Light forces of the Navy. Their significance, tasks and ship composition


Most Russian ships are small ships. But you can’t call it balanced light forces. These are the remnants of the USSR Navy and a number of unsystematically tuned ships


Assessing what the composition of the ship should be fleet, a number of contradictions will inevitably have to be resolved: forces that are optimal for some tasks turn out to be inapplicable if tasks change, universal ships are ships that poorly solve very many problems, and good ones are just some, and a fleet that has optimal “tools” for any task in sufficient quantities, impossible for economic reasons, and, what is important to understand, impossible in principle for anyone, and not just for Russia.

Here are some examples. It is economically possible to focus on small ships, but they themselves are devoid of combat stability and are easily destroyed by a serious enemy, see article "The harmful myth of the mosquito fleet". Many tasks that can be solved with small ships can be solved by large ships, but here economics and demography come into play: even a rich country will have difficulty recruiting the right number of crews and financing the fleet, in which destroyers are assigned the tasks of corvettes. In addition, the life cycle of such a ship is much more expensive than that of a corvette, and it can only solve some problems with a helicopter.

For example, a missile boat can get ahead of the enemy in a maneuver, launch a high-speed attack, and launch a missile on an enemy ship from a favorable position due to a speed of 43-45 knots, and the frigate will not be able to shoot expensive expensive long-range missiles, or use a shipborne helicopter armed with missiles or even a couple.

But there may be no target designation, and the weather may not allow helicopters to fly. On the other hand, boats with a high degree of probability can be killed aviation the enemy. As it happened, for example, with Iraqi boats in 1980, and with them in 1991.

As you can see, there are a lot of contradictions.

The USSR resolved this issue by creating specialized ships for each task and creating naval fighter and missile aircraft. Rocket boats and small missile ships, in the far sea zone, could be attacked by surface ships, except aircraft and submarines, by modernized BODs (for example, Project 61PM ships equipped with anti-ship missiles), missile cruisers of various types - from Project 58 to Orlan, later aircraft carriers cruisers. Small anti-submarine ships in the BMZ were in charge of anti-submarine defense, project 1135 BPCs (later reclassified to SKR) in BMZ and DMZ, 61, whole anti-submarine helicopter carriers cruiser 1123, project 1134A and 1134B, then 1155, 11551 ...

This system had a giant minus - it was just incredibly huge and required a lot of money. Even the USSR, with its power, could not stand the arms race at the time, to say nothing of today's Russia. Russia will have to “combine the incompatible” and build a powerful and efficient fleet - but cheaply. Is it possible? Yes it is possible. Let us examine what approaches to surface forces will have to be guided in order to do this.

Light forces and their place in the Navy system


We will call the “light” forces the Navy surface formations, consisting mainly of small ships from boats to corvettes, inclusive. This is an unprofessional term, but intuitive for a civilian. Why does the fleet need such forces?

There is such an eloquent example, as a comparison of the intensity of operation of the BOD of projects 61 and 1135 on the one hand, and small IPC projects 1124 on the other. The captain of the 1st rank A.E. wrote about this. Soldiers in his memoirs "Admiral Routes":

Now about the cost - effectiveness. There were other beautiful anti-submarine ships. For example: BOD pr. 61 and pr. 1135 (1135A), which subsequently, modestly transferred to patrol ships of the second rank. But project 61 differed from project 159 (159A) only in large displacement, number of crew, gluttony of gas turbine engines and high cost of maintenance. Armament and sonar were almost the same, the crew was almost double the rank of the second. Of particular pride is the architecture and gas turbine power plant, it is really beautiful - “The Singing Frigate”. But it is impossible to fight with submarines alone. But the 1135M, in addition to the wing-mounted GAS, already had a towed hydro-acoustic station (BGAS) “Vega” MG-325, which combined the advantages of the winged and lowered GAS, because the BGAS antenna could be towed at a given depth (within the TTD). True, the ship commanders really did not like to use BGAS because of the danger of losing the towed antenna. So, it is no coincidence that they were reclassified to watchdogs. They were practically not allowed to engage in anti-submarine training, but kept in bases because of the high cost of operation. On fuel, which one ship with two gas-turbine power plants consumed for a daily exit to the sea, the KPUG, consisting of three ships of Pr. 1124, could search for submarines for three days!


For reference. KPUG - ship search and strike group, so-called small (3-4 units) detachments of anti-submarine ships that perform tasks of group search and, in case of war, the destruction of enemy submarines.

What is important for us here? The financial issue is important - small ships, firstly, cost less, require smaller crews, and, very importantly, require less fuel. For a period of 25-30 years, the savings are huge. In addition, focusing on “light forces” you can have more fleets for the same money - literally.

The disadvantages are mentioned above, in addition, such ships cannot conduct high-intensity military operations in the far sea zone. Drive one submarine or sink a couple of transports - please.

To become an instrument for breaking into the defense of a large ship’s strike group or even an aircraft carrier group, to fight with heavy ships, to “work” as part of a ship’s strike group (CGM) in the open ocean is not. Little autonomy, little weapons on board, severe restrictions on the use of weapons on pitching, a strong drop in maximum speed on pitching, inability to repel massive air and missile attacks, inability to work together with aviation outside the combat radius of base (ground) aviation.

The conclusion is simple - those tasks that the "light forces" perform better than the "heavy" must be solved precisely by light forces, while on the one hand, their number should not be too large, otherwise they will "eat up" the resources that are needed for others forces, and on the other hand, they must act together with the "heavy forces", which will have to provide them with combat stability and protect them from attacks of a potential enemy. The question, therefore, is in finding the optimal balance between light and cheap ships on the one hand, and large and expensive on the other. And also in their optimal appearance.

Considering that the conduct of offensive military operations by Russia against some third world countries is much more likely than the defense of its territory during the global war, our “light forces” should not be a strictly defensive tool in order to fight only on their own shore. They should be able to be used for offensive purposes, at least for secondary tasks.

Given that Russia is not the USSR, and, firstly, it does not have so much money, and secondly, it has already seen the collapse of the country, these ships cannot, with rare exceptions, repeat the Soviet concept, when for most tasks there were specialized ships . In most cases, ships should be multi-purpose.

Further we start from tasks.

We list the tasks that small ships and the main threats to them can effectively solve. Based on the list of these tasks, it will already be possible to “make an approach” to determine the optimal appearance of “light forces”.

Anti-submarine defense. No matter how far the progress strides, the quantity matters. A large number of ships using combined means of searching for submarines, for example, low-frequency omitted hydroacoustic stations when working from a stop and towed hydroacoustic stations when working on the go, as well as various sources of external low-frequency “backlight” (from GAS-emitters on some ships that give “backlight” »For others, up to special ammunition for bombing, the practical feasibility of which has already been proven), allows you to create very effective movable anti-submarine lines, which the submarine simply cannot overcome condition. This is especially important when the task is to prevent the breakthrough of foreign submarines in one or another water area. To form such lines, the number of ships is still important, they need a lot, and since we traditionally have little money, these should be cheap ships, both on their own and in operation (for example, “for fuel”). No less important are such qualities in the anti-submarine guarding of convoys and landing troops at the transition.

Protection of the water area (separately from the tasks on the PLO). Small ships can perform the tasks of protecting the designated area near the coastline or man-made object at sea from the penetration of "light" enemy forces, subversive and reconnaissance groups on speed boats and other watercraft, speed boats and boats trying to carry out mine-setting, in some cases - by helicopter. Also, light forces can effectively block any designated areas, provided that dominance is achieved in the air and at sea.

Striking cruise missiles along the coast from a large number of dispersed platforms, an example of which was the combat use of the Caspian Flotilla’s RTOs against terrorists in Syria. RTOs as an example of a ship are unsuccessful, it itself is conceptually unsuitable for the fleet of the future and this issue will be considered separately, as long as we take the principle that small ships can do this, and the enemy cannot (under a number of conditions) destroy them all simultaneously.

Tracking weapons. During a threatened period, a small ship can monitor enemy naval groups in the near sea zone under a number of conditions (for example, it must be used in appropriate weather conditions so that a priori less seaworthiness compared to a large ship does not prevent it from performing a wave task).

Destruction of enemy surface ships.

Support for landing operations - protection from submarines, surface ships and single aircraft at the transition, fire support by conducting artillery fire along the coast. Here we again come to the conclusion that there are more ships - more artillery barrels, and the example of the same corvettes suggests that it can be a 100 mm gun.

In this case, it is impossible to reduce the actions of light forces to the defense of their territory or work in their BMZ - this is not true. Offensive actions are quite “tough” with light forces, and not only in the near sea zone, but also near the enemy’s coast.

Examples of such places are the Norwegian fjords, the straits between the Kuril Islands, the straits between the Aleutian Islands, some parts of the Baltic Sea, the South China Sea, the Philippines, the Aegean Sea, the Caribbean Sea. Small ships are capable of carrying out effective attacks of the naval forces of the enemy, his units of warships, transport ships, individual ships and ships, subject to the achievement of air supremacy, or at least ensuring that the enemy is unable to use aviation in the absence of his own aviation, too, and more before the seizure of dominance at sea. And the need to use them and away from their shores (and close to strangers) requires taking seaworthiness seriously - even a small ship should be able to storm and move with strong excitement. And this is quite feasible.

What's in the red? In the air defense minus. And that is the problem. When providing any KPUG or KUG ship from the light forces with reconnaissance information, an attempt to withdraw a group from an air strike can be made with the same or great success as for large ships. But if the exit didn’t work out and the enemy strikes, then the Iranian Operation “Pearl” is repeated for the Iraqis or the shooting at Bubiyan for them - the aircraft will simply gobble up small ships and not choke. It has always been so.

For small ships, it is technically impossible to provide the power of ship’s air defense sufficient to independently repel massive air strikes.

Another problem is the battle with large surface ships of the enemy - the latter can simply hit a relatively small salvo of small ships with their own air defense systems, but the opposite is not the fact that it turns out to be true - the vertical launch installations, which are today the de facto standard for warships, can form a large salvo of anti-ship missiles. At the same time, a large ship can survive the hit of one anti-ship missile system and even maintain limited combat effectiveness, and with small ones it will not work, there is one rocket and the end, at best, the charred skeleton of the ship can be towed for repair. This limitation dictates requirements for the number of attacking units, the number of missiles at them, their speed both in attack and at its exit and withdrawal, to stealth in the radar and infrared range. We will come back to this too.

So, the tasks are clear, consider what tools they can be addressed. As well as how the composition of light forces, their interaction with other forces, is affected by the limitations on combat use that they have.

Options for the composition of light forces, their disadvantages and advantages


As already mentioned, it is necessary to immediately put aside the idea that a separate ship is needed for each task - simply because it will be too much for the budget. Accordingly, ships should be multi-purpose, except for those tasks that a normal ship made at a realistic level of technology cannot be solved. Then a specialized ship will be used.

We make an assumption and suppose that we want to solve all the problems listed above with one ship. We’ll check if this is possible, and what kind of ship it should be, what features it should have.

First, consider weapons and weapons.

So, to accomplish missile defense tasks, we need: a sonar system (SAC), a launcher for anti-submarine missiles (PLUR), preferably at least a small bomb, such as RBU-1000, the Package-NK complex, preferably redesigned to use torpedo tubes instead launcher with TPK. In this case, the HAC may include both towed, and hardened or bulb and lowered hydroacoustic stations (GAS).

Need a radar system. Since a small ship cannot resist massive air strikes or powerful missile salvoes, it makes no sense to deploy a powerful and expensive radar with fixed large-sized canvases - all the same, there will be no missiles on board in the right amount, and it’s better to save. So, it can be a relatively simple complex.

In addition, when solving OVR tasks, a gun is required, some missiles to destroy surface targets, preferably simpler and cheaper.

To conduct offensive operations, the same gun, the same missiles are needed, but now it’s not simpler and cheaper, but more efficient. And they are also needed for tracking weapons.

What is necessary in order for such a ship to deliver cruise missile attacks over long distances? Need a universal launcher 3C-14 for "Gauges." But, in fact, for the anti-ship missiles needed in a serious war, it is needed the same as for the anti-submarine PLUR needed.

The tasks to support the landing are solved the same with the caveat that the gun is needed from 100 mm.

What else do we need? We need a helicopter. To perform tasks on PLO. But here we need to make a reservation - in principle, we need a helicopter, where it will be based - this is another matter. It just has to be by itself, it’s not necessary to have all the infrastructure on the ship for it.

But even if it will be - also not bad.

Now imagine our ship.

Light forces of the Navy. Their significance, tasks and ship composition
Photo collage. REV from the usual 20380 (and in fact it is even possible to radar from Karakurt, it may turn out even better), PU 3S-14 for offensive missile weapons (Caliber, Onyx, Zircon, PLUR), PU Uranus and SAM with 16 rockets at the stern. More powerful than 20385 and apparently cheaper

So, option 1 is our good old 20385. But, an important caveat, it removed the multifunctional radar from Zaslon, as a totally redundant system for a mass ship of this type, a simplified radar system was used (on this model - like the first 20380, there is a tower with “Furke”, “Puma” and “Monument”, it’s really not necessary to do just that, there are options both cheaper, and easier and better - at the same time), launchers of RK “Uranus” are delivered to the vacant volumes. Experts argue that if you use a radar complex on a similar ship that was used at Karakurt RTOs and use a simplified steel instead of a composite superstructure, the cost of the ship can be reduced to 17-18 billion rubles at current prices.

This is less than a pair of RTOs. Our ship satisfies the list of tasks that were listed above almost completely. He has a hull, there is a cannon, there are rockets, and different, both expensive (Onyx, Caliber, in the future Zircons), and cheaper Uranus. He carries an anti-submarine helicopter on board, and if you design such a ship again (a simplified version is in any case a new project), then you can also provide a strike Ka-52K. It is possible to envisage a missed ASU that is absent on this project and a bomb on a newly designed ship can also be “registered", even if it is small.

Such a ship can also inflict cruise missile attacks. Can it be considered cheap and massive? Quite. For 1,8 prices MRK Navy will receive a replacement for MRK, and also a replacement for the IPC, as well as a replacement for TFR. In terms of anti-submarine capabilities, such a ship is several times superior to the old TFRs of project 1135 and frigates of project 11356, closely approaching ships that are a class higher.

Such a ship can even carry out an interbase transition to another ocean - the Baltic corvettes went to the Red Sea, which proves their ability to make transitions to the Indian Ocean, which means such ships would find themselves in an offensive war somewhere far from our shores.

What are the disadvantages of such a ship? Cons are.

For warfare in some complex coastal areas (skerries, fjords, archipelagos), among the channels and shallow water, it is too big. He has a big draft - 7,5 meters on the bulb, this is due to the large bulb GAS Zarya. For the same reason, such ships cannot be built in factories that are located on inland waterways, except for the Amur River - it will not pass along most rivers.

