Combat Stability of Russian Submarine Forces


Exist historical a tale about how the Athenians in ancient Greece, wanting to bargain for themselves more benefits, and fewer obligations, sent an ambassador to Sparta, who was extremely sophisticated in rhetoric. He spoke to the Spartan ruler with a magnificent speech and spoke for an hour, incline him to the Athenian proposals. But the answer of the warrior king was brief:


“We forgot the beginning of your speech because it was a long time ago, and we did not understand the end because we forgot the beginning.”

So, in order not to elevate the esteemed reader to the Spartan throne, I allow myself to briefly list the conclusions of previous articles, which will form the basis of the proposed material.

1. The SSBNs, as a means of conducting a global nuclear war, are significantly inferior to the Strategic Rocket Forces by the criterion “cost-effectiveness”. However, the SSBNs are an indispensable political means of preventing such a war, since in the mass consciousness of Europe and the United States it is submarines with ICBMs on board that guarantee the inevitability of nuclear retaliation.

2. The SSBNs can serve as a means of nuclear deterrence only if their secrecy in combat services is ensured. Alas, according to open publications and the opinions of a number of naval officers, the secrecy of our strategic submarine missile carriers today is not provided at all, or, at least, is provided to a completely insufficient degree. This applies to all types of SSBNs currently in service. fleet, that is, the projects 667BDR Kalmar, 667BDRM Dolphin and 955 Borey.

3. Unfortunately, there is no certainty that the situation with the secrecy of our SSBNs will dramatically improve after the entry into operation of the most advanced nuclear submarine missiles of the Borey-A type.

If you try to translate all of the above into at least some numbers, you get something like the following.

Those entering the combat service of the Pacific Fleet’s SSBN were identified and accompanied by anti-submarine forces of our “sworn friends” in approximately 80% of cases. Moreover, this happened regardless of the route: whether the boats went into the "bastion" of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, or whether they tried to advance into the ocean.

The author does not have any reliable figures about such statistics of the Northern Fleet. But we can assume that the "disclosure" of strategic nuclear-powered ships at this theater was still lower. Here, in favor of our submariners, factors such as the presence of ice under which it was possible to hide, the difficulties of acoustic detection of submarines in the northern seas, as well as more modern types of SSBNs than those that were in service with the Pacific Oceanians worked. All this improved the secrecy of our "strategists", but still did not save these ships from regular "glare" by anti-submarine means of the Americans.

Let's try to figure out why this happened before, and is happening now. And also with what we do with all this.

About American PLO


I must say that in the interval between the two world wars in the United States they preferred to plan grand sea battles of battleships and aircraft carriers, but they did not seriously think about the threat from under the water. This led to enormous losses of the merchant fleet when the Americans entered the war - German submariners staged a real massacre off the coast of the United States.

The lesson taught by the dashing guys kriegsmarine, went for the American Navy for the future, and more sailors under the star-striped flag never made such a mistake. The attitude to Soviet submarines in the USA was the most serious, as evidenced by the scale of the anti-submarine defense deployed by the Americans. In fact, a long series of articles can be safely written about American means of PLO, but here we will confine ourselves to the shortest list of them.

SOSUS system


It was a “network” of underwater hydrophones, the data of which were processed by special and computer centers. The most famous part of SOSUS is the anti-submarine line, designed to detect Soviet submarines of the Northern Fleet during their breakthrough into the Atlantic Ocean. Here hydrophones were deployed between Greenland and Iceland, as well as Iceland and Great Britain (Danish Strait and Farrero-Icelandic border).


But besides this, SOSUS was also deployed in other areas of the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, including along the US coast.

In general, this system has demonstrated high efficiency against the 2nd generation nuclear submarines, and limited - against the 3rd generation nuclear submarines. Apparently, somewhat reliable identification of 4th-generation ships beyond the capabilities of SOSUS, so most of this system is mothballed today. SOSUS was a global submarine tracking system, but today it is outdated: as far as the author knows, the Americans do not plan to create a similar system at a new technical level.

SURTASS system
It has two fundamental differences from the previous one. The first is that SOSUS is stationary, while SURTASS is mobile, since it is based on sonar reconnaissance ships (KGAR). The second difference from SOSUS is that SURTASS uses the active search mode. That is, at the very beginning of its development, the KGAR were equipped with a long (up to 2 km) antenna, consisting of hydrophones, and working in a passive mode. But in the future, the equipment of the KGAR was supplemented by an active, radiating antenna. As a result, SURTASS ships got the opportunity to work on the principle of “underwater radar”, when the active antenna emits low-frequency pulses, and a giant passive antenna picks up echo pulses reflected from underwater objects.

The KGARs themselves were relatively small (from 1,6 to 5,4 thousand tons) and low-speed (11-16 knots) ships that did not have weapons, except for hydroacoustic. The form of their combat use was military services, lasting up to 60-90 days.

To date, the SURTASS system, we can say, is minimized by the Americans. So, in the period 1984-90. It was built 18 KGAR type "Stalworth", in 1991-93. - 4 more types of “Victories”, and then, in 2000, the most modern “Impeccle” was put into operation. But since then, not a single KGAR has been laid in the United States, and most of the available ones have been withdrawn from the fleet. Only 4 ships of this class remained in service, three Victories and Impeccles. All of them are concentrated in the Pacific Ocean and appear only occasionally near our shores. But this does not mean that the idea of ​​a sonar reconnaissance ship using sonar is outdated or vicious.


The most modern KGAR "Impekbl"

The fact is that the main reason for the reduction of the KGAR in the US Navy was the total reduction in the submarine fleet of the Russian Navy in comparison with the times of the USSR and an even greater decrease in the activity of our submarines in the late XX - early XXI centuries. That is, even those submarines that still remained in the fleet began to go into the ocean much less frequently. This, plus the improvement of other methods of detecting and tracking our submarines, has led to the fact that they refused to continue building ships of the Impekble type.

However, today in the United States, an unmanned sonar reconnaissance ship is being developed, and the Americans consider this an important direction in the development of their Navy.

Underwater and surface hunters


The American multipurpose nuclear submarines pose a huge danger to our submarine forces, both strategic and general. Throughout almost the entire 20th century, US submariners had a significant advantage both in the quality of their sonar systems and in the low noise of submarines. Accordingly, ceteris paribus, the Americans beat us in the distance of detecting Soviet nuclear submarines, both SSBNs and multipurpose ones.

In the 80s of the last century, the development of Soviet science and technology (as well as the successful operation to acquire Japanese high-precision machine tools) allowed us to significantly narrow the gap with the Americans. In fact, the third generation of domestic submarines (project 971 Schuka-B, project 941 Shark) were comparable in their capabilities with the American ones. In other words, if the Americans were still better, then this difference was not a death sentence for our submariners.

But then the United States created the 4th generation of atomarines, which began with the famous Sivulf, and the USSR collapsed.


Sivulf. The most advanced multi-purpose submarine of the Cold War era

For obvious reasons, work on improving submarines in the Russian Federation was slowed down. For the period 1997-2019, that is, for 22 years, the Americans put into operation 20 multipurpose nuclear submarines of the 4th generation: 3 Sivulfa and 17 Virginia. At the same time, the Russian Navy did not replenish with any ship of this generation: the Severodvinsk Project 885 and the three strategic Boreas of Project 955 are, so to speak, submarines of the 3+ generation, since hulls were used to create them backlogs and equipment of ships of previous series.

Most likely, the nuclear submarines of the 4th generation will become nuclear submarines of projects 885M (Yasen-M) and 955A (Borey-A). We can hope that they will be quite competitive with the American ones - at least in terms of noise and other physical fields, and perhaps in the capabilities of the hydroacoustic complex. However, the problem of confronting the American multi-purpose nuclear submarines persists: even if we manage to achieve quality parity with the Americans (which is not a fact), we are corrupted by the quantity. At present, it is planned to hand over to the fleet 8 MAPLs of project 885M in the period until 2027 inclusive. Seeing the existing pace of nuclear submarine construction, it can be argued that this is still a very optimistic scenario, the deadlines can easily go “to the right”. And even if a decision is made to lay some more Ashen-M, they will go into operation after 2027.


