]

Now I am convinced that you are not reading. First of all, I don’t need to explain to me what a radar is for an air defense system. I know . That's just the radar is not always and not everywhere destroyed with the help of PRR. Much more often - the usual multi-purpose TSA. And they are being fooled with the help of layouts, which, by the way, are not only visually similar to air defense systems or radar, but also have similar radar, infrared and TP signatures. And to simulate the radar, those products that I have listed above are used and there is certainly something newer. Plus, of course, the special modes of the radar, the regulation of their work and other activities. So how many, in your opinion, did the PRR fire in Yugoslavia and how many radars were there?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Liam

For which (except for RosPila) if they are absolutely unsuitable against basically anti-air defense weapons — namely HARMs?

Of course, I understand that for you any imported weapon is an ultimatum and has no analogues in the world, as well as easily breaking the pre-ancient Soviet and Russian equipment, but the trouble is that the HARM is not even close to being the main "anti-air defense system" weapon.
I highly recommend that you familiarize yourself with at least "A NEW CONCEPT FOR DESTROYING AIR DEFENSE IS IMPLEMENTED IN IRAQ" (authors - A. Sumin, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor O. Korol, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor A. Shushkov) Here are some quotes

In our opinion, the comprehensive use in Yugoslavia of these intelligence systems and guided aircraft weapons equipped with inertial navigation systems (ANNs) adjusted according to the Navstar radar navigation system (SRNS) data indicates the transition from the previously existing concept of temporary suppression that began in the US air defense system (SEAD), to the new operational concept "Destruction of the enemy air defense system" (DEAD).

What kind of new concept is this?

The new concept involves, in addition to anti-radar missiles (PRR) and radio-electronic suppression means, which were previously used to suppress air defense systems operating RES, apply relatively inexpensive guided aerial bombs (UAB) and guided missiles (UR) with powerful warheads to ensure the destruction of its ground assets .

This is a word about "cast iron". And what about the "super effective" HARM?

American experts were convinced that the mass of the warhead of the Kharm missile defense did not provide guaranteed destruction of the radar, since even with small missile guidance errors it is very difficult to determine the state of the radar after an impact: it turned off or was struck, and if it was struck, what is the degree of damage.

So it goes.

Quote: Liam

Do you think someone will spend time "storming" fake launchers that do not show any radar activity and no missile launches are observed despite the "attack" that has begun?) ... Are you seriously holding amers for such idiots?

No, I don’t hold it, because I KNOW that the Americans are exactly destroying the air defense system’s positions

Judging by the press, usually at night, NATO aircraft delivered two aerial missile attacks on the positions of the Yugoslav air defense systems. In the course of the first strike on the radar-guided air defense radars, Harm-type missiles were launched. As a result of a missile strike, the radar was either disabled or turned off by their combat crews. Moreover, the maximum radar operating time for radiation usually did not exceed 23 - 25 seconds.
Then, after a short time, a second blow was delivered to the positions of the air defense systems, but with the use of several powerful UABs or SDs, which led to the destruction of air defense military equipment if it did not manage to leave its previous positions in a timely manner.

How to resist the new American approaches? We read one of the points

- misinformation of the RTR of the enemy by placing simulators of the air defense group of the air defense group on false positions

Quote: Liam

The release of 4 regimental complexes a year is piece production. All places of dislocation of these air defense systems are known, their movements are carefully monitored and linden rubber products that appear from nowhere are unable to deceive anyone.

Blessed is he who believes :)) Let's just say - for today, the USA has no means that could solve such a problem even theoretically. And almost ...

Quote: Liam

as well as inflatable figures of hundreds of soldiers scurrying at the positions of air defense systems, checkpoints, sentries, canteens, cars, field kitchens, etc. or the actors from the crowd will do it)

No, real fighters do it.

[Rome]

You put too much on HARM! it is aimed at radio-emitting targets, i.e. radar antennas and can be on kp antennas if they send something on the air! They themselves do not hit pu and even kp, I destroy the rest of the economy and the bombs are smart and not very, with visual guidance! They can induce at least from space, but still visually identify the target, in different spectra, but visually! for these identifiers they also make rubber mock-ups with different IR simulators, so that all homing confidently homing where we need, and not them

[Liam]

Quote: Eroma

Sami pu and even kp they do not hit

And who needs PU without a radar?

