Warships. Cruisers. The trick that did not go for the good

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Warships. Cruisers. The trick that did not go for the good

Continuing the theme of Italian heavy cruisers, we move from Trento to Zaram.

Zara was a more thoughtful job. Italian shipbuilders took very seriously the work on the last four of the cruisers permitted by the Washington Treaty, so seriously that ... they decided to deceive everyone!



In general, by the start of the construction of these ships from the experience of building the Trento and Trieste, it became clear that creating a sane and balanced ship within the framework of 10 contract tons is simply unrealistic.

Therefore, the Italians decided to cheat. The idea of ​​creating a “killer of the Washington cruisers” was directly in the air and really liked the Italian command, but Italy was not ready to directly confront the “Washington Club” by creating such ships. It became clear that for such killer cruisers, the displacement had only to begin at least 15 tons.

The gut was thin, and right. But you can always cheat a little. The Italians announced that everything is shito-covered and smooth, the displacement of new ships as is 10 tons and everything is beautiful and honest.

In fact, the numbers were pretty underestimated. The real standard displacement (it's still how to measure) with cruisers dangled from 11 to 500 tons. And how much was complete, in general no one still knows. The data was classified. But I think that just with full ammunition, all reserves and crew, the ships pulled 11-900 thousand tons easily.

So the realization of the dream to create a cruiser capable of cracking down on the “Washington”, in fact, failed.


However, Italians would not be Italians if they had not “burned” with charming spontaneity. In 1936, for some unknown reason (translated from Italian - by sloppiness), the Gorizia cruiser pulled a pair of aviation gasoline and damaged the hull. The cruiser commander did not dare to go to the base, but made his way to Gibraltar, where he docked.

The British instantly calculated the displacement of Gorizia and realized that there was a minimum of 11 tons. In general, it is very strange, but for some reason no sanctions and claims followed. Either the political component made the British once again swallow the fortress of Hitler’s ally, or everyone already didn’t give a damn about all the agreements.

So, here they are, no less beautiful than their predecessors, but seemingly with worked out errors. “Zara”, “Paula”, “Fiume” and “Gorizia”.


Yes, these cruisers were designed on the basis of the Trento, but with very many changes that affected even the appearance of the ships. The most noticeable change - the hull has become low-sided with a short forecastle.

Yes, such innovations could not but affect seaworthiness, but: a few hundred tons and in Italy weigh a lot. And as shown by the operation of Trento and Trieste, oceanic seaworthiness in the Mediterranean Sea is completely unnecessary.

They did not install torpedo tubes, the power plant from Parsons was a new generation, much lighter than on Trento.

For what is saving so mad? But for what: the airborne armored belt grew from 70 mm to 150! And 150 millimeters is, sorry, seriously. A projectile of 203 mm, maybe, will break, of course, but all that is less - sorry.

Although later in the text there will be an interesting point on the topic "the better to pick."

And just in time for the next topic, very momentarily there will be one more moment. Historically, God knows from what times Italian ships, including cruisers, had their mottos. There was something like a coat of arms for some, but the motto is mandatory.

“Zara” - “Persistent.”
"Fiume" - "Let valor not be exhausted."
"Gorizia" - "In difficulties, calm."
"Paula" - "Brave in any endeavor."

It is clear that the mottos were in Latin, but here is how they corresponded to the ships ... In general, be patient a little, nevertheless first we’ll talk about the ships themselves.


All cruisers of the Zara type had a low-side hull with a very short (81,6 m) forecastle. The interdeck height over the entire length of the ship was 2,2 m. In total there were two continuous decks - the upper and main, two platforms - the middle and lower decks and the deck of the forecastle.

The main battery deck was armored. Along the entire length of the hull was a double bottom and 19 waterproof bulkheads. In the area of ​​the engine compartments housed a longitudinal bulkhead.

In general, cruisers had to withstand flooding up to three adjacent compartments. Unlike the Trento type, the Zar corps did not “play,” that is, they had no problems with durability.

