The Mongol invasion of Russia in 1237-1241 did not become a big disaster for some Russian politicians of the time. On the contrary, they even improved their position. The chronicles do not hide in particular the names of those who may have been a direct ally and partner of the notorious "Mongolo-Tatars". Among them is the hero of Russia, Prince Alexander Nevsky.
In our previous article on the invasion of Batu in the North-Eastern Russia in 1237-1238, we attempted to calculate the mileage traveled by the conquerors, and also raised questions about the sustenance and supply of the giant Mongolian army, full of dilettantism. Today, the Interpreter's Blog publishes an article by the Saratov historian, a member of the United Russia party and the deputy of the Saratov Regional Duma, Dmitry Chernyshevsky, “Russian allies of the Mongol-Tatars”, written by him back in the year 2006.
Immediately make a reservation that we do not share the “Eurasian” approach of the researcher (he is a follower of the folk-historian LN Gumilyov), as well as a number of his conclusions, but we just want to note that Chernyshevsky is after V.V. Kargalov was one of the few Russian historians who seriously raised the question of the real number of the steppe army in the campaign against Russia (you can read his opinion in the article: D.V. Chernyshevsky. Priidosh countless, like Pruzi // Questions stories, 1989, No. 2. C.127-132).
After the collapse of the USSR, relations between the Slavic and Turkic ethnic groups in the Russian Federation became the ethnic dominant determining the fate of the state. The interest in the past of Russian-Tatar relations, in the history of the great Turkic state on the territory of our country - the Golden Horde - naturally increased. Many works appeared, highlighting various aspects of the emergence and existence of the Chingizid state, the relationship between the Mongols and Russia (1), the “Eurasianism” school, considering Russia as the heir of the Genghis Khan's power, was widely recognized in Kazakhstan, Tataria and Russia (2) . Through the efforts of L.N. Gumilyov and his followers, the very concept of the Mongol-Tatar yoke, pervertedly representing the medieval history of Russia (3), was shaken in the very foundations. The approaching 800 anniversary of the proclamation of Genghis Khan (2006), widely celebrated in China, Mongolia, Japan and having already caused an avalanche of publications in Western historiography, stirs interest in the world-historical events of the XIII century, including in Russia. The traditional ideas about the destructive consequences of the Mongol invasion (4) have already been largely revised, the time has come to raise the question of revising the causes and nature of the Mongol conquest of Russia.
The time when the thought of the success of the Mongol invasion was due to the huge superiority of the conquerors was long gone. Ideas about the "three hundred thousandth horde," wandering through the pages of historical books from the time of Karamzin, were archived (5). By the end of the twentieth century, the followers of G. Delbrück’s historians' long-term efforts were accustomed to a critical approach to the sources and application of professional military knowledge in describing wars of the past. However, the rejection of the Mongol invasion as the movement of countless hordes of barbarians drinking the river in their path, comparing the cities to the ground and turning the inhabited lands into deserts, where only wolves and crows (6) remained the only living creatures, makes us ask a question - a How did a small nation manage to conquer three-quarters of the then known world? With reference to our country, this can be formulated as follows: how did the Mongols manage in 1237-1238? to accomplish what neither Napoleon nor Hitler could do - to conquer Russia in the winter?
The commanding genius of Subudai-Bagatura, the commander-in-chief of the Western march of Chingizids and one of the largest commanders in world military history, the superiority of the Mongols in organizing troops, in strategy and in the very way of warfare, of course, played a role. The operational-strategic art of the Mongolian commanders was strikingly different from the actions of their opponents and rather resembled the classic operations of the generals of the Moltke senior school. References to the impossibility of feudal-fragmented states to resist the united iron will of Genghis Khan and his successors to the nomads are also valid. But these general premises do not help us to answer three specific questions: why does the Mongols in the winter of 1237-1238 do in general? went to the North-Eastern Russia, as the many thousands of cavalry conquerors decided the main problem of the war - supply and foraging on enemy territory, how the Mongols managed to defeat the military forces of the Grand Duchy of Vladimir so quickly and easily.
Hans Delbrück proved that the study of the history of wars should be based primarily on military analysis of campaigns, and in all cases of contradiction between analytical conclusions and these sources, strong preference should be given to analytics, no matter how authentic the ancient sources are. Considering the Mongolian Western campaign of 1236-1242, I came to the conclusion that within the framework of the traditional notions of invasion based on written sources, it is impossible to give a consistent description of the campaign of 1237-1238. In order to explain all the available facts, it is necessary to introduce new acting characters - the Russian allies of the Mongol-Tatars, who acted as the “fifth column” of the conquerors from the very beginning of the invasion. The following considerations prompted me to ask this question.
First, the Mongolian strategy excluded senseless from the military point of view, hikes and a major offensive in all azimuths. The great conquests of Genghis Khan and his successors were carried out by few people (experts estimate the population of Mongolia in the range from 1 to 2,5 million people (7)), which operated on the gigantic theaters of operations against superior opponents (8) . Therefore, their strikes are always well thought out, selective and subject to the strategic goals of the war. In all their wars, without exception, the Mongols have always avoided the unnecessary and premature expansion of the conflict, involving new opponents before crushing the old ones. Isolating enemies and defeating them one by one is the cornerstone of the Mongolian strategy. So they acted in the conquest of Tangut, in the defeat of the Jin Empire in North China, in the conquest of Southern Song, in the struggle with Kuchluk of Naiman, in the Khorezmshahs, in the invasion of Subudai and Jebe in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe in the 1222-1223 years. During the invasion of Western Europe in 1241-1242. The Mongols unsuccessfully tried to isolate Hungary and exploit the contradictions between the emperor and the pope. In the struggle with the Rumsky Sultanate and the campaign of Hulagu in Baghdad, the Mongols isolated their Muslim opponents, attracting the Christian principalities of Georgia, Armenia and the Middle East. And only Batu’s march to North-Eastern Russia within the framework of traditional ideas looks unmotivated and unnecessary diversion of forces from the direction of the main attack and decisively drops out of the usual Mongolian practice.
The objectives of the Western campaign were defined on the 1235 Kurultay. Eastern sources speak of them quite definitely. Rashid ad-Din: “In the year of the ram (1235 - D.Ch.), the blessed look of the kaan focused on the fact that from the princes Batu, Mengu-kaan and Guyuk-khan together with other princes and numerous troops went to the areas of Kipchaks, Russians , bular, majar, bashgird, ases, pike perch and those lands to conquer those ”(9). Juvaynni: “When Kaan Coget was the second time he organized a big smoking-room (1235-D.CH.) And appointed a meeting regarding the destruction and extermination of the rest of the recalcitrant, the decision was made to take possession of the Bulgara, Ases and Russia countries, which were located next to the Batu camp, were not still completely conquered and proud of their multiplicity ”(10). Only the peoples who were at war with the Mongols since the march of Jebe and Subudai in 1223-1224, and their allies are listed. In the “Secret Story” (Yuan Chao bi shi), the entire Western campaign was called the sending of princes to help Senetayu, who started this war in 1223 and re-appointed to command on Yaik in 1229 g (11). Batu Khan’s letter to Hungarian King Bele IV, selected by Yuri Vsevolodovich from the Mongolian ambassadors in Suzdal, explains why the Hungarians (Magyars) were on this list: “I found out that you keep my Kuman’s slaves under your protection; why am I ordering you not to keep them in my house anymore, so that because of them I will not stand against you ”(12).
