Resolution of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars No. 443ss: the first step towards a future victory

Resolution of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars No. 443ss: the first step towards a future victory
KV tank 1939. Photo by Wikimedia Commons


On December 19, 1939, the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted Decree No. 443ss “On the Adoption of the Red Army tanks, armored vehicles, artillery tractors and their production in 1940. " In accordance with this document, several new models of equipment of a number of classes were adopted for arming and supplying the Red Army. Also, the decree determined the order of their production. In fact, Resolution No. 443cc set the direction for the development of the armored vehicles fleet for the next several years, including for the time that would become the time of World War II.

New designs


Sovnarkom decided to adopt the Red Army 11 new products. For the armored forces intended "heavy reservation tank" KV and medium T-34, made on the basis of the existing T-32. Before starting the series, they should have been finalized. They also adopted a BT tank with a V-2 diesel engine, a T-40 amphibious tank and a BA-11 armored car. To ensure the production of new tanks, the V-2 diesel was adopted.

Also, the ZiS-5 truck and the GAZ-61 car were intended for the troops. Tractors-artillery tractors “Voroshilovets”, ST-2 and STZ-5 developed by different plants were taken for supply.


Tanks of pre-war development. Leftmost - BT-7, right - modifications of the T-34 of the 1940s and 1941s. Photo: Wikimedia Commons

The decree had requirements to launch the production of new samples. They also adopted guidelines for various enterprises in the defense and automotive industries, which were to master the production of equipment and components for it. The production of new combat and auxiliary vehicles was required to be launched in the next 1940.

It is easy to notice that most of the listed samples remained in service until June 1941, and then were actively used in the fight against the Nazi invaders. Thus, the decision of the KO under SNK No. 443ss had a great impact on the defense capability of our country in that difficult period. Let us consider in more detail the main results of the decision in terms of production and operation of equipment.

Tank success


In the context of tanks, the first thing to consider is the latest V-2 diesel engine. By the time of its adoption, five modifications were created for different tanks and combat vehicles. During the war, new options appeared with enhanced characteristics, and for the construction of armored vehicles made several tens of thousands of B-2s of all versions. After the war, the development of the structure continued, resulting in the appearance of a whole family of diesel engines. The later products of this line are still being manufactured and operated.


One of the surviving T-40 tanks in the Patriot Park. Photo: Wikimedia Commons

Fulfilling resolution No. 443ss, the Leningrad Kirov Plant in February 1940 launched the production of the KV heavy tank in its existing configuration. By the end of the year they managed to assemble 139 cars. In mid-1940, the documentation was handed over to the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant, and at the beginning of the next year he released his first HF.

In accordance with the decree, the tank should be rearmament, replacing the L-11 gun with the F-32 product. Subsequently, new similar upgrades were carried out. The production of KV (KV-1) lasted until August 1942. For all the time the Red Army received approx. 3540 heavy tanks. This technique, having high characteristics, for a long time was a serious argument on the battlefield and made a significant contribution to the fight against the advancing enemy.

Work on improving the T-32 tank and creating a new T-34 took several months. March 31, 1940 there was an order to launch its production at the Kharkov Locomotive and Stalingrad Tractor Plants. The launch of the series was associated with numerous difficulties, but until the end of the year the Red Army received 115 new tanks. Already at the beginning of 1941, the situation changed dramatically, and every month more tanks left the assembly line than for the entire 1940th.


Heavy artillery tractor "Voroshilovets" at work. Photo: Bronetehnika.narod.ru

During World War II, medium tanks T-34 were produced by several plants. The design was constantly improved, deep modernization was carried out with a significant increase in performance. So, in 1942, Nizhny Tagil, Stalingrad, Gorky, Omsk, Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk gave the army 12,5 thousand tanks, and in 1943 - almost 15,7 thousand. Production of the T-34 continued until 1945. In total the difficulties of the army were transferred over 35 thousand cars. A successful combination of high combat and operational characteristics, quantity and tactics of use made the T-34, at least one of the best tanks of its time.

Light samples


The BT-7M light tank with a V-2 diesel engine, also adopted by decree No. 443cc, turned out to be less successful and successful. The first such tanks were assembled already in 1939, and in 1940, by order of the Red Army, a series of 700 units was built. In parallel, made approx. 70 BT-7M tanks with the M-17T gasoline engine for the NKVD troops. In 1941, the BT-7M was not produced.

BT tanks of all modifications, including diesel BT-7M, were actively used in the initial period of the war. They could effectively solve the main combat missions, but opposing the enemy led to losses. In addition, over time, the obsolescence of the structure affected more and more. As a result, by the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, only small amounts of BTs of different versions remained in the troops, and often they were transferred to the training category.


STZ-5 on Red Square. Photo: Bronetehnika.narod.ru

The decree stipulated the release of a light floating tank T-40. Its production was entrusted to Moscow plant No. 37 with the beginning in 1940. A plan of 100 vehicles was set for the first year of production, but only 41 were handed over to the army. In the fall, it was possible to complete the modernization of production capacities, which led to an increase in production rates. However, already in the summer of 1941, plant No. 37 was ordered to curtail production of the T-40 to prepare for the production of a more advanced T-50. As a result, the company managed to build only 960 light tanks in about two years.

In the battles, the serial T-40s proved to be ambiguous. They coped well with the tasks of reconnaissance of enemy rear lines or of guarding convoys - for which they were created. However, the use of the front line as a means of supporting infantry often led to unjustified losses. Moreover, the initial period of the war with its deficit of armored vehicles forced the use of the T-40 precisely in non-optimal conditions. As a result, the floating tank quickly showed its shortcomings, and they began to replace it with other equipment of close classes.

The least successful model from the decree No. 443ss can be considered the armored car BA-11. It was created on the basis of the ZiS-6 cargo chassis and equipped with protection and weapons that meet the requirements of the Red Army. Tests of an experienced armored car took place in 1939, and in 1940 a small series started. Various problems led to a delay in work, and after the outbreak of war, production was canceled in favor of higher priority projects. In total, they managed to build 17 BA-11s. With all its advantages, such a small equipment could not significantly affect the course of battles.

Tractors and vehicles


At the very end of 1939, the KhPZ began assembling serial Voroshilovets heavy artillery tractors. The following year they entered a full-fledged series. Production in Kharkov continued until August 1941, when the production line was evacuated. By this time they managed to build 1120 tractors, and about 1000 were already in operation in the Red Army. After the evacuation of the plant, the production of tractors did not resume.


One of the modifications of the serial ZiS-5. Photo: Kolesa.ru

In accordance with the decree No. 443ss ChTZ received a task for the production of ST-2 tractors. Until the beginning of 1940 it was required to assemble 10 prototypes; in 1940 - 1500 serial. The work was faced with various problems, because of which the start of the supply of the army was delayed. In addition, the industry failed to meet customer requirements for the number of equipment.

The STZ-5 transport tractor has been in series since 1937, and at the end of 1939 it was adopted as a light artillery tractor. Thanks to this, the Stalingrad Tractor Plant was able to easily deploy equipment for the Red Army. Production of the STZ-5 continued until September 1942 and was stopped only in connection with the approach of the enemy to the manufacturer. In total, almost 9950 tractors were produced.

Together with the tractors, the ZiS-5 truck with two driving axles was adopted. The car of the three-ton class ZiS-5 in a number of modifications has been produced since the mid-thirties and was one of the main vehicles of the Red Army. Decree of the Council of People's Commissars No. 443ss ensured the further development of the fleet due to more advanced equipment. In total, several hundred thousand ZiS-5s of all modifications were built.


Staff car GAZ-61. Photo: Wroom.ru

Simultaneously with the truck, a GAZ-61 off-road passenger car was adopted. From 1940 to 1945, less than 240 of these machines were built. But they also made a significant contribution to the victory - this technique had the opportunity to carry the highest command of the Red Army. Light artillery tractors based on an SUV were also limitedly produced and used.

Artillery tractors, trucks and staff cars, adopted for service in December 1939, began their service in 1940 and remained in service until the very end of World War II. The equipment suffered losses, but the crews and mechanics did everything possible so that it continued to work, bringing victory closer.

Mythic document


It is easy to see that in the KO decree under the SNK No. 443ss, several samples of military and auxiliary equipment were mentioned at once, which were of particular importance for our army during the Great Patriotic War. Some of them not only received high marks, but also became symbols of future victory.

Thus, the decision of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars “On the Adoption of Tanks, Armored Vehicles, Artillery Trucks and Their Production in 1940 for the Red Army” was of particular importance for the development of our army’s fleet and predetermined a lot of further events. Fulfilling the instructions of the Council of People's Commissars was not easy, and far from all the plans were implemented. However, everything possible was done, and this became one of the prerequisites for our victory.
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  1. avia12005 2 February 2020 06: 44 New
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    Eh, at least someone from the Stalinist Commissars at the Ministry of Industry and Trade put ...
    1. AUL
      AUL 2 February 2020 08: 17 New
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      Lawrence!
      1. Lamata 2 February 2020 08: 27 New
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        Vannikova.
        1. avia12005 2 February 2020 10: 42 New
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          Grabina at Roscosmos. And in a couple of years, the astronauts will be on Mars. Surprisingly, no one steals anything.
          1. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 11: 48 New
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            Quote: avia12005
            Grabina at Roscosmos. And in a couple of years, the astronauts will be on Mars. Surprisingly, no one steals anything.

