Do we have many air defense systems? ZPRK "Tunguska" and ZRPK "Shell"

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Do we have many air defense systems? We continue to review domestic air defense systems available in the Armed Forces of Russia. Today we’ll talk about mobile anti-aircraft cannon-missile systems designed to provide anti-aircraft cover for troops in the frontline and in the air defense system in the depths of defense.

ZPRK "Tunguska"


Do we have many air defense systems? ZPRK "Tunguska" and ZRPK "Shell"

In the early 1970s, the development of a new anti-aircraft self-propelled artillery installation began, which was to replace the ZSU-23-4 Shilka. Calculations showed that increasing the caliber of artillery rifles to 30 mm while maintaining the same rate of fire would increase the likelihood of damage by 1,5 times. In addition, a heavier projectile gives an increase in reach in range and height. The military also wanted to get an anti-aircraft self-propelled gun equipped with its own radar for detecting air targets with a range of at least 15 km. It’s no secret that the Shilka radio instrument complex has very limited search capabilities. The satisfactory effectiveness of the ZSU-23-4 actions was achieved only when preliminary target designation was obtained from the battery command post, which, in turn, used the data received from the control head of the division’s air defense head, who had at his disposal a low-altitude circular surveillance radar of the P-15 or P type -19. In the event that communication with control centers disappeared, the ZSU-23-4 crews acting independently, with their own radars in the circular search mode, could detect about 20% of air targets.



Given the fact that a number of air defense systems were already in service with the Soviet Army and new ones were being developed, the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense hesitated regarding the need to create another anti-aircraft artillery complex. The impetus for the decision to start work on a new army complex on a caterpillar chassis was the active use by the Americans at the final stage of the war in Southeast Asia of anti-tank helicopters equipped with ATGMs.

The anti-aircraft weapons available in the troops in the early 1970s were mainly focused on combating jet fighter-bombers, attack aircraft and front-line bombers and could not effectively counter combat helicopters using short-term climb tactics (no more than 30-40 s) to launch guided missiles. In this case, air defense systems of the regimental level were powerless. The operators of the Strela-1 air defense system and the Strela-2M MANPADS did not have the ability to detect and capture a target that briefly hung at an altitude of 30-50 m at a distance of several kilometers. The Shilok crews did not have time to obtain external target designation, and the effective firing range of 23 mm assault rifles was less than the launch range of anti-tank missiles. The Osa-AK division anti-aircraft missile systems located in the depths of their positions at a distance of 5-7 km from the attacking helicopters, according to the total reaction time of the complex and the SAM missiles, could not hit the helicopter before launching the ATGM from it.

In order to increase firepower, probability and range of destruction of air targets, the new complex, in addition to 30-mm artillery guns, it was decided to arm anti-aircraft missiles. The Tunguska SAM system, in addition to a pair of 2-mm 38A30 double-barreled guns, included: a decimeter-wave circular radar and 8 missiles with radio command guidance through the optical channel along the missile tracer. This anti-aircraft self-propelled gun was the first to achieve a combination of two types of weapons (cannon and missile) with a single radar-instrument complex for them. Fire from 30-mm cannons can be fired on the fly or from a place, and the launch of SAMs only after a stop. The radar-optical fire control system receives primary information from a surveillance radar with a target detection range of 18 km. There is also a target tracking radar with a range of 13 km. Hanging helicopters are detected by the Doppler frequency offset from the rotating rotor, after which it is taken for auto tracking in three coordinates by the target tracking station. In addition to the radar, the LMS includes: a digital computer, a stabilized optical sight and devices that determine the angular coordinates and nationality of the target. The combat vehicle is equipped with a navigation, topographic and orientation system for determining coordinates.

Talking about the Tunguska air defense system, it is worthwhile to dwell on its armament. The 30A2 double-barreled 38-mm anti-aircraft machine gun weighs 195 kg and provides firing of cartridges supplied from a cartridge strip common to two barrels.


Management of firing is carried out using electric trigger. Barrel cooling - liquid. The total rate of fire - 4050-4800 rds / min. The initial velocity of the shells is 960-980 m / s. The maximum length of a continuous line is 100 rounds, after which barrel cooling is required.


SAM 9M311

The 9M311 anti-aircraft guided missile, 2,56 m long, weighs 42 kg (54 kg in TPK) and is built according to the bicaliber design. The starting and starting engine in a plastic case with a diameter of 152 mm, after the development of solid fuel, accelerates SAM to 900 m / s and is separated after about 2,5 s after start. The absence of a marching engine eliminates smoke and allows the use of relatively simple guidance equipment with an optical target line of sight. At the same time, it was possible to ensure reliable and accurate guidance of missiles, reducing the mass and dimensions of the missile, and to simplify the layout of on-board equipment and combat equipment.


The average speed of the march stage of a rocket with a diameter of 76 mm on the trajectory is 600 m / s. At the same time, defeat is ensured in oncoming and catch-up courses of targets flying at a speed of up to 500 m / s and maneuvering with an overload of 5-7g. The warhead of the rod type weighing 9 kg is equipped with contact and non-contact fuses. During tests at the test site, it was found that the probability of a direct hit on the target in the absence of organized interference is more than 0,5. With a miss of up to 15 m, warhead detonation is carried out by a non-contact fuse with a laser sensor of 4 semiconductor lasers forming an eight-beam radiation pattern perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the rocket.

When firing anti-aircraft guns, the digital computer system automatically solves the problem of meeting the projectile with the goal after entering it in the affected area according to data from the tracking radar and rangefinder. In this case, guidance errors are compensated, the angular coordinates, range are taken into account, and when the machine moves, the quality and course angles. In case of suppression by the enemy of the range finder channel, a transition was made to manual tracking of the target in range, and if manual tracking was not possible, to tracking the target in range from the detection station or to its inertial tracking. When staging intense interference of the tracking station along the angular channels, the target was tracked in azimuth and elevation by an optical sight. But in this case, the accuracy of firing from guns is significantly impaired and there is no possibility of firing at targets in conditions of poor visibility.

When firing anti-aircraft missiles, target tracking in angular coordinates is carried out using an optical sight. After launch, the rocket is displayed in the field of view of the optical direction finder of the coordinate extraction equipment. The signal from the rocket tracer in the equipment determines the angular coordinates of the missiles relative to the line of sight of the target, which entered the computer system. After the formation of missile control commands, they are encoded into pulse packets and the transmitter of the station guidance radio signals are transmitted to the rocket.