Photo: CrazyMk / forums.airbase.ru
The first "Ash-M" - "Kazan"

At the same time, withstanding the current pace of construction, the US Navy will have at least 2027-30 Virginia by 32. Given the three Sivulfs, the advantage of the US Navy in the 4th generation multipurpose nuclear submarines will exceed the 4: 1 ratio. Not in our favor, of course.

The situation could be corrected to some extent by non-nuclear submarines, but, unfortunately, we did not proceed with the large-scale construction of the Lada diesel-electric submarines, and the improved Varshavyanka project 636.3 are, although improved, but only ships of the previous generation.

In general, it can be said that this component of the US Navy anti-aircraft defense (although, of course, multi-purpose nuclear submarines are capable of performing many other functions) is actively developing and improving. It is not necessary to think that the Americans are “stuck” on one type of nuclear submarines - their “Virginia” are built in separate sub-series (Вloc IV), each of which has very significant changes in comparison with the ships of the previous “blocks”.

As for surface warships, today the US Navy and NATO have masses of corvettes, frigates, and destroyers that perform two important functions. First of all, it is the provision of PLO aircraft carrier, amphibious ship groups and transport convoys. In addition, surface ships can be used to maintain contact and destroy enemy submarines detected by other components of the PLO. However, in this capacity they have significant limitations, since they can act effectively either where the enemy is completely absent aviation (and other means of air attack, including land-based anti-ship missiles), or in the area of ​​domination of their aircraft.

Air and space tools


It is well known that the main trump card of any submarine warship is stealth, and for many readers it is associated with low noise. But this, alas, is not so, because in addition to noise, the submarine “leaves” other “traces” that can be detected and decrypted using the appropriate equipment.

Like any other ship, the submarine leaves a wake mark. When it moves, waves form, the so-called Kelvin wedge, which under certain conditions can be detected on the surface of the sea, even when the submarine itself goes under water. Any submarine is a large metal object that forms anomalies in the magnetic field of our planet. Nuclear submarines use water as a cooler, which they are then forced to dump overboard, leaving thermal traces visible in the infrared spectrum. In addition, as far as the author knows, in the USSR they learned to detect traces of cesium radionuclides in seawater that arise where the atomarine passed. Finally, the submarine cannot exist in the information vacuum, it periodically receives (in some cases, and transmits) radio messages, so that in certain situations it can be detected by electronic reconnaissance.

According to the generally accepted opinion, to date, none of these methods does not guarantee the detection of a submarine and maintaining contact with it. But their complex application, with automatic processing of data and bringing them into a single picture, makes it possible to identify atomic and non-nuclear submarines with a high degree of probability. This is how the aerospace component of the US PLO is built: reconnaissance satellites monitor the expanses of the oceans, revealing what can be seen in optical and thermal imaging cameras. The data obtained can be updated by the latest Poseidon R-8A airplanes equipped with powerful radars, which are likely to be able to find "wave traces" of submarines, optoelectronic cameras for detecting a thermal trace, RTR systems, etc. Of course, the Poseidons also have hydroacoustic equipment, including discharged buoys, but, apparently, today all this is not so much a means of search as a means of additional exploration of underwater targets and keeping contact with them.


There are suggestions that in the USA they were able to develop and put into industrial production some new equipment, possibly using other physical principles to search for an underwater enemy than what was listed above. These assumptions are based on cases where US Navy aircraft “saw” the Soviet and Russian submarines, even in cases where the “classic non-acoustic” methods for detecting such did not seem to work.

Of course, the satellites and planes involved in the US anti-aircraft defense are supplemented by helicopters: the latter, of course, do not have such capabilities as the Poseidons R-8, but are cheaper and can be based on warships. On the whole, the effectiveness of the aerospace component of the US Navy anti-aircraft defense should be evaluated as extremely high.

And what do we do with all this?


First of all, we should understand and accept the real balance of power in the underwater confrontation between Russia and the USA. In other words, we need a detailed understanding of whether Russian 4th generation submarines can fulfill their inherent tasks in the context of counteracting the US Navy anti-aircraft defense or its individual components.

The exact answer to such a question cannot be obtained through reflection or mathematical modeling. Only practice will be the criterion of truth.

How can this be done? Theoretically, this is very simple. As you know, the Americans are trying to escort our SSBNs that go on combat duty, “attaching” to them multipurpose nuclear submarines. The latter follows the domestic missile carrier, in readiness to destroy it if the SSBN begins preparations for a nuclear missile strike. It is also obvious that the "hunter boat" following our strategic missile carrier is not so difficult to detect. To do this, it is enough to put a reliable "trap" at one or several points on the SSBN route - after all, we know it in advance. The role of the "trap" may well be performed by surface or submarine ships of the Russian Navy, as well as naval anti-submarine aviation. Enemy atomarina can not know in advance what, following the SSBN, he’ll get in some place ... well, for example, in the “field of miracles” that was “seeded” with sonar buoys in advance. As a matter of fact, this is exactly how the Soviet and Russian sailors revealed the facts of regular surveillance of our submarines.

It is very important that the first ships of the 4th generation, the SSBN of project 955A “Prince Vladimir”, the SSBN of project 885M “Kazan”, and the subsequent submarines, are 120% used as such “guinea pigs”, leaving as often as possible and longer on combat services. And in the north, and in the Far East. It is necessary to try all the options: try to quietly slip into the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, go under the pack ice of the Arctic, into the "bastions" of the Barents and Okhotsk seas. And look for "spies" - the American MAPL, following our SSBNs and PLO aircraft "accidentally" found themselves nearby. Then, in all cases of detection of American “escort” - to understand in detail, calculate, determine at what exact moment the Americans managed to “catch the tail” of our ships, and why. And the most important thing! Understanding where exactly we are “piercing”, to develop and take retaliatory measures, up to the most radical ones.

Today in the open press there are a lot of statements about the secrecy of our submarines, both strategic and multi-purpose. Extreme, polar points of view can be formulated as follows.

1. The latest Borey-A SSBNs and Yasen-M SSBNs are at least equal and even superior to the best foreign counterparts, and are capable of solving all their tasks (nuclear missile deterrence for the former, destruction of the enemy’s ASG and submarine forces for the latter ) even in areas of dominance of the US Navy and NATO.

2. Modern methods for detecting submarines have reached such heights that the location of even the quietest ships of the Russian Navy, such as 636.3 Varshavyanka, Borey-A, Yasen-M, is no longer a secret for the US Navy and NATO. The movement of our nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines is constantly monitored both in the near and in the far sea zone, including under ice.

According to the author of this article, the truth, as usual, is somewhere in between, but we need to know exactly where exactly. Because knowledge of the real capabilities of our nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines will not only allow us to choose the optimal tactics for their use, but will tell us the correct strategy for building and developing the fleet as a whole. The most important task of the Russian Navy is to ensure nuclear deterrence and, if necessary, launch a full-scale nuclear missile retaliation strike. Accordingly, having determined the areas and the order of carrying out combat service of the SSBNs, at which their maximum secrecy is achieved, we will understand where and with what exactly the general purpose forces of the fleet should help them.

We will analyze this with a very simplified and hypothetical example. Suppose, according to statistics existing at the Pacific Fleet, our SSBNs in combat services were detected and taken for escort in 8-9 cases out of 10. It would seem - this is a sentence to our nuclear underwater shield, but ... maybe not. Perhaps such statistics arose because before that the Pacific had been serving on obsolete 2nd generation ships, and it is possible that with the introduction of the latest SSBNs, the result would improve significantly.

Suppose that the statistics of exits to military service showed: in 10 attempts to enter the ocean, the Borey-A type SSBN was found in 6 cases. Moreover, four times the Borea was “boarded” by the nuclear submarines, guarding the SSBN’s exit in neutral waters in the immediate vicinity of the military base, and in two other cases our missile carriers were discovered and “taken to the front” after they managed to go into the ocean unnoticed.