[Rome]

Firstly, there are spare radars, secondly, our missiles have their own radars, they are not surveillance, but sectoral, but radar.
In general, network-centric wars today say (who coined the word ), in these wars, missiles with AGSN can be launched for any external target designation, even with a fighter or UAV, or AWACS of any size! Therefore, we even have transport-loading machines that can launch rockets!
And you say why destroy launchers

[Liam]

Quote: Eroma

First there are spare radars

Only HARMs of various modifications produced about 30.000 pieces.

Quote: Eroma

our pu have their own radar

Do they have immunity from HARM? Or work on other physical principles)
And again. It's about the meaning of using balloons instead of real air defense systems. Nobody can buy such garbage, because models can’t reproduce the main sign of air defense systems. They also consume a lot of energy, so there’s a story about then simulators are conversations for the poor. This is not taking into account the resolution of the same reconnaissance UAVs, the operator of which must be blind so as not to see the difference between an inflatable layout and a dvizhuha on a real air defense system

[Rome]

Inflatable targets are not for HARMs, but for GOS weapons, they just do not distinguish rubber targets from real ones, if they look like real ones!
An UAV can detect the real position of an air defense system, but the strike is not instantaneous and the air defense system, realizing that it has been detected, can leave and leave targets.
The squadron of HARMs is not infinite, but limited! The positions of the air defense systems are blocked by electronic warheads that imitate the operation of radars, part of the missiles goes into milk, the radars themselves are covered by shells, those missiles that are aimed at the radar are not a fact that they will strike! ... and if the enemy’s forces are too many, the air defense systems will not enter the battlefield (rubber ones will come in handy targets), and will act from an ambush, taking into account the possibility of using HARM! ... for example, irradiating planes from behind, and launching missiles in the forehead
In short, the HARM is not aimed at the Avx, and the missile launcher is aimed at the Avax!

In short, not everything is so simple in the war of smart iron

[sivuch]

You never answered - how many HARMs were capitalized in 1999 in Serbia

[alexmach]

Great move!

And who whom ?! Who has better shutter speed.

In fact, they are still in a slightly more advantageous position since they are in the role of an attacker ....

[Insurgent]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Hardly such.

Not exactly, of course, but the likeness is the same. At a new technological level, with a new ideology of application ...
It’s like the next generation of aircraft, with new features.

[iouris]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

can seriously confuse air defense calculations.

Ah, it's not difficult to deceive me! ..
I'm happy to deceive myself!
AS Pushkin
Air defense missiles will be inflatable.

[Tusv]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

In general, a rather crappy thing, which can really seriously confuse air defense calculations.

In in. The worst thing for Our brother is the "control targets" when they simulate an attack. Full exposure on the radar and looking for behavior targets.
But I’m interested in the fact of applying on Light two. Ba da it is the Penguin in all its glory. He is invisible, for the time being, the discovery of bomb gangs. As I understand it, one penguin launches two false targets and unarmed, and even discovered. Now I understand the logic of the Loch kid. There should be a lot of penguins. For each pilot at least 10 pieces

[orionvitt]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

can really seriously confuse air defense calculations

It may be confusing, but it is unlikely to deceive a competent calculation. You yourself wrote here that every air target has a certain radar signature, so to speak a portrait. The whole institute deals with this problem.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: orionvitt

It may be confusing, but it is unlikely to deceive a competent calculation. You yourself wrote here that every air target has a certain radar signature, so to speak a portrait.

A portrait depends on 100500 things, including the perspective of the goal and so on. In difficult jamming, separating flies from cutlets will be extremely difficult. And in any case - this is the time that in a fleeting battle is worth its weight in gold.

[orionvitt]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

In difficult jamming, separating flies from cutlets will be extremely difficult.

Difficult, I agree. But not impossible.

[venik]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Hardly such. MALD can simulate microwave, VHF and microwave radar signatures to achieve realistic simulations of virtually any subsonic aircraft, from F-117 to B-52.

=======
Isn’t it easier to place Luneberg lenses under the radiolucent fairing, which, with certain sizes and configurations, can simulate the EPR of almost ANY aircraft from F-117 to B-52 ???
Although YES! It's the Yankees! They "do not look for easy ways" - the main thing for them is that it is "better" and more expensive!

