How the Red Army broke into the Mannerheim Line

How the Red Army broke into the Mannerheim Line
Two fighters of the Red Army with accordions on an exploded Finnish bunker in the Summa-Khotinen area. 1940


Winter war 80 years ago, on February 11, 1940, troops of the North-Western Front under the command of S. K. Timoshenko began a breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line. Finnish concrete fortifications were destroyed by heavy artillery, explosives, flamethrowers and aerial bombs.

Some errors


The Red Army failed to break through the Finnish army’s defense line the first time. At the same time, the beginning of the war against Finland was chosen by the supreme Soviet command correctly. The area in the Finnish direction was distinguished by numerous rivers, streams, lakes, swamps. In December, the soil was captured by frosts, numerous reservoirs froze. But there was still little snow. That is, the Red Army could use its advantage in mechanization.

The Red Army could well break through the Mannerheim Line. The Finnish line of defense was far from perfect. Most of the long-term structures were single-story, partially buried in the ground with reinforced concrete structures in the form of a bunker, which was divided into several rooms. Three pillboxes of the "millionth" type had two levels, another three - three levels. The Finns did not have the usual underground galleries for France, Germany and Czechoslovakia that connected the bunkers. There were no underground narrow gauge railways. The Mannerheim Line, in comparison with other similar lines of defense, had a lower density of bunkers per 1 kilometer, inferior to the number of artillery bunkers. Finnish artillery bunkers had no guns that could hit any Soviet tank of that time. That is, the "Mannerheim Line" was not "impregnable."

The main problem of the Red Army was the lack of intelligence on Finnish fortifications. There was only fragmentary data about the Mannerheim Line. As Marshal Shaposhnikov noted: "For us, such a depth of defense was a well-known surprise." In particular, there was no information about the late fortifications of 1938–1939. Another important factor of failure is the balance of power in the initial period of the war. Hacking the Finnish defense required decisive superiority in forces and means, but it was not there. The head of the General Staff of the Red Army, Tymoshenko wrote that intelligence reported that the Finns would have up to 10 infantry divisions and 15 separate battalions. In reality, the Finns deployed much more; before the start of the war they generally planned to advance. The Finns deployed 16 divisions and a significant number of individual battalions. We started the war with 21 divisions. Thus, the Red Army had no decisive advantage at the beginning of the war. Already during the war we brought forces on the Finnish front to 45 divisions and ended the war with 58 divisions.

In December 1939, only five Soviet divisions of the 7th Army were sent to three enemy divisions in long-term fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus. And the standard ratio of forces advancing and defending in the direction of the main strike is 1: 3. Later the ratio became 6: 9, which is also far from the norm. In terms of the number of battalions and troops, the picture is still obvious: 80 calculated Finnish battalions versus 84 Soviet; 130 thousand Finns against 139 thousand Soviet soldiers. It is clear that the Red Army had a strong advantage in armored vehicles, aviation and artillery. But the infantry is not in vain "the queen of the fields." In addition, Soviet divisions were not brought into battle all at once. As a result, the forces of the parties on the Karelian Isthmus were approximately the same, but the Finns sat in long-term fortifications. But the Red Army did not have complete information about the pillboxes, and experience in their assault. Hence the corresponding result.

The picture in secondary directions, for example, between the Ladoga and Onega lakes, was similar. Here attacked five divisions of the 8th army. These are 43 calculated battalions. On the Finnish side, two infantry divisions and a network of separate battalions were defending — 25 battalions. That is, the ratio of forces is 1: 3 and not close. The same balance of power was between the Finnish army and the Soviet troops allocated for the offensive. The Finns had 170 military battalions, the Red Army - 185 military battalions. Obviously, the Soviet high command underestimated the enemy and did not provide decisive superiority of forces at the beginning of the war. Errors corrected already during the war.


Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Mikhail Ivanovich Sipovich (left, in a ruined observation cap) and captain Ivan Evdokimovich Korovin on a captured Finnish pillbox


Red Army soldiers cleaning the 203-mm howitzer B-4 on the Karelian Isthmus. February 1940


Soviet 203-mm howitzer B-4 at a firing position on the Karelian Isthmus. February 1940

Storm on all the rules


After it became obvious that the Finnish defense could not be broken right away, the Red Army had strong fortifications and the Finnish military-political leadership under arms all who it could put, and even attracted foreign volunteers (there was also the prospect of the British and French arriving at the front ), it was decided to storm the "Mannerheim Line" according to all the rules of military art. The troops in the Karelian direction have significantly strengthened. From the troops of the right wing of the 7th Army, a new 13th Army was formed. The 7th Army was brought up to 12 divisions, the 11th Army - 9 divisions, 2 divisions were in reserve front, 3 divisions - in reserve Headquarters. Increased artillery.

As a result, the correlation of forces compared with December 1939 to February 12, 1940 began to comply with the standard 1: 3. The Red Army now numbered 460 thousand people against 150 thousand Finns. Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus now totaled 26 divisions, 1 rifle-machine gun and 7 tank brigades. The Finns had 7 infantry divisions, 1 infantry, 1 cavalry brigade, 10 separate infantry, rangers and mobile regiments. Of the 80 Finnish battalions, 239 were Soviet. Soviet troops were superior in artillery with a caliber of 122 mm or more by 10 times. The Soviet troops had four divisions of great power for the destruction of reinforced concrete fortifications.

Thus, when the appropriate forces and means were accumulated for the destruction of the Finnish fortified areas, the Red Army hacked the Mannerheim Line, despite the winter, snow and Finnish stubbornness. Bunkers and bunkers were destroyed artillery caliber 152, 203 and 280 mm. Finnish soldiers called the 203-mm howitzer of the 1931 model (B-4) “the Stalinist sledgehammer”, and ours called the “Karelian sculptor”, as they turned long-term structures into bizarre ruins of concrete and steel (“Karelian monuments”). To destroy the bunker, from 8 to 140 kilogram shells of these guns were required. In this case, the pillbox usually lost its combat value at the beginning of the process. But only complete destruction convinced the infantry that one could go further.

For example, in the 123rd Infantry Division of the 7th Soviet Army, which stormed Summayarvi, in February 1940 there were 18-mm “Stalinist sledgehammers” and 203-mm mortar “Br-6”. They used up 280 shells during the preparation of the offensive in the first decade of February, having achieved 2 direct hits. Dot "Popius", which stopped the division in December 4419, was destroyed by 247 direct hits. Also for the elimination of enemy fortifications, explosives were actively used. So, the second powerful fortification of the Summayarvi Dot No 1939 site was blown up, laying a mountain of boxes with explosives on it. At first, the artillery defeated the Finnish infantry around the bunker, the Soviet arrows completed this process, the sappers planted the explosives. The explosion on the roof of the western casemate forced the Finnish garrison to flee. Next, the pillbox finished off with two tons of TNT, laid under the walls.

They also dealt completely with other engineering structures of the line with quite ordinary means. The hollows were undermined by explosive charges, shifted tanks T-28, destroyed by armor-piercing shells. Passages in minefields and wire fences were carried out by artillery and mortars. Severe frost and deep snow did not save the Finns.


Soviet tank T-28 on the march on the Karelian Isthmus. 1940


Soviet heavy tank T-100 from a special group of heavy tanks on the Karelian Isthmus. February 1940


Soviet chemical (flamethrower) tank HT-26 in action on the Karelian Isthmus. February 1940


Soviet tank BT-5 fires on the Finnish bunker on the Karelian Isthmus. February 1940

Victory February 1940


February 11, after a strong artillery bombardment began a general offensive of the Red Army. The main blow was inflicted on the Karelian Isthmus. After a three-day assault, the 7th Army divisions broke through the first line of defense of the line. Tanks were introduced into the breakthrough. The Finns, in order to avoid being surrounded, retreated to the second line of defense. By February 21, our troops reached the second defense line; on March 13, they entered Vyborg. The defense was broken through, the Finnish army was defeated, further resistance was pointless. Finland had no choice but to ask for peace.

The stop of the Red Army in the Winter War was associated with errors in command and intelligence, and underestimation of the enemy. It was necessary to carry out work on the mistakes, to accumulate strength and resources and to storm the "Mannerheim Line" in accordance with all the rules of military art. After eliminating the mistakes, the accumulation of forces, the Finnish defense was hacked at a good pace.

The Red Army has shown that there is no “impregnable” defense for the modern army. During an operational pause, the location of all enemy fortifications was clarified. Concrete fortifications were destroyed by heavy artillery, explosives, flamethrowers, and air bombs. In addition, the Finnish army had weak artillery, aviation and tank units and could not provide effective counteraction.

As a result, the Finnish campaign revealed both shortcomings in the command of the Red Army and the possibility of the Red Army as a fully modern army in 1940, mechanized, with a lot of artillery, tanks, aircraft, special and engineering units. The Soviet army could break through a strong enemy defenses, develop success by attacking tank formations and infantry.

True, the "world community" was left impressed by the first stage of the war - unsuccessful for the Red Army. In January 1940, Churchill declared that Finland "had revealed to the whole world the weakness of the Red Army." This erroneous opinion was shared by Hitler and his entourage, which led to fatal errors in the Reich military-political strategy towards the USSR.


The link of the Soviet SB bombers in flight. February 1940


Residents of Leningrad welcome tankers of the 20th Tank Brigade on T-28 tanks returning from the Karelian Isthmus. 1940


Leningraders on Liteiny Bridge meet a column of OT-130 tanks (a flamethrower tank based on the T-26 tank) that have returned from the Karelian Isthmus. March 30, 1940
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  1. vladimirZ 11 February 2020 06: 54 New
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    Well, finally, at least an objective article about the Winter War of 1940, otherwise historians, writers, filmmakers poured mud about the "weakness" of the Red Army in the Finnish War.
    The shortcomings were objectively in the leadership of the spacecraft, in intelligence, in attempts to sneakily win the war with the Finns without proper preparation, and I must say these shortcomings, without a proper critical assessment of our own abilities, were not eliminated by the beginning of World War II, which was the reason for the defeat of the initial stage 1941, and 1942
    This strategy, in a snap, to take and win the war with the Germans flourished in the General Staff (Zhukov) and the People’s Commissariat of Defense (Tymoshenko) before the war, for which they bear full responsibility to the people and the country, and even to a history that has not yet given a serious assessment of their activities. True I.V. Stalin critical assessment Zhukov G.K. all the same, he gave it after the war, demoted him to the post of commander of a secondary district, but with the death of Stalin and the reign of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, etc., they forgot this, making Zhukov the "Marshal of Victory."
    1. novel66 11 February 2020 07: 39 New
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      schA will be removed from you, for Zhukov! from me plus lol
      1. vladimirZ 11 February 2020 07: 59 New
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        So what? The truth is more important!
        It’s high time to give an objective assessment to the leadership of the Red Army of the beginning of the war, otherwise the “Marshal of Victory”, the “Marshal of Victory”, and because of this “Marshal of Victory” millions of people died in the war, rudeness and unjustified cruelty passed down the command levels, ignored proper preparation of troops (without reconnaissance, without art and air training, etc.) for the offensive; the offensive through undetermined minefields, revealing them with attacking ranks of soldiers, the attitude towards the soldier on the basis of the principle "women will give birth," and so on, so on and so forth from the Zhukovsky training manual for conducting military operations.

        Here in Russia we are now being told that in the West they distort the history of WWII and the Great Patriotic War, and they will not allow anyone to distort it, forgetting that we ourselves were the first to distort the history of this war, starting from the Khrushchev period, and off we went Brezhnev, Gorbachev, and now the Yeltsin-Putin era, including distorting, destroying and hiding the archives of those years to such an extent that it is already difficult to understand how it was in reality.
        Some historians say and write one thing, the other the opposite. Even the official state WWII stories, under the leadership of large groups of authors, cannot write, and as it was, with a proper assessment of everyone and everything, then slide into praise, or sometimes the guilt of the state leadership, instead of an objective analysis of the actions of the highest military leadership.
        1. novel66 11 February 2020 08: 26 New
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          my friend, I absolutely agree with you, hi but, mind you, the minuses have already flown, however, without refutation, since there is essentially nothing to say ... inertia ..
        2. smaug78 11 February 2020 09: 35 New
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          And you yourself didn’t try to calculate the percentage ratio of Zhukov’s losses during military operations and compare with other spacecraft commanders, read his military orders, etc.? Or do the inscriptions on the fence inspire more confidence? laughing
          1. vladimirZ 11 February 2020 09: 51 New
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            Unlike you, probably, I’ve shoveled so many books on WWII and WWII over 40 years of interest in WWII history, what else can you read and read about my knowledge of this period.
            1. bairat 11 February 2020 11: 44 New
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              Quote: vladimirZ
              Unlike you, probably, I’ve shoveled so many books on WWII and WWII over 40 years of interest in WWII history, what else can you read and read about my knowledge of this period.


              It seems I even know the authors of your books: Suvorov, Solonin, etc. Those are also "sources of truth."
              1. vladimirZ 11 February 2020 14: 01 New
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                It seems I even know the authors of your books: Suvorov, Solonin, etc. Those are also "sources of truth." - bairat (Airat)

                You are mistaken! Suvorov-Rezun, a long-passed stage in the historiography of the Second World War, refuted by historians who investigated the problems of the history of the Second World War after him. Although he still has a certain circle of followers, such as M. Solonin and a number of other authors of the “Resinists," as I qualify them for myself.
                The merit of Suvorov-Rezun, despite the fact that he remains and will forever remain a traitor to our country, is not in the veracity of his books, but in the fact that he was the first to study the problems of the history of the Great Patriotic War, which, unfortunately, Soviet, stubborn and dull historiography tried to for various reasons, to conceal from the general reader, and indeed the people as a whole, to hide the true causes of the defeat of 1941-42, to conceal the acute problems of war, unpleasant for the authorities and ideology.
                In the end, hide the real number of those who died in the war, and state the reasons for their birth, including the shortcomings of the top military leadership, which led to such enormous human and material losses.
                To conceal the activity, in particular of such a military leader as G. Zhukov, in my opinion, as well as of many professional historians who have been unjustifiably exalted to please the country's anti-Stalinist policy, making him the only "Marshal of Victory", which is completely wrong .
                And so, historians, researchers, unfortunately, with the small opening of part of the archives becomes more and more. Among them, I would single out such populists of History and authors of books as Yuri Zhukov, Spitsyn, Nikiforov, Martirosyan, Kozinkin and others who are trying to open and describe the true picture of the Second World War in small crumbs of the open part of archives about the Second World War.
        3. Alexey RA 11 February 2020 11: 29 New
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          Quote: vladimirZ
          ignoring the proper training of troops (without reconnaissance, without art and air training, etc.) for the offensive

          Tell me, what - Zhukov personally had to plan artillery training in divisions and regiments? Or maybe Zhukov forbade reconnaissance? Or Zhukov personally demanded that tank commanders advance through the tops of the hills? And he also forbade firing from personal weapons?
          Here is a typical situation in 1942: a tank brigade should support a rifle division. In the evening, at the level of the headquarters of the division and brigade, the offensive plans were agreed upon, forces on paper were allocated. And in the morning it turns out that no one had given the plans to the artillerymen of the division, the rifle battalion, interacting with the brigade according to the plan, was sent by the divisional commander to the other flank, and only mat was heard in the telephone receiver - forward tankers, cowards, shoot.
          Or the commander receives an order (by the way, signed by the GKZh) - it is forbidden to storm fortified villages in the forehead, bypass and cut off. What does a division commander do? That's right - continues to attack in the forehead. Come to the tank brigade - do not attack without infantry. What is he doing? Well, you guessed it ...
          1943 year. The Front Headquarters reports to the representative of the Headquarters that they are ready for the offensive. The roads planned according to the plan turn out to be in fact littered with snow (even in their rear), along which the tank corps extends to the concentration area at 10 km / h, towing cars with tanks (in violation of the order). The front has no intelligence about the enemy. They even despite the fact that next to the army headquarters sits the headquarters of the partisan movement. And the direction of impact of the tank units is planned on a tank inaccessible terrain. Zhukov expresses to the front command everything he thinks about it
          And then historians cry about Zhukov’s rudeness towards poor unfortunate subordinates and about criminal orders. Not paying attention to the fact that with the statutory execution of the received order, he was quite doable.