What else? And he lacks speed. The best representatives of the project 20380 reached the move to 26 knots with the project 27 knots. The speed value will be considered a little later, for now, just remember this. Of course, if you design the ship again, then “playing” with contours and propellers, you can speed up, but how much is an open question.

Nevertheless, even taking all of the above into account, such a ship could very well become the basis of the “light forces”.

Option 2. If we talk about mass character, then the simplified version of 20385 with reinforced, oddly enough, weapons can be beaten by the creation of Zelenodolsky Design Bureau. The model in the picture is assigned the index 11664, but there are other options on the same case.



A couple of options for the corvette based on the 1166 case. The most interesting, alas, was not shown. ZRAK in this place will icy wildly. If it is "Shell-M", then also water dust will interfere with aiming. ZRAK must be removed aft

A corvette based on the project 1166 building can also serve as a base for the “light forces”. What are its advantages in comparison with the reference above 2038X?

Firstly, it is cheaper. Generally speaking, it is quite difficult to calculate the price of a ship that is not yet there, but most likely its price will be somewhere in the range of 13-15 billion. It has less draft and smaller size, which means that it can be built at a larger number of plants (including Zelenodolsk itself) and has less restrictions on conducting military operations in shallow areas. For the cost of ten 2038X, you could probably get 12-13 1166X. Even with the same GEM of two DDA-12000 units, a ship with a Zelenodolsky hull will most likely be a little faster. On it you can ensure the constant basing of the helicopter, but the conditions for its storage will be worse, there will be less fuel on board. At one time, the fleet rejected such a ship, wanting to get a more “cool” 20380. As a result, however, it was left almost without ships.

Other disadvantages of the project are also obvious - a simpler sonar station “Platinum-M”, “Zarya” will not fit there, all missile weapons are located in the 3C-14 installation, there is simply nowhere to add more missiles. In general, the ship is a little faster, a little cheaper, a little more massive, worse, like an anti-submarine and with weaker rocket weapons. As well as the previous version, it replaces the RTOs when striking along the coast with cruise missiles. The most important difference is that if the 2038X has a Redut air defense system with 16 missiles, which, with a sane radar, will also go where it should, then the Zelenodolsk project does not have any air defense systems, it has an air defense system, and it is extremely poorly located. It would be much more logical to place it at the stern, and to lay an artillery gun in air defense tasks from bow course angles. By the way, in this case it will have to be made 76 mm, since such a gun is better than an 100 mm as an anti-aircraft gun. But she is worse in everything else. The differences between 100 and 76 mm guns are especially critical when shooting along the coast - the expenditure of shells on the same typical target with a 76 mm gun is XNUMX times higher. But there will be no choice - the weakness of the air defense of the ship does not leave him.

You can, however, go even further and simplify the ship even more, losing in the combat power of each individual ship, while winning in their quantity.

Option 3. So, the well-known Chinese project 056. One of the most massive warships in the world. Two diesel engines, two shaft lines, a 76-mm gun, small-sized cheap anti-ship missiles, self-defense air defense aft. There is no hangar for a helicopter at all, there is only a landing pad and a fuel supply.


Type "056", also known by the name of the lead ship as type "Qingdao". A model of simplicity and mass, but not without flaws

There is a towed GAS, there is a surname, the latter, sort of like a subspecies of the Russian Platinum. Simplicity and cheapness as it is. There is a truth and a nuance - the inclined launchers for Chinese anti-ship missiles YJ-83 allow launching new Chinese anti-ship missiles with a range of up to 50 kilometers - here the Chinese technologically gave us “as young” - in Russia such a project was killed during various near-naval intrigues many years ago, but the Chinese brought everything to metal. We wouldn’t be bothered by such an option for real and serial 20380, such missiles are very much asking for it, but what’s not there isn’t. There are normal torpedo tubes of caliber 324 mm - we just have to finish it before, apparently for this we will have to lose some war with great losses.

Russia is quite capable of producing such ships. Our engines are slightly weaker than those used by the Chinese, the maximum diesel power SEMT Pielstick used on the Chinese corvette is greater than our Kolomensky 16D49 at 1400 hp. We do not have a compact rotary launcher for self-defense air defense systems, similar to the American RAM, which the Chinese install on their corvettes.

But, to tell the truth, this cannot stop us if we have to build “light forces” around such ships - the same as that used on Project 22160 patrol ships, that is, two DRRA6000 diesel engines, each of which includes engine 16D49 Kolomensky plant with a maximum power of 6000 hp and gear transmission RRP6000. With all the disadvantages of such a power plant (low power and too bulky and heavy transmission), it is quite possible to create a similar warship around it, but you will have to win back the lack of power by the contours of the hull. In principle, this cannot be considered impossible.

The place of the Chinese self-defense air defense system will be completely taken by the Pantsir-M, instead of the Chinese anti-ship missiles the vertical 3C-14 will completely “stand up”, which will again provide for the launch of the missile launchers on ground targets and anti-aircraft missiles, and even more than the Chinese ammunition and more powerful missiles . RLK will also get serial, from Karakurt. The productivity of the Kolomensky Zavod and Zvezda-reduktor LLC will allow it to build a couple of such ships a year, if necessary, without any additional investments in infrastructure. True, having invested a penny in a couple of stands for assembling and testing gearboxes and units, you can order large corvettes in the same quantity, but they are more expensive.

What are the benefits of “Russian 056”? Price and production time. Such a ship will cost 11-12 billion rubles and it can be laid literally at any shipyard in the country. About two units a year right now. The minuses are also clear - in comparison with 1166X it will not have conditions for basing a helicopter, the latter can only make a short landing on it for refueling and replenishing ammunition.

Speed ​​is critical - the Chinese ship is unacceptably slow, we, with the mass of our units and lower diesel power, will have to try very hard not just to keep up with them, but to get the normal speed.

Another critical point is that in such a small ship, in a rather acute form, restrictions on the use of weapons begin to arise due to unrest and a drop in speed with great unrest. It is impossible to do something here without high costs and expensive technical solutions, and even these expensive solutions will not solve all the problems - some types of rolling can only be eliminated due to the size of the ship and nothing else. This flaw of the hypothetical “Russian 056” must be clearly kept in mind. However, something here you can "win back" due to the contours.

With the fire support of the landing, everything will also be “not very”, as with the 1166X - a 76 mm caliber gun for shooting along the coast is far from the best option, but, again - there is no choice with such air defense.

Nevertheless, a similar ship can also become a base for light forces. But this option is not the last.

Option 4. As mentioned earlier in the article “Step in the right direction. The multi-purpose project "Karakurt" (PLO) » the ship that we know as the Karakurt RTO could initially be multi-purpose. And even had to be. However, this is now quite real.


One of the early projects of a multi-purpose ship based on the Karakurt. Unfortunately, THIS MOST project was not shown. Till.

The internal volumes of “Karakurt” make it possible to reconfigure this ship and create on its basis a small corvette that would be able to carry out both the tasks that are assigned to the RTOs today and those that performed and are fulfilling the old MPC. At the same time, its composition of weapons on board will be as follows - a 76-mm gun, a 3S-14 launcher, the Pantsir-M air defense missile system, and Pack-NK launchers, apparently installed across the ship, above the hull frames (to compensate for recoil) Naturally, without the possibility of recharging. Although in the right way it would be still develop a light torpedo tube - then the “Karakurt PLO” would have increased ammunition, and the requirements for the installation site of the SL would be much more lenient.

The GAS on such a ship is likely to get towed and lowered, which, in principle, would be enough for the mass use of such ships, although it would not be superfluous. The disadvantages of such a ship are clear - everything is the same as that of the “Russian 056”, and even the complete lack of the ability to land a helicopter - in the best case, you can attach a compact platform to which you can lower some cargo on a cable or lift a wounded from it, no more . Speed ​​will be a plus - such a ship will be clearly faster than all the options listed above.

And of course, these options are not the only ones possible. The ship subsystems produced in Russia make it possible to come up with many other options, which are quite “working”.

Interaction with BNK


It is easy to see that whichever of these ships becomes the base for the future “light forces”, and all of them are related in one thing - insufficient air defense, which, in principle, has already been mentioned. And since we plan to use such forces, we must immediately resolve the issue of air defense. Let us immediately clarify why aviation from the coast cannot completely solve the problem with air defense.

Article “We are building a fleet. Wrong ideas, wrong concepts ” an example was analyzed with the reflection of an enemy aircraft attack on a naval strike group, and in some ideal, almost unattainable conditions, when there is a reliable radar field for many hundreds of kilometers. And even in this case, the chances of aviation on alert at the airport are minimal or even zero.

In principle, the combat experience confirms this: the Iranian operation “Pearl” in 1980 ended just like that - Iraqi boats were simply killed in about a four-minute attack. The only thing that matters is the presence of fighter aircraft on combat duty in the air. But it is impossible to hold large forces in the air, and small aviation forces will only mitigate the enemy’s strike, but they will not be able to repel it.

These examples quite sufficiently substantiate a huge problem that light forces themselves will not solve - air defense.

And here we need a means of giving the light forces the very lack of combat stability - large surface ships.

Of all the above options for the base ship of "light" forces, the corvette based on project 20385 is the most capable of air defense, the least hypothetical is the "Russian 056".

Accordingly, to protect the hypothetical 2038X we will need an air defense ship of the same force, to protect everything else a little less. In the future, when the process of shaping the appearance of warships will be returned back to a scientific basis, this will be an important point - saving on a corvette, we spend additional money on an air defense ship and this must be taken into account.

What kind of ship should this be? It can be something similar to frigate of project 22350. Perhaps, it is simply he himself. Acting in conjunction with a couple of duty fighter units in the air, and, in fact, protected by corvettes, such a ship by the fact of its presence in the KPUG or KUG (ship strike group) of small ships will make an attack on them a rather expensive event. At the same time, it will not hurt to strengthen the ship group and a couple of frigates if the danger of an air attack grows.

In the future, however, it will be necessary to depart from such use of the frigates of project 22350. These ships will be needed for more serious offensive missions. At present, Russia is developing a “large” frigate of project 22350M, a fully gas turbine ship with a significantly enhanced composition of missile weapons, and, hopefully, a couple of helicopters.

It is to be expected that as soon as a lead ship of this type completes state tests and enters the Navy, the construction of the 22350 familiar to us will probably be stopped, and instead of it the place of the most powerful domestic URO ship will take 22350M. This, in general, is good and right if everything works out as it should.

However, the 22350M is an attack ship, the task of which is not to graze corvettes, but in high-intensity offensive operations in the DMZ, otherwise there is no need to create it.

And in this case, it turns out to be beneficial for Russia to develop an easy and relatively simple air defense frigate, possibly completely diesel, in which both anti-submarine and offensive capabilities would be at the level of a corvette, and only in terms of air defense and seaworthiness would it have significant superiority over light ships. Such a ship would be substantially cheaper than 22350, and, in general, universal enough to use it not only for air defense of "light" forces. It is especially important that he can carry two helicopters on board, and it is desirable that these could be AWACS helicopters if necessary (the width of his hangars should allow them to be based on board).

Thus, a scheme emerges - small ships, whether it is a 2038X level corvette or the conditional "multi-purpose" Karakurt "perform all of the above combat missions, and so that they are not interrupted by air strikes, a couple of interceptor links are on duty over the area in which they operate on water one or two light air defense frigates. Which, in other conditions, can perform tasks independently.

At the same time, both corvettes and a light frigate should be created in a complex - for example, if helicopters (2038X and 1166X) can be based on corvettes, then the presence of a pair of helicopters on each frigate is not so critical and you can donate one hangar to save money (although this is very strong not advisable). And if “Russian 056” or “multipurpose“ Karakurt ”are fighting with us, then it’s absolutely impossible to sacrifice a hangar and each ship must carry a couple of helicopters. So it will be possible to give the KKE even a little anti-submarine helicopters “here and now”, and not on the shore. At a great distance from the coast, this can be important.

It should also be understood that all possible light corvettes except 2038X will have 76-mm guns, unsuitable for shooting along the coast, which means that this task will largely fall on frigates, which dictates only a 100-mm or larger gun on it , and increased barrel life and ammunition.

Theoretically, a brigade of surface ships (brnk), which we call “light” forces in the article, could have two divisions of four ships each, which in wartime would form the desired ship groups, for example two, and frigates would be given command fleet, from one to two per brnk. In exceptional cases, up to three.

However, we lack something in this scheme. None of the above types of ships has one important property, which is often necessary for strikes on enemy surface ships - speed.

The value of speed and how to attack surface ships?


In the article “Building a Fleet. Attacks of the weak, loss of the strong ”one of the universal rules was formulated - so that the weakest side in a naval war had a chance of victory over the strongest side, it should have superiority in speed.

Alas, with the above options for warships, this is not a dream. The same corvette 20380 in its perfect condition is much slower than the destroyer Arly Burke, and with increasing excitement, this difference grows.

Can this be neglected? In the case of light forces, partly yes. Almost all of the tasks listed above can well be solved at 25-26 nodes. This is for the forces fighting in the DMZ, where you can’t count on the rapid emergence of your aircraft from the coast, where it is easy to stumble on the totally superior enemy forces and find yourself in a situation of “breaking contact or dying,” speed superiority is simply critical. For light forces, which either operate in their BMZ, under the cover of “heavy” and aviation from the coast, or operate on foreign coasts, but then, when the “heavy” forces have already thoroughly undermined the enemy’s ability to resist and you just need to kill him, the speed is not so critical. It is needed and important, for example, with a quick change in the search region for submarines, but its drawback is not fatal, although harmful.

In addition to one task for which speed is critical. We are talking about one of the tasks from the list above - about hitting surface ships.

What is essential for attacking enemy surface ships? You need to get ahead of them in the transition to the designated area, you need to preempt them in a maneuver, at the exit to the line of launch of their missiles, and in retreat. Small ships cannot fight with the exchange of blows until the enemy is completely destroyed, they carry out attacks and retreat, then, if necessary, carry out attacks again. The battle with ships in the performance of light forces is "volley" in nature and consists of alternating attacks and waste. And in order to minimize the time during which the enemy himself can attack, and also to prevent him from breaking the contact and leaving the battle, speed superiority is needed. Or, at least, so that the enemy did not have one.

In the modern world, it is accepted that the main means of destruction of surface ships are combat aircraft and submarines. However, these forces have a drawback - they are not able to hold the water area behind them. Only surface ships can do this. Also, only surface ships can ensure the guaranteed inability to use enemy sea lanes. It is very difficult for submarines to stop the movement of warships at high speed (29-30 knots or more), and aviation in numbers sufficient to suppress any ship’s air defense cannot “hang in the air” forever. An example of the Great Patriotic War, when high-speed ships sailed to Sevastopol without air cover and in conditions of enemy domination in the air, is very indicative and it is still relevant.

And this means that in some cases the enemy will have to use his NK to act against our forces. But which ones? Destroyers of one and a half billion dollars per unit? Not. For such purposes, there are other ships.

