Undisclosed details of NATO’s response to Iskander-M ammunition upgrade. In an attempt to replay the RV&A


Countermeasures announced by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on January 13, 2020, preparing to take promising, inconspicuous 9M720 Novator cruise missiles in response to integration into the OTRK 9K729 Iskander-M ammunition, were the subject of a thorough analysis of both domestic and foreign military experts and observers who are aware of the operational-strategic situation in the European conditional theater of operations, as well as the parameters of modern tactical missile systems and air defense systems at the disposal of the airborne forces and missile forces to and artillery of Russia, as well as the armies of the most technologically advanced member states of the North Atlantic Alliance.


The concept of a “defensive response” of the North Atlantic Alliance. What to consider?


Such a high interest in this news due to the fact that even against the backdrop of the withdrawal of the "founding link" of NATO (USA) from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missiles, which previously controlled the number and limited the development and large-scale production of short and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, the list of countermeasures voiced by the NATO Secretary General the alliance in response to equipping Iskander-M with an advanced percussion instrument has a purely defensive character and does not have a single point on the immediate initiation of defense bubbled departments of Western European states develop programs promising means of air attack with the same rocket 9M729 parameters. In particular, it was only a question of “accelerating the implementation of existing projects of promising air defense missile defense systems, intensifying work in the field of designing conventional weapons, increasing the warning time by means of early warning radar systems, and also expanding the anti-ballistic potential of existing anti-ballistic systems.

It may seem to the wide-eyed eye of an ordinary observer or even a journalist who rarely plunge into the thorny process of studying the technological features of the use of modern tactical long-range cruise missiles and anti-aircraft missile systems that the above-described "response" of NATO to operational readiness of Iskander-M missiles 9M729 is not even capable of fending off the strike potential of the Russian Missile Forces and artillery in the European conventional theater of operations. In fact, everything is completely different.

It is known that tactical 9M729 long-range cruise missiles, which are modernized conceptual and constructive hybrids of 9M728 (R-500) and 3M14T / K Kaliber-NK / PL multi-purpose cruise missiles, have far from the most “high-torque” turbofan turbofan engines 50B (“Product 37-01”) with a maximum thrust of about 450 kgf, which provides them with only a subsonic flight speed of 780–950 km / h on the marching and terminal sections of the flight path. As a result, the maximum available overload of the Novator cruise missiles during anti-aircraft maneuvers does not exceed 10-12 units. Poor maneuverability combined with low subsonic / transonic flight speed make Novators vulnerable to modern West European short-range and medium-range anti-aircraft missile systems VL-MICA and Land Ceptor. These mobile air defense systems have highly maneuverable anti-aircraft missile interceptors MICA-EM / IR and CAMM-ER, equipped with a gas-jet thrust vector deflection system that allows maneuvering with 50-60G overloads, due to which airborne objects can be intercepted with overloads of more than 25-30 units.

Where the Novator’s 9M729 cruise missiles pose a big threat are anti-aircraft missile systems such as MEADS (a promising brainchild of the US-German company TVLS GmbH, developed under the Taktisches Luftverteidigungssystem program), Patriot PAC-3MSE and SAMP-T, the first of which is equipped with IRIS-T and MIM-104F PAC-3MSE anti-ballistic missiles, the second is equipped with MIM-104F PAC-3MSE anti-ballistic missiles, the third is equipped with Aster-15 and Aster-30 anti-aircraft missiles. The missiles of the MIM-104F and Aster families are equipped with an even more advanced control system based on gas-dynamic "belts" with pulsed transverse control engines, which provide lightning-fast transverse throws on a trajectory with overloads of 60-65G. The presence of active J- / Ka-band radar homing heads makes it possible to intercept low-altitude air attack tools (including Novators) even behind the radio horizon screen or over natural objects of the terrain. But there is an important nuance that does not play into the hands of the military calculations of the above air defense systems.

This is a small radar signature of tactical long-range cruise missiles 9M729 Novator. The wide use of composite and radar absorbing materials in the design of KR 9M729 airframes, coupled with the internal housing configuration of the TRDD-50B engines (according to the à la Caliber - JASSM-ER "scheme), reduces their effective reflective surface to 0,05-0,07 sq. m, which reduces the range of their direction finding by means of airborne AWACS systems (AN / APY-2/9 radars) by about 2-3 times in comparison with such cruise missiles as the X-55CM.

As a result, the relatively high probability of the aircraft issuing a radar patrol and guiding the E-2D and E-3C with timely targeting to the MEADS, Patriot PAC-3, and SAMP-T complexes for low-altitude Novators will only be maintained when NATO airborne radar converges with "Innovators" at a distance of no more than 120-150 km. Such a rapprochement will be practically impossible if SAMP-T or Patriot anti-aircraft missile batteries are deployed in the immediate vicinity of the airspace A2 / AD of the Russian Aerospace Forces teeming with MiG-31BM interceptors with long-range R-37M air-defense missiles, which pose a mortal threat NATO AWACS.