          In 1941, on the lower levels, they were even cooler - the battalion commanders demanded fire of corps calibers for groups and individual military personnel of the enemy, while the consumption of shells of regimental and battalion guns and mortars was such that the stockpiles of the beginning of the offensive lay in warehouses. And the infantry generals, having met tank crews on the road bypassing the enemy’s positions, canceled the round and threw them head-on at the anti-tank station.
          1. vladimirZ 11 February 2020 14: 27 New
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            Tell me, what - Zhukov personally had to plan artillery training in divisions and regiments? Or maybe Zhukov forbade reconnaissance? .... - Alexey RA (Alexey)

            As the saying goes, "what is pop, such is the coming." How Zhukov G.K. he planned the outbreak of war by an immediate counterattack of the spacecraft’s forces against the attacking German troops without mobilizing and picking up troops, without reconnaissance of the emerging German assault forces, without properly concentrating our troops, concentrating military equipment, ammunition, aviation and artillery at the border, with clumsy 1000 tank mechanized corps at the behest of an eye due to be there, then and there, etc., the whole war went on with the rest of its participants, "despite the losses, I’ll shoot this or that, or else I’ll shoot it."
            And it’s not enough they still managed to persuade Tymoshenko to persuade I. Stalin on the preventive start of the war, the first, “in order to prevent the concentration and deployment of German troops,” as Zhukov admitted in an interview with K. Simonov, and in part is in his memoirs. Fortunately, Stalin had the prudence and knowledge to send these "initiators" to the start of the war.
            So no, they still dragged their vision of the beginning of the war through the frontier deployment of troops intended for the offensive, and Directive No. 3 of 22.06.1941 - an immediate main counterattack from the Lviv ledge towards Lublin, Krakow, and an auxiliary from Bialystok to Warsaw, leading to the catastrophic defeat of our troops in 1941.
            1. Alexey RA 11 February 2020 14: 57 New
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              Quote: vladimirZ
              So no, they still dragged their vision of the beginning of the war through the frontier deployment of troops intended for the offensive, and Directive No. 3 of 22.06.1941 - an immediate main counterattack from the Lviv ledge towards Lublin, Krakow, and an auxiliary from Bialystok to Warsaw, leading to the catastrophic defeat of our troops in 1941.

              In fact, the strike by the mechanized corps of the SWF was absolutely correct. And if the front command had not canceled the order of the National High Command and wouldn’t reinvent the wheel, having lost two days on it, and if Commander-6 didn’t keep its MK and rob the “alien” MK passing through its lane, the 1st TGr would be a big problem.
          2. karabass 11 February 2020 16: 11 New
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            Do you know why? Because any general could be shot for two or three times (any citizen of the USSR) And if your death is near, you do not care about the death of others! That drove millions of people to certain death!
            Survive yourself at any cost, and then God the Stalin will die or the USSR will fall apart, or something else
            1. kalibr 11 February 2020 16: 49 New
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              Quote: karabass
              Do you know why? Because any general could be shot for two or three times (any citizen of the USSR) And if your death is near, you do not care about the death of others! That drove millions of people to certain death!
              Survive yourself at any cost, and then God the Stalin will die or the USSR will fall apart, or something else

              That is exactly what happened. Anyone, just not me!
        4. Nikolai Korovin 12 February 2020 20: 10 New
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          It would be interesting to get acquainted with the original of the above Zhukovsky training manuals. Don’t throw a link?
          1. vladimirZ 13 February 2020 20: 49 New
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            It would be interesting to get acquainted with the original of the above Zhukovsky training manuals. Don’t throw a link? - Nikolay Korovin (Nikolay)

            A reference in documents, characteristics about Zhukov GK, the history of battles where he participated.
            Order of the Minister of Armed Forces of the USSR No. 009. June 9, 1946:
            “Marshal Zhukov, having lost all modesty and being carried away by a sense of personal ambition, believed that his merits were not sufficiently appreciated, while attributing to himself in conversations with his subordinates the development and conduct of all the main operations of the Great Patriotic War, including those operations for which he did not have no relation. ”
            The authors of the text of the order are Bulganin and Vasilevsky. Stalin agreed with the text and signed the order.
            Marshal Rokossovsky K.K .:
            “Zhukov, this usurper and rude, treated me very badly, just not humanly. He trampled all on his way ... I already worked with comrade Zhukov, and I know him as flaky. This is a terrible and narrow-minded person. A careerist of the highest mark ... It should be said that Zhukov’s operational art is 5-6 times superior in strength, otherwise he won’t get down to business, he doesn’t know how to fight not by quantity, and builds his career on blood ”
            (“VIZH” No. 5, 1994, p. 19)
            In 1930, Rokossovsky was the commander of the 7th Samara named after the English proletariat of the cavalry division. And Zhukov in this division commanded the 2nd brigade. Here is an excerpt from the certification signed by Rokossovsky on November 8, 1930:
            “Has a significant share of stubbornness. Painfully proud .... He cannot be assigned to staff and teaching work, he organically hates her ”(VIZh 1990, No 5, p. 22)
            Rokossovsky describes the situation of wild nervousness in the Zhukov brigade. The brigade was shaking and feverish. It was possible to restore order only by removing Zhukov from the brigade. Zhukov was kicked up.
            In a letter to the editorial office of the VIZH, Rokossovsky writes:
            “Complaints came to the division, and the command had to deal with them. Attempts to influence the brigade commander were unsuccessful. And in order to improve the situation in the brigade, we were forced to “nominate” G.K. Zhukov to the highest position. ” (VIZH, 1988, No. 10 p. 17)
            In the army, this is called "kick up." Maybe in November 1930, the commander of the Rokossovsky K.K. unfairly certified his subordinate? Maybe it was just wrong? Subsequent events proved the truth of Konstantin Konstantinovich.
            31 October 1931 of the year certification on Zhukov writes Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, inspector of the cavalry of the Red Army S.M. Budyonny. He believes that Zhukov is a solid member of the party, but adds: excessive rigidity is observed. (“VIZH”, 1990, No. 5. P. 23)
            Certification of Zhukov by Commander of the Belarusian Military District Commander MP P. Kovalev inscribes the usual words: "There have been cases of rudeness in the treatment of subordinates, for which Comrade Zhukov has a reprimand for the party line." (Marshals of the Soviet Union. Moscow. Favorite book. 1996. S. 35).
            January 14, 1941 Zhukov, chief of the General Staff of the spacecraft. The General Staff begins to develop measures to ensure plans for an offensive war against Germany with the main strike in the direction of Romania-Hungary-Germany and an auxiliary strike through East Prussia and Poland to Berlin.
            In May 1941, the plan was ready and its detailed implementation began. I don’t know what Zhukov’s contribution to the development of the plan was, but this plan was written by the chief of the operational department of the General Staff Vasilevsky and, although it does not have the signatures of Stalin, Tymoshenko and Zhukov, they began to implement the plan. The proposals of this “plan” to Stalin from Zhukov-Timoshenko are in the memoirs of Zhukov G.K.
            The result is the summer-fall of 1941 CATASTROPHE. And the Chief of the General Staff bears direct and full personal responsibility for it.
            On June 23, 1941, General Zhukov, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, urgently departed for the South-Western Front to implement his Directive No. 3 of 22.0-6.1941, where he organized a tank counterattack. Zhukov personally organized and led the tank battle in the area of ​​Dubno-Lutsk-Rivne (June 23-30, 1941). Having assembled “only” 6 mechanized corps (4th, 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd), which had about 3400 tanks, not including motorized infantry divisions, plus 4 rifle corps , plus the cavalry corps, Zhukov tried to strike at the German forces of the South group, which had just less than 600 tanks in 4 tank divisions and 6 infantry divisions. Zhukov, giving orders, introducing tank divisions into battle in parts, right from the march, not allowing them to concentrate, not allowing them to put their equipment in order, not allowing people to get at least a little rest and food, achieved ... a complete defeat of his armada. After making sure of the defeat, Zhukov left the troops and left for Moscow.
            Zhukov in Leningrad. 5 days after taking office, Zhukov sends an order to the troops that not only those who are captured will be executed as enemies of the people, but also their families that are to be shot - “Soldiers who surrendered are to be shot upon return. Families who surrendered to the enemy to track down and shoot ... ". The effect of this order was devastating. The troops stopped attacking, the scouts did not go behind enemy lines, the pilots stopped crossing the front line. You never know what could be! They will bring down an airplane on the other side — a family under execution. Concussion during the battle - the family is over. Risking yourself is one thing, but if there is also a burden of responsibility for the family .... The Navy forwarded the text of Zhukov’s order to their superiors in Moscow, they went to Stalin and the Supreme Order canceled it ...
            Defense of Moscow. The solid “stand to death” is the style of Zhukov’s command, with the threat of execution to everyone. An example, to build a defense near a natural water barrier is beneficial. The river, lake, reservoir should be in front of the line of defense, and not in the rear. This is an axiom! Rokossovsky asks for permission to withdraw troops over the water barrier and build defenses along the coast. Zhukov threatens to be shot on the spot. Rokossovsky calls through Zhukov’s head directly to the chief of the General Staff and he sanctioned the withdrawal of troops. Zhukov cancels the order of the General Staff and again threatens the execution of Rokossovsky ...
            But he takes care of himself ... Zhukov turns to the Supreme for permission to withdraw the front headquarters to the eastern outskirts of Moscow. The witness of the conversation was Chief Marshal of Aviation Golovanov. Stalin advised those who called from Zhukov’s headquarters to take shovels and dig graves for themselves where the headquarters is now.
            For the victory in the battle of Moscow, many soldiers, officers and generals were awarded. Zhukov did not receive anything - such is the assessment of his "merits" in the Moscow battle by Stalin I.V.
            Under Rzhev. Zhukov drives immediately after the Moscow battle the remaining exhausted troops into a further offensive: to storm, take Sychevka at any cost! It doesn’t work ... Tens of thousands of soldiers lay down in front of Sychevka. Zhukov drives them again and again .... The first attack from January 8 to April 20 of the 42nd year. Irrecoverable losses (officially) 272 thousand 320 people. According to indirect data - at least 500 thousand. Objectives not achieved. The Rzhev-Sychev offensive operation July 30 - October 1. Losses of at least 200 thousand. The goal is not achieved. Second Rzhev-Sychevsky strategic offensive operation (Operation Mars), November 25 to December 20, 42. About 200 thousand more losses. Moreover, Zhukov near Sychevka and Rzhev had more troops, more tanks, more artillery and aviation than was used near Stalingrad. And failure again.
            Vasilevsky and Rokossovsky suggested stopping the Rzhev-Sychev attempts of Zhukov. They suggested moving there on the defensive, and transferring forces and means to the south to attack Rostov, cutting off the entire Army Group “South”. But Zhukov categorically objected, insisting on squeezing the enemy out of Sychevka with frontal attacks.
            After rzhev Zhukov became the "representative of the Supreme High Command." What was the work of the "representative of the bet" - no one really can not explain. Below is the opinion of Rokossovsky K.K. about the "institute of representatives of the Bet." In principle, Zhukov’s position can be called “Stalin’s controller-coordinator”. Stalin did not allow Zhukov to work out plans of operations anymore, realizing the validity of the characteristics of 1930 - Zhukov did not understand and did not like staff work.
            Kursk arc. From a letter of K.K.Rokossovsky to the editorial office of the VIZH:
            “... Zhukov G. K. refused even to authorize my proposal to start artillery counter-training, providing a solution to this issue to me, as the front commander. It was necessary to decide on this event immediately, since time did not allow the request of the Bet. G.K. Zhukov phoned Stavka at about 10 a.m. on July 5, reporting to HF in my presence to Stalin (I transmit verbatim) that Kostin (my pseudonym) is commanding the troops confidently and firmly and that the enemy’s attack is successfully repelled. Immediately, he asked for permission to depart to him at Sokolovsky. After this conversation he left us immediately. This is actually what G. Zhukov’s stay on the Central Front looked like. In the preparatory period for the operation, G. Zhukov never visited us on the Central Front. ”
            1944 Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge. Telegram of Stalin to Zhukov:
            “I must point out to you that I have entrusted you with the task of coordinating the actions of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts, and meanwhile, from your report today it is clear that, despite the severity of the situation, you are not sufficiently aware of the situation: you are not aware of the occupation an adversary of Hilka and Nova Buda; You do not know Konev’s decision to use 5 Guards. kk. and Rotmistrov’s tank corps with the goal of destroying the enemy who had broken through to Shenderovka. The manpower and resources on the left wing of the 1st UV and on the right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front are enough to eliminate the enemy’s breakthrough and destroy the Korsun group. I demand that you pay the main attention to this task. ”
            1. Nikolai Korovin 14 February 2020 00: 06 New
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              You butchered the Marshal of Victory as God the tortoise. No living space left. However, not everything you wrote. Khalkhin-Gol, Leningrad, operation "Bagration", the capture of Berlin ... In general, he filled up with corpses. Under one Sychevka he laid 900 thousand. Wrecking, however! But only it seems to me that you are exaggerating a little. That Stalin agreed with Bulganin and Malinovsky is perhaps true. He was somewhat afraid of Zhukov’s influence - well, he sent him to Odessa. That Zhukov is a tough and tough person - it was also known for a long time. Here they are with Stalin right two boots of steam. Vladimir Ilyich also wrote to the congress that Comrade Stalin is rude, and therefore it would be necessary to replace him with a more polite person. But something there did not grow together, and comrade. Stalin remained at his post. But here is a relatively bad relationship with Rokossovsky - something I somewhat doubt. I read and heard the opposite. Moreover, the capture of Berlin was entrusted to Zhukov and Rokossovsky for a couple, so to speak. If they had such a bad relationship, it is unlikely that Stalin ordered them to carry out this operation together. Somehow I would spread it, I would say: "Break!" In addition, all this became clear somehow in the 90s, when there was no one to ask. And then, I remember, a lot of all kinds of interesting documents appeared about which no one had heard anything about it before. So, as they say ... oh, the forbidden word ... - well, in general, our Ukrainian brothers, "the treb rozuzhuvat cherished." Somehow somewhat unclear. Well, the opinion of Bulganin and Malinovsky ... Bulganin did not specifically command anything at all, was a member of several front-line military councils, and he directly replaced Stalin as Minister of Defense. Malinovsky, of course, a prominent military leader, commanded the fronts ... But he, too, had a hand in the Izyum-Barven operation, followed by an attack on Kharkov with known consequences as commander of the Southern Front. Although he really stopped Manstein near Stalingrad as commander of the 2nd Guards Army, and then had merits, especially as commander of the Transbaikal Front in 1945, and was also Minister of Defense from 1957 to 1967. But there is also no doubt that fact that in 1957 Malinovsky replaced Zhukov as Minister of Defense, and Zhukov was expelled from the party, removed from all posts and dismissed in 1958. So not everything is so clear with the presentation of Comrade Bulganin and Malinovsky comrade To Stalin.
              1. vladimirZ 14 February 2020 07: 49 New
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                But here is a relatively bad relationship with Rokossovsky - something I somewhat doubt. .... - Nikolay Korovin (Nikolay)

                And this I did not cite all the documents and facts on G. Zhukov. I didn’t miss the comment volume in VO. Yes, well, you want to read it yourself.
                As for the attitude of K.K. Rokossovsky read his memories, his characteristics Zhukov G.K.
                Rokkosovsky and Golovanov - two military marshals who did not betray I.V. Stalin to please Khrushchev, and remained faithful to their Supreme, despite the disgrace of the power-holding Khrushchev. And Zhukov G.K. betrayed I.V. Stalin voluntarily wrote a libel to him at the closed Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The plenary session did not take place, but the document remained in the archives, it was posted on the Internet, you can read this dirty lie on the Supreme Commander.
                By the way, if we evaluate the objective characteristics of contemporaries and top leaders of the state to G. Zhukov in the post-war Soviet era, both Stalin and later, it is negative for him. There is an Internet video of a respected historian Yuri Zhukov about his attitude to Zhukov G.K. then generals.
                I.V. Stalin for all his relations with people and subordinates, for failure due to the fault of Zhukov G.K. the initial stage of the war, for looting, arrogance and attribution of merit to the development and conduct of other people's non-Jewish strategic operations in the Second World War, removed him from senior positions in the Army, first to the Odessa Military District, but after he awarded there, even further to the second-class Ural Military District .
                Khrushchev pulled out of there Zhukova G.K. for their own purposes, the seizure of personal power, instead of the collective leadership of the country by the leadership of the CPSU. For dubious “merits”, in fact, participating in a coup d'etat, having appointed him Minister of Defense, but after two years seeing what this “terrible and short-sighted” person really represents (KK Rokossovsky’s description - see above), removed him from his post from the Army completely, which was usually not done with honored marshals and generals, although his age still allowed Zhukov to serve. Later NOBODY and NEVER, knowing the objective characteristic of Zhukov G.K. didn't even try to get him back from there.
                The exaltation of Zhukov G.K. It came in the anti-Stalin and anti-Soviet period, when instead of the present and current Head of the USSR Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War, I.V. Stalin, it took a different person to power, so that the people forgot Stalin. And then it was time for “Marshal of Victory” Zhukov G.K. that now "triumphs" contrary to common sense and the real history of the Second World War. But time MUST dispel "mountains of garbage and slander" against the actual Marshal of Victory Stalin IV, and inevitably the Truth will triumph in the country and the people.
                1. Nikolai Korovin 25 February 2020 03: 45 New
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                  Something I somehow missed your answer. Well - insomnia, give, I think, I'll see what they write to me. You wrote quite a lot here, but you did not convince me. You are probably still quite young. The film epic "Liberation", presumably, did not look. She was widely shown throughout the country in the early 70s, the artist Nikolay Olyalin, who played the role of a combat front major, was very popular. Then the war veterans took it for their own. But only by age he didn’t get to the front in any way. Well, the work of the Supreme High Command Headquarters was shown in some detail, moreover, when developing several operations. It is worth recalling that L.I. Brezhnev himself was a real front-line soldier, although he was a political worker, but the activities of political workers at the front are distorted in modern military crafts, although it must be admitted that among them were not particularly worthy people according to various opinions. But this does not apply to most of them. Sam L.I. Brezhnev received the rank of major general during the war, participated in the Victory Parade. So he understood what was happening. Participation in the landing through the Novorossiysk Bay is, you know, not a sheep sneezed.