[sivuch]

those. Can they simulate the EPR of a real aircraft in meter and decameter ranges? Vaguely imagine how this is possible

[venik]

Quote: sivuch

those. Can they simulate the EPR of a real aircraft in meter and decameter ranges? Vaguely imagine how this is possible

======
And who uses it in radar air defense systems meter и decameter Do not tell me the range ???
As far as I know, these frequencies are used exclusively in over-the-horizon radars (for example, early warning systems)! Air defense radars are usually centimeter (maximum decimeter) and millimeter ranges. For example, the 96L6E all-altitude detector of the S-400 complex operates in the "C" range !!! Air traffic control and monitoring stations - in the "L" and "S" bands ......
You might have guessed, especially since the Yankees use Luneberg lenses (in peacetime) to hide the true ESR values ​​of their F-35 fighters!

[sivuch]

Those. , Radar Sky and P-18 - meter range? Thanks I'll know .

[sivuch]

Meant - not meter? Because Terek has a wavelength of 1.7m, Heaven is not sure, but, it seems, too

[Victor_B]

Here's a missile simulator B-52:

[bessmertniy]

Much invented new is well forgotten old. In principle, we need some cheaper phantoms. This one doesn't look cheap.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: bessmertniy

This one doesn't look cheap.

The English wiki gives depending on the modification from 45 to 322 thousand dollars. Absolutely not beyond

[bessmertniy]

For their budget tolerant. Probably, with a large party - discounts?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: bessmertniy

For their budget tolerant. Probably, with a large party - discounts?

Yes, who knows :))))) Judging by the American military-industrial complex - more likely premiums :))))
In general, the thing is unpleasant, you can’t ignore, you need to look for methods of selection.

[Romario_Argo]

need to look for selection methods

it remains only to bring to mind ROFAR - radio-photon radars, there will be selection and how many people and how many and what weapons on board

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Romario_Argo

it remains only to bring to mind ROFAR

I believe there are simpler ways, the main thing is to do it.

[Kirya]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

I suppose there are simpler ways, the main thing is to do it.

It's only in the minds "all-consuming" - "Russia does nothing". Russia has such weapons - you simply did not dream, and the designers are engaged in all aspects of the development of weapons, including on new principles.

[Dog]

Quote: Kirya

designers deal with all aspects of arms development

For example, IL-112.
To solve the problem - you must first see it. But, of course, not through the eyes of all-scouts.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Kirya

This is only in the minds of the "all-propals" - "Russia is not doing anything."

I wrote somewhere that the Russian Federation does not deal with this? :))))

Quote: Kirya

Russia has such weapons - you just never dreamed

I have no doubt that you were dreaming. But still do not have to tell your dreams on the site dedicated to real weapons.

[Kirya]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

I wrote somewhere that the Russian Federation does not deal with this? :))))

And where is it written that you said that? So you yourself attributed to all props! They flogged themselves.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

I have no doubt that you were dreaming. But still do not have to tell your dreams on the site dedicated to real weapons.

Judging by your statements, you have colorful dreams! For knowledge does not smell at all!

[Tusv]

Reflect the signal, as on the "Pope" of my meter three-band P-12
These Yankees do not perceive the native Paramilitary for people?

[Mountain shooter]

Raytheon is a super company ... I'm even afraid to think about what budgetary funds it "digests" ...

[Tusv]

Quote: Mountain Shooter

Raytheon is a super company ... I'm even afraid to think about what budgetary funds it "digests" ...

Do not be afraid,. Civil and military budget of the Russian Federation twice The basis of American and European air defense

[knn54]

For LOCAL conflicts, it will do. And in a full-scale war, the carriers will be "exposed" with all the consequences for the latter.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: knn54

And in a full-scale war, the carriers will be "exposed" with all the consequences for the latter.

So its tactical aviation is including. And in the case of Armageddon, ICBMs will fly faster, so that the air defense will be pretty thinned out

[Rome]

With the IBR, this is a mutual problem, their airfield and other infrastructure necessary for aviation, I think, together with the planes will also be thinned out! And in general, after the ICBM, everyone will not be able to win! Even if there is no nuclear winter, the governments and NATO command will certainly not be up to Russia, just as we are.

[Sky strike fighter]

YouTube channel LA MAGRA demonstrated the process of manufacturing and testing the Russian reconnaissance-strike drone Orion.
https://youtu.be/ScobhmDDz60

[sabakina]

So, in contrast to this system, they will come up with a scan for the presence of bioforms like in "Star Wars. Episode IV". The eternal struggle between the shield and the sword.