To aim the anti-aircraft missile, the target must be observed visually, which significantly limits the effectiveness of the first version of the Tunguska. At night, with heavy smoke and fog, it is possible to use only artillery weapons.


The maximum range of destruction of air targets by artillery guns is up to 4 km, in height - up to 3 km. With the help of missiles, a target can be fired at ranges of 2,5 to 8 km, and altitude up to 3,5 km. Initially, there were 4 missiles on the machine, then their number was doubled. For 30-mm guns there are 1904 artillery shots. The ammunition consists of high-explosive incendiary and fragmentation tracer shells (in a ratio of 4: 1). The probability of hitting a target of the “fighter” type when fired from cannons is 0,6. For missiles - 0,65.

ZPRK "Tunguska" entered service in 1982. The tracked chassis of the GM-352 cannon-missile system, with a war machine weight of 34 tons, provides highway speeds of up to 65 km / h. The crew and internal equipment are covered with bulletproof armor providing protection from rifle caliber bullets from a distance of 300 m. For power supply of the machine with the main diesel engine switched off, there is a turbine unit.

It was assumed that the combat vehicles of the Tunguska complex at the regimental level would replace the ZSU-23-4 Shilka, but in practice this was not fully achieved. Four combat vehicles of the Tunguska anti-aircraft missile system were reduced to a rocket-artillery platoon of an anti-aircraft missile-artillery battery, which also had a platoon of the Strela-10 air defense system.


PU-12M

The battery was part of the anti-aircraft division of the motorized rifle (tank) regiment. The PU-12M command post was used as the battery command post, which was subordinate to the command post of the PPRU-1 of the regiment air defense chief. When pairing the Tunguska complex with the PU-12M, control commands and target designation on the combat vehicles of the complex were transmitted by voice using standard radio stations.


ППРУ-1 "Gadfly"

Although the supply of Tunguska air defense missile systems to the troops began more than 35 years ago, artillery and missile systems have not yet been able to completely supplant the seemingly hopelessly outdated Shilka, which were discontinued in 1982. This was primarily due to the high cost and lack of reliability of the Tungusok. It was possible to eliminate the main "children's sores" of the new air defense systems, in which many fundamentally new technical solutions were used only by the end of the 1980s.

Although developers from the very beginning used the latest electronic components at the time, the reliability of electronic components left much to be desired. For timely troubleshooting of very complex instrumentation and radio equipment and missile testing, three different repair and maintenance machines (based on the Ural-43203 and GAZ-66), and a mobile workshop (based on the ZiL-131) for field repairs were created GM-352 crawler chassis conditions. The replenishment of ammunition should occur with the help of a transport-loading vehicle (based on KamAZ-4310), which carries 2 ammunition and 8 missiles.

Moreover, in comparison with the Shilka, the combat capabilities of the Tunguska have substantially increased, the military wanted a simpler, more reliable and cheaper cannon-rocket complex capable of operating missiles in the dark and in low visibility conditions. Given the shortcomings identified during the operation, from the second half of the 1980s, work was carried out to create a modernized version.

First of all, it was about increasing the technical reliability of the hardware of the complex as a whole, and improving combat controllability. Fighting vehicles of the modernized Tunguska-M complex were interfaced with the unified Battery Rangir command post, with the possibility of transmitting information via a telecode communication line. For this, combat vehicles were equipped with appropriate equipment. In the case of controlling the actions of the Tunguska fire platoon from the battery command post, the analysis of the air situation and the selection of targets for shelling by each complex were carried out at this point. In addition, new gas turbine units with a resource increased from 300 to 600 hours were installed on the upgraded machines.

However, even taking into account the increased reliability and command controllability of the Tunguska-M air defense missile system, such a serious drawback as the impossibility of firing rockets at night and at low transparency of the atmosphere was not eliminated. In this regard, despite funding problems in the 1990s, the creation of a modification capable of using rocket weapons was carried out regardless of the possibility of visual observation of the target. In 2003, the radically modernized Tunguska-M1 air defense missile system was adopted for service in Russia. The most noticeable external difference between this option and previous versions is the oval-shaped radar antenna for airborne surveillance. During the creation of the Tunguska-M1 modification, work was carried out to replace the GM-352 chassis manufactured in Belarus with the domestic GM-5975.


ZRPK "Tunguska-M1"

For the modernized complex, a new 9M311M missile system with improved characteristics was created. In this missile, the non-contact laser target sensor was replaced by radar, which increased the likelihood of hitting small-sized high-speed targets. Instead of a tracer, a flash lamp was installed, which, together with an increase in the operating time of the engine, made it possible to increase the range of damage from 8000 m to 10000 m. At the same time, the firing efficiency increased by 1,3-1,5 times. Thanks to the introduction of a new fire control system into the hardware of the complex and the use of a pulsed optical transponder, it was possible to significantly increase the noise immunity of the missile control channel and increase the likelihood of destroying air targets that operate under the cover of optical interference. The modernization of the optical sighting equipment of the complex made it possible to significantly simplify the process of tracking the target by the gunner, while simultaneously increasing the accuracy of tracking the target and reducing the dependence of the effectiveness of the combat use of the optical guidance channel on the professional level of training of the gunner. The refinement of the pitching and heading angle measurement system made it possible to significantly reduce the disturbing effects on gyroscopes and reduce the error in measuring the tilt and heading angles, and increase the stability of the anti-aircraft gun control loop.

It is not entirely clear whether the Tunguska-M1 air defense missile system was able to operate missiles at night. A number of sources say that the presence of thermal imaging and television channels with automatic target tracking guarantees the presence of a passive target tracking channel and the daily use of existing missiles. However, it is not clear whether this is implemented on the complexes available in the Russian army.

Due to the collapse of the USSR and the “economic reforms” that began, the modernized Tunguska-M / M1 air defense missile systems were mainly exported, and our armed forces received very few of them. According to information published by The Military Balance 2017, the Russian army has more than 400 Tunguska air defense systems of all modifications. Considering that a significant part of these self-propelled anti-aircraft mounts was built during the Soviet era, many of them need reconstruction. The operation and maintenance of the Tungusok in working condition requires costly and time-consuming operations. Indirectly, this is confirmed by the fact that the ZSU-23-4 Shilka are still actively used in the Russian armed forces, which even after modernization and the introduction of the Strelets missile system into service are significantly inferior in combat effectiveness to all Tungusok variants. In addition, the radar systems of the modernized ZSU-23-4M4 "Shilka-M4" and ZPRK "Tunguska-M" no longer fully satisfy the requirements of noise immunity and stealth.