For example, Japanese "patrol ships" of the Hayabusa type, with a displacement of 240 tons, they are armed with four Japanese anti-ship missiles Type 90 (analogous to Harpoon or our Uranus), 76 mm cannon, and two 12,7 mm machine guns . GEM - three turbines and three water cannons. Speed ​​- 46 knots.


"Patrol" (the Japanese do not call everything by their proper names, masking their creeping remilitarization) boat "Hayabusa".

And here is the Norwegian Skjold. Displacement 274 tons. Due to aerostatic air unloading of the hull, its speed at zero waves exceeds 60 knots. With three points - 45. Armament - eight barely visible anti-ship missiles NSM, which today are perhaps the best small-sized anti-ship missiles in the world. In any case, neither our Uranus nor the American Harpoon stood with them. And traditionally - 76 graph paper. At the same time, the Skjold is also inconspicuous - its missiles are removed in the hull, and the hull forms are specially made so that the ship was difficult to detect. Like the Hayabusa, turbines were used as engines for the Norwegian ship.


Norwegian Skjold.

That is, they do not save on power plants at such ships, they save on everything else. Because speed.

In fact, there are many examples - almost all of our neighbors have similar high-speed units in one form or another.

Recently, a high-speed warship, which not only formally exists and is in combat, but also something really can appear, appeared among the Americans. It is, oddly enough, about LCS - this sample drank public money, fortunately not our sample and not our money.


There was a useless freak, a useful and dangerous freak became. LCS type "Independence" armed with anti-ship missiles Koensberg Naval Strike Missile NSM. And also the UR “Hellfire” launcher to repel mass attacks of small boats and boats, a 57-mm automatic cannon capable of firing shells with programmable detonation, a combat helicopter with anti-ship missiles “Penguin” or UR “Hellfire”, and UAVs for reconnaissance. The stealth hull and the speed of a missile boat

Something, however, is changing - today in the US Navy there is a program for installing Koensberg NSM anti-ship missiles on these ships. And that all changes. A suitcase without a handle suddenly turns into a ship with guided missile weapons capable of supporting a course of 44 or 47 knots for a long time. Add to this the ability to carry a helicopter armed with anti-ship missiles and we have to admit that now the combat value of these ships is very far from zero. Of course, the air defense problem remains, but the Americans rarely go on the attack without ensuring air supremacy.

So, if some enemy climbs to our shore to fight surface ships, then they will have a common and key property - high speed. No one will ever send an expensive and slow missile destroyer to a meat grinder.

Similarly, start a blockade of some coast of Russia, and such high-speed units armed with massive and cheap missiles will fight with its fleet. And this is exactly what we need to prepare for.

Of course, a helicopter is an ideal tool against such ships. But, as already mentioned, aviation cannot always fly, and it cannot hold the water area, cannot continuously be in the designated area, or be based for weeks on a piece of rock with a floating berth and a fuel barrel. And sometimes that’s what will be needed.

What means does Russia have for such quick battles? Firstly, these are missile boats, and secondly, project 1239 RTOs. At the same time, RTOs are huge as corvette and expensive as a frigate, it also has expensive Mosquitoes, and there are only two of them, both in the Black Sea Fleet. By and large, they can be considered as a statistical error, they will not be built anymore.

But project 1241 missile boats are a completely different matter, if only because there are a lot of them.
Like western classmates, they have a speed of more than 40 knots and a 76-mm gun. Like foreign boats, they use afterburner gas turbine engines. At the same time, boats are larger than their classmates, heavier and more noticeable in the radar range. They are inferior in speed to their competitors, but not by much, not by critical value.


The upgraded Lightning with anti-ship missiles Uranus. Until the development of the next-generation missile boat, that’s fine. It’s only in line for the engines that the existing boats stand both for Karakurt and for the existing RTOs.


At the same time, there is the possibility of a substantial increase in the missile weapons of existing boats - their modernization with the installation of a missile weapon complex similar to project 12418 would allow these boats to carry up to 16 Uran missiles, which would make the boats the most armed boats in the world.

It is worth saying that, in principle, the boat should be different - even more speedy, inconspicuous, with a reduced crew and preferably cheaper. At the same time, you can put up with a reduction in the number of missiles on board for speed and stealth. But while there is no such boat, the Lightnings rearmed with Uranus are quite suitable for missile attack tasks.

Alas, few today demonstrate a full understanding of the role of a missile boat. Even among military professionals, boats are rated as a less important combat weapon than RTOs (meaning “normal” RTOs capable of catching and attacking a surface ship, rather than Buyan-M “missile barges” that cannot do anything like that). The motivations in this case are usually the following - MRCs are better armed, have more advanced electronic weapons and self-defense air defense systems, you can organize aviation control from it by placing KPUNIA / KPUNSHA there.

That is true, but for some reason no one undertakes to explain how to impose a battle on an enemy who has an advantage in speed of 10-13 knots (18,5-24 km / h)? How to re-maneuver it? And if the battle was not in our favor, then how to break the contact and leave?

And why is it so important to have powerful electronic weapons on the attacking “unit” if its task is simply to bring the missiles to the launch line, launch them and leave at the speed limit? All this can be done by external target designation from other ships or even aircraft. REV MRK risks being a thing in itself.

In fact, faith in RTOs stems from the belief that the enemy will be forced to expose their expensive large surface ships, which are inferior to RTOs in speed, under their blow. But an unbiased analysis of the situation tells us that if this happens, it is visible only in the Sea of ​​Japan and only during the conflict in which Japan is involved. In all other cases, the enemy is more likely to withdraw his URO ships, pushing forward light forces and submarines supported by aviation. YES and BNK are inferior in speed only in calm water, and in four points the RTOs may not catch up with a large destroyer.

In fact, the only real advantage of a “classic” missile defense system over a missile boat is the presence of self-defense air defense systems. But they won’t win the war, to defeat the enemy’s ships, the boat, subject to the issuance of a reliable command center for it, surpasses the RTOs in solving such a problem, if only because the RTOs will not be able to catch up with most of their goals. At least important.

Who will issue the control center for missile boats? For example, helicopters from corvettes (if corvettes capable of carrying them on board will be taken as the basis) or from frigates providing light air defense forces. Or basic aviation from the coast will give it. And the absence of air defense systems must be compensated by interference systems, speed and maneuverability, and stealth in the radar and infrared ranges.

To summarize the subtotal. "Light" surface forces should consist of:

- main ships - multi-purpose corvettes. It is they who must hunt submarines, carry out attacks of surface ships in simple conditions (the target cannot evade an attack due to speed or does not try to do this), attack the enemy coast with cruise missiles, guard convoys and landing troops. If a decision is made that these should be large corvettes (2038X or 1166X), then helicopters should be based on corvettes. If any other variant of the corvette is selected, except 2038X, then, therefore, the cannons on frigates should allow the fulfillment of the tasks of fire support for the landing. In general, this ship can be small - right up to the Karakurt with anti-submarine capabilities:

- missile boats for solving the tasks of anti-ship defense. Onts should be very fast, inconspicuous in the radar and thermal ranges, small and inexpensive, armed with 76-mm guns and anti-ship missiles and minimal self-defense weapons, without prejudice to the above qualities. These boats will have to cover the corvettes from attacks of small NK enemy, attack the enemy from ambush.

These ships are supported by frigate URO, which provide them with air defense. Moreover, in principle, frigates, like multipurpose ships, are capable of acting independently.

Also, surface forces interact with aviation, both base and ship. It is precisely such forces that will fight "off the coast" - it does not matter whether ours or the enemy.

And, of course, evaluating the appearance of “light forces”, one cannot but give a few examples of how to provide the KUGs and KPUGs of the Navy with the necessary number of helicopters.

Helicopters


As previously mentioned in the article “Air fighters over the ocean waves. On the role of helicopters in the war at sea ”, helicopters are capable of performing a wide range of tasks, including the defeat of air targets.

Moreover, their defeat by enemy fighters is very difficult. However, they need to be based somewhere.

If the base ships of the "light forces" will be corvettes with a hangar, the problem disappears. Assuming that the hypothetical air defense frigate we have has two hangars, we get that the KPUG has four corvettes, and one such frigate has 6 helicopters.

However, everything changes if we have a small corvette as the base ship, for example, analogue 056, or the “multipurpose Karakurt”. Then we have only two places on the KPUG where helicopters can be stored. And, if we assume that in a pair of "neighboring" KPAGs, AWACS helicopters from frigates interact not only with their frigate, but also with the "neighboring" one, then this is more or less acceptable. But anti-submarine helicopters have nowhere to be located.

Is this a problem? On its shore - no. At a distance of 100-150 kilometers from the coastline, it is even better to base helicopters on the ground - they do not depend on pitching. But as the area of ​​action of the KPUG moves away from its territory, the problem grows more and more. It can be solved without involving other ships only by capturing the land and equipping the runways there.

This, in principle, is possible, but in the case of an offensive war against some distant country, the situation temporarily becomes unsolvable.

This factor has long been well known, but many military personnel are not very worried, because for them the ship is, first of all, a means of PLO, moreover, in its BMZ and not very far from the coast, and not just PLO, performing tasks on PLO during the deployment deployment RPSL. And here they are right in some way, a small corvette will be cheaper than a large one, which means that more will be built with the same money, which will provide more search capabilities, and aviation, in the course of tasks to ensure the deployment of strategic nuclear forces, will fly from the coast, this is just not principle .

And the fact that later it may be necessary to fight in completely different places and completely different conditions, and you can also think later.

The question, however, remains.

But there are solutions.

The first thing that suggests itself is the use of integrated supply ships as a carrier for helicopters. Currently, there is not a single full-fledged such ship in the Navy, although there is positive experience with their use. The Navy previously had such a ship - "Berezina" project 1833.


KKS "Berezina" transfers cargo to the BOD (later TFR) of project 61.


Drawing.

Currently, small auxiliary vessels are being built for the auxiliary fleet, and the spacecraft are not designed and laid.

However, the need to conduct some operations away from the coast will inevitably force them to build, simply because without such ships it is impossible to organize a full-fledged fighting fleet. And here their large sizes can come to our aid.

KKS usually has a hangar and a runway. The reason is that, firstly, sometimes there is a need to make up for losses in helicopters. And, secondly, because sometimes you can transfer cargo only (or is it just more convenient) by helicopter.

The same "Berezina" had a hangar. But we are not interested in Berezina.


RFA "Fort Victoria".

Fort Victoria is a British ship of this class. Among other things, it has a hangar for three helicopters Augusta Westland AW101 - rather rather big cars. And the take-off and landing deck for two helicopters at the same time. That is, in this case, it’s not just about just carrying helicopters on board and sometimes flying one of them into the air, but about making regular group flights possible. And this is so, the British constantly use this ship both as a supply vehicle and as an aircraft carrier that “closes” the shortage of helicopters for naval groups operating in the sea.

Actually, this is the solution. A certain nonexistent and not designed now, but once needed in the future Russian ship of this class, in the same dimensions, will be able to provide the base for about four Ka-27 or Ka-31 helicopters. Thus, the problem of helicopter basing is partially resolved.

In general, there is a need to discuss a frigate carrying not two, but three helicopters. From 1977 to 2017, the Japanese Naval Self-Defense Forces were armed with Shirane-type destroyers. These, of course, are not frigates; their total displacement exceeded 7500 tons. But they also had a lot of weapons - two 127-mm gun mounts, a massive ASROC anti-submarine missile launcher. There was a developed superstructure. If we talk about our needs, when using hangars for our compact helicopters, one artillery installation and a shorter flight deck, three helicopters can be “fit” into a significantly smaller ship.


DDH-144 "Kurama" type "Shirane".

Theoretically, the very compact Ka-27s and their derivatives can be stored in very small hangars, as evidenced by the hangar on the same corvettes 20380. At the same time, even the width of the corvette 20380 (or 20385) is sufficient to accommodate a pair of hangars. Its width is less than what the American frigate of the Perry type is only 70 centimeters. Here's what the result of “measuring” the corvette 20385 in width looks like.


Please do not take for a really possible technical solution, it's just an estimate of the size - one.

And below is a section of a corvette in order to estimate the required dimensions of a hangar for one helicopter along the length of the ship. And silhouettes to scale.



You should not consider these pictures as some kind of call to make a corvette with two helicopters - this is nothing more than a demonstration of what dimensions are really needed on the ship for several helicopters (namely, the corvette will not work out like that, but this is not about that).

But at the same time, it is not difficult to verify that the ability to create a ship with a displacement of 3900-4000 tons, armed at the project level 20385 (100-mm gun, Package-NK, one PU 3S-14, a pair of ZAK AK-630M or one or two ZRAK), but with increased ammunition of the air defense system and powerful radar (the same "Poliment Redoubt") and three helicopters is not obviously unrealistic.

Although it will require designers to exert themselves.

One way or another, creating a new generation of “light forces”, it’s worth exploring the possibility of providing them with helicopters in the right quantity - naturally, in case the ship without a helicopter becomes the basic “small corvette”.

At the worst, there is the opportunity to go along the path of very poor countries and equip a former civilian ship in a warship, for example, the Malaysians did, creating their own ship base for fighting the Bunga Mas Lim pirates and its sistership on the basis of a small container ship. Such a solution has a lot of disadvantages, but they are blocked by one of its advantages - price. And in the extreme case, if there are no sane and quickly implemented options, you can go for it too, but with the understanding that the presence in the naval group conducting the hostilities is not essentially a combat ship that does not have, for example, design features aimed at increasing the combat survivability can have extremely negative consequences.


Bunga Mas Lima. It can be so, and it will even work, with all the disadvantages of such an approach. The price will be much less RTOs.

Nevertheless, such methods should not be dismissed on the spot, even the British resorted to them during the Falklands war, using mobilized transport vessels, and during operations in Lebanon altogether an impromptu helicopter carrier converted from the merchant ship under the ARAPAJO project was extremely unsuccessful, by the way. But blindly repeat after them and do not, the principle is important.

One way or another, this issue is being resolved - if resolved.

Conclusion


"Light forces" with the support of large ships and aircraft - an effective means of warfare at sea. They are able to provide anti-submarine defense, which is critical for us, and to solve a host of other tasks. An ideal option would be to build them around large corvettes as a universal unit and missile boats as an anti-ship unit. With corvettes 2038X in size, there will be fewer questions about seaworthiness and the use of these forces in the DMZ, for example, when protecting some convoys to Venezuela or somewhere else just as far away. Corvettes have a minimal gun for conducting more or less effective fire along the coast, and they themselves carry a helicopter. It is only necessary to simplify and cheapen them, while simultaneously strengthening the composition of weapons on board - and this is possible.

But in other cases - if it is mistaken for a basic corvette on hull 1166 with a 76-graph paper or with a ship similar to the Chinese project 056, or with something multipurpose in size and displacement of the Karakurt, the scheme will also work. Moreover, each option will have its own strengths and weaknesses. For example, a small multi-purpose version of Karakurt will allow you to configure one and a half times more ships than a certain version of 2038X. But it will be necessary to separately resolve the issue of fire support for the landing and helicopters.

