Radar camouflage in ground operations

51

Radar "Fara-BP", installed on the AGS. Very dangerous adversary due to range and accuracy of detection


Radars gradually move from heaven to earth and become one of the success factors in ground battles. In recent years, quite a few samples of ground-based reconnaissance radars have appeared.



For example, Fara-VR can detect a tank at a distance of up to 10 km, an infantryman at a distance of up to 4 km, with an error of not more than 0,3 degrees in azimuth. It can be used to guide heavy machine guns or grenade launchers. There is also a unified radar "Credo-1E", capable of detecting a tank for 40 km, a person for 15 km, and simultaneously track 20 targets. True, unlike the Farah, weighing 12 kg, Credo-1E already requires a car for transportation due to the weight of 100 kg. Plus more aviation Various types of radars are often used for reconnaissance of ground targets and targets.

In light of this circumstance, the task of developing radar masking and protection arises. Unlike airplanes or ships, which can be specially designed taking into account the radar stealth, with ground-based equipment, this is much more difficult, and people almost do not lend themselves to such alteration. And what to do in this case?

Good old dipole


One of the good solutions for radar camouflage of ground equipment and people can be a dipole reflector, familiar to everyone as a passive hindrance to suppress enemy radars.

In the same quality, it can be used on earth, only with some differences. If any ground-based object is highly radio-contrast and it is impossible to reduce its visibility, then you need to go the other way - add more false objects so that the real ones get lost between them. False objects should be reflected first on the radar, and reflectors are best suited for this. A dipole reflector, which is a strip of foil half the wavelength of the radar (for the above-mentioned radars operating in the range of 10-20 GHz with a wavelength of 1,5-3 cm, the length of the dipole reflector will range from 0,7 to 1,5 cm ), or a piece of metallized fiberglass, is perfect for creating numerous false targets and interference. It is cheap and technologically advanced in mass production, dipole reflectors can be made in a makeshift way from a suitable foil. A pack of such reflectors can be given to each soldier.

Radar camouflage in ground operations
A simple thing is a dipole reflector, but how hard it is to find a good photo! Therefore, for now, we are satisfied with this low-quality one. The simplest dipole reflector is really strips of foil. These aircraft are long, against air defense radars, and against ground-based radars they will be very short, 1-1,5 cm


Tactically, the use of dipole reflectors comes down to two tricks. The first is to scribble them more generally and everywhere, on trees, stones, houses, on any objects, so that with any use of the radar it gets clogged with these false marks. This method is also suitable against aircraft radars, including AWACS. If a certain area in which the connection operates is covered with dipole reflectors, then this mess will not be easy to figure out. The second way is to create false objects that can be set and tidied up. For example, a panel, a sheet of cardboard or plywood with glued dipole reflectors. If we are talking about a panel for creating false targets, then it can also be factory production, when the fabric is stitched with metallic thread so that a dipole reflector for different wavelengths is obtained.

If the first method simply makes it difficult for the enemy to use radars, then the second method is aimed at deceiving him. As in any disguise, the use of such funds requires a carefully developed plan, taking into account all circumstances, otherwise it may turn out to be ineffective.

Absorption protection


Another type of radar masking is the so-called “black dipole”, which is a strip or piece of fiber from a radar absorbing material, also at half the wavelength. In the formulation of radar interference, they were often used to enhance the protective effect of the bands and clouds of dipole reflectors. A very simple and cheap tool: hundreds of small pieces of graphite, carbon or other radar absorbing filaments. This material does not completely absorb radio emission and reflects part of it towards the radar, however the absorption is very noticeable and the reflection is very weak, so the “black dipole” creates a good screening effect.


A large number of carbon threads are now produced and sold.

Based on carbon fiber, radio-absorbing materials have been developed that can absorb radiation with a wavelength of 3 mm to 30 cm. It looks like a very fleecy carpet in which the fibers are of different lengths.

On the basis of the “black dipole” camouflage materials can be made. This can be, for example, a mask of non-woven fabric of camouflage color, into which pieces of carbon fiber of the required length are pressed in.