ZRPK "Shell" 1C and 2C



In 1989, the USSR Ministry of Defense expressed interest in creating an anti-aircraft missile-cannon complex designed to protect military columns on the march, and to provide air defense for important stationary objects. Although the complex received the preliminary designation "Tunguska-3", from the very beginning it was provided that its main weapons there will be rockets, and the guns were intended for drifting air targets and self-defense from a ground enemy. At the same time, the tactical and technical task specifically stipulated the possibility of the daily use of all types of weapons and resistance to organized radio-electronic and thermal interference. Since the complex was intended to be used outside the line of contact with the enemy, they decided to place it on a partially armored wheeled chassis in order to reduce the cost of it. The promising air defense missile system created at the Tula Instrument Design Bureau had a high continuity with the Tunguska air defense system.

The first modification of the new complex on the Ural-5323.4 automobile chassis was armed with two 30A 2A72 guns (used as part of the BMP-3 armament) and 9M335 anti-aircraft guided missiles were tested in 1996. However, the complex with a defeat range of 12 km and a height of 8 km did not impress specialists. The 1L36 Roman radar did not work reliably and was unable to demonstrate the declared characteristics, the complex was not capable of destroying targets beyond 12 km, and could only fire after stopping. The effectiveness of firing at air targets from 30-mm 2A72 guns with a total rate of fire of 660 rounds / min was unsatisfactory.

In the mid-1990s, amid a radical reduction in the country's military budget and the presence in the troops of a large number of different anti-aircraft systems inherited from the USSR, the need to fine-tune the new air defense system to the leadership of the Russian Defense Ministry seemed unobvious. Due to the shortage of radar equipment, a variant was developed with a passive optoelectronic system and a thermal imaging channel for detecting air targets and guiding missiles, but in this case there was no particular advantage over Tunguska-M1 air defense systems

The “Shell” received a permit to life thanks to a contract concluded with the United Arab Emirates in May 2000. The Russian side pledged to supply 50 complexes with a total value of $ 734 million (the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation paid 50% to pay off Russia's debt to the UAE). At the same time, a foreign customer allocated an advance of $ 100 million to finance R&D and testing.

The complex received the name "Shell-C1" in many ways differed from the prototype presented in 1996. The changes affected both weapons and hardware. The export version of the “Shell-S1E” was located on the eight-axle MAN-SX45 cargo chassis. This modification used foreign-made equipment, 2A38 anti-aircraft guns and 9M311 SAM systems — also used as part of the Tunguska air defense system.

In November 2012, the Pantsir-C1 ZRPK on the KamAZ-6560 chassis entered service with the Russian army. A machine weighing about 30 tons with an 8x8 wheel arrangement can develop speeds of up to 90 km / h on the highway. Cruising range - 500 km. The crew of the complex is 3 people. Deployment time is 5 minutes. The threat response time is 5 seconds.

The combat module is equipped with two units with six 57E6 anti-aircraft guided missiles and two 30A2M double-barreled 38-mm guns.


The combat module includes: a phased radar detection station, a radar system for tracking targets and missiles, and an optoelectronic fire control channel. Ammunition is 12 anti-aircraft missiles 57E6 and 1400 ready-to-use 30-mm rounds.


Anti-aircraft missile 57E6 and anti-aircraft machine 2A38M

The 57E6 anti-aircraft missile looks and looks similar to the 9M311 SAM used in the Tunguska air defense system. Bikalibernaya rocket made by the aerodynamic scheme "duck". To aim at the target, radio command control is used. The engine is at the first separating stage. The length of the rocket is 3160 mm. The diameter of the 1st step is 90 mm. The mass in the TPK is 94 kg. Weight without TPK is 75,7 kg. The mass of the core warhead is 20 kg. The average flight speed of missiles at a range of 18 km is 780 m / s. Firing range - from 1 to 18 km. The height of the defeat is from 5 to 15000 m. The detonation of the warhead with a direct hit is provided by a contact fuse, with a miss - by a non-contact fuse. The probability of hitting an air target is 0,7-0,95. Possible shooting at one target with two SAMs.


Two double-barrel 30 mm 2A38M anti-aircraft guns have a total rate of fire of up to 5000 rds / min. The initial velocity of the projectile is 960 m / s. Effective firing range - up to 4000 m. Reach in height - up to 3000 m.


The radar station of the circular review of the decimeter range is capable of detecting an air target with an EPR of 2 square meters. m at a distance of up to 40 km and simultaneously conduct up to 20 targets. A radar for target tracking and guidance of a missile with a phased array operating in the millimeter and centimeter frequency ranges ensures the detection and destruction of targets with an EPR of 0,1 sq. m at a distance of up to 20 km. In addition to radar, the fire control system also contains a passive optoelectronic complex with an infrared direction finder, which is capable of digital signal processing and automatic target tracking. The whole system can work in automatic mode. The optoelectronic complex is designed for the daily detection of targets, their tracking and missile guidance. The automatic tracking range for a fighter target is 17-26 km, the HARM anti-radar missile can be detected at a range of 13-15 km. The optoelectronic complex is also used when shooting at sea and ground targets. Digital signal processing is carried out by the central computer complex, which provides simultaneous tracking of 4 targets with a radar and optical channel. Maximum speed of capture of air objects up to 10 units per minute.

ZRPK "Shell-C1" is able to work both individually and as part of a battery. The battery has up to 6 combat vehicles. The effectiveness of the complex increases significantly when interacting with other combat vehicles and when receiving external target designation from the central air defense command post of the area to be covered.


The Pantsir-C1 complex is highly advertised by the Russian media and carries a halo of “superweapon”, but it is not without a number of significant drawbacks. In particular, the Russian military has repeatedly pointed to the unsatisfactory patency of the KamAZ-6560 base chassis and its tendency to tip over. In the past, options were developed for placing the combat module on various wheeled and tracked chassis, but in our army there are no such vehicles. In addition, the capabilities of the optoelectronic station in terms of target detection and missile tracking very much depend on the transparency of the atmosphere, and therefore it is rational to switch to radar tracking of missiles, but this can increase the cost of the complex. The defeat of actively maneuvering small targets is difficult and requires more missile consumption.

In 2016, deliveries to the troops of an improved modification of the “Shell-C2” began. The updated ZRPK differs from the previous version by the presence of a radar with improved characteristics and expanded missile nomenclature. In 2019, information appeared in the media about the tests of the Pantsir-SM air defense missile system. The features of this complex are: a new multifunctional radar station with headlamps capable of seeing a target at a range of up to 75 kilometers, a high-speed computing system and more long-range anti-aircraft missiles. Thanks to these innovations, the firing range of the "Shell-SM" has increased to 40 kilometers.