That is why, as one of the main subparagraphs of the “defensive response”, NATO Stoltenberg announced an “increase in warning time”. Apparently, we are talking about increasing the energy capabilities of airborne AWARS radars, which is already being implemented in a promising project of the Swedish company “Saab-AB”, which provides for the development of an advanced aircraft radar equipped with “farsighted” and anti-jamming S-band radar “Saab Erieye” with with a range of target detection of the type “small-sized cruise missile” of the order of two to three hundred kilometers.
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  1. Vladimir_2U 16 January 2020 05: 58 New
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    Let the air defense enemy build up, less money will go on strike weapons!
  2. Aerodrome 16 January 2020 06: 00 New
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    Comrade Damantsev ... your fears about the evil and dangerous "patriots" have not been confirmed. (and more than once) they are a clear failure in a missile defense of a potential enemy. exhale ... and rejoice that you live on this side of the Iskander. yes
  3. Ka-52 16 January 2020 06: 21 New
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    Sometimes it seems that a bot program writes texts for Eugene. Otherwise, how to explain such a confusion of facts that are not entirely related to each other. For instance:
    they have far from the most “high-torque” turbofan turbofan engines TRDD-50B (“Product 37-01”) with a maximum thrust of about 450 kgf, which provides them with only a subsonic flight speed of 780–950 km / h on the marching and terminal sections of the flight path. As a result, the maximum available overload of the Novator cruise missiles during anti-aircraft maneuvers does not exceed 10-12 units. Low maneuverability combined with low subsonic / transonic flight speed make Novators vulnerable to modern short-and medium-range Western European anti-aircraft missile systems

    for example, take the same Tomahawk Block IV, the wiki kindly tells you that his cravings are 3,1 Kn. When converted to kilogram-force, we get a thrust equal to 305. That is, even lower by 150 kgs indicated by Eugene 9M728. But for some reason no one removes the threat from American axes, as one of the most powerful arguments of the United States.
    About the anti-aircraft maneuvering ability of the Kyrgyz Republic, what is this all about ?!
    1. Charik 16 January 2020 06: 31 New
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      maybe the number of axes
    2. Amateur 16 January 2020 06: 49 New
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      Evgenia texts are written by a bot program

      Or maybe he is a bot machine IskIn (artificial intelligence) of a higher level than the "Fedor"? wassat
    3. D16
      D16 16 January 2020 07: 08 New
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      Otherwise, how to explain such a confusion of facts that are not entirely related to each other.

      I have always believed that the maximum allowable overload is determined by the strength of the product, and not by engine thrust. And strength, in turn, depends on the price of a disposable product. It is one thing to shoot at an aircraft carrier worth $ 10 billion, another at a platoon stronghold.
      About the anti-aircraft maneuvering ability of the Kyrgyz Republic, what is this all about ?!

      As much as possible to bypass the previously explored air defense systems.
      1. Ka-52 16 January 2020 08: 34 New
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        As much as possible to bypass the previously explored air defense systems.

        bypass or change of course, do not require high overloads. Because prospective areas of deployment of air defense forces are known in advance and included in the flight program.
        1. D16
          D16 16 January 2020 09: 21 New
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          That's why no one bothers with the durability of the axes .3M14. It is sufficient for flying in envelope mode. And more is not necessary.
    4. Fedor egoist 16 January 2020 12: 00 New
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      Quote: Ka-52
      Sometimes it seems that the bot program writes texts for Eugene

      I have been sure of this for a long time)) Even a screenshot was already thrown off wassat
  4. Amateur 16 January 2020 06: 47 New
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    provides them only with a subsonic flight speed of 780–950 km / h on the marching and terminal sections of the flight path. As a result, the maximum available overload of the Novator cruise missiles during anti-aircraft maneuvers does not exceed 10-12 units.

    Will Mr. Damantsev explain how the cruising speed and permissible operational overloads are related.
    But
    Aerospace forces of Russia, teeming MiG-31BM interceptors
    "Gigabyte" MiG-31 is cool. Almost a masterpiece. For this, you can even forgive another salad of names and numbers. what
    1. bessmertniy 16 January 2020 06: 55 New
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      He broke all the brains into pieces! repeat It is clear that we have created another problem for the West. Let their heads hurt. And ours can somehow regret it or something ... what
  5. thanks 16 January 2020 07: 06 New
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    Quote: Evgeny Damantsev Unrevealed details of NATO’s response to the renewal of the Iskander-M ammunition. In an attempt to replay the RV&A
    ... reduces their effective reflective surface to 0,05-0,07 square meters. m, which reduces the range of their direction finding by means of airborne AWACS systems (AN / APY-2/9 radars) by about 2-3 times in comparison with such cruise missiles as the X-55CM.

    Dear Evgeny Damantsev! Love your writing style! However, there are small blots.
    If the image intensifier is reduced to 0,05 - 0,07 m2 relative to the image intensifier = 0,3 m2 X-55SM, the detection range of the 9M729 missile system by means of DRLOiU aviation systems (AN / APY-2/9 radars) will decrease by only 1,44 - 1,57, 2 times, not 3 times ...