[Piramidon]

Quote: sabakina

bioform scan

The 6th generation is promised to be made unmanned, without bioforms.

[sabakina]

The unmanned 6th generation is the future, I do not know how distant. Imitators of the present.

[Piramidon]

Quote: sabakina

The unmanned 6th generation is the future, I do not know how distant. Imitators of the present.

Devices from "Star Wars" are also far from real

[Avior]

Hamster put in the bait?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Sergey, an American hamster is expensive. Earthworms!

[Avior]

Hardly, we need warm-blooded logic :))
Rats or mice can be planted, bought at a cheap price from the sewer service.
And symbolically, and inexpensively, and when else rats fly by plane :)))

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Avior

Hardly, we need warm-blooded logic :))

And they will heat them :)))))))))

Quote: Avior

Rats or mice can be planted, buy at a cheap price from the sewer service

It is truth too:)))

[voyaka uh]

The Israeli Air Force has long been using such missiles. We must give the air defense something to bring down and report on 75% of the intercepted. Then air defense workers give a bonus, and all parties are satisfied

[Hey]

Isn’t it easier to simulate a cruise missile strike in the form of an empty engine case? Probably much cheaper.

[sabakina]

Actually, we are talking about simulating aircraft, not cruise missiles.

[Hey]

Actually, we are talking about simulating aircraft, not cruise missiles.

Actually, the task of air defense is to protect the object from damage. And if the air defense will chase only carriers and miss weapons, the price of such air defense is worthless.
An example from the history of the Second World War. The indicator for German fighters is the number of aircraft shot down. For Soviet fighters, the indicator is the successful completion of their mission by attack and bomber aircraft. The rest along the way. The result is obvious.
Therefore, "dummies" are a problem for air defense, especially when a real threat lingers between them.

[Grigory_45]

Quote: MUD

Isn’t it easier to simulate a cruise missile strike in the form of an empty engine case?

This is another, also known way to suppress or complicate the life of air defense. After releasing false targets, force them to work on them, having spent ammunition and having opened the defense system.

In this case, we are talking about an UAV defender of an airplane (an aviation analogue of a submarine simulator). Separating from the carrier, such a false target simulates the EPR of a carrier aircraft, its infrared signature, speed, makes maneuvers in heading and altitude, etc. To distinguish a snag from a real target, and in a difficult jamming environment is a difficult task.

[Oleg1263]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

MALD can simulate microwave, VHF and microwave radar signatures to achieve realistic simulations of virtually any subsonic aircraft, from F-117 to B-52.

That is, does she know the algorithms of the carrier frequencies of the scanning radar? Or does the radar operate at a certain frequency, and is it quite easy for the snag to radiate these frequencies on the air? Please explain .

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: oleg1263

That is, does she know the algorithms of the carrier frequencies of the scanning radar?

Quite simply, MALD gives a picture of a maneuvering air target with RCS and thermal radiation, similar to a fighter or other simulated aircraft. This will have to be distracted and "explained" even under ideal conditions, and in a difficult jamming environment it will generally be indistinguishable from a real aircraft.

[Mishiko]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

This will have to be distracted and "explained" even under ideal conditions, and in a difficult jamming environment it will generally be indistinguishable from a real aircraft.

Andrey is from Chelyabinsk! What is the minimum time for tuning the "trap" transmitter to the frequency of the range of the ARGSN radar receiver and to the power comparable to the ESR of the carrier from the distance? At relatively small distances, it will immediately be seen what is the trap and what is the target, even in the presence of interference.

[Mishiko]

Forgot to mention the polarization of radio waves! This further complicates the task for "traps".

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Mishiko

Andrey is from Chelyabinsk! What is the minimum time for tuning the "trap" transmitter to the frequency of the range of the ARGSN radar receiver and to the power comparable, with the ESR of the carrier, from the distance?

Excuse me, but what does the ARGSN have to do with it?

Quote: Mishiko

At relatively short distances - it will immediately be seen what the trap is and what the target is, even in the presence of interference.

On relatively small ones, it will. But if the calculation of the air defense missile system identified the trap as a target deserving attention, and applied a missile defense system with an ARGSN on it, then if the indicated ARGSN "explained" upon approaching that it was still a trap, then the trap fulfilled its task completely. And yes, how many missiles with AGSN are in our troops? :)

[Mishiko]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Excuse me, but what does the ARGSN have to do with it?