            Yeah ... if the product of Comrade Grabin does not fail the test, if it does not turn out to be too heavy and dimensional, and if Comrade Grabin does not quarrel with allies about this.
          2. Pedrodepackes 3 February 2020 13: 26 New
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            Quote: avia12005
            Grabina at Roscosmos.

            Grabina? What is it like? From a gun to the moon? flew here alone, Munchausen his last name. Or I didn’t understand, but do you offer Grabin’s products at Roscosmos to direct direct fire?
        2. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 11: 47 New
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          Quote: Lamata
          Vannikova.

          And then put in for disrupting the plan? wink
      2. Rey_ka 3 February 2020 14: 55 New
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        Lavrenty Pavlovich in 1938 after Yezhov resolved the situation. A lot of specialists returned to his peaceful life with a light hand ... maybe not all but many. And who will remember him kindly now? Other portraits go to the Immortal regiment, but with the marshal of the Union no one dares !?
    2. mark1 2 February 2020 08: 24 New
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      Nothing will change, not that era! Stalin's Commissars need a leader asking them like Stalin.
      1. mat-vey 2 February 2020 09: 24 New
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        So his goals should be like those of Stalin - the country and the people.
    3. Alekseev 2 February 2020 19: 29 New
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      Quote: avia12005
      Eh, at least someone from the Stalinist Commissars at the Ministry of Industry and Trade put ...

      Quote: AUL
      Lawrence!

      A laugh, a laugh, but ....
      It is not a complicated and controversial question to present in the form of a chain of continuous achievements.
      Otherwise, the question arises: where did everything go in the first period of the war?
      Today, individual civilians are no longer satisfied with the factor of surprise, but they are also accused of failures of the enemies that were not finished in 1937 ....
      In essence, it can be said that measures to equip the Red Army were indeed carried out on a large scale. But ... As the army quickly swelled up (mainly the deployment of personnel units began only in 1939) quantitatively, but, inferior, as noted by G.K. Zhukov, to the German in all respects, so the industry could not jump above its head.
      For example, the T-34 tanks, and especially the KV, had such shortcomings that, along with poor command and poor training of the troops, did not allow them to become an “unbreakable wall”, well, the way of the German tank groups, armed in theory with much weaker vehicles.
      Our industry was technologically unable to produce a V-2 diesel with a resource of at least 200 hours, reliable gearboxes, main clutches, r / st and much more, not only for tanks, but also for aircraft. The problems were with the quality of ammunition, gasoline, etc. etc.
      The advantage of ZiS-5, basically, is that it could be disassembled with an open-end wrench. For the war, it’s not bad, I had to leave for the Studios and the Willis.
      In addition, there was a clear skew - more tanks, planes, and means of support, training for military units, somehow later ... Although tanks and planes cannot fight without them.
      Why did that happen? But otherwise it could not. After the great devastation of the civil war, only 20 years passed, with a series of severe repressions.
      The positions of leaders were occupied not only by Ustinov, Ascension and Kosygin, but also, often, simply ignorant people. Not to remember this is stupid and mean to the millions who died in that war.
      1. Ingenegr 2 February 2020 20: 28 New
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        I added a "+". It is rightly noticed - there were bison among the leaders of that era, and there were fry.
        I will only add that a huge success for the country at that time was the fact that the main vector of development and movement was set by a titanium man with state thinking. And the demand was equal from the bison and fry. Strong demand.
        In this regard, the position of manager was less a blessing, more a heavy burden.
      2. Magog 2 February 2020 21: 15 New
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        cOkay, Alexei, to fill in the “new song about the old” ... And who prepared the l / s during the war? And who drove the Nazis away from Moscow? The same "poorly trained", by the way, personnel troops - only from the Far East ... And the small resource B-2 somehow did not really prevent this! It is unlikely that during the course of the war the quality of our military equipment has greatly changed in the direction of increasing the resource, and the result is known.
        1. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 12: 28 New
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          Quote: Magog
          And who prepared the l / s during the war?

          The war was cooking. Our losses are precisely due to the fact that we had to learn to fight at the front. Survivors gained experience.
          At least the fact that the orders "on elimination of deficiencies" in terms of remedial measures almost completely repeated the charters and instructions testifies to the level of training of ordinary and command personnel. And in the report on the actions of the Katukov brigade, it was separately noted that the success of the brigade is associated with strict observance of the Charter.
          Quote: Magog
          And who drove the Nazis away from Moscow?

          At what cost? And, again, about the preparation: just at that time an order was issued banning the head-on assault on fortified settlements. Violations of this order followed immediately: divisional commanders and headquarters simply could not plan a detour operation, it was easier for them to storm in the forehead.
          Quote: Magog
          The same "poorly trained", by the way, personnel troops - only from the Far East ...

          Compounds with the Far East were used mainly in the defensive phase of the Moscow operation. And their fate was different. The same 58th TD was almost zero for several days of fighting.
          Quote: Magog
          And the small B-2 resource somehow didn’t really prevent this!

          When the tank brigade on the march from the railway station to the concentration area loses half of the materiel for technical reasons - this is not gut.
          Quote: Magog
          It is unlikely that during the course of the war the quality of our military equipment has greatly changed in the direction of increasing the resource, and the result is known.

          Are you serious? Yes, the pre-war T-34 arr. 40 and T-34 arr. 45 in quality are two different cars. The same engine resource at the end of the war was four times from the pre-war. Plus five steps. Plus clutches (which before the war could not withstand 200 km due to a design error).
          Plus normal surveillance devices. At the same T-34 arr. 40 the main instrument for observing the commander was the sight (since the commander was a gunner). Moreover, according to the test results, it was found that for the tower to rotate, the commander should break away from the sight, so that the tower rotated blindly (the location of the sight and handwheels was such that the commander needed tentacles or eyes on the stems for their simultaneous use). belay
    4. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 11: 46 New
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      Quote: avia12005
      Eh, at least someone from the Stalinist Commissars at the Ministry of Industry and Trade put ...

      Yeah ... Salzman. Chubais would be glad. smile
    5. The comment was deleted.
    6. Pedrodepackes 3 February 2020 13: 30 New
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      Quote: avia12005
      at least one of the Stalinist People’s Commissars at the Ministry of Industry and Trade put ...

      yeah, without Stalin they are all the Ministry of Industry and Trade and plunder no worse, or maybe better than the current ones, you can at least offer Beria over them
  2. GKS 2111 2 February 2020 08: 00 New
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    Thus, the decision of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars “On the Adoption of Tanks, Armored Vehicles, Artillery Trucks and Their Production in 1940 for the Red Army” was of particular importance for the development of our army’s fleet and predetermined a lot of further events.

    Including the victory in the battle of Stalingrad!
    1. Borik 2 February 2020 11: 00 New
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      T-40 Tank
      T-40
      In the photo is not the T-40 but its modification T-30, the predecessor of the T-60
      1. The comment was deleted.
  3. Ros 56 2 February 2020 08: 43 New
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    And the clearance on the GAZ-61 will give odds to today's SUVs. soldier
    1. Free wind 2 February 2020 09: 39 New
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      Ground clearance, yes, no ground clearance. He will sit on bridges in the mud like any rogue.
      1. Ros 56 2 February 2020 09: 43 New
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        So, in addition to dirt, hemp and stones come across. stop hi
        1. Free wind 2 February 2020 09: 50 New
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          Well so on a hemp and a pebble bridges will remain.
          1. Ros 56 2 February 2020 09: 51 New
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            Something always interferes with a bad driver, like a dancer. fellow laughing
    2. Narak-zempo 2 February 2020 09: 46 New
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      Quote: Ros 56
      And the clearance on the GAZ-61 will give odds to today's SUVs. soldier

      Nobody demanded such speeds along the highway from him.
  4. Free wind 2 February 2020 09: 44 New
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    It’s bad that not a single tank of those years had anti-aircraft weapons, maybe somewhere and from the raptors could fight back.
    1. BAI
      BAI 2 February 2020 10: 49 New
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      When they were created, there was full confidence that Soviet aviation would prevail in the sky.
      1. Free wind 2 February 2020 11: 20 New
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        And when our aircraft really began to dominate in the sky, they began to put anti-aircraft machine guns, an example of the IS-3. Rudel's hind leg was shot from a tank anti-aircraft machine gun, sort of. Hans has a rudder in his memoirs, there is an interesting chapter in his memoirs, where he writes that at the beginning of the 45th year he saw from the air an unusual Soviet tank. This rudel has gone through the whole war, is familiar with all the technology. The IS-3 didn’t seem to be delivered, they were only in Iran, the T-44 was only tested, which was interesting for the tank. Maybe all the same a couple of IS-3s were tested in battles with the Fritz.
        1. fox_rudy 2 February 2020 11: 32 New
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          It seems that some IS-2 was installed.
          1. Alf
            Alf 2 February 2020 21: 47 New
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            Quote: fox_rudy
            It seems that some IS-2 was installed.