                  So here. The front life of the soldiers and officers was shown in this beautiful film mainly in the form of a tragic and lyrical story, but the Headquarters, as I understand it, was based on documents that were then available to the country's leadership. And the figure of I.V. Stalin was by no means compromised. On the contrary. It was shown that he always reserved the last, decisive word. But it was also clearly shown that G.K. Zhukov was precisely that military leader, to whose opinion I.V. Stalin listened most of all and whom he sent to the most responsible sectors of the front — whether as the front commander, or as the representative of the Headquarters ... You seem to underestimate the role of representatives of the Headquarters.
                  And that some documents came to light in the 90s ... You know, a lot of different documents appeared then, in which it was written that the ears were curled up. But what is characteristic is that some such document will appear, someone strongly compromising - well, that’s all, there’s nowhere to put samples on the person. And suddenly - bam! There is no document. Nobody remembers him. Because in it, among other things, something is written that contradicts the facts known to a bunch of people, and voices are heard - where, they say, came from? So I don’t particularly believe this compromising evidence, revealed half a century later, and you did not convince me.
                  We remain each in our opinion in partial agreement. Do you think that the true Marshal of Victory is I.V. Stalin. I agree with you on this. But you think that G.K. Zhukov only interfered with him, or even directly engaged in sabotage, and wrote some kind of slander about him — I disagree with this. On the contrary, I believe that G.K. Zhukov was, so to speak, the right hand of I.V. Stalin.
                  As A.V. once put it Suvorov: "Kutuzov commanded my left flank, but was my right hand." What characterizes M.I. very well Kutuzova, agree. Or is it about P.I. Bagration said? But, you know, I have such a general impression that A.V. Suvorov always sent P.I. Bagration, bypassing the left flank of the enemy, that is, P.I. Bagration just as if commanded the right flank. But I could be wrong - I have not read the relevant literature for a long time, and I completely abandoned the maps. So see for yourself if you're interested. But what roundabout maneuvers was always commanded by P.I. Bagration is a fact.

                  Since neither I can convince you, nor you me, we’ll split up this way. Brack, so to speak.
                  1. vladimirZ 25 February 2020 09: 07 New
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                    You did not convince me. You are probably still quite young. The film epic "Liberation", presumably, did not look. - Nikolay Korovin (Nikolay)

                    Your mistake is that you evaluate the Second World War on feature films and the same books, but this is not true. The history of war needs to be studied in documentary, archives, historical research.
                    I’m almost seventy years old, I have been interested in the history (documentary) of WWII and WWII for more than 45 years, since studying the course “history of military art” of the military department of the university. I read hundreds of books of documentary, research, memoirs, many, many authors on this topic, which was transformed into such an understanding of the history of the war, as described above.
                    The film "Liberation" and the role of Zhukov G.K. in it - free fiction on the theme of war, nothing more, which gave rise to a misunderstanding of the essence of the war and the role of Zhukov in it.
                    Unfortunately, the history of the Second World War, especially its initial period, the role of individuals in it, especially I.V. Stalin, Zhukova G.K. and others. Built on false myths, undisclosed military archives, compiled to please political temporary workers in power, and does not correspond to objective historical reality.
                    Today, our government in Russia is actively opposing the distortion of WWII history by Western politicians, but they themselves do this by deleting from the history of the war, for example, its most important components, such as the huge organizing role in the war of the Communist Party and Communists, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the role of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin, exaggerating the role of all kinds of "penal battalions", "unjustified repressions against entire nations", exaltation of the same Zhukov G.K. instead of I.V. Stalin, etc., etc.
                    It is your right to remain convinced of the artistic work of the authors of fictional films and books.
                    1. Nikolai Korovin 25 February 2020 18: 49 New
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                      Well, sorry, please. If you started with the fact that you have been involved in the history of the Great Patriotic War for 45 years and studied hundreds of books on this issue, I would not have cited the film as an example, although I still believe that it is basically true. And in general, the last post was written in a state of insomnia, and draw on the basis of its conclusions with a hint of the level of my mental development. I can’t boast of so much special and memoir literature read - I won’t conceal that I read more works of art, and did not immediately learn to find certain inconsistencies in them. But I still read a dozen or two books of such a plan, as you mention, and did not notice such incriminating evidence against Zhukov as you mention. For starters, I read what is at hand. Unfortunately, there are not very many. But still, in order to restore general orientation during the war, it’s enough, and, admittedly, I began to forget the dates of the main operations of the war, the front commanders, etc. On the basis of everything that I knew at the moment, I can’t accept your point of view, but I will keep in mind that it exists.
                      1. vladimirZ 25 February 2020 19: 12 New
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                        Read, on the Internet there are a lot of documentary books, archival sources, historical studies on the themes of the Second World War, memoirs and memoirs, various authors, just have time to read.
                        The main thing is to take everything critically, not to focus on one version of the above, and on one author, no matter how much he impressed you with his point of view. With the mass of readings, understanding of the history of the war will come, as an objective historical process close to reality, and not a popular print drawn in feature films, and real participation in it, and not propaganda as opposed to I.V. Stalin, the same Zhukov G.K.
    2. svp67 11 February 2020 08: 48 New
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      Quote: vladimirZ
      This strategy, in a snap, to take and win the war with the Germans, flourished in the General Staff (Zhukov) and the People’s Commissariat of Defense (Tymoshenko)

      And what does this have to do with it? During this war, the General Staff was completely led by Shaposhnikov, and the People's Commissar was Voroshilov
      1. vladimirZ 11 February 2020 09: 05 New
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        And what does this have to do with it? During this war, the General Staff was completely led by Shaposhnikov, and the People's Commissar was Voroshilov - svp67 (Sergey)

        So the training system for military personnel was the only one that trained personnel from poorly educated people, raising it to the principle "we did not finish academies!" Let Voroshilov-Shaposhnikov be in Finnish, although Shaposhnikov objected to this beginning of this military campaign, and the conclusions from the unsuccessful start of the Finnish campaign were corrected in a matter of days.
        Well, the Great Patriotic War, its flaws, which did not make obvious conclusions from the Winter War, is already Zhukov-Tymoshenko's “valor”, nowhere to go. Their "merit", forever inscribed in history as a black spot. Yes, the benefit would be a black spot, but how to write off millions of people who died and suffered through their fault.
        1. Alexey RA 11 February 2020 11: 35 New
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          Quote: vladimirZ
          So the training system for military personnel was the only one that trained personnel from poorly educated people, raising it to the principle "we did not finish academies!"

          So there were no other frames. 90% of cadets with primary education in the early 30s are a bitter prose of life, a slice of Soviet society. But it is precisely these cadets who will become divisional commanders for war.
          The situation more or less improved only by the end of the 30s, and then almost half of the future officers had only seven years behind them.
          The expansion of the network of military educational institutions was made possible thanks to the successes of the cultural revolution, the growth of the general educational level of the people. In 1939, among cadets of colleges, graduating from technical schools and technical schools accounted for 14,5% of the total, 10 classes - 17%, 9 classes - 9,9%, 8 classes - 12,6%, 7 classes - 43,9%, and students Universities were 1,5%.

          Quote: vladimirZ
          Well, the Great Patriotic War, its flaws, which did not make obvious conclusions from the Winter War, is already Zhukov-Tymoshenko's “valor”, nowhere to go.

          Tell me, how to draw conclusions from the Winter War in a year? Moreover, against the background of a cardinal reform of the army with a threefold increase in the number of formations only at the level of divisions.
          1. vladimirZ 11 February 2020 16: 51 New
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            Tell me, how to draw conclusions from the Winter War in a year? Moreover, against the background of a cardinal reform of the army with a threefold increase in the number of formations only at the level of divisions. - Alexey RA (Alexey)

            I fully agree with you on the level of education. By the way, now I’m reading Andrei Smirnov’s book “The Collapse of 1941 - nothing to do with repression! Has Stalin“ beheaded ”the Red Army?” So the author is on various documents: reports in / districts and inspectors for verification of troops, minutes of meetings, and reports of various levels of commanders, acts of verification of military units, the results of various kinds of exercises, etc. analyzes the ability of command and command staff of the spacecraft before the "repressions" of 1937 and after them. It is not myths and liberal fables, but specifically facts and documents, and it concludes that “repressions” did not in any way affect the level of commanding skill — they, as they were bad before the “repressions,” remained bad after not able to properly organize troops for the introduction of training and military operations, ignoring reconnaissance, organizing interaction with artillery, inability to establish communication with subordinate troops in movement and during exercises, not to mention military operations, etc. Honestly, the author writes a bit boring, and where is the fun, when Smirnov cites many excerpts of documents telling about the weakness of the command staff of the spacecraft, and it must be said that this was before the "cardinal reform of the army with a threefold increase in the number of formations only at the level of divisions."

            Now on the question, what could be drawn from the conclusions of the Winter War “in a year”? Well, not in a year, but more than a year, or rather, 1,4 years.
            first - abandoning ill-conceived adventurous actions in a snap, without reconnaissance, and properly preparing the troops for offensive operations, do not ignore the strategic defense, which includes historically justified tactics of temporary retreat for the accumulation of forces and training - active defense.
            Second - not to conduct such a deployment of the troops of the first echelon along the border line, deliberately substituting the troops for rout.
            The third - do not store military equipment, ammunition, tank and art parks, airfields, etc. at the border. A simple fact is that in the first days of the war the Germans destroyed or captured more than 5 million rifles intended for mobilization personnel, resulting in, as some write, “one rifle for three,” which is probably a fake, but “there is no smoke without fire” and such facts were.
            Fourth - not to place rifle corps and divisions formed on the basis of the national armies of the former Baltic countries, which actually opened the front at the junction of the PribVO and OzapVO, into which strategically important Gotha tanks flocked towards Vilnius, and then turned to Minsk, together with the Guderian tank group, operating from Brest, the environment of all the troops of the OzpAVO.
            Well, etc, etc. not requiring something beyond the natural of the already weak state of combat readiness of our troops.
            1. Alexey RA 11 February 2020 19: 18 New
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              Quote: vladimirZ
              The first is to abandon ill-conceived adventurous actions abruptly, without reconnaissance, and properly prepare the troops for offensive operations, and not to ignore the strategic defense, which includes historically justified tactics of temporary retreat for the accumulation of forces and training - active defense.

              The country has been preparing for strategic defense since the 20s. "Strategy of starvation", evacuation and mobilization - three pillars of the future great war.
              And while propaganda was broadcasting about "on a foreign land," the people's commissars signed plans to expand the evacuation areas. smile
              Quote: vladimirZ
              The second is not to conduct such a deployment of the troops of the first echelon along the border line, deliberately substituting the troops for rout.

              This is the deployment of a cover army. Which was supposed to fight the invading army. and not try to repel the blow of the entire mobilized army of the enemy.
              In addition, do not forget that we have the Red Army-40. The daily march of the same mechanized corps is only 50 km.
              Quote: vladimirZ
              Third, do not stockpile military equipment, ammunition, tank and art parks, airfields, etc. at the border. A simple fact is that in the first days of the war the Germans destroyed or captured more than 5 million rifles intended for mobilization personnel, resulting in, as some write, “one rifle for three,” which is probably a fake, but “there is no smoke without fire” and such facts were.

              Ammunition:
              Of the total number of district warehouses, 10 were built in the pre-Soviet period, 20 were organized in 1941 in the Baltic republics, Western Belarus and Ukraine on the basis of military warehouses already existing there, 13 were equipped in the open air, and the remaining 68 warehouses were created during the Soviet era in mainly in 1930-1940
              (...)
              The artillery depots of the border districts were dispersed along the front and layered in depth. The first line of warehouses located 50-75 km from the state border was advanced warehouses, usually small ones (4th category). On the second line, 300-400 km away from the state border, warehouses of the 3rd and partially 2nd category were located, and on the third (rear) line were the most powerful warehouses (1st and 2nd categories). The total depth of the separation of the warehouses reached 500-600 km.
              © "Artillery Supply in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45."
              500-600 km from the border - so much further? These are five daily truck runs!
              And behind these warehouses there were still warehouses of central subordination (70% of the capacity of warehouses of all districts) - from Toropets and Nizhyn to Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk.
              Quote: vladimirZ
              Fourth, do not place infantry corps and divisions formed on the basis of the national armies of the former Baltic countries on strategically important areas in the Baltic Military District

              Yes there. But on the other hand, part of the Baltic formations fought with honor throughout the war.
              EMNIP, near Moscow, one of the Baltic anti-aircraft units at the exit from the boiler took advantage of the fact that they left the old uniform and weapons in the Red Army - so they drove through the Germans in German helmets and overcoats, and even on German tractors pulling German guns. smile
              1. ser56 12 February 2020 17: 06 New
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                Quote: Alexey RA
                The country has been preparing for strategic defense since the 20s.

                it was, but in 1941 she had 21 MK ... and 24 tanks ..
                Quote: Alexey RA
                The daily march of the same mechanized corps is only 50 km.

                Do you need more? such a promotion, even in Vistula-Odersuyu, was rare ...
                1. Alexey RA 12 February 2020 18: 08 New
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                  Quote: ser56
                  it was, but in 1941 she had 21 MK ... and 24 tanks ..

                  And these 24 were enough to hold out for the first six months. wink
                  Quote: ser56
                  Do you need more? such a promotion, even in Vistula-Odersuyu, was rare ...

                  50 km is a march in its rear, without enemy influence, along a working road network.
                  1. ser56 12 February 2020 18: 37 New
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                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    And these 24 were enough to hold out for the first six months. wink

                    and it was quite enough to defeat the enemy, with their competent use ... request
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    50 km is a march in its rear, without enemy influence, along a working road network.

                    and this is the problem of their structure - the bulkiness and poor equipment of cars and tractors! The militants in the march in Mongolia showed good strategic mobility ...
                    1. Alexey RA 18 February 2020 17: 58 New
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                      Quote: ser56
                      The militants in the march in Mongolia showed good strategic mobility ...

                      And complete helplessness in a collision with infantry - due to the lack of their own motorized infantry and artillery. And as soon as the NPP tank brigades began to make full-fledged formations, the states immediately began to grow by leaps and bounds.
                      1. ser56 19 February 2020 11: 41 New
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                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        And complete helplessness in a collision with an infantry

                        who is arguing?
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        And as soon as they began to make full-fledged formations from tank brigades

                        somehow the monsters turned out request Instead of introducing 2-3 battalions of motorized infantry and a division of 122 howitzers, better than self-propelled ones like SU-5-2, into the TBR, they began to build monsters ...
                        and what about the GKZH started - 29 MK for 1000 tanks - this is a super fool ... request
          2. ser56 12 February 2020 17: 03 New
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            Quote: Alexey RA
            So there were no other frames. 90% of cadets with primary education in the early 30s are a bitter prose of life, a slice of Soviet society

            However, in RI it was somehow possible to form a competent officer corps, but in the Red Army - no! And after all the successes of education in the USSR ... Why? request
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Tell me, how to draw conclusions from the Winter War in a year?

            And after all, by 1939, Soviet power was already 20 years old ... repeat
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Moreover, against the background of a cardinal reform of the army with a threefold increase in the number of formations only at the level of divisions.

            The growth of the Wehrmacht was more rapid ... but managed ... request
            Maybe something was wrong in the preparation of the Red Army command, so neither Zhukov, nor Tymoshenko, nor the others bothered to pull up anything in common. nor military education? repeat But you read the memoirs of the Germans, for example, the Soldier of three armies - so they are constantly learning ... hi
            1. Alexey RA 12 February 2020 18: 39 New
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              Quote: ser56
              However, in RI it was somehow possible to form a competent officer corps, but in the Red Army - no! And after all the successes of education in the USSR ... Why?

              The "literacy" of the Red Army command staff was greatly undermined by the reform of 1939-1940, during which the sharply increased number of staff positions was filled with cash command staff.
              Appointments and relocations in 1939 alone involved 246626 people, which was then 68,8% of the staff of the commanding staff.
              (...)
              The total number of appointments to the nomenclature positions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for 1939 amounted to 3031 people, i.e. 62,5% of their full-time staff; for the group of combat posts from the regiment commander and above, 2452 appointments were made in the same year, or 73,9% of their full-time staff.

              Due to frequent movements, many officers before the war performed their posts for a short time and did not have time to gain the necessary experience. In a number of military districts, up to half of the command staff had practical command experience from 6 months to 1 year. In all districts, 30–40% of mid-level commanders were reserve officers with insufficient military training. In February 1941, 35,7% of the Air Force commanders of the districts and their deputies were held for up to 6 months, 39,3% - from 6 months to 1 year and 25% - over a year, 55% of the commanders of aviation corps, brigades and their deputies served in this capacity for up to 6 months, 41,3% - from 6 months to one year, and only 3,7% - over one year. 37,4% of aviation regiment commanders commanded regiments for less than 6 months, 27,6% - from 6 months to one year, 13% - from one year to 2 years, and 22% - over 2 years.
              In the ground forces at the military district - regiment level, an average of 75% of the commanders and 70% of political workers had a working experience of up to one year. Approximately in the same position was the officer corps of the Navy.

