Air defense systems in Russia. SAM "Buk"

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Air defense systems in Russia. SAM "Buk"

Do we have many air defense systems? In 1967, the "Cub" air defense system entered service with the Soviet Army, designed to defeat air attack weapons at a range exceeding the use of aircraft weapons. A distinctive feature of the "Cube" complexes was the placement of self-propelled launchers and self-propelled reconnaissance and guidance systems on a tracked chassis, which made it possible to keep up with armored vehicles. However, due to the high cost of the "Cube" complexes in many Soviet tank divisions, the anti-aircraft missile regiment was equipped with the Osa air defense system.

At the time of the appearance of the Kub SAM, it had no analogues and was very successfully used in a number of regional conflicts. During the “Doomsday War” in 1973, the Kvadrat export modification complexes inflicted heavy losses on Israel’s aviation. With the accumulation of experience in combat use and operation, the creation of new modifications with improved combat characteristics was carried out. In 1976, the Kub-M3 air defense system with enhanced noise immunity entered service. For this option, the range of destruction of air targets was 4-25 km. Reach in height - from 20 to 8000 m.




Battery SAM "Cube"

However, like any other weapon, complexes of the Cube family were not without drawbacks. In the course of real hostilities, it turned out that transport-loading vehicles based on ZIL-131, in the absence of a developed road network, can not always reach self-propelled launchers. In the event of a failure or destruction of a self-propelled reconnaissance and guidance system, the entire anti-aircraft missile battery completely lost combat effectiveness. In the second half of the 1970s, the military was no longer fully satisfied with the capabilities of the Cuba in terms of combating combat helicopters and the inability to simultaneously fire at several targets.

In 1978, the delivery of the Kub-M4 modification began. In fact, this option was a transition. In order to increase the ammunition ready for use and increase the number of target channels, the self-propelled 9A38 firing system was additionally conducted. The equipment of the combat vehicle included: a radar, a television optical sight, and a computer system designed to detect a target and aim a 3M9M3 or 9M38 missile system with a semi-active seeker, as well as its own life support system, navigation, orientation and topographic sensing equipment, “friend or foe” recognition and communications with other battery machines. The inclusion of an additional self-propelled firing system in the air defense system allowed to increase the autonomy and combat stability of the complex as a whole. SOU 9A38 combined the functions of the SPU and partially replaced the SURN, independently detecting targets in a given sector, performing capture and auto tracking.


SOU 9A38 with 3M9M3 SAM

After the introduction of the SOA 9A38 into the Cube-M4, it became possible to direct three own missiles and three missiles of the self-propelled launcher associated with it.

SAMs of the Cube family remained in service with the Russian army until the mid-1990s. In the 21st century, almost all complexes of this type located at the storage bases were disposed of, and a small part of the most recent Cube air defense systems, after reconstructing and “minor” modernization, was transferred to the Allied countries.

SAM "Buk"


In 1980, the Buk air defense system was adopted. The Buk anti-aircraft missile division included: a 9C470 mobile command post, 9C18 Kupol detection and targeting station, two anti-aircraft missile batteries with two 9A310 self-propelled firing systems and one 9A39 launcher-loading unit, as well as a communications unit, technical support and maintenance. Four divisions were organizationally reduced to an anti-aircraft missile brigade, to control the actions of which the ACS "Polyana" was used. The brigade also had its own radar equipment and radio communication machines. Organizational anti-aircraft missile brigade was subordinate to the Army Air Defense Command.

The 9C470 mobile command post, located on the GM-579 chassis, provided for the reception and processing of information received from SOC 9C18, SOU 9A310 and from higher CP. In the course of combat work in automatic or manual mode, targets were selected and distributed between self-propelled firing installations indicating the sectors of responsibility of the JMA.


Mobile command post 9С470

The crew of the command post could handle up to 46 targets in a zone with a radius of 100 km and at altitudes up to 20 km. During the review cycle of the detection and target designation station, up to 6 target designations were provided to self-propelled firing systems with an accuracy of 1 ° in azimuth and elevation, 400-700 m in range. The mass of the KP with a combat crew of 6 people did not exceed 28 tons. A machine equipped with a 710 liter diesel engine. sec., on the highway accelerated to 65 km / h. Cruising range - 500 km.

As part of the Buk air defense system, a 9C18 Kupol three-coordinate coherent-pulse air target detection station was used with an electronic beam scanning in the sector in the elevation angle (set to 30 ° or 40 °) and mechanical (in a circular or in a given sector) antenna rotation azimuth.


Station of detection of targets 9C18 "Dome"

The detection and recognition of air targets was provided at a range of up to 120 km (45 km at a flight altitude of 30 m) while transmitting information about the air situation to the command post of the division. The station provided target tracking with a probability of at least 0,5 against the background of local objects and in passive interference using a moving target selection circuit with automatic wind speed compensation. Protection of the station from anti-radar missiles was achieved by software tuning the carrier frequency and switching to circular polarization of the probing signals or into intermittent radiation mode. The time of the radar transfer from traveling to combat - no more than 5 minutes, and from standby mode to working - no more than 20 s. The mass of the station with a crew of 3 is about 29 tons. The maximum speed on the highway is 60 km / h. Since the initial development of the SOC 9C18 “Dome” was carried out outside the scope of work on the Buk air defense system, and it was intended to be used as a means of detecting air targets of the air defense divisions of the ground forces, another tracked chassis was used for this station, which was very similar to the air defense system “ A circle".

Compared to the Cube family air defense system, the Buk complex, thanks to its own multi-functional radar on the SOU 9A310, had better combat stability and noise immunity, an increased number of target channels and anti-aircraft missiles ready for use. Self-propelled firing systems could carry out an independent search for targets in a given sector, each AA 9A310 had four anti-aircraft missiles. Self-propelled firing system is capable of performing the firing task of hitting a target autonomously - without target designation from the KP division. Telecode communication equipment provided a pair of self-propelled firing installations with a command post and a launcher-loading installation.

The time of the transfer of the JMA to the combat position is no more than 5 minutes. The time the unit was switched from standby to working, after changing the position with the equipment turned on, was no more than 20 s. In the case of replenishment of the ammunition from the launcher-loading installation, the full reload cycle is 12 minutes. When using a transport-loading machine, a full recharge cycle is 16 minutes.


SOU 9A310 with mock-ups of missiles at the Museum of Military Equipment, in Verkhnyaya Pyshma

The crew of a four-person self-propelled firing system was protected by armor protecting against bullets and light fragments. The combat vehicle on the GM-579 tracked chassis weighed 34 tons and could reach speeds of up to 65 km / h on the highway.


Loading anti-aircraft missiles at the SOU 9A310 with ROM 9A39

The 9A39 missile launcher was designed to transport, store and launch eight 9M38 missiles. The launch-loading installation, in addition to a starting device with a power follow-up drive, a crane and lodgements, included: navigation, topographic and orientation equipment, telecode communication and a power supply unit. The mass of the installation in the combat position is 35,5 tons. The crew is 3 people. Mobility and power reserve at the level of SOU 9A310.

To defeat aerodynamic targets in the Buk air defense system, 9M38 missiles were used. This rocket, made according to the normal aerodynamic design with an X-shaped wing, used a dual-mode solid-fuel engine with a total operating time of about 15 seconds. The missile was equipped with a semi-active radar seeker, with homing according to the method of proportional navigation. Target capture took place after the start, target illumination is carried out by radar СОУ 9А38.


9M38 missiles next to the automated control and test mobile station 9V95, designed for integrated verification of airborne anti-aircraft missile equipment
The launch mass of the rocket is about 690 kg. Length - 5500 mm, diameter - 400 mm, wingspan - 700 mm, wingspan - 860 mm. To destroy air targets, a fragmentation warhead weighing 70 kg is used, equipped with a charge weighing 34 kg of a mixture of TNT and RDX. The missile is equipped with an active pulsed radio fuse, which provides warhead detonation at a distance of 17 m from the target. When the fuse did not work, the rocket self-destructed. 9M38 missiles can hit targets at ranges from 3,5 to 32 km, with altitudes from 25 to 18000. The probability of hitting a fighter target with one missile was 0,7-0,8 (0,6 when maneuvering with overloads up to 8G) , helicopters at low altitude - 0,3-0,6, cruise missiles - 0,25-0,5. The anti-aircraft missile division could simultaneously fire at 6 targets.