            At all regularly, all heavy self-propelled guns too.
        2. Alf
          Alf 2 February 2020 21: 46 New
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          Quote: Free Wind
          The IS-3 didn’t seem to be delivered, they were only in Iran,

          And what is IS-3 to do in Iran?
          Quote: Free Wind
          T-44s were only tested, which was interesting for the tank.





        3. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 12: 45 New
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          Quote: Free Wind
          And when our aircraft really began to dominate in the sky, they began to put anti-aircraft machine guns, an example of the IS-3.

          As the uv. M. Svirin, according to the results of tests of an anti-aircraft turret with a DShK, its complete unsuitability for firing at aircraft was established. Nevertheless, this turret was recommended for installation on heavy tanks and self-propelled guns precisely as an installation for anti-aircraft firing - in the first sense of the word, for firing at zenith, with large UVN. The reason is the fighting in the cities and the need for a heavy machine gun to fire on the upper floors of houses.
      2. The comment was deleted.
      3. Magog 2 February 2020 20: 19 New
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        "When they were created, there was full confidence that Soviet aviation would prevail in the sky." This is the opinion of Rychagov, who predicted the almost complete destruction of enemy aircraft by a sudden attack on airfields. The Germans themselves refuted this theory: directly during raids on airfields during the outbreak, and throughout the war, aircraft losses did not exceed 3 - 7 percent.
    2. Octopus 2 February 2020 12: 31 New
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      Quote: Free Wind
      didn’t have anti-aircraft weapons,

      So it was not him, for starters. The DShK is in terrible shortage, there is no CPV, you won’t especially fight with a rifle machine, if against machine guns. MZA all the more not.

      CCP everywhere could afford only the Americans then.
      1. Octopus 2 February 2020 12: 48 New
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        Quote: Octopus
        if against machine guns

        aircraft
        1. Kote Pan Kokhanka 2 February 2020 14: 00 New
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          Quote: Free Wind
          It’s bad that not a single tank of those years had anti-aircraft weapons, maybe somewhere and from the raptors could fight back.

          Anti-aircraft machine guns received BT-7M.
          Later they were armed with IS-2, model 44 years. In the hostilities in Warsaw, Prague and Berlin, for example, they were sometimes shot. DShK hooked tram and telephone wires.
          1. Octopus 2 February 2020 15: 46 New
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            Quote: Kote Pan Kokhanka
            Anti-aircraft machine guns received BT-7M.

            1. Optional. 2. It was DT, you won’t fight like that with Rudel.
      2. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 13: 15 New
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        Quote: Octopus
        CCP everywhere could afford only the Americans then.

        And we could - after all, there were plans before the war to buy a license for the product of John Mozesovich. But alas, the Browning was hacked because of "less armor penetration."
        The cartridge is different - yes. But if our industry was able in two 12,7-mm rounds - without a welt for a DShK and with a welt for a ShVAK ...
        1. Octopus 3 February 2020 14: 19 New
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          Quote: Alexey RA
          could we - after all, there were plans before the war to buy a license for the product of John Mosesovich.

          Well, you know. License is not a factory. And not a cartridge factory. And not a powder factory.

          If would - should would otherwise allocate resources between the aviation and land checkpoints / MZA. With aviation it was possible to say well, but with land it was very bad.

          What is funny, the Americans did the opposite. They made 100 thousand barrels of marine MZA, almost useless, but the planes flew the whole war with ground machine guns.
          1. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 15: 16 New
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            Quote: Octopus
            If - it would be necessary to otherwise distribute resources between the aviation and ground checkpoints / MZA. With aviation it was possible to say well, but with land it was very bad.

            C aviation before the war was ... difficult. UB was created problematically, and took it into service two months before the war.
            1. Octopus 3 February 2020 18: 49 New
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              Quote: Alexey RA
              Before the war it was ... difficult

              It was difficult with everything. But with DShK more difficult than others, 8 thousand for the entire war, EMNIP.

              On the other hand, they were oriented to the Germans, the Germans with the CCP are also not rich. But there is a MZA.
              1. Alexey RA 4 February 2020 12: 15 New
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                Quote: Octopus
                It was difficult with everything. But with DShK more difficult than others, 8 thousand for the entire war, EMNIP.

                Yeah ... and a hundred thousand theoretically much more complex UB. That's what happens when a machine gun is made under the factory. smile
                Quote: Octopus
                On the other hand, they were oriented to the Germans, the Germans with the CCP are also not rich. But there is a MZA.

                So we should have been. But the unrecognized genius, instead of tweaking his 23mm gun to the mind, continued to gush with new ideas. The end is a bit predictable ... ©
                1. Alf
                  Alf 4 February 2020 21: 35 New
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                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  The end is a bit predictable ... ©

                  But then bloody Beria personally appeared, dragging the unfortunate talent into the basement, ordered a hug to the wall and fired a bullet in the forehead ...
    3. Constanty 2 February 2020 15: 12 New
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      that from the Lapptellers they could fight back, tanks are not needed. Armored units were supposed to include more trucks with anti-aircraft weapons. Such as:
      GAZ-AA with a quadruple machine gun Maxim M4


      or even better than the 25-mm 72-K automatic anti-aircraft gun in the ZIS-32 or ZIS-36 body, or the 37-mm 61-K automatic anti-aircraft gun on the ZIS-32 chassis, which were tested before the war
      1. Free wind 2 February 2020 16: 28 New
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        Top photo from the games of the club of reenactors. And anti-aircraft guns based on the ZIS-32 were made azhzhzhzhzhzhzhzh
        Two pieces!!!!!!!
    4. Jager 2 February 2020 15: 28 New
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      What is it then? Anti-aircraft scrap?
      1. Aviator_ 2 February 2020 15: 58 New
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        Very similar to DT. You can scare a plane with a rifle caliber, especially with tracer bullets, shoot down - more than problematic.
        1. Magog 2 February 2020 20: 11 New
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          With the help of a light machine gun Degtyarev it is even possible (rifle cartridge). Particularly arrogant aces-Hans, who attacked the columns of the retreating troops, very fell. True, many of these "Voroshilov riflemen" were immediately shot by commanders for not fulfilling the order "do not open fire on the enemy," but the facts are known.
          1. Alf
            Alf 2 February 2020 21: 50 New
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            Quote: Magog
            True, many such "Voroshilov riflemen" were immediately shot by commanders for failure to comply with the order "do not open fire on the enemy,"

            Can facts be?
            1. Magog 3 February 2020 17: 16 New
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              Give the fact of such an order or the facts of the executions of fighters violating orders? I take it as a whim! However, there is a story of my father (he started the war as part of 37 TD, Western Ukraine). Before his eyes, officers of companies and battalions repeatedly used this right to be shot on the spot. True, this was observed en masse at the beginning of the war in the confusion of the first days. Then these officers disappeared somewhere, new ones did not indulge in this right so often. For a downed (really) enemy plane, my father risked getting the same bullet in the forehead, but apparently the fear of disappearing from the invisible hand of his own subordinates or the awareness of the absurdity of such an order averted the threat of reprisal. And shot down from a machine gun Degtyareva - a fact! I quote a similar article: “On a march in an open field, they were attacked by enemy aircraft and suffered significant losses. Even before the start of their first battle with the German army, there were already many killed and wounded in the division, a significant number of officers died. But even under such conditions, the soldier pressed obscure order “not to succumb to provocations.” Extract from: https://ava.md/2017/06/22/22-iyunya-1941-goda-ne-poddavat-sya-na-provokacii/.
              1. Alf
                Alf 3 February 2020 21: 41 New
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                Quote: Magog
                Give the fact of such an order or the facts of the executions of fighters violating orders? I take it as a whim!

                You were asked a clear question, you considered it a whim .. You are not mistaken on the site?
                Quote: Magog
                Before his eyes, officers of companies and battalions repeatedly used this right to be shot on the spot.

                Specify why the execution on the spot? Only without verbiage.
                Quote: Magog
                And shot down from a machine gun Degtyareva - a fact!

                Well done, nothing to say, great preparation.
                1. Magog 4 February 2020 12: 06 New
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                  Shot on the spot for firing towards the enemy, that is, violation of the order "do not give in to provocations, do not open fire ..." Look at the link, a heavy impression. Since childhood, I heard such stories from my father! "... everyone screamed" Shot down! Shot down! ", And joyfully congratulate me. But I stand, legs, arms, I don’t feel in my head: well, now I’m ... Combat officers and officers are loudly saying:" Who shot?! "They point at me. The commander came up, slapped me on the shoulder and ... approvingly: "Well done! Congratulations! "(Almost verbatim). There are other similar episodes that revolted me and terribly surprised me.
        2. Alf
          Alf 2 February 2020 21: 50 New
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          Quote: Aviator_
          You can scare a plane with a rifle caliber, especially with tracer bullets, shoot down - more than problematic.

          But to bring down the question is not posed, the main thing is to drive away and not to allow bombing, to storm aiming.
    5. Alf
      Alf 2 February 2020 21: 39 New
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      Quote: Free Wind
      It’s bad that not a single tank of those years had anti-aircraft weapons, maybe somewhere and from the raptors could fight back.