Photo: CrazyMk / forums.airbase.ru
RPKSN "Prince Vladimir" (type "Borey-A")

Obviously, in this case, we should focus on the means of detecting enemy submarines operating in our near sea zone, areas adjacent to the base of the SSBNs. We are talking about stationary hydrophones, sonar reconnaissance ships and light fleet forces, coupled with anti-submarine aircraft. Indeed, if we know the location of foreign hunter boats, it will be much easier to bring the SSBNs into the ocean past them and the frequency of SSBN detection by the enemy will significantly decrease.

But, perhaps, the practice of military services will demonstrate that the Borei-A are quite capable of going unnoticed into the open ocean, having successfully missed the US sentinel submarines. But already there, in the ocean, they are regularly detected by satellite and aerial reconnaissance forces. Well, then it is worth recognizing that the oceans are not yet for us (at least for a while), and focus on strengthening the "bastion" in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, considering it as the main area of ​​military service of the Pacific SSBNs.

In theory, everything is simple. But in practice?


“Author, why are you breaking through the open door? - Ask another reader. “It is obvious that the methods you described for detecting American nuclear submarines that you described were used in the USSR and continue to be used in the Russian Federation.” What else do you want? ”

Yes, in general, a little. So that all the statistics obtained are carefully analyzed at the highest level, moreover, fears for “the honor of the uniform”, without fear of making a “politically incorrect conclusion”, without fear of trampling someone’s high-ranking callus. In order to find the optimal forms and areas of combat services (the ocean, coastal "bastions", areas under the ice, etc.) based on the results of the analysis. So that on the basis of the foregoing, specific goals and tasks will be determined that the general purpose forces of the fleet will have to solve to cover the deployment of the SSBN. For experienced naval analysts to convert these tasks into performance characteristics and the number of ships, planes, helicopters and other means necessary to ensure the combat stability of the naval component of strategic nuclear forces.

And so that on the basis of all this, the areas of priority R&D are finally determined and the shipbuilding program of the Russian Navy is formed.

But maybe all this is already being done, and right now? Alas, looking at how our state weapons programs are being formed, every year you doubt it more and more.

We are pompously building a series of the latest SSBNs, but we are frankly “slipping” on the minesweepers necessary in order to put submarines into the sea. We plan to build dozens of frigates and corvettes - and we “forget” about their power plants, planning to buy them in Ukraine or Germany, without localizing production in Russia. We really need the ships of the near sea zone, but instead of creating an easy and cheap corvette based on Project 20380, we begin to sculpt the Project 20385 missile cruiser from it without five minutes. And then we refuse the Project 20385 ships, because, you see, they are too the roads. The author completely agrees that they are too expensive, but, attention, the question is - why did the responsible people figure this out only after laying two ships on project 20385? After all, the high cost of their construction was obvious even at the design stage. Well, let's assume it's better late than never. But if we already realized for ourselves that 20385 is too expensive for a corvette, why then have we started building an even more expensive ship of project 20386?

And such questions can be asked a lot more. And the only answer to them will be only the growing conviction that the term “systematic”, without which a somewhat combat-ready navy is impossible today, is not applicable today to the construction of the Russian Navy.

In other words, the author has no doubt that the fleet will necessarily “break in” the latest Borei-A and Yaseni-M, will test their capabilities in practice, as they say, in conditions close to combat. But the fact that this valuable experience will be correctly used, that on its basis plans for R&D and construction of the Russian Navy will be adjusted, there are doubts, are very big.

To be continued ...
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  1. pmkemcity 3 February 2020 07: 09 New
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    The fact that there is a "cat in a dark room" is water even from Chelyabinsk. To squeeze out, not to “destroy”, namely to squeeze out, this “cat” from the areas of our basing and military service will cost incredible efforts and money. And after reducing our activity, the enemy will always be able to return to the abandoned areas.
    We drove ourselves into these "bastions." I would call them "reservations." And grazing your cattle there, do not think that the whole prairie belongs to us. The Americans are only happy about this.
    The submarine fleet must be launched into the ocean. Only then can we talk about the inevitability of punishment of the aggressor.
  2. Vladimir_2U 3 February 2020 07: 10 New
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    and the USSR collapsed.
    It did not break up, but was broken up.
    I thought it was the end of the article, but no.
  3. Amateur 3 February 2020 07: 33 New
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    Alas, by data open publications and opinions of a number naval officers, the secrecy of our strategic submarine missile carriers today is not provided at all

    GIGO (Eng. Garbage In, Garbage Out, “Garbage at the entrance - garbage at the exit”) is a principle in computer science, meaning that if the input data is incorrect, incorrect results will be obtained, even if the algorithm itself is correct.

    To draw any conclusions based on "open sources of information" (i.e. the yellow press) and the subjective opinions of individual, usually ambitious individuals, a waste of time and disrespect for potential readers. fool Everything else is a military secret.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 3 February 2020 08: 48 New
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      Firstly, the concept of "open sources" is much wider than the yellow press. Secondly, if I built my calculations on the basis of data exclusively from Klimov and several other officers actively publishing on the Internet, then you would be right. But the problem is that a number of officers who do not care about the Internet in private conversations said the same ...
      And, most importantly, I do not build the conclusions of the article solely on these figures, but only take them into account. So with the trash you got really excited
      1. Amateur 3 February 2020 09: 13 New
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        So with the trash you got really excited

        Dear Andrey! Agree that the procedure and measures to ensure the entry of nuclear submarines into the database are "information constituting state or military ...". So you either do not possess information in a certain amount, or disclose information ... I am sure that you are not doing either one or the other.
        Therefore, I am a supporter of GIGO.
        But you can have your own opinion.
        Just like mine. drinks
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 3 February 2020 09: 18 New
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          I can once again refer to the article by Rear Admiral Zhandarov that New Hampshire revealed our strategic deployment in the SF. I doubt that Rear Admiral would issue state secrets in publications :))
          And yet - do not nevertheless interfere in one specific measure to ensure that there really is a state state, and general information about which I write
          1. Amateur 3 February 2020 09: 37 New
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            I did not know anything about such an admiral. but after your link looked in the internet:
            From February 11 to August 13, 2014, the New Hampshire submarine unhindered the entire strategic containment of the Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea.
            Of privacy considerations I have no right to reveal the seriousness of the issue of covering the situation at least near the deployment points of our missile submarine cruisers, but I consider it necessary to do this, since my reports to the military-industrial complex and the General Staff have not been accepted.
            Sergei Zhandarov, Rear Admiral

            I made 2 conclusions:
            1. In terms of secrecy, the admiral and I hold approximately the same position.
            2. From which Mr. Admiral concluded that the American submarine
            unobstructedly revealed all the strategic containment activities of the Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea
            absolutely incomprehensible. If we exclude the version that absolute amateurs are in the headquarters of the Federation Council for secrecy and operational deployment of the fleet, then as an IT and systems analysis specialist I responsibly declare that from one point in two days to receive and process the entire array of information on
            all activities for strategic deterrence of the Northern Fleet in the Barents
            physically impossible. This requires at least a combination of NSA forces and assets involving satellites, reconnaissance vessels, radio interception, etc.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 3 February 2020 10: 15 New
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              In terms of secrecy, it’s hard to understand where such conclusions come from :) Both I and Zhandarov write that our strategic deployment is being revealed, but we avoid details. And nevertheless, are you right? :)
              I also want to inform you, as an expert in IT and system analysis, that from February 11 to August 13 a little more time than two days, about 6 months approximately :)))) (I'm sorry, I could not resist sarcasm) repeat
              1. Vladimir1155 3 February 2020 12: 04 New
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                as a specialist in system analysis, I can’t resist sarcasm, if the funds transferred by a respected amateur were not allocated within two days, then a whole year would not have rectified the situation, and even more so months
              2. Amateur 3 February 2020 12: 26 New
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                I apologize for the dates. I really did not look at the months and was mistaken. I’ll clarify with you as a specialist: what, NewHampshire for 6 months continuously ran on the boundary of the thermal water (or in general in the thermal conductors) and no one found it? drinks
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 3 February 2020 15: 51 New
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                  Quote: Amateur
                  I specify with you, as a specialist

                  Alas, I'm not a specialist
                  Quote: Amateur
                  What, New Hampshire for 6 months continuously cruised on the boundary of the thermal water (or in general in the thermal conductors) and no one found it?