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

On relatively small - will be. That's only if the calculation of the SAM determined trap like a target, deserving attention, and applied on it a missile defense system with ARGSN, then if the specified ARGSN "explained" upon approach

Andrey from Chelyabinsk - according to the polarization of radio waves, the trap is easily detected at long distances by the radar of the anti-aircraft complex. Can you answer why? About the ARGSN, you conducted a dialogue above.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Mishiko

Andrey from Chelyabinsk - according to the polarization of radio waves, the trap is easily detected at large distances of the radar of the anti-aircraft complex. Can you answer why?

No I can not. Enlighten? :))))

[Oleg1263]

I’ll ask a different question - say, the radar starts scanning at a frequency of 1.988 GHz, then the frequency changes, say 30 times per second according to an algorithm known only to the radar itself. The question is, how will this false target simulate a change in frequencies? To do this, she must know the algorithms, otherwise she will be identified as false within 0.5 seconds.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: oleg1263

I’ll ask a different question - say, the radar starts scanning at a frequency of 1.988 GHz, then the frequency changes, say 30 times per second according to an algorithm known only to the radar itself. The question is, how will this false target simulate a change in frequencies?

let's first figure out what this frequency shift will give you and at what distance.

[Mishiko]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

let's first figure out what this frequency shift will give you and at what distance.

Andrey is from Chelyabinsk! Changing frequencies gives noise immunity. What hindrances do you even know?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Mishiko

Andrey from Chelyabinsk! Changing frequencies gives noise immunity.

Michael, do not leave the topic. Oleg said

Quote: oleg1263

The question is, how will this false target simulate a change in frequencies? To do this, she must know the algorithms, otherwise she will be identified as false within 0.5 seconds.

I asked him a question, what will the frequency change in this case give? In the context of the foregoing, it is obvious that we are talking about the range of detection and classification of the target as a trap. Where is the noise immunity here?
And yes, modern electronic warfare stations automatically adjust to the changing frequency, so talking about noise immunity is not entirely correct. Of course, a radar that generates random frequencies is much more difficult to "hammer", but it is possible

[Mishiko]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Michael, do not leave the topic. Oleg said

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

I asked him a question, what will the frequency change in this case give? In the context of the foregoing, it is obvious that we are talking about the range of detection and classification of the target as a trap. Where is the noise immunity here?

I do not leave the topic. Changing the sounding frequencies of radio pulses from period to period - according to the pseudo-random law, we give greater noise immunity, and you will not be able to interfere with the radar receiver in the next repetition period of the probing pulses until you tune your transmitter, and for this you need to receive data from your receiver, which needs to scan a huge frequency range and find the operating frequency in this period, the next period - the trap has to start all over again ... It takes a lot of time. Oleg was talking about a burst of pulses - the time of irradiation of the "trap" at azimuth, meaning the width of the radiation pattern in the azimuthal plane and the scanning speed (scanning frequency) in the azimuthal plane of the radar of the anti-aircraft complex. The delay time of the signal from the "trap", for example, at a distance of 100 km, is equal to 666,7 μs, 10 km is equal to 66,7 μs, 1 km is equal to 6,7 μs. It is unlikely that the trap will be able to adjust to the sounding frequency. That is the whole answer to your question.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Sorry, but this is not the answer. With your permission, I will unsubscribe in more detail in the evening

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Well, finally I can answer in detail :)))
There is a feeling that we are talking about completely different things. I am talking about MALD, whose task is to simulate an attacking combat aircraft.
The technology of its application is approximately the following. Even before entering the enemy’s air defense zone, airplanes drop these same MALDs. In theory, the launch of the MALD should be carried out before the group of aircraft reaches the line of detection of the enemy's radar (even ground-based at least airborne).
Further, MALD flies to itself along a certain path set in advance in it, simulating the flight of a fighter-bomber. In essence, the idea is that by the probable moment of detecting aircraft, the enemy would see planes and MALDs at the same time, but did not know which of them was who.
That is, it should be like this - a general overview radar fixes several groups of targets coming from different directions, and identified as fighter bombers. But in reality, only part of the goals are those, the rest are MALD. And the task of calculating the air defense system will be to understand which of the goals that the radar sees are airplanes, and which ones are their imitation of MALD.
MALD does not put any interference. MALD cannot, does not know how, and is not intended to "hide" the plane posing as it. If the positions of the air defense missile systems are attacked by airplanes and MALDs, then the calculation will perfectly see both of them (unless, of course, specialized electronic warfare aircraft are used, but we are not talking about them now), but it will not know which of them is who - this requires target selection. MALD is not a means of active individual protection of the aircraft, diverting the strike of the missile defense system. It's just an airplane simulator - nothing more, but nothing less. MALD, in principle, cannot and should not resist detection - it will be detected by the most common pre-ancient radar, incapable of "chaotic" frequency change. Its task is not to hide or jam the radar, but to be detected, but at the same time classified as a strike aircraft.
And now let me repeat my question - how will changing the radar frequencies make it possible to identify MALD as a simulator?