              © "Military personnel on the eve of the war"
              The "wild" officers at first were not particularly literate. Plus, in this case, there is a great chance to jump even above the personal threshold of incompetence - because there are fewer people than posts. EMNIP, the lack of command personnel in the Red Army in 1941 amounted to 60 thousand people. In the spring of 1941, the commander of one of the mechanized corps reported that he had one man in the operational department of one of the divisions.

              What about educational success - Believe propaganda less. The same educational program worked all the thirties. Two-thirds of privates in 1941 with only primary education are the standard of living of the BTW KOVO.
              1. ser56 13 February 2020 16: 37 New
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                Quote: Alexey RA
                The "literacy" of the Red Army commanding staff was greatly undermined by the reform of 1939-1940.

                the question is why was the advance training of the command staff in military departments in technical schools and universities not provided? OR those who could be trained destroyed in 1930 as part of Operation Spring?
                Quote: Alexey RA
                And about the success of education - believe less propaganda

                I understand that the general level of secondary and higher education in the USSR has fallen compared with RI, but the number of graduates has nevertheless increased!
        2. Sugar Honeyovich 11 February 2020 15: 20 New
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          Quote: vladimirZ
          So the training system for military personnel was the only one that trained personnel from poorly educated people, raising it to the principle "we did not finish academies!"

          Education 01.01.1941 commanders of the Red Army:
          Corps commanders: 52% higher and 48% average.
          Divisions and brigades: 40% higher and 60% average.
          Regiments: 14% higher, 60% average, 26% accelerated, 3 people (out of 1833) —none.
          Battalions: 2% higher, 92% average, 6% accelerated, 7 people (out of 8425) –– none
          https://www.litmir.me/br/?b=20231&p=31
        3. Nikolai Korovin 12 February 2020 20: 14 New
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          Pavlov, therefore, an innocent victim. Where the directive was brought in time to the troops, the Germans in the early days did not have much success. The entire severity of the summer-autumn of 1941 was predetermined solely by failure in the Belarusian direction.
    3. strannik1985 11 February 2020 08: 58 New
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      Well, finally, at least an objective article about the Winter War

      The article is almost completely taken from chapter 2. “Tolstoyans” and “Millionaires” of the book by A. Isaev "Ten myths of the Second World War."
    4. Olgovich 11 February 2020 09: 47 New
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      Quote: vladimirZ
      True I.V. Stalin critical assessment Zhukov G.K. all the same given

      Certainly: G.K. Zhukov is the only one four times Hero of the Soviet Union, three of which he taught DIRECTLY for the war.
      NOBODY got more than him.

      And this is absolute recognition of military merit.

      And what was after war was after her.
      For its post-war reasons.
      П
      Quote: vladimirZ
      Here is this strategy unceremoniously take and win the war with the Germans flourished in the General Staff (Zhukov) and the People’s Commissariat of Defense (Tymoshenko) before the war

      Bring proof of of this nonsense: Zhukov’s documents with these allegations of "cheating", etc. ,
      By the way, he was the beginning. The General Staff is only a few MONTHS to the beginning of the Second World War, which is clearly a secret for you.

      What are not able to?

      Of course not.

      But in a position to chat dirty Gossip, like surviving from a grandmother at the entrance ....

      PS Zhukov, does not relate to the Winter War in any way, it is not mentioned in the article, pulling it here is just a flood
      1. vladimirZ 11 February 2020 09: 52 New
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        G.K. Zhukov is the only four times Hero of the Soviet Union, three of whom he taught directly for the war. - Olgovich (Andrey)

        Well, let's be precise. For the Second World War Zhukov G.K. received, like a significant part of the generals, only 2 stars of the Hero. The first is for Khalkhin-Gol, the 4th is anniversary.
        So, according to the awards, he does not have any special merit, in comparison with other generals twice as Heroes.
        1. Olgovich 11 February 2020 10: 24 New
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          Quote: vladimirZ
          For the Second World War Zhukov G.K. received, like a significant part of the generals, only 2 stars of the Hero. The first is for Khalkhin Gol

          And Khalkhin Goal already .... not a war ?! belay
          1. vladimirZ 11 February 2020 10: 28 New
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            And Khalkhin Goal already .... not a war ?! - Olgovich (Andrey)

            Well. Are you a history buff ?! Khalkhin-Gol military conflict, not related to the Second World War against Germany and its European satellites.
            1. Sanichsan 11 February 2020 17: 32 New
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              Quote: vladimirZ
              Khalkhin-Gol military conflict, not related to the Second World War against Germany and its European satellites.

              what do you mean? You want to say that Khalkhin-Gol did not affect the events of the Second World War?
          2. Alexey RA 11 February 2020 11: 46 New
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            Quote: Olgovich
            And Khalkhin Goal already .... not a war ?!

            Thank God no. We just still did not have enough war with IJA in 1939 for complete happiness. smile
            Yes, and the results of HG were slightly different from how they were later described in propaganda.
            On August 28, at 21 p.m. Moscow time, Commander Zhukov sent a telegram to the People's Commissar of Defense:
            "Moscow. Comrade Voroshilov
            The Japanese-Manchu troops that violated the border of the MPR are completely surrounded and destroyed by parts of the 1st Army Group and the MPR.
            At 22.30 on 28.8, the last center of resistance was liquidated - the Remizovskaya height, where up to three infantry battalions were destroyed. The remnants - 100-200 people who fled into the dunes, are destroyed in a night battle.
            The MPR border has been fully restored. Details by special report ”
            On this winning telegram Zhukov Voroshilov imposed a resolution:
            “Comrade To Stalin
            I am sending the report just received to Comrade Zhukov and Kalugin. As expected, there were no divisions in the encirclement, the enemy either managed to withdraw the main forces, or rather, there were no large forces in this area for a long time, and a specially trained garrison was sitting, which is now completely destroyed. ”
            © Ulanov / Shein
            1. Olgovich 11 February 2020 12: 16 New
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              Quote: Alexey RA
              Quote: Olgovich
              And Khalkhin Goal already ....not war ?!

              Thank God,
              no. We just still did not have enough war with IJA in 1939 for complete happiness.

              Exactly, it was a "world"! yes

              Therefore, apparently he is named: Khalkhyn golyyn bayldaan or Mong. Khalkhin Golyyn Dine «Khalkhin-Golskai am war» recourse

              With tens of thousands of KILLED, hundred warring tanks and planes, this is exactly what happens peaceful conflict resolution between countries - using armed forces sides. yes
              1. strannik1985 11 February 2020 15: 50 New
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                With tens of thousands of KILLED

                Local conflict of high intensity, for example, by June 25, 12,5 thousand Soviet soldiers against 38 thousand Japanese, by July 10, 57 thousand against 75, respectively.
                1. Olgovich 11 February 2020 15: 52 New
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                  Quote: strannik1985
                  Local conflict high intensity

                  There is a definition of the concept of "war" and it fully fits in there ...
                  1. strannik1985 11 February 2020 16: 32 New
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                    There is a definition

                    Of course, but do you understand that war is war?
                    According to Shaposhnikov’s "Strategic Deployment Plan" of March 24.03.1938, 40, 5 SDs, 7 CDs, 3 TBbrs, 27 MBBrs were going to be deployed in the East against 33-4 PDs and XNUMX Japanese security and special brigades. Yes, HG war, but not full-scale, a test of strength.
              2. Alexey RA 11 February 2020 15: 57 New
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                Quote: Olgovich
                Exactly, it was a "world"!

                It was a conflict of limited scope. Not a war.
                You want to start a big war in Mongolia. The enemy in response to your rounds will throw additional forces. The center of struggle will inevitably expand and take a protracted character, and we will be drawn into a long war.
                © IVS
                Quote: Olgovich
                With tens of thousands of KILLED, hundreds of warring tanks and planes, this is precisely the peaceful resolution of the conflict between the countries, with the help of the armed forces of the parties.

                This is precisely the conflict.
                War in those parts - this is the front from Mongolia to the Pacific Ocean, the Kwantung army in its entirety (including reinforcements from the Metropolis) plus IJN against the Far Eastern Front, DBA and Pacific Fleet, Japanese assaults on our SDs, our raids on Japan and other excesses are bad.
                1. Hantengri 11 February 2020 21: 03 New
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                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  It was a conflict of limited scope. Not a war.

                  Simple, small, such an international tournament in applied chess. Yes? lol
                  1. Alexey RA 12 February 2020 13: 53 New
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                    Quote: HanTengri
                    Simple, small, such an international tournament in applied chess. Yes?

                    No. Clash of hull scale, limited by the number of forces involved and by geography.
                    If it was a full-fledged war, then the Kwantungs would not have had to put in place the same training aircraft to make up for losses - the Metropolis or the Expeditionary Force would help. But no - this conflict was considered an internal affair of the Kwantung Army.

                    And while this pair of corps fought each other, the main forces of the Far Eastern Front and Kvantuntsev carefully looked at each other in the sight, but did not budge.
                2. Olgovich 12 February 2020 07: 58 New
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                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  It was a conflict of limited scope. Not a war.

                  There is a definition of the concept of "war", incl. and the military encyclopedia — and this conflict fully fits into it.
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  The war in those parts is the front from Mongolia to the Pacific Ocean, the Kwantung army in its entirety (including reinforcements from the Metropolis) plus IJN against the Far Eastern Front, DBA and Pacific Fleet, Japanese assaults on our SDs, our raids on Japan and other excesses are bad.

                  No, it’s just that there are wars different scale
                  1. Alexey RA 12 February 2020 13: 56 New
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                    Quote: Olgovich
                    There is a definition of the concept of "war", incl. and the military encyclopedia — and this conflict fully fits into it.

                    In the narrow sense, military conflict implies a specific form of military violence, which, like a war, has a political connotation, but in contrast to it the objectives pursued by the conflicting parties are limited, situational or local in nature.

                    Specifically, on XG, the Japanese needed to slightly move the border with Mongolia to a line that was more advantageous for defense - to ensure the safety of the new road. I.e, limited or local on the face.
            2. Sugar Honeyovich 11 February 2020 15: 23 New
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              Quote: Alexey RA
              Thank God no

              At the same time, Zhukov, he said, had never seen a larger air battle than on Khalkhin Gol ... request
              1. Alexey RA 11 February 2020 19: 22 New
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                Quote: Sugar Honeyovich
                At the same time, Zhukov, he said, had never seen a larger air battle than on Khalkhin Gol ...

                And where could he see an air battle before? wink

                By the way, the year before, on Hassan, ours threw against the Japanese in one of the raids as many as 60 TB-3. Here we were conflicts.
                1. Sugar Honeyovich 12 February 2020 07: 59 New
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                  It's not about DO, but AT ALL. For the entire Great Patriotic War he did not see this.
            3. vladimirZ 11 February 2020 17: 04 New
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              Yes, and the results of HG were slightly different from how they were later described in propaganda. - Alexey RA (Alexey)

              Speaking of Khalkhin Gol. The Japanese ended the military conflict with the USSR in 1939 at the convincing "insistence" of the Germans who "listened" to the request of the leadership of the USSR when concluding the "Molotov-Ribentrop Pact" to help end this military conflict.
              The likelihood of this collision escalating into a full-scale war was. I.V. Stalin skillfully took advantage of the situation to help the Germans end this military conflict with Japan, which lasted several months.
              1. Sanichsan 11 February 2020 17: 38 New
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                Quote: vladimirZ
                Speaking of Khalkhin Gol. The Japanese ended the military conflict with the USSR in 1939 at the convincing "insistence" of the Germans who "listened" to the request of the leadership of the USSR when concluding the "Molotov-Ribentrop Pact" to help end this military conflict.

                very strange thesis. then why didn’t they start in 1941? only the Germans, in your words, stopped them.
                something you fantasize yes and the Molotov Rebentrop Pact, together with secret articles in the public domain, and there is not a word about Japan, as far as I remember.
                1. vladimirZ 11 February 2020 19: 34 New
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                  very strange thesis. then why didn’t they start in 1941? - SanichSan (Alexander)

                  Japan did not start a war with the USSR in 1941 because a Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty had already been concluded (April 1941), although it means little to the aggressor, BUT besides, it was already drawn into a long war in China , in the Pacific Islands, plus a war was brewing with the United States.
                  And most importantly, they could start this war when Germany would have strategically won the war with the USSR, and only against a weakened enemy, only after that.
                  Japan simply did not have the strength to act on its many fronts. In Japan, among the military there were 2 camps: land generals and naval admirals, calling on the emperor each for his own version of the action. By 1941, the “party” of the naval war won, which is why Japan went to the conclusion of an agreement with the USSR on neutrality.

                  As for the end of the conflict on Khalkhin-Gol in 1939 with the mediation of Germany, this was one of the conditions set by I. Stalin at the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty - the Molotov-Ribentrop Pact, from which Hitler could not evade.
                  Germany is Japan’s anti-Comintern pact ally, the power of the Triple Axis, concludes a treaty with the USSR - the Non-Aggression Pact, and then on friendship, and at this time its ally Japan is fighting with the USSR. What are the actions of the leadership of the USSR in this case? A common diplomatic practice is to influence your ally to end hostilities. In international treaties on relations between countries, such conditions are usually not fixed, remaining outside the framework of these treaties. Where I read about it, I don’t remember now, but in connection with the discussion of the 80th anniversary of this Pact this year.
                  1. Sanichsan 12 February 2020 14: 01 New
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                    Quote: vladimirZ
                    Japan did not start a war with the USSR in 1941 because a Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty had already been concluded (April 1941), although it means little to the aggressor, BUT besides, it was already drawn into a long war in China

                    nonsense and fantasy. at the time of Khalkhin Gol, war was already underway with China, and in a much hotter phase. for some reason this did not stop the Japanese at all. but when China’s resistance was already crushed, then suddenly something began to interfere with them. what nonsense? well at least they specified about the "peace treaty" that it did not guarantee anything.
                    Quote: vladimirZ
                    And most importantly, they could start this war when Germany would have strategically won the war with the USSR, and only against a weakened enemy, only after that.

                    stop, stop, stop ... but the Khalsin-Gol happened when the USSR was not at all weakened. at the same time in 1942, when the USSR fought the hardest battles near Stalingrad, the Japanese somehow attacked the United States. also Germany persuaded?
                    Quote: vladimirZ
                    In Japan, among the military there were 2 camps: land generals and naval admirals, calling on the emperor each for his own version of the action. By 1941, the “party” of the naval war won, which is why Japan went to the conclusion of an agreement with the USSR on neutrality.

                    about two fractions famous funny story laughing yes, but what happened to the land generals? What did they do, hara-kiri after that? or went to bed before 45? of course not. but they did not attack the USSR, despite the fact that they made plans.
                    Quote: vladimirZ
                    As for the end of the conflict on Khalkhin-Gol in 1939 with the mediation of Germany, this was one of the conditions set by I. Stalin at the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty - the Molotov-Ribentrop Pact, from which Hitler could not evade.

                    once again ... in the Molotov Rebentrop Pact, there is no mention of Japan. also in the Treaty of Friendship and Border there is no mention of Japan. what you are telling is very reeking of the stories of the "friend of the railwayman" Radzinsky, who had seen Stalin and Hitler in Lviv wassat
                    Quote: vladimirZ
                    Germany is Japan’s anti-Comintern pact ally, the power of the Triple Axis, concludes a treaty with the USSR - the Non-Aggression Pact, and then on friendship, and at this time its ally Japan is fighting with the USSR. What are the actions of the leadership of the USSR in this case? A common diplomatic practice is to influence your ally to end hostilities.

                    that is, the fact that Japan did not attack the USSR in 1941 - is this an unusual diplomatic practice? Japan did not leave the Axis, but from the Anti-Comintern Pact ...

                    There are deep logical failures in your reasoning. in order for them to be closed, documentary evidence or clear and logical explanations are needed.
    5. Sasha_rulevoy 11 February 2020 09: 53 New
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      Quote: vladimirZ
      True I.V. Stalin critical assessment Zhukov G.K. still gave it after the war,


      In my opinion, earlier - in July 1941, when he ousted the chief of the General Staff from his post.
      1. vladimirZ 11 February 2020 10: 01 New
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        Yes, then this was the first time, I agree with you. And later after Moscow and Rzhev, before the Berlin operation (political necessity), I.V. Stalin is already Zhukova G.K. did not set the front commander. Used only as a representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, along with Vasilevsky, Mehlis and others. The reasons were obvious.
        By the way, Rokossovsky K.K. He criticized the need to represent the “institute of VGK representatives” on the fronts, as a deterrent to the initiative of the commanders of the fronts, moreover, a representative of the VGK, but not responsible for the instructions given. Perhaps the only case in the war was the punishment of the representative of the Supreme High Command for the failure of the defense of Crimea, when Mehlis was punished with a significant demotion.
    6. ser56 12 February 2020 16: 56 New
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      Quote: vladimirZ
      Well, finally, at least an objective article about the Winter War of 1940

      controversial statement ... somehow about the rout of our divisions 163 and 44 divisions fell out of the review ... request
  2. Lamata 11 February 2020 07: 38 New
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    To be honest, the Finnish war revealed a bunch of shortcomings in the Red Army, and the weakness of the command staff and the weak BP of the troops.
    1. Magv 11 February 2020 08: 29 New
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      Do you understand what is written?
      1. Lamata 11 February 2020 08: 35 New
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        I understand well, not a failure. And contact you, I didn’t drink with you on a brooder.
        1. Pane Kohanku 11 February 2020 17: 28 New
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          I understand well, not a failure. And contact you, I didn’t drink with you on a brooder.