Although the complexes of the "Shell" family have been adopted by the Russian army relatively recently, they have already passed baptism of fire. According to RIA "News”, in 2014, the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system shot down several dronesflying in from Ukraine. According to information published in open sources, missile and gun systems deployed at the Khmeimim airbase in Syria have been repeatedly used to intercept unguided rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles.


At the end of December 2017, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Sergey Shoigu stated that during the entire presence of the Russian Armed Forces contingent in Syria, 1 NURS and 54 UAVs were destroyed with the help of the Pantsir-C16 air defense missile system. However, the use of 57E6 missiles to destroy such targets is a very expensive pleasure, so the decision was made to create relatively inexpensive compact missiles with a shorter launch range.


At present, the main task of the Pantsir family air defense missile system is to protect important stationary objects from air attack weapons operating at low altitudes. In particular, the Shell-C1 / C2 batteries are attached to some anti-aircraft missile regiments armed with S-400 long-range air defense systems. This approach is entirely justified, it allows you not to spend expensive long-range missiles “four hundred” for secondary purposes and minimizes the risk of breakthrough cruise missiles to S-400 positions at low altitude. This is a significant step forward. Based on personal memories, I can say that in the past the positions of the S-200VM and S-300PT / PS air defense systems in the "threatened period" were to be protected by 12,7 mm DShK and Strela-2M machine guns. Separate radar companies until the mid-1990s were given 14,5 mm towed ZPU-4 units.

According to information published in open sources, as of 2018, the Pantsir-C1 complex was armed with 23 batteries. Foreign research organizations specializing in assessing the military power of various states agree that the Russian armed forces have more than 120 Zanzavod-Pantsir-S1 / C2. Given the size of our country and the number of strategically important facilities that need protection from air strikes, this is not such a large number. It should be recognized that our army is still far from being saturated with a sufficient number of modern air defense systems, while only a part of the long-range air defense missile systems are covered by missile-cannon systems.

To be continued ...
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  1. -5
    19 February 2020 07: 00
    Do we have many air defense systems? ZPRK "Tunguska" and ZRPK "Shell"

    ENOUGH .... but there is no limit to "perfection". We modernize, modify, equip even better and DO MORE !!!
    1. +15
      19 February 2020 07: 17
      Quote: rocket757
      Enough
      Here, it seems, as with cartridges, either very little or not enough, but more already to raise. )))
  2. +8
    19 February 2020 07: 47
    Somewhere published a photo of the SM version. There, one rocket is more powerful with high speed and small rockets of 3 pieces in one standard container.
    1. +10
      19 February 2020 09: 43
      Quote: Zaurbek
      and 3pcs small missiles in one standard container.

      4 re small missiles:
      1. +4
        19 February 2020 09: 54
        Exactly .... four.
        1. +2
          19 February 2020 11: 02
          Somewhere (in VO), an interview with developers was published, where it was said that a hypersonic missile is already available on conventional prztsir-C1, while small ones are not yet adopted, but are only at the development stage.
          1. +2
            19 February 2020 11: 06
            There are still some nuances with the radar .... they are announcing a rocket for ballet, but the old radar is not pulling ...
            1. +2
              19 February 2020 11: 32
              Perhaps they talked about the modernization of combatant. It’s not entirely clear what the radar may not pull.
              1. +5
                19 February 2020 12: 19
                The accuracy of determining the coordinates of the target ... angular. missiles do not have AGSN and generally GOS and hit on the target depends on the accuracy of the radar. And for ballistic purposes, this is needed even more.
    2. +4
      19 February 2020 10: 22
      Quote: Zaurbek
      There is one rocket more powerful at high speed

      a larger launch stage has been delivered

      Quote: Zaurbek
      and 3pcs small missiles in one standard container.

      4 "nails" in one TPK. Only now it is not clear whether the production of these missiles is deployed, or everything ended at the "talker" stage.
      1. +4
        19 February 2020 11: 00
        In the Shell CM announced ....
        1. +3
          19 February 2020 12: 01
          Quote: Zaurbek
          In the Shell CM announced

          announced yes. But it seems that the small-sized missiles are still under development. Even its name and at least approximate characteristics are unknown.
      2. +4
        19 February 2020 15: 39
        4 "nails" in one TPK. Only now it is not clear whether the production of these missiles is deployed, or everything ended at the "talker" stage.

        In a recent interview with the designer, they said that at the stage of OCD.

        a larger launch stage has been delivered

        No, not at all. And this was also in the interview. A larger stage is not enough because the gas-dynamic rudders of the warhead at such speeds are not effective. There, most likely, in the design of the head part of the change too, there should be rotary nozzles and as a result the entire control system will be redesigned. Here at the nails - yes, there is simply less than an accelerating step.
        1. +2
          19 February 2020 19: 34
          Quote: alexmach
          A larger stage is not enough because the gas-dynamic rudders of the warhead at such speeds are not effective.

          Where did the information about the gas-dynamic rudders on the combat unit come from?

          1. +4
            19 February 2020 19: 54
            I came across information on the "Shell" from a slightly different angle:
            The most dangerous enemy tank is considered a helicopter, sharpened for this case. Therefore, tank columns must be covered by their own air defense. For this, among other things, the "Tunguska" was created, which, in the future, was to be replaced by a more advanced "Shell". But for some reason they tried to lift the characteristics of the "Shell" (one might say, climbed into the clearing of the "Torah"), and stuck, moreover, Kamaz on a wheeled chassis. (Why Kamaz is understandable: then Serdyukov was also on the board of directors of Kamaz, including pushing its products wherever possible and impossible). As a result, "Carapace lost the ability to shoot on the move, and it is worth keeping quiet about its ability to accompany tank columns."
            Here is an opinion.
            1. 5-9
              0
              20 February 2020 14: 34
              The carapace is originally an object of air defense, its main objectives are missiles and guided bombs, and no helicopters.
              1. -1
                20 February 2020 16: 10
                Quote: 5-9
                initially object defense

                When they decided to put him on wheels, then yes, he is not capable of covering the columns of armored vehicles. By the way, from the experience of Syria, he confuses small aircraft (all sorts of drones) with birds, but "Thor" has no problems with this.
                1. -2
                  20 February 2020 18: 04
                  By the way, from the experience of Syria, he confuses small aircraft (all sorts of drones) with birds, but "Thor" has no problems with that.