Buk-М1 SAM



Immediately after the successful completion of state tests of the Buk air defense system, work began on its modernization. The customer demanded to increase the ability to combat cruise missiles and helicopters, increase the likelihood of destruction, and also ensure the defeat of operational-tactical ballistic missiles. The 9K37M1 Buk-M1 air defense system was adopted in 1983. All Buk-M1 air defense systems were fully interchangeable with elements of the basic modification complex.


The main elements of the Buk-M1 anti-aircraft missile system. From left to right: mobile KP 9S470M1, SOTs 9S18M1 Kupol-M1, SOU 9A310M1, PZU 9A39M1 and transport and loading vehicle 9T229 on the KrAZ-255B chassis
To detect air targets as part of the Buk-M1 air defense system, a more advanced 9C18M1 Kupol-M1 airborne detection and targeting station was used on a new element base, which has a flat headlamp and a unified tracked chassis GM-567M.


SOC 9S18M1 "Dome-M1"

Command post 9С470М1 provides the simultaneous reception of information from its own SOTs and about six targets from the air defense control unit of the division or from the air defense army CP. Self-propelled firing system 9A310M1 provides detection and capture of targets for auto tracking at long ranges (25-30%), as well as recognition of aircraft, ballistic missiles and helicopters. The SOA 9A310M1 radar system uses 72 letters of illumination frequency (instead of 36), which improved protection against interference.

Along with the 9M38 SAM, the Buk-M1 air defense system used improved 9M38M1 missiles with a maximum firing range of 35 km. The probability of destroying a fighter target with one missile in the absence of organized interference is 0,8..0,95. The upgraded complex is capable of shooting down ALCM cruise missiles with a probability of destruction of at least 0,4, anti-tank AH-1 Huey Cobra helicopters with a probability of 0,6-0,7, and also hovering helicopters with a probability of 0,3-0,4 at a range from 3,5 to 10 km.

In addition to improving combat performance, the Buk-M1 air defense system was able to achieve greater operational reliability compared to Buk. The transfer of the main elements of the complex to a single tracked chassis simplified repair and maintenance. The Buk-M1 modification complexes became the most widespread in the family. Although the Buk air defense system was formally created to replace the Cube air defense system in the anti-aircraft missile regiments of tank divisions, in fact, it was mainly equipped with army submission anti-aircraft missile brigades. The brigade provided effective cover for troops in almost the entire range of heights from aircraft, helicopters and cruise missiles of the enemy. The Buk air defense system in the structure of the Soviet military air defense squeezed the Krug air defense system and partially replaced and supplemented the longer-range S-300V air defense systems.

Buk-М1-2 ADMS


The collapse of the USSR and the economic “reforms” that led to the underfunding of experimental design work seriously hindered the further improvement of the Buk family anti-aircraft missile systems. The next modification, the Buk-M1-2, was formally adopted only in 1998. Although it is not known about the purchase of such complexes by the RF Ministry of Defense, the Buk-M1-2 air defense system was a significant step forward thanks to the use of the new 9M317 SAM and the modernization of other elements of the complex. At the same time, tactical ballistic missiles, aircraft missiles at ranges up to 20 km, cruise missiles with low EPR, surface ships at ranges up to 25 km and radio-contrast ground targets at ranges up to 15 km were defeated. The far border of the affected area has been increased to 45 km, in height - up to 25 km. Flight speed - up to 1230 m / s, overload - up to 24 g. The launch mass of the rocket is 715 kg.


9M317 missile launcher

Externally, the 9M317 missiles differ from 9M38M1 in the shorter wing chord length. To control it, an inertial system with radio correction is used, combined with a semi-active radar seeker with an on-board computer, with guidance according to the proportional navigation method. The missile is equipped with a two-channel fuse - an active pulse and semi-active radar, as well as a system of contact sensors. The core warhead weighs 70 kg. When firing at surface and ground targets, the radio fuse is turned off and a contact fuse is used. The missile has a high level of reliability, a fully assembled and equipped missile does not require checks and adjustments over the entire life of 10 years.

The main elements of the Buk-M1-2 complex are made on the GM-569 chassis. The television-optical sight and laser rangefinder are added to the hardware of the SOU 9A310M1-2. In fact, “Buk-M1-2” is an option of “small” modernization of the Buk-M1 air defense system, during which, at the lowest cost, thanks to the introduction of the new 9M317 missile system, it was possible to achieve a significant improvement in combat performance. Subsequently, the developments obtained during the creation of the Buk-M1-2 air defense system were used to create more advanced systems.

Buk-М2 SAM


The next serial modification was the Buk-M2 SAM, adopted for service in 2008. At this complex, radar equipment and information display facilities have undergone a radical update. On all machines of the complex, screens with cathode ray tubes were replaced by multifunctional color LCD monitors. All combat vehicles are equipped with modern digital radio stations that provide reception and transmission of both voice information and coded target designation and target distribution data. In parallel with inertial navigation equipment, satellite navigation is used. The complex can be operated in various climatic zones, for this the machines are equipped with air conditioning.

Aerial targets are detected by SOC 9S18M1-3 with a centimeter-range coherent-pulse survey radar with electronic beam scanning in a vertical plane mounted on a GM-567M tracked chassis. Protection against interference is provided by the instantaneous adjustment of the pulse frequency, as well as by blocking the range intervals. From radar signals from the ground and other passive interference, the radar is protected by compensating for losses in direction, wind speed and selectivity of real targets. The target detection range with an EPR of 2 m² is 160 km.

The updated 9C510 command post was able to simultaneously process 60 targets and issue 36 target designations. In this case, the time from receiving information to transferring to firing systems is no more than 2 seconds.


SOU 9A317

The 9A317 self-propelled firing system on the GM-569 caterpillar chassis externally differs from the previous models of self-propelled guns by the flat surface of the radar with a phased antenna array. СОУ 9А317 can search for targets in the area of ​​± 45 ° in azimuth and 70 ° in elevation. The target detection range with an EPR of 2 m², flying at an altitude of 3 km - up to 120 km. Target tracking is carried out in the sector in azimuth ± 60 °, in elevation - from -5 to + 85 °. The installation is capable of simultaneously detecting up to 10 targets and firing up to 4 targets. The reaction time of the JMA is 4 seconds, and putting it on alert after a position change is 20 seconds. The calculation also has an all-day optoelectronic system with thermal imaging and television channels, which significantly increases the noise immunity and survivability of the air defense system. A number of sources say that with the SAU 9A317 without turning on the illumination and guidance radar, it is possible to use 9M317A anti-aircraft missiles with an active homing radar. But whether there are such missiles in the troops is unknown.

The 9A316 launcher and launcher was mounted on the GM-577 crawler chassis. As in the early Buk missile systems, it can be used as a launcher and a transport and loading vehicle. A crew of 4 people provides loading the 9A317 SOU with 9M317 missiles in 15 minutes. Self-loading time - 13 minutes.

A new element has been introduced into the Buk-M2 air defense system - a 9C36 missile target and missile guidance station. According to its characteristics, the station is similar to the radar used on the 9A317 SDA. Raising to a height of up to 22 m, the radar antenna post with the PAR is designed to direct the 9M317 missiles to targets flying at low and extremely low altitudes, in wooded and rough terrain. The rising antenna post provides an extension of the radio horizon at extremely low altitudes by more than 2,5 times, which makes it possible to detect cruise missiles flying at an altitude of 5 m, at a distance of up to 70 km.


9S36 missile target and missile guidance station

The first Buk-M2 production systems in 2009 received the 297th anti-aircraft missile brigade deployed in the vicinity of the village of Leonidovka in the Penza Region. According to information published in publicly available sources, as of 2019 in the Russian Army Buk-M2 air defense systems were equipped with 5 anti-aircraft missile brigades.