    The data of the X-55CM image intensifier tube are taken from the site - https://dima-piterski.livejournal.com/447745.html. Good luck.
  6. rocket757 16 January 2020 07: 09 New
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    That is why, as one of the main subparagraphs of the “defensive response”, NATO Stoltenberg announced “an increase in alert time.”

    Nobody suggests that the NATO allies will simply watch and wait for the “piano” to fall on their heads. They will, will, improve airspace controls and intercept potential threats.
    The confrontation of defenses and attacks will never stop.
    While the means of attack dominate, but to hope that it is possible by simple, outdated methods / means to inflict catastrophic damage to a potential enemy is a big mistake.
    Opponents on both sides have the potential, methods, to protect themselves, for a sufficient time to inflict a retaliatory strike.
    There will be no absolute winner; everyone will get it. PARITY ... but, until that time, until someone stops in their development, they will not improve their SHIELD / SWORD arsenal.
  7. Old26 16 January 2020 11: 28 New
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    Quote: Aerodrome
    Comrade Damantsev ... your fears about the evil and dangerous "patriots" have not been confirmed. (and more than once) they are a clear failure in a missile defense of a potential enemy. exhale ... and rejoice that you live on this side of the Iskander. yes

    Of course Damantsev in his role. As always, a lot of designations and stuff, but in this case I must agree with his view of the problem.
    And do not belong to the "Patriot" that way condescendingly-ironic. Not worth it. The complex is regularly upgraded based on the experience of participating in hostilities, and the current Patriot is not the 1991 Patriot.
    We love to remember the "misses" of the enemy without even trying to analyze them. It is so nice to think that they are suckers, not capable of anything. Moreover, situations where the "Patriots" worked within their performance characteristics are usually not considered. But situations with misses are absorbed regularly.

    The first thing that is always mentioned is the ineffective work of the Patriot during Desert Storm. True, forgetting that the first modification of the “Patriot” was used there, designed to intercept exclusively aerodynamic targets and the maximum capable of that - to intercept a ballistic target with a firing range of 70 km. And what in principle means "not working effectively"? Even this modification, not adapted for intercepting missiles, nevertheless fulfilled its functions, minimizing the loss of personnel and civilians.

    The second mention is the failure of the Saudi missile defense in the area of ​​the oil complex. However, the following factors are most often never taken into account during the discussion:
    1. The structure of building air defense of Saudi Arabia. And it is built on a focal principle and does not have a single radar field. And at the same time "fool", where cruise missiles and drones can pass - in bulk
    2. Speaking about the failure of the Patriot, the question is never asked in this situation, but was the Patriot there? And if there were batteries on the coast of the bay, was the flight path within their reach or not?
    3. We always say that the "minimum" of reach in height at the "Patriot" is 60 meters. And the fact that there is a landscape there - a desert as flat as a table and rockets and drones above it could go at an altitude of 5-10 meters - they also try not to talk about

    But the territory of Europe, on which these new Russian 9M729 missiles will be aimed, is not a desert. And the landscape is different. And do not forget that the altitude of cruise missiles above land is 100-150 meters. And this means that cruise missiles will be in the affected area of ​​the Patriot missiles. So do not be so lenient about this missile defense system. It is fraught. And this must be taken into account, and not "harbor" that "they will bring us down"

    Quote: Amateur
    Will Mr. Damantsev explain how the cruising speed and permissible operational overloads are related.

    This is not for our minds. This is higher order information. laughing

    Quote: bessmertniy
    It is clear that we have created another problem for the West. Let their heads hurt. And ours can somehow regret it or something ...

    This is not even a problem. Interception of subsonic non-speed targets - there is nothing in this that has already ceased to exist. If 9M729 is created using stealth elements, then the only problem (completely solvable) is detection
  8. Radikal 16 January 2020 14: 06 New
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    120-150 km. Such a rapprochement will be practically impossible if SAMP-T or Patriot anti-aircraft missile batteries are deployed in the immediate vicinity of the airspace A2 / AD of the Russian Aerospace Forces teeming with MiG-31BM interceptors with long-range R-37M air-defense missiles, which pose a mortal threat NATO AWACS.
    It sounds very life-affirming! lol And how many of those “teeming” MiG-31BMs for all of the theater? winked
  9. Dmitry V. 16 January 2020 15: 36 New
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    As a result, the maximum available overload of the Novator cruise missiles during anti-aircraft maneuvers does not exceed 10-12 units.

    Comrade science fiction!
    Cruise missiles do not carry out anti-aircraft maneuvers - at subsonic cruising speed it is absolutely useless!
    The main method of overcoming air defense - navigation involves bypassing air defense zones, a low-altitude flight profile and an insignificant reflective signature, which complicates the early detection of air defense.
    Everything else will depend on the separation of the air defense facility.
  10. Andrey.AN 16 January 2020 20: 38 New
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    And who exactly are going to notify, Europe? Or will a fortune teller be hired to indicate where he flies?
  11. Andrey.AN 16 January 2020 20: 43 New
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    No, a warning about a missile attack is known where to send, only when analyzing a ballistic trajectory, it relates to cruise missiles differently, they will wake anti-aircraft gunners if they sleep (if any), and that’s all.