The ships were almost identical, with the exception of the "Paul", which was planned as the flagship, because the superstructure had a slightly different shape.


The main power plant had continuous power (on which the ship can make long trips) of 76 l. with., there was the possibility of boosting up to 000 liters. from.

The tests and measurements of the cruiser showed a speed of about 32 knots, but like its predecessors, the working speed during service was in the region of 29-30 knots.

Armament.

The main caliber of the Zara-type cruisers was 8 guns of 203 mm caliber, placed in pairs in 4 towers. The towers were installed in a linearly elevated pattern, two in the bow and stern. Everything is exactly the same as with Trento.


But the guns were already somewhat different: the 203 mm guns of the Ansaldo system of the 1927 model (Ansaldo Mod. 1927). Compared with the guns of the previous model (1924 model), the volume of the charging chamber, working pressure, the initial velocity of the projectile and the firing range were increased.

The initial velocity of the armor-piercing projectile was 900 m / s, high-explosive 930 m / s. Firing Range 31 300 m.

In terms of towers, the Italians decided not to change anything, because it was not easy to design a new tower, time was really running out. And it seems that new trunks were placed in old towers. And the Zary inherited the same problems that the Trento differed: two barrels in one cradle, which, when fired, gave an additional incentive to the spread of shells. And when a good projectile hit the turret, both guns could be lost.

The main caliber fire control system consisted of two command and rangefinding posts, the top on the top of the foremast, the lower on the roof of the conning tower. The equipment of the command rangefinder post included a stereo range finder with a base of 5 meters. The data obtained in the command and rangefinding posts were processed at the central artillery post.

A backup fire control system of the main caliber with control from the towers was also provided. For this, in the elevated towers of the 203-mm guns, they had their own stereo range finders with a base of 7 meters and the simplest computing devices.

The Italian gunners worked out the following main-caliber fire control schemes:

1) All 4 towers fire according to the data of the 1st command and rangefinder post (top) according to the normal scheme (using all data processed by the central firing machine).

2) All 4 towers fire using the data of the 2nd command and rangefinding post (backup version of targeting).

3) Aft towers use data KDP No. 1, bow KDP No. 2.

4) The towers are divided into two groups (bow and stern) with fire control from elevated towers.

5) All towers fire independently.

On paper, everything looks quite, practice ... Practice was sad.

Universal artillery consisted of all of the same frankly old 100-mm installations with OTO Mod guns. 1927. Development on the basis of the Czech K11 gun from Skoda, armadillos of the already defunct Austria-Hungary went with them, the Italian gun differed from the original with a lined barrel.

The gun had a rate of fire of 8-10 rds / min, the initial velocity of the projectile was 840 m / s, the maximum firing range was 15 m (elevation angle 240 degrees), reach in height - 45 m (elevation angle 8500 degrees). In general, so-so.

The guns were mounted in twin units and could fire, both on air and surface targets. Efficiency was lower than average, because in the late 30s, feed plants were happy to change to 37-mm automatic machines.

The anti-aircraft armament initially consisted of four 40-mm Vickers-Terni submachine guns of 1915/1917 (licensed copy of the British Pom-Pom) and four coaxial 13,2-mm Bred machine guns M1931.

Torpedo tubes were not installed, as mentioned above.

Each cruiser could take on board three seaplanes, but usually took two due to the poor location of the hangar and catapult. The hangar was located under the deck of the forecastle in front of the bow tower, there was a catapult directly in front of the hangar and a regular third seaplane usually had to be located immediately on the catapult.


But in this position, the plane greatly complicated the angle of fire for the first tower of the main caliber.

An interesting point: a crane for lifting aircraft was not installed, so the aircraft were disposable. After taking off and completing the mission, the pilot had to fly to the nearest airfield and land on water or land there.

In general, in comparison with Trento, the armament did not get better.

And finally, for the sake of which the whole garden was set up with deceit and the elimination of torpedo weapons and an aircraft crane.