Blackthorn Radar Absorbing Material


T-90 in radar absorbing protection. This is the same "Blackthorn". True, I think that such an approach as in the photo is completely unsuitable for combat conditions. Such protection will collect dust and dirt. The tank will quickly turn into a moving pile of dirt


It can also be made using artisanal methods by quilting the fabric with carbon fiber stitches of the required length.

Such a banner is installed to protect any object from enemy radar reconnaissance. These panels can cover the trenches, firing points, equipment, making it difficult to detect enemy radar reconnaissance.

Methods can be combined when the “black dipole” reduces the visibility of the real technique, and a conventional dipole creates false targets elsewhere. The use of these masking agents can vary with regard to conditions and conditions. For example, a real firing point is covered by an absorbing sheet, and around with the help of dipole reflectors several false targets have been created.

It is believed that on the basis of radar absorbing materials, such as carbon filaments and fleecy materials, a cloak can be made that will very effectively reduce the footprint of the infantryman in both the radar and thermal ranges. Carbon fiber has very little thermal conductivity and should well shield the thermal radiation of the human body.

The methods may not be ideally effective, but quite applicable, able to achieve the desired effect. The most important thing in them is that such camouflage means against radar reconnaissance can be made easily and simply using a variety of improvised materials (a roll of ordinary food-grade aluminum foil can be turned into “Tanks"," Guns "," aircraft "), and apply them in all units, up to a single soldier. If radars, especially compact ground-based radar stations, enter the battlefield, then everyone should have anti-radar camouflage. This should be prepared in advance.
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  1. +4
    3 March 2020 06: 42
    Actual topic ... thanks to the author for clarification. hi
  2. +1
    3 March 2020 07: 29
    Class.
    What can be opposed to electronic intelligence, and so, Schaub struggled with this protection simply could not ??? Passive protection in conjunction with electronic warfare, just what you need.
  3. -3
    3 March 2020 08: 01
    It's amazing how ingenious everything is simple)
    1. +5
      3 March 2020 08: 47
      It's amazing how ingenious everything is simple)

      As for the dipoles, modern target selection algorithms have long learned to digest and eliminate this "genius". Therefore, the article is a plus for the idea, but not for practicality))
      And besides, it seems that the battlefield is so littered with radio-reflecting objects (broken equipment, large fragments of ammunition, cartridges, etc.) that the need for dipoles may not arise.
      Another thing is when a ground-based radar is used at a guarded facility to control the surrounding territory against the penetration of violators or sabotage groups
      1. +1
        3 March 2020 09: 36
        Quote: Ka-52
        As for the dipoles, modern target selection algorithms have long learned to digest and eliminate this "genius".

        How can a radar distinguish a car and a sheet of metal with a similar EPR? Tell me the algorithm.
        1. +6
          3 March 2020 10: 42
          How can a radar distinguish a car and a sheet of metal with a similar EPR? Tell me the algorithm.

          firstly, dipoles do not create copies of the target's radar signal. They simply create massive noise interference. Filtering which for the brains of modern detection stations is not difficult.
          At the initial stage, polarization portraits of artificial objects and background obtained as a result of mathematical modeling are usually analyzed. Further, the group of algorithms uses spectral differences of signals from targets and passive reflectors. With the known parameters of the probing signal and the use of an optimal signal-to-noise filter in the receiver to optimize signal processing in the presence of passive interference, a second filter is introduced that suppresses the frequency components of the interference spectrum, which differ from the signal by the difference value of their Doppler shifts.
          Anti-interference is also possible due to the correct choice of frequency, duration and repetition period of the probe pulse, changes in the polarization law, etc.
          Dipoles can work (not always) against AGSN missiles, because the latest digital computers have low power and radar is the same. And ground-based radars and aircraft radars are already more serious units. And they learned how to select targets in a difficult jamming environment.
          1. +2
            3 March 2020 15: 12
            Quote: Ka-52
            Dipoles can work (not always) against AGSN missiles, because the latest digital computers have low power and radar is the same. And ground-based radars and aircraft radars are already more serious units. And they learned how to select targets in a difficult jamming environment.