      Why? On the T-26, BT, T-28, KV, DT machine guns for firing at aircraft were regularly installed on the roof of the tower, another thing is that there were few of them. It seems that they put on each BT a 3 or 5 tank.
  5. Constanty 2 February 2020 13: 22 New
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    Hi This is my first post. I apologize for any language errors - I read fluently, I write poorly in Russian

    There is no doubt Decree No. 443ss “On the Adoption of Tanks, Armored Vehicles, Artillery Tractors and Their Production in 1940” This is a very important document, but with some notes.
    Although the W-2 engine, despite its initially catastrophic low durability, or the KW-1 tank, which I consider to be the best tank of 1941, these are undoubtedly huge advantages - especially the immortal engine, this doubt - which may surprise me, I get the T- 34.
    Despite the legend, I do not consider it a good tank - in fact, its creators did not think so, and before the war they developed a project called T-34M.


    Despite the name, it was a completely different, certainly the best tank with great prospects and the potential for modernization.

    Premature introduction into production of a conventional, underdeveloped T-34, development before
    the war of production lines meant that the USSR was held hostage to this model, which subsequently cost the Red Army a lot of blood and casualties.

    I know that a better sparrow in the hand than a pigeon on the roof, but the authors, analyzing the beginning of Barbarossa, write that the new tanks, due to the relatively small number and poor preparation of the crews, did not have a big impact on the course of the first weeks, if not months. However, at least several hundred cars were lost.

    In this situation, a delay of several months and the introduction of a much higher-quality T-34M into production looks like the best step, and the usual T-34 for a premature costly mistake.
    1. Kote Pan Kokhanka 2 February 2020 14: 15 New
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      History has no syllable. Here it is worth recalling our "tank gurus"!
      For example, Kotorin writes.
      The vicious practice of saving the resource of military equipment played a negative role at the beginning of the war. Learning to drive a T-26 you will not learn to fight on a T-34. Sometimes it reached the point of absurdity. The new Thirty-Fours were losing because they could refuel them with gas, rather than diesel.

      Shpakovsky citing the statistics of losses, indicates that in 43 and 44 we almost sunk almost five hundred tanks in swamps and rivers !!!
      Yes, we played in a number of technical and organizational aspects: observation, communication, habitability and heavy workload of crews! But our losses were associated with this from part. Basically, our trouble was that we were not ready for war. The enemy, mobilized and insignificant for two years, defeated our corps and divisions, but at a terrible cost to themselves. At the same price, we learned to fight and win victories. By the end of the war, the Germans had excellent tanks, but this no longer helped them. Victory is ours !!!
      1. Aviator_ 2 February 2020 16: 01 New
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        By the end of the war, the Germans had excellent tanks,

        It is, of course, in terms of characteristics, it seems, and so, but expensive (which affected their quantity) and not repairable. You would still remember the “Little Mouse”.
      2. Free wind 2 February 2020 16: 19 New
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        The Germans, when training tankmen, were as resource-efficient as possible. Mekhvody at first drove around the landfill on tractors with controls similar to tanks, there were tractors with Panther control and t-4. then transplanted into the "trough". there is no tower and there is no top of the armored hull .. When driving skills were reinforced, they were transplanted into battle tanks. Tiger drivers were trained the fastest, usually the drivers were with experience and the controls are very simple. the longest prepared gunners and tank commanders. Refueling from barrels, which barrel is difficult to determine. For example, the tractors "Stalinets", "Komsomolets" worked on a legroin, who can distinguish diesel from legroin from you by smell? A lorry was brought in with barrels of fuel for refueling tanks, there should be diesel fuel in the barrels, well, they were refueled by what they brought in, not everyone will determine what kind of fuel by smell. Filled, shells thrown into battle.
      3. Constanty 2 February 2020 21: 19 New
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        I had in mind technical problems - the suspension on torsion rollers in the T-34M, not the Christie vertical springs, which take up a lot of space in the case, and, even worse, the limitation of the diameter of the turret in the T-34.

        And this is not an alternative story - the T-34M project was developed, and if it had not been for the start of the war in June 1941, this tank would quickly replace the usual “34” on production lines. It was planned to do
      4. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 13: 34 New
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        Quote: Kote Pan Kokhanka
        History has no syllable. Here it is worth recalling our "tank gurus"!
        For example, Kotorin writes.
        The vicious practice of saving the resource of military equipment played a negative role at the beginning of the war. Learning to drive a T-26 you will not learn to fight on a T-34. Sometimes it reached the point of absurdity. The new Thirty-Fours were losing because they could refuel them with gas, rather than diesel.

        The vicious practice of saving the resource of military equipment was caused by objective reasons.
        1. The engine life of the B-2 engine before the war - 100 hours at the stand. In the troops - about 50 hours (because violations of the terms of maintenance and handling of equipment were widespread - often even fuel filtration was not carried out).
        2. The consumption of motor resources only for driving training - 40-50 hours. Because all crew members were trained in driving. Moreover, the driver with his open hatch as the only observation device was the least protected member of the crew (however, the closed hatch did not even hold a 75 mm OFS).
        3. The supply of new B-2 industry led at the rate of 1 engine per 10 tanks. Instead of 2 engines per 1 tank, as required by the GABTU.
        Based on these three points, in the border districts, a little more than a hundred T-34s and KVs could be allocated to the BTV training and combat park.
        Quote: Kote Pan Kokhanka
        Yes, we played in a number of technical and organizational aspects: observation, communication, habitability and heavy workload of crews! But our losses were associated with this from part. Basically, our trouble was that we were not ready for war.

        If a tank is struck aboard by an undetected enemy tank, or scattered by dozens of unpunished shots of an undetected anti-tank attack, this is not readiness. These are the very technical points - for example, the inability to use a standard monitoring device, which turned out to be located above the breech of the gun. Or the impossibility of using surveillance devices, because the tank commander fulfills the duties of a gunner, and it’s corny not to tear himself away from the sight.
        If the tank formation on the march and in battle is uncontrollable, then here the reasons are largely technical. For there is no corny connection. No, formally there are radio stations. But in fact, in motion, the quality of communication is deteriorating up to a complete loss of communication.
    2. Jager 2 February 2020 15: 34 New
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      The T-34M was only a couple of months late by the start of the war ... And the military themselves were not particularly happy with the complex, expensive, extremely inconvenient for the crew and not reliable T-34 compared to the same T-28.
      Admittedly, the T-34 mod. 40 years old and the T-34 of the end of 1943 is a VERY different machine.
      1. Octopus 2 February 2020 15: 50 New
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        Quote: Jager
        T-34M was late for the war only a couple of months

        Yes Yes. The BT-shaped T-34 from the 40th year was what it was, and the T-34M, almost completely new, would become a sweetie.

        Ask when quality issues were resolved with the T-44. Had Kharkov residents removed the T-34 from production - in the 42nd there would have been no tanks at all except the T-60.
        1. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 17: 54 New
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          Quote: Octopus
          Had Kharkov residents removed the T-34 from production - in the 42nd there would have been no tanks at all, except for the T-60.

          Nothing, STZ would help out - they did not have time on time. So they wouldn’t have time to discontinue the T-34 either. smile
        2. Jager 4 February 2020 00: 55 New
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          How much more complicated was the T-34M than the T-34? Especially - nothing. The torsion bar suspension was already on HF. And this is a completely different weight. Christie's miserable suspension was completely unsuitable for a tank of this class. Although on Pz. IV was even worse with that. In fact, the T-34M is the T-34 brought to mind. Normal running gear, gearbox, more spacious turret, surveillance devices - this is exactly what the T-34 lacked.
          In general, the inertia of the plants is surprising - most of the minor problems could be solved without any damage to the number of cars produced. Take the same air filter ...
          1. Octopus 4 February 2020 08: 05 New
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            Quote: Jager
            Especially - nothing .... In general, the inertia of the plants is surprising

            It seems that you do not pick up anything heavier than a glass and, hmm, a tablet.

            The T-34M has very little in common with the T-34 / BT. It is impossible to do it on the production base of Kharkov 41. 60mm armored hire in the 41st there is nowhere to take. There is nothing to handle a wide shoulder strap. There are no monitoring devices. Nothing to do torsion bars. A planetary gearbox has never been done before.

            Your T-34M can be made in Leningrad. But not in Kharkov.
            1. Alexey RA 4 February 2020 12: 22 New
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              Quote: Octopus
              60mm armored hire in the 41st there is nowhere to take.

              You still ask - how to cook thick armor. The same HF in Leningrad was collected on bolts-guzhon, and only then scalded.
              Quote: Octopus
              A planetary gearbox has never been done before.

              Yeah ... the planetary gearbox at the factory, where the gearbox was previously designed not on the basis of engine features, but on the basis of available equipment. I remember the crushing conclusions of specialists from Kubinka on the four steps of the T-34 from the 1942 report on transmissions of domestic tanks.
              1. Octopus 4 February 2020 13: 18 New
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                Quote: Alexey RA
                You still ask - how to cook thick armor

                Comrade Koshkin, a national nugget, had a decision. Bend. From cemented armor.

                Literally in the morning I listened to Ulanov-Shein. If war by that left too lot time, in addition to the KV and T-34 they would have managed to make some kind of KV-3 and T-34M. In the same volumes and quality as in the 40th. There would be not 7 models of tanks in the hull (BT-7 / 7M I think for one), but ten. Only new ones even without shells, and old and "intermediate" ones already without spare parts. So damn lucky yet that the Fuhrer did not allow the Soviet government to turn around properly.
                1. Alexey RA 4 February 2020 19: 28 New
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                  Quote: Octopus
                  Comrade Koshkin, a national nugget, had a decision. Bend. From cemented armor.