Armor. Heavy cruisers of the Zara type had the most powerful reservations among “crippled colleagues” and “Washington” cruisers.


The thickness of the armored belt was 150 mm, in the lower third it was reduced to 100 mm. In height, the armor belt reached the main deck and fell below the waterline by 1,5 m.

A flat main armored deck rested on the upper edge of the main belt. It consisted of plates 70 mm thick above the artillery cellars and compartments of the power plant and 65 mm at the sides (above the double bottom compartments).

There was a second citadel above the citadel thus formed. It consisted of a 30-mm armor belt and a 20-mm armor deck, the main purpose of which was to remove the armor-piercing caps.

The frontal plates of the main-caliber towers were 150 mm thick, the side plates were 75 mm thick, and the roof plates were 70 mm thick. The tower barbets were 150 mm thick above the upper deck, 140 mm between the upper and main decks and 120 mm below the main deck. The thickness of the armor around the entire perimeter of the barbet was uniform.

The conning tower was protected by 150 mm armor around the perimeter, with an 80 mm roof and a 70 mm bottom. The internal diameter of the conning tower is 3,3 m. Above the conning tower was a rotating command-range measuring post of the main caliber. The internal diameter of the KDP is 3,5 m. It was protected by 130 mm armor around the perimeter, 100 mm from the top, 15 mm from the bottom.

The total weight of the armor of each cruiser amounted to 2 688 tons. It was believed that booking heavy cruisers of the Zara type was able to withstand armor-piercing 203 mm British shells in the range from 65 to 125 cable (from 12 to 23 km). But the war made some adjustments.

In general, the battle path of the cruisers was not very rich. Yes, they took part in all the few operations of Italian fleetbut had no success at all.

"Zara."


It was laid down on July 4, 1929, launched on April 27, 1930, and joined the fleet on October 20, 1937.

The pre-war service of the ship was not accompanied by special noteworthy events - he participated in exercises, parades and visited various Mediterranean ports.

In April 1939 he participated in the occupation of Albania. January 13, 1940 all heavy cruisers of the Zara type became part of the 1st division of the cruisers of the 2nd squadron (reconnaissance forces).

When Italy entered World War II, Zara covered mines between the island of Lampedusa and the bank of Kerkenna. June 13-14 went out to intercept the English ships conducting the operation off the African coast. There was no meeting with the enemy. I was looking for the enemy in French communications. Have not found. July 9, participated in the battle with the British Mediterranean fleet. He shot, but did not hit anyone.


In general, the service was like that ... They didn’t beat the loungers, and thank God. Until it came to a battle at Cape Matapan, where the Italians flew into the trap set up by the British, who deciphered the negotiations with the help of Enigma.

The battleship Vittorio Veneto, eight cruisers, including Fiume, Paula and Zara, accompanied by several destroyers, were to coordinate the convoys off the coast of Greece with coordinated actions. And they came upon almost the entire British Mediterranean fleet awaiting them ...

On the morning of March 28, 1941, the Italian compound entered into battle with the British cruisers, but then, not waiting for the promised German air cover, they began to retreat to the base.

Italian ships were under constant British attack aviationboth deck and shore. In the evening, the torpedo bomber “Swordfish” torpedoed the cruiser “Paul”, which lost speed. The remaining ships went forward.

Soon, Admiral Iakino ordered the 1st Division cruisers to return to the damaged cruiser and assist him. The unit commander did not know that he was being pursued by enemy battleships. “Zara”, “Fiume” and 4 destroyers laid down on the reverse course.

The cruisers didn’t go into battle, and therefore only half of the crews were at the combat posts, and towing cables were prepared by the whole crew for the main caliber towers.


At about 22 p.m., the British discovered a cruiser and opened artillery fire at 22 p.m. All three British battleships fired at Zara: Worthspite, Valiant and Barham.