Buk-М3 SAM


In 2016, the Buk-M2016 SAM was demonstrated for the first time at the Army 3 international military-technical forum in Kubinka, and the complex was put into service the same year.


SOU 9A317M

The main external difference between the Buk-M3 and Buk-M2 air defense systems was the use of new 9M317M anti-aircraft missiles delivered in transport and launch containers. At the same time, the ammunition ready for use on combat vehicles of the Buk-M3 SAM increased by 1,5 times. On the 9A317M self-propelled firing launcher, performed on the GM-5969 unified chassis, the number of missiles increased from 4 to 6, and on the 9A316M self-propelled launcher instead of 8 missiles, 12 missile launchers were deployed.


SPU 9A316M

The characteristics of optoelectronic and radar detection and guidance means are similar to those used in the Buk-M2 air defense system. At the same time, the combat capabilities of the Buk-M3 air defense system were significantly enhanced thanks to the use of new anti-aircraft missiles. The complex provides simultaneous shelling of up to 36 air targets flying from different directions.


Layout of marine missiles 9M317MFE

Unfortunately, it was possible to find a high-quality image of only the 9M317MFE missile, which is used as part of the Shtil-1E space-based air defense system. In the ship's version, the rocket is vertically ejected from the transport and launch container to a height of 10 meters with the subsequent engine starting.

9M317M missiles is a single-stage solid-fuel rocket, made according to the normal aerodynamic scheme. The length of the rocket is 5180 mm, the diameter of the hull is 360 mm, the range of the rudders is 820 mm. Due to the fact that the rocket is equipped with a more powerful dual-mode engine with increased operating time, the controlled flight range of 9M317M has been increased to 70 km. Reach in height - 35 km, flight speed - 1550 m / s. The missile is delivered and stored in an airtight transport and launch container, completely ready for combat use, and does not require on-board equipment inspections during the entire specified period of operation.

At the main stage of the flight, the rocket is controlled by an autopilot with correction for radio signals, and when approaching the target, a semi-active Doppler radar homing head with an integrated on-board computer is used. However, this guidance method requires radar illumination at the final stage, which significantly unmasks the air defense systems and limits the range of use of the radio horizon. To eliminate this drawback, the 9M317MA missile system with an active homing radar was developed. The use of missiles with ARGS makes it possible to fire with off-load tap-changers, which greatly increases the survivability of the division. The characteristics of the ARGSN used on the 9M317MA rocket make it possible to capture a target with an EPR of 0,3 m² at a distance of up to 35 km.

After adopting the Buk-M3 air defense system, they began to actively replace the obsolete and exhausted Soviet-built Buk-M1 systems. According to information published in the Russian media at the end of 2017, 3 anti-aircraft missile brigades partially or completely switched to new systems.

SAM "Buk-M1", "Buk-M2" and "Buk-M3" in the armed forces of Russia


During the years of "Serdyukovschina" a certain amount of air defense systems of the Buk family was withdrawn from the air defense units of the ground forces. Anti-aircraft missile brigades disbanded, and their equipment, weapons and personnel were transferred to the air defense missile defense air defense systems to equip anti-aircraft missile regiments that perform missions to cover important strategic targets. So, in the course of “giving a new look”, the holes formed in our air defense system after the decommissioning of the S-200VM / D and S-300PT air-defense systems that had exhausted their life, patched up.


Satellite image Google Earth: position of the Buk air defense system in the Uch-Dere area, Krasnodar Territory

The Buk family air defense systems were originally created in the interests of the air defense of the ground forces, but quite often they are used to cover important military and civilian objects from air attack weapons. A typical example of this approach is the position in the Uch-Dere region, about 8 km northwest of the center of Sochi.

According to The Military Balance 2016, four years ago there were more than 400 Buk-M1 and Buk-M2 air defense systems in the Russian armed forces. Apparently, the reference book refers to self-propelled gun mounts and launch-loading vehicles, that is, equipment with which anti-aircraft missiles can be launched. Thus, in the anti-aircraft missile brigades of the air defense of the ground forces and in the anti-aircraft missile regiments of the airborne forces should be more than 60 divisions. However, this estimate is excessively high. According to more realistic information, cited by domestic and foreign experts, in 2018, the army defense forces of the military unit had: 10 Buk-M1 launchers, 12 Buk-M2 launchers, and 8 Buk-M3 launchers. In total, at that time, the troops included: 90 SOU 9A310M1 and PZU 9A39M1 (SAM Buk-M1), 108 SOU 9A317 and PZU 9A316 (Buk-M2), 32 SOU 9A317M and SPU 9A316M (Buk-M3). Considering that the Buk-M1 modification systems are being removed from service and replaced by Buk-M2 and Buk-M3, the number of anti-aircraft missile divisions in anti-aircraft missile brigades remains at approximately the same level.

Although military air defense systems on a caterpillar chassis are not very well suited for carrying out long combat duty, after re-equipping anti-aircraft missile brigades with new equipment and mastering it with personnel, anti-aircraft missile battalions are alternately involved to provide air defense for large military garrisons, air bases and other important defense facilities.


Satellite image Google Earth: position of the Buk-M2 air defense system in the vicinity of Afipsky, Krasnodar Territory
Judging by satellite images, one 90th air defense missile division deployed in the village of Afipsky, Krasnodar Territory, after rearmament in 2015 with Buk-M1 air defense systems to Buk-M2, has been on combat duty on an ongoing basis.


Satellite image Google Earth: Buk-M2 air defense system in the vicinity of Domna air base, Trans-Baikal Territory

The same applies to the 140th air defense missile system, deployed near the large air base of Domna in the Trans-Baikal Territory. Since the place of permanent deployment of equipment and weapons of the anti-aircraft missile brigade is located in close proximity to the air base, combat alert is conducted on the site near the boxes where fighting vehicles are stored.

Currently available in the troops of the Buk-M2 / M3 air defense system, they are able to cover groups of the RF Armed Forces in the entire range of heights and accompany tank and motorized rifle divisions on the march and in the frontline. In the event of the outbreak of war, they should not only provide protection against air strikes of groupings, associations and bases, but also be involved in solving the country's air defense tasks in places of deployment. However, taking into account the need to write off the remaining Buk-M1 air defense systems and improve the enemy’s air attack facilities, a number of anti-aircraft missile brigades need to be re-equipped with modern systems.

To be continued ...
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108 comments
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  1. -3
    2 March 2020 18: 33
    Dear author! What is the most important advantage of the Buk-M3 air defense system, which most of the US and Israeli anti-aircraft systems, if not all of their systems, lack?
    1. +2
      2 March 2020 18: 47
      Dear author! What is the most important advantage of the Buk-M3 air defense system,

      And for what purpose, are you actually interested?
      1. +1
        2 March 2020 21: 01
        Self-propelled firing installations could carry independent target search in a given sector, on each SOA 9A310 there were four anti-aircraft missiles. Self-propelled firing system capable of performing a fire mission to hit the target autonomously - without target designation from KP division.
        It is amazing how many people continue to deny this.
        1. +5
          3 March 2020 00: 30
          Just the capabilities of the JMA are very limited in height and range!
          And in order to bring down the Boeing at the level of 9500m SOU Buk-M1 should have been located directly under the flight path of the board (the exact coordinates and flight time of which only Ukrainian controllers could know) hi
          1. +1
            3 March 2020 00: 37
            Quote: Protos
            Just the capabilities of the JMA are very limited in height and range!
            This, of course, is not so. TTX SOU in offline mode can be easily found in an accessible form on the Internet. Opportunities are limited by the angle of the search, but not so much that the JMA could not detect such a bast shoe as a Boeing without outside help. Still, Soviet engineers did it, and not at all for fun.
            1. +4
              3 March 2020 12: 08
              And what is a search angle? And then I heard about the azimuth angle and elevation angle, and here, apparently, a new word in the air defense technology
              1. 0
                3 March 2020 12: 10
                "Azimuth and elevation angle when the radar is in target search mode", if that's more clear to you.

