ZRPK "Pantsir-C1": Tula went beyond reality
In the joint project "Tula News”And“ Tula Business Magazine ”-“ Weekly Bulletin ”published an article“ Secrets and Problems of Existing Modifications of “Shell-S1 / 2”. What are the media silent about? ” Judging by the headline, one could expect a detailed analysis of the problems of the Pantsir ZRPK from the article. Instead, the author criticizes the Izhevsk air defense system "Tor". In the garden of elderberry, in Kiev, uncle. The shell has problems, but we criticize the torus. One could, of course, not pay attention, especially since the Tula bulletin is for internal use, so to speak. Yes, the trouble is: a variety of media began to “copy-paste” the article intensely. And she went far beyond Tula. Although this is not the main thing, let them print themselves. But in the Tula article heaped up such an incredible amount of lies that you just can not pass by. Among other things, the almost helplessness of Russian equipment in front of Western air attack weapons and the "standard" of the western air defense systems are being asserted. This is not even about the Torah and the Shell, but about Russian weapons at all. Therefore, the article requires a detailed analysis.
"Black myth" about the "dead funnel"
Referring to the Syrian experience, the “newsletter” writes:
(The spelling, punctuation and original classification of the author are hereinafter fully preserved.)
In reality, the tracking zone at the elevation of the radar of guidance of the air defense systems of the Tor-M family is from -5,5 ° to + 85 °. That is more than that of the Pantsir-C1 air defense system. The detection zone at the elevation angle of the SOC SAM of the Tor-M family is 0-64 °. Angle tangent 64 ° - 2,05. This means that the near line of capture for tracking a target flying at an altitude of 12 km is 6 km. The detection range of the SOC SAM systems of the Tor family is 32 km. Even if the SVN flies at a speed of 1000 m / s, the Thor will have 26 seconds to take it “in the crosshairs”. Despite the fact that the reaction time of the complex is 6 seconds. Well, after the target was taken by the guidance station, even diving at an angle of 85 ° does not present a problem for the Tor-M2 air defense system. As for the OEC ZRPK “Pantsir”, this is an extremely weather-dependent guidance system, which the Tula themselves admit - and even in the article under consideration. At the same time, the combat work of the air defense systems of the Tor family does not depend on weather conditions or the time of day.
In an irrepressible thirst to find (at least on paper) a “hole” in the domestic short-range air defense, the author turns to very exotic Western air attack weapons:
- climb to a height of 12 km / ... / above the estimated location of the enemy air defense systems; parachute deployment and slow descent with barrage and simultaneous scanning of the earth's surface for radar; shooting a parachute, launching an accelerating solid-propellant solid-propellant rocket of the combat (2nd) stage, followed by a dive to a detected radiation source.
It is logical to assume that the survival rate of the Shell-C1, in the event of an ALARM anti-radar missile strike, will be several orders of magnitude higher than the similar coefficient of the Tor-M1 / 2B self-propelled air defense systems.
As shown above, the "Shell", if it differs from the "Thor" in terms of the presence of a "dead zone", is only for the worse. So in reality, the "survival rate" (in Russian - combat stability) SAM "Tor-M2" is higher than that of the SAM "Shell P1". Including thanks to the lightly armored hull on a tracked chassis, noticeably less susceptible to small-caliber and fragmentation weapons than an unarmored hull on wheels.
As for UR ALARM, even a descent at an angle of 90 ° does not provide her with the possibility of defeating the Tor air defense missile system, as well as the Pantsir air defense missile defense system.
The author does not notice a logical contradiction: if the location of the air defense system is known exactly, why look for it? And if the location of the air defense system is not exactly known, how can the missile defense be brought exactly to the “dead zone”, which at a height of 12 km near the Tor-M2 air defense system has a radius of only 1 km? If the SD is reduced strictly vertically, then what kind of barrage can be discussed? And if the descent angle is less than 90 °, then where is the guarantee that the SD will not go beyond the "dead zone" (which is constantly decreasing to a distance of 1 km from the complex and has a radius of only 3 meters at an altitude of 250 km)? And what will happen if the air defense system is in motion while UR ALARM is “parachuting”? He drove a kilometer, and shot down (a matter of minutes, no longer than parachuting from 12 km). To engage in parachuting in the area of the air defense system is a very risky event.
But the main thing is not even that, but the fact that the “couch experts”, as usual, have very strange ideas about the tactics of using air defense systems. They regularly “disperse” them in such a way that the combat vehicles are completely alone. Meanwhile, the air defense missile systems are designed for military use as part of the unit (the basic tactical unit of the air defense system "Tor-M2", as well as the air defense system "Shell-S1" is a battery) and as part of the layered air defense system, where the systems and systems are short, medium and long mutually cover each other. The minimum tactical unit is the link (2 BM). And already when working in the "link" mode, the "dead craters" completely disappear.