Southern Russian princes became the enemies of the Mongols from 1223, standing up for the Polovtsy. Vladimirskaya Rus did not participate in the Battle of Kalka and was not in the war with Mongolia. The threats to the Mongols did not represent the northern Russian principalities. For the Mongol khans, the forest northeastern Russian lands had no interest. VL Egorov, drawing conclusions about the objectives of the Mongolian expansion in Russia, rightly notes: “As for the inhabited Russian lands, the Mongols remained completely indifferent to them, preferring the usual steppes that ideally corresponded to the nomadic structure of their economy” (13). Moving to the Russian allies of the Polovtsy - the Chernigov, Kiev and Volyn princes and further to Hungary - why was it necessary to make an unnecessary raid on North-Eastern Russia? There was no military necessity - security against the flank threat - because North-Eastern Russia did not pose such a threat. The main goal of the campaign was the diversion of forces to the Upper Volga did not help at all, and purely predatory motives could wait until the end of the war, after which it would be possible to empty Vladimir Russia without haste, thoroughly, and not at a gallop, as happened in the current reality. Actually, as shown in the work of Dmitry Peskov, the "pogrom" of 1237-1238. greatly exaggerated by tendentious medieval pamphletists like Serapion of Vladimir and uncritically historians who took it to tears (14).
The Batu and Subudaya campaign to the North-Eastern Russia receives a rational explanation only in two cases: Yuri II openly took the side of the enemies of the Mongols or the Mongols on the Zalesk Russia, the Russians themselves called to participate in their internecine disassembly, and the Batu campaign was a raid to help local Russians allies, allowing quickly and without great efforts to ensure the strategic interests of the Mongolian empire in this region. What we know about the actions of Yuri II says that he was not a suicide: he did not help the southern princes on Kalka, did not help the Volga Bulgars (V.N. Tatishchev reports), did not help Ryazan, and generally held on strictly defensively. Nevertheless, the war began, and this indirectly indicates that it was provoked from within Vladimir-Suzdal Russia.
Secondly, the Mongols never started the invasion without preparing it for the enemy to disintegrate from within, the invasions of Genghis Khan and his commanders always relied on the internal crisis in the enemy's camp, on betrayal and treachery, on beckoning rival groups within the enemy country to their side. During the invasion of the Jin Empire (North China), the White Tatars (Onguts) who lived near the Great Wall of China, the rebels of the Khitan tribes (1212) who lived in revolt against the Jurchens (1218), and the Chinese of the Southern Song who had not concluded an alliance with the invaders, switched to the side of Genghis Khan. During the invasion of Chepe into the state of Kara-Kitayev (1254), the Uighurs of Eastern Turkestan and the inhabitants of the Muslim cities of Kashgaria took the side of the Mongols. The conquest of South China was accompanied by the transfer to the Mongols of the Yunnan and Sichuan mountain tribes (1255-XNUMX) and the massive betrayal of Chinese generals. Thus, the impregnable Chinese fortress Sanyang, which Kubilai’s armies could not take for five years, was surrendered by its commander.
Mongol invasions in Vietnam took place with the support of the South Vietnamese state of Champa. In Central Asia and the Middle East, the Mongols skillfully used the contradictions between the Kypchak and Turkmen khans in the state of Khorezmshahs, and then between the Afghans and the Turks, the Iranians and the Khorezm warriors of Jelal al-Din, the Muslims and the Christian principalities of Georgia and of Chilean Armenia, in the Middle East, the Muslims and the Christian principalities of Georgia and Chilean Armenia, in the Middle East, the Muslims of Jelal al-Din, and the Christian principals of Georgia and of Chilean Armenia, in the Middle East, the Muslims of Jelal al-Din, Muslims and the Christian principalities of Georgia and Chilean Armenia, in the Middle East. Mesopotamia, tried to win over the Crusaders. In Hungary, the Mongols skillfully inflamed hostility between the Catholic Magyars and the Polovtsy retreating to Pashto, some of whom went over to the side of Batu. And so on and so forth. As the outstanding Russian military theorist of the beginning of the 20th century, General A.A. Svechin, wrote, the bet on the “fifth column” followed from the very essence of Genghis Khan’s advanced strategy. “The Asian strategy, with a huge scale of distances, in the era of domination of predominantly load transport, was unable to organize the proper transportation from the rear; the idea of moving the base to the areas lying ahead, only briefly flashing in the European strategy, was the main one for Genghis Khan. A base in front can be created only by a political disintegration of the enemy; widespread use of funds behind the front of the enemy is possible only if we find like-minded people in our rear. From here, the Asian strategy demanded a far-sighted and insidious policy; all means were good for military success. The war was preceded by extensive political intelligence; they didn’t buy off either bribes or promises; all possibilities of opposing some dynastic interests to others, some groups against others were used. Apparently, a major campaign was undertaken only when there was a conviction that there were deep cracks in the state organism of a neighbor ”(15).
Was Russia an exception to the general rule that belonged to the main ones in the Mongolian strategy? No, it was not. The Ipatiev Chronicle reports on the transition to the side of the Tatars of the Bolkhov princes, who supplied the conquerors with food, fodder, and - obviously - the guides (16). What was possible in South Russia is undoubtedly permissible for Northeast. And indeed, the Mongols who had gone over to the side were. "The Tale of the Ruin of Ryazan Batu" indicates "a certain from the nobles of Ryazan," who advised Batu that it is better to demand from the Ryazan princes (17). But in general, the sources are silent about the "fifth column" of the conquerors in Zalesk Russia.
Is it possible on this basis to reject the assumption of the existence of the Russian allies of the Mongol-Tatars during the invasion of 1237-1238? In my opinion, no. And not only because, for any discrepancy between these sources and the conclusions of military analysis, we must resolutely reject the sources. But also due to the known scarcity of sources about the Mongol invasion of Russia in general and the falsified Russian northeastern chronicles in this part - in particular.
As is known, the first predecessor of the “red professor” M.N. Pokrovsky, who proclaimed that “history is a policy overturned into the past,” was Nestor the Chronicler. On the direct orders of the Grand Duke Vladimir Monomakh and his son Mstislav, he falsified the most ancient Russian history, depicting it tendentiously and one-sidedly. Later, the Russian princes became skilled in rewriting the past, did not escape this fate and the chronicles, which told about the events of the XIII century. Actually, there are no authentic chronicle texts of the 13th century at the disposal of historians, only later copies and compilations. The southern Russian arch (Ipatiev Chronicle, compiled at the court of Daniil Galitsky), the Lavrentiev and Suzdal Chronicles of North-Eastern Russia and the Novgorod Chronicles (mainly Novgorod First) are considered to be the closest to the time. The Ipatiev Chronicle has brought to us a number of valuable details about the Mongol campaign of 1237-1238. (for example, the message about the capture of the Ryazan Prince Yuri and the name of the commander who defeated Prince Yuri Vladimirsky in the City), but in general is not well aware of what happened at the other end of Russia. Novgorod chronicles suffer extreme laconism in everything that goes beyond the boundaries of Novgorod, and in covering events in the neighboring Vladimir-Suzdal principality are often no more informative than Eastern (Persian and Arabic) sources. As for the Vladimir-Suzdal chronicles, the relatively Lavrentievskaya has a proven conclusion that the description of the 1237-1238 events. It was falsified at a later period. As GM Prokhorov proved, the pages dedicated to the Batu invasion in the Laurentian Chronicle underwent a cardinal editing (18). At the same time, the entire outline of the events - the description of the invasion, the dates of the capture of cities - is preserved, so the question arises: what then is erased from the chronicle drawn up on the eve of the Battle of Kulikovo?
The conclusion of G. M. Prokhorov about the pro-Moscow revision seems fair, but needs a more extended explanation. As it is known, the heirs of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich and his famous son Alexander Nevsky - successive supporters of subordination to the Mongols ruled in Moscow. The Moscow princes achieved leadership in Northeastern Rus by "Tatar sabers" and servile obedience to the conquerors. The poet Naum Korzhavin had every reason to contemptfully comment on Ivan Kalita:
"You are in the Horde of belligerent climbed
And licked how much strength.
You suppressed Prince of Tver
To Khan distinguished you.