                Quote: sivuch
                azimuth angle
                If you are already digging, then you yourself be careful in terms. Azimuth is an angle, "azimuth angle" is an "angle of an angle".
                1. +1
                  3 March 2020 17: 31
                  Kind, tell me once you have awareness, you served at the BUK m1 complex, were you an operator, did you try the trick with the SDA?
                  1. -3
                    3 March 2020 18: 17
                    I have no desire to participate in the attempts of argumentum ad hominem. Consider how you personally are closer.
                    1. +2
                      3 March 2020 19: 44
                      everything is clear, my opinion is higher than the rest. Only there are people who served at these complexes, according to the nature of the wreckage, they say they shot down, but not by beech.
                      1. -2
                        3 March 2020 19: 54
                        The Almaz-Antey specialists officially state that the picture of destruction is consistent with the defeat of Boeing by the 9M38 Buk air defense missile system.
                      2. 0
                        3 March 2020 21: 00
                        Quote: Vyacheslav Viktorovich
                        The Almaz-Antey specialists officially state that the picture of destruction is consistent with the defeat of Boeing by the 9M38 Buk air defense missile system.

                        ==========
                        Respected! If you are trying to prove the version voiced by the Ukrainian media that the Boeing was shot down by the Russian missile launcher 9A310M1 of the Buk-M1 complex, which was dragged across the border on a trailer in a SINGLE COPY (!!!), then this is just nonsense !!!
                        Dragging the ONLY (!) SOU - in the expectation that it will be able to EFFECTIVELY cover a vast territory (the southern sector of the DPR) - this is 100% folly! For its effectiveness would be simple scanty!
                        If you wanted to do this, you would have brought in and delivered at least a "reduced set" - 2-3 SOU, SOC, KP and a couple of TPUs! And such column neither the "all-seeing" Ukrainian intelligence service, nor the "all-knowing" Ukrainian media - well, they would never have missed! Such a howl would have risen ...
                        So this topic (about the Russian SDU) is so "rotten" that it does not stand up to any criticism!
                      3. 0
                        3 March 2020 22: 32
                        Quote: venik
                        RAVE!!!
                        folly!
                        scanty!
                        This is all nothing more than your personal opinion, which you are trying to argue, mentally placing your head on the shoulders of the people who decided to send the Buk. The reality is that the opinions of other people, as well as their ideas about effectiveness and expediency, may differ from yours, for reasons that you may or may not know. Therefore, I am not very interested in opinions and attempts to think for others; I prefer to look at the facts.
                      4. 0
                        4 March 2020 08: 59
                        I know a man who firmly believed and relied on the same arguments as you. He is a military man. But having collected the full information, I realized that the story is not simple. Especially stupid story with Buk, dragging from abroad. Admit it, you have no arguments.
                      5. -2
                        4 March 2020 13: 01
                        Why do I have to do something because of some friend of mine that I don’t even know? What I consider to be noteworthy arguments, I quote. If you think that they do not exist - well, then there is no subject for discussion.
                      6. 0
                        7 March 2020 17: 19
                        I wanted to say this, that over time, the brains fall into place.
                      7. -2
                        4 March 2020 14: 05
                        Why is this beech story from abroad stupid
                      8. 0
                        4 March 2020 10: 05
                        Quote: Vyacheslav Viktorovich
                        Therefore, I am not very interested in opinions

                        =========
                        But in vain !!! Very in vain! Usually this indicates excessive self-esteem and hypertrophied conceit .....
                        -------
                        Quote: Vyacheslav Viktorovich
                        I prefer to look at the facts

                        ===========
                        Great! Well, WHERE are they? WHERE are these FACTS ???
                      9. -2
                        4 March 2020 12: 55
                        Quote: venik
                        Great! Well, WHERE are they? WHERE are these FACTS ???
                        The fact is that the performance characteristics of the Buka in an autonomous mode allow him to detect and bring down a Boeing by forces of one self-propelled gun.
                      10. +1
                        7 March 2020 17: 08
                        The fact allows that the plane could be shot down like a Mig-29, Su-27, a bomb planted on board the aircraft, the Ukrainian Buk M1 crew, given that there are many nationalists in the army, but to drag one SDA unit across the border into the combat zone , where there is no clear line and location of troops, given the fact that you can burn off to the whole world. Are you stoned or so naive. Do you have any fools in our General Staff? Rather, the story of the Boeing recalls that Saakashvili and the United States would have nothing to do with the adventure.
                      11. -3
                        8 March 2020 00: 17
                        You again tell me your opinion (about the advisability of sending the Buk from the point of view of the people who made the decision to send). It is uninteresting to argue with an opinion; in a dispute of two opinions, persuasiveness depends on which of the disputants knows how to shout louder. I don’t know how to shout loudly.
                      12. 0
                        8 March 2020 11: 52
                        But in vain !!! Very in vain! Usually this indicates an increased self-esteem and hypertrophied conceit ..... In a dispute it depends on the evidence, and not on what I described above.
                      13. -4
                        8 March 2020 09: 15
                        It would be impossible to burn .. If that beech shot down what kind of aircraft it was necessary, then everyone would throw bonnets into the air with joy that the militia had their own Bukahs and everyone would not care where he came from .. But there was an error ..
                      14. 0
                        8 March 2020 11: 57
                        the question is only whose mistake. There are specialists in Buk in the Russian army and APU. If it was a beech. There is data from US satellites, but this is secret. So, not everything is known.
                      15. -3
                        8 March 2020 20: 51
                        Yes, there are a lot of things .. Just you do not want to see this ..
                      16. 0
                        8 March 2020 21: 39
                        rather, you do not see the whole truth, a lot of things are hidden from us. We must not look for evidence of guilt of Putin and Russia, and who really was the guilty party, and they hide the true guilty party with full evidence. Believe me, if the Americans had pictures of the launch from the territory of Ukraine, the exact place, everything had already fallen into place. A fake about one SDA installation on a tractor, has long been recognized as a fake, and from one single registrar. I think ours ourselves do not fully understand what they brought down.
                      17. -4
                        9 March 2020 09: 22
                        Yes, surround yourself .. And the photos and videos are complete and even with 3 missiles after the event ..
                        And telephone conversations and everything else ..
                      18. 0
                        10 March 2020 17: 46
                        Dada, that such a fake did not hear. About how from the voice of the militias, you can create a whole radio broadcast. A mustache can be faked. Now it’s possible to get such pictures that you personally shot down the plane, and you can fake negotiations.
                      19. -5
                        11 March 2020 04: 32
                        Yes, yes, all that does not suit us is fake.
                        Good position..
                      20. 0
                        12 March 2020 17: 04
                        the most important thing is to distinguish fake and what really happens. It is necessary to search for the guilty, and not proof of the guilt of Russia, in particular Putin.
                      21. 0
                        4 March 2020 08: 56
                        The specialists of Almaz Antey conducted an experiment, although not an exact one, to show the nature of the rocket’s defeat in the airplane’s body, arguing that if there was a defeat, then from a different direction. But the fact of defeat is the question of what is unclear.
                      22. 0
                        4 March 2020 13: 09
                        I objected to the argument that someone acquaintance claims that Boeing’s injuries are not consistent with Buk’s defeat picture. Almaz-Antey does not think so. They do not exclude the 9M38 missile defense version. Accordingly, the version of the defeat by Buk does not contradict the observed damage to the Boeing. If she contradicted, she would be expelled.
                      23. 0
                        7 March 2020 17: 18
                        This is not someone familiar, but the military who served in the Buk m1 air defense system and expressed their opinion, there have already been 3 such.
                      24. 0
                        8 March 2020 00: 02
                        That is, non-professionals work at Almaz-Antey - is that how it works? They, with all their experts and an array of non-public official information, could not rule out the version that people who served on the Buki had excluded from a couple of photos?
                      25. 0
                        8 March 2020 11: 53
                        That is, in Almaz Antey they tested the theory that is used in the prosecution as the main one.
    2. +2
      2 March 2020 19: 09
      As experts draw attention to, citing the results of practical tests, in a number of ways the new Russian Buk equalized and even surpassed the S-300. So, the probability of hitting air targets at Buk-M3 was a record index of 0,9999.
      https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201601060753-g1ze.htm
    3. +12
      2 March 2020 19: 32
      What is the most important advantage of the Buk-M3 air defense system, which most of the US and Israeli anti-aircraft systems, if not all of their systems, lack?