                  You will take an interest in what purposes the Carapace is intended for, and for what Thor, and then you will understand your mistake.
                  1. 0
                    20 February 2020 19: 24
                    Quote: Nikolay3
                    ask what purpose the Shell is intended for and what Tor

                    In Wik they write that to cover stationary objects, but on other sites there is also a wider setting of tasks for this complex:
                    "..... The new air defense missile system was assigned the following tasks: defense of mobile units of the ground forces, important military and economic facilities. In addition, the air defense missile system was supposed to protect air defense systems with a long range of destruction (for example, the S-300) ..... "
                    Also, what the military did not like in "Tunguska", and what should have been corrected in its change (Pantsira):
                    ".... However, the Tunguska could use its missile armament only during stops... "That is, I had to be able to shoot right away, which is absolutely useless to guard stationary objects.
                    https://militaryarms.ru/voennaya-texnika/artilleriya/pancir-s1/
                    1. -1
                      21 February 2020 13: 54
                      Dear Bad_gr (Vladimir!
                      The smallest EPR of the target for the Carapace complex: 2 cm² (0,0002 m2) [23]. This allows you to record small reconnaissance UAVs short-range. https://army-news.ru/2010/12/kompleks-pancir/

                      Minimum ESR of the target for the Tor complex: 500 cm² (0,05 m2). This allows you to record small reconnaissance UAVs short-range.
                      http://web.archive.org/web/20140413131257/http://vadimvswar.narod.ru/ALL_OUT/TiVOut0507/MAKS7/MAKS7005.htm

                      The overall sensitivity of the "Pantsir-C1" complex is higher, therefore it "sees birds". it not a disadvantage, but the advantage of the Pantsir complex. SAM Tor will not find such small targets that can destroy the shell.
                      "Armor" was a natural development of the Tunguska air defense missile system, which was put into service in 1982. During the time that has passed since the adoption of the Tunguska complex, the technical characteristics of air attack weapons have changed significantly. Cruise missiles (CR) appeared, which fly at low altitudes and provide high accuracy of hits, remotely piloted aircraft (RPV), having an extremely small signature in all emission ranges... The flight speed of some types of targets increased to 1000 m / s. The missile armament of the Tunguska air defense missile system turned out to be ineffective for dealing with new threats.
                      http://rbase.newfactoria.ru/missile/wobb/panz/panz.shtml
                      1. 0
                        21 February 2020 14: 58
                        Quote: 5-9
                        The carapace is originally an object of air defense, its main objectives are missiles and guided bombs, but no helicopters.

                        Take a deeper look.
                        The features of the complex (Shell-C1) are:

                        universality of action, i.e. ensuring the destruction of air targets, and above all all types of high-precision weapons flying at an object with speeds of up to 1000 m / s from different directions at angles from 0 - 10 ° to 60 - 70 °, of airplanes with a flight speed of up to 500 m / s, helicopters, UAVs, as well as ground lightly armored targets and enemy manpower ...
                        http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/panz/panz.shtml
                      2. +1
                        21 February 2020 15: 33
                        Quote: Nikolay3
                        The overall sensitivity of the "Pantsir-C1" complex is higher, therefore it "sees birds". This is not a drawback, but an advantage of the Pantsir complex. SAM Thor will not detect such small targets that the Shell can destroy.

                        "............." Military journalists ", referring to unnamed Russian officers of the air defense forces in Latakia, where the Khmeimim base is located, wrote that" in a real combat situation, "Pantsir" does not justify the assigned hopes for him. "So, according to the Telegram channel, in Syria, it turned out that these complexes practically" do not see "low-speed and small-sized targets, which include drones, but at the same time regularly fix large birds flying around the base, thereby shooting down confused operators.
                        The channel proved the low efficiency of the Pantsirei in comparison with the Tor-M2U complexes, the presence of which at Khmeimim first became known in April of this year. “On July 1, the first UAV raid was carried out, and three vehicles from the UAV group managed to fly up to the territory of the Russian base and drop nine improvised explosive devices. Immediately after the start of the attack, the Tor-M2U crew detected targets and hit four UAVs with five anti-aircraft missiles on altitudes of 2,5-3 kilometers. In turn, three more drones were shot down by "Pantsir-C1", but used up as many as 13 missiles for this, "- said in the publication ......"
                        https://vpk.name/news/233481_voennyi_ekspert_opublikoval_post_o_provale_pancirya_v_sirii_i_udalil_ego.html
                      3. -2
                        21 February 2020 17: 58
                        Bad_gr (Vladimir) - did your technical arguments end with you? They contradict themselves, showmen:
                        So, according to the Telegram channel, in Syria it turned out that these complexes are practically "do not see" low-speed and small-sized targets, which include dronesbut at the same time regularly flying around the base large birdsthan confuse operators.

                        Now fake news has come into play. You forgot to write the initial paragraph of fake news that puts all the points on i of this lie, picked up by journalists Yellow Press in the person of Lenta.ru and Vpk.name:
                        Quote: The rights to this material belong to Lenta.ru and are presented by VPK
                        The well-known Russian military expert, editor-in-chief of the Arsenal of the Fatherland magazine, Viktor Murakhovsky, posted on his Facebook page the text of a publication from the Military Journalists Telegram channel, which speaks of the uselessness of the Pantsir-C1 anti-aircraft missile and gun systems covering the Russian airbase Khmeimim in Syria. A day later, Murakhovsky deleted his post, to which another military expert Aleksey Khlopotov drew attention.

                        Do not forget the fake video with the gluing of Israel will insert where the Shell-C1 rocket has incomprehensible maneuverability and at the beginning of the fake it flies on a rope - the Jews have already brought it to Wikipedia. Talking to you further, it makes no sense!
                        Victor Murakhovsky recalled that at the beginning of the Syrian operation, Russian troops went unofficial rumors about the insufficiently accurate work of "Shell" on drones and other small targets. But today, according to the expert, the military claims that the effectiveness of the air defense missile system is close to one hundred percent.
                        https://ria.ru/20190624/1555796206.html
                      4. 0
                        21 February 2020 19: 17
                        Quote: Nikolay3
                        Talking to you further, it makes no sense!

                        It is clear that what did not coincide with your opinion - the machinations of the Jews, the yellow press (https://vpk.name), did not mention that I received money for this business.
                      5. -2
                        21 February 2020 19: 37
                        Quote: Bad_gr
                        It is clear that what did not coincide with your opinion - the machinations of the Jews, the yellow press (https://vpk.name), did not mention that I received money for this business.