Pacified you everywhere
But you were a deeper patriot -
And extortion over collecting tribute
You prepared the sunrise. ”
However, under Metropolitan Alexy and his spiritual comrades Sergius of Radonezh and Nizhny Novgorod Bishop of Dionysia (direct customer of the Laurentian Chronicle), Moscow became the center of national resistance to the Horde and eventually led the Russians to the Kulikovo Field. Later, in the XV century. Moscow princes led the fight against the Tatars for the liberation of the Russian lands. In my opinion, all the chronicles that were within the reach of the Moscow princes and later kings were edited specifically in terms of the behavior of the forefathers of the dynasty, who clearly did not fit into the benevolent picture of the heroic struggle with the Golden Horde. Since one of these ancestors, Alexander Nevsky, had a posthumous fate to become a national myth, renewed in Russian history at least three times - under Ivan the Terrible, under Peter the Great and under Stalin - everything that could cast a shadow on the impeccable figure of the national hero, was destroyed or discarded. The reflection of the holiness and purity of Alexander Nevsky naturally fell on his father, Yaroslav Vsevolodovich.
Therefore, to trust the silence of the Russian chronicles is impossible.
We take these preliminary considerations into account and proceed to the analysis of the situation and evidence of the thesis that the Mongol invasion of 1237-1238. to the North-Eastern Russia was caused by the internecine struggle of the Russian princes for power and sent to the approval of the allies of Batu Khan in Zalesskaya Russia.
When this article was already written, I became aware of the publication of A.N. Sakharov, in which he put forward a similar thesis (19). The well-known historian A.A. Gorsky saw in it “the tendency to dismantle Alexander Nevsky, which turned out to be so infectious that one author came to the assumption of the collusion of Alexander and his father Yaroslav with Batu during the invasion of the latter to North-Eastern Russia in 1238.” (20). This forces me to make an important clarification: I am not going to engage in any “debunking” of Nevsky, but I consider such assessments to belch politicized mythology of the past, which I pointed out above. Alexander Nevsky does not need advocates like A.A. Gorsky. It is my fundamental conviction that the fact that he and his father were consistent allies of the Mongols and supporters of subordination to the Golden Horde could not in the slightest degree be a pretext for the moral speculations of the modern “patriots”.
For the simple reason that the Golden Horde is the same as our state, the predecessor of modern Russia, like the ancient Russia. But the attitude of some modern Russian historians to the Tatars as “alien”, “enemies”, and towards the Russian principalities as “theirs” is an unacceptable mistake incompatible with the search for truth, and an insult to the millions of Russian people in whose veins the blood of their ancestors flows from the Great Steppe. Not to mention the citizens of the Russian Federation of Tatar and other Turkic nationalities. The recognition of the indisputable fact that modern Russia is as much the heiress of the Golden Horde as the ancient Russian principalities is the cornerstone of my approach to the events of the XIII century.
Arguments in favor of the assumption of the union of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich with Batu Khan as the reason for the Mongols march on North-Eastern Russia are, in addition to the above:
- the character of Prince Yaroslav and his relationship with his elder brother Yuri II;
- the nature of the actions of Yuri II in repelling the invasion;
- the nature of the actions of the Mongols in the winter of 1237-1238, which can not be explained without the assumption of the help of local Russian allies;
- the nature of the actions of the Mongols after the campaign in the Vladimir Russia and the subsequent close cooperation with them Yaroslav and his son Alexander Nevsky.
Let us examine them in more detail.
Yaroslav Vsevolodovich - the third son of Vsevolod III the Big Nest, father of Alexander Nevsky and the ancestor of the branch of Rurikovich, who ruled in Russia until the end of the XVI century. Since the descendants of his son became the Moscow kings, and Nevsky himself was a national hero and political myth of Russia, a glimpse of their glory involuntarily lay on this prince, to whom Russian historians traditionally treat with great respect. The facts show that he was an unprincipled ambitious man, a brutal feudal seeker of thrones, who had been striving for the highest power all his life.
In his youth, he became the main instigator of the internecine war among the sons of Vsevolod III, which ended with the notorious battle of Lipitz (1216), in which he and his brother Yuri were defeated by the army with huge losses. The ambassadors of Mstislav Udatny to Yuri II, who tried to settle the matter with peace before the battle, directly pointed to Yaroslav as the main cause of the war: “We bow to you, brother, we have no offense from you, but there is an insult from Yaroslav — to Novgorod, and Konstantin, the oldest to your brother. We ask you to, be reconciled with the oldest brother, give him the eldership according to his truth, and Yaroslav was let go of the people of Novgorod and Novotorzhan. May human blood not be shed in vain, for that God will charge us ”(21). Yuri then refused to put up, but later, after the defeat, he acknowledged the correctness of Novgorod, reproaching his brother that he had brought him to such a sad position (22). Behavior of Yaroslav before and after the Lipitsk battle - his cruelty, expressed in the seizure of the Novgorod hostages in Torzhok and in the order to kill them all after the battle, his cowardice (from Torzhok when Mstislav approached, Yaroslav ran away, fleeing on Lipitsa so that he left his gilded in the bushes the helmet, later found by historians, after the battle, he was the first of the brothers to surrender to the winners, begging forgiveness and parish from his elder brother Constantine, and from his father-in-law, Mstislav, returning his wife, future mother Alexander Nevsky), his merciless ambition instigation of Yaroslav the Jury gave the order to take no prisoners battle, confident of victory in advance brothers divided between all of Russia until Galic) - A.Zorinu allowed to call him "the most repulsive personality Lipitsa epic» (22).
His whole subsequent life before the invasion is a continuous search for power. Specific Pereyaslavl did not suit Yaroslav, he long and stubbornly fought for power over Novgorod, because of his cruelty and stubbornness, the tendency to headaches and extrajudicial reprisals constantly causing rebellion against himself. In the end, at the beginning of the 1230's. He was still established in Novgorod, but the dislike of the townspeople and the limited rights of the drafted prince pushed him to find a more attractive "table." In 1229, Yaroslav made a conspiracy against brother Yuri II, who became Grand Prince of Vladimir in 1219. The plot was uncovered, but Yuri did not want - or could not - punish his brother, limiting himself to external reconciliation (23). After that, Yaroslav got involved in the struggle for Kiev, which he even captured in 1236, but under pressure from Prince of Chernigov, Mikhail was forced to leave and return to Suzdal before the invasion.
Chronicle riddles begin here: the southern Ipatiev Chronicle reports about the departure of Yaroslav to the north, V.N. Tatishchev writes about this, the northern chronicles are silent and depict events as if Yaroslav returned to Zalesskaya Russia only in spring 1238 after the invasion. He accepted the inheritance of the deceased brother Yuri, buried the dead in Vladimir and sat down on the Great Duchy (24). Most historians are inclined to northern news (25), but I think that V.N.Tatischev and the Ipatiev Chronicle are right. Yaroslav during the invasion was in the North-Eastern Russia.
Firstly, it is obvious that the southern chronicler was more knowledgeable about South Russian affairs than the Novgorod and Suzdal colleagues. Secondly, it was precisely Yaroslav’s behavior during the invasion that, in my opinion, was the main object of editing in the Laurentian Chronicle: the version of Yu.V. Limonov about corrections related to the reasons for the non-arrival of Vasilko Rostovsky to Kalku (26) cannot be considered serious. Vasilko died in 1238, and the Rostov principality at the time of the editing of the chronicle was long ago plundered and attached to Moscow, and before the ancient Rostov princes nobody was in business. Third, supporters of Karamzin’s version of the coming of Yaroslav to Vladimir in the spring of 1238 from Kiev are not able to clearly explain how this could have happened. Yaroslav came to Vladimir with a strong retinue, and very quickly - when the corpses of the killed citizens were still not buried. How this can be done from distant Kiev, when Mongolian troops were moving on all the roads to Zalesie, they were leaving from Torzhok in the steppe - it is not clear. In the same way, it is not clear why his brother Yuri (27) sent to Yaroslav — to Kiev — for help from the City. Obviously, Yaroslav was much closer, and Yuri expected that his brother’s strong squad would have time to go to the gathering place of the grand duke’s army.