      Their presence in the arsenal of the Russian Armed Forces.
    4. 0
      3 March 2020 08: 11
      The main thing is that it is better likely to be noise immunity, reaction time, plus new missiles and the ability to reload ammunition faster. This is at least.
    5. 0
      6 March 2020 10: 04
      Quote: Posted by Linnik
      The detection and recognition of air targets was provided at ranges up to 120 km (45 km at a flight height of 30 m) with simultaneous transmission of information about the air situation to the command post of the division.

      Author! With a target altitude of 30 m and an SOC 9C18 antenna height of 8,02 m, the line of sight (for centimeter range) is equal to 29,66 kmAnd not 45 km. Again you are wrong.
      Aerial targets are detected by SOTS 9S18M1-3 with a centimeter-range coherent-pulse survey radar with electronic beam scanning in a vertical plane mounted on a GM-567M tracked chassis. Protection against interference is provided by the instantaneous adjustment of the pulse frequency, as well as by blocking the range intervals. From reflected signals from the ground и other passive interference Radar protected by compensation of losses on the direction, wind speed and selectivity of real targets. The target detection range with an EPR of 2 m² is 160 km.

      Horror! This expression does not fully withstand criticism. Selectivity due to what? Some mistakes in the article. Author, did you even understand what you wrote?
      1. 0
        6 March 2020 11: 07
        Quote: Posted by Linnik
        Interference protection provided by instantaneous tuning pulse frequenciesas well as blocking range intervals.

        Be so kind, what frequency are you talking about? The expression is dualistic and illiterate. Maybe pulse repetition rates? fellow
        1. 0
          6 March 2020 11: 34
          Quote: Posted by Linnik
          From reflected ground signals and other passive interference ...

          Maybe from "local items", dear author?
  2. +9
    2 March 2020 18: 46
    According to more realistic information, cited by domestic and foreign experts, in 2018, the army defense forces of the military unit had: 10 Buk-M1 launchers, 12 Buk-M2 launchers, and 8 Buk-M3 launchers.

    Not at all thick ....
    1. +2
      2 March 2020 20: 20
      Not at all thick ....

      even if you count the minimum staff PU and ROM
      10 zrd Buk-M1 (90) = 480 zur
      12 zrd Buk-M2 (108) = 576 zur
      8 zrd Buk-M3 (32PU, generally 48PU) = 384 zur
      In total in a volley, without taking into account the channels TsU = 1440 zur
      Fig not a lot wassat
      1. +4
        3 March 2020 01: 02
        Quote: Romario_Argo
        Fig not a lot

        I agree, harm and not a little Yes But do not forget that a third of the army-level complexes available in the troops are Buk-M1 built in the 80s. They are very worn out, and the missiles are beyond the limits of service life. Let's hope that in the near future, the obsolete and physically obsolete air defense systems will be replaced with new Buk-M3.
  3. +1
    2 March 2020 18: 50
    The missile is too big by modern standards.
    1. +1
      3 March 2020 13: 08
      as an option,
      can integrate 9M96E2 from Redut to Buk-M3, immediately the range will increase to 150 km
    2. +3
      3 March 2020 21: 45
      Quote: Pavel57
      The missile is too big by modern standards.

      ========
      Yah??? We will see:
      - "Aster" block-2, EU, 2006, long distance -100 km, start weight - 510 kg;
      - Chu-SAM, Japan, 2005, a long distance of 50 km, starting weight - 580 kg;
      - HQ-16, China, 2011, range 40 km, starting weight - 615 kg;
      - HQ-12, China, 2007, range 50 km, starting weight - 900 kg;
      - MEADS (PAC-3MSE) EU-USA, 2006, long. -100 km, weight - 510 kg;
      --------
      - "Buk-M3" (9M317M) RF, 2016 long. 70 km, start. weight - 581 kg;
      =========
      Well, WHERE is the "GREAT" ?????
  4. +1
    2 March 2020 19: 27
    I would like to see how the 9A316 launcher-loading system self-charges ... Something I can hardly imagine the rise of the 4 lower missiles to the launch line.
    1. +2
      3 March 2020 13: 09
      reloading on the S-350 has become easier, 2 containers of 6 missiles each, 5-7 minutes and the launcher is ready to fire
  5. 0
    2 March 2020 21: 28
    Thanks to the author! Interesting.
  6. +3
    2 March 2020 21: 35
    I wonder how tpk buk-m3 improve the performance of the zur in comparison with the "naked" zur m1 and m2? It is unlikely that it will protect against bullets and shrapnel, but it can probably provide a longer storage period for the zur, protect against unintentional impacts during loading and transportation, protect against condensation during daily temperature fluctuations, but how can this be estimated, let's say, quantitatively? it seems like the TPK was inherited from the ship's air defense system, it turns out that this is all a desire to unify and improve operational characteristics.
    Curiously, if the zur for the beech-m3 was originally created for a "cold" start with a docking turn and starting of the main engine, then from the TPK installed on the beech-m3 it starts in the same way ??
    1. +3
      3 March 2020 01: 07
      Quote: Nikolay R-PM
      I wonder how tpk buk-m3 improve the performance of the zur in comparison with the "naked" zur m1 and m2? It is unlikely that it will protect against bullets and shrapnel, but it can probably provide a longer storage period for the zur, protect against unintentional impacts during loading and transportation, protect against condensation during daily temperature fluctuations, but how can this be estimated, let's say, quantitatively? it seems like the TPK was inherited from the ship's air defense system, it turns out that this is all a desire to unify and improve operational characteristics.

      Nikolai, good day! In a number of sources (not priority ones) they write that TPKs protect against light bullets and fragments. But how reliable this is, I can’t say ..request In any case, as you rightly noted, protection from meteorological factors and loading are provided.
      Quote: Nikolay R-PM
      Curiously, if the zur for the beech-m3 was originally created for a "cold" start with a docking turn and starting of the main engine, then from the TPK installed on the beech-m3 it starts in the same way ??

      As far as I know, no. Land and sea missiles have structural differences.
  7. 0
    2 March 2020 21: 53
    Sergey, hi

    Thank you for the article!
    And are 9M317MA already included in the composition of the three rubles or have they just passed state tests? I wonder what proportion between conceived on the SDA? what
    Although, most likely, this is classified information.
    M3 is an extremely successful complex, and handsome, a tomboy laughing
    1. 0
      3 March 2020 01: 09
      Hello! hi
      Quote: Orkraider
      And are 9M317MA already included in the composition of the three rubles or have they just passed state tests? I wonder what proportion between conceived on the SDA?

      I do not know. No.
      Quote: Orkraider
      M3 is an extremely successful complex, and handsome, a tomboy

      I really like him too good I hope the supply of Buk-M3 to the troops will continue in the future.
      1. -5
        3 March 2020 01: 16
        Author! You forgot to answer Ingenegr! After all, is he completely right?
        And then, the illiterate are welcomed, he was completely bombarded!
        1. 0
          3 March 2020 01: 24
          Quote: Nikolay3
          Author! You forgot to answer Ingenegr! After all, is he completely right?
          And then, the illiterate are welcomed, he was completely bombarded!

          I. Vasya! If I need your advice, I will definitely ask you for it! I myself choose with whom to conduct a dialogue, usually I don’t communicate with inadequacies.
          1. -4
            3 March 2020 01: 30
            Bongo! We must admit our mistakes ... And I'm not Vasya! Ingenegr - totally right!
            1. +3
              3 March 2020 05: 26
              Quote: Nikolay3
              Ingenegr - totally right!

