U.S. Navy intends to order a bomber for air defense systems

U.S. Navy intends to order a bomber for air defense systems

The U.S. Navy intends to conclude a contract with the American company Raytheon for the production of a fake missile that simulates combat aircraft. According to Jane's, the Miniature Air Launched Decoy - Navy (MALD-N) missile is used as a false target for enemy air defense systems.


According to the publication, the equipment placed in the rocket is programmed to create a false target for enemy enemy radars simulating a real plane. The bait rocket has a flight range of about 900 kilometers and a cruising speed of about 0,6 Mach. If necessary, the turbojet engine can accelerate the rocket to 0,9 M. Moreover, the rocket itself can be launched from the same aircraft as the AIM-120 AMRAAM, in particular, with the F / A-18E / F Super Hornet and F-35C Lightning II .

Details of the contract were not disclosed, but earlier it became known that in the years 2021-2023 it is planned to order 250 MALD-N missiles.

As stated at the Pentagon, the main task of such a missile is to simulate real combat aircraft of the US Air Force in order to confuse enemy air defense. According to the US military, the launch of false targets gives a definite advantage to real fighters and bombers in overcoming air defense systems.
Photos used:
https://www.janes.com/
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  1. Victor_B 15 March 2020 09: 00 New
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    Lord!
    About such deceit missiles we were reported to the military commissar in 1982.
    Each of them B-52 already had four pieces. (By memory)
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 09: 15 New
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      Quote: Victor_B
      About such deceit missiles we were reported to the military commissar in 1982.

      Hardly such. MALD can simulate microwave, VHF and microwave radar signatures to achieve realistic simulations of virtually any subsonic aircraft, from F-117 to B-52. The control system uses inertial and GPS navigation, a pre-programmed flight task can contain up to 256 points, however, it can be changed by the carrier operator.
      In general, a rather crappy thing, which can really seriously confuse air defense calculations.
      1. svp67 15 March 2020 09: 19 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In general, a rather crappy thing, which can really seriously confuse air defense calculations.

        And how many can a manned airplane carry and use? And how much space will he have left for combat loading?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 09: 29 New
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          Quote: svp67
          And how many can a manned airplane carry and use?

          Quite a lot, because the UAV itself weighs from 45 to 115-140 kg, depending on the modification.
          1. svp67 15 March 2020 09: 33 New
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            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Quite a lot, because the UAV itself weighs from 45 to 115-140 kg depending on the modification

            So they will look for the possibility of their identification and screening, although everything must be destroyed. No one will give assurances that even a "bogus rocket" cannot have a warhead
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 09: 39 New
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              Quote: svp67
              So they will look for the possibility of their identification and screening

              Hurry ...
              Quote: svp67
              although everything must be destroyed.

              Just - not worth it. This missile has a weight of 95-140 kg, what warhead is there?
              1. svp67 15 March 2020 09: 40 New
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                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Just - not worth it. This missile has a weight of 95-140 kg, what warhead is there?

                Yes, even KINETIC, the weight for this is quite normal
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 10: 10 New
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                  She has no guidance. And the weight largely forms the fuel that burns out in flight.
                  In general, select and forget. But you need to learn how to select, here I completely agree with you.
                  1. Dog
                    Dog 15 March 2020 13: 26 New
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                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    In general, select and forget

                    Leave for cheaper near-field products.
                    1. Zaurbek 15 March 2020 19: 53 New
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                      We'll have to leave all the goals for cheaper air defense ..... also a bad option
                    2. Kirya 15 March 2020 20: 03 New
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                      Quote: Mishiko (Michael)
                      I do not leave the topic. Changing the probe frequencies of radio pulses from period to period - according to the pseudo-random law we give greater noise immunity, and you can not interfere with the radar receiver in the next repetition period of the probe pulses until you adjust your transmitter, and for this you need to get data from your receiver, which needs to be scanned a huge range of frequencies and find the working frequency in a given period, the next period - it is necessary for the trap to start all over again ... It takes a lot of time. Oleg talked about a train of pulses - the exposure time of the “trap” in azimuth, bearing in mind the width of the radiation pattern in the azimuthal plane and the scanning speed (scanning frequency) in the azimuthal plane of the radar of the anti-aircraft complex. The delay time of the signal from the "trap", for example, at a distance of 100 km, is 666,7 μs, 10 km is 66,7 μs, 1 km is 6,7 μs. Whether the trap can adapt to the probing frequency is unlikely. That is the whole answer to your question.

                      “A miracle happened, a friend bailed out a friend.” Andrew from Chelyabinsk, that's the specialist’s answer! MALD-N is like a goat button accordionagainst anti-aircraft missile systems S-300, S-400 and ARGSN anti-aircraft missiles of Russia. She will not even be able to adjust to false interference - there will not be enough time!
                    3. bayard 15 March 2020 23: 05 New
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                      Quote: Dog
                      Leave for cheaper near-field products

                      Yes, just treat it as a false goal, after FLC (selection of false goals), ignore it, and fight real goals.
                      But these will fall.
        2. Grigory_45 15 March 2020 11: 44 New
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          Quote: svp67
          And how many can a manned airplane carry and use? And how much space will he have left for combat loading?

          enough. MALD has a weight and dimensions smaller than the UR BB AIM-120 AMRAAM
          Even the ancient false target of the ADM-20 (GAM-72) "Quail" was relatively small.
        3. ltc35 15 March 2020 16: 25 New
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          However, it will save the real aircraft and allow it to fulfill its combat mission, the value of which is much higher.
      2. Kirya 15 March 2020 09: 34 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Hardly such. MALD can simulate microwave, VHF and microwave radar signatures to achieve realistic simulations of virtually any subsonic aircraft, from F-117 to B-52.

        Andrey from Chelyabinsk (Andrey), everything you wrote is simply not real! The development of artificial intelligence is parallel to the field of air defense and missile defense, as well as ARGSN. At different radar distances from the target, when flying an anti-aircraft missile with an ARGSN, the deception is revealed and the real target (carrier) is most likely to be hit!
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 10: 08 New
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          Quote: Kirya
          Andrey from Chelyabinsk (Andrey), everything you wrote is simply not real!

          Alas, more than real.
          Quote: Kirya
          At different radar distances from the target, when flying an anti-aircraft missile with an ARGSN, the deception is revealed and the real target (carrier) is most likely to be hit!

          I would really advise you to study the materiel before writing this. Firstly, there will be no retargeting of a missile with an AGSN (more precisely, this will be possible in 5% of cases), and secondly, a missile with an AGSN will not reveal anything on its own in a difficult jamming environment - God forbid that it clings to anything at all. Thirdly, the basis of air defense of the Russian Federation for today is missiles with semi-active or radio command guidance
          1. Kirya 15 March 2020 11: 58 New
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            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            I would really advise you to study the materiel before writing this. Firstly, there will be no retargeting missiles with AGSN (more precisely, this will be possible in 5% of cases), secondly, a missile with an AGSN will not reveal anything on its own in difficult jamming environments - God forbid that even attached to at least something. Thirdly - The basis of the Russian air defense today is missiles with semi-active or radio command guidance

            This is for you, Andrei from Chelyabinsk (Andrei), you need to learn the materiel and read carefully what I wrote - there was no talk of retargeting ARGS in my expression. To talk, repeat the topic about the resolution of the ARGSN and algorithms of work. About EW, keep your ignorance to yourself, as a panacea for everything. It’s not up to you to judge the basis of the Russian air defense - a favorite topic of “all-tramplers” in the military. Everything flows and everything changes ...
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 14: 14 New
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              Quote: Kirya
              This is for you, Andrey from Chelyabinsk (Andrey), you need to learn the materiel and read carefully

              Well :))) You wish to live in a fantasy world - your right.
              1. Kirya 15 March 2020 16: 36 New
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                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Well :))) You wish to live in a fantasy world - your right.