The British always knew how to shoot. Therefore, after just a few minutes, the 381-mm Zara guns caught in the exact fire burned like a dawn. Hits in the bow tower, bridge, engine room deprived the cruiser of the course, and he began to roll to the left side.

Soon, the battleships ceased fire and left the battle, apparently believing that the "Dawn" had come to an end. What happened on the burning and sinking cruiser is not known for certain, the rest of the crew definitely fought for survivability, but alas, no luck.

At about 2 a.m. on March 29, the Zara was discovered by the Jervis destroyer, which killed it with torpedoes. Almost the entire crew died, along with the division commander Admiral Catteno.

Fiume.


Laid down on April 29, 1929, launched on April 27, 1930, entered the fleet on November 21, 1931.

During the Spanish Civil War, he assisted nationalists. In April 1939, Fiume took part in the occupation of Albania. The first operation in World War II was the covering of a mine setting along with Zara, then until the end of June the cruiser made two exits as part of the compound: to intercept the British squadron and search on the French communications. There was no meeting with the enemy.


On July 9, Fiume participated in a battle near Calabria (Punto Steel), shot at British ships, and didn’t hit anyone. The rest of the year he spent escorting North African convoys.

November 27, 1940 during the British operation "Collard" Italian ships entered into battle with the British compound "N". The fight was indecisive and without result.


Participated in the battle at Cape Matapan. On March 28, at 22 p.m., Fiume, following Zara, received a full airborne volley from the Worspite battleship and a volley from the bow towers of the Valiant battleship, and then another volley from the Worspite.

The cruiser was almost destroyed, lasted on the water for another half hour and sank for about 23 hours, taking with him most of the crew.

"Paula".


Laid down on March 17, 1931, launched on December 5, 1931, entered into service on December 21, 1932. The ship’s pre-service was usual: trips to the Mediterranean Sea, visits to its ports, visits to foreign ports, exits to exercises.

In 1936-1938, the cruiser "Paul" assisted the troops of General Franco, accompanied transports with weapons.

The first military operation was the cover of a mine setting on the night of June 11 to 12, along with sisterships. A day later, an exit to intercept the enemy squadron took place. On June 22, 1940, the Italian fleet conducted another exit to intercept the enemy fleet. There was no meeting with the enemy.


The next exit of all the fighting forces of the Italian fleet guarding the convoy ended in a battle with the British fleet at Calabria (Punto Stilo). The rest of the summer the cruiser spent escorting convoys to Africa.

He took part on November 27, 1940 in the battle with the British formation "N" at Teulada. "Paula" made 18 volleys from the main caliber guns, but did not hit anyone. During the departure, the cruiser was attacked by torpedo bombers from the Ark Royal aircraft carrier, but the Paula fought off and dodged torpedoes.

On December 14, the port of Naples, in which the ships were located, was attacked by British aircraft. One of the bombs hit the cruiser. The 3rd boiler room was destroyed, and the "Polu" was sent for repairs, from which she left just at that time to take part in the battle at Cape Matapan.


On March 28, after a short battle with cruisers, the Italian compound began to retreat, being attacked by enemy carrier-based and coastal aircraft. At first, the attacks were very successful, but then the British hit torpedoes in the flagship battleship Vittorio Veneto. The speed of the squadron decreased, and the British managed to refuel and repeat the raid. These were torpedo bombers from the Formidedle aircraft carrier.

This time the Italians were unlucky, and the "Paula" got a torpedo to the starboard side between the engine and boiler rooms.

Three compartments were instantly filled with water, electricity was lost, and cars got up. Somehow it turned out to inform the squadron commander Admiral Iakino that the "Paula" is completely immobilized and defenseless.

After receiving information about the incident, the commander of the Italian unit ordered the remaining ships of the 1st Division (Zara and Fiume) to help the damaged fellow. When approaching the drift site, the "Floors" of the cruiser were discovered and destroyed. The culprit of the incident drifted peacefully until about 2 am he was discovered by the English destroyers Jervis and Nubien, who finished off the cruiser with torpedoes and took the crew.