              Well, of course, No. and the developers are wrong ... wassat
              Quote: Nikolay3
              And I'm not Vasya!

              You are a liar! am Here is a profile scan of your old account:

              Only last month you were repeatedly banned for trolling, rudeness, insults, inciting ethnic hatred and the simultaneous use of multiple accounts. negative Or will you deny this too?
            2. +3
              3 March 2020 05: 45
              Bongo! We must admit our mistakes ... And I'm not Vasya! Ingenegr - totally right!

              the author has long been seen in dislike of answers to "uncomfortable" questions and arrogant arrogance
              But in response, Ingenegr will tell you that on the one hand you are right - the radio horizon at a height of 22 m does not exceed 25-30 km, depending on the type of terrain.
              But on the other hand, there are techniques for locating low-altitude HE against the backdrop of an angel echo outside the radio horizon: EME radio waves are channeled through tropospheric radio waves.
              1. -2
                3 March 2020 10: 35
                Quote: Ka-52
                the author has long been seen in dislike of answers to "uncomfortable" questions and arrogant arrogance

                Let me decide for myself who to answer and what questions. As for "arrogant arrogance", I, unlike some, do not allow myself to tell others what to do and how to act. And the fact that you are in support of a character caught using multiple accounts, and who is banned several times a month for rudeness and insults, characterizes you accordingly. negative
                1. +1
                  3 March 2020 14: 00
                  And the fact that you are supporting a character caught using multiple accounts

                  do not carry nonsense. I do not support anyone. I wrote that your arrogance is already known to me, and reading your comments above, I was once again convinced of this.
                  And I answered these gentlemen because of my knowledge of the topic of radar. Unlike you, I’m not trying to breed a booth. If you do not agree with my opinion regarding the method of over-the-horizon detection of low-altitude objects - well, so object in essence.
                  1. 0
                    4 March 2020 00: 23
                    Quote: Ka-52
                    do not carry nonsense. I do not support anyone.

                    To the question of delirium:
                    the author has long been seen in dislike of answers to "uncomfortable" questions and arrogant arrogance
                    Maybe you should learn to communicate normally? For adequate people, for adequate questions, I always answer, including on this thread.
                    Quote: Ka-52
                    And I answered these gentlemen because of my knowledge of the topic of radar. Unlike you, I’m not trying to breed a booth.
                    I fully admit that you, as the "commander" of the ship, are equally well versed in booths and radar. Yes
                    Quote: Ka-52
                    If you do not agree with my opinion regarding the method of over-the-horizon detection of low-altitude objects - well, so object in essence.

                    But I agree with that. Moreover, I am always interested in the competent opinion of a specialist. It is not clear only why an outsider should get into other people's squabbles and get personal? request
          2. The comment was deleted.
  8. +4
    2 March 2020 23: 20
    Raising to a height of up to 22 m, the radar antenna post with the PAR is designed to direct the 9M317 missiles to targets flying at low and extremely low altitudes, in wooded and rough terrain. The rising antenna post provides an extension of the radio horizon at extremely low altitudes by more than 2,5 times, which makes it possible to detect cruise missiles flying at an altitude of 5 m, at a distance of up to 70 km.

    Very unlikely to be true. If physics and the laws of propagation in the space of centimeter-wave radio waves have not yet been canceled, then the detection range of a target flying at a height of 5 m when raising the antenna on a 22-meter tower should be no more than 30 km.
    To ensure the detection range of the CC at a height of 5 m to 70 km, the antenna will have to be raised half the height of the Ostankino television tower - as much as 300 m.
    1. -2
      3 March 2020 10: 55
      Quote: Ingenegr
      Very unlike the truth. If the physics and laws of propagation in the space of centimeter-wave radio waves have not yet been canceled

      Why such statements, colleague ?! Ultra-short wavelengths of the centimeter range used in radars propagate rectilinearly, so the detection range is limited by direct visibility. It follows that 22 meters will completely ensure the removal of interference from physical objects that interfere with detecting low-flying targets!
      1. 0
        3 March 2020 13: 05
        Quote: businessv (Vadim)
        Quote: Article IN
        Raising to a height of up to 22 m, the radar antenna post with the PAR is designed to aim the 9M317 missiles at targets flying at low and extremely low altitudes, in wooded and rough terrain. The rising antenna post provides an extension of the radio horizon at extremely low altitudes by more than 2,5 times, which makes it possible to detect cruise missiles flying at an altitude of 5 m, at a range of up to 70 km.

        Quote: Ingenegr
        Very unlike the truth. If physics and the laws of propagation in the space of centimeter-wave radio waves have not yet been canceled, then the flying detection range at a height of 5 m, the target when lifting the antenna on a 22-meter tower should be no more than 30 km.
        That provide the detection range of the CC at an altitude of 5 m in 70 km, the antenna will have to be raised half the height of the Ostankino TV tower - already 300 m.

        Why such statements, colleague ?! Ultra-short wavelengths of the centimeter range used in radars propagate rectilinearly, so the detection range is limited by direct visibility. It follows that 22 meters will completely ensure the removal of interference from physical objects that interfere with detecting low-flying targets!

        businessv (Vadim), read the article carefully. We are talking about the detection range of a cruise missile flying at an altitude of 5 m, which cannot be detected in any way at a distance of 70 km. To detect a cruise missile flying at an altitude of 5 m and a range of 70 km, the radar antenna must be raised to a height of 300 m. It is ugly for you to write "noodles" - stupidity, trying to whitewash the wrong statement of the author of the article!
        1. -4
          3 March 2020 13: 54
          Quote: Nikolay3
          It is ugly of you to write "noodles" - stupidity, trying to whitewash the wrong statement of the author of the article!
          Where is the nonsense written? You talk about the detection of a specific target flying at an altitude of 5 meters (no RC flies at this altitude, usually 15-20 m, except for P500 - 7 m), in this case, of course, it will be impossible to detect it beyond 70 km. I think about 20-25 km maximum. You delved into the details, missing the main thing, which I pointed out to you. "The radar for target illumination and guidance of 9S36 missiles with an antenna post rising to a height of 22 m ensures the destruction of targets flying at low and extremely low altitudes, in wooded and rough terrain.". I wrote to you
          It follows that 22 meters will completely ensure the removal of interference from physical objects that interfere with detecting low-flying targets!
          One caveat is that objects should not be higher than 20 meters. All other performance characteristics do not differ from these types of radars. To detect targets, detection stations are used, rather than target highlighting and missile guidance stations. which work only in a given azimuth. As for the author, in this paragraph I agree that the data are not correct.
          1. -1
            3 March 2020 15: 32
            Quote: Nikolay3
            Quote: businessv (Vadim)
            Quote: Article IN
            Raising to a height of up to 22 m, the radar antenna post with the PAR is designed to direct the 9M317 missiles to targets flying at low and extremely low altitudes, in wooded and rough terrain. The rising antenna post provides an extension of the radio horizon at extremely low altitudes by more than 2,5 times, which makes it possible to detect cruise missiles flying at an altitude of 5 m, at a distance of up to 70 km.

            Quote: Ingenegr
            Very unlikely to be true. If physics and the laws of propagation in the space of centimeter-wave radio waves have not yet been canceled, then the detection range of a target flying at a height of 5 m when raising the antenna on a 22-meter tower should be no more than 30 km.
            To ensure the detection range of the CC at a height of 5 m to 70 km, the antenna will have to be raised half the height of the Ostankino television tower - as much as 300 m.

            Why such statements, colleague ?! Ultra-short wavelengths of the centimeter range used in radars propagate rectilinearly, so the detection range is limited by direct visibility. It follows that 22 meters will completely ensure the removal of interference from physical objects that interfere with detecting low-flying targets!

            businessv (Vadim), read the article carefully. The conversation is about the detection range of a cruise missile flying at an altitude of 5 m, which cannot be detected at a range of 70 km. To detect a cruise missile flying at an altitude of 5 m and a range of 70 km, the radar antenna must be raised to a height of 300 m. It is ugly for you to write "noodles" - stupidity, trying to whitewash the wrong statement of the author of the article!