                In a world of fantasies and assumptions, you live without understanding the physics of the work of the ARGSN and ZRS.
        2. Dog
          Dog 15 March 2020 13: 31 New
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          Quote: Kirya
          The development of artificial intelligence is underway

          Have you heard about the incident when one specially modified pixel deprived the neural network of the ability to correctly identify the picture?
          Today, AI differs from what it was in the 20th century, only in the power of the iron on which it is deployed. We remembered the old developments, put them on modern iron, got the result - and again ran into the border, which so far cannot be overcome.
      3. Starover_Z 15 March 2020 10: 16 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In general, a rather crappy thing, which can really seriously confuse air defense calculations.

        Confused and not weak in real cases, but also when jamming. And the calculation of the consumption of missiles of air defense systems.
        And we started to make our own imitators a little earlier.

        And who whom ?! Who has better shutter speed.
        1. Liam 15 March 2020 10: 22 New
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          Quote: Starover_Z
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          In general, a rather crappy thing, which can really seriously confuse air defense calculations.

          Confused and not weak in real cases, but also when jamming. And the calculation of the consumption of missiles of air defense systems.
          And we started to make our own imitators a little earlier.

          And who whom ?! Who has better shutter speed.

          And how will these inflatable mock-ups cheat HARMs?
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 10: 33 New
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            Quote: Liam
            And how will these inflatable mock-ups cheat HARMs?

            Easy. For they, like MALD, imitate, including thermal and other signatures of real military equipment
            1. Liam 15 March 2020 11: 05 New
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              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Easily

              Even too easily. MALD is not a rubber product, but a mini-rocket in hardware that is really flying and crammed with electronics and I suspect it is expensive. To say that an inflatable rubber prototype can reproduce the operation of a modern combat air defense radar is great ... optimism. Moreover, the deployment of a modern air defense system consisting of dozens of multi-ton trucks with the appropriate dimensions are troublesome and easily observed by all means of reconnaissance and it is impossible to recreate such a process with rubber models.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 11: 46 New
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                Quote: Liam
                .MALD is not a rubber product, but a mini-rocket in hardware that is really flying and stuffed with electronics, and I suspect it is expensive.

                Yeah. From 45 to 322 thousand dollars. That is, not much more expensive than a set of JP ES-guidance for an unguided bomb.
                Quote: Liam
                To claim that an inflatable rubber mockup can reproduce the work of a combat radar of a modern air defense system is a big ... optimism

                Um, it’s infinitely difficult to expect such a thing even from you. WHY do the mock up simulate the work of a real radar? :))))) Do you think that HARM is used exclusively according to the "Fly, enemy turned on the SLA radar system and we fucked it with HARM?" :) :)))))))))
                Quote: Liam
                Moreover, the deployment of a modern air defense system consisting of dozens of multi-ton trucks with the appropriate dimensions is troublesome and easy to observe by all means of reconnaissance and it is impossible to recreate such a process with rubber models.

                Tell this to the Americans who confused a tank column and a passenger train in Yugoslavia.
                In fact, with the correct deployment of the air defense system, it can generally be seen only very randomly. Reveal it and destroy - that is still a mess. And if reconnaissance equipment detects a part of the complex ready for battle, located on a "quiet" combat duty, then they will be chipped with a probability of 95% (except that there are no more resources for swotting). And here the side using the mock-ups has a lot of interesting options - from the simple exchange of mock-ups to cruise missiles, to the formation of traps for aircraft strike groups.
                1. Liam 15 March 2020 11: 59 New
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                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  WHY do the mock up simulate the work of a real radar? :)))))

                  ))) I'll try again .. easier)
                  The purpose of the layout is to deceive the enemy, to make him work on a false goal.
                  To make the plane use the HARM model, it must detect itself, otherwise the plane will simply fly by and go to the real goal, and in this case, the layouts are just wasted money.
                  Here flies a group of attack aircraft covered as expected by EW and HARM aircraft.
                  Realistically explain how the layout works and what happens next.
                  1. akarfoxhound 15 March 2020 12: 34 New
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                    Already been worked out, about 15 years ago, at least. The mock-up is not in itself a "rubber swindle", and other buns come to it and emitter blocks included. And dears are bought, even warned about cardboard fools, bought ...
                    And I didn’t read it on the Internet wink That's all
                  2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 14: 46 New
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                    Quote: Liam
                    Here flies a group of attack aircraft covered as expected by EW and HARM aircraft.
                    Realistically explain how the layout works and what happens next.

                    It's not hard. So, there is a region, say, of the concentration of troops of the Russian Federation (or there is an important transport hub) which, in theory, should be covered by Russian air defense systems. Suppose, even, an air patrol, which was located not far from this area, was fired upon by missiles from the ground, although unsuccessfully.
                    The Americans localize the deployment area, carefully study satellite intelligence data - and find the positions of air defense systems and radar. They are well hidden - but not so good as not to be noticed. The satellite data are being verified by radio engineering and some other intelligence (for example, a group of green berets, or there UAVs with a good radar) - it turns out that the appearance and infrared singing (heat of warmly heated engines) are quite consistent with the domestic S-300 and the shell that covers it or something similar. SAM and radar in positions, maintenance personnel - to the best of fuss, conducting ongoing maintenance of complexes ...
                    The Americans do not need it, and they plan an air operation to destroy the air defense systems. At the same time, since they are far from stupid, they competently calculate the approach routes of shock groups and cover groups, etc. etc.
                    And here, finally, the group recommending you comes out on stage. She competently approaches the goal, turns around ... and sadly finds herself “ande attak” with forces that are far superior to those that she expected to meet here. And she, by the way, has assigned goals - the positions of the detected air defense systems, which she will try to storm, have not yet been beaten with them. As a result, the enemy’s losses are noticeably greater than he expected, ours are noticeably smaller, and even half of them consist of inflatable mock-ups.
                    1. sivuch 15 March 2020 15: 36 New
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                      I would also add competent radio exchange - both through open channels and by telecode. Otherwise, they will not believe.
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 March 2020 10: 22 New
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                        Of course. I think there are others besides radio. You understand very well that there is a whole range of events, and as a layman, I can only talk about the most obvious ones.
                      2. sivuch 16 March 2020 10: 33 New
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                        I am in the same position.
                        Now try to convince your opponent that it’s not just that some people are inflating rubber products.
                      3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 March 2020 10: 47 New
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                        I won’t even try :)))) In his universe, NATO aircraft do not take into account air defense systems at all, but simply kill them with one missile when they turn on the radar. That is, a person never read about the anti-air defense system waged by the same Israelis that they achieved success only thanks to effective reconnaissance and excellent planning of operations to destroy the Arabs' ground air defense ... And that’s all happened
                      4. Liam 16 March 2020 11: 17 New
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                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        In his universe, airplanes

                        In my universe, no serious army cuts the state budget for inflatable balloons, develops for this purpose MALD-N and not rubber products in the form of airplanes. It’s because Israel itself is seriously engaged in reconnaissance to combat air defense systems, even the bright Arabs had no idea the idea is to rely on inflatable props.
                      5. sivuch 16 March 2020 12: 26 New
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                        Firstly, these mockups are a much more serious product than just a rubber toy (if anything, this is not for you, but for people who can perceive information)
                        Nobody spoke about the layouts of the aircraft except you. And are you sure that no one is developing or using mock-ups of military equipment?
                  3. Liam 16 March 2020 11: 40 New
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                    Quote: sivuch
                    not just some inflate rubber products.