Gorizia.


The only ship in the series that did not take part in the battle at Cape Matapan.

Laid on March 17, 1930, launched on December 28, 1931, entered the fleet on December 23, 1931.

The ship participated in helping the Francoists and the occupation of Albania. The first operation of World War II was the cover of a mine setting on the night of June 11-12, 1940.


Gorizia, as part of the compound, went to intercept the British compound and search for French communications, took part in the battle at Punto Stilo (Calabria), and escorted North African convoys. He went to sea as part of a squadron to counter the British Operation Hats.

November 27, 1940 "Gorizia" took part in the battle with the British formation "N", which entered history like a fight at Teulada. The cruiser in this battle made 18 volleys with guns of the main caliber, without achieving hits. Some time after the battle, Gorizia got up for scheduled repairs, which apparently saved her from Matapan. Repair lasted until the summer of 1941.

Since the remaining cruisers of the division had already died by this time, Gorizia was enrolled in the 3rd division. Then she regularly participated in countering the British convoy operations Mensmith, Aleppo, M-41, and M-42.

The battle, which went down in history as the “first battle in the Gulf of Syrt,” occurred during Operation M-42. In this battle, "Gorizia" still achieved the main caliber hit the British destroyer, but he was able to escape in the darkness.

Further, the cruiser took part in escort operations, but the fuel crisis that had begun condemned almost the entire Italian fleet to complete inaction. This took advantage of the Americans, who began regular raids on the Italian ship parking.

On December 4, 1942, American aircraft attacked the Italian naval base in Naples. The Royal Italian fleet lost 1 cruiser, 2 more were damaged.


To avoid the repetition of such an outrage, the heavy cruisers Trieste and Gorizia were transferred from Messina (Sicily Island) to Maddalena (Sardinia Island). It did not help, and on April 10, 1943, this base was attacked by American aircraft, which sank the heavy cruiser Trieste. Gorizia was seriously damaged by a direct hit of 3 bombs. On April 13, she was towed to La Spezia for repairs.


On September 9, the cruiser, together with the whole of Northern Italy, fell into German hands. The question of its repair and inclusion in the German fleet was not even considered. June 26, 1944 "Gorizia" was blown up by a British-Italian group of combat swimmers. The British command was afraid of its flooding in the entrance channel.

After the war, the corps was lifted and disassembled.

Here is such a peculiar fate.

Heavy cruisers of the Zara type are perhaps one of the most successful and balanced, albeit due to tricks with the displacement of Washington cruisers.

On the one hand, very beautiful ships, they could not show their fighting qualities.

Cruisers of the Zara type were perfectly adapted specifically for the Mediterranean theater of operations. The lack of seaworthiness and sailing range in its conditions for Italian ships was not at all critical, and for the rest of the possibilities they looked much more advantageous than British classmates.


And the armor, the same one that was so lacking for all Washington cruisers ... If the Zaras received normal main-caliber guns and normal shells, they would certainly be one of the most dangerous ships in the world.

But ... in the end, most of these cruisers were shot by British battleships, against the shells of which, of course, there simply could not be protection. Even a decent speed could not save, because the British played the eternal Italian disorder, which cost them three heavy cruisers.


Well, rightly so, in principle. The trick is not always unpunished and fruitful.
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  1. +15
    12 January 2020 06: 54
    The ships are beautiful. the armor is good ... but something tells me if the Italians had at least "Baltimore" the result would have turned out the same. In their case, it's not about the ships.
    1. +11
      12 January 2020 08: 00
      Quote: mark1
      In their case, the matter is not in the ships.

      smile Recently, an article was about this ...
      " Seven cruisers with 56 barrels achieved THREE recorded hits during the war.
      This, you see, if not a shame, then his dress rehearsal.
      "
      1. +6
        12 January 2020 09: 29
        I kind of read somewhere 3-4% of hits from the fired shells in World War 1 in the fleets were considered quite a good indicator
    2. 0
      12 January 2020 08: 28
      Quote: mark1
      if the Italians even had “Baltimore” the result would have been the same.