            Quote: businessv
            Quote: Nikolay3
            It is ugly of you to write "noodles" - stupidity, trying to whitewash the wrong statement of the author of the article!
            Where is the nonsense written? You talk about the detection of a specific target flying at an altitude of 5 meters (no RC flies at this altitude, usually 15-20 m, except for P500 - 7 m), in this case, of course, it will be impossible to detect it beyond 70 km. I think about 20-25 km maximum. You delved into the details, missing the main thing, which I pointed out to you. "The radar for target illumination and guidance of 9S36 missiles with an antenna post rising to a height of 22 m ensures the destruction of targets flying at low and extremely low altitudes, in wooded and rugged terrain." I wrote to you ...

            businessv (Vadim), it is ugly to write a lie, about the flight of a cruise missile at a height of 5 m - this was written by the author of the article, not me. And all this conversation, you tried to paint over your general, meaningless phrases about the statements of the author of the article. And then you began to change your shoes on the go: "... in this case, of course, it will be impossible to find it beyond 70 km." However, even here you cited incomplete statements by the author of the article - trying to whitewash the author and your statements again - do not focus on a specific statement about the flight of a cruise missile at an altitude of 5 m (statement by the author of the flock) and its detection at a distance of 70 km.

            .
            Quote: businessv
            From this it follows that 22 meters will completely provide for itself Removing interference from physical objects that interfere with detecting low-flying targets!
            One caveat is that objects should not be higher than 20 meters. All other performance characteristics do not differ from these types of radars. To detect targets, detection stations are used, rather than target highlighting and missile guidance stations. which work only in a given azimuth. As for the author, in this paragraph I agree that the data are not correct.

            businessv (Vadim), the conversation was about the sphericity of the earth, not "interference" from specific physical objects - you confuse these phenomena, and even more so at a distance of 70 km (the author’s statements)!
            1. -1
              3 March 2020 23: 16
              Quote: Nikolay3
              you confuse these phenomena, and even more so at a distance of 70 km (the author’s statements)!

              I do not confuse anything - not my profession! It is clear that we are talking about the curvature of the earth, and therefore wrote that
              beyond 70 km it will be impossible to detect. I think about 20-25 km maximum. You delved into the details, missing the point, which I pointed out to you.
              And yes, you again saw not what I wrote to you, i.e. again missed my main point. I think it’s time to end the dialogue due to its futility, soon you will copy the entire article in your answer. Hear only yourself, this is the problem! hi
              1. 0
                3 March 2020 23: 22
                businessv! Do not confuse the concept of radar - forward range equation with your answers to common phrases ... hi
                1. -1
                  3 March 2020 23: 31
                  Quote: Nikolay3
                  Do not confuse the concept of radar - the equation of direct visibility with your answers to common phrases ...
                  Again:
                  I do not confuse anything - not my profession!
                  and for reminder:
                  The radar for target illumination and guidance of 9C36 missiles with an antenna post rising to a height of 22m ensures the defeat of targets flying at low and extremely low altitudes in wooded and rugged terrain.
                  You see, what is the height of 22 meters for? This is a question, not a general phrase! For the antenna post, the azimuth of responsibility is selected and it can be set between hills, or objects of responsibility, with a height of not more than 20 meters. Do you have anything to do with radar in my posts? As for the author, he also wrote:
                  As for the author, in this paragraph I agree that the data are not correct.
                  Read this post a couple - three times and try to understand what exactly I want to tell you! And I ask - please do not answer me anymore!
                  1. The comment was deleted.
      2. +8
        3 March 2020 13: 14
        A statement from the curvature of the Earth. Ironically, it has a +/- shape spherical, with a radius of about 6370 km. Hence, direct visibility between objects located at an altitude of 5 and 24 m, respectively, will be 26 km. And 26, if I understand correctly, less than 30. And certainly less than 70.
        1. -3
          3 March 2020 14: 06
          Quote: Ingenegr
          Hence, direct visibility between objects located at an altitude of 5 and 24 m, respectively, will be 26 km.
          That is what I wrote to Nicholas 3.
          You talk about the discovery of a specific target flying at an altitude of 5 meters (not a single RC flies at this altitude, usually 15-20 m, except for the P500 - 7 m), in this case, of course, it will be impossible to detect it over 70 km. I think about 20-25 km maximum.
  9. 0
    3 March 2020 00: 32
    Quote: Nikolai R-PM
    I wonder how tpk buk-m3 improve the performance of the zur in comparison with the "naked" zur m1 and m2? It is unlikely that it will protect against bullets and shrapnel, but it can probably provide a longer storage period for the zur, protect against unintentional impacts during loading and transportation, protect against condensation during daily temperature fluctuations, but how can this be estimated, let's say, quantitatively? it seems like the TPK was inherited from the ship's air defense system, it turns out that this is all a desire to unify and improve operational characteristics.
    Curiously, if the zur for the beech-m3 was originally created for a "cold" start with a docking turn and starting of the main engine, then from the TPK installed on the beech-m3 it starts in the same way ??

    Kevlar containers fully protects against small fragments and non-armor-piercing small arms bullets!
  10. -1
    3 March 2020 10: 46
    To be continued ...
    Sergey, thank you very much for the interesting material, competent selection and a lot of work done! I look forward to continuing!
  11. +4
    3 March 2020 12: 14
    which makes it possible to detect cruise missiles flying at an altitude of 5 m
    Sergey, is this an eyepiece? How do you imagine the Kyrgyz Republic, which flies (over land) at an altitude of 5 meters?
    1. 0
      3 March 2020 12: 58
      Quote: sivuch
      which makes it possible to detect cruise missiles flying at an altitude of 5 m
      Sergey, is this an eyepiece? How do you imagine the Kyrgyz Republic, which flies (over land) at an altitude of 5 meters?

      Hi, hello! The data was taken from fairly authoritative sources from such as missiles.ru. Perhaps this was a unique result obtained in tests.
  12. +2
    3 March 2020 16: 21
    In a past life, the 5U75 "Periscope" radar rowed cruise "Ikarus" along the South Coast of the Crimea. The plant workers had to coarse the processing speed threshold from 50 to 90 km / h.
    1. +2
      3 March 2020 18: 18
      Only I heard that only the factory teams could cope with the first (without M) Periscopes
      1. Aag
        +2
        5 March 2020 12: 33
        A question for those who know: what about stationary positions, do not use camouflage means in PPD? (See photo).
        1. 0
          5 March 2020 14: 18
          Quote: AAG
          A question for those who know: what about stationary positions, do not use camouflage means in PPD? (See photo).

          What's the point? The places of permanent deployment are well known to "probable partners". However, even if the "Bukovskie" missile brigade carries a database, it is not a full complement. To a greater extent, this applies to the stationary positions of the S-300P, S-400 and partly the S-300V. They are perfectly visible even in publicly available commercial satellite imagery. It is clear that after the announcement of the "special period", the zrdn are removed from their place and redeployed to reserve positions, not illuminated by radio and satellite reconnaissance means. But in the case of relocating the S-300P / S-400 to a new position, often great difficulties arise with the delivery and deployment of a low-altitude detector.
          1. Aag
            +1
            5 March 2020 14: 29
            "Sloppiness begins with unstitched collars (- sank into the air), and dirty boots." During the deployment of the Pioneers, Topoyi (during planned exercises) at the PP (field positions), a helicopter flew after N-th time. At least block all the standards! -If in the photo you will be shown a photograph of your unit, -Evaluation of FAILURE.
            1. Aag
              +1
              5 March 2020 14: 30
              The point is in training l / s, combined arms discipline.
              1. Aag
                +1
                5 March 2020 14: 40
                Thank you for the article and the answer. True, neither one nor the other does not stimulate a good night's sleep. :-)
                1. +1
                  5 March 2020 14: 44
                  Quote: AAG
                  Thank you for the article and the answer. True, neither one nor the other does not stimulate a good night's sleep. :-)

                  You are welcome! Whenever possible, I try to write objectively. The next "series" will be about the S-300P / S-400 air defense systems. hi
                2. Aag
                  +1
                  5 March 2020 14: 46
                  Maybe I want too much, but I would like to know what forces, air defense, missile defense systems covered the posi tional areas of Topol, Yars.
                  1. +1
                    5 March 2020 14: 53
                    Quote: AAG
                    Maybe I want too much, but I would like to know what forces, air defense, missile defense systems covered the posi tional areas of Topol, Yars.