You need to work together. And everyone should do their own thing. SAM S-300 and S-400 - shoot down strategic aircraft aviation and ballistic missiles (by the way: there is no data on the interception of the Pantsir-C1 air defense tactical ballistic missiles; this is a pure invention of the author of the bulletin). SAM "Buk" - to fight with planes and helicopters of tactical aviation outside the launch zone of the strategic missile forces. SAM "Tor" - to intercept high-precision and small-sized air-launched missile systems that broke through the first lines of defense. And "sofa experts" should lie on the couch. Desirable - in silence.
Reality vs. Fantasy
Paying all the attention to the notorious "dead funnel", the author forgets about other key characteristics of the complexes he compares. But not only the elevation range determines the ability of air defense systems to intercept air targets. The effectiveness of combat work is determined by a huge number of factors. What are the final, integral indicators of the Tula and Izhevsk complexes? In 2009, demonstrative (in essence and according to the original plans, comparative) firing of the Tor-M2U air defense system and the Pantsir-C1 air defense system were carried out. Here is what Lieutenant General A. G. Luzan reports on their results:
That is, in the course of these firing, the Pantsir-C1 air defense missile system confirmed its effectiveness only in intercepting medium-sized low-speed targets (maximum speed E-95 is 80 m / s, the average speed of the Osa launcher, on the basis of which the Saman was created, is over 500 m / s).
Such depressing results required a thorough analysis, the results of which were announced in 2012 at the XV scientific and technical conference “Actual Problems of Protection and Security”, held under the auspices of the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences. The report of the candidate of military sciences V.V. Belotserkovsky and I. A. Razin (VA VPVO VS), in particular, noted:
Simply put, the Pantsir ZRPK is capable of hitting targets flying directly or almost directly at it - 4-6 km along the front. Indicated and reason:
(The course parameter of the Tor-M2 SAM is ± 9,5 km, that is, it is capable of covering a front 19 km wide.)
(In the TTX of the Tor-M2 air defense system, the maximum target speed is indicated at 700 m / s, but at the same time, according to one of the operators of the Belarusian Army, the Tor-M2U complex already successfully intercepted targets flying at a speed of 1000 m / s .)
(Tor-M2 air defense systems at a distance of 15 km are guaranteed to hit a target flying at a speed of 300 m / sec.)
Etc. In total, the list of critical shortcomings of the Pantsir-C1 air defense missile system was 15 points, among which were problems with aiming missiles, problems with millimeter-range radars, and problems shooting at low-flying targets. And finally, a long time transfer from traveling to combat "Exceeds the stated 5 minutes (actually 8-9)" (deployment of the Tor-M2 SAM takes 3 minutes).
I would like to believe that these shortcomings ZRPK "Shell" are eliminated. But so far there is no reliable information about this. Military expert, chief editor of Arsenal of the Fatherland magazine Viktor Murakhovsky, referring to his sources - air defense officers, reports:
According to him, the effectiveness of the Tor-M2 SAM system is 80%, while that of the Pantsir’s does not exceed 19%. Similar data were repeatedly published by other authors.
Despite this, the Tula people continue to disseminate fake information about the superiority of the Pantsir air defense system over the Tor air defense system. Alas, the principle of "trust, but verify" has not been canceled. But with the verification of the high TTX declared by the Tula KBP of their complex, everything does not go out very smoothly. So, at the beginning of 2020, already Indian media reported that "ZRPK" Shell "did not pass competitive tests." India chose the South Korean complex K-30 Biho. And this is really bad, because the “victory” over the “Shell” of a rather mediocre South Korean air defense system affects the reputation of Russian weapons in general.
"Cherry on the cake"
The “bulletin” author seems to be aware of the shortcomings of the Pantsir-C1 air defense missile system; he carefully invented the shortcomings of the Tor-M2 air defense missile systems (“human imagination is limitless”) - where should the “poor expert” go? “Abroad will help us!” The author predictably completes his opus, as they would say in the old days, with "worship of the West":
On what basis? And they have homing systems! The fact that at short range radio command guidance is superior to GOS, that GOS on western complexes do not have a good life, but they inherited them from the aviation SDs on the basis of which they were developed, does not concern the Tula “expert”. The indicated complexes have an ugly long deployment period - 15-20 minutes (!), Two to three times more than the “Shell”, and five to seven times more than the “Thor”. In principle, they cannot conduct combat work on the move (Russian MD systems have such an opportunity). Spider has problems intercepting low-flying targets: the lower border of the affected area is 20 meters (the Shell and Torah are 5 meters). Land Ceptor was tested only a year ago, and what it really is capable of is a big question. But all this, of course, is not important, since they are made in the West ...
On this, I would like to finish the analysis of the absurdities that enmeshed the media path of the air defense systems of the MD. But to finish is unlikely to succeed. Because articles like this one regularly appear on the pages of domestic information resources. Who orders them and why?
- Leo Frolov
- http://www.kbptula.ru/ru/fotogalereya/category/4-pantcir-c1
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