                  Monsieur knew a lot about perversions ... ©
                  I even know where this decision came from. On the T-34 with this bent sheet pretty tormented.
                  Quote: Octopus
                  If the war left too much of this, they would have managed to make some kind of KV-34 and T-3M in addition to the KV and T-34.

                  KV-3 would definitely not be able to - the engine and transmission would not have given. About the dream of reason in the form of KV-5 (with its turrets, mother-mother-mother) I do not speak.
                  1. Octopus 4 February 2020 20: 02 New
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                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    the engine and transmission would not give

                    But you are a communist! - And he machineed the machine gun again ...
                    1. Alf
                      Alf 4 February 2020 21: 38 New
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                      Quote: Octopus
                      Quote: Alexey RA
                      the engine and transmission would not give

                      But you are a communist! - And he machineed the machine gun again ...

                      The 106th aircraft engine was also prepared by the Communists, but nothing ...
            2. Jager 6 February 2020 01: 15 New
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              Do not worry. And he worked at the factory and finished the university.

              I do not see any problems doing it in Leningrad.
              I didn’t understand the passage about torsion absolutely - HF had been traveling with them for two years now. About surveillance devices, too. During the war, the planetary gearbox was mastered quickly and there were practically no complaints about it. The question about epaulettes also does not raise special questions - remember the epaulet of the same KV-1. The only problem is the rental. But in peacetime, this issue would be resolved rather quickly.
              In fact, this is a new generation tank with all the disadvantages of a new car. All of this is solvable.
              The production of the T-34 in the spring of the 43rd took almost half the time than the manufacture of the same T-34 in 1940.
              1. Octopus 6 February 2020 01: 38 New
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                You do not see the problems of doing it in Leningrad, but the Soviet government saw it. In Leningrad HF and T-50. T-34 was designed in Kharkov and near Kharkov. This is a minus and a plus, a tank designed for a bad machine park in Kharkov was more acceptable as a car of a special period.
                Quote: Jager
                In fact, this is a new generation tank with all the disadvantages of a new car. All of this is solvable.

                In the case of the T-54, this was solved in 5 years.
                Quote: Jager
                To manufacture the T-34 in the spring of the 43rd

                And what is the thesis? Do you want to confirm that the production of a new tank in a series, the development of technology for its mass production, the USSR took 4 years? And there is.
                1. Jager 6 February 2020 12: 38 New
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                  In the conditions of the loss of the main tank manufacturing plants, using unskilled labor, in conditions of a shortage of machinery and ALL production materials, 75000 tanks are to be produced ... Well, you understand ...
                  As for the T-54, this is already a peacetime machine and there was no sense in driving it back to work as in the Second World War. Since in the late 40s the USSR possessed already powerful tank armies.
                  1. Octopus 6 February 2020 12: 47 New
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                    Quote: Jager
                    to release 75000 tanks ... Well, you understand ...

                    No, I don’t get it. You through this figure deny that in the first year Kharkov handed over about 100 cars or what?
                    Quote: Jager
                    as for the T-54, this is already a peacetime machine and there was no sense in driving it back to work as in the Second World War

                    You see, it was the military’s argument on the contrary. The war is over, they told industry, it’s more that has no analogues, Mr. we will not take, then to do another 10 years of UKN. Be kind enough to do it humanly right away.

                    By the way, you do not quite adequately assess the capabilities of the SA of the late 40s.
      2. Constanty 2 February 2020 21: 22 New
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        I always thought the T-28 was more complex and time-consuming
        1. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 13: 39 New
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          Quote: Constanty
          I always thought the T-28 was more complex and time-consuming

          The T-28 was difficult to manufacture: it was imprisoned under the best-equipped plant and equipment in the USSR - LKZ.
          But on the other hand, by the end of the 30s, the T-28 was the most "licked" technically and reliable tank.
    3. Alf
      Alf 2 February 2020 21: 52 New
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      Quote: Constanty
      In this situation, a delay of several months and the introduction of a much better T-34M into production looks like the best step,

      Not the best step. The T-34 was introducing itself with a huge creak, and the T-34M was a more complex machine, some of which were torsion and gearboxes. And then every day was worth its weight in gold.
  6. Magog 2 February 2020 13: 41 New
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    When the war started from the very beginning according to the enemy’s plans, much of what was prepared turned out to be unsuitable or partially unsuitable: Su-2, KV-2, L-20, MiG-1 ... Any model of weapons is created for certain tasks, "imprisoned" as it is now fashionable to express. The same applies to the organizational structure of troops, to the construction of battle formations, to the content of orders and field manuals. In other words, if you want to understand the reasons for defeats / victories, then you must carefully analyze all of the above. "We were preparing for the defense of the country" - today's slogan of patriots urging not to allow "rewriting the history of the Great Patriotic War". Without any attempts to "rewrite" someone show by examples of organizational, structural and quantitative indicators that such events really took place before the war. The Finns erected a line of powerful fortifications, and the Red Army shed a lot of blood, breaking these fortifications. As a result, Finland remained outside the Soviet Union, retained independence, unlike the Baltic states, Bukovina, Bessarabia ... Who prevented the Soviet leadership from building a strategic defense, no worse than the Finnish one? The pre-war experience came in handy when they gave half the country, and by the heroic efforts of the rear and the front drove the invader back. But this must be understood, and not "hide one’s head in the sand" and build in defense of the false notions of the theory of the "criminal flagrant unpreparedness of the USSR for war." As you can see from the article, they were very prepared!
    1. Jager 2 February 2020 15: 39 New
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      So what? Did you have to dig everything up with anti-tank ditches, from the Barents to the Black Seas? France did not help. The STRATEGY of war has changed
      1. Magog 2 February 2020 19: 40 New
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        At the very least, do not disarm the "Stalin line", create backup purely defensive fronts behind the back of the First echelon of troops. And to give the enemy the opportunity to see this is to play along with Abwehr. Then it is unlikely that the Nazis would have so easily decided to attack. You look, and we would have the possibility of the first crushing blow. “... to dig, from the Barents to the Black Seas?” We have already dug up all this space, and more than once, and even under fire and enemy bombing.
        1. Constanty 2 February 2020 21: 31 New
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          After the capture of the eastern territories, IIRP it was enough to stay with the main forces on the old border and on the “Stalin line” a in the west to retain only border forces and deterrence. This would not allow the enemy to take an element of surprise, and by the time he reaches the main line of defense, the main lines of attack would be known, and the Red Army units would be ready to repel them.
          1. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 14: 32 New
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            Quote: Constanty
            After the capture of the eastern territories, IIRP it was enough to stay with the main forces on the old border and on the “Stalin line” a in the west to retain only border forces and deterrence.

            Through which the enemy would go through the butter like a knife. And who would "eat up" the best forces of the border districts and most of the technology to their formation. Oh yeah, when forces are being diverted to the old border, there immediately arises the problem of covering the foreground from the air - the combat radius of the main Red Army fighter is 130-140 km.
            The Red Army tried to detain the enemy with defenses with the expulsion of advanced detachments in 1942. The result was a failure - the detachments did not fulfill their mission, but at the same time weakened those formations from which they were allocated.
            In fact, even the advanced detachments sent out were an attempt by the Soviet command to find a solution to the problem of forecasting enemy actions. What was needed was some kind of “creative”, “Kunstshtuk,” and such advanced units became. Theoretically, they could, firstly, delay the enemy, force them to move in battle and pre-battle orders, and not in marching columns. Secondly, they could feel for a really strong enemy grouping and reveal the direction of its movement. This idea cannot be called successful. The depth of the task of the advanced detachments (PO) from the front line of the defense line in the area of ​​the 192nd Infantry Division was 88 km, the 33rd Guards. Infantry Division - 66 km, 147th Infantry Division - 82 km. For small arms this was a very long distance. The maneuverability due to the lack of vehicles in the units was low. At the same time, up to 25% of the divisional forces with reinforcements were allocated to the advance detachments. Having come into contact with the troops, the Germans fettered them from the front with small forces and walked around from the flanks. As a result, the advance detachments were individually defeated by the Germans moving east. Their remnants randomly departed in small groups to the front line of defense. So, the 33rd Guards. Infantry Division moved into the strip of the 192nd Infantry Division.
            Major Kordovsky, an officer of the General Staff of the spacecraft in the 62nd Army, wrote the following about the actions of the advance detachments in his report to AM Vasilevsky: “As a result of sending the software to a great distance, the army lost a large amount of manpower and mate. parts before the start of the battle at the forefront. Very few have completed their main task. ”
            © Isaev
            1. Constanty 3 February 2020 14: 43 New
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              I think we did not understand each other.

              I meant that the USSR between the German border and the old state border with Poland would leave only a few units of delay and intelligence.