                  I believe that in the end they discovered and identified, otherwise how would Zhandarov know about all this?
                  1. Amateur 3 February 2020 16: 51 New
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                    otherwise, how would Zhandarov know all this?

                    The question is of course interesting. And how did Zhandarov really find out what exactly the American boat had identified.
                    Or it was also served by officers who communicate with their command through the media.
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 4 February 2020 17: 14 New
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                      Quote: Amateur
                      The question is of course interesting. And how did Zhandarov really find out what exactly the American boat had identified.

                      If you watched the SSBN - everything is clear
            2. timokhin-aa 3 February 2020 10: 20 New
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              You are the dates of the combat service of New Hampshire from your own quote, you see, an IT specialist? It was not an instant process.
              Zhandarov, by the way, doesn’t finish something, New Hampshire was burned at that service and his nerves were shook a little.
              But in general, the problem exists in a very acute form.
            3. Vladimir1155 3 February 2020 11: 58 New
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              our admirals are undercover now, they are trying by all means to defame the nuclear submarines, and to cut more into unnecessary AVs and cruisers and destroyers, where they are lit by stars and crowds standing on the string L / C, and the pitching there is small especially at the pier, and just cut it dough for its comfortable service and high salary, preferably for the Black Sea Fleet or Baltic Fleet ... in essence, the submarine’s vulnerability in the ocean is exaggerated if all ships of the first second rank are transferred to the submarine bases (at the same time drastically reducing the number of unnecessary and inflated unnecessary fleets in the Baltic Caspian and Japanese com), and to ensure the absence of enemy nuclear submarines at the entrance to the bay, then it’s not easy to identify submarines traveling at ocean depths, quiet and demagnetized, especially in a storm and whether there is a fresh wind, there are such noises and random waves, and its depth the course is so great ...
              1. pin_code 4 February 2020 07: 09 New
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                without AB, cruisers, destroyers ... as well as ships of the far and near sea zone, the price of a nuclear submarine is worthless. everything should be in a complex. including submarine aviation, minesweepers, all kinds of scouts. may sound corny, but in order to pave the way for the submarine to the ocean, you need to spend several times more on aviation, satellites and surface ships. I, as an amateur, of course, could be wrong. or vice versa, maybe not all were listed ...
                1. Vladimir1155 4 February 2020 20: 39 New
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                  Quote: pin_code
                  I, as an amateur, of course, could be wrong.

                  It was the main TPL that made the mistake of stealth and autonomy; the maximum is the reception in passive mode of instructions from the satellite at night. All of the above you unmask boats and destroy it, you only need to provide it with a way out of the base, and separation from enemy tracking AT YOUR BASE, then it does not need helpers
                  1. Nehist 4 February 2020 22: 23 New
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                    Wow what a fierce nonsense !!!! In order to ensure the secrecy of nuclear submarines in the ocean, it must first be brought out there! That's why there are DMZ ships that divert enemy forces giving the submarine the opportunity to break away in all this mess. Roughly speaking, active jamming
                    1. Vladimir1155 5 February 2020 22: 52 New
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                      Quote: Nehist
                      Roughly speaking, active jamming

                      it’s very rude, for example ..... to withdraw the infantry division to actively interfere by advancing the other deaths to certain deaths? ...... but it seemed to me that the interference is usually caused by electronic warfare and does not imply mass deaths of personnel for AV 3000 people, for cruiser-esincellinkor 1000 people each?
          2. ser56 3 February 2020 14: 29 New
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            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            to the article of Rear Admiral Zhandarov

            Are you sure that he writes the truth, but does not cast a shadow on the wattle fence? request recall the situation with the signal books of the Germans after the death of the Kyrgyz Republic in the Baltic?
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 3 February 2020 15: 52 New
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              Quote: ser56
              Are you sure that he writes the truth, but does not cast a shadow on the wattle fence?

              And the meaning to suggest? Americans themselves know whom and where they spotted
              1. ser56 4 February 2020 13: 03 New
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                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                And the meaning to suggest? Americans themselves know whom and where they spotted

                You exaggerate their capabilities a little. In any case - even having fixed our submarines, they are not sure of the reliability of the information received - war is a way of deception ... request Therefore, confirmation of the information goes through other channels - their people are grated ... repeat including through agents and open source analysis ... hi So, it is extremely reckless to believe the words of GT carriers in open sources, they bear personal criminal responsibility ... And, secondly, if there are real problems, then they can go on an instance, up to the Supreme (who keeps the situation under control - he himself gave instructions on the type of houses for the base in Vilyuchensk) - this is not a small house, so access to the open sphere is doubtful for general reasons .... request
                In general, a ring of doubt and truth cannot be found without an admission ... hi
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 4 February 2020 17: 16 New
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                  Quote: ser56
                  You exaggerate their capabilities a little. In any case, even having fixed our submarines, they are not sure of the reliability of the information received.

                  Yes, how to say? They thought up KGAR for nothing, and paid much attention to the individual noise of our nuclear-powered ships. So they have noise portraits of submarines.
                  Quote: ser56
                  So to believe the words of GT carriers in open sources is extremely reckless, they bear personal criminal responsibility ...

                  Do not carry :))) This information is not secret
                  Quote: ser56
                  And, secondly, if there are real problems, then to solve them they can go up to the Supreme Court (which keeps the situation under control - he himself gave instructions on the type of houses for the base in Vilyuchensk)

                  Unfortunately, the level of the Supreme does not allow to go beyond the level of houses in Vilyuchinsk, excuse me
                  1. ser56 4 February 2020 18: 07 New
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                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    So they have noise portraits of submarines.

                    I recall that noise simulators were invented a long time ago ....
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Do not carry :))) This information is not secret
                    Quote: ser56

                    I don’t see any reason to argue - they don’t bear it, they don’t bear it ... bully
                    glad you know - what is secret, what is not ... hi
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    the level of the Supreme does not allow to go beyond the level of houses

                    I will say this - even the ITT, which did not have a higher education, did not know foreign languages, except Russian, which has spoken throughout life with an accent living among Russians for decades (something reminiscent of Gorbi with his start bully ) - I could understand the technical details ...
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    excuse me

                    it's not for me ... request
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 4 February 2020 19: 15 New
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                      Let me remind you in response that simulators are one of the main weaknesses of our submarine fleet, not to mention the fact that no simulator can work for a long time, and they followed us for days.
                      And about the "even IVS", it's just sad. Where is the ITT, and where is the supreme .... How is the Strugatsky? "My dear Ripat! Do not forget that from the height of my origin the difference between you and the king is completely imperceptible." Or, as one person said, there was a cult, but there was a personality ...
                      1. ser56 5 February 2020 11: 09 New
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                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Let me remind you in response that simulators are one of the main weaknesses of our submarine fleet,

                        but it’s very effective, so it’s necessary to develop ... and not so complicated ...
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        that no simulator can work for a long time, and they followed us for days.

                        to knock off the trail you need much less time ... request do not put excessive requirements ...
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Where is the detention center and where is the supreme ..

                        1) But do not you think that you are a prisoner of the myth of IVS? If you look at reality, then he is great as a politician - i.e. in seizing and holding power, PR - for the rest - not at all! The failures in his strategy (economic, political, military,) and personnel policy are simply terrible, even criminal ... hi
                        2) do you feel so bad about VV that even write a post with a capital letter? bully
                        I do not support him in everything, but at a certain stage he was simply brilliant for Russia, but alas - he was too long in power ...
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        the heights of my origin the difference between you and the king is completely invisible

                        I don’t know about your origin, but usually such things do not even come from the common people, but from foreigners ... hi The destiny of fools boasts of origin ...
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        as one man said - there was a cult, but there was a personality ...