The common points for any base ship will be, firstly, the need for air defense frigates, capable, together with aviation and the corvettes themselves, of repelling an air strike, and secondly, the need for very high-speed missile boats, with a minimum level of radar visibility and 76- mm gun plus to missiles. Before the creation of such ships, it is quite possible to get by with the existing project 12418 and modernize the existing missile boats of project 1241.

I would also like that the final formation of the appearance and the determination of the required number of “light forces” should be preceded by research, covering all aspects of the problem - operational-tactical, economic and the question of the possibility of attracting the right amount of personnel. And so that when developing modifications of corvettes for the forces of the new structure, the mass of their subsystems and body contours are subject to the most serious checks to ensure the required speed.

In practice, it’s true that there’s nothing like that, but there are only 12 corvettes already built and under construction that can at least somehow fight with submarines (not to say very well), useless patrol ships and the “eternal” long-term construction 20386, and a rather big brood of new RTOs, which sometime in 2027 will be in operation 30 units. The concept of “build anything” is obvious, and the results will also be “on the face”. But so it is with us.

Nevertheless, it is worth at least voicing the right ideas. It is possible that someday they will begin to be realized.
Author:
Photos used:
https://gorod-plus.tv, http://bastion-karpenko.ru, РИА Новости Крым. Андрей Киреев, e-news.su, www.naval-technology.com, http://factmil.com, Национальная оборона, Naval News, Malaysia military power
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  1. Vladimir_2U 14 February 2020 06: 15 New
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    It was useless, it became useful and dangerous. LCS type "Independence" armed with anti-ship missiles Koensberg Naval Strike Missile NSM.
    Well written! Ready to even forgive this myth
    Even the USSR with its power could not stand the arms race
    1. Grandfather 14 February 2020 07: 33 New
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      +1
      in the absence of sufficient ships of the first rank, we begin to come up with a new concept for the fleet ... like: everything is fine ... we just wanted to.
      1. lucul 14 February 2020 10: 51 New
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        for the lack of ships of the first rank in sufficient numbers, we begin to come up with a new concept for the fleet ... like

        I don’t quite understand why shove a helicopter into each corvette? This greatly increases the cost of the ship. One helicopter carrier / air defense completely solves the problems with helicopters, and because of its size it is possible to fill the air defense to the eyeballs - which will significantly increase the combat stability of the group ...
        1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 11: 46 New
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          This is a question of money. Helicopter-carrying ship is not cheap pleasure. It should be done separately purely for PLO helicopters - it is irrational. Here it is possible to use the landing ship in such quality - it is possible. But if he is busy with the landing?
          In general, the process of finding the optimal solution will not be easy.
          1. Dart2027 14 February 2020 12: 29 New
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            Quote: timokhin-aa
            Here it is possible to use the landing ship in such quality - it is possible. But if he is busy with the landing?

            On the one hand, yes. But on the other, what kind of assault can we talk about?
            To Turkey or Japan? Fiction, at least 20 years.
            To Ukraine or to the Baltic states? Perhaps, but in this case, the PLO is no longer particularly necessary.
            The notorious Mistral, about which they often wrote that they are useless in a big war, could well become an aircraft skimmer for the PLO system if the VK of "medium intensity" had begun.
            1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 12: 34 New
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              On the one hand, yes. But on the other, what kind of assault can we talk about?
              To Turkey or Japan? Fiction, at least 20 years.
              To Ukraine or to the Baltic states? Perhaps, but in this case, the PLO is no longer particularly necessary.


              We recall the landing of the Second World War
              1. Dart2027 14 February 2020 13: 07 New
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                Quote: timokhin-aa
                We recall the landing of the Second World War

                I know. Only then was there a world-wide massacre with the participation of all any serious countries, and I am talking about wars of a slightly different scale.
                Quote: Dart2027
                The notorious Mistrals, about which they often wrote that they say in a big war they are uselesscould well become Aviamatki for the PLO system, if only started VK "medium intensity".
            2. Lopatov 14 February 2020 14: 10 New
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              Quote: Dart2027
              But on the other, what kind of assault can we talk about?
              To Turkey or Japan? Fiction, at least 20 years.

              First of all, Moldova. Not starting a full-fledged war, not only with it, but also with Ukraine, otherwise it will not work to help Transnistria.
              The most likely scenario.
              Plus the Kuril Islands, where it may be necessary to strengthen the grouping of troops, plus Kaliningrad with similar tasks. Plus, in general, all similar cases of the need to transfer troops to an un-equipped coast in the face of possible opposition.
              1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 18: 58 New
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                First of all, Moldova. Not starting a full-fledged war, not only with it, but also with Ukraine, otherwise it will not work to help Transnistria.
                The most likely scenario.


                I also cite this scenario as an example all the time. The landing, the truth will be in Ukraine, though.
                1. Lopatov 14 February 2020 19: 39 New
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                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  I also cite this scenario as an example all the time. The landing, the truth will be in Ukraine, though.

                  Who cares ... This is not forcing all of Ukraine’s air defense to remain silent for the sake of creating a permanent safe air corridor.
                  Transnistria is generally an ode from our weakest points, and so far only Moldovans' reluctance to go to confrontation saves us.
                  1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 20: 16 New
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                    Yes, there Ukraine does not twitch. They understand that if we are driven into a corner, then we will step over the corpses of the beaters.
                    1. Lopatov 14 February 2020 20: 24 New
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                      Quote: timokhin-aa
                      Yes, there Ukraine does not twitch. They understand that if we are driven into a corner, then we will step over the corpses of the beaters.

                      Time.
                      With the active assistance of Romania and Ukraine, four Transnistrian armed forces brigades, together with two Russian MRBs, will lead to silence much faster than we manage to establish a safe air corridor through Ukraine.

                      I just repeat once again that the current Moldovan authorities do not want to freeze their ears in spite of Russia. Although they persuade, and actively persuade
              2. Dart2027 14 February 2020 19: 17 New
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                Quote: Spade
                First of all, Moldova. Not starting a full-fledged war, not only with it, but also with Ukraine, otherwise it will not work to help Transnistria.

                Quote: Dart2027
                To Ukraine or to the Baltic states? Perhaps, but in this case, the PLO is no longer particularly necessary.
                There is a difference between a full-fledged, let’s say, war and a war similar to the forced peace of Georgia in 2008. Actually after it, they decided to buy UDC.
                Quote: Spade
                Plus the Kuril Islands, where it may be necessary to strengthen the grouping of troops, plus Kaliningrad with similar tasks.

                There will already be a slightly different situation.
                1. Lopatov 14 February 2020 19: 36 New
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                  Quote: Dart2027
                  There is a difference between a full-fledged, let’s say, war and a war like the coercion of peace in Georgia in 2008.

                  There is absolutely no difference. Even in such a war, they pay blood for delay or for limited opportunities.


                  Quote: Dart2027
                  There will already be a slightly different situation.

                  Why?
                  The exact same thing.
                  In general, the marines, as far as I remember, are part of the Coastal Forces of the Navy. Together with BRAV. With all the consequences.
                  1. Dart2027 14 February 2020 19: 50 New
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                    Quote: Spade
                    Even in such a war, they pay blood for delay or for limited opportunities.

                    It's not about delay, but about the use of one weapon or another and tactics.
                    Quote: Spade
                    Why?

                    An adversary of a different level. We are about Japan and Germany.
                    1. Lopatov 14 February 2020 20: 14 New
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                      Quote: Dart2027
                      It's not about delay, but about the use of one weapon or another and tactics.

                      As for me, there is not much difference.
                      These are not counterinsurgency actions that, in principle, have a different specificity.

                      Quote: Dart2027
                      An adversary of a different level. We are about Japan and Germany.

                      But I’m not sure that we are as superior to NATO and Japan, as the USSR once surpassed Germany and Japan.
                      1. Dart2027 14 February 2020 20: 23 New
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                        Quote: Spade
                        These are not counterinsurgency actions that, in principle, have a different specificity.
                        It is one thing to fight an army armed with modern weapons of all types (the Air Force, the Kyrgyz Republic, electronic warfare, electronic warheads, submarines, anti-ship missiles, etc.) and it’s another to fight an enemy who, in principle, has no modern high-tech weapons and powerful aircraft. Hypothetical databases against Japan and against Ukraine are far from the same ... That's just a direct battle with Japan is much less likely.
                        Quote: Spade
                        that we are as superior to NATO and Japan as the USSR once surpassed Germany and Japan

                        The USSR was not superior to NATO, the forces were approximately equal and the balance fluctuated, then in one direction, then in the other.
                      2. Lopatov 14 February 2020 20: 28 New
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                        Quote: Dart2027
                        Hypothetical databases against Japan and against Ukraine are far from the same ...

                        I am afraid that in the Black Sea we will encounter not only Ukraine. But also with Romania. With the very unfriendly neutrality of NATO at best.
                        And this is a completely different scenario, not cap-hatting.

                        Quote: Dart2027
                        The USSR was not superior to NATO, the forces were approximately equal and the balance fluctuated, then in one direction, then in the other.

                        But we, NATO, are not at all superior. And this must be taken into account.
                      3. Dart2027 14 February 2020 23: 16 New
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                        Quote: Spade
                        I am afraid that in the Black Sea we will encounter not only Ukraine. But also with Romania.

                        Well, Romania is also not a superpower, so ...
                        Quote: Spade
                        But we, NATO, do not exceed

                        Even theoretically. So a full-fledged war is possible only with nuclear weapons.
        2. timokhin-aa 25 February 2020 11: 13 New
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          To Ukraine or to the Baltic states? Perhaps, but in this case, the PLO is no longer particularly necessary.


          PLO is not necessary, and anti-boat defense is completely needed and there is work for helicopters and for the small fleet, and again we need to look for the very balance. Although Ukraine will be easier, our coast is nearby.
          And some Libya is more complicated.


          In general, I repeat - UDC as a carrier for PLO helicopters is quite possible, but relying on it and only on it is wrong.
          1. Dart2027 25 February 2020 16: 35 New
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            Quote: timokhin-aa
            UDC as a carrier for PLO helicopters is quite possible, but it is wrong to rely on it and only on it

            So alone they do not send him anywhere. UDC, like an aircraft carrier, walks as part of the formation.
      2. Dante Alighieri 14 February 2020 16: 20 New
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        Alexander, there is a feeling that the number of ships capable of taking a turntable aboard is already significantly ahead of the number of Ka-27 and Ka-29, which are currently in the army. So is it worth it to spray at all with the obligatory presence of a corvette hangar, especially since it is already problematic to put a machine on board such a relatively small ship, and if this operation is complicated by weather conditions, it becomes a task for real professionals in their field. But again, the question is: do we have many? Maybe it’s better to follow the Sino-Soviet path: leave the takeoff, set aside a light folding hangar, like on 11661 or 956 and calm down on this? And let a full-fledged hangar be the property of larger ships: destroyers, frigates. What do you think?

        Speaking of frigates. After the 22350 is quite naturally converted into a destroyer (in fact, I always assumed that it was necessary to lay it as such from the very beginning), a whole vacant niche will appear, which, of course, will need to be filled with something. Like you, I tend to be critical of the fact that this is possible for extended 20386. However, in the welterweight, I am increasingly returning to the idea that 11356 looks against this background not the worst option (if you can solve the problems with the power plant of course). Judge for yourselves: a fairly good PLO, medium-range air defense in the person of Shtil, of course, is morally outdated, but still nothing to yourself, 8 ZS-14, of course, is not enough, but if you abandon RBU-6000 I think you can install another set of 8 cells (if memory does not change there according to the scheme only officer cabins under the superstructure). The general layout is certainly far from the stealth system, but in general it is not so that it is radically bad. And the main plus is the cost. The cost of the corvette 20385 with incomparably more powerful weapons and wider possibilities for its use. It’s not to say that the ship looks outdated: the Chinese project 054, of which the Chinese have already riveted more than 3 dozen, is generally similar and even uses the same weaponry. Hindus themselves buy these ships from us. So how do you think the project has a chance to occupy a deserted niche or the navy will not go to this scenario?
        1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 19: 02 New
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          On turntables - there is a problem, but it can be solved in a little longer than building one corvette.

          According to 11356 - do not enter this river twice, it is all of antiques. And 533mm torpedo tubes, and Calm with spotlights. And GEM, yes. It’s really easier to make a new project, with the right “sharpening" - all at a minimum plus air defense and a maximum of helicopters.
          1. bayard 16 February 2020 10: 02 New
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            Good article, Alexander, and a review of problems, and solutions. I think that for our Fleet, at least for the Pacific Fleet and Northern Fleet, only "heavy corvettes" of the 2038X type will be relevant - storms, cyclones and other weather, climate in a word. And if it weren’t for this, I would recommend not to start a stationary hangar on ships of this class, dispense with a movable hangar, and due to the freed up space to place a larger ammunition of missiles and missiles (in the place of the same hangar - UKKS, and before the cabin a large missile launcher), but ... climate is climate.
            But for the Black Sea Fleet and services, say in the Mediterranean (Tartus), lighter corners of the corvette would also be suitable ... However, given the need for maximum unification and uniformity, it is more reasonable to build just one type of corvettes.

            In terms of providing air defense in the near zone, the Container ZRLS can become a huge help, the second copy of which is being completed in the east of the country. Now you still have to get used to and learn to use these new features. The fact is that at a distance of at least 2000 km. from our borders all airborne and surface conditions will be illuminated, any aircraft at an enemy airfield, even from the moment of dispersal in a strip, can be taken for escort. Secretive deployment of enemy aircraft to strike becomes impossible, because it will not be secretive in principle. Therefore, to counteract enemy aircraft over adjacent water areas, the role (and effectiveness) of fighter fleet aviation is increasing. And they will have time for reaction. Thanks to timely detection of threats and notification of them.
            The disclosure of threats from the enemy’s surface forces is also greatly facilitated, because their surface ships are as clearly visible as their aircraft. It is possible that sometimes (depending on the capabilities of the GOS) the data from such a ZGRLS can serve as target designation for missile launchers of anti-ship missiles ... from the same RTOs and coastal systems. If the accuracy of these data is insufficient, then in any case the threat will be uncovered, and it will be possible to further investigate the targets with other instruments (aviation, UAVs, satellites, etc.). By the way, this will lead to the fact that in the air you do not have to constantly keep AWACS planes (even if they appear in the required quantity), but to raise them only to guide the database of your fighter aircraft and more detailed reconnaissance of previously identified targets.
            This is a new quality of information illumination and it remains to be recognized and learned to use it wisely.
            In conditions of such information awareness, missile boats and RTOs acquire completely new qualities, as well as all other ships and fleet aviation. In any case, the light forces of the fleet will always be able to count on air cover from any possible threats - they certainly will not become sudden.
            ... And if you place such ZGRLS in the south of Cuba fellow ... all of North America, all of the North Atlantic will be in full view. But she ("Container") can also detect the start of missiles on an ionized flare trail ... She dreams well ...