              As you write, the Germans passed through these territories as if they were passing through oil (they were lost and unprofitable), but in a few days they would meet organized defense by the old state border with air cover, there would be no boilers, as in Brest, on exhibition in Bialystok, or idiotic marches back and forth, like in Dubno or the Horse-Mechanized Group of General Boldin. without leaving ammunition depots

              Defense will take place in reinforced positions with full knowledge of where the main wedges of the Wehrmacht are headed. Also there would be no such problems with communication.
              1. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 17: 47 New
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                Quote: Constanty
                I meant that the USSR between the German border and the old state border with Poland would leave only a few units of delay and intelligence.

                Which will either be so small that they will not be able to detain anyone, or so large. that they’ll just be discovered and circumvented.
                Quote: Constanty
                As you write, the Germans passed through these territories as if they were passing through oil (they were lost and unprofitable), but in a few days they would have met organized defense by the old state border with air cover

                The Germans in real life in the presence of resistance on June 25 reached Minsk. That is, without resistance, the Germans go to MiUR on the second or third day of the war. Will the cover troops and garrisons of the UR turn around in three days?
                One more thing. MiUR was originally designed for the Polish army of the 30s. And then a campaign group of Eberbach cautiously creeps out onto it with its 15 cm cannons and 21 cm mortars. Will the defense stand?
                Why eberbach? And because its composition, tactics of action and effectiveness are well known for the battle with the battalion of Captain Kim (also mistakenly known as the "battle of Sirotinin"). wink
                Quote: Constanty
                there would be no boilers, as in Brest, at an exhibition in Bialystok,

                Well, there would be boilers after the Stalin Line breakthrough. Another Uman and Smolensk.
                Quote: Constanty
                or idiotic marches back and forth, like in Dubno

                But it will be for sure. For the breakthrough location has not been determined, and reconnaissance is strange, showing tanks where they are not and ignoring where they are. Plus MK is partially subordinate to the armies, and partially to the front.
                And the frontal corps will run along the front line, and along the way they will be pulled by armies for their private needs. And army MKs will be surrendered for the needs of the front by nowhere. Well, traditionally, MK gunners will be removed from the corps and cut their own defense lanes.
                Quote: Constanty
                Defense will take place in reinforced positions with full knowledge of where the main wedges of the Wehrmacht are headed.

                Yeah ... like near Moscow in 1941. There was also knowledge and prepared defense.
                Or you can recall Kiev, where a full-blooded tank group suddenly concentrated on the bridgehead in just two days. Let me remind you that the speed of our MK’s march is 50 km per day, not more. This is precisely our main problem - the Germans in 1941 were corny more mobile, and even the infantry (at the expense of the advanced detachments).
                Quote: Constanty
                Also there would be no such problems with communication.

                Where do you get the signalmen? Or will the army team again sit on the line of the People’s Commissariat of Communications? Well, 22.06 showed how it ends.
          2. Magog 3 February 2020 17: 23 New
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            You can argue a lot "if" but "yes." But the border districts / fronts did not have such tasks. No one set the troops to keep their territories inviolable. What is covered by the definition of “cover of borders” (?) - we ask the local authority A. Isaev.
        2. Alf
          Alf 2 February 2020 21: 56 New
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          Quote: Magog
          create reserve purely defensive fronts behind the back of the First echelon of troops.

          That's what the Germans were surprised when, near Shepetovka, they met units of the 16th Army of the Second Echelon, which, according to intelligence, could not exist in nature.
          1. Magog 3 February 2020 20: 09 New
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            The "second tier" did not have the task of building a strategic defense. And what they “saw and were surprised” was hastily erected fortifications by the forces of these armies after the fact of the outbreak of war. And what were the tasks (and arming) of the Second Echelon in reality?
        3. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 14: 27 New
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          Quote: Magog
          At least not to disarm the "Stalin line"

          Built in the 30s, almost all SDs do not comply with the "SD System" of 1938.
          At uv. M. Svirin had an article on the “Stalin Line” - widespread violations of concrete pouring technology, illiterate DOS location on the ground, lack of weapons and personnel.
          The only UR "LS" that got the army against which it was built is KaUR.
          Quote: Magog
          create reserve purely defensive fronts behind the back of the First echelon of troops

          Compounds of internal districts deployed before the war in the rear of border districts. wink
          1. Magog 3 February 2020 17: 44 New
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            Any noticeable defensive battles recorded with the participation of these "compounds of the internal districts"? Was there a weapon in these URs? Or are you also dropping the de-zu intended for the enemy before the war?
            1. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 18: 00 New
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              Quote: Magog
              Any noticeable defensive battles recorded with the participation of these "compounds of the internal districts"?

              If you take 16A, then this is Senno-Lepel and the defense of Smolensk. Plus Shepetovka defense forces OG Lukin.
              Quote: Magog
              Was there a weapon in these URs?

              But what about. And filling with artillery up to 203 mm.
              And the Germans broke this line in 2-4 days.
              The defense on the line of the old UR is well described by Isaev in "From Dubno to Rostov."
              1. Magog 3 February 2020 20: 14 New
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                The word "broke" is too pathetic! "They stayed here and there for 2-4 days." Is it defense readiness? For the sake of these 2-4 days, "won time" and "delayed how could the war"?
                1. Alexey RA 4 February 2020 12: 27 New
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                  Quote: Magog
                  Is it defense readiness? For the sake of these 2-4 days, "won time" and "delayed how could the war"?

                  So no one planned to fight in 1941. In 1939, it was planned that the Germans would get bogged down in France, as in 1914. In 1940-1941. - that the Germans will not fight on two fronts. ICH, our intelligence sang the same songs - all sources regularly reported that until the end of the war with England, Germany would not fight the USSR.
                  Judging by the terms of construction of the SD and the plans for the exercises, the war was expected in 1942.
                  And only in June did it become clear that the war would be on the verge. But they did not have time to do anything.
                  1. Magog 4 February 2020 12: 49 New
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                    Alexey, stop it! I have the full text of "Considerations ..." There it is clear in all editions, starting from July 1940, the headquarters games of January 1941 and until May 15, 1941 - only options for offensive operations (northwest, western, south -western), URs are mentioned only as auxiliary means to cover the actions of fronts from the flanks. The term "border protection" itself also implied in this regard active offensive and defensive actions in the border areas, moreover, on the territory of the enemy. If you so wish, I will quote the document verbatim. I do not have such blanks as you have “for all incoming questions,” but I can do it specifically for your sake. Your colleague, Meltyukhov M.I. the historian quite worthily analyzed this document. You can quote him, after all, Doctor of Historical Sciences ! There is no serious evidence that the Red Army was prepared to repel aggression! I appreciate your efforts to prove the opposite: they probably pay your brother for this, huh?
    2. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 13: 42 New
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      Quote: Magog
      Without any attempts to "rewrite" someone show by examples of organizational, structural and quantitative indicators that such events really took place before the war.

      Is the design, layout on the ground and the construction of a third-level SD (along the line: Ostashkov, Rzhev, Vyazma, Spas-Demensk) suitable? Work began in the winter of 1941, the first phase of construction was to be completed by June 1, 1942, an intermediate stage by January 1, 1942.
      1. Magog 3 February 2020 17: 35 New
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        More like a de-si for a potential adversary. In reality, even during the war, these projects were not implemented, were they? What work began in the winter of 1941? What was completed and could be used?
        1. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 18: 12 New
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          Quote: Magog
          More like a de-si for a potential adversary. In reality, even during the war, these projects were not implemented, were they?

          Even as implemented. After the outbreak of the war, the terms were sharply shifted to the left, and construction according to pre-war plans was already active in July 1941.
          Since the start of construction, the employees of Glavgidrostroy and its departments have not developed business relations with the leaders of Smolensk and other regions. So, on July 11, 1941, the bureau of the Smolensk regional party committee heard a report by A. Alpov, one of the construction managers. The bureau’s decision “On the construction of the third defensive line” noted a number of major shortcomings associated with the disruption of the organizers of the defense construction (downtime of people and equipment, lack of documentation, funding, management of work on the ground, power outages of builders).
          ....
          The bureau took hasty measures to assist the builders of the third line of defense.

          In 2017, after a tour of the terrain using SD maps of the third boundary, the situation was as follows:
          To date, about 550 structures have been discovered in the territory of the Rzhevsky UR alone, and about 900 have been found along the line so far.
          1. Magog 3 February 2020 18: 43 New
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            Aleksey, exactly - "in July 1941" ! So the Luga border, judging by the Soviet films, began to design and build right there, mobilizing the population. Perhaps there were plans and projects, but no one tried to implement them in a hurry to implement “before the threat of an enemy invasion”. As Vatutin put it in "Considerations ..." that it is "important to forestall the enemy in deployment" for delivering the first strike - that’s the whole "fuss" about this. Why is official history (Soviet and present, including you) so afraid to admit it? From the military’s point of view, it’s normal practice: “hit first if you see that you can’t avoid a fight!” (V.V. Putin!). "Preparing and organizing a war" is what scares! So beat the Nazis! Noble intention ...
            1. Alexey RA 4 February 2020 12: 55 New
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              Quote: Magog
              Aleksey, exactly - "in July 1941" !

              In order to carry out work in early July, you must already have approved lines, a project for SD and a breakdown of structures on the ground.
              Quote: Magog
              So the Luga border, judging by the Soviet films, began to design and build right there, mobilizing the population.