                    Covered, but not all. In the past, I already "received a hat", although I operated exclusively with open sources. If you are interested in a specific area, I can write in a personal. Perhaps you will also be interested in this:
                    Will VKS protect our Far East? Past and Present 11 th Red Banner Army Aerospace Forces. H. 1
                    https://topwar.ru/138460-proshloe-i-nastoyaschee-11-y-krasnoznamennoy-armii-vozdushno-kosmicheskih-sil-smogut-li-vks-rossii-zaschitit-nash-dalniy-vostok-chast-1.html
                    Will VKS protect our Far East? Past and Present 11 th Red Banner Army Aerospace Forces. H. 2
                    https://topwar.ru/138464-proshloe-i-nastoyaschee-11-y-krasnoznamennoy-armii-vozdushno-kosmicheskih-sil-smogut-li-vks-rossii-zaschitit-nash-dalniy-vostok-chast-2.html
                    1. Aag
                      +1
                      9 March 2020 13: 27
                      Thank you, if I have the time, I’ll get acquainted. And somehow I feel uncomfortable retiring two hundred meters from the KP RD. :-)
                      1. +1
                        9 March 2020 13: 29
                        Quote: AAG
                        Thank you, if I have the time, I’ll get acquainted. And somehow I feel uncomfortable retiring two hundred meters from the KP RD. :-)

                        Where is the headquarters of the division?
                      2. Aag
                        +1
                        9 March 2020 13: 31
                        Are you a spy? Irkutsk. 29 rd.
                      3. Aag
                        +1
                        9 March 2020 13: 31
                        Open Information ...
                      4. +3
                        9 March 2020 13: 32
                        Quote: AAG
                        Are you a spy?

                        The same as you)))
                        Quote: AAG
                        Maybe I want too much, but I would like to know what forces, air defense, missile defense systems covered the posi tional areas of Topol, Yars.
                      5. +3
                        9 March 2020 13: 49
                        20 km to the west of Irkutsk, the database carries one S-300PM1
                        Until the second half of the 90s, air defense of this region was provided by an anti-aircraft missile brigade in which there were 12 S-75, S-125, and S-200 divisions. Draw your own conclusions ... hi
                  2. Aag
                    +1
                    5 March 2020 14: 58
                    I apologize for the "off-topic", but, in my opinion, our problem, among others, is too large a gap between theory and practice: who knows how it works in practice, and those who conceived all this; and the impossibility of comprehensive information from the first to the second ... (((
                    1. +1
                      5 March 2020 15: 05
                      Quote: AAG
                      I apologize for the "off-topic", but, in my opinion, our problem, among others, is too large a gap between theory and practice: who knows how it works in practice, and those who conceived all this; and the impossibility of comprehensive information from the first to the second ... (((

                      If you are talking about the problem of ensuring defense in general. and about air defense in particular, the main problem is extremely low combat stability with a sufficiently long warfare using conventional weapons.
            2. +1
              5 March 2020 14: 42
              Quote: AAG
              Sloppiness begins with unsewn collars (-sanned in the summer), and dirty boots. "When deploying" Pioneers "," Topoy "(during planned exercises) at the checkpoint (field positions), after the N-th time a helicopter flew. standards! -If on the photo you will be shown a photograph of your unit, -Evaluation of FAILURE.

              Alexander, do not confuse the RVSD and the air defense missile systems of the country. You want to say that the "Topol" are carrying a DB with missiles raised to the zenith and unmasking themselves with radar radiation? No. The process of carrying the database in the RVSD and the air defense forces is different, which is determined by various tasks.
              Quote: AAG
              The point is in training l / s, combined arms discipline.

              Of course, the camouflage tasks are being worked out, but how do you expect the guidance stations, the radar for detecting air targets or low-altitude detectors under camouflage networks to operate in the database transfer mode, and how can I launch missiles?
              1. Aag
                0
                5 March 2020 17: 20
                RVVD, what is it?
                1. Aag
                  0
                  5 March 2020 17: 30
                  In the Strategic Missile Forces (in mobile soil complexes) this problem is solved. At different levels of control units (combat control) in different ways. As for the APU (autonomous launcher), the ILC (camouflage cover kit) does not reduce readiness for launch for a second.
                  1. Aag
                    0
                    5 March 2020 17: 33
                    Not special, and therefore asked: is it possible to mask the radar. About PU, I’m sure that it’s possible, it just didn’t take root, it’s a bad thing ...
                    1. Aag
                      +1
                      5 March 2020 17: 41
                      According to the experience of the Second World War, the calculations of respected teachers of combined arms departments: you can at least bury your masked object! But, if you forgot about the access roads (and at least the paths along which l / s go out of need), your location is highly likely to be predetermined.
                2. 0
                  6 March 2020 00: 10
                  Quote: AAG
                  RVVD, what is it?

                  I corrected the minus put to you by Idyotom Vasya, but you are finding fault with a banal typo (Strategic Missile Forces). I’ll tell you a little secret, talking with you, Seryozha simultaneously printed the following article. It happens to him, he thinks one thing, and on the machine he writes another.
                  1. Aag
                    +1
                    6 March 2020 08: 15
                    Thank you. Got it. Sorry.
                  2. -1
                    6 March 2020 11: 14
                    Quote: zyablik.olga
                    Minus set to you Go-ot Vasya I fixed...

                    Who are you then? fellow
                    1. +1
                      6 March 2020 11: 35
                      Quote: Nikolay3
                      Who are you then?

                      At least I'm not Go-away from Vasya ... wink
  13. +3
    10 March 2020 22: 19
    Dear Sergey, it is interesting to read your articles, but narrow-minded people like me are a little confused in terms and methods. Maybe, how will you get a gap in the cycles, you write something like "methods of guidance in the air defense system" or "Countermeasures to radar interference"?
    1. 0
      12 March 2020 02: 32
      Quote: Sckepsis
      Dear Sergey, it is interesting to read your articles, but narrow-minded people like me are a little confused in terms and methods. Maybe, how will you get a gap in the cycles, you write something like "methods of guidance in the air defense system" or "Countermeasures to radar interference"?

      You can write this of course, and the editorial board of VO will probably skip and publish it. But how many will read it?
  14. +1
    11 March 2020 09: 03
    Thank you for the article. He remembered his youth, Emba-5, 83 years old. It was part of the battery, which provided acceptance tests for the BUK M1.
  15. 0
    27 July 2020 17: 55
    So I understand the Buk air defense system on wheeled chassis, we do not have, but the author writes that tracked chassis for the object air defense air defense system is not the best choice. The Buk-M2E was created on the wheeled chassis of the MZKT-6922, it is understandable since "E" is export, but why did not they develop a similar version of the Buk-M3 for their own troops?
    The Belarusian version of the Buk-MB3K on the MZKT-692250 chassis is also interesting, although it has 3 in the index, but rather it is an advanced complex, an analogue of our M2 version in a wheel modification. Again, there are developments and the chassis tested by Belarusians.
    What might not suit us in the MZKT chassis? It is clear not 100% domestic, but our Yars also ride at MZKT, and many domestic chassis with a high carrying capacity are hard to consider domestic - the percentage of foreign components is very high, and not from production facilities deployed in our territory.
  16. 0
    3 August 2022 09: 29
    Illumination and Guidance Calculation Operator. Served on RPN 9S36, in 90 ZRBr.
    I saw our database in the photo and remembered how mask-nets were thrown on rockets)

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