            The concept of a light frigate "Air Defense" is very good, I have long spoken for it on how I would say about a frigate PLO, however, one does not interfere with the other in the implementation on one ship.
            What kind of ship could it be? Of course, he needs a hangar for two helicopters (three are overkill, they simply cannot be used at the same time, or he will have to increase the helipad to make it possible to work \ launch \ land 2 helicopters at the same time, this is impossible on a light frigate), Poliment-Redut air defense missile system, UKKS not less than 16 KR, a good hull with a towed GAS ... You can design a new ship, say if there are new diesel engines for 10 l / s (000 l / s for its power plant would be enough), but you can just redesign 40 for a new - extended hangar, in e rest there, and so there. In this case (redesigning 000) you can save development time and a lot of money, and a power plant for it with such difficulty mastered (sort of) by the industry would find its application, otherwise it would just be insulting to limit itself to only six sets. A new frigate, of course, can turn out to be cheaper and of a smaller displacement, but TIME to develop a project, build a headache, cure childhood diseases, launch a series ... can create a new epic for us for long-term construction. So I am for continuing the series of the updated Gorshkov with two helicopters in the hangar. Of course, without prejudice to the construction of the 22350M series.

            And for the organization of anti-submarine round-up in the BMZ as carriers of helicopter submarines, it will be possible to use the BDK now under construction, designed specifically for basing 4 helicopters. ... in his spare time from other knowledge bases, of course.
            1. timokhin-aa 19 February 2020 11: 45 New
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              In terms of providing air defense in the near zone, the Container ZRLS can become a huge help, the second copy of which is being completed in the east of the country. Now you still have to get used to and learn to use these new features. The fact is that at a distance of at least 2000 km. from our borders all airborne and surface conditions will be illuminated, any aircraft at an enemy airfield, even from the moment of dispersal in a strip, can be taken for escort. Secretive deployment of enemy aircraft to strike becomes impossible, because it will not be secretive in principle. Therefore, to counteract enemy aircraft over adjacent water areas, the role (and effectiveness) of fighter fleet aviation is increasing. And they will have time for reaction. Thanks to timely detection of threats and notification of them.


              This is a peacetime system, it will be destroyed in the early days of the conflict.

              In this case (redesigning 22350) you can save development time and a lot of money, and a power plant for it with such difficulty mastered (sort of) by the industry would find its application, otherwise it would just be insulting to limit itself to only six sets. A new frigate, of course, can turn out to be cheaper and of a smaller displacement, but TIME to develop a project, build a headache, cure childhood diseases, launch a series ... can create a new epic for us for long-term construction. So I am for continuing the series of the updated Gorshkov with two helicopters in the hangar.


              Maybe, but the question of capacity arises there. This ship has a very tight layout. Although I have no fundamental objections.
        2. Cyril G ... 26 May 2020 20: 05 New
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          set off, set aside a light folding hangar, like on 11661 or 956 and calm down on that? And let a full-fledged hangar be the property of larger ships: destroyers, frigates.


          Quite an adequate option, at the same time we save space and displacement ...
      3. SVD68 15 February 2020 05: 41 New
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        Quote: timokhin-aa
        This is a question of money. Helicopter-carrying ship is not cheap pleasure. It should be done separately purely for PLO helicopters - it is irrational. Here it is possible to use the landing ship in such quality - it is possible.

        The docking chamber and tank deck will be shoved into the landing helicopter carrier and here the question of money, of course, will arise. We need just a helicopter carrier without additional empty loads.
      4. Connor MacLeod 25 February 2020 03: 50 New
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        Quote: timokhin-aa
        In general, the process of finding the optimal solution will not be easy.

        UDC not needed. Need separately BDK with a tactical battalion group and 2-3 helicopters (advanced project 11711) and helicopter carrier (for 10 - 000 tons) with 15-000 helicopters and perhaps company of special forces. In the strike version, the helicopter carrier will use the Ka-52 air link, and in the anti-submarine Ka-27 air link.
    2. Cympak 14 February 2020 12: 58 New
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      At the beginning, I would ask myself: do we have so many PLO helicopters? It was written here that helicopters fly to ships of the first rank only during state tests and ostentatious maneuvers.
      1. Winnie76 14 February 2020 13: 20 New
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        Quote: Cympak
        At the beginning, I would ask myself: do we have so many PLO helicopters?

        And AWACS helicopters are even more exotic. Vika writes the Ka-31 in service with as many as two units.
        1. EvilLion April 28 2020 11: 05 New
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          Ka-31 at least in production, but how about the stock of Ka-27 and Ka-29 issue. Although the Ka-32 has not disappeared. In general, the construction of hundreds of helicopters is a purely quantitative task, but to make a special out of a helicopter. a car, like, Ka-27, this is R&D.
      2. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 14: 21 New
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        No, but we don’t have much else either.
        Work is simple.
  2. BREAKTHROUGH READY 14 February 2020 11: 42 New
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    Pervorangi is a punching tool in international trade.
    What goods and where should Russia push?
  3. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 12: 02 New
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    Light forces, if properly organized, do not replace heavy ones. They have different tasks. It’s like tanks and infantry.
  • Dart2027 14 February 2020 07: 03 New
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    option 1
    In my opinion, it is better to adapt Uranus missiles to the Caliber launcher than to install a separate complex.
    1. rudolff 14 February 2020 08: 45 New
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      Yes, the eye also hurt. Two missile systems on the corvette, this is already too much.
      1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 11: 03 New
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        Why? 4 PLUR + 4 SLCMs for a strike along the coast + 8 Uraniums and this is multiplied by 4 ships in the KMG or KPUG. Imagine how flexible the tool comes out.
        1. Dart2027 14 February 2020 11: 43 New
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          Quote: timokhin-aa
          4 PLUR + 4 SLCMs for a strike along the coast + 8 Uranus

          It is better to have one launcher and make rockets under it, than to step on the rake of the Soviet Navy again. If so it is necessary to increase the ammunition load, it is better to put 16 launchers of Caliber and charge PKR-RLUR-KRMB in any ratio.
        2. rudolff 14 February 2020 12: 06 New
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          There are nuances. There are separate launchers to be placed under Uranus, then another ship-based automated control system on the ship will have to be integrated. I do not know if the caliber firing complex can work with Uranus.
          By the way, X-31 and turntable can carry.
          If we are talking about the OVR corvette, does it need 3M14 in launchers? Moreover, these RTOs like fleas will soon be. Maybe enough PLUR with RCC in the launcher?
          1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 12: 15 New
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            Well, maybe so, but I think Sigma will take everything out. On it, the RLC from 20385 and Uranus were spliced ​​on the last 20380, a variant of the same BIOS is located in Karakurt.

            If we are talking about the OVR corvette, does it need 3M14 in launchers? Moreover, these RTOs like fleas will soon be. Maybe enough PLUR with RCC in the launcher?


            So the launcher is universal, and any default option is suitable for 3M14. What is needed is what will load it.
            1. Cympak 14 February 2020 13: 27 New
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              I agree, but I see no reason to occupy the cells of the UKKS SLCM on BMO corvettes. As Timokhin wrote: it makes no sense to put more than 8 UKKS on the corvette (taking into account the dimension, displacement, power plant and the required speed). Then the optimal composition of weapons in the UKKS: 4 anti-ship missiles + 4 anti-ship missiles in a universal version.
              1. Dart2027 14 February 2020 14: 03 New
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                Quote: Cympak
                but I see no reason to occupy the cells of the UKKS SLCM on BMO corvettes

                Depends on the situation. The base of partners is not so far from us.
        3. Cympak 14 February 2020 12: 54 New
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          I would have abandoned the idea of ​​installing SLCMs on corvettes in principle, leaving only PLUR and RCC. Corvette combat stability is small, autonomy is small. Chasing him to the "enemy shores" is a dubious pleasure. If we recall the story of the SLCM launches of SLCMs from the Caspian Sea through Syria, it happened only because we agreed with Iran and Iraq on the possibility of cruise missiles flying over their territory. There are few countries today that will allow us to repeat "such pranks." Look at the map, where you can shoot SLCMs from your shore from a corvette? And if you shoot from your own shore, then you can get by with cheap land-based missile launchers of the Kyrgyz Republic based on Iskander-M.
          1. Dart2027 14 February 2020 13: 09 New
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            Quote: Cympak
            I would have abandoned the idea of ​​installing SLCMs on corvettes in principle, leaving only PLUR and RCC.

            Universal PU is good because you don’t have to give up anything and add anything - what you need is what we set it up for.
          2. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 14: 01 New
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            There are few countries today that will allow us to repeat "such pranks." Look at the map, where you can shoot SLCMs from your shore from a corvette?


            In Japan, in Alaska, in Poland, Denmark, Turkey. For example.
    2. Cympak 14 February 2020 13: 06 New
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      Why, when 3 types of anti-ship missiles climb into the UKKS: with a supersonic stage 3M-54, a subsonic 3M-54E1, 3M55 Yakhont and, in the long term, Zircon.
      Uranus has the main advantage - compactness and relative cheapness of PU. Can be mounted on deck. And for UKKS you need to have 9,58 meters under the deck.
      1. Dart2027 14 February 2020 14: 05 New
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        Quote: Cympak
        Can be mounted on deck. And for UKKS you need to have 9,58 meters under the deck.

        UKKS can also be mounted on the deck. But various PUs cause a problem during further operation and modernization.
  • Lamata 14 February 2020 07: 44 New
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    Interestingly written, thanks to the author.
  • Mavrikiy 14 February 2020 07: 47 New
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    universal ships are ships that poorly solve very many problems, but good - only a few,
    Very controversial. Rather: universal ships are ships that solve all problems worse than special ones.
    1. rudolff 14 February 2020 08: 54 New
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      Well, there is a “special” RTO Buyan or Karakurt. PU for 8 missiles RK Caliber. On the "universal" 80/85th corvettes the same launcher for 8 missiles. Well, now tell me why RTOs are better than a corvette in terms of launching a missile strike? According to the mind and PLO of the corvette, one can organize exactly as well as the IPC.
      1. Mavrikiy 14 February 2020 16: 07 New
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        Quote: rudolff
        Well, there is a “special” RTO Buyan or Karakurt.

        I wonder when they became like that.
        Small missile ships (RTOs) of project 21631 code "Buyan-M" - Russian multi-purpose missile and artillery ships of small displacement, near sea zone.
        1. rudolff 14 February 2020 16: 21 New
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          Since birth. For the simple reason that he can’t do anything else than launch his 8 missiles. Neither provide PLO nor air defense.
          1. Mavrikiy 14 February 2020 16: 23 New
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            Quote: rudolff
            Since birth. For the simple reason that he can’t do anything else than launch his 8 missiles. Neither provide PLO nor air defense.

            Read the wiki carefully.
            The official purpose of the ships of this project is the protection and protection of the economic zone of the state
            1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 19: 09 New
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              But nothing that the law is the task of the FSB? Gon is all.
              There was a kick from Putin in 2006 for the fact that we have cruise missiles on export ships and ours are not. Then, as a result, the General Staff directive to ensure the use of SLCM "from specialized missile ships." Then - the genius of Vysotsky and Serdyukov.
              We checked whether the Russian KR would fly by the example of "Dagestan", then they came up with to attach launchers to small art. ship, and when under Serdyukov and Vysotsky the engine from the "Star" did not start, they came up with stuffing MTU there.

              This miracle literally "grew itself." When there is no doctrine of the construction of the Navy, it is always so.
          2. common man 15 February 2020 10: 45 New
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            Quote: rudolff
            For the simple reason that he can’t do anything else than launch his 8 missiles. Neither provide PLO nor air defense.

            Karakurts can act as PLO arsenal ships. Without your own HACK, you can shoot PLURs at the tip of normal IPCs. As I understand it, the PLUR missile flies to predetermined coordinates, like the SLCM.
            1. rudolff 15 February 2020 12: 21 New
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              Buyan M cannot shoot PLUR, he has a castrated firing complex. Karakurt ... I don’t know. There are doubts. But why all this? Unload two ships to the area to perform one task? Isn’t it easier, who discovered, destroys it? The same IPC, but rather a full corvette. The problem is that the command, sending the ship to protect the water area during the threatened period, may not know what threat this ship may face. Maybe an enemy ship, maybe a submarine, maybe an aircraft or a missile ship. How to equip launchers of RTOs and whom to give him in pair? There is one more point. After this firework from the Caspian, the General Staff began to consider the RK Caliber and specifically 3M14, as a kind of strategic weapon. I am afraid that during the threatened period, these RTOs will generally become inaccessible to the fleet command, either the military district or Moscow will decide on their application.
  • K-50 14 February 2020 08: 48 New
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    and the weather may not allow helicopters to fly.

    If the weather interferes with helicopters, it will also prevent the use of weapons from lighter carrier platforms. There seems to be a limit of up to 5 points?
    What's in the red? In the air defense minus. And that is the problem.

    Since a small ship cannot have a lot of missile defense, there is only hope for electronic warfare systems, there is no alternative. sad
    "missile barges" "Buyan-M"

    It is necessary to remember in what conditions they were created.
    We urgently needed a platform for installing the Caliber, because in this type of weapon we had nothing, from the word at all, namely the possibility of cruise missile attacks on coastal targets at a considerable distance. Therefore, they "concocted" such an option for a quick hand. Now the question is no longer so acute, and therefore the "buoys" are no longer needed.
    1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 11: 38 New
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      We urgently needed a platform for installing the Caliber, because in this type of weapon we had nothing, from the word at all, namely the possibility of cruise missile attacks on coastal targets at a considerable distance. Therefore, they "concocted" such an option for a quick hand.


      Inclined launchers for the old MRK + UVP in the case of “Inquisitive” instead of the launcher of the PLRK + modernization of 877 submarines - that’s all, they scored a volley.
      No buoys were really needed.
  • rudolff 14 February 2020 09: 02 New
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    "The concept of" building whatever is "evident, and the results will also be" on the face. "But that’s the way it is with us." The cornerstone of the whole article. We are able to solve many problems of the fleet even with current financing and with the current capabilities of the industry, we are able to build fully sane ships, but ... we do not solve and we do not build. Know why ..?
    1. Sergey S. 14 February 2020 17: 09 New
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      Quote: rudolff
      Know why ..?

      A lot of bosses.
      The bosses of ambition are ahead of qualification.
      Hence the number of projects is almost equal to the number of ships built.
      1. bayard 16 February 2020 11: 25 New
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        Quote: Sergey S.
        The bosses of ambition are ahead of qualification.

        Well said . However, sabotage for reasons should not be rejected, as well as deliberate wrecking, otherwise it cannot be explained by selfish interests alone.
        1. Sergey S. 16 February 2020 21: 43 New
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          Quote: bayard
          However, sabotage for reasons should not be rejected, as well as deliberate wrecking, otherwise it cannot be explained by selfish interests alone.