      ))).
      Not. The Baltics originally had a radar.
      1. +7
        12 January 2020 08: 58
        But neither the radar nor the magnificent Mk 13/15 would help in a shootout with the owners of the 15-inch armored belt and 0-inch guns - just like after a couple of 870-kg suitcases, the ships would be out of order, even if they managed to reign in the enemy.
        1. +3
          12 January 2020 15: 41
          Quote: CTABEP
          But in a shootout with the owners of the 13-inch armored belt and 15-inch guns, not a radar,

          So the peculiarity of this battle is precisely in the fact that LK (and AB for the company) succeeded sneak up to the pistol distance. The British had radars, but the Italians did not. If the Italians knew about the British, they would have screwed up without options, their speed is much higher.
      2. +1
        13 January 2020 10: 52
        Quote: Octopus
        Not. The Baltics originally had a radar.

        So the Italian Baltimors will also have Italian shells and charges. wink
        No radar station and no SUAO will help if the weight of the shot is "walking", and the temperature in the cellars is kept above normal.
        1. 0
          13 January 2020 11: 41
          Quote: Alexey RA
          So the Italian Baltimors will also have Italian shells and charges.
          No radar

          Normal heroes always go around. To those, about on time, he took a break, the same shells are not needed. The battle won is the one that did not take place, Sun Tzu, that’s all.

          But seriously, the decision for cruisers in an artillery battle with LK is not to engage in an artillery battle with LK. For this, among other things, the radar would not hurt.
          1. +1
            13 January 2020 12: 00
            Quote: Octopus
            But seriously, the decision for cruisers in an artillery battle with LK is not to engage in an artillery battle with LK. For this, among other things, the radar would not hurt.

            Well, or at least sane aerial reconnaissance - in the remaining daylight hours. Which would show that the ABK, without turning anywhere, is chasing the Italian squadron.
            Bagheera! I'm in a hurry! ©

            And also, be with the Italians short barrel torpedoes and normal signalmen - everything could end differently. smile
            1. -2
              13 January 2020 12: 24
              Quote: Alexey RA
              And also, be with the Italians

              Oblique faces and a Japanese passport.
              1. +1
                13 January 2020 17: 17
                Quote: Octopus
                Oblique faces and a Japanese passport.

                Kaigun-tisho Carro Cattaneo and Kaigun-tusho Sanso Netti. laughing
      3. 0
        18 January 2020 14: 18
        In the current situation (near Mapatan), the radar might not work. On the "Field" not up to the radar (it was out of order as a result of hits), on "Fiume" they did not turn it on, and on "Zara" they misunderstood the radar data
        In any case, the cruiser under the fire of battleships, and even at a pistol distance ...
        Maybe the Japanese "Mioko" / "Takao" would have had a chance - if they had time to use torpedoes.
        1. -1
          18 January 2020 14: 22
          Quote: Sergey Zhikharev
          Japanese "Mioko" / "Takao" would have a chance

          Destroyers would have a chance.

          Especially Japanese.
          1. 0
            18 January 2020 14: 31
            In this case (Anglo-Japanese Mapatan), the situation may develop in "the British had a chance"
            The Japanese would notice the British, take advantage of their passivity (the fact that the Japanese see them on the radar, the Japanese do not know), and torpedoes, torpedoes.
            1. -1
              18 January 2020 14: 35
              The battle "Japanese destroyers against LK with radar" was carried out. 42nd year, death of Kirishima. The battle went on in a peculiar way, the Japanese overwhelmed all Li's ships with torpedoes, except for the LK.
              So how the card will fall.
    3. 0
      12 January 2020 20: 56
      Quote: mark1
      but something tells me, if the Italians at least "Baltimore" the result would have turned out the same. In their case, it's not about the ships.