          Igor, there is a book "Secrets and Lessons of the Winter War." This is just a collection of dry documents, a selection. Everything was very bad, unfortunately. And with preparation, and with interaction. recourse
          https://www.litmir.me/bd/?b=269966
          Download to health, for free. That hedgehog applies to all forum participants - download! With respect, Nicholai hi
          And yes - following the results of the war, in many respects, the correct conclusions were made! hi
          1. Lamata 11 February 2020 18: 47 New
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            Thank you, I’ll find it read
            1. Pane Kohanku 11 February 2020 18: 54 New
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              I find it read

              no need to search! here is the download link! Come and press "download".
              https://www.litmir.me/bd/?b=269966
              from my comrades, I have already sent this book to everyone.
              1. Lamata 11 February 2020 19: 10 New
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                OK, thanks for the link, I'll start studying in the evening.
                1. Pane Kohanku 11 February 2020 23: 22 New
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                  I'll start studying in the evening.

                  just a collection of documents. Ending with a famous meeting on the results - AlekseyRa has already quoted a part. hi
        2. The comment was deleted.
          1. Lamata 12 February 2020 08: 32 New
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            No, my friend / gentleman, you don’t need to share anything with me))) Just read carefully, do not wave documents and a cardboard saber from the sofa, it’s not impressive.
  3. novel66 11 February 2020 07: 43 New
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    KV-2 was made according to the results of this war, so that the armor is strong and the gun is cooler
    1. igordok 11 February 2020 10: 02 New
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      Help me sort out my doubts about the photos of the flamethrower tank. Rather, it is OT-133, not HT-26

      In the photo there is a tank with a tower from a single-turret tank, like in 133.
      The stream of fire escapes not from the water hose about from the tower as on OT-133.
      And the “trunk” is most likely an imitation, so as not to become a primary target.
      1. novel66 11 February 2020 10: 13 New
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        it seems, and so one base
      2. illuminat 11 February 2020 14: 47 New
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        Quote: igordok
        Help me sort out my doubts about the photos of the flamethrower tank. Rather, it is OT-133, not HT-26

        Judging by the tower, this is the KhT-130, and the barrel is really a "laid on".
      3. Avior 12 February 2020 01: 42 New
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        Then rather OT-130
        OT-133 has a characteristic narrowed front of the tower and a semicircular flamethrower mask.

        At-130 they are closer to direct, as in the photo
        but it’s definitely not the HT-26 tower
        There were also OT-131s and 132s, but I didn’t see their photos and I’m not sure that they were in the troops, and not as experimental models.
        and pay attention to the back of the tower in the photo, it is clearly raised (although it didn’t completely get into the frame, this can be seen in the shape of the tower), which is also characteristic of the OT-130, and not like the OT-133.
        1. illuminat 12 February 2020 16: 07 New
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          Quote: Avior
          Then rather OT-130
          Yes, not "sooner", but this is the same tank HT-130 / OT-130. Moreover, the name "chemical" is much more accurate than the "flamethrower". Since, for example, the KhT-26 had a smoke curtain system using the same fire mixture. And the KhT-130 could use flamethrowing equipment for chemical contamination of the area, the tank was enough to infect 20000 square meters while capturing a 25 meter strip in one pass.
          Information from Ardashev’s book WWII Flamethrower Tanks.
  4. smaug78 11 February 2020 09: 00 New
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    That's when Samsonov just copy-paste military historians get normal articles. And when the Internet conspirators ...
    1. Krasnodar 11 February 2020 09: 23 New
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      The hosts of the West under the control of the Fed are not able to stop the singer of Russian super civilization Samsonov, exposing the machinations of the enslavement of working people in the USA and the Old World!
      1. Hantengri 11 February 2020 21: 29 New
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        They are trying very hard. But, unfortunately, "The drug can not feel for the brain." (with).
  5. ANB
    ANB 11 February 2020 09: 23 New
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    Quote: vladimirZ
    True I.V. Stalin critical assessment Zhukov G.K. all the same, he gave it after the war, demoted him to the post of commander of a secondary district, but with the death of Stalin and the reign of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, etc., they forgot this, making Zhukov the "Marshal of Victory."

    Well, Khrushchev did not forget. Although I used it and also sent it away.
    1. vladimirZ 11 February 2020 09: 47 New
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      Khrushchev was still that type, but he didn’t understand the essence of GK Zhukov that he would not stop in the struggle for power because of his excessive ambitions, including using the armed forces, which he demonstrated, for example, to eliminate L. Beria.
      And after Zhukov’s statement that not one tank could move without his permission, Khrushchev realized that he was threatened, and quickly sent him out of the Army. Moreover, he did not leave, like most of the top generals and marshals, in the group of General Inspectors of the SA, but completely removed him to an "honorable" pension.
      And none of the subsequent leaders even hinted to restore the "injustice" shown to Zhukov G.K. Everyone recognized this need.
  6. smaug78 11 February 2020 09: 30 New
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    Quote: Krasnodar
    The hosts of the West under the control of the Fed are not able to stop the singer of Russian super civilization Samsonov, exposing the machinations of the enslavement of working people in the USA and the Old World!

    Class !!! laughing
  7. VictorStar 11 February 2020 09: 31 New
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    IMHO, the main evil is that then, even earlier, now it is a mortal fear of leadership and a desire to please him at all costs. Along with various sorts, as they say now, effective managers are an explosive and destructive mixture.
    As far as I know, one of the main miscalculations of the beginning of that war was that its own resources and infrastructure capabilities were absolutely incorrectly evaluated. Checkers (guns) on the head is somehow not right on the pillboxes. but even so, you need timely replenishment of resources and drugs, the ability to build up a strike ... evacuate the wounded, etc. And there was one train line, shot through, there were stations clogged by trains in Leningrad and under ...
    Of course, it’s true for the division, but they still need a ride.
    That's when this question was more or less solved, then it happened. True, the price has risen sharply against the expected.
    1. Sanichsan 11 February 2020 17: 50 New
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      Quote: VictorStar
      IMHO, the main evil is that then, even earlier, now it is a mortal fear of leadership and a desire to please him at all costs.

      very interesting .. and with what did the brigade commander Vinogradov try to please 163 divisions trying to please Stalin?
      Quote: VictorStar
      And there was one railway branch, shot through, there were stations clogged with echelons in Leningrad and under ...

      hmmm .. and by February there were 2 branches? or did she not get shot?
      probably still this is not the case?
  8. smaug78 11 February 2020 10: 01 New
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    Quote: vladimirZ
    Unlike you, probably, I’ve shoveled so many books on WWII and WWII over 40 years of interest in WWII history, what else can you read and read about my knowledge of this period.

    Clearly, cheeks went))) I didn’t ask you about books, but asked about numbers. So while you are an ordinary balabol ...
    1. vladimirZ 11 February 2020 10: 24 New
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      If you are interested in looking in the directories yourself, they are there, but I have no time to just raise the exact statistics on the fronts, which everyone can see.
      It’s not even a matter of figures, but in relation to these statistics, which, by the way, are still pretty crafty, compiled by different historians with different accounting methods - as the satirists say: “we read here, we skip here, they wrapped fish here,” to please a political order.
      Some consider G.K. Zhukov losses, like all other commanders, others that are overpriced. And nobody knows the real picture from the archives that are still closed.
      But the attitude of a subordinate to Zhukov G.K. generals (memoirs), with a few exceptions, - Zhukov conducted military operations with significant losses of troops, especially, for example, the capture of the Zeelovsky heights and the direction of 2 tank armies to Berlin, where most of the tanks were burned by the Faustpatrons instead of sending them to cover Berlin , from which there would be no way out.
      1. avia12005 11 February 2020 10: 33 New
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        There was also big politics. Churchill intended to turn the German divisions together with the Allied forces on the Red Army. And this is a fact. Therefore, it was necessary to take Berlin as soon as possible. The archives are open and you can fully familiarize yourself with them. If the Red Army again flooded Berlin with corpses, then why did Volkssturm fight at Hitder, but not at Zhukov?
      2. smaug78 11 February 2020 10: 46 New
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        I understand that you are an ordinary balabol with puffed cheeks ... And about the storming of Berlin, losses and classified documents, you especially amused laughing laughing laughing . No way Svanidze looked around and others ... A reader with forty years of experience laughing
        1. vladimirZ 11 February 2020 17: 13 New
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          And besides insults, what facts can you give? And only blah blah blah?
          Speaking of archives. Until now, most of them are not open. As an example, only this year the PART of the archive in Poland was opened. Why ask yourself this question? What could be secret after 75 years of military events of the already destroyed USSR?
          1. smaug78 12 February 2020 09: 55 New
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            Everything is clear chatterbox with pouting cheeks merged ... Dear Alexey RA below you have already been harassed by a “face on table” about taking Berlin, and you all continue to sing liberal mantras about closed archiveslaughing
            1. Yamato1980 6 March 2020 12: 18 New
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              40 years to read the same books laughing
      3. Alexey RA 11 February 2020 12: 12 New
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        Quote: vladimirZ
        especially, as an example, the capture of the Zeelov Heights and the direction of 2 tank armies to Berlin, where most of the tanks were burned by the Faustpatrons, instead of sending them to cover Berlin, from which there would be no way out.

        That's interesting - and who then covered Berlin from the north and south, forming an outer ring? wink
        And also interesting - who sent the 3rd and 4th tank armies to Berlin? Whose order is it really Zhukov too:
        ... by the end of April 20, take possession of the Beelitz, Troyenbritzen, Luckenwalde areas, and take possession of Potsdam and the southwestern part of Berlin on the night of 21. The neighbor on the right — the 3rd Guards Tank Army — was tasked with the task of crossing the river during the night of April 18. Spree and swiftly develop the offensive in the general direction of Fetschau, Barut, Telt, the southern outskirts of Berlin, and break into Berlin from the south on the night of April 21

        Or who issued this order, excluding the introduction of TA into a clean breakthrough and prescribing the introduction of TA into battle even at the stage of breaking through the enemy’s defense:
        ... promptly introduce into the breakthrough the strong advanced units of the 4th Guards Tank Army to accelerate the hacking of the entire tactical depth of enemy defense, so that as soon as the 5th Guards Army captures the opposite bank of the river. Neice will build bridges to develop the offensive.


        During the assault on Berlin, the TAs were to first close the ring around the city and prevent the enemy units 9th A and 4th TA from retreating into the city. And then, together with the infantry, push the Germans to the city center. But, unfortunately, there was not enough infantry at all. With the infantry, the USSR in 1945 was generally tense - even before the capture of Berlin, the infantry divisions were able to replenish only 4,5-5 thousand people. By the way, that is why the infantry had to be propped up by artillery and tanks, replacing all these missing active bayonets.

        As for the tanks in the city ...
        In the framework of the largest operation against the German capital, in which four field and four tank armies of two fronts took part, the use of the tank army for a direct attack on such a large city as Berlin, and the struggle on its streets, acquires a great operational and tactical interest. The current operational-strategic and political situation in the final stage of the war required the rapid capture of the German capital. With the fall of Berlin, the collapse of Germany, the demoralization of its army and the inevitably quick surrender were foreseen.
        In these conditions, the use of a tank army for direct combat inside a large city was dictated by necessity. The shackling of the most valuable qualities of armored and mechanized troops — mobility, the use of such troops in conditions where they cannot use their full combat capabilities — fire at the ultimate range and ramming power — is justified by the importance of the operation and its decisive results.
        The use of tank and mechanized formations and units against settlements, including cities, despite the undesirability of hampering their mobility in these battles, as shown by the great experience of World War II, very often becomes inevitable. Therefore, this type of battle needs to be well taught by our tank and mechanized troops.
        © Rybalko
      4. Olgovich 11 February 2020 12: 37 New
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        Quote: vladimirZ
        the direction of 2 tank armies to Berlin, where most tanks burned faustpatrons

        You write, um, a lie. :

        1.
        In total, during the street battles in Berlin from April 22 to May 2 Bogdanov’s army lost irrevocably 104 tanks and self-propelled guns (16% of the population fleet of military vehicles to the beginning of the operation). 1st Guards Tank Katukov army during street battles, too, she irretrievably lost 104 armored units (15% of combat vehicleswho were in service at the beginning of the operation). 3rd Guards Tank Rybalko army in Berlin itself from April 23 to May 2, irretrievably lost 99 tanks and 15 self-propelled guns
        https://www.popmech.ru/weapon/10273-tekhnika-v-boyakh-za-berlin-shturm-berlina/

        2. Tanks operated as part of assault groups.

        Zhukov’s directive recommended to be included in the assault squads 8−12 guns in caliber from 45 to 203 mm4-6 mInomet 82-120 mm. The assault groups includedapers and chemists with smoke bombs and flamethrowers. Tanks became permanent members of these groups.
        1. Alexey RA 11 February 2020 16: 08 New
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          Quote: Olgovich
          2. Tanks operated as part of assault groups.

          These are NPP tanks from among the corps, brigades, and regiments attached to the combined arms armies.
          And the tanks of tank armies were forced to rely mainly on their motorized infantry. In which the battalions to Berlin were squeezed to the mouth. The front commanders tried to reinforce the tank armies with infantry, but there were not enough infantry divisions at all.
          1. Sanichsan 11 February 2020 18: 00 New
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            Quote: Alexey RA
            And the tanks of tank armies were forced to rely mainly on their motorized infantry. In which the battalions to Berlin were squeezed to the mouth. The front commanders tried to reinforce the tank armies with infantry, but there were not enough infantry divisions at all.

            Well, as if the advance of tank armies into the city was an initiative of the commanders of tank armies, not Zhukov or Stalin.
            according to the plan, they should not have climbed there at all, and as a result did not have infantry support. resulting in high losses in technology. those parts which actually had to storm Berlin according to plan had the necessary resources and significantly smaller losses.
            Isaev has a good video in which the preparation and the course of the operation and losses are disassembled. if I'm not mistaken in the cycle "There is such a topic."
            1. Alexey RA 11 February 2020 19: 23 New
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              Quote: SanichSan
              Well, as if the advance of tank armies into the city was an initiative of the commanders of tank armies, not Zhukov or Stalin.
              according to the plan, they should not have climbed there at all, and as a result did not have infantry support.

              Hmm ...
              ... by the end of April 20, take possession of the Beelitz, Troyenbritzen, Luckenwalde areas, and take possession of Potsdam on the night of 21 and southwestern part of Berlin. The neighbor on the right — the 3rd Guards Tank Army — was tasked with the task of crossing the river during the night of April 18. Spree and swiftly develop the offensive in the general direction of Fetschau, Barut, Telt, the southern outskirts of Berlin, and on the night of April 21 break into Berlin from the south
              © Konev
              1. Sanichsan 12 February 2020 13: 14 New
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                as we all know, here they discuss why. who was supposed to storm Berlin according to the bet plan? you want to say that "tanks without infantry support"?
                1. Alexey RA 12 February 2020 14: 56 New
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                  Quote: SanichSan
                  as we all know, here they discuss why. who was supposed to storm Berlin according to the bet plan? you want to say that "tanks without infantry support"?

                  This is where I wrote this? belay
                  I wrote that in addition to the infantry (8 Guards A and 5 beats A), TA was also initially involved in the assault on Berlin. But the task of the tankers was primarily to surround Berlin along the suburbs, and only then move into the city.
                  1 Guards TA:
                  Take possession of the area: Marzahn, Karlshorst, Schöneveide, Kopenik, Friedrichshagen, Noenhagen.
                  Subsequently, a blow to the south-west, in cooperation with 2 guards. TA, take possession of the area: Charlottenburg, Wilmensdorf, Zelendorf, Lichtenrade, Rudov, Prig. Treptow, Neykeln

                  2 Guards TA:
                  Go to the area: Birkenwerder, Heiligenense, Rosenthal, Schönwalde.
                  In the future - in one building to capture the crossing of the Hohenzollern Canal in the section Oranienburg, Gennigsdorf and take possession of the bridgehead in its west. shore. The main forces of the army attack south, in collaboration with the 1st Guards. TA, take possession of the northwestern part of Berlin to the railway line Bernau, Pankov, Charlottenburg, st. 1 km east Wannsee

                  Listed in the tasks of the 1st Guards. The name of the tank army is basically not the areas of the city of Berlin itself, but its suburbs. The districts of Berlin among the above are Charlottenburg, Wilmensdorf, Treptow and Neikeln. Described in the directive No. 00539 / op maneuver of the 1st Guards. tank army defenders of the city isolated from the approach of reserves from the south and southeast. Neither the 1st nor 2nd tank armies were tasked with hoisting the red banner over the Reichstag. Their task was to quickly break into the outskirts of Berlin and capture the suburbs around the perimeter of the city.
                  © Isaev
                  1. Sanichsan 12 February 2020 15: 14 New
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                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    I wrote that in addition to the infantry (8 guards. A and 5 beats. A) to storm the Berlin initially TA was also involved.

                    absolutely right! but there is one "but." not initially. yes
                    tank armies allowed to begin the assault on Berlin on the basis of the military situation, namely, due to the fact that the main forces, those that were supposed to storm Berlin, were stuck in the fighting on the outskirts, while the TA successfully completed the tasks of encircling the city.
                    the capture of the lair of fascism is an honorable matter and not a single commander wanted to miss the opportunity to participate in the final defeat of the fascists, but not all of these parts initially, according to the plan of the assault on Berlinhad to participate in street battles.

                    the fact that all the forces participating in the encirclement, as a result, took part in the assault, is a fact. the fact that some units were completely unprepared for street fighting is also a fact.
                    1. Alexey RA 12 February 2020 19: 26 New
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                      Quote: SanichSan
                      absolutely right! but there is one "but." not initially.