            I am not talking about dipoles, but about false goals. I suspect that the inflatable metallized layout by any frequencies (the more so they are known), you cannot filter by any algorithms.
            Moreover, the EPR of the same tank is variable. From one angle, it is one, from another it is different, with a third cloak, with a fourth body kit from lattices.
            Accordingly, there is no standard with which I compared - I was convinced that this is not a tank. Spectral differences, and what are they due to? Material difference? Those. how the computer can determine whether it is a tank with a distorted signature, or whether it is a layout with a signature adapted to a real tank.
            1. 0
              4 March 2020 09: 20
              I am not talking about dipoles, but about false goals.

              as if in the article there is no mention of false goals. If you are talking about a variant of false traps, such as ADBL, then yes, they can interfere in the form of a false signal. They can be of two options: either completely imitate the signature of the target radiation, or give out a more powerful signal that drowns out the signal of a real object (well, both at the same time). I can’t say anything about an inflatable tank lined with foil (which is stupid), but modern tracking stations also learned how to deal with ADBL. To paint signal processing algorithms (primary, secondary) is long and dreary. If you want, I’ll dig in and throw you a link to the literature in this matter.
              layout with signature fitted to a real tank

              A signature is a set of unique characteristics of an emitted or reflected signal. Lenses and angles can only return back a signal of a given power. Radar portraits of military installations can be protected in the memory of the digital computer. It is on the basis of the entire detection system that provides not just a flare mark on the radar screen, but recognition of the type of target. The possibility of selecting targets, separating the useful signal from the noise signal from passive interference is like a sword and shield fight - they are being improved in parallel.
              I suspect that the inflatable metallized layout by any frequencies (the more so they are known), you cannot filter by any algorithms.

              just a simple inflatable metallized layout is pretty easy to filter. But I agree with you that only powerful detection stations and having advanced processing systems, high suppression characteristics (tens of millions of times) of interfering signals, cascade overload protection, and so on can cope with some trap simulators.
        2. +2
          3 March 2020 10: 42
          For example, the speed and nature of the movement.
          When irradiated from different angles, it may be possible to understand that the sheet is flat.
          There are surely other ways.

          Only not the radar, but the software that processes the data from the radar.
          1. -1
            3 March 2020 13: 24
            Interestingly, who and me set the minuses to you? Probably one of these:

      2. +4
        3 March 2020 10: 02
        -Cases made of ferrite fabric. The "trick" is not only in manufacturing, but also in the fact that the threads are woven in such a way that when objects are irradiated, not the contours of a specific target appear on the screens, but a kind of blurred spot.
        -Termodymovaya equipment TDA-2K With a partial dispersal of the smoke screen, the aerosol cloud merges with the atmosphere. From the outside, it creates the appearance of empty space. Three to ten hours.
        In this case, it hides from visual observation.
  4. 0
    3 March 2020 08: 41
    Thank you for the article. I hope in the case of BP, the foil does not have to buy from the eastern neighbor.
    1. 0
      5 March 2020 22: 03
      The other day, I bought food foil for baking meat (Shrovetide!), So it is from its eastern neighbor. Another native, until it came across.
  5. The comment was deleted.
    1. +3
      3 March 2020 09: 57
      Naturally. Any modern detection complex can and should apply multivariate analysis, collecting data in all ranges, both in the radio frequency and optical, and in the IR, and in the sound. Such devices can already be assembled on the knee, from ready-made blocks that can be easily bought on the civilian market.
      So, if the army wants to keep armored vehicles in battle formation, as well as any equipment at all, then passive defense in one range is simply ridiculous. It makes sense at the moment more active protection, since any radar is an easily detectable target, which itself kindly designates. In principle, it’s quite simple to process old-old developments in this direction for modern electronic devices.
      In general, there are more radars on the battlefield, so immediately they will become less. But the IR and optical range ... this is more complicated.
      1. +3
        3 March 2020 12: 13
        Quote: Mikhail3
        It makes sense at the moment more active protection, since any radar is an easily detectable target, which itself kindly designates.