                        Who argues - but the criminal person - the Caucasian revolutionary terrorist a la Basayev, God has saved Russia from repetition ...
                        And all these jerks and violence against the country from poor education and contempt for people - that collectivization, that industrialization, cultural revolution, etc. This is clearly visible in China - everything was absurd there, even compared with us ...
                      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 5 February 2020 20: 00 New
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                        Quote: ser56
                        but very effective

                        If you need to mislead a torpedo - yes, but a submarine is already more difficult.
                        Quote: ser56
                        and not so complicated ...

                        VERY complicated. Possible and needed, yes, but complex.
                        Quote: ser56
                        to knock off the trail you need much less time ...

                        For more than a day, San Luis was attacked by the British Navy at the Falklands, although it used good simulators.
                        Quote: ser56
                        Do not you think that you are captive to the myth of IVS?

                        I suggest not discussing this. I was "captured by the myth" after a lot of work with the stability of those years and many other documents, and studies of the economy and science of the USSR in the Stalin period and the subsequent period. You see, I did not immediately come to this point of view, but now I am confident in it. I suppose, and you are sure of yours, so what's the point of arguing? We will not convince each other. And I wrote about the IVS only to indicate my position on this issue.
                        Quote: ser56
                        Are you so bad about VV that even write a post with a capital letter?

                        Yes
                        Quote: ser56
                        I don’t know how you are with the origin

                        And where does mine? I meant that from the height of the IVS, the difference between the GDP and the British queen (or Trump there, if you will) is completely insignificant.
                      3. ser56 6 February 2020 14: 08 New
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                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        If you need to mislead a torpedo - yes, but a submarine is already more difficult.

                        even the first is enough request As far as I know, the Premier League’s main weapon of defeat is not ram recourse But in any case, it’s useful to create difficulties for the adversary ....
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        VERY complicated. Possible and needed, yes, but complex.

                        I'm not an expert, of course, but it's just a set of powerful speakers of different frequencies with programmed control ... request Essentially a synthesizer ...
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        I suggest not discussing this.

                        as you wish...
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        after a lot of work with the adequacy of those years and many other documents,

                        there is such an expression - lie as witnesses ... also lie and documents ...
                        by the way - you don’t want a little thing, either way it has an indirect relation to the topic ...
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        that from the height of the IVS, the difference between the GDP and the British queen (or Trump there, if you will) is completely insignificant.

                        However ... it’s a pity that you created yourself an idol ...
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Yes

                        fun ... but we have freedom of opinion ...
  • rocket757 3 February 2020 07: 53 New
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    Do not put all the eggs in one basket !!! This is expensive, but still works with a plus.
    Somewhere we are on a horse, somewhere we are walking nearby ... the main thing is not to trail behind and not to stomp on any other way ....
    1. CTABEP 3 February 2020 10: 48 New
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      [Quote] [/ quote]

      The main thing is not under the hooves :).
      1. rocket757 3 February 2020 11: 25 New
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        Hold on tight in the saddle, do not miss the stirrups ... in short, be a horseman, not a bag .... potatoes, for example.
  • Tiksi-3 3 February 2020 08: 17 New
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    I read the article and was surprised, because I completely agree with the opinion of the author, accurate to the point ..... it feels like I wrote)) ...
  • SVD68 3 February 2020 08: 34 New
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    But what if all the proposed measures fail? And tracking our SSBNs will still be in 80-90% of cases.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 3 February 2020 08: 36 New
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      But we will analyze it in the next article :)))
      1. CTABEP 3 February 2020 10: 48 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        But we will analyze it in the next article :)))


        Look forward to! And then something has not been your articles for a long time :(.
      2. pin_code 4 February 2020 07: 14 New
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        Then we are waiting for the continuation!
    2. Narak-zempo 3 February 2020 16: 18 New
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      Quote: SVD68
      But what if all the proposed measures fail? And tracking our SSBNs will still be in 80-90% of cases.

      Paws up and
      But here is not Cambodia, here is the United States, the state of Russia ... (© "Ministry of Love")
  • Yehudi Menuhin 3 February 2020 09: 00 New
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    As always, it is very consistently and reasonably stated. Thank you very much, dear Andrey
  • Narak-zempo 3 February 2020 09: 48 New
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    moreover, without fear for the “honor of the uniform”, without fear of making a “politically incorrect conclusion”, without fear of trampling someone’s high-ranking callus

    It must be either a superman, or really not be friends with the head. Because the war, perhaps, in our lifetime will not be, and it will turn out to calmly rise to retirement. But for such "activity" you can easily lose everything in peacetime. And in general, the authorities are worse than the enemy, so it seems, Frederick II bequeathed.
  • Operator 3 February 2020 10: 27 New
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    Another article in the style of the Soviet cargo cult: if they have AB, NPS, EM, SB, SOI ... (put down the right one), then we need to have the same blood from the nose laughing
  • Demagogue 3 February 2020 10: 55 New
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    I do not agree with Andrei regarding a cheap corvette based on 20380. It will not be as cheap as necessary. 2000 tons of 20380 do not give the opportunity to fully use the helicopter. Then why are they needed? You need something up to 1000 tons like Visby. And you need a lot of such boats.
  • Vladimir1155 3 February 2020 11: 47 New
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    a very important topic was raised by the respected Andrey from Chelyabinsk, the nuclear submarine is the base of the fleet and ensuring their combat stability is an extremely important task
  • God save the king 3 February 2020 12: 10 New
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    Amateur delirium. It would be a shame to post this on the site in the "weapons" category.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 3 February 2020 14: 14 New
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      The value of your criticism cannot be underestimated. love
      1. God save the king 3 February 2020 14: 27 New
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        There is not so much criticism as indignation at a read publication.
        You didn’t expect that under the article consisting of fantasies and conjectures constructive comments will appear?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 3 February 2020 16: 07 New
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          Quote: God save the King
          There is not so much criticism as indignation at the read publication.

          Yes, I see :)))) It's much more difficult to criticize, because you need to at least slightly understand the issue.
          1. God save the king 3 February 2020 17: 25 New
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            I repeat, in my comments on this publication there is no criticism, it is not worth it (criticism of the publication or vice versa, decide for yourself).
            I have figured out this issue enough to have my opinion - with 1,6% of world GDP, the high seas fleet is a land power - Russia simply will not pull, but there are plenty of asymmetric responses to threats.
            NATO will not go into Russia, while others do not dare to aggress in our direction. .
        2. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 16: 30 New
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          Quote: God save the King
          There is not so much criticism as indignation at a read publication.
          You didn’t expect that under the article consisting of fantasies and conjectures constructive comments will appear?

          The problem is that the pre-infarction state of the national aviation PLO, the death of mine defense and the solemn burial of the air defense missile are an objective reality given to us in our feelings.
          How much do not say halva powerful navy of Russia, the facts of the presence of 8 PLO aircraft and two or three aircraft of the previous generation for all fleets will not be canceled. As well as the fact that the OVR was equipped with ships built thirty years ago, the replacement of which is still at the stage of approval of TK.
          And the situation with ICAPL has been under discussion for several years. And during this time, as there was 1 combat-ready ICAPL at the Pacific Fleet, it remained the only one.
          1. God save the king 3 February 2020 17: 17 New
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            With anti-submarine aircraft, the issue was resolved, it will be supplemented with modified Tu214.
            For the rest, the fleet corresponds to the tasks assigned to it, and quite logically, for the land power, the high seas fleet is not a priority.
            1. Alexey RA 5 February 2020 14: 44 New
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              Quote: God save the King
              With anti-submarine aircraft, the issue was resolved, it will be supplemented with modified Tu214.

              That is, another 10 years we will not have a new PLO aircraft.
              Quote: God save the King
              For the rest, the fleet corresponds to the tasks assigned to it, and quite logically, for the land power, the high seas fleet is not a priority.