                    If rubber products are inflated in the Russian army, then someone needs this)
                    And you don’t have to be seven spans in your forehead to understand exactly who. How is it called LLC producing this inflatable garbage?
                    PRR is not the only way to combat air defense systems, but it is the most obvious way to demonstrate all the senselessness and unscrupulousness of all this venture with balloons. Because in the case of PRR it is impossible to fantasize and pull an owl on the globe with hallucinations about deceiving the AGSN by some imitators. In a real air defense system there are so many technically and visually unmasking factors that cannot be reproduced with inflatable products — that it’s never a matter of launching any missiles on them.
            2. Liam 15 March 2020 15: 55 New
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              )))
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              the positions of the detected air defense systems, which she will try to storm

              To storm? On a shaving flight with free-falling cast iron? Do you live in 2020 or in 1941?
              HARM works on a “beam” of a combat radar that operates in a certain frequency range with a certain power. Not on the appearance of inflatable mock-ups, not on heat sources and other garbage, but on radio waves with a certain power and characteristics embedded in the brain of a rocket. And it will do this with distances of tens of kilometers.
              Where did you get such radars in inflatable mockups?
              The modern object of the S-300/400 air defense system is a complex economy of dozens if not hundreds of cars with hundreds of people worth billions of dollars in personnel, with sophisticated logistics and long periods for deployment. They are produced in pieces to protect critical city objects, industrial objects, air bases, etc. Their movement is not one week and suddenly out of nowhere do not appear at the edge of the forest.
              In this air defense system, there are more than one radar station — dozens of sources that create such a radar “noise and din” and consume so much energy that in order to “recreate” a similar plausible picture with rubber mock-ups and microwave ovens as forum comrades like to paint these affairs, you will have to spend amounts comparable to deployment This SAM, in addition to including all this props, you need to have a real combat radar from the S-300/400 nearby integrated like rubber mockups that can detect the moment of approach of aviation and, alas, get your own name and not fake HARM as soon as it turns on. This is not to mention the fact that it is necessary to turn the American green berets from professional scouts into idiots who can not distinguish a combat vehicle from an inflatable layout swaying under the pressure of the wind.
              And all these passions, so that 1 of the dozens of HARMs that are used when attacking an air defense system goes into layout? For after the explosion of the first HARM giving a cloud of fragments of thousands of square meters from your entire inflatable props, there will be no wet trace
              1. sivuch 15 March 2020 16: 48 New
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                Their movement is not a matter of one week and suddenly out of nowhere do not appear at the edge of the forest.
                You didn’t confuse this with the S-200? The S-400 has a shorter coagulation time and more than fifty of them, not counting the remaining S-300. .
                And you do not need to deploy a real radar. Have you heard about Doubler-75/125 or OU-1 products? Or about the same advertised newspaper. Of course, rubber products are not required for the classic HARM, but for AARGM, which has both an active and a passive head
              2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 17: 45 New
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                Quote: Liam
                To storm? On a shaving flight with free-falling cast iron?

                To storm - yes, but about the iron I wrote where?
                Quote: Liam
                Where did you get such radars in inflatable mockups?

                They do not need them. Layouts are required for other purposes, which I described above. HARM against layouts is completely useless.
                Quote: Liam
                The modern object of the air defense system a la S-300/400 is the most complicated economy of dozens if not hundreds of cars with hundreds of people worth billions of dollars. They are released in pieces to protect critical city objects.

                Do not write nonsense, please. Today in Russia we have 125 S-300 divisions with 1500 starting divisions, and S-400 - more than 50 divisions. A billion dollars today is S-400 POLK, and not for the native army, but for export. A regiment is 2 divisions, each division is an independent combat unit with a general-view radar, an SUO radar and launchers, and so on.
              3. Liam 15 March 2020 18: 00 New
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                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Layouts are required for other purposes, which I described above. HARM against layouts is completely useless

                For which (except for RosPila) if they are absolutely unsuitable against basically anti-air defense weapons — namely HARMs? Or do you think someone will spend time "storming" fake PUs that do not show any radar activity and no missile launches are observed despite the "storming" that has begun?) ... Do you seriously hold amers for such idiots?
                The release of 4 regimental complexes a year is piece production. All places of dislocation of these air defense systems are known, their movements are carefully monitored and linden rubber products that appear from nowhere are unable to deceive anyone.
                PySy and the developers (budget saws) who flush this garbage produce inflatable barracks, tents and other infrastructure of the military camp, as well as inflatable figures of hundreds of soldiers scurrying at the positions of air defense systems, checkpoints, sentries, canteens, cars, field kitchens, etc. or these are actors from extras will do)
              4. sivuch 15 March 2020 18: 09 New
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                In my opinion, you simply do not read the answers, otherwise you would not ask the second time. And, perhaps, it will be a surprise for you, but PRR is only one of the means of fighting radar, and the most hemorrhoids. The number of PRR launches on not-so-modern radars is two orders of magnitude greater than the number of radars destroyed.
              5. Liam 15 March 2020 18: 35 New
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                Quote: sivuch
                To my mind

                In my opinion, you write unscientific garbage. The radar brain and the heart of an air defense system. Without it, everything else is a pile of useless metal. Therefore, the destruction of an air defense system is the destruction of its radar by anti-radar missiles, and not the "attack" of fake launchers. The pilot doesn’t see with your eyes your inflatable products “buy” them. He flies far and high and his weapon fires on a combat radar beam and rockets are automatically launched at the source of this beam. You can inflate at least until the blueness of the models, the plane and the rocket do not they will see and do not react in any way. They will only react to a real radar. If only these figures sawers do not come up with inflatable radio waves S, X and other ranges of military radars.
                In what other serious armies do they spend money on inflating rubber air defense systems?
              6. sivuch 15 March 2020 18: 54 New
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                Now I am convinced that you are not reading. First of all, I don’t need to explain to me what a radar is for an air defense system. I know . That's just the radar is not always and not everywhere destroyed with the help of PRR. Much more often - the usual multi-purpose TSA. And they are being fooled with the help of layouts, which, by the way, are not only visually similar to air defense systems or radar, but also have similar radar, infrared and TP signatures. And to simulate the radar, those products that I have listed above are used and there is certainly something newer. Plus, of course, the special modes of the radar, the regulation of their work and other activities. So how many, in your opinion, did the PRR fire in Yugoslavia and how many radars were there?
          2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 March 2020 17: 21 New
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            Quote: Liam
            For which (except for RosPila) if they are absolutely unsuitable against basically anti-air defense weapons — namely HARMs?