        Only these radars are a gigantic amount. Only infantry at the mouth level have 9 stations per regiment / brigade. Plus intelligence, plus artillery, plus anti-aircraft guns (at least one per platoon).
        Plus systems using radar technology. All these Doppler speed sensors, systems for measuring the deviation of the initial velocity of the projectile, systems for determining wind parameters, in the future are KAZ and RL sensors and sights.

        And the accuracy of the notch of these systems is low. The complexity of organizing a notch is high. The cost of specialized anti-RRL ammunition that can stop the difficulty of determining the coordinate is high.

        So it goes....
        1. -1
          4 March 2020 09: 16
          All this because the order of equipment from the Ministry of Defense and in general any interaction with modern equipment in the armies ... how would it be without a mat ... no, I don’t know without a mat. Finding and detecting ANY radar, even if they work out for 10-20 seconds and hide again, is a completely childish task. For a computer with less sophisticated software equipped with receivers, it’s nothing at all.
          But firstly, there is no one to order it. The vast majority of customers in their thinking are at least 50 years old in the past. And even further.
          And secondly, those people who understand the situation are somehow connected with the military-industrial complex. And what is the military-industrial complex, and even the Russian one? These are a few secret laboratories that do something, and the mass of captured bans ... that is, I wanted to say by deputies and members of the Federation Council of enterprises issuing different emitting junk signals with big names.
          After all, all this will have to be written off in one fell swoop! It is a target and nothing more! Yes, but the developers of military equipment remained in the USSR, no one came to replace them, and they cannot ban ... deputies and members work with engineers and scientists. And they cannot organize production. That is, they will fly out of the market, where a lot of money is now spinning. They don't know how to do anything, but to kill ... Better not to stand in their way. We continue to "re-equip the army with modern models of military equipment", which the enemy will knock out in a matter of minutes in the event of a Real War ...
          1. 0
            4 March 2020 09: 30
            Quote: Mikhail3
            Finding and detecting ANY radar, even if they work out for 10-20 seconds and hide again, is a completely childish task.

            eight))))))))))
            No, the task is not at all childish, and to this day it has not been solved.
            All that these "serifs" can do is to provide an area for further additional exploration.
            Physics 8)))))

            In addition, increasing accuracy will be possible only by increasing the base. And increasing the base increases the vulnerability to electronic suppression.
            1. +1
              4 March 2020 11: 13
              You see ... There is such a thing, progress is called. If you place dozens of receivers along the front line, for example, spacing them 10 kilometers (or maybe 100) .. The trick is that with modern means they will be primitive (for a modern production base) blocks with a brick size that cost about the size of a boot . And there may be at least hundreds, but even thousands. And you can scatter them even with a shovel in the bushes.
              And then a clap, and tied them through a trunk station! And you have such a base that there are no words, snot alone!
              And modern computers allow you to implement completely stunning search and comparison algorithms. Technical capabilities are now beyond. The mental power that allows at least a thousandth of these opportunities to understand is what is in short supply.
              1. 0
                4 March 2020 12: 02
                Quote: Mikhail3
                If you place dozens of receivers along the front line, for example, spacing them 10 kilometers (or maybe 100) ..

                That system will give coordinates with insufficient accuracy for a fire defeat. And at the same time it is very vulnerable to REP. Because it will need a perfect connection


                Quote: Mikhail3
                The joke is that with modern means it will be primitive (for a modern production base) blocks with a brick size that cost about like a boot.

                eight))))))

                The bricks are large, the boots are lined with diamonds.

                Quote: Mikhail3
                And then a clap, and tied them through a trunk station! And you have such a base that there are no words, snot alone!

                Exactly, some snot ... And the result is zero.
                1. 0
                  4 March 2020 12: 50
                  I began to object ...))) Yes nakoy? Stay where you are. Nefig, I’m not moving anyone anywhere. Enough for me is one military innovation. You are right about everything).
                  1. 0
                    4 March 2020 16: 01
                    Quote: Mikhail3
                    I began to object ...