          This, of course, can be, but massively ... Then everything is completely bad.
          1. bayard 16 February 2020 21: 46 New
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            There are specific characters there, and the author of the article knows them.
            But times are changing.
  • tlauicol 14 February 2020 09: 38 New
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    As long as we don’t have a normal light air defense missile in a Barak or Essm type air-defense system, all these projects of the MRK with Shells and Duets will remain crap
    1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 11: 39 New
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      Why? The patient is not perfect and SHP takes up a lot of space, but the system is quite working.
      1. tlauicol 14 February 2020 11: 48 New
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        and it occupies a place, and takes away the VI, and compensates for the stability, and radio visibility, and not all-angle, and shelling sequentially - but if you dig and compare ...
        1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 11: 54 New
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          This is understandable, but our engineers are masters of cramming the invisible. In Karakurt, in 800 tons there is a Shell, a 76-mm cannon, and a Russian Mk41, all of which also runs faster than 30 knots + hotel living conditions - sailors live in six-berth cabins, midshipmen in four-seater ones. Plus an empty aft deck.
    2. Cympak 14 February 2020 13: 11 New
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      There is a missile - the Redut complex with 9M96. The only problem is that there is no cheap "working" RLC for this missile. They offered to take one canvas of the antenna from "Poliment" and put it on a rotating platform. Yes, shelling will be only sectorial, but for a corvette - this is enough.
      1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 14: 02 New
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        Doesn’t it go positive?
        A canvas from Polement is also an option.
  • Krasnoyarsk 14 February 2020 10: 20 New
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    = Even the USSR with its power could not stand the arms race at one time, =
    Everyone knows that A. Timokhin that this is stupidity.
    1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 11: 05 New
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      Oh yes, it’s the United States, but not the USSR. I just forgot.
      1. Krasnoyarsk 14 February 2020 13: 42 New
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        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Oh yes, it’s the United States, but not the USSR. I just forgot.

        You really figure it out, we are talking about the causes or the effect?
        1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 14: 03 New
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          Problems in the economy were one of the reasons, and most important.
          1. strannik1985 14 February 2020 14: 08 New
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            Problems

            Not related to a violent change of government. Otherwise, the DPRK and Cuba would have long changed regimes.
            1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 14: 19 New
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              In the USSR, the loss of power by authority and trust among the masses was a consequence of, among other things, failures in the economy.
              1. strannik1985 14 February 2020 14: 37 New
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                IN USSR

                After 5 years, already in the Russian Federation, against the background of failures in the economy and politics, the population re-chooses EBN. There is no direct connection.
                1. God save the king 14 February 2020 18: 04 New
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                  Let's be honest, against the background of the bald communists of those years, EBN was not so bad.
                  North Korea and Cuba are tiny countries where one person can control everything, in the USSR the sizes are completely different, both the population and the level of education of the people. It’s one thing to twist the rope from peasants on rice or sugar plantations, and it’s quite another to organize terror against highly skilled specialists.
                  1. strannik1985 14 February 2020 18: 34 New
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                    Let's be honest

                    C'mon, 5 million unemployed, wars in Transnistria, Chechnya, Tajikistan, rampant banditry and all for some 5 years. Those communists themselves leaked. This is not a Union, in a democratic Russian Federation, the jokes are bad.
                    DPRK and Cuba

                    Those. Are you saying coups are not possible in small countries? Seriously?
                    1. God save the king 14 February 2020 19: 32 New
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                      C'mon, 5 million unemployed, wars in Transnistria, Chechnya, Tajikistan, rampant banditry and all for some 5 years.
                      a hangover after 70 years of hard drinking could not be painless, but people’s head cleared up ... sorry, not everyone.
                      This is not a Union, in a democratic Russian Federation, the jokes are bad.
                      In Russia, the leader has enough reason not to repress initiative and capable. There is no need to fight if you can lead.
                      Those. Are you saying coups are not possible in small countries?
                      Anything is possible, but power in a small Kula country is easier to maintain than in a huge multinational empire.
                      1. strannik1985 15 February 2020 04: 21 New
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                        hangover

                        I mean, is this normal for you? good
                        In Russia

                        Namely, the actions of the authorities are important, and not the standard of living, the presence of civil liberties and other factors.
                        Anything is possible

                        Not at all, a small country is much more vulnerable, you can threaten, organize a coup from abroad and much more.
                      2. God save the king 15 February 2020 14: 44 New
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                        I mean, is this normal for you?
                        I mean, I know this.
                        Namely, the actions of the authorities are important, and not the standard of living, the presence of civil liberties and other factors.
                        “living standards, civil liberties and other factors” - including the actions of the authorities. Yes, besides them there are also repressive and punitive methods and propaganda, but man has such a nature that people will always strive for welfare.
                        Was it possible to save the Union? Probably possible, only there was no one to do it in the conditions of the permanent oppression of freedom of thought. (If you think it was necessary to arrange another mass terror? - this is an occasion to visit a psychologist).
                        The concentration camp country was not nice even for the guards themselves, and therefore was destroyed. What personally I am happy with all my heart, and how much I communicate with people, most Russians support this point of view. Normal people do not want to go to jail without guilt over their souls.
                        a small country is much more vulnerable - you can threaten, organize a coup from abroad
                        that is, only from abroad and only if the prison state does not export international competition from more prosperous countries. What I wrote to you about below.
                      3. strannik1985 15 February 2020 16: 12 New
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                        Yes, besides them

                        No state in the world provides for a violent change of power, to prevent which there is a repressive apparatus.
                        Concentration camp country

                        Namely, people from the repressive apparatus betrayed their country, and not at all for the sake of freedom of spirit, but in order to get personal property of what previously belonged to the state.
                        For millions of citizens of the USSR, this turned into a tragedy.
                        that's it

                        Not necessarily, any regime, any country, there are no exceptions. A coup is possible in any country in the world. Just small countries are more vulnerable in this regard.
                      4. God save the king 15 February 2020 17: 14 New
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                        No state in the world provides for a violent change of power
                        Firstly, this is not the case https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Return Right
                        Secondly, in the previous comments I did not write about that. The repressive apparatus strangles the economy very much, and if for a short period the mobilization of resources gives a tangible increase in the power of both the ruler and the country, then strategically such a political system will ALWAYS lose.
                        not for the sake of freedom of the spirit, but in order to get personal property of what previously belonged to the state.
                        it is clear that the shepherds of the herd are not aware of either sentimentality or ideological fanaticism. But the Central Committee of the party were the state that actually owned them. The problem was created by the fact that they could not use this property properly, and while the neighboring shepherd (China) quietly learned to sell sheep and live happily ever after.
                        For millions of citizens of the USSR, this turned into a tragedy.
                        The world is harsh, but life at the expense of others could not go on indefinitely.
                        A coup is possible in any country in the world.
                        miracles do not happen, a strong state that uses maximum resources for real development is simply impossible to shake.
                      5. strannik1985 16 February 2020 16: 37 New
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                        First

                        Can you tell me, the people of which country used this right in recent history?
                        Repressive

                        Are you talking about industrialization ??? And what does repression have to do with it? request
                        it is clear that the shepherds

                        Everything would be fine, but with the new shepherds, the economy and finances are market-oriented, closely tied to the volume of the domestic market (we do not have a reserve currency and we cannot stimulate the economy by non-market methods), but it is small, everything fell right away.
                        The world is harsh

                        For whose? Almost 30 years have passed since the coup, while the unemployed, for example, 3,4 million. The “medicine” turned out to be more harmful than the disease. I do not understand your enthusiasm, yes, you can write something in the newspaper or on the Internet, but people have the same attitude to the real government of the country as under the USSR.
        2. Lopatov 14 February 2020 20: 33 New
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          Quote: strannik1985
          population re-chooses EBN

          8)))))
          The population did not choose him.
          1. ADEPT 14 February 2020 20: 41 New
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            Quote: Spade
            Quote: strannik1985
            population re-chooses EBN

            8)))))
            The population did not choose him.

            He was chosen by the neoliberals and the State Department .. And by shooting from tanks, the Russian Armed Forces, he showed it to all of Russia
            Well then, blood poured all over Russia and its enclaves .. hi
            1. Lopatov 14 February 2020 21: 03 New
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              Quote: ADEPT
              He was chosen by the neoliberals and the State Department

              No, he was stupidly credited with voices.
              I personally heard of at least two polling stations in different regions in which commissions were replaced by "Varangians" before the second round

              Well, blood poured much earlier, even with darling-Gorbachev.
          2. strannik1985 15 February 2020 16: 16 New
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            The population did not choose him.

            It doesn’t matter, the narot sat and clapped his ears while transferring power from the right pocket to the left.
      2. Sergey S. 14 February 2020 18: 04 New
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        Quote: timokhin-aa
        In the USSR, the loss of power by authority and trust among the masses was a consequence of, among other things, failures in the economy.

        This does not refute or prove.
        The main question is what lies ahead: an egg or a chicken?

        The construction of the Great Industry ensured authority in the 1930s, and no hard labor conditions for most people led to failure ...

        Living conditions in the USSR in the 1980s were an order of magnitude better, and. whatever they say, they are constantly improving. Moreover, if combined with a change in living conditions, the growth of well-being was real. That is, looking back, 40-year-olds actually saw that 10 years ago it was harder, and 20 years ago even harder ...

        I saw it on my own and on my relatives ... so the failures in the economy are a legend of liberals. In their heads, only this fits.

        In reality, how power has lost credibility, it’s for the fighters of the ideological front ... - by the very one who repainted and suddenly fell in love with French rolls.
  • Krasnoyarsk 14 February 2020 15: 04 New
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    Quote: timokhin-aa
    Problems in the economy were one of the reasons, and most important.

    Problems in the economy were deliberately initiated by the authorities themselves. To undermine the authority of Soviet power. To make it easier to overthrow her. Example, 79, I was discharged, married, began to live separately from my parents. I needed household appliances. There is no problem, the store has a choice: TVs, refrigerators, washing machines, etc., etc., etc., 86 years old. I returned from the Chernobyl accident and went to another area of ​​the city, because there were only beneficiaries , queued up for the purchase of ... a vacuum cleaner !!! In the stores there was nothing of household appliances. Where did it go? Are the plants stopped? Not! Natural disasters? Not! What then? In 85 the enemy came to power - the humpback !!!
    And you say - an arms race.
  • Cyrus 15 February 2020 14: 27 New
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    in this case you are wrong.
  • Andrey.AN 14 February 2020 14: 10 New
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    The USSR didn’t collapse from an arms race, but rather from the high cost of the ruble caused by the cheapness of gasoline. From show off.
  • AAK
    AAK 14 February 2020 11: 05 New
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    One of, alas, a few recently sensible articles on VO, without lulling and all-encompassing ...
    For the Black Sea Fleet and Baltic Fleet, compact “Zelenodolsky” options are probably better, there is a small water area and a developed network of coastal airfields. Well, for the north and Kamchatka, the optimal yield is possible - this is slightly increased in terms of displacement, somewhere up to 2000 tons (to improve seaworthiness), option 2038X
  • BREAKTHROUGH READY 14 February 2020 11: 36 New
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    By far the best analytics in your performance, and this time I write without any irony.
    It’s not for nothing that for so many years commentators have hammered on the “role of the fleet” and its rational, balanced development. With the store of knowledge, understanding has come.
    I still have questions about the armament of such a ship, the sufficiency of an air defense system, but in general I put “approvals” on the whole article.
  • Warrior MorePhoto 14 February 2020 12: 21 New
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    To the author of Bravo!
    Logically thought for all the MO.

    1. I would like to hear your opinion gentlemen on the war trinity of Rusich.

    2. And my thought is Trimaran-type Combat Boats with a speed of 40-45 knots, length 25-27 meters with armament in front of the combat module 12,7 (as on the Boomerang armored personnel carrier), 57 mm above the captain’s combat module, and behind
    - 1 option Air Defense Pine
    - 2 option shock Hermes
    - 3 option PLO (RBU type)
    - 4 version of EW and RER
    - 5 option landing
    About the boat, if anyone remembers the armored tank of Indonesia, something like that.

    Why do I think so?
    The cost is small, the crew is 6-8 people, the combat modules are ready (yes, refinement will be needed under the sea, but this will be a refinement and not from scratch), excellent protection and patrolling the coast in peacetime, protection from pirates if it’s urgent where it’s worth it (delivery option in generally not critical for a container ship), in wartime, in theory, and to the Turks you can come from your own coast, not to mention other neighbors in the Black Sea, the Baltic, etc.
    And also, a large number of enterprises can build, and accordingly, at a low cost, each fleet can build 6 boats of each type (in a short time if there is a need, and if it is wake up in wartime, then this is generally a "treasure"), totaling 30 boats for each fleet, taking into account their armament, they can both help, and generally make the "weather". A sort of marine special forces.
    I would like to hear opinions)

    PS
    And for each boat at the back, the omitted GAS and the ability to use the minimum number of mines, I don’t know if each one is done, then in my opinion it will be ideal!
    1. Cympak 14 February 2020 13: 21 New
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      Your proposal for boats is very reminiscent of this "craft":

      We already have Bohr ships - this is the FSB border service.
    2. Cympak 14 February 2020 13: 37 New
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      And I really would like to understand the project of the Rusich SAR Zelenodolsky Design Bureau.


      He, it seems, won the contest for the OVR corvette. After that, the whole topic of the OVR was quickly covered up. And after that, Zelenodolsk residents did not shine with SAR corvettes.
  • Andrey.AN 14 February 2020 14: 59 New
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    EW tools are also not superfluous, to control the water area and to protect.
    1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 19: 10 New
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      They are on every ship.
      1. Andrey.AN 14 February 2020 19: 21 New
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        there are radio engineering, there are no optoelectronic.
        1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 20: 14 New
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          Shooting traps are multispectral. Plus, you can stick lasers and soon I will do it, I think.
          1. Andrey.AN 14 February 2020 20: 23 New
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            Lasers wouldn’t hurt, times like this - optics have developed, radio interference doesn’t touch it, drones dazzle and missiles are now more and more with optical homing, a laser can even spoil a satellite’s picture, a ship is an expensive unit to neglect protection.
  • Narak-zempo 14 February 2020 15: 15 New
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    The problem of vulnerability to air strikes for groups of small ships can be solved by building special lead ships with powerful air defense systems, including capable of giving target designation to other ships of the group when reflecting a raid?
    1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 19: 11 New
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      Well, this is roughly what the frigates mentioned in the article are, but I would not do highly specialized ships, because they can face different tasks.
      1. Narak-zempo 14 February 2020 19: 27 New
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        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Well, this is roughly what the frigates mentioned in the article are, but I would not do highly specialized ships, because they can face different tasks.

        Well, for example, to leave anti-submarine capabilities at the level of a small ship, and to use the increase in displacement for air defense and anti-ship missiles. That is, on his own he will be able to perform the same diverse tasks, but the main function is a qualitative increase in the combat stability of the compound.
        1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 20: 14 New
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          The article says so - all the capabilities at the corvette level, plus powerful air defense and helicopters.
          1. Narak-zempo 14 February 2020 20: 25 New
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            I read in fits and starts, I missed it.
          2. Lopatov 14 February 2020 20: 35 New
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            Quote: timokhin-aa
            helicopters.