                      By "originally" I meant just "according to the initial plan of the operation."
                      Because the document, according to which 1 Guards. TA prescribed
                      Take possession of the area: Marzahn, Karlshorst, Schöneveide, Kopenik, Friedrichshagen, Noenhagen.
                      Subsequently, a blow to the south-west, in cooperation with 2 guards. TA, take possession of the area: Charlottenburg, Wilmensdorf, Zelendorf, Lichtenrade, Rudov, Prig. Treptow, Neykeln
                      is a private directive No. 00539 / op of April 12, 1945
                      The districts of Berlin among the above are Charlottenburg, Wilmensdorf, Treptow and Neikeln.
                      © Isaev
                      1. Sanichsan 13 February 2020 15: 23 New
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                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        Because the document, according to which 1 Guards. TA prescribed

                        Yeah. prescribed to seize the suburbs. how is the suburb different from the city?
                        did you find No. 00539 / op dated April 12, 1945 in Isaev’s book? right?
                        tell me why you are so grossly falsify sources? Isaev wrote in black and white that under this directive the assault was carried out by forces of 8 m 5 shock armies. it also says in plain Russian
                        The difficulties of using tank formations in a large city were obvious, and therefore the 1st and 2nd Guards. tank armies were supposed to prepare Berlin for an assault by general army armies.

                        © Isaev
                        you did not read? you need to be careful wink
                      2. Alexey RA 18 February 2020 18: 10 New
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                        Quote: SanichSan
                        Yeah. prescribed to seize the suburbs. how is the suburb different from the city?
                        did you find No. 00539 / op dated April 12, 1945 in Isaev’s book? right?
                        tell me, why are you so rudely falsifying sources? Isaev wrote in black and white that under this directive the assault was carried out by forces of 8 m 5 shock armies

                        We open Isaev:
                        The task of the 1st Guards. tank army was the symmetrical task of the 2nd Guards. tank army relative to the center of Berlin. On the second day after entering the breakthrough, the army of M.E. Katukov was supposed to:
                        “Take possession of the area: Marzahn, Karlshorst, Schöneveide, Kopenik, Friedrichshagen, Noenhagen.
                        Subsequently, a blow to the south-west, in cooperation with 2 guards. TA, take possession of the area: Charlottenburg, Wilmensdorf, Zelendorf, Lichtenrade, Rudov, Prig. Treptow, Neykeln »

                        Listed in the tasks of the 1st Guards. tank army names this basically not areas of the city of Berlin itself, but its suburbs. The districts of Berlin among the above are Charlottenburg, Wilmensdorf, Treptow and Neikeln.

                        See in bold? Among the targets of the 1st Guards TA, four areas of Berlin are initially present. Not a suburb, namely a district. And Isaev writes directly about this.
                        The Charlottenburg district generally borders the Tiergarten park.

                        Chihiks ... favorite competition of the "special VIF Olympiad" - when opponents prove opposing points of view, relying on the same source. smile
                      3. Sanichsan 19 February 2020 16: 20 New
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                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        Chihiks ... favorite competition of the "special VIF Olympiad" - when opponents prove opposing points of view, relying on the same source.

                        laughing
                        but you just ignore the quote I quoted. it says in plain text that they were not intended for the assault. beyond these areas they should not have gone. Yes, I know that they did, but initially they shouldn’t. yes
    2. Lamata 11 February 2020 20: 20 New
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      And how did Zhukov see the B 4 howitzer in the assault squad, is it just technically clean?
      1. Alexey RA 12 February 2020 11: 00 New
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        Quote: Lamata
        And how did Zhukov see the B 4 howitzer in the assault squad, is it just technically clean?

        Well, something like this:

        But if GAU and GABTU would not cling in a clinch around Pinocchio C-51, then the calculations would not have to deploy towed howitzers under fire, even riflemen.
        1. Sanichsan 12 February 2020 13: 17 New
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          Quote: Alexey RA
          But if GAU and GABTU would not clutch in a clinch around the “Pinocchio” S-51, then the calculations would not have to deploy towed howitzers under fire even the riflemen.

          so the artillery as a whole and the B4 in particular, had the smallest losses. and the S-51 shed on a street littered with debris is, to put it mildly, a very dubious idea. just look at the B-4 in the artillery museum in St. Petersburg and the S-51 in Kubinka.
          1. Alexey RA 12 February 2020 15: 08 New
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            Quote: SanichSan
            Yes, and the S-51 shed on a street littered with debris is, to put it mildly, a very dubious idea

            And the B-4 “barn gate” on the same street is not a dubious idea? wink
            Especially considering the process of extending an 18-ton howitzer (10 x 2,5 m) on a tracked carriage to a firing position - by the forces of an agricultural tractor or Voroshilovets. The dimensions of this coupling are even larger than that of the S-51.
            The main advantage of the S-51 was precisely self-propelled - it was possible to crawl out relatively quickly to the firing position, fire a shot and crawl back. At the same time, the mechanical drive and the engine were protected by armor and could lead the howitzer with the calculation into cover even under the fire of the rifleman and anti-tank gun.
            1. Sanichsan 12 February 2020 16: 00 New
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              Quote: Alexey RA
              And the B-4 “barn gate” on the same street is not a dubious idea?

              well, they’re almost half as much yes
              Quote: Alexey RA
              At the same time, the mechanical drive and the engine were protected by armor and could lead the howitzer with the calculation into cover even under the fire of the rifleman and anti-tank gun.

              what for? again, artillery suffered the least loss. those same B4 no one shoved under fire. Let me remind you that the Red Army has already taken Koenigsberg and a number of other fortress cities. great experience has been gained.
              I also recall the complexity of production. B-4s and S-51s are a bit incomparable, and even B-4s were a reserve of the main command. there were very few of them. if instead of them let out S-51 then they will be multiple less. what will we storm with?
              1. Alexey RA 12 February 2020 19: 33 New
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                Quote: SanichSan
                what for? once again, artillery suffered the least loss. those same B4 no one shoved under fire.

                B-4 in Berlin (and before him - in the same Küstrin) fired direct fire. That is, undisguised calculations were in the fire zone of the rifleman.
                Quote: SanichSan
                and even the B-4s were a reserve of the high command. there were very few of them. if instead of them let out S-51 then they will be multiple less. what will we storm with?

                Very few - this is more than a thousand issued. smile
                Moreover, since 1942, production was virtually discontinued. So S-51 wouldn’t be released instead B-4, and from the available B-4.
                1. Sanichsan 13 February 2020 15: 55 New
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                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  B-4 in Berlin (and before him - in the same Küstrin) fired direct fire. That is, undisguised calculations were in the fire zone of the rifleman.

                  and what are the losses? minimal!
                  you still don’t understand that you didn’t take into account something and didn’t understand what was happening? I don’t understand why are you inventing some kind of nonsense? B-4 was not deployed in the shooting range. they were just deployed outside this zone, which allows the range of this weapon. it is slightly higher than that of the rifle, even on direct fire wink
                  I don’t understand anymore, do you think those who took Berlin are not very smart people, or did you have enough in viewing the "masterpieces" of Mikhalkov and still under the indelible impression of attacks with shovel cuttings? request
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  Very few are more than a thousand issued.

                  umm ... what and you don’t understand that for 5 years of war it’s really very few? i would even say catastrophically small.
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  So the S-51 would not be released instead of the B-4, but from the existing B-4.

                  Yeah ... and the engines, chassis, armored hull, would probably appear magically? or all the same, instead of something, like tanks.
                  I also recommend reading what difficulties the production of the B-4 encountered, and so, by a glance, figure out how much more complicated the S-51 is and could release them not only 1000, but at least 10.
                  1. Alexey RA 18 February 2020 18: 35 New
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                    Quote: SanichSan
                    and you don’t understand that for 5 years of war this is really very little? I would say catastrophically little.

                    So this is artillery OM and BM - RGK. Nobody had it. They tried to keep it in the depths of battle formation - direct fire was considered unacceptable (but, despite this, it was widely used - the same B-4 pair captured by Finns in Beloostrov shot from a kilometer).
                    Quote: SanichSan
                    and engines, chassis, armored housing, probably would have appeared magically? or all the same, instead of something, like tanks.

                    Instead of a part of ISU-122. Which were produced only because the production of the chassis for the ISU-152 exceeded the production of the ML-20S.
                    Quote: SanichSan
                    I also recommend reading what difficulties the production of the B-4 encountered, and so, by a glance, to estimate how much more difficult the S-51

                    The S-51 production is the installation of the finished B-4 on the modified ISU-152 chassis. B-4 itself is not necessary to produce, and nowhere else.
                    RGK has a hundred guns for this. Moreover, these self-propelled guns, along with the B-4, should remain with the artillerymen, and not go to the GABTU.
                  2. Sanichsan 19 February 2020 16: 15 New
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                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    So this is artillery OM and BM - RGK. Nobody had it. They tried to keep it in the depths of battle formation - direct fire was considered unacceptable (but, despite this, it was widely used - the same B-4 pair captured by Finns in Beloostrov shot from a kilometer).

                    Well, in Berlin they were generally transferred to the assault armies and used to directly support the assault operations.
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    Instead of a part of ISU-122. Which were produced only because the production of the chassis for the ISU-152 exceeded the production of the ML-20S.

                    ha ha ha laughing wildly sorry, but I’ve been thinking all this time about the SU-14 repeat
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    The S-51 production is the installation of the finished B-4 on the modified ISU-152 chassis. B-4 itself is not necessary to produce, and nowhere else.
                    RGK has a hundred guns for this. Moreover, these self-propelled guns, along with the B-4, should remain with the artillerymen, and not go to the GABTU.

                    so yes, but in fact we have the use of the B-4 in Berlin with minimal losses.
                    Of course, it would be more convenient with self-propelled artillery, but this did not affect the losses, in fact.
      2. Lamata 12 February 2020 18: 39 New
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        move b4 after the upcoming assault group quickly fails
        1. Sanichsan 13 February 2020 16: 05 New
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          Quote: Lamata
          move b4 after the upcoming assault group quickly fails

          B-4 was used to destroy specially fortified centers of resistance. it does not need to be dragged behind the assault group, it needs to be dragged to a specific place and there were not so many places like that.
          Let me remind you that most of the resistance nodes, Soviet troops simply walked around, such as an air defense bunker in the zoo, which housed the Berlin defense headquarters. as a result, the headquarters was cut off from defense nodes in the city. they shot at him a little from B-4, looked that it was dreary and for a long time and just went on.
  9. Yamato1980 6 March 2020 12: 22 New
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    About the evil Faustpatrons very epic
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  • Operator 11 February 2020 10: 26 New
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    In addition to the quantitative correlation of forces and the use of heavy artillery, engineering reconnaissance of the Finnish positions on the Karelian Isthmus by forces of special sapper groups armed with Fedorov’s assault rifles, which were 6 times longer than the Finnish submachine guns in real fire, was very important for Soviet sappers won all fire fights with Finnish guard.

    In the attack on fortifications, tanks were widely used, since most of the bunkers were equipped with machine guns, which were destroyed by tanks by direct fire from 45 mm cannons through embrasures with penetration of armor plates.

    On the flat side, hacking Finnish defense in the forest area was helped by newly created company tactical groups of tanks with bulletproof metal drags, which cleared the way from mine traps and fire ambushes along forest roads.

    In addition, along with the advancement of tactical groups on both sides of the roads, ski reconnaissance and sabotage groups moved with snipers and machine gunners, who destroyed the Finnish cuckoos from the rear.
  • Stas57 11 February 2020 10: 38 New
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    This erroneous opinion was shared by Hitler and his entourage, which led to fatal errors in the Reich military-political strategy towards the USSR.
    this is not a true statement, it is enough to look at what the Germans and Finns wrote for the Germans then. The articles were in the VIZH, a general conclusion, the Germans considered the Red Army weak even without the Winter War. They openly put on the opinion of the Finns, since they were not seriously rated at all
  • Alexey RA 11 February 2020 10: 38 New
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    The main problem of the Red Army was the lack of intelligence on Finnish fortifications. There was only fragmentary data about the Mannerheim Line.

    The command of the Red Army had an "Album of fortifications of the Karelian Isthmus", in which there were data on the lines of defense as of 1938.
    The head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the General Staff Proskurov reported on the state of affairs with intelligence on the Finnish defense at the well-known "Meeting": three lines, including the preflight, in 1939 there was an intensive construction of new DOS.
    PROSKurov. I would be very glad that the intelligence, starting today, should be shocked and discussed. They dealt with all sorts of questions, but not enough intelligence.
    What did we know about white finns? We believe that for general calculations of enemy suppression forces, intelligence had the necessary input data. Intelligence reported this data to the General Staff. This is not the merit of the current composition of the Intelligence Directorate, since the basic data relate to 1937-1938. By October 1, 1939, we knew that Finland had created three defensive lines and two cut-off positions on the Karelian Isthmus. The first defensive line, intended for cover units, was located directly near the border and rested on the flanks of Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland, having a length of [more than 100]. Its fortifications consisted mainly of field-type structures: trenches, rifle, machine gun, artillery. There were anti-tank installations. There was also a small number of reinforced concrete, stone and wood-earth points, the total number of which reached 50. This is the so-called pre-field.
    The second line of defense that was known to intelligence on October 1.
    MEHLIS. What year is October 1st?
    PROSKurov. On October 1, 1939, the Second defensive line began from the Gulf of Finland and passed through Remneti, Summa, Mälkel and other points and further along the northern coast of Suvantoyarvi. The general defense system was based on the creation of 13 nodal resistances, the so-called centers of resistance for the use of rivers and lakes.
    The third defensive line was represented by a resistance unit in the Vyborg area, in which there were up to 10 artillery reinforced concrete points. By October 1, 1939, the presence of up to 210 reinforced concrete and artillery points in fortified areas was established. There were a total of 210 points. These points are plotted, there was an album, which, as Comrade himself said. Meretskov, all the time lying on his table.
    MERETSKOV. But not one matched.
    PROSKurov. Nothing like this. The reports of the commanders of the units and reconnaissance showed that most of these points are located where indicated on the diagram.
    MERETSKOV. It's a lie. In the region of Sumy there are 12 points, Korn - 12.
    PROSKurov. Nothing like this.
    MEHLIS. When was this material transferred to the General Staff?
    PROSKurov. Until October 1, 1939. By this time, it was known that the Finns were launching large construction works.
    It was known that the Finns launched large construction work in the summer of 1939. The agents reported that intensive construction was underway.
    During the summer of 1939, various reports indicated that a large quantity of various building materials was being transported. We did not have exact data in the second half of 1939.

    Moreover, the data on the construction of DOS have actually been confirmed - from the central section of the Mannerheim Line there are many photos of unfinished or undersized DOS- "millionaires".
    1. The comment was deleted.
  • Olgovich 11 February 2020 10: 39 New
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    Finns before the outbreak of the war generally planned to advance.

    Finns at the beginning of 1939 already had 30 so-called "tanks" of WWI and an army of 27 thousand people.

    HOW in your right mind to plan with this ... to attack the USSR?
    By the time of the offensive of the Red Army, however, they had bought as many as 30 tanks and increased in several. time of the army, but! - only after very persistent offers of the USSR to exchange territory

    The author’s assertion about the need for the assault of the Mannerheim Line of the correlation of forces in the infantry 3/1 is very controversial: a successful and quick assault by our powerful Koenigsberg denies this: our forces were LESS defending Nazis, but the artillery, self-propelled guns, tanks, aircraft-in several times more. The result speaks for itself ....
    1. Karen 11 February 2020 10: 51 New
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      Quote: Olgovich
      The author’s assertion about the need for the assault of the Mannerheim Line of the infantry 3/1 balance of forces is very controversial: the successful and quick assault of our powerful Koenigsberg refutes this: our forces were LESS Nazi defenders, but ARTILLERY, self-propelled guns, tanks, the plane was several times more. The result speaks for itself ....

      It was believed that by the end of the war, 40 ... 60 artillery barrels should be the norm for one kilometer of the front, but ours could already exhibit 240, which they did ...

      And so, along the lines of Mannerheim ... If I remember correctly, Parsegov was called out of the academy teachers to teach the attack on the spot ...
    2. Sugar Honeyovich 11 February 2020 15: 44 New
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      Quote: Olgovich
      Finns before the outbreak of the war generally planned to advance.
      Finns at the beginning of 1939 already had 30 so-called "tanks" of WWI and an army of 27 thousand people.
      HOW in your right mind to plan with this ... to attack the USSR?