            Of course, I understand that for you, any imported weapon is the ultimate and unparalleled in the world, as well as easily destroying the ancient Soviet and Russian equipment, but the trouble is that HARM is by no means the main "anti-air defense" weapon.
            I highly recommend reading at least “A NEW CONCEPT OF DESTRUCTION OF AIR DEFENSE REALIZED IN IRAQ” (authors - A. Sumin, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor O. Korol, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor A. Shushkov) Here are some citations
            In our opinion, the comprehensive use in Yugoslavia of these intelligence systems and guided aircraft weapons equipped with inertial navigation systems (ANNs) adjusted according to the Navstar radar navigation system (SRNS) data indicates the transition from the previously existing concept of temporary suppression that began in the US air defense system (SEAD), to the new operational concept "Destruction of the enemy air defense system" (DEAD).

            What kind of new concept is this?
            The new concept involves, in addition to anti-radar missiles (PRR) and radio-electronic suppression means, which were previously used to suppress air defense systems operating RES, apply relatively inexpensive guided aerial bombs (UAB) and guided missiles (UR) with powerful warheads to ensure the destruction of its ground assets .

            This is a word about "cast iron." And what about the "super-efficient" HARM?
            American experts were convinced that the mass of the warhead of the Kharm missile defense did not provide guaranteed destruction of the radar, since even with small missile guidance errors it is very difficult to determine the state of the radar after an impact: it turned off or was struck, and if it was struck, what is the degree of damage.

            So it goes.
            Quote: Liam
            Do you think someone will spend time "storming" fake launchers that show no radar activity and no missile launches are observed despite the "storming" that has begun?) ... Do you seriously hold amers for such idiots?

            No, I don’t hold it, because I KNOW that the Americans are exactly destroying the air defense system’s positions
            Judging by the press, usually at night, NATO aircraft delivered two aerial missile attacks on the positions of the Yugoslav air defense systems. In the course of the first strike on the radar-guided air defense radars, Harm-type missiles were launched. As a result of a missile strike, the radar was either disabled or turned off by their combat crews. Moreover, the maximum radar operating time for radiation usually did not exceed 23 - 25 seconds.
            Then, after a short time, a second blow was delivered to the positions of the air defense systems, but with the use of several powerful UABs or SDs, which led to the destruction of air defense military equipment if it did not manage to leave its previous positions in a timely manner.

            How to resist the new American approaches? We read one of the points
            - misinformation of the RTR of the enemy by placing simulators of the air defense group of the air defense group on false positions

            Quote: Liam
            The release of 4 regimental complexes a year is piece production. All places of dislocation of these air defense systems are known, their movements are carefully monitored and linden rubber products that appear from nowhere are unable to deceive anyone.

            Blessed is he who believes :)) Let's just say - for today, the USA has no means that could solve such a problem even theoretically. And almost ...
            Quote: Liam
            as well as inflatable figures of hundreds of soldiers scurrying at the positions of air defense systems, checkpoints, sentries, canteens, cars, field kitchens, etc. or the actors from the crowd will do it)

            No, real fighters do it.
    2. Eroma 15 March 2020 20: 36 New
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      You put too much on HARM! fellow it is aimed at radio-emitting targets, i.e. radar antennas and can be on kp antennas if they send something on the air! They themselves do not hit pu and even kp, I destroy the rest of the economy and the bombs are smart and not very, with visual guidance! They can induce at least from space, but still visually identify the target, in different spectra, but visually! fool for these identifiers they also make rubber mock-ups with different IR simulators, so that all homing confidently homing where we need, and not them laughing
    3. Liam 15 March 2020 21: 12 New
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      Quote: Eroma
      Sami pu and even kp they do not hit

      And who needs PU without a radar?
    4. Eroma 15 March 2020 21: 48 New
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      Firstly, there are spare radars, secondly, our missiles have their own radars, they are not surveillance, but sectoral, but radar.
      In general, network-centric wars today say (who coined the word wassat ), in these wars, missiles with AGSN can be launched for any external target designation, even with a fighter or UAV, or AWACS of any size! Therefore, we even have transport-loading machines that can launch rockets! soldier
      And you say why destroy launchers lol
    5. Liam 15 March 2020 22: 03 New
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      Quote: Eroma
      First there are spare radars

      Only HARMs of various modifications produced about 30.000 pieces.
      Quote: Eroma
      our pu have their own radar

      Do they have immunity from HARM? Or work on other physical principles)
      And again. It's about the meaning of using balloons instead of real air defense systems. Nobody can buy such garbage, because models can’t reproduce the main sign of air defense systems. They also consume a lot of energy, so there’s a story about then simulators are conversations for the poor. This is not taking into account the resolution of the same reconnaissance UAVs, the operator of which must be blind so as not to see the difference between an inflatable layout and a dvizhuha on a real air defense system
    6. Eroma 15 March 2020 22: 52 New
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      Inflatable targets are not for HARMs, but for GOS weapons, they just do not distinguish rubber targets from real ones, if they look like real ones!
      An UAV can detect the real position of an air defense system, but the strike is not instantaneous and the air defense system, realizing that it has been detected, can leave and leave targets.
      The squadron of HARMs is not infinite, but limited! The positions of the air defense systems are blocked by electronic warheads that imitate the operation of radars, part of the missiles goes into milk, the radars themselves are covered by shells, those missiles that are aimed at the radar are not a fact that they will strike! ... and if the enemy’s forces are too many, the air defense systems will not enter the battlefield (rubber ones will come in handy targets), and will act from an ambush, taking into account the possibility of using HARM! ... for example, irradiating planes from behind, and launching missiles in the forehead
      In short, the HARM is not aimed at the Avx, and the missile launcher is aimed at the Avax!

      In short, not everything is so simple in the war of smart iron
    7. sivuch 16 March 2020 12: 28 New
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      You never answered - how many HARMs were capitalized in 1999 in Serbia
  • alexmach 15 March 2020 12: 06 New
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    Great move!
    And who whom ?! Who has better shutter speed.

    In fact, they are still in a slightly more advantageous position since they are in the role of an attacker ....
  • Insurgent 15 March 2020 10: 40 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Hardly such.

    Not exactly, of course, but the likeness is the same. At a new technological level, with a new ideology of application ...
    It’s like the next generation of aircraft, with new features.
  • iouris 15 March 2020 11: 01 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    can seriously confuse air defense calculations.

    Ah, it's not difficult to deceive me! ..
    I'm happy to deceive myself!
    AS Pushkin
    Air defense missiles will be inflatable.
  • Tusv 15 March 2020 13: 37 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    In general, a rather crappy thing, which can really seriously confuse air defense calculations.

    In in. The worst thing for Our brother is "control targets" when they imitate an attack. Full exposure on the radar and looking for goals in behavior.
    But I’m interested in the fact of applying on Light two. Ba da it is the Penguin in all its glory. He is invisible, for the time being, the discovery of bomb gangs. As I understand it, one penguin launches two false targets and unarmed, and even discovered. Now I understand the logic of the Loch kid. There should be a lot of penguins. For each pilot at least 10 pieces
  • orionvitt 15 March 2020 14: 04 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    can really seriously confuse air defense calculations

    It may be confusing, but it is unlikely to deceive a competent calculation. You yourself wrote here that every air target has a certain radar signature, so to speak a portrait. The whole institute deals with this problem.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 14: 55 New
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      Quote: orionvitt
      It may be confusing, but it is unlikely to deceive a competent calculation. You yourself wrote here that every air target has a certain radar signature, so to speak a portrait.

      A portrait depends on 100500 things, including the perspective of the goal and so on. In difficult jamming, separating flies from cutlets will be extremely difficult. And in any case - this is the time that in a fleeting battle is worth its weight in gold.
      1. orionvitt 15 March 2020 15: 41 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In difficult jamming, separating flies from cutlets will be extremely difficult.