              Pfff ... do not confuse propaganda and military planning - in the USSR they were often perpendicular. Before the war, the people's commissar of defense could broadcast from the rostrum about in a foreign land we will defeat the enemy, and leaving the rostrum - sign a directive on expanding evacuation areas in the event of a war. laughing
              On the Krasnogvardeisky UR I met data that he was also part of the UR of the third frontier and was designed even before the war. So Luzhsky could also be from the third frontier.
              Quote: Magog
              As Vatutin put it in "Considerations ..." that it is "important to forestall the enemy in deployment" for delivering the first strike - that’s the whole "fuss" about this.

              Yeah ... and planned in the same "Considerations" the construction of SD on the Hungarian direction in 1942. laughing
              The funny thing in "Considerations ..." is that the forces and means of the Red Army indicated in them for 1941 were virtually absent. Out of 61 TDs and 31 MDs, in fact, there were only 7-10 TDs and 3-5 MDs (almost all MDs in the reports of MK commanders from April-March 1941 pass as "incompetent"), and these connections have not yet completed coordination (according to the plan - September 1941). The Red Army mechanized corps did not have a single one - even the first eight" autumn "MKs were" paper tigers. " experimental exercises of a fully equipped MK were appointed to test its capabilities in defense, offensive and on the march - with the subsequent change in the OSh of the corps.
              With the Air Force, it’s even worse - the aviators are re-equipping the old and forming new units and formations. And the first results of this process will only be in the autumn of 1941, but in general the reform is stretched until the summer of 1942. The Air Force also has no rear services - in 1941 a complete reform of the basing system was launched.
              The rear ... it's generally a song without words. Where is our stock of fuel for the call? That's right - in Maykop. And why? And because reservoirs from industry were not received, and fuel is stored at the place of processing - because there is nowhere to fill it in the district. Ammunition? Basically, beyond the line of the old border. For the same reason - there are no warehouses. The supply? Tankers 10-15% (which is not surprising, because this device is like a BT tank), even the usual barrels are not enough. Trucks?
              Lorries and wheeled vehicles are provided with rubber at 60%; armored vehicles 100%. Of the presence of trucks, 200 cars are on pads due to lack of rubber. Average wear of rubber by 70%.
              © report 8 MK
              All stocks of tires available at the People’s Commissariat of Defense were used up for the period 1939-1940. In 1941, the People’s Commissariat of Defense claimed 525000 sets of rubber. For the first half of 1941, a fund of 195000 sets was allocated, or 35% of the annual application.
              © Report of the Chief of the State Academic Technical University to the Main Military Council of the SC on the state of providing armored vehicles and property of the Red Army. June 1941
              1. Magog 4 February 2020 13: 56 New
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                A large farm is the same sloppiness. Warehouses of weapons, ammunition, fuel, equipment in the open air at the very borders are clear evidence of not only sloppiness, but also our intentions to repel aggression! Fighter airfields a few kilometers from the border are also proof of non-trivial strategic defense plans! IAPs, flying into the depths of our territory, fleeing from German tank breakthroughs near the border, landed at airfields deprived of any reserves of fuel, ammunition, spare parts - this is also an outstanding example of preparing to repel aggression! The main losses of fighter aircraft for this reason, and not the notorious sudden massive attacks on airfields, although there were still some losses from this attack. Well, etc. in the same context! The Plan of "Considerations" was nevertheless carried out with some degree of approximation, and no one has yet presented the other! What is left? They did everything wrong, prepared not to understand why, they overtook a bunch of troops to the borders "for slaughter" and were taken prisoner, gave the enemy mountains of weapons and supplies. And then - the sheer heroism of the people and the army! The last one is true!
                1. Alexey RA 5 February 2020 10: 42 New
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                  Quote: Magog
                  Warehouses of arms, ammunition, fuel, equipment in the open air at the very borders are clear evidence not only of sloppiness, but of our intentions to repulse aggression!

                  And there were no large warehouses at the very borders of the warehouse. There were only third-class warehouses - consumables, for supplying field parts.
                  Of the total number of district warehouses 10 were built in the pre-Soviet period, 20 were organized in 1941 in the Baltic republics, Western Belarus and Ukraine on the basis of military warehouses already existing there, 13 were equipped in the open air, and the remaining 68 warehouses were created during the Soviet era, mainly in 1930-1940.

                  The artillery depots of the border districts were dispersed along the front and layered in depth. The first line of warehouses located 50-75 km from the state border was advanced warehouses, usually small ones (4th category). On the second line, 300-400 km away from the state border, warehouses of 3-nd and partially of the 2nd category were located, and on the third (rear) line were the most powerful warehouses (of the 1st and 2nd categories). The total depth of the separation of the warehouses reached 500-600 km.

                  © "Artillery Supply in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45."
                  Quote: Magog
                  Fighter airfields a few kilometers from the border are also proof of non-trivial strategic defense plans!

                  1. These are airdromes of mixed air divisions, which were operatively subordinate to the armies and based in their strip. Say thanks to the theoreticians who decided to provide each army with their own aviation, while flagrantly violating the principle of concentration of forces and means (because even the front headquarters could not scratch something back from the armies - the 8th MK was an example).
                  2. The combat radius of the main fighter of the Red Army Air Force is 130-140 km. And he needs not only to reach the front line, but also to cover the bombers working on the enemy’s communications.
                  Quote: Magog
                  IAPs, flying into the depths of our territory, fleeing from German tank breakthroughs near the border, landed at airfields deprived of any reserves of fuel, ammunition, spare parts - this is also an outstanding example of preparing to repel aggression!

                  Apparently the lack of reserves for fuel, ammunition, spare parts is also an outstanding example of preparing an offensive. smile
                  In fact, everything is simpler - since the spring of 1941, a radical reform of the basing system and rear has been going on in the Red Army Air Force. It should have ended in theory by the beginning of autumn, but in fact would have been stretched until 1942 - for the new states were not provided with equipment. So at many airfields the same BAO were only on paper. Plus, the reform itself was not thought out - so, the new supply structures did not have their own transport. Everything is in stock - but there’s nothing to deliver to the airport.
                  Quote: Magog
                  The Plan of "Considerations" was nevertheless carried out with some degree of approximation, and no one has yet presented the other!

                  The Plan of "Considerations" was based on forces that were absent in reality. How can you plan to advance with tank divisions that are in the process of formation? Or motorized divisions that lack artillery, trucks, and even rifles? Or aviation regiments that exist only on paper — there is an order for formation, a regiment is formally there, but is it planned to receive equipment only in 1942?
                  Quote: Magog
                  Did everything wrong, prepared do not understand what

                  Preparing for a classic war with preliminary diplomatic caresses and the threatened period used to mobilize and concentrate. Like in Poland. Like in France. Like in Finland. Nobody expected a blow by a completely mobilized army without claiming and even without declaring war.
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                  3. Magog 5 February 2020 14: 08 New
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                    “The combat radius of the main fighter of the Red Army Air Force is 130-140 km. And he not only needs to fly to the front line, but also to cover the bombers working on the enemy’s communications.”
                    What problems ? Locate airfields behind defense lines and support lines, preventing the enemy from reaching these airfields. In reality, during the war this was done. But this is in the conditions of defense, and the task: to prevent the enemy "bombers" from their communications. Otherwise, our option is: closer to the border, so as to accompany your forces of aerial processing of enemy rear lines as far as possible.

                    "How can you plan to advance with tank divisions that are in the process of formation?"
                    The offensive at the beginning of the operation was assumed by the forces of the "echelon of cover", this was a completely sound idea of ​​the operational department of the General Staff. And under this cover, conduct the deployment of the main forces of the invasion, including understaffing. That is, as I understand it, in conditions of open mobilization, the supply of formed parts with equipment and supplies would be massive and sufficient.

                    "No one expected a strike by a fully mobilized army without claiming, or even without declaring war."
                    Here I completely agree. According to our plan, military operations (their beginning, development, continuation) completely depended on us (even specific dates of the beginning of the operation were indicated in the early versions of this war plan).

                    "The direction of concentration of the main efforts by the Soviet command was chosen not in the interests of a strategic defensive operation (such an operation was simply not foreseen and was not planned), but with respect to completely different methods of action."
                    1. Alexey RA 7 February 2020 16: 31 New
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                      Quote: Magog
                      What problems ? Locate airfields behind defense lines and support lines, preventing the enemy from reaching these airfields.

                      Well, there they were for the most part located - behind the frontiers of defense of the border armies.
                      If we attribute them to the Stalin Line, then the Germans in polygon conditions will go to it in a couple of days. And the troops of the near field will practically lose their air cover.
                      Quote: Magog
                      But this is in the conditions of defense, and the task: to prevent the enemy "bombers" from their communications.

                      And where did the task of "disrupting the concentration of the enemy by strikes on communications" go? Or "strikes on the reserves of the advancing enemy and places of their unloading"? Or "attacks on enemy artillery"? Or “attacks on airfields and rear depots”?
                      Yes, in defense of strike missions behind the front line, aviation has no less than in an offensive.
                      Quote: Magog
                      The offensive at the beginning of the operation was assumed by the forces of the "echelon of cover", this was a completely sound idea of ​​the operational department of the General Staff.

                      Yeah .. look at the composition of the forces of the South-Western Front in "Considerations". And then try to find them in 1941 in real life. smile
                      Quote: Magog
                      That is, as I understand it, in conditions of open mobilization, the supply of formed parts with equipment and supplies would be massive and sufficient.