                    And I would send you to learn materiel.
                    Guess what size and how much a modern topographic reference system has.
                    After all, in order to give the coordinates of the target you need to bind the station, as well as orient it.
                    Guess what size and how much the antenna has, which you also need to raise higher.
                    What size and how much communication system has

                    And so forth ...
    2. +1
      3 March 2020 12: 28
      Quote from rudolf
      In Syria, UAVs use thermal imaging and optical surveillance channels, and they all care about these reflectors.

      What kind of UAVs are these?
      For example, the American Reaper has a very sophisticated radar on board
      The Turkish "Anka", which is now heard, is similar.
      1. The comment was deleted.
        1. +2
          3 March 2020 14: 56
          Quote from rudolf
          Why shine once again when it’s fine to do without it.

          Why significantly reduce the detection radius of targets, if you can not do this?
          1. The comment was deleted.
            1. +1
              3 March 2020 15: 25
              Quote from rudolf
              But the risk of detecting UAVs increases significantly.

              Why?
              Conventional radars will detect UAVs regardless of whether the radar is working or not. And they’ll pinpoint for sure.
              And not "about in this area, most likely a UAV"
              1. The comment was deleted.
                1. +1
                  3 March 2020 15: 33
                  Quote from rudolf
                  There are passive systems / modes of detection by sources of radar radiation.

                  And they have very low accuracy.
                  So much so that the implementation of information is possible only after further exploration.
                  1. The comment was deleted.
                    1. +1
                      3 March 2020 15: 40
                      Quote from rudolf
                      For missiles with AGSN this accuracy is more than enough.

                      Controversial.
  6. +1
    3 March 2020 09: 41
    Carbon fiber has very little thermal conductivity and should well shield the thermal radiation of the human body

    Imagine the effect of wearing such a suit that returns heat radiation back. No, the sentry in cool weather is even a plus. And if you need to work actively in the heat? And then, any cloak on a warm object will warm up sooner or later and begin to radiate itself if it is not cooled, for example, by forced ventilation.
  7. +4
    3 March 2020 10: 13
    Unlike airplanes or ships, which can be specially designed taking into account radar stealth, it is much more difficult to do with ground technology,

    From the exact opposite! This ground tin is simpler and easier to make inconspicuous than a supersonic plane. The fact that some eto do not, another question)).
  8. +1
    3 March 2020 10: 17
    Such protection will collect dust and dirt. The tank will quickly turn into a moving pile of dirt
    "Heavy in mud, easy in radiation." Great Russian commander. (nearly) wink
  9. +2
    3 March 2020 10: 23
    The information on dipoles described in the article is known and has been used for about 50 years.
    At the present stage, reconnaissance does not rely solely on a ground-based radar bolted to some kind of weapon; this is the last frontier when a soldier presses a trigger on an impenetrable darkness in front of him and focuses on the target’s illumination on the radar.
    All modern methods and reconnaissance methods involve complex classification and detection.
    Radar, and optical, and acoustic and thermal imaging means in different ranges are combined at the same time.
    The only protection against modern reconnaissance tools that are used comprehensively is heavy rainfall at night. Under such conditions, the detection efficiency drops to zero.
    All other man-made methods give protection in any one range, or for a very limited time.
  10. 0
    3 March 2020 10: 45
    In such cases, small anti-radar missiles become relevant.
    For example, in the TPK from the ATGM and as part of its ammunition.
    And the device for detecting radiation and determining the direction will be completely uncomplicated.
    1. +3
      3 March 2020 10: 56
      Why are such difficulties all invented and operated, the working radar is excellently direction-finding, after which it is hit by artillery / mortars.
      1. 0
        4 March 2020 11: 28
        Why are such difficulties all invented and operated, the working radar is excellently direction-finding, after which it is hit by artillery / mortars.