              Since when did OVR become high seas fleet?
              We no longer have base defense fleet.
  • Operator 3 February 2020 12: 23 New
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    Quote: Berkut-38
    I promised to talk to you

    Do not forget to remind me of this when the Poseidon becomes operational.
  • Glory1974 3 February 2020 13: 08 New
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    Each coin has 2 sides.
    As our boats can detect, so can we.
    As always in war, the main resource. Of course, the United States has more resources. And accordingly more opportunities. It follows that our boats cannot be sent alone to the ocean. There, using their superiority, the Americans will discover and destroy them. Therefore, we will not sink any convoys from the USA to Europe.
    But in our seas, using all our forces, we can make a zone of coverage for our boats, primarily for the SSBN cruisers to strike retaliation. In this case, the war will not start, because no one can guarantee that our boats will not be able to shoot.
  • ser56 3 February 2020 14: 24 New
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    "However, the SSBNs are an indispensable political means of preventing such a war, since in the general consciousness of Europe and the United States it is submarines with ICBMs on board that guarantee the inevitability of nuclear retaliation."
    A controversial thesis to justify the gigantic cost of the SSBN! In fact, the substitution of reality by PR ... repeat
    The mass consciousness is completely reprogrammable for the necessary images, which, by the way, is what our leadership does - through leaks about Poseidon and stories about hypersonic nuclear warheads ... hi
    It is clear that a new generation of SSBNs is being actively built and abandonment is no longer possible - so the next 30 years is a reality .... what
    That is why it is necessary to ensure that partners are forced to spend heavily in return. lol
    And here is one way - access to the ocean, so the concept of bastions must be archived ... request
  • icant007 3 February 2020 14: 42 New
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    Those entering the combat service of the Pacific Fleet’s SSBN were identified and accompanied by anti-submarine forces of our “sworn friends” in approximately 80% of cases.


    Where did this information come from?
  • Sapsan136 3 February 2020 14: 52 New
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    The USA also doesn’t have everything smoothly ... The Sea Wolf submarine, it’s only 3 nuclear submarines, which are very different from each other and essentially diverse, and very expensive, so expensive that even the US budget didn’t take their massive construction ... Building Virginia , this is an attempt to save money, which came sideways, since the use of cheaper materials on them had the most negative effect on their combat qualities and secrecy, including
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 3 February 2020 16: 07 New
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      Quote: Sapsan136
      The Virginia building is an attempt to save money, which came sideways, since the use of cheaper materials on them had the most negative effect on their fighting qualities and secrecy, including

      In vain do you think so, with secrecy they have everything in order
      1. agond 3 February 2020 18: 24 New
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        The stability problem of our submarine forces was created by us ourselves, we had a bad craving for everything big, we built, we are building and intend to build nuclear submarines, but we had to build nuclear submarines of a smaller size and a larger number, and long ago it was time to abandon the dogma of vertical launch for large ballistic missiles, one missile with a “torpedo” launch forward is enough. For this, the double-hull scheme used in the 941 “Shark” is ideal, only reduce the length by 3 times and the displacement by 20 times, a pop-up container with a rocket udet placed between the pressure hulls An intermediate. If the length of the missile is not limited by the diameter of the submarine, then the missile can be made with very strong energy, on a high trajectory, at any range, with a large casting weight, the positioning area can be anywhere even in Antarctica. and try to trace such a submarine and try to intercept its warheads.
        1. Sapsan136 4 February 2020 10: 19 New
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          The French built the smallest combat nuclear submarine in the world, nothing good happened, and one missile in the ammunition, taking into account the US missile defense, is nothing ...
      2. Sapsan136 4 February 2020 10: 17 New
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        I don’t think, I know what I’m writing about. In Virginia, a defect in the outer shell of the hull, which peels off, turns into rags and makes noise as it should ... There are other defects ... In the United States, it is impossible to build a nuclear submarine of the same high quality as the Sea Wolf for much less money ...
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 4 February 2020 10: 34 New
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          Flaking of cladding is a common problem for all submarines, not just Virginia. And about the cost reduction ... Virginia is smaller, it has cut part of the performance characteristics relative to Sivulf, + cost reduction due to large-scale construction. But with stealth, everything is fine there
          1. Sapsan136 4 February 2020 10: 53 New
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            Everything is relative, I would say, but not good ... By the way, it is written here that all submarines of the Russian Federation are supposedly being detected by the United States at a time ... This, to put it mildly, from the Evil One ... 5-10 years ago, the United States conducted joint exercises , from one of the Arab countries armed with a Varshavyanka-type submarine ... the United States (confidently) led a submarine of a conditional enemy ... The embarrassment of the situation is that the Arabs surfaced in a completely different place and managed to conduct a training torpedo attack on the US aircraft carrier .. . So it’s not so simple ... It all depends on the crew and equipment and on numerous circumstances ...
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 4 February 2020 17: 24 New
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              Quote: Sapsan136
              About 5-10 years ago, the United States conducted joint exercises, with one of the Arab countries armed with a VPL of the Warsawyanka type ... the United States (confidently) led a submarine of a conditional enemy ... The embarrassment of the situation was that the Arabs surfaced in a completely different place and managed to conduct a training torpedo attack on a US aircraft carrier ...

              Are you sure you have not been confused with Gotland? However, oddly enough, Varshavyanka can, subject to several conditions. On a boat, they know exactly the area of ​​maneuvering of the AUG and the Americans do not use patrol planes. In the case of Gotland, they didn’t lift the EMNIPs at all, they limited themselves to surface ships and “elk”. And yes, under such conditions, diesel-electric submarines at low noise can.
              But we are discussing SSBNs, and they are discussing submarines.
              1. Sapsan136 4 February 2020 18: 09 New
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                This is not Gotland, the case was exactly with Varshavyanka ... I don’t remember about the planes ... The nuclear submarines are also of different projects and if the chances of older and (or) noisier projects tend to zero, then the success of more successful projects is quite possible ...
  • sevtrash 3 February 2020 18: 08 New
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    It is strange to expect something else, and in almost all areas. What determines the quality advantage of a product? Works in basic sciences, applied research, R&D, material and human resources, quality of education, etc. Once upon a time, the United States and not only ahead of the USSR, and even more so the Russian Federation. And not only the USA. Yes, there are still schools and at the very least financed, you can expect almost a miracle from them - only from some and partial - for how long they will last. So, no matter what the conversation is, the economy is primary. And everything is harsh there - the budget was cut between officials and oligarchs and order is not visible.
  • Tests 3 February 2020 18: 59 New
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    Alexey RA (Alexey), dear, BRAVO !!!
    All you need is the valiant Russian fleet, developing every day, not even by leaps and bounds, but by nine steps, and to the side, and not forward, under the guidance of the PedRossians, to discredit! There are as many as 6 base minesweepers built in 1984-1991 on the Northern Fleet, though there are a bit more bases. There are 2 “Aquamarines” in 1974 and 75, and “Ruby” in 1994. And about the OVR ships, uncle, it’s not yours! In Severodvinsk MPK "Naryan-Mar" celebrates Flag Raising Day from 07.10.1991/30/1991, so he is not yet 30 years old! And MPK "Onega" was launched in general in 2, he was up to 236 years old even in the sea to run and run! I have not been in the port for 2 years, I have not seen the treasures of the Belomorsk naval base - the Korund RT-1, I don’t know if it is still alive. And he is already! Any adversary would ask the heat! It’s true that it cannot be divided into 2 either lengthwise or across, so that apart from Severodvinsk and Arkhangelsk, it’s sad ... Sad ... It seems that experience XNUMX and XNUMX of the World does not teach our admirals anything, and the Kara Gate, and the White Sea, and Germans locked up the seas around Novaya Zemlya very efficiently ...
  • Dmitry Chelyabinsk 3 February 2020 19: 22 New
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    Alas, according to open publications and the opinions of a number of naval officers, the secrecy of our strategic submarine missile carriers today is not provided at all, or, at least, is provided to a completely insufficient degree.


    Good evening)
    I would like to get acquainted with such open publications, can you throw off a couple of links?
    Only the book of Shirokorad A.B. comes to my mind. "The fleet that destroyed Khrushchev."
    But there are estimates of the detection characteristics of submarines in the 60s - 70s.