                        You exaggerate. Nothing bad has been written about the Jews. They proved to you technically, and you switched to the fake of the Yellow Press. Your argument on this is over.
                      6. +1
                        21 February 2020 20: 07
                        Quote: Nikolay3
                        You have been proven technically

                        That is, theoretically it is ideal, and a link to reviews of its practical application is not welcome.
                        PS
                        I do not consider the site vpk.name to be the yellow press, so there is a link to it.
                      7. -2
                        22 February 2020 09: 35
                        "To shame a liar, make fun of a fool
                        And arguing with a woman is the same
                        What to draw water sieve:
                        Deliver us from these three, God! .. "
                      8. 0
                        April 15 2020 13: 07
                        The difference is that the Carapace hits well when the target flies at it (object air defense), and Thor will bring down targets that fly not only at it (zonal air defense)
                2. 5-9
                  0
                  21 February 2020 08: 28
                  The shell was made because it is cheap (relatively) with cheap rockets. This is its main advantage, and not ultra-high efficiency.
                  Thor is the most highly efficient short-range system that knocks down everything with a probability of almost 1,0. But he is very expensive. These are not analogues and not a replacement for one another.
                  1. -2
                    21 February 2020 15: 10
                    Quote: 5-9
                    Thor is the most highly efficient short-range system that knocks down everything with a probability of almost 1,0.

                    You are very embellished.
                    In the world there is not a single SAM system with a probability of defeat P = 0,99999, and even more so P = 1,0.
              2. The comment was deleted.
            2. The comment was deleted.
          2. +3
            19 February 2020 21: 23
            Where did the information about the gas-dynamic rudders on the combat unit come from?

            I wrote nonsense above, I had in mind the aerodynamic wheels in the old rocket and probably the gas-dynamic in the new one.
            1. +1
              19 February 2020 21: 59
              Quote: alexmach
              I mean the aerodynamic wheels in the old rocket and probably the gas-dynamic in the new one.

              Clear.
  3. -4
    19 February 2020 08: 03
    What is the S200VM? C200 he is in Africa C200, including at the time of its withdrawal from service. We did not have a DShK or Strel, even in storage in case of war, and we carried out air defense of Novosibirsk and strategists, we were constantly on duty.
    1. +15
      19 February 2020 10: 22
      Quote: Victor Sergeev
      What is the S200VM? C200 he is in Africa C200, including at the time of its withdrawal from service.

      Oh really? Even I know that there were modifications of the S-200A, S-200V (VM) and S-200D, which significantly differed in the equipment of control cabins, anti-aircraft missiles and combat characteristics.
      Quote: Victor Sergeev
      We did not have a DShK or Strel, even in storage in case of war, and we carried out air defense of Novosibirsk and strategists, we were constantly on duty.

      It is hard to imagine that the positions of the S-200 air defense system near Novosibirsk would be attacked by a B-52 at low altitude. lol But the complexes in the Far East, where the author served, were very likely to be attacked by carrier-based and tactical enemy aircraft.
      Py.Sy. I want to share information! Seryozha has a creative anniversary today! This publication on the Military Review is 500 !!!
      1. +3
        19 February 2020 16: 32
        Great series of articles. We look forward to continuing =))
        P.S. congratulations drinks
    2. +3
      19 February 2020 10: 41
      Quote: Victor Sergeev
      C200 he and in Africa C200

      there were several modifications of the complex: S-200 (A) Angara, S-200V Vega (modernized Angara), S-200D Dubna, S-200M (modernized Vega), S-200VE (export version of Vega)
  4. +3
    19 February 2020 08: 31
    An interesting review. Respect to the author, I look forward to continuing.
  5. +3
    19 February 2020 08: 38
    For the modernized complex, a new 9M311M missile system with improved characteristics was created. In this missile, the non-contact laser target sensor was replaced by radar, which increased the likelihood of hitting small-sized high-speed targets. Instead of a tracer, a flash lamp was installed, which, together with an increase in engine operating time, made it possible to increase the range of damage from 8000 m to 10000 m
    1. Let me ask you: to which side can you stick the 9M311-1M rocket? Indeed, just 9M311-1M was created for Tunguska-M1 ... and the range was increased to 10 km ... What is the difference between the 9M311-1M missile and the 9M311M missile? Explain, pliz ... otherwise I'm confused! Earlier, I assumed that the 9M311M was created for the Tunguska-M or for the Kortik ... (3M88 ...), and the improvements concerned ... for example, replacing the radio frequency fuse with a laser ... (then it was done the other way around ...) By the way, it is a pity that the zur 9M311-1e was not "introduced" ... distance = 10 km and height = 6 km - this is not a "hukhry-muhry"! And yet ... the press mentions the 9M311 zur, both with a fragmentation-rod warhead, and with a rod ... what modifications are equipped with this or that warhead?
    [The 57E6 anti-aircraft missile is similar in appearance and layout to the 9M311 air defense missile used in the Tunguska air defense missile system. The bicaliber rocket is made according to the "canard" aerodynamic design. For aiming, radio command control is used. The engine is in the first separating stage. Missile length - 3160 mm. The diameter of the 1st stage is 90 mm. Weight in TPK - 94 kg. Weight without TPK - 75,7 kg. Weight of the rod warhead - 20 kg Actually, the diameter ("caliber") of the 1st stage is 170 mm ... 90 mm is the diameter of the 2nd stage .... hi
  6. -3
    19 February 2020 10: 33
    "Nails" with PARGSN are our everything laughing
  7. +1
    19 February 2020 11: 09
    They would have adopted the Yenisei simultaneously with Shilka, would have been the main 37mm caliber.
    1. 0
      19 February 2020 12: 29
      Now the main will be 57 mm.
      I hope so.
  8. +7
    19 February 2020 12: 50
    Sergey, I'm sorry for being late, I'll try to catch up. First, about Shilka, or rather, her reaction time (as you know, without indicating the source - he wants to, so he will announce himself)
    Shilka. The reaction time is 20 seconds, highly dependent on target designation. If we take the situation "There is one installation in an open field and a target is flying somewhere within the detection zone, that is, not at an altitude of 5 km", then yes. Really, with the roughest control point 8 ... 10 seconds. In Shilka, a circular search is implemented when the antenna rotates at a speed of 20 deg / s, and a sector search, when the antenna rotates at the same speed in a sector of 30 ... 110 deg / s, the width of the sector and the position of its bisector are controlled by the operator. Usually they set 30 ... 45 degrees, the sector survey lasts 2 seconds, and in two or three surveys the target is found, and then it is no longer a problem. It's a paradox (in fact, pure geometry), but the further the target is from the vehicle, the easier it is for tracking. In general, combat work on Shilka is very much determined by training and calculation experience. An experienced calculation with target acquisition from a range of 12 ... 8 km copes easily. Shooting in the first mode (angles and range from the radar) is generally no problem. In addition, during the search, the command guidance device - CPN - powerful optics works autonomously. Having found a target in the CPN, the commander can turn on the CPN testing, and the tower will turn at the angles determined by the CPN, then capture, the first mode and, in fact, the solution of the problem. This is how they work, without SOC. But this work is not for smooth phlegmatic people with untreated cerebral palsy.
  9. -1
    19 February 2020 12: 54
    This is a question of a foreign intelligence officer to his source.
    They should be enough to solve a specific problem. And what is the task? No goal no task.
  10. +3
    19 February 2020 12: 59
    In the air defense states, everything was even more interesting -
    https://yv-gontar.io.ua/s204347/shtaty_pvo_msp_i_tp_sovetskoy_armii
    States Air Defense SMEs and TP of the Soviet Army
    OShS air defense motorized rifle and tank regiments of the SA in 1986-1991
  11. +6
    19 February 2020 15: 39
    The Pantsir-C1 complex is very much publicized by the Russian media and carries a halo of “superweapon”, but it is not without a number of significant drawbacks. In particular, the Russian military has repeatedly pointed to the unsatisfactory patency of the KamAZ-6560 base chassis and its tendency to tip over. In the past, options were developed for placing the combat module on various wheeled and tracked chassis, but in our army there are no such vehicles.