        Difficult, I agree. But not impossible.
  • venik 15 March 2020 15: 00 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Hardly such. MALD can simulate microwave, VHF and microwave radar signatures to achieve realistic simulations of virtually any subsonic aircraft, from F-117 to B-52.

    =======
    Isn’t it easier to place Luneberg lenses under the radiolucent fairing, which, with certain sizes and configurations, can simulate the EPR of almost ANY aircraft from F-117 to B-52 ???
    Although YES! This is the Yankees! They are "not looking for easy ways" - the main thing for them is to "do it more nicely" and more expensive!
  • sivuch 15 March 2020 15: 40 New
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    those. Can they simulate the EPR of a real aircraft in meter and decameter ranges? Vaguely imagine how this is possible
    1. venik 15 March 2020 16: 14 New
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      Quote: sivuch
      those. Can they simulate the EPR of a real aircraft in meter and decameter ranges? Vaguely imagine how this is possible

      ======
      And who uses it in radar air defense systems meter и decameter Do not tell me the range ???
      As far as I know, these frequencies are used exclusively in over-the-horizon radars (for example, SPRN)! Air defense radars are usually centimeter (maximum decimeter) and millimeter ranges. So, for example, the high-altitude detector 96L6E of the S-400 complex works in the "C" range !!! Air traffic control and control stations - in the "L" and "S" ranges ......
      You might have guessed, especially since the Yankees use Luneberg lenses (in peacetime) to hide the true ESR values ​​of their F-35 fighters!
      1. sivuch 15 March 2020 16: 19 New
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        Those. , Radar Sky and P-18 - meter range? Thanks I'll know . winked
        1. sivuch 15 March 2020 17: 12 New
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          Meant - not meter? Because Terek has a wavelength of 1.7m, Heaven is not sure, but, it seems, too
  • Victor_B 15 March 2020 09: 15 New
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    Here's a missile simulator B-52:
    1. bessmertniy 15 March 2020 09: 23 New
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      Much invented new is well forgotten old. In principle, we need some cheaper phantoms. what This one doesn't look cheap.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 09: 37 New
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        Quote: bessmertniy
        This one doesn't look cheap.

        The English wiki gives depending on the modification from 45 to 322 thousand dollars. Absolutely not beyond
        1. bessmertniy 15 March 2020 10: 00 New
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          For their budget tolerant. Probably, with a large party - discounts? wink
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 10: 09 New
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            Quote: bessmertniy
            For their budget tolerant. Probably, with a large party - discounts?

            Yes, who knows :))))) Judging by the American military-industrial complex - more likely premiums :))))
            In general, the thing is unpleasant, you can’t ignore, you need to look for methods of selection.
            1. Romario_Argo 15 March 2020 10: 36 New
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              need to look for selection methods

              it remains only to bring to mind ROFAR - radio-photon radars, there will be selection and how many people and how many and what weapons on board
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 11: 48 New
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                Quote: Romario_Argo
                it remains only to bring to mind ROFAR

                I believe there are simpler ways, the main thing is to do it.
                1. Kirya 15 March 2020 12: 20 New
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                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  I suppose there are simpler ways, the main thing is to do it.

                  It's only in the minds "all-crawler" - "Russia does nothing". Russia has such weapons - you simply did not dream, and the designers are engaged in all aspects of the development of weapons, including on new principles.
                  1. Dog
                    Dog 15 March 2020 14: 09 New
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                    Quote: Kirya
                    designers deal with all aspects of arms development

                    For example, IL-112.
                    To solve the problem - you must first see it. But, of course, not through the eyes of all-scouts.
                  2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 14: 57 New
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                    Quote: Kirya
                    This is only in the minds of the “all-prodigy” - “Russia does not do anything”.

                    I wrote somewhere that the Russian Federation does not deal with this? :))))
                    Quote: Kirya
                    Russia has such weapons - you just never dreamed

                    I have no doubt that you were dreaming. But still do not have to tell your dreams on the site dedicated to real weapons.
                    1. Kirya 15 March 2020 16: 48 New
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                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      I wrote somewhere that the Russian Federation does not deal with this? :))))

                      And where is it written that you said that? So you yourself attributed to all props! They flogged themselves.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      I have no doubt that you were dreaming. But still do not have to tell your dreams on the site dedicated to real weapons.

                      Judging by your statements, you have colorful dreams! For knowledge does not smell at all!
    2. Tusv 15 March 2020 13: 44 New
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      Reflect the signal, as on the "Dad" of my meter three-band P-12 wassat wassat wassat
      These Yankees do not perceive the native Paramilitary for people?
  • Mountain shooter 15 March 2020 09: 10 New
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    Raytion is a supercompany ... I’m even afraid to think of what budget funds it is “digesting” ...
    1. Tusv 15 March 2020 13: 59 New
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      Quote: Mountain Shooter
      Raytion is a supercompany ... I’m even afraid to think of what budget funds it is “digesting” ...

      Do not be afraid,. Civil and military budget of the Russian Federation twice bully The basis of American and European air defense
  • knn54 15 March 2020 09: 31 New
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    For LOCAL conflicts it will do. And in a full-blown war there will be a "flare" of carriers with all the consequences for the latter.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 10: 32 New
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      Quote: knn54
      And in a full-blown war there will be a "flare" of carriers with all the consequences for the latter.

      So its tactical aviation is including. And in the case of Armageddon, ICBMs will fly faster, so that the air defense will be pretty thinned out
      1. Eroma 15 March 2020 21: 07 New
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        With the IBR, this is a mutual problem, their airfield and other infrastructure necessary for aviation, I think, together with the planes will also be thinned out! And in general, after the ICBM, everyone will not be able to win! Even if there is no nuclear winter, the governments and NATO command will certainly not be up to Russia, just as we are.
  • Sky strike fighter 15 March 2020 09: 45 New
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    YouTube channel LA MAGRA demonstrated the process of manufacturing and testing the Russian reconnaissance-strike drone Orion.
    https://youtu.be/ScobhmDDz60
  • sabakina 15 March 2020 10: 08 New
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    So, in contrast to this system, they will come up with a scan for the presence of bioforms in Star Wars Episode IV. The eternal struggle of the shield and the sword.
    1. Piramidon 15 March 2020 10: 32 New
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      Quote: sabakina
      bioform scan

      The 6th generation is promised to be made unmanned, without bioforms.
      1. sabakina 15 March 2020 10: 37 New
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        The unmanned 6th generation is the future, I do not know how distant. Imitators of the present.
        1. Piramidon 15 March 2020 17: 51 New
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          Quote: sabakina
          The unmanned 6th generation is the future, I do not know how distant. Imitators of the present.