Yaroslav Vsevolodovich due to his nature was capable of plotting against his brother, attracting nomads for this was common practice in Russia, he was at the epicenter of events and managed to get out of the war unharmed, retaining the squad and almost his entire family (only in Tver his younger son Mikhail died, which could well have been a military accident). The Mongols, always striving to destroy the enemy's manpower, who had managed to find amazingly quickly and easily in the Volga forests on the river Sit Yuri II camp, on the squad of Yaroslav who had entered Vladimir, did not pay any attention. Subsequently, Yaroslav was the first of the Russian princes to go to the Horde to Batu Khan and received from his hands a label for a great reign ... over all of Rus (including Kiev). If we take into account that Batu distributed labels to Russian princes only on their own principalities, then the question naturally arises: why did Yaroslav have such an honor? Daniel Galitsky also did not fight the Tatars, but ran from them all over Europe, but only the Galician-Volyn principality "granted" him, and Yaroslav became the Grand Duke of All Russia. Apparently, for the great services to the conquerors.
The nature of these merits will become clearer if we analyze the actions of Grand Duke Yuri II to repel an invasion.
Historians accuse the prince of various transgressions: they did not help the Ryazan people either, and he himself was not ready for the invasion, and he miscalculated, and feudal pride showed “he wanted to curse himself” (28). Externally, the actions of Yuri II are indeed similar to the mistakes of a man taken aback by an invasion and not having a clear idea of what is happening. He failed to collect troops or effectively dispose of them, his vassals - the Ryazan princes - died without help, the best forces sent to the Ryazan line, fell under Kolomna, the capital fell after a short assault, and the prince himself, who left the Volga to collect new forces , did not have time and died ingloriously on the City. However, the problem is that Yuri II was well aware of the impending threat and had enough time to meet her fully armed.
The invasion of the Mongols in 1237 was not at all sudden for the Russian princes. As Yu.A. Limonov noted, “probably, Vladimir and Vladimir-Suzdal land were among the most informed regions of Europe”. Under the "land", obviously, it is necessary to understand the prince, but the statement is absolutely fair. The Suzdal chroniclers recorded all the stages of the Mongols' advance to the borders of Russia: Kalku, the invasion of 1229, the campaign of 1232, and finally, the defeat of the Volga Bulgaria 1236, V.N.Tatischev, relying on the lists that did not reach us, wrote that the Bulgarians had fled in Russia "and asked to give them a place. Prince Great Yuri Velmy was glad for this and ordered them to be separated into cities near the Volga and to others. ” From the fugitives, the prince could receive comprehensive information about the scale of the threat, far exceeding the previous movements of the Polovtsy and other nomadic tribes - it was about the destruction of the state.
But there is a more important source at our disposal, directly indicating that Yuri II knew everything — right up to the expected time of the invasion. In 1235 and 1237 Hungarian monk Julian visited the Vladimir-Suzdal principality in his travels to the east in search of "Great Hungary". He was in the capital of the principality, met with the Grand Duke Yuri, saw the Mongolian ambassadors, refugees from the Tatars, came across in the steppe with the Mongol partitions. His information is of great interest. Julian testifies that in winter 1237, i.e. almost a year before the invasion - the Mongols had already prepared for an attack on Russia and the Russians knew about it. “But now (in the winter of 1237 - D.Ch.), being on the borders of Russia, we have learned the real truth that the whole army going to the countries of the West is divided into four parts. One part of the river Ethil on the borders of Russia from the eastern edge approached Suzdal. The other part in the southern direction has already attacked the borders of Ryazan, another Russian principality. The third part stopped against the Don River, near the Voronezh Castle, as well as the principality of the Russians. They, as the Russians themselves, the Hungarians and the Bulgars, who fled before them, handed over to us, wait for the earth, rivers and swamps to freeze with the onset of the coming winter, after which the entire multitude of Tatars will easily crush all of Russia, the entire Russian country ”(29) . The value of this message is obvious because it indicates that the Russian princes were well aware not only of the scale of the threat, but also of the expected timing of the invasion — in winter. It should be noted that the long standing of the Mongols on the borders of Russia - in the Voronezh region - was recorded by the majority of Russian chronicles, as was the name of the castle that houses the Batu Khan camp.
In Latin transcription, Julian is Ovcheruch, Orgenhusin - Onuz (Onuzla, Nozla) Russian chronicles. The recent excavations of Voronezh archeologist G. Belorybkin confirmed both the fact of the existence of border principalities in the upper reaches of the Don, Voronezh and Sura, and their defeat by the Mongols in 1237 g (30). Julian has a direct indication that the Grand Duke Yuri II knew about the plans of the Tatars and was preparing for war. He writes: “Many pass for the faithful, and the prince of Suzdal verbally conveyed to the Hungarian king through me that the Tatars, day and night, confer how to come and seize the kingdom of Hungarian Christians. For they, they say, have the intention to go to the conquest of Rome and further. Therefore, he (Khan Batu - D.Ch.) sent ambassadors to the Hungarian king. Driving through the land of Suzdal, they were captured by the prince of Suzdal, and the letter .. he took from them; even I saw the ambassadors themselves with the satellites that gave me the data ”(31). From the above passage, Yuri’s efforts to diplomatically influence Europeans are obvious, but for us it’s more important that the Russian prince’s awareness is not only about the operational plans of the Mongols (to attack Russia in winter), but also about the direction of their further strategic offensive (Hungary, which by the way completely corresponded to reality) . And secondly, the arrest of Batu’s ambassadors by him meant the proclamation of a state of war. And they usually prepare for war, even in the Middle Ages.
The history of the Mongolian embassy to Russia has been preserved very vaguely, although it is of key importance to our topic: perhaps it was at this moment that the fate of Russia was decided, negotiations were held not only with the Ryazan princes and Yuri II of Suzdal, but also with Yaroslav Vsevolodovich. In “The Tale of the Ruin of Ryazan, Batu” it is said: “The ambassadors were sent to Rezana to the Grand Duke Yury Ingorievich Rezansky, asking tithes for everything: in the princes and in all sorts of people, and in everything.” The council of the Ryazan, Murom and Przemsky princes gathered in Ryazan did not come to an unequivocal decision to fight the Mongols - the Mongolian ambassadors were allowed to go to Suzdal, and the son of the Ryazan prince Fedor Yuryevich was sent to the Batyi with embassies. (32). Information about the Mongolian embassy in Vladimir, except for Julian, is preserved in the epitaph of Yuri Vsevolodovich in the Lavrentyev Chronicle: “godless Tatars, released, gifted, sent their ambassadors bye-bye: illusion of bloodsuckers, reluctant - put up with us, he didn’t even like him. (33).
Let us leave the unwillingness of Yuri to put up with the Tatars on the conscience of the chronicler of the epoch of the Kulikovo battle: his words that Yury released the ambassadors “giving them” testify to the opposite. Information about sending ambassadors during the long stay of the Mongols on the Voronezh River has been preserved in the Suzdal, Tver, Nikon and Novgorod First Chronicles (34). One gets the impression that, standing on the border of the Ryazan and Chernihiv lands, Batu-Khan and Subudai decided on the form of “appeasement" of the northern border, conducting reconnaissance, and at the same time negotiations on the possible peaceful recognition of North-Eastern Russia depending on the empire. The Chinese worldview perceived by the Mongols, eliminated equality between the "Celestial" and marginal possessions, and the requirements for the recognition of dependence, it was obviously difficult to accept the Grand Duke Vladimir. Nevertheless, Yuri II made concessions, behaved very loyally, and it cannot be excluded that the Mongols would move towards their main goals - Chernigov, Kiev, Hungary - even in the case of a veiled refusal to immediately recognize vassalage. But, apparently, the work on the decomposition of the enemy from the inside brought a more advantageous solution: to attack with the support of local allies. Up to a certain point, the Mongols did not tie their hands, leaving the opportunity for any decision, while at the same time negotiating, inspiring the Russian princes with the hope of avoiding war and hindering the unification of their forces. When did the winter 1237-1238. chained the rivers, opening up convenient paths deep into Zalesskaya Rus, they attacked, knowing that the enemy was disconnected, paralyzed by internal sabotage, and guides and food from the allies awaited them.