    I’ll raise another point about the complex. Pay attention to the way it is transported by rail. When loading onto a platform in two parts, this is done using a fairly powerful crane installation. When loading on prepared sections of the railway, everything is fine. And what to do when arriving in the combat application area, where unloading must be carried out not at the stations but in a bare field. And there is not always a crane there or it cannot reach the desired platform. They didn’t unload the combat module, that's it, unloading became. That is why I think that it will not find application in the composition of tank and motorized rifle divisions. It is necessary to create low-profile wheel or tracked bases. But for the protection of individual air defense facilities, bridges and other things, it’s very suitable
    1. +1
      19 February 2020 17: 00
      Why such a loading?
      1. +4
        19 February 2020 17: 47
        Assembled beyond the railway. dimensions.
        1. 0
          19 February 2020 19: 47
          In terms of height, as I understand it, if you can’t remove the wheels a lot
    2. +3
      19 February 2020 18: 02
      Quote: AlexGa
      That is why I think that it will not find application in the composition of tank and motorized rifle divisions. It is necessary to create low-profile wheel or tracked bases.

      And they will have to be created. Because the army air defense complex must have patency at the level of equipment it covers.
      And the original "Pantsir" is not designed for army soldiers, but for the country's air defense, with cross-country ability at the level of self-propelled and towed versions of the S-300/400. Plus, the country's air defense usually sits on some kind of road network left over from the times when the same C-75s or monsters of the C-200 type with their multimeter and multi-ton missiles sat in these positions.
      1. +3
        19 February 2020 18: 09
        So I say that so far this complex has limited use. While there is no replacement for Tunguske.
        1. +1
          19 February 2020 19: 11
          Replacements?
          So it was not there.
          Yes, and Tunguzka herself, judging by the article
          1. is present in very small quantities
          2. TTX does not shine (which is not worth all weather and the inability to use at night) and is rapidly becoming obsolete
          1. +4
            19 February 2020 19: 23
            In my regiment, the anti-aircraft missile division was in the most modern state, 3 batteries: Tunguska, arrows-10 and Needles
            1. +1
              19 February 2020 20: 38
              Was it a group of troops? Was there a ballast?
              1. +2
                19 February 2020 20: 56
                5 Army Corps, this is the state of all brigades, then moved to the regiments. Minsk
                1. +4
                  19 February 2020 20: 59
                  PPRU at the division commander. There were 5 such states in the internal districts in Minsk and 48 in Kyakhta.
                  1. +4
                    19 February 2020 21: 04
                    thank . Then you should talk about Tunguska. wink
      2. +1
        20 February 2020 12: 46
        Quote: Alexey RA
        And the original "Pantsir" is not designed for army soldiers, but for the country's air defense, with cross-country ability at the level of self-propelled and towed versions of the S-300/400.

        it was then that they wanted to shove the land investigators into it, but alas, the price tag for the GM352M1E platform of the Minsk Tractor Plant for our municipal unit headed by Taburetkin turned out to be very large.
        Photos of calculation jobs (Shell on the GM352M1E chassis):
        1. +3
          20 February 2020 18: 36
          Quote: PSih2097
          it was then that they wanted to shove the land investigators into it, but alas, the price tag for the GM352M1E platform of the Minsk Tractor Plant for our municipal unit headed by Taburetkin turned out to be very large.

          Now they won’t buy it any more - you yourself know about relations with Lukashenko.
          Interestingly, but the Mytishchi chassis - "Tungus" GM-5975, "Torovskoe" GM-5955 or "Bukovskoe" GM-569, will not fit the army "Pantsir"?
          1. +1
            21 February 2020 16: 34
            Quote: Alexey RA
            and Mytishchi chassis - "Tunguso" GM-5975

            No, everything will not fit stupidly, this chassis would be optimal:

            At the moment, the creation of a military Carapace is possible, but this requires a chassis suitable in size and carrying capacity. For example BAZ-5937, on which the Osa air defense system was based.
            It is noteworthy that this chassis was designed to create a military air defense system, with the possibility of placing radar and anti-aircraft missiles on one chassis. The chassis floats, its carrying capacity is 7.5 tons. Will 7.5 tons be enough for Carapace or does he need more? For example, KamAZ-6560 has a chassis weight of 14,4 tons, and the weight in the Pantsir version is about 20 tons. In my opinion, it makes sense to switch to the BAZ-5937 chassis. And in my opinion "Point U" uses the same chassis.
    3. 0
      23 February 2020 01: 35
      This is the case with the old versions of the Shell, where the two-sided target detection station (SOC) cannot be transported on the railway tracks without removing the tower (due to optics 30cm above the norm), the new version with the one-sided SOC is solved and can be safely transported without removing the entire tower with the chassis.
  12. 0
    19 February 2020 19: 07
    The operators of the Strela-1 air defense system and the Strela-2M air defense system did not have the ability to detect and capture a target that briefly hung at an altitude of 30-50 m at a distance of several kilometers
    But this phrase is somewhat inaccurate. In those old years, slow-moving ATGMs were also required to be pointed until they hit it, and at the same time not to twitch so as not to tear the cord, so this is short-term - this is at least half a minute. I brought a sign somewhere.
  13. -5
    19 February 2020 19: 49
    Regarding the low-intensity war, we state that there are no specialized anti-aircraft systems in the Ground Forces.
    The most acceptable characteristics of the "Pantsir-C1" complex on a wheelbase. But it clearly carries excess missile firepower and insufficient artillery weapons. There are also questions about the maneuverability of the wheelbase. Of course, there is nothing to say about adequate armor. Any barmaley bullet for this complex is deadly. And the life cycle cost of "Shell" exceeds all reasonable limits.
    Another contender for air defense in a low-intensity war is the Tunguska complex. The complex is more or less acceptable, only the question arises again. The price for a low-intensity war is too high. A good owner shouldn't pay for excessive quality.
    Our honored veteran "Shilka" can not cope with the attack of drones and shelling of the MLRS. In connection with the above arguments, it is time to switch to artillery air defense systems with a caliber of 57 mm or 100 mm. But the inertia of thinking and the benefits of a high price for the defense industry block any movement of funds in the artillery direction. It is now profitable to buy anti-aircraft 100 mm modernized Soviet guns from the Iranian army. A modernized "Shilka" in Belarus. The whole world freely exchanges military equipment. No need to wait for a swarm of cheap drones of illegal armed groups to be swept away by a high-tech anti-aircraft system while reloading missiles.
    It is necessary to quickly rebuild and object defense. For example, air defense of oil refineries by existing forces and means is not possible in 2020. About 32 factories need to be guarded by two hundred armored vehicles. This is more than 100 billion rubles of equipment. The cost of artillery air defense systems with similar capabilities of 2 billion rubles. Feel the difference.
    The cost of the Pantsir launcher is 200 million rubles. The cost of one rocket launch is 6 million rubles. I cannot imagine the situation that at least one combat vehicle will be taken from the division commander during the threatened period to guard the rear plant. But I can well imagine the situation that 5-6 civilian drones with incendiary charges or gas cylinders from a homemade mortar will be launched from the roof of the country house towards the plant.
    In this case, a battery of modernized "Shiloks" will be especially appropriate near the fence of the plant. Or the Iranian 100-mm anti-aircraft artillery system "Sair", developed on the basis of the Soviet cannon KS-19. The cost of the gun is 12 million rubles. The cost of one shot is 6 thousand rubles. The vaunted "Derivation" was 4 years late. And in the best case, they will make it in an acceptable amount for 4 years. For example 200 pcs. By the way, with MLRS, by setting barrage fire, air defense artillery copes better than anti-aircraft missiles and turns cruise missiles into Chinese fireworks successfully in any massive raid on an object.
    Recall the confrontation between the air defense system of Vietnam and American aviation. The main load in the war was carried by anti-aircraft artillery. It was the anti-aircraft gunners that struck 2/3 of the American vehicles shot down during the Vietnam War. And in just three years, 3495 cars were destroyed. The rejection of anti-aircraft artillery must be recognized as voluntarism in the style of Khrushchev N.S. And to direct significant financial resources to correct this error.
    1. +4
      19 February 2020 21: 28
      ora switch to artillery air defense systems, caliber 57 mm or 100 mm

      It is now profitable to buy anti-aircraft 100 mm modernized Soviet guns from the Iranian army. A modernized "Shilka" in Belarus.

      The cost of artillery air defense systems with similar capabilities of 2 billion rubles

      And you came up with calculations for all these cheap systems where can I get it?
      1. -1
        23 February 2020 00: 27
        [Quote] [/ quote]
        The question of manning the Russian armed forces is not an easy one. The demographic pit glows with a red hazard level. Therefore, the argument for reviving anti-aircraft artillery is becoming more significant. The preparation of an artillery crew from a conscript contingent of "low" quality never caused a crisis. The experience of the Second World War and the Vietnam War confirms this. Weekly courses in any battery and a soldier from "makhra" (infantry) becomes a "conditionally" trained artilleryman. Ready to place a fire curtain at the command of the control battery. In contrast, operator training for "Tunguska" requires a minimum of six months in a well-equipped training center and a conscript qualification of at least 70 EG points. And his practice will result in tens of millions of rubles of erroneous starts and misses. Moreover, if we talk about anti-aircraft missiles, then during the threatened period, and even more so after the first strikes by non-nuclear weapons, they will end in 2 weeks. And it will be impossible to make them, since the "train" with the chips will definitely not reach the factory. And not because the truck with them will run into a destroyed bridge, but because the manufacture of these chips requires a thousand conditions, ranging from the presence of masks on the nose and washing powder for the staff's dressing gowns and ending with the purest silicon. Artillery shells can be crafted at "any bed factory". And the remote firing chip there is "no more complicated than a child's toy." Colleagues, I expect from you a reasoned criticism of my opinion on the full revival of anti-aircraft artillery.
        1. 0
          9 March 2020 07: 52
          Yes, but a more sophisticated technique is approaching, and the requirements are actually higher. And in the brain, and in strong-willed, moral preparation. The conscript with criminal procedural thinking is just meat, on the battlefield.
  14. +2
    19 February 2020 21: 29
    Having received a real training ground in Syria, the Pantsir air defense system showed, in addition to the general advantages, and some disadvantages. They are now being corrected promptly. And without such real combat work, the tests would have stretched for many years and it is not a fact that they could be identified.
  15. mvg
    +3
    19 February 2020 21: 46
    You read the article, you recognize the author. Thoroughly. A plus
  16. +3
    20 February 2020 05: 11
    author pros respect!
  17. 0
    9 March 2020 07: 48
    As always, about the interaction of different parts of the air defense system, they either forget, or the leadership of these units lacks intelligence, here it’s clear to the hedgehog that one must cover the other and carry out a set of actions to protect the protected object. And again, why, for example, drones can’t be integrated into bundles, they can carry radar and some ammunition, and in which case they can be put under a missile attack, or ram enemy equipment. But keep the main complex. Somehow everything through one place seems to be there, but Coca-Cola erases everything ...
  18. -1
    2 September 2023 09: 22
    What is the author's problem? With the air defense system, everything is fine with us. Or are you in doubt? Have you yourself served in the Air Defense Forces?
  19. 0
    17 September 2023 14: 33
    The evil irony is that we owe the appearance of the Shell to the UAE. For some reason, our idiots at the top were unable to formulate requirements for such complexes.