        Well ... Then on the agenda a one-time parachute-mounted lighting rocket is a transmitter of the location range. laughing Users only have receivers. You can’t measure the range, but it will give a picture. And from the picture and landmarks already determine the coordinates and peel. Like in Patriotic night.
        By the way, such a parachute over the enemy's positions will "blind" the enemy - after all, next to each other.
    2. 0
      3 March 2020 14: 19
      In such cases, small anti-radar missiles become relevant.

      yeah. Probably not in the know that anti-radar missiles are some of the most expensive. For example, in the latest modification E, the AGM-88 HARM missile stands under a million evergreen American rubles.
      And the device for detecting radiation and determining the direction will be completely uncomplicated.

      fantasies started? The radiation alarm module of the type of our "Pastel" (l150 which) weighs about 50 kg without the power supply unit and antennas. It will probably be interesting to see how you, in the form of an infantryman, will carry such a device on you laughing
      1. +2
        3 March 2020 15: 38
        Quote: Ka-52
        fantasies started? The radiation alarm module of the type of our "Pastel" (l150 which) weighs about 50 kg without the power supply unit and antennas. It will probably be interesting to see how you, in the form of an infantryman, will carry such a device on you

        ERRS-1 direction finding receiver (1L64)
      2. 0
        3 March 2020 15: 59
        Quote: Ka-52
        stands under a million evergreen American rubles.

        And hitting such, for example, an antenna "Harmony" is very, very expensive.
  11. +3
    3 March 2020 13: 12
    And our engineers also have such a long-tested "device" - the "corner reflector" is called

    1. 0
      3 March 2020 14: 06
      The reflector for yachts is more compact in size and more practical.
      Do not forget that you will have to carry a box on your hump.
      1. +1
        3 March 2020 14: 10
        Quote: wehr
        Do not forget that you will have to carry a box on your hump.

        You seem to just not be familiar with them ... they are transported by car and placed stationary, as in the diagrams above I have shown and no one is touching before removal ...
        And there is also a "pyramid"

        A lot of things were invented in the Soviet Army, you just need to know about it and be able to use them in time, for example like that ...
      2. 0
        3 March 2020 15: 55
        Quote: wehr
        carry on his hump.

        This topic is solved by only one way of "dragging on one's hump". Move slowly or not move at all.

        In all other cases, group methods are used. Aerosol curtains (modern airtight for radar), foam masking, wraps, covers, masks from radar absorbing materials, rep, imitators, etc.
        Moreover, in this area initiative is strictly contraindicated. Especially in imitation.
    2. +2
      3 March 2020 15: 22
      Quote: svp67
      And our engineers also have such a long-tested "device" - the "corner reflector" is called

      This is a simulator. "To impart radio-reflecting properties to mock-ups of equipment and weapons made of non-metallic materials"
      Quote: svp67
      And there is also a "pyramid"

      To simulate metal and reinforced concrete bridges, dams, dams.

      There is also an "Angle" for simulating radar landmarks like small settlements and industrial. objects

      There are pneumatic "Sphere-PR" for simulating floating bridges and ferry crossings.



      There is an IDT for simulating moving military equipment
      1. 0
        3 March 2020 15: 56
        Quote: Spade
        This is a simulator. "To impart radio-reflecting properties to mock-ups of equipment and weapons made of non-metallic materials"

        But not only that, they were also hung along traffic routes to hide the movement of equipment from technical intelligence
        1. 0
          3 March 2020 15: 57
          Quote: svp67
          But not only that, they were also hung along traffic routes to hide the movement of equipment from technical intelligence

          These are also imitators.
          And hung out not to hide. And in order to prevent the use of ammunition with radar guidance.
          1. 0
            3 March 2020 16: 01
            Quote: Spade
            And hung out not to hide. And in order to prevent the use of ammunition with radar guidance.

            I will not argue what I learned from the GSVG, then I told you. hi
  12. The comment was deleted.
    1. +1
      4 March 2020 00: 10
      Three. One for hats
  13. 0
    4 March 2020 00: 09
    I remember the SDS (selection of a moving target) mode for filtering out passive interference worked fine even in the early medium-range air defense systems

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