          Star Wars devices are far from real
    2. Avior 15 March 2020 10: 55 New
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      Hamster put in the bait? smile
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 11: 47 New
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        Sergey, an American hamster is expensive. Earthworms! laughing hi
        1. Avior 15 March 2020 12: 26 New
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          Hardly, we need warm-blooded logic :))
          Rats or mice can be planted, bought at a cheap price from the sewer service.
          And symbolically, and inexpensively, and when else rats fly by plane :)))
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 14: 58 New
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            Quote: Avior
            Hardly, we need warm-blooded logic :))

            And they will heat them :)))))))))
            Quote: Avior
            Rats or mice can be planted, buy at a cheap price from the sewer service

            It is truth too:)))
  • voyaka uh 15 March 2020 10: 20 New
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    The Israeli Air Force has long been using such missiles. We must give the air defense something to bring down and report on 75% of the intercepted. Then air defense workers give a bonus, and all parties are satisfied smile
  • Hey
    Hey 15 March 2020 10: 21 New
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    Isn’t it easier to simulate a cruise missile strike in the form of an empty engine case? Probably much cheaper.
    1. sabakina 15 March 2020 10: 32 New
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      Actually, we are talking about simulating aircraft, not cruise missiles.
      1. Hey
        Hey 15 March 2020 11: 08 New
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        Actually, we are talking about simulating aircraft, not cruise missiles.

        Actually, the task of air defense is to protect the object from damage. And if the air defense will chase only carriers and miss weapons, the price of such air defense is worthless.
        An example from the history of the Second World War. The indicator for German fighters is the number of aircraft shot down. For Soviet fighters, the indicator is the successful completion of their mission by attack and bomber aircraft. The rest along the way. The result is obvious.
        Therefore, "dummies" is a problem for air defense, especially when a real threat lurks between them.
    2. Grigory_45 15 March 2020 12: 01 New
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      Quote: MUD
      Isn’t it easier to simulate a cruise missile strike in the form of an empty engine case?

      This is another, also known way to suppress or complicate the life of air defense. After releasing false targets, force them to work on them, having spent ammunition and having opened the defense system.

      In this case, we are talking about an UAV defender of an airplane (an aviation analogue of a submarine simulator). Separating from the carrier, such a false target simulates the EPR of a carrier aircraft, its infrared signature, speed, makes maneuvers in heading and altitude, etc. To distinguish a snag from a real target, and in a difficult jamming environment is a difficult task.
  • Oleg1263 15 March 2020 11: 27 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    MALD can simulate microwave, VHF and microwave radar signatures to achieve realistic simulations of virtually any subsonic aircraft, from F-117 to B-52.

    That is, does she know the algorithms of the carrier frequencies of the scanning radar? Or does the radar operate at a certain frequency, and is it quite easy for the snag to radiate these frequencies on the air? Please explain .
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 11: 38 New
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      Quote: oleg1263
      That is, does she know the algorithms of the carrier frequencies of the scanning radar?

      If very simple - MALD gives a picture of a maneuvering air target with EPR and thermal radiation, similar to a fighter or other simulated aircraft. This will have to be distracted and “explained” even in ideal conditions, and in a difficult jamming environment it will be generally indistinguishable from a real aircraft.
      1. Mishiko 15 March 2020 12: 48 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        This will have to be distracted and “explained” even in ideal conditions, and in a difficult jamming environment it will be generally indistinguishable from a real aircraft.

        Andrey from Chelyabinsk! What is the minimum time for tuning the “trap” transmitter to the frequency of the ARGSN radar receiver range and to the power commensurate with the ESR of the carrier from the distance? At relatively short distances - it will immediately be seen what the trap is and what the target is, even in the presence of interference.
        1. Mishiko 15 March 2020 13: 04 New
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          Forgot to mention the polarization of radio waves! This further complicates the task for the "traps".
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 15: 03 New
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          Quote: Mishiko
          Andrey from Chelyabinsk! What is the minimum time for tuning the “trap” transmitter to the frequency of the ARGSN radar receiver range and to the power commensurate with the EPR of the carrier from the distance?

          Excuse me, but what does the ARGSN have to do with it?
          Quote: Mishiko
          At relatively short distances - it will immediately be seen what the trap is and what the target is, even in the presence of interference.

          On relatively small - will be. But only if the calculation of the air defense system identified the trap as a target worthy of attention, and applied it with a missile launcher with ARGSN, then if the specified ARGSN "explained" upon approach that it was a trap, then the trap completed its task completely. And yes, how many missiles with AGSN do we have in the troops? :)
          1. Mishiko 15 March 2020 16: 28 New
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            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Excuse me, but what does the ARGSN have to do with it?

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            On relatively small - will be. That's only if the calculation of the SAM determined trap like a target, noteworthy, and used it with a missile launcher with ARGSN, then if the specified ARGSN "explained" when approaching

            Andrey from Chelyabinsk - according to the polarization of radio waves, the trap is easily detected at large distances of the radar of the anti-aircraft complex. Can you answer why? About the ARGSN, you conducted a dialogue above.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 17: 50 New
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              Quote: Mishiko
              Andrey from Chelyabinsk - according to the polarization of radio waves, the trap is easily detected at large distances of the radar of the anti-aircraft complex. Can you answer why?

              No I can not. Enlighten? :))))
      2. Oleg1263 15 March 2020 13: 05 New
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        I’ll ask a different question - say, the radar starts scanning at a frequency of 1.988 GHz, then the frequency changes, say 30 times per second according to an algorithm known only to the radar itself. The question is, how will this false target simulate a change in frequencies? To do this, she must know the algorithms, otherwise she will be identified as false within 0.5 seconds.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 15: 07 New
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          Quote: oleg1263
          I’ll ask a different question - say, the radar starts scanning at a frequency of 1.988 GHz, then the frequency changes, say 30 times per second according to an algorithm known only to the radar itself. The question is, how will this false target simulate a change in frequencies?

          let's first figure out what this frequency shift will give you and at what distance.
          1. Mishiko 15 March 2020 16: 14 New
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            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            let's first figure out what this frequency shift will give you and at what distance.

            Andrey from Chelyabinsk! Changing frequencies gives noise immunity. What interference do you know?
            1. The comment was deleted.
            2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 March 2020 17: 38 New
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              Quote: Mishiko
              Andrey from Chelyabinsk! Changing frequencies gives noise immunity.

              Michael, do not leave the topic. Oleg said
              Quote: oleg1263
              The question is, how will this false target simulate a change in frequencies? To do this, she must know the algorithms, otherwise she will be identified as false within 0.5 seconds.

              I asked him a question, what will the frequency change in this case give? In the context of the foregoing, it is obvious that we are talking about the range of detection and classification of the target as a trap. Where is the noise immunity here?
              And yes, modern EW stations automatically adjust to a changing frequency, so talking about noise immunity is not entirely correct. Of course, radar generating random frequencies to "hammer" is much more difficult, but it is possible
              1. Mishiko 15 March 2020 18: 21 New
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                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Michael, do not leave the topic. Oleg said

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                I asked him a question, what will the frequency change in this case give? In the context of the foregoing, it is obvious that we are talking about the range of detection and classification of the target as a trap. Where is the noise immunity here?