[Mishiko]

And now let me repeat my question - how will changing the radar frequencies make it possible to identify MALD as a simulator?

Dear Andrey from Chelyabinsk (Andrey)!
1. In the absence of a change in carrier frequency radar radio pulses (S-300, S-400, active seeker), the MALD "trap" transmitter, having tuned in once to the operating carrier frequency of the anti-aircraft radar radio pulses, will also issue its own frequency in the following irradiation periods (bursts of probing pulses) answer instantly . It will be tantamount to radar transponder and the mark on the IRF radar screen will be at the point of receiving the signal reflected from the MALD glider (taking into account the resolving power of the anti-aircraft radar in range equal to the pulse duration, at t = 2 μs this is 300 meters), that is, the operator, differences on the screen of IKO won't see.
2. When changing carrier frequency anti-aircraft radar pulses, from period to period, the MALD radio transmitter will produce its response radio signal with a delay equal to the processing of the receiving signals of the anti-aircraft radar in its receiver and the MALD transmitter settings. Take for example the radiation warning and guidance stations AN / ALR-45 and AN / ALR-46, where the DSA-20 digital computer, created by Dalmo Victor, which provides processing of received signals for fast (in about 30-40 μs) recognition of their emitting means. For the receiver, we take t prm = 40 μs, for the transmitter t prd = 30 μs, the total delay is
t total = t prm + t prd. It turns out that on the IKO screen the operator will see the signal mark from the MALD glider (small ESR = 0,02 m2 - weaker) and at a distance of 10,5 km (delay time t total = 70 μs) mark from the MALD transceiver, equal to the mark for a specific aircraft. There will be not one but two marks from the target MALD on one azimuth, taking into account that the mark from the MALD glider, in view of the small EPR, will be observed when detecting at a detection range of at least 159,549 km for S-300 radars according to open data (D = 600 km with EPR = 4 m2) the transceiver varies from 10,2 km and further for the entire remaining length of the range scale (in the presence of a variable delay line in the MALD receiver). All this will occur during irradiation of MALD in all periods of a certain direction in azimuth. The operator sees the MALD target, identifying it from a distance of 159,549 km according to open data, and possibly from a longer distance, according to the true value of the parameters of the anti-aircraft radar. Using the method of blanking range sections, it is easy to determine two or more different in azimuth (two targets cannot fly on the same azimuth, given the resolution in azimuth).
Thank you for understanding.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Good day, dear Michael!

Quote: Mishiko

In the absence of a change in the carrier frequency of the radar radio pulses (S-300, S-400, active seeker), the MALD "trap" transmitter, having tuned in once to the operating carrier frequency of the anti-aircraft radar radio pulses, will give its response in the following irradiation periods (bursts of probing pulses) instantly

I seem to understand. And I am very grateful to you for the detailed answer, written, moreover, in an understandable language for a layman (which, of course, I am).
But dear Mikhail, I highly doubt that there is a certain transmitter on the MALD. Modern electronic warfare systems are able to adjust to a "chaotic" frequency (of course, with a reaction time), but their mass is clearly prohibitive for a rocket weighing a maximum of 140 kg, and even capable of flying almost 1000 km. There is clearly something simpler, something like a set of reflectors, which, when adjusted, give a MALD-u EPR, similar to the EPR of a particular combat aircraft. Accordingly, the signals of any radar, albeit changing the carrier frequency, albeit not, will still be reflected precisely from the airframe and MALD reflectors, and in this case, changing the frequency does not give any gain, as I understand it, because there will be only one mark

[Grigory_45]

The US Navy intends to conclude a contract with the American company Raytheon for the production of a fake rocket simulating combat aircraft

the idea is far from new. Such false targets were in service with the "strategists" B-52
ADM-20 (GAM-72) "Quail" - decoy cruise missile

entered service in 1961. With the equipping of bombers with SRAM aeroballistic missiles, as well as with the improvement of the air defense systems of a potential enemy, "Quail" traps gradually disappeared from the equipment of aircraft. In December 1978 the Quail was officially decommissioned.