Only in this way can it be explained why Yuri II, who was well aware of all the plans of the Tatars, was nevertheless taken aback. It is unlikely that the talks themselves would prevent him from concentrating all the forces of Vladimir Russia for the battle on the Oka, but they were an excellent excuse for Yaroslav Vsevolodovich and his supporters to sabotage the efforts of the Grand Duke. As a result, when the enemy rushed to Russia, the troops of Yuri II were unassembled.
The consequences are well known: the heroic death of Ryazan, the unhappy battle of Kolomna, the flight of the Grand Duke from the capital beyond the Volga and the capture of Vladimir. Nevertheless, the competent actions of Yuri II and his commander in this most difficult situation should be noted: all available forces were thrown at Oka, Kolomna, at the traditional and in the next centuries border of the meeting of Tatar hordes, the capital city was prepared for defense, it left the grand-ducal family and the prince himself is leaving for the Trans-Volga forests to gather new forces - that is how they will be in the XIV - XVI centuries. act in a similar situation Moscow princes and kings up to Ivan the Terrible. Unexpectedly for the Russian military leaders, it seemed that only the Mongols' ability to easily take outdated Russian fortresses proved to be, and - their rapid advance in a forest unfamiliar country, provided by the guides of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich.
Nevertheless, Yuri II continued to hope to organize resistance, as evidenced by his appeal to the brothers to come to the rescue with the squads. Apparently, the plot was not disclosed. But Yaroslav, of course, did not come. Instead of him, the Tatars of Burundi unexpectedly came to the camp on the City and the Grand Duke died, not even having time to build regiments. The forests on the City are dense, impassable, the camp of Yuri is small, hardly more than several thousand people, as not only the story of Ivan Susanin can get lost to the army in such thicket. In the XII century. in the suburbs lost troops of the Russian princes against each other in the internecine war. I believe that without the conductors of the Tatars to carry out lightning the defeat of the troops of Yuri II could not. Interestingly, M.P. Priselkov, whose authority in the historiography of the Russian Middle Ages does not need much to spread, believed that Yuri was killed by his own people. Most likely, he was right, and this explains the hazy phrase of the Novgorod First Chronicle, “God knows how it ends: many speak more about him.”
It is impossible without the help of the allies from the Russian population to explain the rapid raid of the army of Batu and Subuday across Russia in the 1237-1238 years.
Anyone who has been to the Moscow region in winter knows that outside the highways in the forest and in the field with each step you fall down by half a meter. You can move exclusively along a few paths trodden down by someone or on skis. With all the unpretentiousness of the Mongolian horses, even the Przhevalsky horse cannot dig up the grass on Russian edges from under the snow; it is used all year round to grass. The natural conditions of the Mongolian steppe, where the wind sweeps away the snow cover, and even the snow never falls a lot, and the Russian forests are too different. Therefore, even remaining within the limits of the number of warriors in 30-60 thousand warriors (90-180 thousand horses) recognized by modern science, it is necessary to understand how the nomads could move in a forest unfamiliar country and did not die out from hunger.
What was the then Russia? On the vast expanse of the basins of the Dnieper and the upper Volga - 5-7 million population (35). The largest city - Kiev - about 50 thousands of inhabitants. Of the three hundred known ancient Russian cities in excess of 90%, there are thousands of inhabitants (1) with populations smaller than 36. The population density of North-Eastern Russia did not exceed 3 people. per square kilometer even in the XV century; 70% of villages numbered 1-3, “but no more than five” yards, switching to a completely natural existence (37) in winter. They lived quite poorly, each fall due to the lack of fodder, slaughtering the maximum number of livestock, leaving only working cattle and producers for the winter, who survived with difficulty in the spring. Princely guards — permanent military formations that the country could contain — usually consisted of several hundred soldiers, according to academician B.A.Rybakov, there were approximately 3000 patriarchs of all ranks (38) throughout Russia. Providing food and especially fodder in such conditions 30-60-ti thousand army - an extremely difficult task, dominates over all the plans and decisions of the Mongolian commanders in immeasurably greater extent than the actions of the enemy. Indeed, the excavations of T. Nikolskaya in Serensk, captured by the Tatars during the retreat to the Steppe in spring 1238, show that the search and seizure of grain reserves were among the top targets of the conquerors (39). I believe that the solution to the problem consisted in the traditional Mongolian practice of finding and attracting allies from among the local population to their side.
The union with Yaroslav Vsevolodovich allowed the Mongols not only to solve the problem of collapse from within the Russian resistance, guides in an unfamiliar country and providing food and fodder, he also explains the mystery of the retreat of the Tatars from Novgorod, which for 250 has occupied the minds of Russian historians for years. There was no need to go to Novgorod, ruled by a friendly prince of the Mongols. Apparently, Alexander Yaroslavich, who replaced his father in Novgorod, did not worry about the nomads who had broken through to Ignach-cross, since he was engaged in his marriage to the Polotsk princess Bryachyslavna (40) in a year of the invasion.
It is also easily solved in the light of the concept of the union of the Mongols with Yaroslav and the problem of the retreat of the Tatars from North-Eastern Russia. The raid of the nomads was swift, and immediately after the defeat and death of Yuri II (5 March 1238), all Tatar troops began to gather to leave the country. After all, the goal of the campaign - to bring to power Yaroslav - was achieved. Since Torzhok was besieging Batu at that time, he became the gathering place for the army of conquerors. From here, the Mongols retreated to the steppes, moving not by “raid,” as traditionalist historians say, but by scattered detachments concerned with the search for food and fodder. That is why Batu was stuck near Kozelsk, having fallen into the trap of spring thaw and the strongly fortified nature of the city; as soon as the mud dried out, the Tumeny of Kadan and Storm came from the Steppe, and Kozelsk was taken in three days. If the movement of the detachments were consistent, this simply could not happen.
Accordingly, the consequences of the invasion were minimal: the Mongols took three conventionally large cities (Ryazan, Vladimir and Suzdal) during the march, and 14 cities from 50-70 available in Zalesskaya Russia were in total. Exaggerated ideas about the monstrous ruin of Russia by Batu do not withstand the weakest criticism: the topic of the consequences of the invasion was discussed in detail in the work of D. Peskov, I will only note the myth of the complete destruction of Ryazan by the Mongols, after which the city remained the capital of the principality until the beginning of the XIV century. Director of the Institute of Archeology of the Russian Academy of Sciences Nikolai Makarov celebrates the flourishing of many cities in the second half of the 13th century (Tver, Moscow, Kolomna, Volgda, Veliky Ustyug, Nizhny Novgorod, Ryazan Pereyaslavl, Gorodets, Serensk), which took place after the invasion against the backdrop of the decline of others (Torzhok, Vladimir, Beloozero), and the decline of Beloozero and Rostov is in no way connected with the Mongol defeat, which simply did not exist for these cities (41).
Another example of the inconsistency of traditional myths about the "Batu pogrom" is the fate of Kiev. In 1990-x appeared works VI. Stavisky, who proved the inaccuracy of the most important part of the news about Rus, Plano Carpini, concerning Kiev, and G.Yu. Ivakin, who in parallel showed a real picture of the state of the city, based on archaeological data. It turned out that the interpretation of a number of complexes as traces of disasters and destruction of 1240 of the year rests on unstable grounds (42). There were no refutations, but the leading experts on the history of Russia of the XIII century continue to repeat the provisions about Kiev, which “lay in ruins and barely numbered two hundred houses” (43). In my opinion, this is a sufficient reason to reject the traditional version of the "monstrous invasion" and evaluate the Mongol campaign no more destructive than a major internecine war.
Minimizing the value of the Mongol invasion 1237-1238 to the level of feudal strife and insignificant raid finds its correspondence in the texts of Eastern chroniclers, where the siege of the city “M.K.S.” (Moksha, Mordovians) and operations against the Polovtsy in the steppes take much more space than the cursory references to the campaign against Russia.
The version of Yaroslav’s union with Batu makes it possible to explain the reports of Western chroniclers about the presence of a large number of Russians in the army of the Tatars who invaded Poland and Hungary.