            Why not a UAV?
            They are much more promising.
            1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 20: 39 New
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              1.REW.
              2. Cyberwarfare
              3. You may need an attack helicopter, not an AWACS or PLO.
              4. You may need a landing helicopter.
              1. Lopatov 14 February 2020 21: 01 New
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                Quote: timokhin-aa
                1.REW.
                2. Cyberwarfare

                Solvable. And at sea it is much easier to solve.


                Quote: timokhin-aa
                3. You may need an attack helicopter, not an AWACS or PLO.
                4. You may need a landing helicopter.

                As far as I understand, these are four different helicopters. Limited use of vehicles as transport and combat.

                By AWACS. In the future, a system based on “swarm technologies” will be able to overtake the AWACS very far. And in all respects.
                Well, in general, for reconnaissance, here the UAV is definitely more promising.

                Including, by the way, the base "aviation" like the American "Triton" MQ-4C with a duration of flight without refueling (which is also possible in the future) at 24 hours and a flight range of 15 thousand km

                Including “tethered” UAVs, capable of giving a good opportunity to “look beyond the horizon”, including optics, and not just radar

                The rest is more difficult, but they are quite capable of complementing helicopters. Moreover, UAVs can be placed where helicopters cannot be in principle
                1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 21: 09 New
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                  The trick is that if the infrastructure on the ship now allows you to place a helicopter, then tomorrow it will also allow you to place a UAV. While we do not have all this.
                  And I would not be so optimistic about resistance to electronic warfare and hackers.

                  In addition, other helicopters, attack, transport, etc. are sometimes needed.
                  1. Lopatov 14 February 2020 22: 05 New
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                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    The trick is that if the infrastructure on the ship now allows you to place a helicopter, then tomorrow it will also allow you to place a UAV.

                    But at the same time, UAVs can be placed where not only the basing of a helicopter is impossible, but also a short stay.

                    For example, in submarines 8)))

                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    And I would not be so optimistic about resistance to electronic warfare and hackers.

                    Resistance is much higher than that of helicopters. After all, UAV repeaters are quite capable of providing reliable communication.
                    Well, the “hackers" are, I’m sorry, not serious. There are much more adequate methods of fighting UAVs than trying to “crack” them. Easier and much quicker to bring down.

                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    In addition, other helicopters, attack, transport, etc. are sometimes needed.

                    Why are they "easy forces"?
                    1. timokhin-aa 14 February 2020 22: 27 New
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                      Resistance is much higher than that of helicopters. After all, UAV repeaters are quite capable of providing reliable communication.


                      The adversary can put ALL ranges, plus, when using nuclear weapons, they "fall" mainly. And the person is still alive, will carry out the task.

                      Well, the “hackers" are, I’m sorry, not serious.


                      That's just the Americans the whole headquarters of the 10th fleet is doing this ...
                      You do not understand the purpose of this activity. Imagine that they hacked into your operating system and broadcast false data stream from your own AWACS (unmanned) helicopter into BIUS, and you see that the airspace is empty, but in reality a missile salvo is already coming at you. Here is what cyber warfare is. And that’s exactly what they’re going to.

                      Why are they "easy forces"?


                      see battles for oil platforms and islands in the Persian Gulf in 1991.
                      1. Lopatov 14 February 2020 22: 57 New
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                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        The adversary can put ALL ranges

                        Try to put it down. What's at sea, firstly, is difficult and secondly, it greatly unmasks.
                        But even so, satellites and UAV transponders will solve this problem. For to "put" the connection in direct line of sight and using a directional antenna is a non-trivial task.

                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        That's just the Americans the whole headquarters of the 10th fleet is doing this ...

                        Let them saw, sorry for something.
                        In fact, “hacking” consists in the banal use of deliberate vulnerabilities left by developers (which is possible only for civilian systems) and spoofing the coordinates of global positioning, which again does not really hinder military UAVs. Is it really really cheap and small.

                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        Imagine that they hacked you into an operating system

                        I can’t imagine. In adequate time, this is not possible.

                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        see battles for oil platforms and islands in the Persian Gulf in 1991.

                        And how many boats were military and transport helicopters based on?
                      2. alstr 15 February 2020 00: 08 New
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                        I would add that we can talk not only about UAVs, but we need to think about creating cheap, in fact, disposable sensors, the task of which is to simply inform about the presence of a target.
                        Those. a network of sensors is deployed whose main task is simply to detect the direction in which the target appears. At the same time, the reliability of communication itself is not even important, because a simple loss of communication will be a signal of the enemy.

                        and this applies not only to air defense, but also anti-aircraft defense. And with PLO it will even be a little easier.
                      3. Lopatov 15 February 2020 10: 11 New
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                        Quote: alstr
                        cheap in fact disposable sensors, the task of which is simply to report the presence of a target.

                        This can also be solved with the help of various kinds of autonomous complexes.

                        By the way, not necessarily flying
                    2. timokhin-aa 15 February 2020 01: 23 New
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                      And how many boats were military and transport helicopters based on?

                      On Perry.
                      We, respectively, will have (if necessary) on large corvettes or air defense frigates that cover them
                    3. Lopatov 15 February 2020 10: 07 New
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                      Quote: timokhin-aa
                      On Perry.
                      We, respectively, will have (if necessary) on large corvettes or air defense frigates that cover them

                      This is no longer “light forces”, it is, so to speak, “combat support of light forces”. Which can be done in different ways.
                    4. timokhin-aa 15 February 2020 21: 47 New
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                      If our helicopters will take off from the corvettes, then it is quite easy forces. Frigate hangars can be occupied by AWACS helicopters
                    5. Lopatov 15 February 2020 22: 13 New
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                      Quote: timokhin-aa
                      If our helicopters take off from corvettes

                      Take off is too little. Need to "base" (service-refueling-weapons)
                      Which is hardly possible for light forces.
                      Even the option "he will sit here" seems not very realistic.

                      Therefore, alternative options are needed.
                    6. timokhin-aa 15 February 2020 22: 30 New
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                      The corvettes 20380 and 20385 have:

                      1. Completely enclosed warm hangar, large enough for inter-flight maintenance operations of the helicopter.
                      2. Flight control gearbox, equipment for ensuring helicopter navigation near the ship
                      3. Places for pilots to stay and relax
                      4. A protected cellar for aircraft weapons with an elevator to deliver them to the deck, and the cellar is large, larger than the first series of American Arly Burke EMs.
                      5. Jet fuel tank for five full refueling and refueling equipment.
                      6. Places for storing the instrument and accommodation for the aircraft performing the task of servicing the aircraft.

                      So it goes.
                    7. Demagogue 17 February 2020 21: 40 New
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                      Only there is no displacement so that the helicopter flies to the pitching. And we can’t even dream of a stabilization system.
                    8. timokhin-aa 19 February 2020 11: 47 New
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                      It depends on the pitching. There are automation systems takeoff and landing on pitching



                      There are rolling stabilizers on the corvette; he has good seaworthiness.
                    9. Demagogue 19 February 2020 14: 35 New
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                      The press flashed information about the work of the helicopter at 5 points, but I do not really believe in it. On Faye, for example, 6 points. And why buy a corvette several times more expensive than Karakurt, at least for the best conditions for a helicopter based, whose role in the plaza in the BMZ is doubtful? It will not be able to detect weak gas, the fuel will not be enough on the corvette to comb out a serious one. And to destroy after detection and the plane can, or plur.
                    10. timokhin-aa 20 February 2020 08: 05 New
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                      And why buy a corvette several times more expensive than Karakurt, at least for the best conditions for a helicopter based, whose role in the plaza in the BMZ is doubtful?


                      In case of offensive operations in which light forces will also be useful.

                      It will not be able to detect weak gas, the fuel will not be enough on the corvette to comb out a serious one.


                      1. With a low-frequency GAS helicopter turns into a completely different means of efficiency
                      2. A helicopter can be used with great effect for anti-ship missions (see Gulf-1991) and this may be necessary both for offensive operations and in your BMZ
                      3. A group of corvettes with BUGAS can detect submarines at a great distance, over a hundred kilometers, and send helicopters with ASA there, which will be at the target much faster than from the coast.

                      So there is a sense, another thing is that there may not be enough money and then you have to get out with the ships without helicopters.
                    11. Demagogue 20 February 2020 09: 41 New
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                      With the money that costs this miracle 20380, you can build a helicopter carrier for 8+ helicopters. Under 14 tons. And then, if you have enough mind, let the airborne aircraft from there. Which really can carry out shock missions.
                      Deck work up to 5 points is about nothing. In the Barents Sea, in some months, the average wind speed is below 11 ms. That is 6 points as with good morning. This boat with a helicopter will not ride there. But Bugas can be put on karakurt. You write about it yourself. At least a minotaur. Three Karakurt with a minotaur is quite a force. Helicopters will never be faster than a plane with a cruising 500+ km / h. In the event of hostilities, he is already in the air to love.
                    12. timokhin-aa 20 February 2020 13: 09 New
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                      With the money that costs this miracle 20380, you can build a helicopter carrier for 8+ helicopters. Under 14 tons.


                      It’s impossible, it won’t work out.

                      Helicopters will never be faster than a plane with a cruising 500+ km / h. In the event of hostilities, he is already in the air to love.


                      At their shores. Strangers may not have airfields.
                    13. Demagogue 20 February 2020 14: 19 New
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                      It will work out. 20380 costs almost 300 million dollars. The Japanese head Avik at 14 tons for 000 built. And they have everything at exorbitant prices. The Spaniards Juan Carlos built for 550 the same, TWO times more. For the price of 550.
                      Without planes and at least helicopters, there is nothing to catch a drill in a DMZ. Melt these boats in 10 minutes. All.
                    14. timokhin-aa 25 February 2020 11: 11 New
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                      And they have everything at exorbitant prices.


                      No, they only have exorbitant prices for what they do. In general, there is access to any components, components and subsystems produced in the world, and it’s not a problem to buy technology. We need to do everything ourselves.
                      I had a discussion on this subject with a specialist from 1 Central Research Institute of the Navy. The Japanese, if PPP is considered, pay less for ships.

                      Without planes and at least helicopters, there is nothing to catch a drill in a DMZ. Melt these boats in 10 minutes. All.


                      Well, they will not be there alone even after the “elder brothers” tamp everything up properly. On the other hand, the decisions on how to provide basing for AWACS helicopters are listed in the article, AWACS aircraft have an in-flight refueling system and can fly from far away.
                    15. Demagogue 25 February 2020 13: 19 New
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                      de Witt at the Dutch cost 370 million, and there is a lot of excess for an aircraft carrier. This is a paratrooper.
                      In terms of technology, what are the obstacles? The finisher is not needed, the catapult too. You can even take Mistral as a basis, there is a project. Although what will be the benefit. Yes, it will be twice as expensive, but up to 12 aircraft on board, plus helicopters. Or 20 helicopters, but this makes it a real weapon at least for plos. 20 helicopters or 2 from two fragile boats that cannot be launched above 5 points?

                      Then the main thing is not ships, but planes and helicopters. This is the main trouble. The Yak-141 could be modernized for a long time - to put the engine more economically, new avionics, s-shaped intakes and RPM materials, in order to reduce the EPR. Given its 1.4M, a very interesting car. It can take off vertically with incomplete loading, that is, instantly the link can be raised to repel the blow.

                      AWAC from the shore is good. But not always possible. And it is difficult for him to examine from afar against the background of water, or stealth. A helicopter over Kug, and even with afar, everything is more reliable.
  • Newone 14 February 2020 20: 48 New
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    The article does not disclose criteria by which it would be possible to optimize the composition, equipment and armament of the light forces of the fleet. The article does not indicate the main tasks that small fleet forces should solve, and those tasks that were set (attack of large military surface ships, for example) can be characterized as exclusively situational. A number of the most important tasks of the light forces (mine action, guarding convoys, guarding bases, landing support) are not reflected at all. Under the guise of analysis, the author’s opinion on the layout and composition of the armament of ships of the corvette class and below was issued.
    One can agree with some provisions of this opinion, but the argument is very weak.
    1. timokhin-aa 15 February 2020 01: 33 New
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      The article does not indicate the main tasks that small fleet forces should solve, and those tasks that were set (attack of large military surface ships, for example) can be characterized as exclusively situational. A number of the most important tasks of the light forces (mine action, guarding convoys, guarding bases, landing support) are not reflected at all.


      The article lists the tasks of small ships. Go to the bathroom, wash your eyes, go back to the computer - everything is there. You just have to read it carefully, or not comment.
      Mine missions are left out of the brackets, this is a separate topic, very voluminous.
      1. Newone 15 February 2020 23: 07 New
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        Distribute instructions to your wife Timokhin.
        You didn’t mention the mine action (yes this is a big topic, but you could write it like that), you didn’t mention the guarding of convoys. This is not the protection of the area, but a slightly (many) different task.
        The landing party is mentioned in passing, although this is a task requiring a different set of tools than attacking surface ships.
        Support and use of legal acts are not mentioned at all in the article.
        The deployment of anti-submarine lines is not mentioned (and this also requires a separate set of equipment.
        But NATISK SHOCK with Uranus on an aircraft carrier ...
  • bk0010 14 February 2020 20: 57 New
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    And much more expensive is the operation of the frigate compared to the corvette?
    Something the more Timokhin writes, the less all this trifle is like: they make a normal corvette - almost a frigate is obtained at a price while maintaining the flaws of the corvette. They make a specialized corvette - it becomes a target for everyone, except for those with whom it is sharpened to fight. Raznosortitsa in everything: the engines are different for everyone, the air defense is different, the ASG are different, etc. If there is a helicopter, it’s a close-fitting one. Our seas are severe: small ships do not just shake hard, but impose restrictions on solving problems, a decent chunk of time in a year (and the weather is on the drum for submarines). Plus, the sailors said that it would be better if 1155 and 956 were the same ship: in few places 1155 could work without cover from 956 and vice versa (except for its waters, which is weak for the BOD and destroyer), it should also be taken into account. Only frigates can rivet, and OVR tasks can be solved with stationary means or absolutely boats (like “for the night - home” type) or ships built according to civil standards (cheaper, make expensive elements modular and rearrange them on ships that go on duty from weapons - only AU, the rest - on call (“I’ll call my brother now”), in my water area this is acceptable - they can even launch a rocket from the shore), compensating for the vulnerability with an increased number of rescue equipment.
    1. timokhin-aa 15 February 2020 01: 31 New
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      Only frigates can rivet, and OVR tasks can be solved with stationary means or absolutely boats (like “for the night - home” type) or ships built according to civil standards (cheaper, make expensive elements modular and rearrange them on ships that go on duty from weapons - only AU, the rest - on call (“I’ll call my brother now”), in my water area this is acceptable - they can even launch a rocket from the shore), compensating for the vulnerability with an increased number of rescue equipment.