                I do not leave the topic. Changing the sounding frequencies of radio pulses from period to period - according to the pseudo-random law, we give greater noise immunity, and you can not interfere with the radar receiver in the next repetition period of the probe pulses until you adjust your transmitter, and for this you need to get data from your receiver, which needs to scan a huge frequency range and find the working frequency in given period, next period - it is necessary for the trap to start all over again ... It takes a lot of time. Oleg talked about a train of pulses - the exposure time of the “trap” in azimuth, bearing in mind the width of the radiation pattern in the azimuthal plane and the scanning speed (scanning frequency) in the azimuthal plane of the radar of the anti-aircraft complex. The delay time of the signal from the "trap" for example at a distance of 100 km is 666,7 μs, 10 km is 66,7 μs, 1 km is 6,7 μs. Whether the trap can adapt to the probing frequency is unlikely. That is the whole answer to your question.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 March 2020 08: 04 New
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                  Sorry, but this is not the answer. With your permission, I will unsubscribe in more detail in the evening
                2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 March 2020 16: 44 New
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                  Well, finally I can answer in detail :)))
                  There is a feeling that we are talking about completely different things. I am talking about MALD, whose task is to simulate an attacking combat aircraft.
                  The technology of its application is approximately the following. Even before entering the enemy’s air defense zone, airplanes drop these same MALDs. In theory, the launch of the MALD should be carried out before the group of aircraft reaches the line of detection of the enemy's radar (even ground-based at least airborne).
                  Further, MALD flies to itself along a certain path set in advance in it, simulating the flight of a fighter-bomber. In essence, the idea is that by the probable moment of detecting aircraft, the enemy would see planes and MALDs at the same time, but did not know which of them was who.
                  That is, it should be like this - a general overview radar fixes several groups of targets coming from different directions, and identified as fighter bombers. But in reality, only part of the goals are those, the rest are MALD. And the task of calculating the air defense system will be to understand which of the goals that the radar sees are airplanes, and which ones are their imitation of MALD.
                  MALD does not interfere. MALD cannot, cannot, and is not intended to “hide” an airplane by impersonating it. If the SAM positions are attacked by airplanes and MALDs, then both of them will be perfectly visible (unless, of course, specialized EW aircraft are used, but not about them now), but they won’t know which of them is - for this purpose selection of the purpose is necessary. MALD is not a means of active individual protection of the aircraft, distracting the impact of missiles. It’s just an airplane simulator - no more, but no less. MALD, in principle, cannot and should not resist detection - it will be detected by the most ordinary pre-existing radar, incapable of “chaotic” frequency change. His task is not to hide or interfere with the radar, but to be detected, but at the same time classified as a strike aircraft.
                  And now let me repeat my question - how will changing the radar frequencies make it possible to identify MALD as a simulator?
                  1. Mishiko 17 March 2020 14: 49 New
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                    And now let me repeat my question - how will changing the radar frequencies make it possible to identify MALD as a simulator?

                    Dear Andrey from Chelyabinsk (Andrey)!
                    1. In the absence of a change in carrier frequency radar radar pulses (S-300, S-400, active seeker), the MALD trap transmitter, having tuned in once to the working carrier frequency of the air pulses of the anti-aircraft radar radar, will also give its own signals in the following periods of exposure (bursts of probe pulses) answer instantly . It will be tantamount to radar transponder and the mark on the IRF radar screen will be at the point of receiving the signal reflected from the MALD glider (taking into account the resolving power of the anti-aircraft radar in range equal to the pulse duration, at t = 2 μs this is 300 meters), that is, the operator, differences on the screen of IKO won't see.
                    2. When changing carrier frequency anti-aircraft radar pulses, from period to period, the MALD radio transmitter will produce its response radio signal with a delay equal to the processing of the receiving signals of the anti-aircraft radar in its receiver and the MALD transmitter settings. Take for example the radiation warning and guidance stations AN / ALR-45 and AN / ALR-46, where the DSA-20 digital computer, created by Dalmo Victor, which provides processing of received signals for fast (in about 30-40 μs) recognition of their emitting means. For the receiver, we take t prm = 40 μs, for the transmitter t prd = 30 μs, the total delay is
                    t total = t prm + t prd. It turns out that on the IKO screen the operator will see the signal mark from the MALD glider (small ESR = 0,02 m2 - weaker) and at a distance of 10,5 km (delay time t total = 70 μs) mark from the MALD transceiver, equal to the mark for a specific aircraft. There will be not one but two marks from the target MALD on one azimuth, taking into account that the mark from the MALD glider, in view of the small EPR, will be observed when detecting at a detection range of at least 159,549 km for S-300 radars according to open data (D = 600 km with EPR = 4 m2) the transceiver varies from 10,2 km and further for the entire remaining length of the range scale (in the presence of a variable delay line in the MALD receiver). All this will occur during irradiation of MALD in all periods of a certain direction in azimuth. The operator sees the MALD target, identifying it from a distance of 159,549 km according to open data, and possibly from a longer distance, according to the true value of the parameters of the anti-aircraft radar. Using the method of blanking range sections, it is easy to determine two or more different in azimuth (two targets cannot fly on the same azimuth, given the resolution in azimuth).
                    Thank you for understanding. hi
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 March 2020 16: 50 New
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                      Good day, dear Michael! hi
                      Quote: Mishiko
                      If there is no change in the carrier frequency of the radar pulses (S-300, S-400, active GOS), the MALD “trap” transmitter, once tuned to the working carrier frequency of the air pulses of the anti-aircraft radar, will also give its answer in the following periods of exposure (bursts of probe pulses) instantly

                      I seem to understand. And I am very grateful to you for the detailed answer, written, moreover, in an understandable language for a layman (which, of course, I am).
                      But dear Mikhail, I doubt very much that there is a certain transmitter on the MALD. Modern electronic warfare systems are able to adapt to the "chaotic" frequency (of course, with reaction time), but their mass is clearly prohibitive for a rocket weighing a maximum of 140 kg., And even capable of flying almost 1000 km. There is clearly something simpler, something like a set of reflectors, which when adjusted give the MALD-EPR similar to the EPR of a particular combat aircraft. Accordingly, the signals of any radar station, although changing the carrier frequency, though not, will still be reflected precisely from the airframe and MALD reflectors, and in this case, changing the frequency does not give any gain, as I understand it, because the mark will be one
  • Grigory_45 15 March 2020 11: 37 New
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    The US Navy intends to conclude a contract with the American company Raytheon for the production of a fake rocket simulating combat aircraft

    the idea is far from new. Similar false targets were in service with the B-52 "strategists"
    ADM-20 (GAM-72) "Quail" - cruise missile-false target

    entered service in 1961. With the equipment of the bombers with SRAM aeroballistic missiles, as well as with the improvement of the air defense systems of the likely enemy, the Quail traps gradually disappeared from the aircraft equipment. In December 1978, the Quail was officially retired.
  • Mentat 15 March 2020 14: 16 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    In general, a rather crappy thing, which can really seriously confuse air defense calculations.

    The air situation of the Russian air defense / missile defense systems is controlled further than 900 km. 1 plane flew, 2 flew from this point. It is clear that this is the same bogus rocket.

    By the time they become massively adopted by the Americans, we will have adopted radars based on radio photonics, which determine the type of aircraft in a different way and are able to create their 3D model, which obviously will reset the very principle of operation of such missiles.

    In other words, it is again a weapon against the Papuans.
    1. Sancho_SP 15 March 2020 14: 57 New
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      And which of the two to shoot down, even if it is clear?
    2. Grigory_45 15 March 2020 15: 48 New
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      Quote: Mentat
      1 plane flew, 2 flew from this point. It is clear that this is the same bogus rocket.

      Yes, at least 10 became. Which of the 10 marks is true (target)?

      This is the task of the false goal - to impede the actions of air defense as much as possible. Or spending rockets on dummies, or spending time on target selection. Or both taken together. And if there are no such traps, not 1, not 2, not 10, but 40? Or 100? Yes, there will be interference from the growlers? Go figure it out.
      MALD is a rather small thing (smaller, you can take them decently. Yes, and they cost not so much - not more expensive than missiles, and even more so guarded aircraft and the lives of pilots.