    And those open publications with which I am familiar express a point of view diametrically opposed to that set out in the article regarding the possibilities of detecting submarines.
    For example, articles by E.V. Myasnikov
    https://www.armscontrol.ru/subs/detection/rus/ng102594.htm
    http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/ru/archive/1994/02/can_russian_strategic_submarin.html
  • TermNachTer 3 February 2020 19: 46 New
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    Without going into specific details, and the polemic with the author, I’ll say - more than once there was a situation where it seemed that everything had ended in Ros (Russia), and then it turned out that everything was not so bad.
  • Andrey.AN 3 February 2020 20: 58 New
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    Strategic bombers are also detected and intercepted in the vast majority of cases, when patrolling in peacetime, this does not mean that this will happen in the military.
  • xomaNN 3 February 2020 22: 12 New
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    Useful material for the dispute. Thanks to the author. Of course, the situation with the Russian Navy is not entirely rosy. It looks like a climber tore off the mountain (the peak of the Soviet Navy of the 80s) and almost fell into the abyss (90s under eBn). But ... Here I was hooked on a tubercle and began to climb up a little again again (from the 2010s ..). ...
    And so far Russia does not have enough money, personnel, technologies to compete on equal terms with the fleets of all of NATO and the USA. And we get out of this difficult situation. But this is better than just "lying" under adversaries without a fight am
  • Comrade Kim 4 February 2020 01: 32 New
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    Quote: sevtrash
    Once upon a time, the United States and not only ahead of the USSR, and even more so the Russian Federation.

    The statistics are even sadder.
    Compared with the latest data on the existence of the USSR (1991), if we take for 100% the volume of industrial production in RSFSR, now with all the "breakthroughs" and "achievements" the volume of industrial production of the Russian Federation is less than 95%.
    And so in almost everything, for 30 years effective managers have been catching up with the economy not even of the USSR, but of the RSFSR.
  • CBR600 4 February 2020 09: 24 New
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    Being an absolute amateur, I am worried about these cruisers. I follow the topic, Pts interesting. The situation is clear. Obviously, satellites are busy detecting and tracking. Maybe they need to be blinded? What kind of EW thread? Esi is possible. For myself, I understood from all materials and articles that today the secrecy of nuclear submarines, diesel-electric submarines and MPL is zero for the enemy. Everything is clearly done, they managed. It is also obvious that Poseidons will save the situation. It is not entirely clear how, but it is expected. I can’t imagine a breakthrough in anti-submarine defense as a missile defense system. A technological leap should happen.
    ___ Extrude from the base area. Tell me how? The devices are already marked on the pier with a marker. Even if they break away from tracking, that range of use is no longer any, missiles have become worse, and the coast has a new (its own) layered detection system. Those. it becomes impossible to use these cruisers.
    ___ Oh, don’t minus, this is my amateurish vision of the situation. Or hope it may not be so bad.
  • CBR600 4 February 2020 16: 29 New
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    Quote: agond
    the missile is large and will fly far from the coast of Antarctica

    from the coast of Antarctica just fly, only there it will need to be delivered, the question is how? All paths are blocked.
    1. agond 4 February 2020 18: 39 New
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      Quote: CBR600
      from the coast of Antarctica just fly, only there it will need to be delivered, the question is how? All paths are blocked.

      Overlapped for Belgorod-type submarines with a length of 0.184 km and 30 thousand tons of displacement, and for submarines of 60-70 m in size with a displacement of less than 3 thousand tons, all roads are open. It’s just that the customers with the designers didn’t set the task and received an unsatisfactory answer, it’s just ridiculous to look at it, do and make the diameter of the submarine equal to the length of the rocket !!!
  • Dmitry Chelyabinsk 4 February 2020 19: 38 New
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    Quote: CBR600
    Obviously, satellites are busy detecting and tracking. Maybe they need to be blinded? What kind of EW thread?

    No need to dazzle. Under the ice, the satellite does not see the boat. In the Northern Fleet, ice fighting duty may be year-round, in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk from October to May.

    Quote: CBR600
    Today, the secrecy of the nuclear submarines, diesel-electric submarines and the MPL is zero for the enemy.

    I am not a specialist either, but there are different opinions. You can find the opposite work, “Fundamental Limitations of Passive Acoustics,” at http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/en/archive/1994/02/can_russian_strategic_submarin.html

    Finding boats under the ice is acoustics. "Dolphins" (667BDRM) and "Boreas" in terms of noise are already quite different than boats of previous types. In addition, detection and tracking are not the same thing (you can read this by reference).

    Our problem today is not in secrecy, but in the fact that boats stand in bases almost all the time. From this point of view, it is really a waste of money.
  • Dmitry Chelyabinsk 4 February 2020 22: 42 New
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    Quote: Berkut-38
    Orion did not meddle with me at Okhotsk

    Its radius, like from Hokkaido, does not reach the northern half of the sea, well, at least for a long time it will not be able to patrol. And why did he need to fly ice for 2/3 years.

    Alexander, at what distance Superior Los or Virginia confidently (not occasionally) hear Dolphin and Borey under the ice?
    It is interesting that on the Northern Fleet there were regular collisions of NATO boats with our submarines (which indicates a loss of contact), about the boats the Pacific Fleet did not read this.
  • Valdaev 5 February 2020 00: 21 New
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    [quote] However, the SSBNs are an indispensable political means of preventing such a war, since in the mass consciousness of Europe and the United States it is submarines with ICBMs on board that guarantee the inevitability of nuclear retaliation / quote]

    This phrase is based on a certain basic thesis that all authors of VO postulate. The thesis is this: NATO, all other things being equal, is ready to use the instrument of preventive war "to solve the Russian problem." The thesis is false, because “solving the Russian problem” in this way is incredibly, monstrously expensive, even if we assume that the initiating side won a military victory by the standards of the mid-20th century. The current world of high and thin technologies, which already exist not only in laboratories, but are built into everyday life, is very easily destroyed. A simple example, just to demonstrate the principle - in the Middle Ages, in modern times, etc. it was impossible to turn off the lighting in the houses at once. Each person lit and extinguished candles. The idea, I hope, is understandable (the destruction of a data center with a single missile with a conventional warhead - and it started ...). Today, Western civilization is extremely susceptible to the costs of a major war, and this applies to all walks of life, not excluding elites. Costs are calculated very carefully. So, they don’t like Putin’s regime - well, obviously they don’t like what to argue about. What experience do they have with the extremely hostile regime in the near past? This is the USSR. He collapsed without a European war. According to them, because he could not compete not only technologically, but also because he lost the competition in providing citizens with food, clothing, household appliances, housing, etc. So, NATO has a lesson - you don’t have to fight, you have to wait until the system decays on its own, while showing it that there is enough power to defend itself. NATO does not need a preventive war with its incredible risks. They proceed from the fact that the Putin regime is rot by definition (even examples on this resource are more than enough). The task is to deter aggression, the task is to make it boil in its own juice, in import substitution. Let them wallow in chimeras in preparation for the "big war", which (preparation) is needed only as a negotiating position for Ponte, well, and for threats to neighbors who are obviously weaker. For example, this does not work against Turkey, you have to peck at the tomatoes, and this is limited. We do not forget that maintaining and equipping the Armed Forces for a potential war with NATO requires a lot of money, which, as in the days of the USSR, wastes the country's resources. Because the goal is false, invented
  • commander 5 February 2020 04: 54 New
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    Auto RU. Of course, your article is amateurish. Starting with the term "Combat Stability of Russian Submarine Forces". Explain "Combat Stability" applies to tactical targets. And "domestic submarine forces" is, after all, a branch of the forces of the Navy (I like to write with capital letters :-)). I want to console right away that there are a number of ways to "ensure the combat stability of the PKK SN," moreover, this is the main task for the fleets. These methods are applied and not unsuccessfully. Unless, of course, operational cards at the fleet headquarters are not "drawn" in the Gauss projection, as in the Golden Eagle-38, but in the Mercator projection.
    Golden eagle, your historical nostalgism, of course, is praised. All your military services were commanded by Captain 1st Rank G. Dunaev, or almost all. It was simply unlucky for this officer, and his crew did heroic deeds to separate the enemy from the maneuvering forces of anti-submarine warfare. On your analysis of the K-258 service (paragraph 3 in your comment), Commander E. Baltin told the commander (I quote almost verbatim): “You’re not fucking shouting at the whole Pacific Ocean that the enemy is watching, I can’t tear myself away. I came to the base , threw chalki, recorded in the event log - detached from the maneuvering enemy plv ". First, Sinko, your navigator, spoke about these maneuvers on the edge of the entire Internet, now here you are.
    1. Nehist 5 February 2020 14: 31 New
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      Well, not such a Delitan article !!! There are ways and even an outfit of forces is allocated, which now not one of the fleets can not single out because it simply does not exist !!! The golden eagle was just engaged in hunting for Boats, especially from the air (which at one time led to the collapse of the kriegs marina) Gg about the Internet ... Even in the memorable memorable year 97, all this was dismantled in attempts to close the Sea of ​​Okhotsk .... And than all is over? That the nearest Naval Air Force Base of Mongohta was taken away ... So that Dunaev and others would not perform heroic feats of separation, such as Baltin should not be spoken out by Dunaev but higher !!! Since heroism in Russia is usually stupid bosses !!! It was not for Dunaev to scream !!! And beat the bells in all !!!
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 5 February 2020 19: 53 New
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      Quote: commander
      Of course, your article is amateurish