[Mentat]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

In general, a rather crappy thing, which can really seriously confuse air defense calculations.

The air situation of the Russian air defense / missile defense systems is controlled further than 900 km. 1 plane flew, 2 flew from this point. It is clear that this is the same bogus rocket.

By the time they become massively adopted by the Americans, we will have adopted radars based on radio photonics, which determine the type of aircraft in a different way and are able to create their 3D model, which obviously will reset the very principle of operation of such missiles.

In other words, it is again a weapon against the Papuans.

[Sancho_SP]

And which of the two to shoot down, even if it is clear?

[Grigory_45]

Quote: Mentat

1 plane flew, 2 flew from this point. It is clear that this is the same bogus rocket.

Yes, at least 10 became. Which of the 10 marks is true (target)?

This is the task of the false goal - to impede the actions of air defense as much as possible. Or spending rockets on dummies, or spending time on target selection. Or both taken together. And if there are no such traps, not 1, not 2, not 10, but 40? Or 100? Yes, there will be interference from the growlers? Go figure it out.
MALD is a rather small thing (smaller, you can take them decently. Yes, and they cost not so much - not more expensive than missiles, and even more so guarded aircraft and the lives of pilots.

If false targets take on missiles, emptying the ammunition load of air defense systems, if the number of losses decreases by at least 20-30%, they have fulfilled their task.

We shouldn’t vote that it’s bullshit and it’s impossible, but to conduct an expert (not a couch level) assessment of the possibilities of these buns, and if we have a positive conclusion, get our own. It’s worth learning from the enemy, and not just faulting him.

[Sancho_SP]

Wow, finally guessed. It remains to make the same drones

[eklmn]

For the curious:
Raytheon website
“Obfuscation of enemy air defense systems”
https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/mald
(lane google)
“MALD decoy is a flexible, modular and low cost system that can save pilots and planes from danger. This is a disposable air-based aircraft, similar to a US or allied aircraft for integrated enemy air defense systems or IADS.
The United States and its allies can confuse and deceive the enemy MAAP by sending a group of MALD decoys into false airspace. The weight of the weapon is less than 160kg, and its range is about 900km. After starting from the receiving aircraft, the MALD bait completes a programmed mission.
In addition to protecting valuable aircraft, the weapon offers anti-aircraft operations to neutralize air defense systems that pose a threat to the US and allied pilots.
MALD-J DECOY
The MALD-J bait is a variant of the basic bait with a silencer and the world's first built-in silencer. The MALD-J unmanned bait is oriented and works much closer to the victim radar than the usual electronic warfare when jamming electronics, allowing aviators and aircraft to stay away from danger. And he can linger in the target area for a long period of time - enough time to complete the mission. ”
I’ll add from myself. Recently online edition of Defense.World
wrote that BAE Systems, as part of the DARPA project, demonstrated a new small form factor semiconductor technology designed to measure radio frequency and communication signals in combat conditions in combination with a drone. Hedgehog technology allows operators to get a clear picture of radio signals and their geolocation in real time with a very small size device. The technology provides a wide frequency range and instantaneous bandwidth, which are currently not available for other SDRs.
And if such a device is in this racket, then it will be possible to recognize both the source of the radio signal and its location.

[Nikolay3]

eklmn, write Raytheon advertising stories? For Russia, the MALD-J bait data is not a threat and will be easily knocked down. Read above carefully about their main and serious drawback - two marks on the air defense radar screen from a distance of 160 km in free space at one azimuth ...