The fact that the Mongols widely recruited auxiliary troops among the conquered peoples, according to many sources. The Hungarian monk Julian wrote that “In all the conquered kingdoms, they immediately kill princes and nobles, who inspire fears that someday they can offer any resistance. Warriors and villagers who are fit for battle are armed and send against their will into battle ahead of themselves ”(44). Julian met only with traveling Tatars and refugees; Guillaume Rubruk, who visited the Mongolian empire, gives a more accurate description on the example of the Mordovians: “To the north there are huge forests in which two kinds of people live, namely: Moksel, having no law, pure pagans. They do not have cities, but they live in small huts in the forests. Their sovereign and most of the people were killed in Germany. It was the Tatars who led them along with them before joining Germany ”(45). Rashid ad-Din writes the same about the Polovtsian detachments in Batu’s army: “The local leaders of Bayan and Djik came, expressed submission to [the Mongol] princes” (46).
So, the auxiliary units, recruited from the subjugated peoples, were headed by local princes, who had gone over to the side of the conquerors. This is logical and corresponds to a similar practice in other nations at all times - from the Romans to the twentieth century.
An indication of a large number of Russians in the army of invaders invading Hungary is contained in the Chronicle of Matthew of Paris, which contains a letter from two Hungarian monks, saying that although they are “called Tartars, many in their army are false Christians and commandos (that is, Orthodox and Polovtsy - D.Ch.) ”(47). A little further, Matthew places the letter “Brother G., the head of the Franciscans in Cologne,” which says even more clearly: “their number increases day by day, and the peaceful people who are victorious and subjugate themselves as allies, namely the great multitude of pagans, heretics and false Christians , turn into their warriors. " Rashid-ad-Din writes about the same thing: “What has increased this lately consists of Russian troops, Circassians, Kipchaks, Madjars and others, who are attached to them” (48).
Of course, some insignificant part of the Russians could have been given to the army by Batu Bolkhov princes in South-Western Russia, but the Ipatiev Chronicle, which reports on their cooperation with the conquerors in the food supply, reports nothing to the military contingents. Nor were these petty rulers of the Wake able to expose the numerous detachments spoken of by Western sources.
Conclusion: the auxiliary Russian troops were received by the Mongols from the Allied Russian prince who had submitted to them. Specifically, from Yaroslav Vsevolodovich. And it is for this that Baty granted him the Grand Duke label to all of Russia ...
The necessity and importance of the Russian troops for the Mongols is explained by the fact that in the late autumn of 1240 the main forces of the invaders, the corps of Mengu and Guyuk, were withdrawn to Mongolia (49) by order of Ogedey-kagan, and the further attack on the West was carried out by the forces of Juchi and Subudai- bagatura These forces were small, and without replenishment in Russia, there was nothing for the Mongols to count on in Europe. Later - under Batu, Munch and Kubilai - Russian troops were widely used in the armies of the Golden Horde and the conquest of China. Similarly, during the campaign against Hulagu in Baghdad and further to Palestine, the Armenian and Georgian troops fought on the side of the Mongols. So there was nothing extraordinary in the practice of Batu in 1241.
The further behavior of the Mongols looks logical, as if they forgot about the "conquered" Northeast Russia and went to the West without any fear of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, who had sufficiently powerful forces for 1239-1242. to fight with Lithuania and the Teutonic Order, and help his son Alexander to win the famous victories over the Swedes and the Germans. The actions of Yaroslav, in 1239, who marched not only against the Lithuanians, but also into South Russia - against Chernigov - look simply as the fulfillment of an allied duty to the Mongols. The chronicle is very clear: next to the story about the defeat of the Mongols of Chernigov and Pereyaslavl, Yaroslav’s campaign was quietly reported, during which that “hail took Kamenetz, and bring princess Mikhailov with many people to his own bite” (50).
How and why the prince of Vladimir could end up in Kamenets in the midst of the Mongol invasion of southern Russia embraced with flame - historians prefer not to think. But after all, the war of Yaroslav, thousands of kilometers away from Zalesia, was against the Kiev Prince Mikhail of Chernigov, who refused to accept the Tatar peace and submission offered to him by Menga. The only, as far as I know, Russian historian Alexander Zhuravel, who was thinking about this, came to the conclusion that Yaroslav carried out the direct order of the Tatars and acted as their handler. The conclusion is interesting, and deserves to be given in its entirety: “Of course, there is no direct evidence that Yaroslav acted so according to the will of the Mongols, but it is quite possible to assume. In any case, the capture of Yaroslav Mikhailov's wife is difficult to perceive otherwise than as a result of the persecution, this is how the chronicle text of A.A. Gorsky. Meanwhile, the Nikon Chronicle directly reports that after Mikhail escaped from Kiev, “Gnasha fearing Tatarov and not comprehending him, and having captured much, Mengukak ide, with much to the king of Batu.” And if so, was Yaroslav not one of those “Tatars” from whom Mikhail was forced to flee?
Is it because an unknown author of the “Word about the destruction of the Russian land” is so strange, clearly violating the rules of etiquette, called Yaroslav “the present”, and his brother Yury, who died in battle, “Prince of Vladimir”, wanting to emphasize that he does not recognize Yaroslav as the legitimate Vladimir prince? And is it not for this reason that the “Word” text that has come down to us ends up in words about “the present” Yaroslav and Yuri, what is the next thing the author told about the true acts of the “current” Yaroslav? The truth about the founder of the dynasty that ruled Vladimir and then Moscow Rus over the next 350 years was extremely inconvenient for those in power ... ”(51).
Even more interesting are the events of 1241-1242. when the Russian troops of Alexander Nevsky, consisting mainly of the Vladimir-Suzdal detachments of his father, Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, and the Tatar troops of Paydar, defeated two detachments of the Teutonic Order - in the Ice Battle and under Lygnitsa. Not to see this as a concerted and allied action - as, for example, A. Gorsky (52) does - can only be unwilling to see anything. Especially when you consider that just auxiliary Russian-Polovtsian troops fought with Germans and Poles near Lignitsa. This is the only assumption that makes it possible to consistently explain the message of Matthew of Paris that as the Mongol corps continued to move in the Czech Republic, near Olomouc, the English templar Peter 53, who was in command of the Mongols, was captured. As Dmitry Peskov notes, “The very fact of this message was hardly considered in historiography due to its seeming absurdity. Indeed, neither Genghis Khan’s “Yasa” nor the development of the rules of warfare, as reflected in Rashid-ad-Din, allow for the thought of commanding an alien by Mongolian troops proper. However, linking the message of Matthew of Paris with the news of the Russian chronicles, indicating the practice of recruiting Russians into the Mongolian army and Rashid-ad-Din, we get a completely acceptable hypothesis according to which the mixed Polovtsian-Russian-Mordovian corps operated under Olmutz. (And notice that our consciousness no longer so vehemently protests against the picture of two Russian troops, which at the same time fight with two Teutonic troops) ”(54).
The cooperation of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich and Alexander Nevsky with the Mongols after 1242 was not disputed by anyone. However, only L.N. Gumilev drew attention to the fact that after the completion of the Western campaign, the roles in the alliance of the Russian princes with Batu changed - Batu was already more interested in helping the Russian princes. Even during the campaign against Russia, he had a quarrel with the son of the great Khan, Ugedei, Guyuk. “A secret tale,” referring to the report of Batu to the bet, reports this in the following way: at a feast, when Batu, as the senior in the campaign, first raised the bowl, Sturmé Guyuk was angry with him. Bury said: “How dare to drink the cup before all Batu, who climbs to be with us? It would be necessary to rub it with a heel and stamp the feet of these bearded women who climb to be equal! ” Guyuk also did not lag behind his friend: “Come on, we will be able to gather firewood on the breasts of these women, armed with bows! Ask them! ”(55). Batu's complaint to the Great Khan caused Guyuk to be recalled from the march; This turned out to be very successful for him, because at the end of 1241, Mr. Ogedei died, and the struggle for the right of succession in the empire began in Mongolia. While Batu fought in Hungary, Guyuk became the main contender for the throne, and subsequently, in 1246, he was elected a great khan. His relations with Batu were so bad that the latter did not dare to return to his homeland, despite the law of Genghis Khan, obliging all princes to attend the kurultai, electing a new great khan. In 1248, Mr. Guyuk went to war against a recalcitrant cousin, but died suddenly in the Samarkand region.