      Which is not surprising - I'm a lover :)))
      Quote: commander
      starting with the term "Combat Stability of Russian Submarine Forces". Explain "Combat Stability" applies to tactical targets. And "domestic submarine forces" is, after all, a branch of the forces of the Navy

      Thanks for the clarifications. I can only note that I am very sorry that you, of course, a competent person, have taken the path of "gramnarism", wanting to pull off the "presumptuous shtafki". All because it turned out somehow not very.
      Do you think that the term "combat stability" applies only to tactical targets. However, there is another point of view: Igor Nikolayevich Rodionov, who was the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation in 1996, believed that combat stability was the ability of an army or navy group to maintain combat effectiveness and use its combat capabilities to guarantee the fulfillment of the received combat mission with active opposition from the enemy. And for me it was a serious revelation that we, it turns out, have a kind of Navy "domestic submarine forces." In my simplicity of mind, I believed that the Navy was born underwater forces, and that adding the word “domestic” makes it clear that I’m using the phrase “underwater forces” not as a term in the structure of the Navy.
      Yes, one could write "Combat Stability of Russian Navy Submarine Forces", but then half of the article would have to be given to explain what I meant in the title. In general, the Russian language is great and powerful, and you should not squeeze it into the framework of your usual terminology. In my IMHO, I did not make a fundamental mistake.
      It is even sadder that you did not say anything about the substance of the article and the questions raised in it. Because here it is
      Quote: commander
      I want to console right away that there are a number of ways to "ensure the combat stability of the PKK SN," moreover, this is the main task for the fleets. These methods are applied and not unsuccessfully.

      is not the best editorial for the newspaper Pravda since the 70s, but then they wrote more colorful
  • CBR600 5 February 2020 09: 53 New
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    Last three comments- UXX !! We are grateful for your service.
    On the topic, these means of overcoming are not clear to me. It is only clear that the smaller and fresher the generation, the LESS noticeable, so it is a priori. Those. still noticeable, but less. Is Ash completely silent?
  • exo
    exo 5 February 2020 12: 11 New
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    It is a pity that this is the "voice of one crying, in the wilderness." The submarine, which was put into repair in 2010, and will be commissioned in 2023 (?) The long-suffering Kuznetsov. All programs are implemented through one place. Even something similar to a systematic approach is not visible.
    Under the current leadership, Russia will not have a normal fleet. With another, also a mystery.
    And indeed, the question begs: is it necessary to build an SSBN, if the fleet remains unable to provide their work.
  • Dmitry Chelyabinsk 8 February 2020 17: 25 New
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    Quote: Berkut-38
    Well you asked :-)
    Tof or SF region ... season ... type of hydrology ... heading angles ... speed ...
    Without ice, you can figure out "Chanterelle"
    8 knots ... 30 min. 40 cabs at 667au, this is Sturgeon. Winter. The first type of ha ... ocean zone.
    By BDR, halve. At 6 knots, reduce by another third.
    At 877 in the Kuril Islands there were separate discoveries in Los 208 cab. Usually 60-80. Head-on.
    Under the ice ???
    Especially in Okhotsk, shallow depths. Dudko in the report gave with 671 rtm confidently 60 cabs for our 667 au
    Lobanov at 671 RTM gave 55 cabs on Los. Back side. This is spring, transitional type ha from 1 to 6.


    Thanks for the answers, very interesting information.
    Nevertheless, the conclusion remains that the detection / tracking even of 2nd generation submarines is probabilistic in nature, and therefore the SSBNs located on the BS introduce significant uncertainty into the possibility of a counter-force strike on the strategic nuclear forces.
  • CBR600 10 February 2020 16: 51 New
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    Quote: agond
    Quote: CBR600
    There is an opinion that it is impossible to use SSBNs in the strategic nuclear forces group, because these RPKs will be destroyed with impunity in neutral waters.

    There are black boxes on the plane, and if they are not on the submarine, then this is a question for the sailors.However, an interesting situation has developed with the submarine fleet, for thirty years we have been building and are building submarine airships, and that’s exactly the way most Zeppelin’s airships were smaller than our missile carriers ( who doesn’t believe, check), and suddenly or suddenly it turns out, "the Christmas tree was too big", though they try to hush up this fact and not recognize it, but people don’t like to change their minds, and even more so to acknowledge the mistakes of wasted time and resources ..

    Google r-39. The size of the boat depends on the type / size of missiles. And volley and ice breaking and much more. Autonomy. 500 kilotons in warheads and a range of -12 thousand kilometers !!! 16 pieces! Introduce creepy. Multipurpose do not drag. But there are no cruisers and no such missiles, but they were, but they didn’t complete it, they closed the project.
    Bases are needed first of all. Those. global influence =)
    1. agond 15 February 2020 14: 40 New
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      Quote: CBR600
      The size of the boat depends on the type / size of missiles. And volley and ice breaking and much more

      Wrong, the size of the submarines depends on the ideas of the designer and the customer, they have an obsessive idea that ballistic missiles on the submarines should be placed only vertically, and it does not matter to them that the missiles are 15 meters long., This dogma forces us to build PD (underwater airships) that have to be kept close to their shores under the ice, but simply by supply they can be seen from the cosmos, but to launch rockets it is necessary to break out from under the ice somehow, in general the first stupidity gives rise to the second, second, third and fourth, etc. boat conducting Abli can be obtained by expensive construction projects, expensive to operate, and disposal will not be cheap either. With all this, the detection radius of our PDs by the enemy is increasing every year, naturally questions arise about their compliance with the purpose and the professional suitability of customers with the designers of this. a miracle.
  • Angry April 11 2020 14: 38 New
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    Good, competent article. Confirming that our Sun are engaged in, anyone but just not people with brains. It’s also clear that we will never catch up with the “decaying” States technologically and economically ... it’s pointless to run after them ... It's like China copies, steals, but doesn’t create its own, can be compared in terms of shaft, but in quality - never .. So we, until we reach it, will already have outdated technology for them, and for us “the latest”. The construction of the Russian fleet is simply criminal! Instead of reliably protecting our mobile submarine "divisions" of strategic nuclear forces, which are the undoubted guarantor of the world, we are not developing either a Navy, a submarine defense, coastal anti-submarine aviation, or probably offshore systems for detecting moving underwater objects. What are we counting on? On the Avos? Of course, all, or almost all of our future SSBNs on the BS will be destroyed and will not bring any benefit to the country and people. And the fact that Aegis kicks off with them accidentally ... The "curse of missile defense" is still triggered here, they can shoot down dozens of launching hundred-ton ICBMs crawling into orbit, and we will have to intercept 100 kg warheads falling into us in hundreds, or thousands and already reaching at the first cosmic speed. Here we already knowingly lost the missile defense arms race ... After all, unlike the United States, which has the Aegis naval mobile missile defense system, we have nothing of the kind, but only with the advent of the S-500 can we tell the people that we now have the missile defense.
  • Charik April 25 2020 16: 52 New
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    A recent article about the torpedoes of our submarines is that the US80s alone and don’t have anything else? Are there really torpedoes or not?