[eklmn]

“Read above carefully about their main and serious drawback - two marks on the air defense radar screen from a distance of 160 km in free space at one azimuth ...”
Followed your advice (thanks!) And read a very good analysis by Mishiko (and thanks to him!). Mishiko writes about two signals based on the example of signal processing from AN / ALR-45 and AN / ALR-46. He is right in his proof, but when I googled these devices, they date back to 1970 and have long been discontinued. In my comment I gave a description of the BAE System for the DARPA project:
https://www.defenseworld.net/news/26513/BAE_Systems_Demos_
Small_form_factor_Semiconductor_Tech_in_DARPA_Project # .XnEyWUBFxjp
“The DRAGONS program is designed to enable the identification and geolocation of small-form factor integrated signals in drones. This study and the core study of MATRICs and Hedgehog was developed with financial support from DARPA. ”
The figure, of course, is not given, the secret so far. But it is possible that this system will create one signal for the source locator.

[Nikolay3]

eklmn! It’s impossible to make intelligence devices that "instantly" process the receiving radio signals. Physically - this is not possible at this time. Therefore, always from MALD-J will be observed two marks on the same azimuth.

[eklmn]

"It is impossible to make reconnaissance devices that" instantly "process the received radio signals."
Absolutely right! But the “locate receiving signals” is also necessary for the locator. Because Since Russian electronics is 5-10 years behind, it is quite possible that the signal from the drone will be within the locator's error or even lower.

[Mishiko]

Quote: eklmn

Absolutely right! But the “locate receiving signals” is also necessary for the locator. Since Russian electronics is 5-10 years behind, it is quite possible that the signal from the drone will be within the locator's error or even lower.

You are mistaken! In the field of radar technology, Russia is ahead of everyone. And do not confuse radio engineering, electronics - with computer technology! You do not understand the principle of operation of a pulsed radar, judging by your expression! and deliberately distort a sufficiently large delay in signal processing in
rocket equipment MALD-J. You are writing a lie!

[eklmn]

Mishiko, you proceed from the technical knowledge of modern Russian technology and interpret your knowledge into Amer’s “hardware”.
Neither I nor you know the parameters, a lot is kept secret. You know that Russian electronic warfare systems are the best in the world from two sources - Russian and Amer. It is clear that you will absolutely believe Russian, but you cannot believe Amer’s. They Americans are “modest” in praising themselves; it’s easier for them to praise another.
“Can the trap adjust to the probe frequency - unlikely. "
Unlikely - your opinion. Nobody will dissuade you.

[Cowbra]

Introductory is given:
* Producer - Raytheon (this is where the current minister worked, which orders them)
* In the Air Force already all solid "invisible", for radar and so not visible (multiple highlighted like)
* The primary task is direct NOW, but it was necessary yesterday - to deceive someone else’s air defense systems. and create at least something similar to air defense
----------
Findings? Yes, what are the conclusions! There is no corruption, and the USA is the most advanced country in the world!

[Mentat]

Quote: Gregory_45

Quote: Mentat

1 plane flew, 2 flew from this point. It is clear that this is the same bogus rocket.

Yes, at least 10 became. Which of the 10 marks is true (target)?

This is the task of the false goal - to impede the actions of air defense as much as possible. Or spending rockets on dummies, or spending time on target selection. Or both taken together. And if there are no such traps, not 1, not 2, not 10, but 40? Or 100? Yes, there will be interference from the growlers? Go figure it out.

I’ll give you some ideas to demonstrate the absurdity of the very idea of ​​using such means against a developed opponent such as Russia.

These are subsonic missiles. What flies on the sound towards the border, do not you guess? This means that knocking down such goals will be much more optimal than skipping one. In addition, there cannot be 100 real subsonic targets, after they release real missiles it will become absolutely obvious that there is something. T.O. they are only suitable for delaying the moment of destruction of carriers.

However, until the launch of real missiles there may be no talk of a full-scale exchange of attacks, only of large-scale provocation. After the release of such, the sense in blended missiles is already lost, a full-scale exchange of nuclear strikes begins.
Moreover, even a massive raid on the borders of Russia can be regarded as an excuse for a preemptive strike, and again, the meaning of the bogus missiles is lost.

Further, in order to hit targets deep in the territory, it is first necessary to somehow suppress air defense closer to the border. In this case, there is no point in knocking down these 100 goals in advance, it is necessary to cut off at a logical level. The maneuvers of aircraft producing such targets will say much more than they themselves.

By the way, why did you suddenly decide to ignore information about radio photon radars? They already exist at the level of prototypes and completely, at a fundamental level, eliminate the very possibility of using such missiles.

Given all this, I repeat: weapons against the Papuans.