      If false targets take on missiles, emptying the ammunition load of air defense systems, if the number of losses decreases by at least 20-30%, they have fulfilled their task.

      We shouldn’t vote that it’s bullshit and it’s impossible, but to conduct an expert (not a couch level) assessment of the possibilities of these buns, and if we have a positive conclusion, get our own. It’s worth learning from the enemy, and not just faulting him.
  • Sancho_SP 15 March 2020 14: 56 New
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    Wow, finally guessed. It remains to make the same drones
  • eklmn 15 March 2020 16: 24 New
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    For the curious:
    Raytheon website
    “Obfuscation of enemy air defense systems”
    https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/mald
    (lane google)
    “MALD decoy is a flexible, modular and low cost system that can save pilots and planes from danger. This is a disposable air-based aircraft, similar to a US or allied aircraft for integrated enemy air defense systems or IADS.
    The United States and its allies can confuse and deceive the enemy MAAP by sending a group of MALD decoys into false airspace. The weight of the weapon is less than 160kg, and its range is about 900km. After starting from the receiving aircraft, the MALD bait completes a programmed mission.
    In addition to protecting valuable aircraft, the weapon offers anti-aircraft operations to neutralize air defense systems that pose a threat to the US and allied pilots.
    MALD-J DECOY
    The MALD-J bait is a variant of the basic bait with a silencer and the world's first built-in silencer. The MALD-J unmanned bait is oriented and works much closer to the victim radar than the usual electronic warfare when jamming electronics, allowing aviators and aircraft to stay away from danger. And he can linger in the target area for a long period of time - enough time to complete the mission. ”
    I’ll add from myself. Recently online edition of Defense.World
    wrote that BAE Systems, as part of the DARPA project, demonstrated a new small form factor semiconductor technology designed to measure radio frequency and communication signals in combat conditions in combination with a drone. Hedgehog technology allows operators to get a clear picture of radio signals and their geolocation in real time with a very small size device. The technology provides a wide frequency range and instantaneous bandwidth, which are currently not available for other SDRs.
    And if such a device is in this racket, then it will be possible to recognize both the source of the radio signal and its location.
    1. Nikolay3 17 March 2020 18: 55 New
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      eklmn, write Raytheon advertising stories? For Russia, the MALD-J bait data is not a threat and will be easily knocked down. Read above carefully about their main and serious drawback - two marks on the air defense radar screen from a distance of 160 km in free space at one azimuth ...
      1. eklmn 17 March 2020 23: 51 New
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        “Read above carefully about their main and serious drawback - two marks on the air defense radar screen from a distance of 160 km in free space at one azimuth ...”
        Followed your advice (thanks!) And read a very good analysis by Mishiko (and thanks to him!). Mishiko writes about two signals based on the example of signal processing from AN / ALR-45 and AN / ALR-46. He is right in his proof, but when I googled these devices, they date back to 1970 and have long been discontinued. In my comment I gave a description of the BAE System for the DARPA project:
        https://www.defenseworld.net/news/26513/BAE_Systems_Demos_
        Small_form_factor_Semiconductor_Tech_in_DARPA_Project # .XnEyWUBFxjp
        “The DRAGONS program is designed to enable the identification and geolocation of small-form factor integrated signals in drones. This study and the core study of MATRICs and Hedgehog was developed with financial support from DARPA. ”
        The figure, of course, is not given, the secret so far. But it is possible that this system will create one signal for the source locator.
        1. Nikolay3 18 March 2020 06: 20 New
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          eklmn! It’s impossible to make intelligence devices that "instantly" process the receiving radio signals. Physically - this is not possible at this time. Therefore, always from MALD-J will be observed two marks on the same azimuth.
          1. eklmn 18 March 2020 21: 21 New
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            “It is impossible to make reconnaissance devices that“ instantly ”process receiving radio signals.”
            Absolutely right! But the “locate receiving signals” is also necessary for the locator. Because Since Russian electronics is 5-10 years behind, it is quite possible that the signal from the drone will be within the locator's error or even lower.
            1. Mishiko 30 March 2020 23: 00 New
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              Quote: eklmn
              Absolutely right! But the “locate receiving signals” is also necessary for the locator. Since Russian electronics is 5-10 years behind, it is quite possible that the signal from the drone will be within the locator's error or even lower.

              You are mistaken! In the field of radar technology, Russia is ahead of everyone. And do not confuse radio engineering, electronics - with computer technology! You do not understand the principle of operation of a pulsed radar, judging by your expression! and deliberately distort a sufficiently large delay in signal processing in
              rocket equipment MALD-J. You are writing a lie!
              1. eklmn 31 March 2020 16: 23 New
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                Mishiko, you proceed from the technical knowledge of modern Russian technology and interpret your knowledge into Amer’s “hardware”.
                Neither I nor you know the parameters, a lot is kept secret. You know that Russian electronic warfare systems are the best in the world from two sources - Russian and Amer. It is clear that you will absolutely believe Russian, but you cannot believe Amer’s. They Americans are “modest” in praising themselves; it’s easier for them to praise another.
                “Can the trap adjust to the probe frequency - unlikely. "
                Unlikely - your opinion. Nobody will dissuade you.
  • Cowbra 15 March 2020 16: 40 New
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    Introductory is given:
    * Producer - Raytheon (this is where the current minister worked, which orders them)
    * In the Air Force, all the solid "invisibles" are already invisible to radars (multiple high-likes)
    * The primary task is direct NOW, but it was necessary yesterday - to deceive someone else’s air defense systems. and create at least something similar to air defense
    ----------
    Findings? Yes, what are the conclusions! There is no corruption, and the USA is the most advanced country in the world! laughing
  • Mentat 15 March 2020 17: 02 New
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    Quote: Gregory_45
    Quote: Mentat
    1 plane flew, 2 flew from this point. It is clear that this is the same bogus rocket.

    Yes, at least 10 became. Which of the 10 marks is true (target)?

    This is the task of the false goal - to impede the actions of air defense as much as possible. Or spending rockets on dummies, or spending time on target selection. Or both taken together. And if there are no such traps, not 1, not 2, not 10, but 40? Or 100? Yes, there will be interference from the growlers? Go figure it out.

    I’ll give you some ideas to demonstrate the absurdity of the very idea of ​​using such means against a developed opponent such as Russia.

    These are subsonic missiles. What flies on the sound towards the border, do not you guess? This means that knocking down such goals will be much more optimal than skipping one. In addition, there cannot be 100 real subsonic targets, after they release real missiles it will become absolutely obvious that there is something. T.O. they are only suitable for delaying the moment of destruction of carriers.

    However, until the launch of real missiles there may be no talk of a full-scale exchange of attacks, only of large-scale provocation. After the release of such, the sense in blended missiles is already lost, a full-scale exchange of nuclear strikes begins.
    Moreover, even a massive raid on the borders of Russia can be regarded as an excuse for a preemptive strike, and again, the meaning of the bogus missiles is lost.

    Further, in order to hit targets deep in the territory, it is first necessary to somehow suppress air defense closer to the border. In this case, there is no point in knocking down these 100 goals in advance, it is necessary to cut off at a logical level. The maneuvers of aircraft producing such targets will say much more than they themselves.

    By the way, why did you suddenly decide to ignore information about radio photon radars? They already exist at the level of prototypes and completely, at a fundamental level, eliminate the very possibility of using such missiles.

    Given all this, I repeat: weapons against the Papuans.