      ========
      The ships at the "macaroni" were good ..... but the sailors - lousy!!!
    4. 0
      13 January 2020 04: 55
      Quote: mark1
      The ships are beautiful. armor is good
      The armor is nothing, but the constructive protection is not very:
      on the cruiser "Gorizia" fired a pair of aviation gasoline and damaged the hull. The cruiser commander did not dare to go to the base, but made his way to Gibraltar, where he docked.
      It’s scary to think what would happen if they had kitchen In the galley, the gas cylinder exploded. laughing
  2. +4
    12 January 2020 07: 37
    The French have created a balanced "Washington" cruiser, keeping within 10000 tons of standard displacement. "Algeria".
    1. +3
      12 January 2020 08: 32
      Quote: ignoto
      The French have created a balanced "Washington" cruiser, keeping within 10000 tons of standard displacement. "Algeria".

      Algeria is also under-armored, although noticeably less than its contemporaries. It has practically no free maneuvering zone under 8 ". Otherwise, yes, an excellent ship.

      It turned out funny. The best LC, the best SRT, the best CRL, the best large EM (in my estimation) are among the French, who do not need this whole farm.
      1. 0
        13 January 2020 21: 01
        Yu.I. Aleksandrov, in his monograph on the cruiser Algeria, writes that the zone of free maneuvering under 8 "shells was: from 18 to 26 km.
        1. -3
          14 January 2020 01: 24
          Quote: ignoto
          Yu.I. Aleksandrov, in his monograph about the cruiser "Algeria" writes

          Yes, good work. But for a decisive battle, the distance is far away, probably. Alexandrov recalls the latest SRT, namely Wichita.

          And American super-heavy shells also pull closer penetration of the deck.
  3. +10
    12 January 2020 09: 18
    But in this position, the plane greatly complicated the angle of fire for the first tower of the main caliber.

    Some kind of crooked phrase. Probably still - limited.
    As for the meeting in battle between the "Washington" cruiser and the battleship, the result is a little predictable.
  4. +5
    12 January 2020 09: 21
    Until it came to a battle at Cape Matapan, where the Italians flew into the trap set up by the British from dispersal, deciphering the negotiations with the help of Enigma.

    Enigma?
    It seems to be the so-called German encryption machine? what
    1. +3
      12 January 2020 16: 43
      This Roman unsuccessfully copied past. Already traditionally. Do not wonder.
  5. +4
    12 January 2020 09: 24
    launched on December 28, 1931, entered the fleet on December 23, 1931.
    ??
  6. 0
    12 January 2020 09: 31
    by the way about armor, armor is different in terms of resistance from different countries on ships, as I understand it
    somewhere it seemed like watching a video there they said that the Germans had the best armor on the ships, the British had worse, and the most figurative among the Japanese.
    And how interesting the Italians had with this matter
    1. +1
      12 January 2020 12: 30
      The Japanese alloyed steel with copper, and the Italians don't remember what (the book is far away) but the armor was the most fragile. In the first places are the British, Americans and Germans ("wotan" -15% of the. American)
    2. 0
      13 January 2020 11: 05
      Quote: Graz
      somewhere it seemed like watching a video there they said that the Germans had the best armor on the ships, the British had worse, and the most figurative among the Japanese.

      Evaluation of the low quality of Japanese armor type VH (as 0.86 from American Class A armor, according to other sources, as 0.839) was made on the basis of only two shots at one armor plate.
      1. Are there too few statistics for a generalized conclusion? Compare, for example, with the shooting of "experimental compartments" in Russia and the RSFSR.
      2. "It remains a question whether this plate was rejected during production." (c) V.L. Kofman "Japanese battleships of the Second World" Yamato "and" Musashi.
      3. The most important thing. Even if you do not pay attention to doubts about the quality of the stove, there is one more “but”. At the same time, the Americans also tested another 183-mm thick VH plate of armor, which was recognized as the best plate of all the plates tested by the American Navy (presumably American?) In the range of 6-8 ". However, the results the tests were not recorded and were not used in assessing the quality of the VH armor. The question is, why? Why did the mediocre results go, so to speak, "in credit", but the good results did not?
      The Japanese themselves also checked the plates from the VH armor with shelling, but no criticism was noted about its quality.