                      Yes Yes Yes...
                      The Red Army has a significant shortage of VMS trucks, type “A” and “B” workshops, and marching and charging stations.
                      It will not be possible to count on the lack of coverage for these machines, due to mobilization supplies from the national economy, as the experience of the Polish and Finnish campaigns has shown, since a huge number of cars will arrive at the delivery points in poor technical condition and with worn out rubber.

                      © Head of GABTU Fedorenko, June 1941
                      There was also a marvelous note that the army could not cover the shortage of ZIS-5 and 6 trucks even after mobilizing all the equipment from the national economy. And their partial replacement by GAZ deprives the rear of the opportunity to raise the estimated amount of reserves.
                      With traction, the picture is even worse: the shortage of artillery trucks is 25000. Twenty-five thousand! And these are precisely artillery tractors, not tractors — 41000 more are needed for tractors. There are no artillery tractors in n / a. And industry will give them no more than 3-4 thousand.
                      Well, the cherry on the cake - NGOs do not have rubber either.
                      All stocks of tires available at the People's Commissariat of Defense were used up for the period 1939-1940.
                      In 1941, the People's Commissariat of Defense declared 525000 sets of rubber. For the first half of 1941, a fund of 195000 sets was allocated, or 35% of the annual application.
                  4. Magog 5 February 2020 15: 40 New
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                    This is really interesting: "The first line of warehouses 50-75 km away from the state border was advanced warehouses, usually small ones (4th category). The second line, which was 300-400 km away from the state border, had warehouses 3 2nd and partially 1nd category, and on the third (rear) line - the most powerful warehouses (2st and 500nd categories). The total depth of the separation of the warehouses reached 600 km. "
                    So, already in July-August 41, all warehouses of all categories were in the hands of the enemy, right? To bring out all the good, including factories, factories, warehouses, museums under the bombing and in sight of a rapidly advancing enemy - is not realistic. It is no coincidence that the supporters of our “flagrant unpreparedness for war” are now worried that near Moscow “the soldiers have one rifle for 4/5/6” (who like to emphasize the real drama of the situation with the armament of the troops), or they were found in warehouses (I don’t know which there is a discharge) English light machine guns of the WWI era, cannons with a wooden chassis, etc. If the depots (of any category) were within the reach of an enemy strike, what does that mean? "Sloppiness" do not dismiss! And what about Stalin?
                    1. Alexey RA 7 February 2020 16: 55 New
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                      Quote: Magog
                      So, already in July-August 41, all warehouses of all categories were in the hands of the enemy, right?

                      No not like this. These are only district depots. And behind them stood a strategic echelon - warehouses of central subordination.
                      The grouping of central bases and warehouses on the eve of World War II was characterized primarily by the fact that they were all concentrated on the territory of five military districts (MBO, OrVO, KhVO, PrivO, UrVO).
                      Given the construction of new warehouses, the conventional boundaries of the separation of bases and warehouses were designated as follows:
                      a) the first and the closest border to the state border (distance up to 600 km) passed along the line Toropets - Nizhyn;
                      b) the second - along the line Kuzhenkino - Rzhev - Bryansk - Poltava;
                      c) the third - along the line Rybinsk - Moscow - Lozovaya;
                      d) the fourth - along the line Yaroslavl - Gryazi - Artyomovsk;
                      e) the fifth - along the Ney-Gorky-Tambov-Stalingrad line;
                      f) the sixth - along the line Kirov - Syzran;
                      g) the seventh - along the line Kungur - Urman;
                      h) the eighth - along the line Sverdlovsk - Chelyabinsk.

                      The total depth of the separation of the warehouses reached approximately 2000 km.

                      The total volume of these warehouses was 70% of the volume of district warehouses all counties THE USSR:
                      The actual load of the central bases and ammunition depots as of January 1, 1941 was 41940 wagons.
                      The total workload of the district bases and ammunition depots as of January 1, 1941: 57702 wagons.
                      Quote: Magog
                      If the warehouses (of any rank) were within the reach of an enemy strike, then what does this mean?

                      This suggests that no one expected a breakthrough of 600 km per week. The main warehouses of the border districts were located in the rear of the districts: at the same ZOV - already in the Gomel region. And 600 km is, according to our standards, more than a week’s march of the mechanized corps. The usual march - without the influence of the enemy.
                      And the second - the grouping of district warehouses was dispersed taking into account the satisfaction of the needs of the troops under the existing transport mileage standards. And this is 150 km per day for a truck.
                      1. Magog 9 February 2020 17: 10 New
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                        Thank you for the discussion. The Germans in the above areas were also not all brilliant. The relatively small amount of preparations for the operation "Barbarossa", the good organization of the troops, trophies allowed them to quite successfully carry out their actions as part of the disruption of our plans for the outbreak of war.
  7. Undecim 2 February 2020 14: 55 New
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    From the first lines, you can recognize the author and understand that there will be little information, but a lot of words.
    If the author decided to write about steps towards a future victory, then the Decision of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars No. 443ss cannot be called the first step, since all the samples of "tanks, armored vehicles, artillery vehicles" listed in it, taken into service in accordance with it, were created in in accordance with the decisions of the Defense Committee for No. 198ss of July 7, 1938 and No. 118ss of May 15, 1939
    It was necessary to start with them.
  8. tank64rus 2 February 2020 18: 38 New
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    Yes there were people and there was a country. Not Courchevel, but Kubinka was the goal of their life. Eternal to them Memory and Glory.!
  9. Potter 2 February 2020 19: 54 New
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    Why were all-wheel drive cars developed before the war (1939) still not put on stream? Apart from 200 GAZ-61 and 200 Zis-32? Answer me? I know the answer ..
    1. Magog 2 February 2020 21: 45 New
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      Do you know? So answer it yourself! It’s interesting to know - without fools. Or what are you afraid of?
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  11. mvg
    mvg 3 February 2020 01: 44 New
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    Why is it impossible to minus articles?
  12. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 11: 45 New
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    The STZ-5 transport tractor has been in series since 1937, and at the end of 1939 it was adopted as a light artillery tractor. Thanks to this, the Stalingrad Tractor Plant was able to easily deploy equipment for the Red Army. Production of the STZ-5 continued until September 1942 and was stopped only in connection with the approach of the enemy to the manufacturer. In total, almost 9950 tractors were produced.

    A little about what kind of tractor it was:
    At a meeting of designers with army representatives at the Stalingrad Tractor Plant in April 1941 regarding the operation of the STZ-5, the military did not hesitate in expressions: “... take this tractor and try to work with the gun: it does not pull the required weight of the gun, the power as a military machine is small ... slow motion, barbaric conditions for the driver in the cab completely depreciate this tractor. And if you leave this car as a transport and as a means of transporting goods, then it also does not fit in with the payload ... The army needs three-ton cars, and if it is one and a half-ton, it will not suit the army either ... There is a unique number of disadvantages on all your transport vehicles... The maximum speed of this car is 8 km / h, but it usually does 6 km / h ... the car itself does not pull at 4th speed ... if I got into a fighting position, and then I need to change the position immediately, and I need 40 minutes to just start a tractor ... "

    This is the opinion of the "end user". And here is the assessment of STZ-5 by specialists of the GABTU:
    Since there was no tractor in the Red Army for divisional artillery, in spite of the fact that the STZ-5 tractor did not pass a single polygon test, it was necessary to use this tractor in the Red Army as a temporary measure until a new tractor appeared, fully meeting the new requirements of NPOs.
    In order to improve the design of the STZ-5 tractor ... it was planned to modernize this tractor (increase engine power, improve overall dynamics, change the overall length of the tractor, improve traction ...), although it was clear in advance that even after this revision the tractor would not respond fully NCO requirements for a tractor for divisional artillery ...
    The Stalingrad plant manufactured 2 samples of the modernized STZ-5 tractors, which were subjected to field tests in 1940. The modernized tractors did not pass the landfill tests, after which the Stalingrad plant abandoned these works and still does nothing to modernize the STZ-5 tractor ...
    The STZ-5 tractor, neither in terms of its dynamic qualities, nor in the convenience of its service, nor in its reliability, meets the requirements for the divisional artillery tractor in any way and urgently requires a large number of changes covering the entire tractor structure ...
    Division artillery does not have an appropriate tractor that meets its tactical and technical data and requirements.
    © Ulanov / Shein
    1. Stas57 3 February 2020 15: 38 New
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      Yes, the lack of a tractor and generally a good tractor played a negative role.
      1. Alexey RA 3 February 2020 17: 52 New
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        Quote: Stas57
        Yes, the lack of a tractor and generally a good tractor played a negative role.

        As the uv. Shein, in the entire Red Army there were two tractors that arranged GAU and GABTU. But one of them could not drag anything larger than the 45-mm, and the other was powerful, but rare, and the rembats and artillery of OM and BM competed for it. In the gap between them was not nothing.
  13. illuminat 10 February 2020 15: 20 New
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    Quote: Free Wind
    Ground clearance, yes, no ground clearance.

    What is the difference? I always believed that this is one and the same thing, only the clearance is from armored vehicles, and the clearance is from civilian cars.