      Will not work. We will not master so many units. One 22350 is for forty billion, and far. And there’s nothing to be done, it’s just worth the money.
      As a result, we will freeze the remnants of our ocean ships under the shore.
  • mik193 14 February 2020 21: 22 New
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    A lot has been written, a lot of good thoughts, but it’s real - we need ships of the near sea zone oriented to PLO. To the far sea zone - like walking to China. It is real that it is possible and necessary to create your own submarine defense, air defense and air defense system in the immediate vicinity of its shores.
    1. timokhin-aa 15 February 2020 01: 29 New
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      To the far sea zone - like walking to China


      To the east of Cape Nordkap - already DMZ.
      200 miles southeast of Iturup - DMZ.
      By the way.
  • alexmach 14 February 2020 22: 27 New
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    Something this article left more questions than answers.
    So what ships of Russia to build now in the current situation? Any of the above?
    What about the construction of diverse forces? For example, if you build both Super-Karakurt and 2038X at the same time?
    How realistic is it to improve the driving performance of the 20380 without replacing the engines and is it suitable for anti-submarine operation with such a move?
    It is not clear why create another type of frigate? There are 22350, with satisfactory air defense, which they seem to be planning to lay any large series. Why not use it? How much can it be cheapened at all while maintaining or developing its air defense capabilities?
    1. alstr 15 February 2020 00: 23 New
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      In fact, the presence of two types of theater, then we need two types of ships of the near zone.
      1. For closed seas - BF and BSF
      2. For open seas - SF and Pacific Fleet.

      The former are smaller and cheaper. The main function of PLO. The presence of a 76 mm art system, 4-8 light RCC. Self Defense Air Defense. Good communication to quickly and clearly report on the enemy. All.
      Impact weapons are not needed.

      But for Pacific Fleet and Northern Fleet ships are needed for more. Also PLO, but better. Art system is possible and 100 mm. RCC and missile defense in the VPU pieces 30. Decent medium-range air defense. The platform for the helicopter and UAV. Good tools EW and TSU.
      And do not forget to make them an ice class.

      But to them in the appendage and the first type to add.
    2. timokhin-aa 15 February 2020 01: 28 New
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      So what ships of Russia to build now in the current situation? Any of the above?


      According to the mind, research is needed.

      What about the construction of diverse forces? For example, if you build both Super-Karakurt and 2038X at the same time?


      Undesirable for obvious reasons.

      How realistic is it to improve the driving performance of the 20380 without replacing the engines and is it suitable for anti-submarine operation with such a move?


      Actually, but without science fiction, I think that with similar contours of nodes up to 28 can be reached, with other contours - well, maybe up to 29 if you are completely lucky. And this is generally normal.

      and is it suitable for anti-submarine work with such a move?


      Yes, if only speed is taken into account, but only in a group. Alone, far less suitable.

      It is not clear why create another type of frigate? There are 22350, with satisfactory air defense, which they seem to be planning to lay any large series. Why not use it?


      It is expensive and with one hangar, and we need cheap and with two.

      How much can it be cheapened at all while maintaining or developing its air defense capabilities?


      Almost unrealistic.
      1. alexmach 15 February 2020 02: 31 New
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        Undesirable for obvious reasons.

        So 20380 (5) are already in operation. Karakurts are already being built and, in my opinion, the most logical is to present those that can still be reloaded according to the submarine project. As if by itself it turns out. It is clear that not from a great mind and systematic approach.

        It is expensive and with one hangar, and we need cheap and with two.

        How much can it be cheapened at all while maintaining or developing its air defense capabilities?

        Almost unrealistic.

        M ... then what is the conversation about? Maybe I rephrase the question. Is it possible to build this air defense frigate noticeably cheaper than 22350? If we take Polement-Redoubt as the most rational complex, then what can you save on cheap air defense frigate? And what kind of power plant to build it? Diesel? But there is, in principle, from which it should be assembled, then for a ship of large displacement, if 20380m of power of a power plant is not enough.
        1. timokhin-aa 15 February 2020 21: 45 New
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          So 20380 (5) are already in operation. Karakurts are already being built and, in my opinion, the most logical is to present those that can still be reloaded according to the submarine project. As if by itself it turns out. It is clear that not from a great mind and systematic approach.


          Yes, that's the way to do it, but I look a little further. Karakurt total contracted, built and built 18 units for all fleets. 20380 (50 - 12.
          It’s impossible to close all directions, in any case, we need the concept of “for later”.

          Is it possible to build this air defense frigate noticeably cheaper than 22350? If we take Polement-Redoubt as the most rational complex, then what can you save on cheap air defense frigate? And what kind of power plant to build it?


          Can. A minus 130 mm cannon instead of it is weaving, minus all PU 3C-14, except for one, minus a power plant with an expensive P055 in favor of something simpler.
          On the plus side - smaller sizes (reduced launch, reduced gun), you can play around with contours and achieve an acceptable speed at a lower power plant, then we look at which ship we have as a light base, if it is a corvette based on 20385, then this automatically means the speed at the transition is 20 knots and the maximum is now 27, then, possibly 28-29.
          That is, our air defense ship is reduced in size relative to 22350 and at the same time the requirements for its maximum speed are reduced, approximately by a knot (if we take 28-knots as the target).

          As for me, the GEM here needs to be slightly modified from 20380, namely with the added low-pressure turbine to use the energy of diesel exhaust gases. As a result, we get a power increase of about 600-700 hp. for diesel, which in total for almost the same mass of power plants will give an increase of 2400-2800 hp full power.
          That is 26400-26800 h.p.
          Such a power plant will be able to move the ship at 3000-3500 tons at the right speed.
          This is if you do not invent tricky schemes.
          1. alexmach 15 February 2020 22: 51 New
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            Yes, that's the way to do it, but I look a little further

            And with this approach, the diversity of the Russian fleet is guaranteed and inevitable, and it should be taken simply as a given.

            2019


            - Karakurt submarines
            - And something else that they will start building later, when they take up their heads.

            Plus, in pursuit of this
            - small frigate air defense
            - 22350 in two versions, fortunately almost identical
            - 22350m - which in general could have come up with another index.

            2019

            1. timokhin-aa 19 February 2020 11: 42 New
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              With the ships already laid down, there is no choice - they will have to be completed in one form or another. If we talk about the future, then:

              Corvette - 1 type.
              Air defense frigate - 1 type.
              RCA - 1 type

              All finished with BMZ.
              In DMZ - 22350M + Air Defense Frigates from the previous list.
              Aircraft carrier or aircraft carriers.

              All.
  • Demagogue 14 February 2020 23: 23 New
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    The article is good, but I do not agree with everything.

    1) Such an important element is not mentioned as flat. They also need a lot and cheap. Like Ula.

    2) We definitely need karakurt. Helicopters in the near sea-based zone are not needed. The main means of detecting pl is hook corvettes and pl. On helicopters, the stations are weaker. Further, the aircraft can also be adjusted and thrown with torpedoes. Ships pl need small and very cheap.
  • SVD68 15 February 2020 05: 49 New
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    Speeds of 45 knots for light attack ships are no longer enough. You need 55-60, i.e. we need hovercraft / boats, such as those specified in the Skjold article or our projects 1239 and 12322.
  • VLADIMIR VLADIVOSTOK 15 February 2020 07: 11 New
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    Alexander. Why do you all compare Arabs as a warrior? Small ships have their own niche. The first task is to cover naval bases. What kind of enemy aircraft? There are coastal air defense systems that will not allow enemy aircraft to come nearer. In the far zone, the missile defense systems are not seaworthy. So your article didn’t babble Nick’s schools, but the statement did. It’s like a grown man, and write crap. Even if you do not know. At MRK, there is always time development, from engine reserve to operational readiness. And in time it is much faster than at the front. No one will fight the American aircraft carrier fleet, like in the Coral Sea. He will be lured where necessary and destroyed.
    volume
    1. alexmach 15 February 2020 13: 06 New
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      Small ships have their own niche. The first task is to cover naval bases. What kind of enemy aircraft? There are coastal air defense systems that will not allow enemy aircraft to approach

      And at what distance do you think this base cover should pass? Straight from the raid?
    2. Cyrus 15 February 2020 14: 37 New
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      AUS is able to overload any area of ​​air defense - this time. To consider that the enemy ... there are easier ways to lose the war are two. And Arabs as warriors are at least much better than you.
      1. VLADIMIR VLADIVOSTOK 20 February 2020 00: 02 New
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        AUG never understand the overload power of coastal air defense! And what about coastal aviation? She will not give AUG the opportunity.
  • Alessandr 16 February 2020 00: 14 New
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    Alternatively, two corvettes of project 20380, 20385 and a small marine tanker of project 03182 - the PLO group. Could be effective at Pacific Fleet. In the group of 3 helicopters PLO, RK Uranus, RK Caliber.
  • Whalebone 16 February 2020 15: 16 New
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    I see the main task of the Russian Navy as the provision of the A2 / AD zone in the 1000 km zone from the Russian coast in the Far East and in the North, as well as the control of the World Cup and BM.
    These tasks are perfectly solved by the basic aviation represented by the Su-34 (add comfortable tanks to increase the patrol time), A-100 for AWACS and coastal anti-ship missiles. Universal guard ships with weekly fuel / food autonomy are sufficient to directly protect maritime borders and economic interests.
    The better aviation: mobility (strengthening the desired area in a matter of hours), versatility: work on ships, shore, aircraft. Price - for 18 billion rubles, you can build a dozen Su-34s that will last the same 30 years as RTOs, but they can do much more damage. Let the functions of the PLO be performed by the base aviation at the base. Tu-204 or Superjet. You can forget about squadron battles. Meanwhile, the sea interests of the Russian Federation at far borders can still be omitted - the flag can be demonstrated by the fact that it will sail at the time of the visit + in no hurry to build EM URO / PLO in small quantities.

    Naval aviation must be opposed and, perhaps, it should be no less numerical than the Air Force.
  • Zakhar Makeevsky 16 February 2020 22: 07 New
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    The article is interesting and to some extent useful for our strategists (especially who thinks about business, and not stupidly calculates finances). But before discussing which ships we need, it is necessary to decide on which fleets these or other formations need to be created.
    The Black Sea Fleet should most of all have such light forces, because he will have to conduct military operations only in the Black Moraine. Access to the Mediterranean Sea is likely to be, at best, much more difficult, and our ships remaining in the Mediterranean Sea will not last long. Therefore, combining light forces is quite capable of acting against the fleets of the NATO Black Sea countries. Even taking into account Turkish forces.
    The same applies to the Baltic Sea, provided that the Danish Straits are blocked, and Sweden remains neutral.
    In the Far East, for the defense of the Kuril ridge and operations in the Sea of ​​Japan, some light forces may not be enough. There you will need to have ship groupings, both light forces, and ships of the far zone. In addition, the islands will require the creation of a videoconferencing group.
    The same applies to the Northern Fleet. When it is required for light forces to operate near the Scandinavian coast and at the turn of Medvezhy or Jan Mayenen islands - Cape Nordkapp, and for DMZ ships - to provide deployment of submarine forces in the North Atlantic.
    And you always need to determine the balance of forces according to the real quantitative and qualitative composition of opposing ship groupings in a particular strategic direction
    1. Cyril G ... April 27 2020 21: 44 New
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      absolutely right
  • storm 17 February 2020 00: 27 New
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    The anti-ship defense of Russia from the AUG and large formations in the distant zone of 1000-3000 km should be undertaken by:
    - coastal missile systems "Bastion-M armed with anti-ship missiles Caliber, Onyx-M and hypersonic Zircons;
    - MiG-31K and Tu-22M3M aviation regiments with the Dagger complex.
    - connections of frigates of the project 22350 / 350M and multipurpose submarines with anti-ship missiles Caliber, Onyx-M and Zircons;

    The defense against the "light" and landing forces of the enemy fleet in the near zone up to 1000 km should be provided by:
    - coastal missile systems "Ball" with anti-ship missiles Uranus and Uranus-M;
    - RTOs and Corvettes with anti-ship missiles "Mosquito and Uranus;
    - DPL with anti-ship missile system "Caliber";
    - regiments of naval aviation MiG-29K, Su-30SM, Su-24;
    - attack helicopter squadrons Ka-52K

    To ensure anti-submarine defense will have:
    - build a significant number of PLO corvettes;
    - complete the development and start production of the Lamprey anti-submarine helicopters
    - begin development of anti-submarine aircraft similar to the Boeing P-8 Poseidon based on the MC-21
    1. Yuriy Malyshko 17 February 2020 15: 48 New
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      "Storm", I think your comment is the only one reflecting a more or less comprehensive view of the problem discussed here.
      In general, the Navy of the USSR and the early Russian Federation (I don’t know how it is now) never developed or planned operations for "light" or "heavy" forces. A specific task was set, for example, to ensure the deployment of the TRNKSN during the threatened period. And, based on all (!) Available forces and means, a plan was drawn up, which was rolled around at the KSU and real exercises. At the same time, within this main task, tasks were set, so to speak, smaller: to close and "clear out" the exit routes of the submarines, to protect the coast, to disperse stockpiles of weapons, to urgently finish the repairs that were started, to get assigned personnel and equipment from the national economy, etc. etc. Therefore, I consider discussions about certain functions and tasks of the “light forces” to be absolutely far-fetched and unprofessional.
      And secondly, the very concept of large-scale use of the Russian Navy and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation do not provide for naval battles without the use of nuclear weapons. The fleet will not fight to the point of exhaustion - we crave, and without hesitation, if that. But in this article about nuclear weapons, not a word as if he did not exist. Theorizing for theorizing, without reference, as a classic would say, to objective reality.
  • author-words 20 February 2020 14: 27 New
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    "... the remnants of the USSR Navy and a number of unsystematically tuned ships" - this is the most concise and accurate assessment of our fleet. Thank you so much! Bravo!
  • Sckepsis 24 February 2020 22: 35 New
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    The author talks about speed as if he lives at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was then that the opponents discovered each other deliberately before entering the affected area, and now the song is sung differently. The same KUGs considered will not be worn on max. 24/7, therefore, for their attack there is no need for 40-50 knots. If the enemy knows for sure that an attack is being launched against him, and even from where, then instead of playing catch-up, he will send aviation, and then at least 70 knots will not make the weather go.
  • BUSEYN April 11 2020 21: 29 New
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    You’re not discussing it, comrades. In this situation, it is best to use firewalls. Based on 6 rowboats. Strength plays a major role in modern warfare. And now just .... I don’t know what to say. Example. 1978 year. Black Sea Fleet. I received an order from my sabotage group to destroy MRKs in Sevastopol. According to the plan, there was a command and control center on it. They indicated the bay, indicated the number of RTOs. Parking place. At night surfaced. There are hundreds of them. Not found. "Mined" the first one that came across (everything was 49 minutes). Last year I went to Sevastopol. What you saw, you yourself know. Boat firewalls are best. Virtually invisible during intense combat activities. And so is the theory. It is written very well.