Naturally, in 1242-1248. no one could have foreseen such a turn of events, but the reality was the confrontation between Batu - Khan and Ulus Juchi - with the rest of the empire. The ratio of the Mongol forces proper was radically not in favor of Batu: he had only 4000 Mongol warriors, while Guyuk had the rest of the imperial army. In such a situation, the support of dependent Russian princes was extremely necessary for Batu, which explains his unprecedentedly liberal attitude towards them. Returning to the Steppe from the Western campaign, he settled in the Volga region and summoned all the Russian princes to the Shed, turning all of them extremely graciously and generously handing out labels to their own lands. Even Mikhail Chernigovsky, in 1240-1245, was no exception. fleeing from the Mongols to Lyon itself, where he participated in the Church Council, proclaiming a crusade against the Tatars. But, according to Plano Karpini, the obstinate reluctance of the Chernigov prince to perform the rites of submission angered the khan and the old Mongolian opponent (Mikhail participated in the battle of Kalka) was killed (56).
Russian princes felt the change of roles immediately and behaved very independently with the Tatars. Before 1256-1257 Russia did not pay the Mongols regular tribute, limiting themselves to one-time indemnities and gifts. Daniil Galitsky, Andrei Yaroslavich and Alexander Nevsky, before ascending the Golden Horde throne of Khan Berke, behaved completely independently, not considering it necessary to go to the Horde or coordinate their actions with the Khans. When the crisis in the Steppe was over, the Mongols had to go from 1252 to 1257. actually re-conquer Russia.
1242-1251 events in the Mongol Empire, Yaroslav’s conspiracy in Russia resembled: it was a latent power struggle, which broke openly only with the start of Guyuk's campaign against Batu. Basically it was held in the form of hidden opposition, conspiracies and poisonings; in one of the episodes of this fight under the carpet in Karakorum, Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, the allied Batu grand duke of Kiev and All Russia, poisoned by Guyuk's regent Turakina, was killed. In Vladimir, according to the Law of the Land, Yaroslav's younger brother, Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich, took power. However, the Mongols did not approve it, and, having called the sons of Yaroslav, Alexander Nevsky and Andrey to Karakorum, they divided power over Russia between them. Andrew received the great reign of Vladimir, Alexander - Kiev and the title of Grand Duke of All Russia. But he didn’t go to devastated Kiev, and without possessions an empty title meant little.
And in Russia begins a new amazing story, traditionally suppressed by domestic historians. The elder brother — and the grand duke — but without power, Alexander for several years dangled around the country in the position of “not having sewed a mare's tail”, with one of his views showing the beginning of turmoil and discontent. When the younger - Andrei, the Grand Duke of Vladimir, in agreement with Daniel Galitsky, organized a conspiracy against the Tatars, Alexander went to the Horde and informed on his brother. The result was the punitive expedition of Nevruy (1252), which ANNasonov considered to be the true beginning of Mongol-Tatar rule over Russia. Most traditionalist historians fiercely deny the guilt of Alexander Nevsky in the invasion of Nevruy. But among them are those who admit the obvious. VL Egorov writes: “In fact, Alexander’s trip to the Horde was a continuation of the infamous Russian civil strife, but this time the Mongolian weapons. We can regard this act as unexpected and unworthy of a great warrior, but it was consonant with the epoch and was perceived at that time as quite natural in the feudal struggle for power (57). J. Fennel also explicitly stated that Alexander had betrayed his brother (58).
However, Nevsky himself could have considered otherwise: Andrei and Daniel spoke too late, when the unrest in Mongolia was already over and a friend of Batu Munk was raised to the throne of the great khan. A new wave of Mongol conquests began (Hulagu's campaigns in the Middle East 1256-1259, Munke and Khubilai at China at the same time), and he saved the country from its worst defeat by its actions.
Be that as it may, in 1252, the events of 1238 were repeated: the brother helped the Mongols defeat their brother and establish their authority over Russia. The subsequent actions of Nevsky - the massacre of Novgorod in 1257 and the subordination of Novgorod to the Mongols - finally approved Tatar rule over the country. And at a time when much weaker Hungary and Bulgaria retained their independence, Russia, with the hands of their princes, entered the Golden Horde orbit for a long time. Later, the Russian princes did not try to escape from the Mongolian government, even during periods of unrest and disintegration of this state, which allowed in the XVI century. Russia to act as the successor of the Chingizid Empire in the Volga region and in the East.
The conclusion, in my opinion, does not allow interpretations: the so-called “Mongol-Tatar yoke” was the result of the voluntary submission to the conquerors of a part of the Russian princes who used the Mongols in the inter-prince fighting.
1 See eg.: Russia in the 13th Century: Continuity or the Break of Traditions? M., 2000; Kramarovsky M.G. Chingizid's gold: the cultural heritage of the Golden Horde. SPb., 2001; Gorsky A.A. Moscow and the Horde. M., 2000; Egorov V.L. Alexander Nevsky and Chingizidy. http://tatar-history.narod.ru/chingizidpdf.pdf, 1997; Skrynnikova T.D. Charisma and power in the era of Genghis Khan. M., 1997; Tolochko P.P. Nomadic steppe peoples and Kievan Rus. Kiev, 1999; V. Trepavlov The state structure of the Mongolian empire of the XIII century, M., 1993; Sands Dmitry. Russia and the Mongols // http://gumilevica.kulichki.net/debate/Article07.htm, 1999, Khrapachevsky R. The military power of Genghis Khan. M., 2004, etc.
2 See eg: Homeland, 2004, No. 3.
3 See: Gumilev L.N. Black Legend. M., 1996; Kramarovsky M.G. The Great Horde of Gold: Ulas Juchi as a civilization // Motherland, 2003. No. 11. C.74, paragraph “Parasite State?”
4 The refusal to exaggerate the devastating effects of the invasion, the denial of the important role of the Mongolian strike in the decline of Russia is not only the merit of J. Fennel (Fennel D. Crisis of Medieval Russia. M., 1989) and L.N. Gumilev (Gumilev L.N. Ancient Rus and the Great Steppe. M., 1992), but also Dmitry Peskov (Peskov D. Decree. Op.), Nikolai Makarov (Makarov N. Rus. Thirteenth Century // Homeland, 2003. No. 11), G. Ivakina (Ivakin G Y. Kiev and the Mongol invasion // Russia in the XIII century: continuity or the break of traditions?) And other historians and archaeologists.
5 See: V.B. Vilinbakhov Sources call for a critical approach // Military History Journal, 1961, No. 4; Chernyshevsky D.V. “Priidosh are countless, like a pruzi ...” // Questions of history, 1987, No. 2.
6 Lamb G. Genghis Khan: The Lord of the World. M., 2003. C. 8.
7 See: Dalai Ch. Mongolia in the XIII - XIV centuries. M., Science, 1983. C.57. The army of Genghis Khan on the painting preserved by Rashid-ad-Din, there were 129 000 people.
8 For example, the population of North China numbered 1207 million in 53,5 (8,4 million yards). Since there was a recruitment system in the Jurchen empire, and if necessary 6 fighters were taken from every 1 household, the Jin state could have up to 1,4 million warriors. According to MVVorobyov, Jin exhibited regular 25 000 regular troops and, prior to 700 000, recruits-militiamen (Vorobyev, MV Chzhurchzheni and the state Jin. M., 1975. C.147, 195). The population of Russia in the XIII century. Historians estimate from 5 to 12 million. - the first figure belongs to academician B.A.Rybakov, the second - to academician P.P.Tolochko; According to B.A.Rybakov, in Russia there were about 3000 patrimonial sites of all ranks, which gives feudal armed forces more than 30 000 professional fighters, but sources indicate that militias were drawn into the war (Rybakov B.A. Kievskaya Rus and Russian principalities XII - XIII centuries M., 1982. C. 472).