      IN A HEALTHY MIND - maybe nothing. But the fact was the place to be.
      “The expectation that Finland will be able to repeat the feat of little David, who overthrew the giant Goliath -SSSR, was also reflected in the operational plans of the Finnish army, operating on a vast front from the northern Ladoga to the Barents Sea. It was supposed immediately after the Soviet attack to go on the offensive and occupy a number of territories, primarily in Soviet Karelia ... The Finnish army command finally abandoned these plans only a week after the start of the “winter war”, since the Red Army grouping in this direction was unexpectedly powerful ”(" Homeland "No. 12 1995.).
      And why not plan to advance with 30 tanks, if according to reports Russian tanks do not have any at all, but there are tractors lined with painted plywood, which is easily pierced with a bayonet ... negative hi
    3. Sanichsan 11 February 2020 18: 06 New
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      Quote: Olgovich
      By the time of the offensive of the Red Army, however, they had bought as many as 30 tanks and increased in several. time of the army, but! - only after very persistent offers of the USSR to exchange territory

      Yes, but we were dealing with the Finnish army "increased several times", and not with 27 thousand. and by the way, something about the Finns was not at all embarrassed by the size of the USSR when they tripled the two previous Soviet-Finnish wars.
      1. Olgovich 12 February 2020 08: 08 New
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        Quote: SanichSan
        yes, but we were dealing with the Finnish army "increased several times", and not with 27 thousand

        When the ultimatums were presented to the Finns, they dealt precisely with 27 thousand army.
        After them, she increased.
        Quote: SanichSan
        By the way, something about the Finns was not at all embarrassed by the size of the USSR when they tripled the two previous Soviet Finnish wars.

        1. The USSR was not then.
        2. When the ignoramuses and ignoramuses recognized the independence of Finland, the border did not bother to stipulate.
        Each, respectively, considered the disputed lands to be their own.
        1. Sanichsan 12 February 2020 13: 22 New
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          Quote: Olgovich
          When the ultimatums were presented to the Finns, they dealt precisely with 27 thousand army.
          After them, she increased.

          Well, why is this primitive falsification of the 90s? covert mobilization began another field of first negotiations.
          Quote: Olgovich
          2. When the ignoramuses and ignoramuses recognized the independence of Finland, the border did not bother to stipulate.
          Each, respectively, considered the disputed lands to be their own.

          dooo wassat on the other hand, they didn’t recognize “teach and hope”, they lost the civil one with a bang, fled abroad and went to serve in the SS or CIA. who do not spit, Hero on Hero wassat
          1. Olgovich 12 February 2020 14: 03 New
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            Quote: SanichSan
            Well, why is this primitive falsification of the 90s? hidden mobilization has begun another field first negotiations.

            belay
            And I than Told you? request As the USSR began "negotiations", so they answered.
            Quote: SanichSan
            dooo but "teach and hope" did not recognize, miserably lost the civil

            Lost her (with a bang) ignoramus yes : see on Russian flag over the Kremlin
            Quote: SanichSan
            and went to serve in the SS or the CIA. who do not spit, Hero on Hero

            Well, well, where did they go before AGENT GESTAPO and German intelligence since 1921 (he is the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army) of Trotsky (recognized by the State Prosecutor's Office of the USSR), or spies, poisoners, terrorists, cheating on Germans, Poles and Japanese: MARSHALOV of the USSR Tukhachevsky, Egorov and other Yakirs and Blyuyukher, PRESOVMINA of the USSR, deputies, Commissars, Central Committees transmitting STRATEGIC plans of the country to fascists, opening the country for occupation, etc.
            Did you catch the difference between heaven and earth? yes
            1. Sanichsan 12 February 2020 14: 53 New
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              Quote: Olgovich
              And what did I tell you about? As the USSR began "negotiations", so they answered.

              OU! Well, why lie? what
              Quote: Olgovich
              When presented ultimatums Finns had to deal with precisely 27 thousand army.

              what for? write yourself a post above wrote ...
              an ultimatum was presented almost after a year (!) of negotiations.
              Quote: Olgovich
              The ignorant lost it (with a bang): see the Flag of Russia over the Kremlin

              really shameful yes the flag of Vlasov’s traitors over the country ... well, what can you do, there was a counter-revolution, which means there will be a revolution wink
              and again your destitute will be looking abroad for whom to lie laughing
              Quote: Olgovich
              Well, where do they go ...

              oh in the bad swamp you climbed laughing well these understandably were repressed ... conspiracy propaganda and all that .. but now and then everyone despises whites, without any Soviet propaganda. they fought against Russian people, 90% of the population of the Russian empire. fought shoulder to shoulder with the invaders and occupiers. ordinary traitors and geeks yes
              mind it today. right now. with anti-Soviet propaganda yes washed them - dead number wink
              1. Olgovich 12 February 2020 15: 57 New
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                Quote: SanichSan
                what for? write yourself a post above wrote ...
                an ultimatum was presented almost after a year (!) of negotiations.

                The Finns CORRECTLY understood these "negotiations" as the ULTIMATUM: this is evident from the fact that they IMMEDIATELY with them and began to arm themselves.

                BEFORE these, um, "negotiations" the army did NOT grow
                Quote: SanichSan
                the flag of Vlasov's traitors over the country is really shameful ... well, what can you do, the counter-revolution has happened, which means there will be a revolution

                Russian flag over her which with 1693 years: was hundreds of years and eat again! yes
                Only the enemy can wish the country of revolution
                Quote: SanichSan
                oh, in a bad swamp you climbed well, these are clearly repressed ... conspiracy propaganda and all that .. but now and then white all presshouting, without any Soviet propaganda. fought they are against russian people, 90% of the population of the Russian empire. fought shoulder to shoulder with the invaders and occupiers. ordinary traitors and geeks

                1. FACTS are given to you - your "heroes" - traitors of the highest level.
                2.90%?! lol laughing -Do not bring nonsense: people sent your Bolsheviks in the elections to, aha.
                Therefore, yours and were afraid of the people elections -to paranoia, sweat and night diarrhea: they were rightly afraid! lol yes
  • Alexey RA 11 February 2020 10: 44 New
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    The chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Tymoshenko, wrote that intelligence reported that the Finns would have up to 10 infantry divisions and 15 separate battalions. In reality, the Finns deployed much more; before the start of the war they generally planned to advance. The Finns deployed 16 divisions and a significant number of individual battalions.

    More precisely, intelligence before the war reported on the possible deployment of 10 divisions and 30 separate battalions with the Finns. And about the availability of mobresource of 500 thousand people.
    During the war according to intelligence Finns deployed 12 infantry divisions, 6 separate infantry regiments, up to 30 battalions, about 5 infantry brigades.
    PROSKurov.
    For human resources, what was known from intelligence?
    According to various reference books that were published, we knew that Finland had 600 thousand people liable for military service. There were up to 400 thousand military-trained people.
    In addition, there was the so-called Shutskor organization of women and men, which in its ranks numbered up to 200 thousand people. In total, according to intelligence, it was clear that Finland could expose up to 0,5 million people.
    We had such data.
    Data on the Suomi pistol was first published in the Razvedupra collection, published in 1936. Detailed data were given in 1939 reference books with photographs.
    VOTE. In the books.
    PROSKurov. And here, it’s not as an excuse, ignored automatic weapons.
    Finally, comrade Shaposhnikov reported that there were 16 divisions, we do not have such data. There were 12 infantry divisions, 6 separate infantry regiments, up to 30 battalions, and about 5 infantry brigades.
    STALIN. A total of 18 divisions.
    PROSKurov. If to reduce in divisions - to 18 divisions.
    STALIN. How much did the intelligence of individual divisions give?
    PROSKurov. Up to 10 divisions and up to 30 separate battalions. Which actually happened. But the general contingent of military-trained, comrade Shaposhnikov, must show something, this can not be discarded.
  • smaug78 11 February 2020 10: 54 New
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    Quote: Alexey RA
    PROSKurov. I would be very glad that the intelligence, starting today, should be shocked and discussed. They dealt with all sorts of questions, but not enough intelligence.

    So who is lying Proskurov or Meretskov? Especially if you read, the whole speech, with statements from the floor, remarks by Stalin. So you are a little cunning about what you knew ... And like a cherry on a cake:
    - July 11, 1940 he (Proskurov) was removed from his post and sent to the disposal of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.
    1. Alexey RA 11 February 2020 12: 24 New
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      Quote: smaug78
      So who is lying Proskurov or Meretskov? Especially if you read, the whole speech, with statements from the floor, remarks by Stalin. So you are a little cunning about what you knew ...

      If you read the entire Proskurov’s speech, then Comrade Proskurov directly and unequivocally says that information about the enemy’s armies and theater of operations by commanders of all levels is not studied. The situation when intelligence is available, but no one at the headquarters has read it, is the norm in the Red Army. Nobody even read unclassified literature.
      PROSKurov. For western counties is also necessary.
      Facts about the study of intelligence literature:
      1. The literature of the 5th Directorate, including purely aviation, is not read in the Main Directorate of the Air Force. For example, the experience of using the German Air Force during the Polish campaign, the charter of the French Air Force, the charter of the German Air Force, etc.
      The chief of staff of the Air Force did not even see all the literature; it is kept by some secondary person and is not reported.
      Heads of departments, people who must consider all foreign novelties in their work, as a rule, also do not read literature.
      2. Here is the Artillery Directorate, department heads do not read intelligence reports on foreign technology. After reviewing them by the heads of information departments, the Office sends these reports to the secret library. In the secret library, these books are lying without any movement. Books such as "Artillery of the German Army", "French Army" and others read only four people.
      MERETSKOV. There is a signature stamp in secret, I can’t take a book home, but I can’t read at work, I need to do work, and therefore these books are lying without any movement, no one is reading them. I have no right to take the book home, put it in my portfolio, as it is considered a secret. The regiment commander will not take this book at all.
      STALIN. Who invented this?
      PROSKurov. There was an order of the People’s Commissar of Defense No. 015.
      STALIN. You yourself offered him that, he himself couldn’t come up with that.
      VOTE. This is an order for secret literature, but why should literature be secretly published?
      MERETSKOV. Then allow me to take these books for reading, but only with the caveat - do not lose or do something else so that the books do not lie in the library.
      VOTE. Books should be at headquarters.
      PROSKurov. How to explain, comrade Voronov, that of the 50 translated articles in the Artillery Directorate, only 7 articles were read by two persons. These articles are without any vultures, unclassified.
      VOTE. Where did they check it?
      PROSKurov. We have.
      STALIN. It is necessary to interest people.
      PROSKurov. And dozens more examples can be given.

      As for Comrade Meretskov, at the same meeting he had a very scandalous skirmish with Stern about transferring responsibility for the unsuccessful planning of the operation to others, in which even Stalin took part.
      MERETSKOV. Even Suvorov said that they are fighting not by numbers, but by skill.
      STALIN. What did you always ask for the supply of divisions if they are fighting not by numbers?
      1. smaug78 11 February 2020 13: 01 New
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        I read carefully and it turned out that Proskurov makes a good face in a bad game. He was directly accused of lying. And the most important result - was shot.
        1. Alexey RA 11 February 2020 16: 41 New
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          Quote: smaug78
          I read carefully and it turned out that Proskurov makes a good face in a bad game. He was directly accused of lying. And the most important result - was shot.

          The fortification album is online. The frontiers of defense in it are designated as a whole correctly.
          Meretskov at the meeting tried to reduce the problem to incorrectly indicated on the DOS diagrams. At the same time, leading the discussion away from the fact that the planning of the operation as a whole was carried out without taking into account the presence of a line beyond the field modern long-term fortifications.
          1. smaug78 12 February 2020 09: 53 New
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            Thank. If not difficult, throw a link hi
            1. Alexey RA 12 February 2020 15: 10 New
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              Quote: smaug78
              Thank. If not difficult, throw a link

              Yes, not at all.
              Here is this album:
              http://www.photo.aroundspb.ru/fortification/lm_1938
              Or
              https://radio-rhodesia.livejournal.com/699618.html
              1. smaug78 12 February 2020 15: 24 New
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                Thanks again!
  • Alexey RA 11 February 2020 11: 01 New
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    In December 1939, only five Soviet divisions of the 7th Army were sent to three enemy divisions in long-term fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus. And the standard ratio of forces advancing and defending in the direction of the main strike is 1: 3. Later the ratio became 6: 9, which is also far from the norm.

    Not certainly in that way. In the areas of the main attack, the Red Army created a statutory superiority in forces. So, the whole 50th rifle corps was thrown at two URs of Summakyul and Summayarvi: UR Summakyul tried to break through the 138th SD, and the neighboring Ud Summayyarvi - the 123rd SD. The infantry supported the 20th ttbr.
    The reason for the failure was not at all a lack of strength. And in the complete unpreparedness of the Red Army for war.
    In the very first days of the fighting, it became apparent that infantry without tanks would not go on the attack, even with the support of artillery of all calibers. Along the way to the main line of defense of the Mannerheim Line, infantry lagged behind tanks was systematic. The tankers themselves, under cover of their fire, made passages in the gouges and scarp (for example, the 95th battalion in the Ikola area), searched for and destroyed targets and returned for infantry to lead it forward.

    On December 17, 1939, the brigade command received a combat mission: to support the advance of parts of the 50th Rifle Corps (123th and 138th Rifle Divisions) during the attack of the fortified Khottinen nodes and a height of 65,5. The chief of staff of the 138th division reported to the headquarters of the corps that "there is no fortification area ahead, the enemy is running." Without checking this information, the commander of the corps, commander F. Gorlenko, ordered the cancellation of the previously assigned 5-hour artillery preparation and the attack of the infantry of the 138th division with the support of the 91st tank battalion. However, the attackers ran into a powerful fortified enemy defense strip, and came under heavy artillery and machine-gun mortar fire.
    As a result, the infantry of the 138th Infantry Division, which had no experience interacting with tanks, was cut off from them by machine-gun mortar fire, suffered heavy losses and, in the end, partially lay down and partially fled to their original positions. The 91st tank battalion broke deep into the enemy’s defense beyond the 450–500 m line of first and second grooves, fell under heavy artillery fire and, unsupported by infantry, retreated to its original positions, suffering heavy losses.
    1. smaug78 11 February 2020 13: 24 New
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      PROSKurov. On October 1, 1939, the Second defensive line began from the Gulf of Finland and passed through Remneti, Summa, Mälkel and other points and further along the northern coast of Suvantoyarvi. The general defense system was based on the creation of 13 nodal resistances, the so-called centers of resistance for the use of rivers and lakes.
      The third defensive line was represented by a resistance unit in the Vyborg area, in which there were up to 10 artillery reinforced concrete points. By October 1, 1939, the presence of up to 210 reinforced concrete and artillery points in fortified areas was established. There were a total of 210 points. These points are plotted, there was an album, which, as Comrade himself said. Meretskov, all the time lying on his table.
      MERETSKOV. But not one matched.
      PROSKurov. Nothing like this. The reports of the commanders of the units and reconnaissance showed that most of these points are located where indicated on the diagram.
      MERETSKOV. It's a lie. In the region of Sumy there are 12 points, Korn - 12.
      PROSKurov. Nothing like this.

      Whom to believe?
      PROSKurov. There were some materials about enemy tactics.
      STALIN. When was the brochure on the methods of war published?
      PROSKurov. In the month of December.
      STALIN. She is said to have lain for 5-6 years.
      PROSKurov. There were such materials.
      STALIN. This is a brochure that came out two weeks after the war. Brochure on how to fight the Finns.
      PROSKurov. This is not the brochure that came out later.
      STALIN. This brochure was published two weeks after the war. And why couldn’t I leave in a year?
      PROSKurov. Because it was in the archive.
      STALIN. Her military attache sent.
      PROSKurov. Correctly.
      STALIN. You could not complain that the brochure was in the archive, while you had to take it as the head of intelligence.

      STALIN. Brochure on how the Finns will fight. Is this not a mockery of everyone and the Red Army, that the brochure is more than a year old, 5 years old, others say and print it only two weeks after the war, so that it could be used late in the Red Army.
      PROSKurov. There is no intent.
      STALIN. We are not intelligence.
      1. Operator 11 February 2020 14: 43 New
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        "Head of the 5th (intelligence) department of the General Staff of the Red Army Proskurov

        I want to report that intelligence at the front, in particular intelligence agencies of the Leningrad Military District, was put on alert before the events. But here the question arose - who should lead the military intelligence. They scolded here that the agents did not give data. Hence the conclusion that it was necessary to press on military intelligence. I have hundreds of letters from the Far East and the West, from the Urals and from other districts, where they write the same thing, which coincides with the assessment of our intelligence agencies, no one is engaged in intelligence in peacetime, it also happened in the war.
        From the very first days of combat activity, it was found that the cadres of military intelligence were prepared very poorly, without taking into account the theater. No one was doing this despite the fact that in June at a meeting of the Main Military Council, where you participated, comrade Stalin, when reviewing the structure of the General Staff, the decision was made: “The issues of organizing military intelligence should be transferred to the operational command of the General Staff of the Red Army, at the headquarters of districts, armies and army groups. The transition to the new headquarters organization should be carried out by August 1. ”
        Now intelligence has no master. Nobody is engaged in military intelligence. Thousands of letters indicate that intelligence officers, including the heads of two departments of corps and divisions, are engaged in anything but intelligence, and the ORB are not being prepared as intelligence units.

        STALIN. What is ORB?

        PROSKurov. Separate reconnaissance battalion, available by state in each division. During the war, these battalions were the same battalions as the others. They were placed on the flanks, plugged holes with them, etc. Reconnaissance companies in the regiments, as a rule, were not used.
        And the most difficult situation we have is that there are no trained intelligence personnel. I ask that the question of organizing intelligence and training intelligence officers be considered by the Main Military Council. The General Staff should have an apparatus that would be responsible for training intelligence officers of all military branches. In practice, a gap is obtained. In peacetime, no one is engaged in intelligence. In wartime, the 5th Directorate, which does not have an apparatus for directing military intelligence and the authority to do this, is forced to engage in intelligence.
        During the Finnish events, the 7th Army took over the reconnaissance unit of the Leningrad District, the remaining armies were left without intelligence personnel and recruited anyone. There were one or two people trained. Because of this, army reconnaissance could not be deployed for one to two months. The intelligence departments consisted of operational points (of three to four people). Of course, they could not satisfy the army.

        STALIN. What do you suggest how to improve this?

        PROSKurov. I propose to accept one of the options: either to concentrate all intelligence work in one hand, as is done in foreign armies, there are the so-called 2nd Department or 2nd Bureau as part of the General Staff. We have created the 5th Directorate, which should focus all intelligence. It is necessary to create an apparatus in it that will respond and direct military intelligence.
        Or leave only intelligence intelligence behind the 5th Directorate.
        The General Staff should have such an order that there is an apparatus that will lead and engage in reconnaissance in peacetime and wartime ... I must say that at one time it came to funny things. We received a notice from Comrade Stern and from Comrade Chuikov that they did not receive intelligence information ... Checked where the reports disappear, it turned out that they were not transmitted, since the staff of the General Staff, headed by Comrade. Smorodinov was considered - what is the work of the 7th Army, what is being done on the site of the 8th Army. This is idiocy. How is it that the army command should have known what is being done in the neighboring sector. I believe that this issue should be radically changed. It is necessary to turn the brains of our large and small commanders to intelligence, to force intelligence to engage.
        We had wonderful agents - radio informants who brought information, sitting in the rear for 70 km, sent wonderful radiograms ...
        This is not military intelligence, these are people who parachuted, walked to the rear and reported information via radio. True, as I said, more than half of these people died, unfortunately. Why? First of all, we were forced to throw people away from settlements. He gets down, takes the skis and goes, sees a branch from the road, a ski track, but the population is organized, the troops are targeted, they find and catch it on the ski tracks, and since deep snow, you cannot go without skis, they catch him.
        The difficulties were enormous, and especially on the Karelian Isthmus, where the density of troops was enormous.

        STALIN. It was necessary to plant in peacetime.

        PROSKurov. In peacetime there was planting. The intelligence department made a big mistake here, they hoped that the troop movement would be similar to what it was during the Western company, and they sent agents there, did not turn up in our territory, but at points located on enemy territory. After 10 days, they say, we’ll come to such a point and report the material, but our units did not reach these points.

        STALIN. Stupid.

        PROSKurov. Of course, stupid. I must say that our scouts were infected with the same thing as many large commanders, believed that they would meet with bouquets of flowers, but it turned out wrong.
        Therefore, I ask you to resolve the fundamental question regarding the master of intelligence. The master of intelligence in the Red Army should be and commanders of all degrees will have to engage in intelligence in essence. Otherwise, we will continue to face the same thing as now. Thousands of comrades from the field write that the military scouts are engaged in anything, he and the orderly, he temporarily replaces the commander, who is on vacation, from the operational and other departments.
        In addition, we need Comrade. Stalin, I earnestly ask you, in peacetime, to create such training companies, training units, under various codes, that would be ready to conduct reconnaissance in wartime ...
        I was scolded a lot for organizing sabotage-guerrilla groups and detachments. There was a lot of resistance. Comrade Shaposhnikov instructed the headquarters not to organize any such detachments. And some organized and received tremendous benefits.

        Shaposhnikov. There is no such indication ...

        STALIN. It is necessary that they know the language of the population. What do you throw Russians behind, they don’t know anything - they don’t know the language, they don’t know the morals. Scouts must know the language. How many people have you sent to Finland now in peacetime? Do not send and do not think to send.

        PROSKurov. We send scouts.

        STALIN. No, it’s wrong, don’t send, and Finland sent five people scouts, we caught, killed two. Already transferred. They take our passports, whatever they send. You do not classify this matter, but report. We want to know who you are sending ... We need to know who to quit, we must do it skillfully. Give us a list of whom you are sending to. We want to know. If you say that information is received from the source, then this does not affect us, we laugh at it. Give us a list on the Main Military Council.

        PROSKurov. I am glad that you are interested in this issue, because after that things will go better.
        It was said here that we need to send correspondents, we do it ... We have a lot of such data: a person will go, see where everything is done. View the design of this bunker, find out the plan for the exact location - this is another matter. We had such a curiosity: Skornyakov sent a telegram. And Kulik calls - order Skornyakov to send the drawings ... But he cannot give this information. This must be done differently and we cannot solve this problem by sending tourists. ”
  • Alexey RA 11 February 2020 11: 03 New
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    Moreover, on December 19, the tankers of the 20th armored brigade broke through the Finnish line of defense in the offensive zone of the 138th SD! But the lack of infantry forced them to return to baseline.
    On December 19, at 12.00:90 a new attack of the 138th tank battalion from the 91th infantry division on Khottinen was made, and the 123st battalion from the 65,5rd infantry division - to a height of XNUMX. This time the attack was preceded by artillery preparation. The tankers, literally "crawling" under their artillery fire, crossed two barriers, "saddled" the fortified site and advanced three kilometers inland, actually breaking through the Finnish main defense line.
    By 14.00 p.m., the 90th tank battalion of Captain Yanov with a T-28 company and a company of heavy tanks reached the forest 1,5 km northeast of Turt, passing the entire line of fortifications on this site and actually completing the task of breaking through the fortified area. Two other companies of the battalion at that time fought in the depths of the defense, firing at the pillboxes and covering the infantry, and the 95th tank battalion launched an attack from the front.
    When the tankers demanded that the infantry of the 138th Infantry Division throw forward to occupy the bunkers, the Finns opened mortar fire and the infantry retreated in a panic. Moreover, the Finns were so demoralized that they hardly even fired machine-gun fire on the infantry. However, having felt that the tanks were operating alone, they, pulling up anti-tank guns, began to shoot them from the flanks and rear, and the Finnish infantry began to set fire to the wrecked tanks with bottles of gasoline. By 17.00 p.m., on the orders of the brigade commander, the remnants of the battalion retreated to their original positions, having suffered heavy losses in materiel and personnel. In this battle, the commander of the battalion, Captain Yanov, also died. The attack of the 91st tank battalion was also drowned due to the passivity of its infantry. In total, the brigade lost 29 T-28s that day.
    © Kolomiets
    After this battle, the 20th TTR was withdrawn to the rear due to the loss of combat readiness.
    1. denplot 11 February 2020 11: 31 New
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      The Finns organized the competent interaction of the field troops covering the bunkers with their garrisons. The bunkers themselves were built and entered into the area very efficiently, plus engineering barriers and minefields. Due to the cutoff of the infantry from the tanks, the attacks broke down one after another. As soon as ours adjusted the interaction of tanks, infantry and artillery, things started to go.
      1. fk7777777 11 February 2020 19: 59 New
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        Everything is correct, but also the tanks were on aviation kerosene, the diesel later went.
        1. The comment was deleted.
        2. Alf
          Alf 11 February 2020 20: 43 New
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          Quote: fk7777777
          the tanks were on aviation kerosene

          Do not disgrace, here still not first-graders have gathered, if there is no special literature, at least look into Vika.
          1. fk7777777 11 February 2020 21: 08 New
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            And I don’t even disgrace when I drove tanks, the wiki was the name of a girl, but it didn’t bother you to read, even if it were Kolobanov’s memoirs, he was just a Finnish tanker, and yes, before the Second World War, they installed automobiles in tanks, and aircraft engines, diesel diesel engine went later, learn the materiel.
            1. Alf
              Alf 11 February 2020 21: 27 New
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              Quote: fk7777777
              And I don’t even disgrace when I drove tanks, the wiki was the name of a girl, but it didn’t bother you to read, even if it were Kolobanov’s memoirs, he was just a Finnish tanker, and yes, before the Second World War, they installed automobiles in tanks, and aircraft engines, diesel diesel engine went later, learn the materiel.

              And where does it say that tank engines operate on kerosene, and even on aviation? Don't jump off the topic.
              Quote: fk7777777
              when drove tanks

              Did you refuel them with kerosene?
              1. fk7777777 11 February 2020 22: 13 New
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                Kerosene can be used, for example, instead of Arctic diesel fuel, in many fuel engines and kerosene is clean and gasoline is 80, the octane rating of kerosene is about 40, GOST requires 45, I understand that everything is okay for you, so drink Coca-Cola, chew orbits without sugar , and demand further that all the same you would be returned to it initially the whole composition ...
        3. Hantengri 11 February 2020 22: 12 New
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          Quote: fk7777777

          That's right, but also the tanks were on aviation kerosene,

          I wonder since when did piston aircraft engines start using kerosene as fuel?
          1. Alf
            Alf 11 February 2020 22: 39 New
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            Quote: HanTengri
            Quote: fk7777777

            That's right, but also the tanks were on aviation kerosene,

            I wonder since when did piston aircraft engines start using kerosene as fuel?

            The tanker knows better, at first I thought carbine was back ...
          2. fk7777777 12 February 2020 08: 42 New
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            Since then, when the internal combustion engine appeared, jet engines went much later, for example, they only use kerosene in a fire show (low combustion temperature) or do you think that engines from modern fighter jets are installed there? .... Or is it a revelation for you that our technology could already use at that time everything that was at hand? ....
            1. Alexey RA 12 February 2020 11: 07 New
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              Quote: fk7777777
              Or for you the revelation that our technology could already use everything that was at hand at that time? ....

              Could. But only once.
              ... To power the T-26 tanks of new types, use only gasolines of the first and highest grades - not lower than Groznensky. Pouring gasoline into tanks is strictly prohibited in order to avoid the possibility of damage to the material part ...

              For T-28 and carburetor BT, the picture is the same. In the NPO application for fuel for 1941 for T-26, BT, T-28 and T-35, gasoline KB-70 is included.
              Mobtanks of the times of war have similar requirements. For example, T-70:
              ... Applicable fuel Aviation gasoline KB-70 or B-70. In exceptional cases, work on cracked gasoline of the 2nd grade (gasoline) is allowed. In no case can you use Grozny first-class gasoline, as well as gasoline mixed with ligroin or kerosene ...
  • Operator 11 February 2020 12: 28 New
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    Quote: Alexey RA
    Before the capture of Berlin, rifle divisions were able to replenish in total up to 4,5-5 thousand people. By the way, that is why the infantry had to be supported by artillery and tanks

    For once.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. Alf
      Alf 11 February 2020 20: 45 New
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      Quote: Operator
      Quote: Alexey RA
      Before the capture of Berlin, rifle divisions were able to replenish in total up to 4,5-5 thousand people. By the way, that is why the infantry had to be supported by artillery and tanks

      For once.

      1. denplot 11 February 2020 22: 13 New
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        After the fighting on the Oder, the number of rifle divisions of the Red Army sank to 4-4,5 thousand people, as Isaev writes, these were the pale shadows of the divisions before the Vistula-Oder operation. These small divisions took Berlin. Infantry was sorely lacking, it came to the point that the tankers left two people in the tanks (mechvod and gunner), the rest formed cover groups. This is me to the fantasies of the liberals that Berlin took the number of troops, the masses, etc.
  • smaug78 11 February 2020 14: 09 New
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    Quote: avia12005
    Churchill intended to turn the German divisions together with the Allied forces on the Red Army. And this is a fact.

    The fact that the plan of Operation "The Unthinkable" did not go beyond the preliminary planning.
    1. Yamato1980 6 March 2020 12: 53 New
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      The name speaks for itself laughing
  • A.TOR 11 February 2020 16: 54 New
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    All that this war brought - the abandonment of Finland, which before that was clearly and firmly gravitated to Britain - into Hitler's arms. From the same England, volunteers rode to the Finns to fight the USSR. By the way, nobody from Germany.
    But after the “war” the Finns had nowhere to go - England is far away, and what Comrade will come up with Stalin no one knows. Here you have the Karelian front in all its glory with the blockade and others.
    However, where and to whom am I writing all this ...
    1. Alexey RA 11 February 2020 19: 30 New
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      Quote: A.TOR
      All that this war brought - the abandonment of Finland, which before that was clearly and firmly gravitated to Britain - into Hitler's arms.

      She would have rushed at them anyway - after the summer of 1940.
      For there are no options: the old patrons are no longer able to guarantee something to the Finns, they themselves would survive. So, you need to look for new ones. None of the Finnish leadership will be thrown into the arms of the USSR even without the Special Forces Party - especially taking into account affairs in the Baltic states. And the only option remains.
      Moreover, the Germans also need an ally on the northern flank - they still need to supply Ditl and cut the Kirov railway.
      Quote: A.TOR
      But after the “war” the Finns had nowhere to go - England is far away, and what Comrade will come up with Stalin no one knows.

      Comrade Stalin, the Finns feared before the war. No wonder they back in the 20s acquired so many patrons. So an allied or neutral pre-war Finland is like an allied or neutral pre-war Poland. smile
      1. A.TOR 11 February 2020 19: 36 New
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        Comrade Stalin could intelligently build relations with a small northern neighbor and get a calm flank in the north. Hitler could not capture Finland with all his will - there is no common border, and moving across the Baltic near the USSR is unlikely.
        So we got what we got.
        Comrade Stalin in international affairs - in fact - only spoiled and sharpened
        1. Alexey RA 12 February 2020 11: 13 New
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          Quote: A.TOR
          Comrade Stalin could intelligently build relations with a small northern neighbor and get a calm flank in the north.

          Rather, he could get another "neutral Hungary."
          Quote: A.TOR
          Hitler could not capture Finland with all his will - there is no common border, and moving across the Baltic near the USSR is unlikely.

          In Norway, the Germans did not stop it. However, they were not stopped even by the presence of RN. smile
          And then, why should the Germans capture the country, whose independence was brought on the German bayonets of the von der Goltz corps and the Finnish rangers prepared in the last Reich?
    2. Alf
      Alf 11 February 2020 20: 46 New
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      Quote: A.TOR
      However, where and to whom am I writing all this ...

      Who is holding you here?
    3. evgic 11 February 2020 21: 02 New
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      It is you at the meeting of your brothers in mental development that you bring such nonsense. Here the people are educated and well-read. Do not set off. Go learn some more
  • Andrey VOV 11 February 2020 18: 12 New
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    Quote: vladimirZ
    Unlike you, probably, I’ve shoveled so many books on WWII and WWII over 40 years of interest in WWII history, what else can you read and read about my knowledge of this period.

    You sat in the archives, did you study documents from the battalion level and up? Did you yourself serve in the army as a team? Did you graduate from the General Staff Academy to draw such conclusions? You yourself are a falsifier of history.
    1. Viktor Sergeev 12 February 2020 08: 44 New
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      As I understand it, you were in the archive, you commanded at least a battalion, do you have an incredible store of knowledge? Give examples, show no docking, you are our chatterbox.
      1. Andrey VOV 12 February 2020 09: 42 New
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        Are you me? If so, then I did not command the battalion, but participated in the hostilities, the luggage of my knowledge is not for you to evaluate, but the historical faculty is behind me in the form of my first higher education. ...
  • Operator 11 February 2020 19: 40 New
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    Quote: Alexey RA
    This is the deployment of a cover army. Which was supposed to fight the invading army. and not try to repel the blow of the entire mobilized army of the enemy

    This is purely a jamb of the highest leadership of the USSR — the covering army should have been located at least 100 km inland from the border to unambiguously identify the directions of the enemy’s main attacks, not to mention the elementary exclusion of the factor of surprise attacks.

    In fact, the covering army along with the rear services (sic!) Was located in the zone of effective artillery fire of the enemy. And what's the point, that the army stockpiles of ammunition, fuel and food were located deep in the territory of the USSR - scattered crowds of retreating, not military units, were already moving to the warehouses.
  • fk7777777 11 February 2020 19: 49 New
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    Firstly, Br 2 is a 152 mm gun, and Br 5, this is just 280 mm motir please correct. Secondly, on the occasion of the "squirrel" of some comrades about G.K. Zhukov, yes, he was a genius in his field, the problem of our country is that he was only one, and not a dozen, at least the Zhukovs, in the third some comrades do not need to bend their fingers like a fan and show teeth in tattoos, this is only after knowing, because it is not known how they would behave there. With respect to all participants in the discussion.
  • Viktor Sergeev 12 February 2020 08: 42 New
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    All the “democratizers" did not understand one thing: the first failure is even good, it causes a desire to improve, develop, learn. It was the same near Narva, the same thing happened in 1941.
  • evgen1221 12 February 2020 14: 00 New
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    Well, given the practice of England to eliminate those who are objectionable with the wrong hands, it’s quite in their style to lie to Adik about the weakness of the Russians, in order to push the Germans to war in the right direction.
  • Yamato1980 6 March 2020 13: 13 New
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    One gets the impression that the USSR was not going to fight Finland at all, but to solve the whole matter amicably. The fact that many different proposals were made to the Finnish side, in principle, for an understandable desire to push the border away from Leningrad, already speaks volumes.