9 Cit. by: Tizengauzen V.G. Collection of materials on the history of the Golden Horde. T.I. SPb., 1884. C.34.
10 ibid. C.22-23.
11 See: S. Kozin Sacred Legend (Yuan Chao bi shi). M.-L., 1941. C.194.
12 Anninsky S.A. News of Hungarian missionaries XIII - XIV centuries. about Tatars and Eastern Europe // Historical archive. T. III. M.-L., 1940. C.88-89.
13 Egorov V.L. Alexander Nevsky and Chingizidy. http://tatar-history.narod.ru/chingizidpdf.pdf, 1997. C.13.
14 Peskov Dmitry. Russia and the Mongols // http://gumilevica.kulichki.net/debate/Article07.htm
15 Svechin A.A. The evolution of military art. M., 2002. C.141.
16 See: PSRL., T.2. Stb.xnumx.
17 See: Military tales of ancient Russia. M.-L., 1949. C.10.
18 See: G. Prokhorov Codicological analysis of the Laurentian Chronicle // Auxiliary historical disciplines. L., 1972. S.77-104: He is. Tale of Batu invasion in the Laurentian Chronicle // TODRL. T. XXVIII. L., 1974. C. 77-98.
19 Sakharov A.N. The main stages of the foreign policy of Russia from the earliest times to the XV century // History of Russian foreign policy. Late XV - XVII century. M., 1999.
20 Gorsky A.A. Alexander Nevsky // World history. 2001. No. 4. Note 49.
21 Zorin A.V. Lipitskaya battle // http://www.xlegio.ru/armies/zorin/lipitza.htm
23 See: N. Karamzin The history of the Russian state in 12-ti. T.II-III. M., 1991. C.497; PSRL T.10.C.98.
24 See: PSRL.T.2.Stb.777; Tatishchev V.N. Russian history. M.-L., 1964. T.III. C.230; PSRL T.1. Stb 467; Ibid. T.XXV. S.130 (“Yaroslav, the son of the Grand Duke Vsevolod Yuryevich, came to the table at Volodyemeri and renewed the land of Suzhdalskaya and cleared the churches from the dead of the dead ...”).
25 See: A.V.Mayorov. Galitsko-Volyn Rus. SPb., 2001. C. 563-565; Rapov O.M. Princely possessions in Russia in X - the first half of the XIII century., Moscow University Press, M. 1977 C.153-154; Khrapachevsky R.Veliky Western campaign of Chingizids to Bulgar, Russia and Central Europe // ttp: //www.xlegio.ru/armies/khrapachevsky/batu_raid.htm; Gorsky A.A. Decree
26. See Y. Limonov. "Vladimir-Suzdal chronicle"
27 PSRL t.10, p.109
28 See: PSRL T.XXV. C.126; Kargalov V.V. Foreign factors of development of feudal Russia. Feudal Russia and Nomads, Higher School, M. 1967. C. 89; Mongay A.L. Ryazan land. M., 1961 C.358; Limonov Yu.A. Vladimir-Suzdal Russia. L., 1987. C.113 et al.
29 S.Anninsky. Decree C.86.
30 See eg.: Belorybkin G. The death of the city on Sura // Motherland, 2003. No. 11. C.75-77.
31 Anninsky S.A. Decree C. 88.
32 “Monuments of Literature of Ancient Russia. XIII century ", M. 1981. C. 184.
33 PSRL. T.1, stb.468.
34 See: PSRL. T.1.Stb.468; Stb.515; T.3. C.51; T.10. C.105; T.15.Stb.366.
35 Urlanis B.T. European population growth. M., 1941. C.86.
36 Tikhomirov M.N. Old Russian cities. M., 1956. C.140.
37 Rabinovich MG Settlements // Sketches of Russian culture of the XIII - XV centuries. M., 1969. C.232.
38 Rybakov B.A. Kievan Rus and the Russian principalities of the XII - XIII centuries. M., 1982. C.472
39 Nikolskaya T.N. Land Vyatichi. M., 1981. C.140.
40 PSRL. T.4. C.34.
41 See: N. Makarov. Rus. Thirteenth century // Motherland. 2003. No. 11. C.20-22.
42 See: G. Ivakin. The historical development of Kiev XIII - the middle of the XVI century. Kiev, 1996 (in Ukrainian); He is. Kiev and the Mongol invasion // Russia in the XIII century: a continuity or a break of traditions ?. M., 2000; Stavissky V.I. To the analysis of news about Russia in the “History of the Mongols” by Plano Carpini in the light of its archaeographic tradition. / DG. 1986; He is. "The history of the Mongols" Plano Karpini and Russian chronicles. / DG. 1990.
43 Egorov V.A. A. Nevsky and the Golden Horde. // A. Nevsky and the history of Russia. N., 1996. C.49 .; Kuchkin V.A. Alexander Nevsky - statesman and commander of medieval Russia. // A. Nevsky and the history of Russia. N., 1996. C.19; Gorsky A.A. Alexander Nevsky // World history. 2001. No. 4.
44 S.A. Anninsky News Hungarian missionaries XIII - XIV centuries. About Tatars in Eastern Europe // Historical Archive, Vol. III, Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, M.-L. 1940. C.85-87. Wed the message of the Russian bishop Peter, who fled from the Tatars to Europe, in the program of Matthew of Paris: “They are fairly well in compliance with the agreements [with those] who immediately give them up and turn into a slave; they take from them select warriors who are always put forward in battle. " (Matthew Paris. The Great Chronicle // XIII century site library. Http://www.vostlit.narod.ru/)
45 The history of the Mongols / J. del Plano Karpini. - Journey to Eastern countries / G. de Rubruk - Book by Marco Polo - M., Thought, 1997. C.108.
46 Rashid ad-Din Collection of Chronicles, vol. II, USSR Academy of Sciences Publishing House, M.-L. 1960. C. 38.
47. See Nasonov A.N. Mongols and Russia. C.54-55 or here: Matthew Paris. The Great Chronicle // Site Library XIII century. http://www.vostlit.narod.ru/ (Message of the Dominican and Franciscan monks about the Tatars).
48 See Rashid ad-Din. Collection of chronicles. T.1.cn.2 M.-L., 1952. C.274.
49 Rashid-ad-Din, cited in: Tizengausen, T.2. C.37; Iakinf (N.Ya.Bichurin) The history of the first four khans from the house of Chingizov. SPb., 1829. C.282.
50 PSRL. T.7. C. 141; T.25. C.130. V.V. Kargalov, citing this message, comments it like this: “Despite the imminent danger of an invasion, there were no attempts to unite in South Russia to repel the enemy” M., 1967. C.378). It seems that things were much more complicated.
51. See Zhuravel A. On the origin of Mikhail Vsevolodich of Chernigov. http://www.hrono.ru/statii/2003/muchenik.html
52 “The assumption is absolutely fantastic that Alexander in the fight against the crusaders at the beginning of 1242 had“ a strong support ”“ in the person of Baty ”- he writes about A.Sakharov's opinion - A. Gorsky. Alexander Nevsky // World history. 2001. No. 4. Note 24.
53 See: Matthew Paris. Great Chronicle // http://www.vostlit.narod.ru/. C.282-283.
54 Peskov Dmitry. Decree. cit. http://gumilevica.kulichki.net/debate/Article07a.htm.
55 A short story. C.194.
56 Plano J. Carpini. History of the Mongols / History of the Mongols / J. del Plano Karpini. - Journey to the eastern countries / G. de Rubruk. - Book of Marco Polo. M., 1997. C. 36.
57 Egorov V.L. Alexander Nevsky and Chingizidy. C.7.
58 Fennell J. The Crisis of Medieval Russia. 1200 - 1304. M., 1989. C. 149.