      © V. Sidorenko
    3. 0
      13 January 2020 17: 01
      Quote: Graz
      by the way about armor, armor is different in terms of resistance from different countries on ships, as I understand it
      somewhere it seemed like watching a video there they said that the Germans had the best armor on the ships, the British had worse, and the most figurative among the Japanese.
      And how interesting the Italians had with this matter

      It is a myth. The Yapas have normal armor. After the war, Americans tested plates from Japan. As far as I know, they were the same as the American ones.
  7. +1
    12 January 2020 10: 52
    In general, the service was like that ... They didn’t beat the loungers, and thank God


    The actions of the Italian fleet were determined by the chief of staff, Admiral Domenico Cavagnari, they were to be defensive in nature. Not prolonged "skirmishes" with the enemy were allowed.
    The main attacks on enemy ships were to be delivered by Regia Aeronautica together with the fleet. This explains the actions of the Italian Navy. But interaction was never achieved throughout the war.
  8. +8
    12 January 2020 10: 59
    ... The Italians from dispersal flew into the trap arranged by them by the British, who deciphered the negotiations with the help of Enigma.
    Enigma cannot be decrypted; it can be encrypted with it. Enigma is a German encryption machine.
    The Italian Navy used a cryptographic machine of its own design based on the cryptographic machine of the Swede Hagelin C-38.
    1. Cat
      +3
      12 January 2020 12: 11
      Italians flew into the trap set up by the British

      Even as a child, in the magazine "TM" about the battle at Cape Matapan, I read an article in which the reason for the successful ambush was indicated that the British had radars and the Italians had them absent or malfunctioning. It happened in the dark.
      1. +6
        12 January 2020 13: 18
        The root cause was the interception of Italian radiograms. Just in March 1941, specialists from Bletchley Park managed to crack the Italian naval code. The British were alarmed by the increased activity of the Italians in terms of tracking the movement of their ships, and the transcript of the negotiations made it possible to clarify the details of the upcoming raid and plan an ambush. Admiral Cunningham was playing golf at the Alexandria Golf Club until dark, so that Italian agents would not spot the compound.
        And the Italians were spotted on March 27 using air reconnaissance.
        1. +3
          12 January 2020 18: 10
          Quote: Undecim
          Root cause

          In fact, this is not so. The British could not crack the Navy codes (at that time, anyway). They hacked the codes that were used for the ships as part of the convoys as well as the Enigma Luftwaffe code. Considering that the fleet worked both as part of the convoys and in cooperation with the Luftwaffe, it got under the distribution
          1. 0
            13 January 2020 07: 20
            They cracked the codes that were used for ships as part of convoys and also the Enigma Luftwaffe code.Considering that the fleet worked both as part of convoys and in cooperation with the Luftwaffe, it also came under distribution
            - Where are the firewood from, let me know? I found this information on Enigma on Wiki:
            In 1940, the German navy made some changes to the car. Only after the capture of the U-9 submarine on May 1941, 110, along with several new instances of the machine, British cryptanalysts were able to figure out the changes [1].
            - it turns out that starting from 40g until May 9th of the 41st, the British could hardly adequately and quickly decipher the messages encrypted by Enigma.
            Incidentally, there could be no "Luftwaffe Enigma Code". In general, the question is whether the linear units of the Luftwaffe used the Enigma.
        2. +5
          12 January 2020 18: 18
          Quote: Undecim
          And they spotted the Italians on March 27 with the help of air reconnaissance

          This was a tactical move by the British, so as not to disclose the fact that they read the codes of Italians and Germans — before the interception and convoys and purely military squadrons, as in this case — they sent an air reconnaissance, knowing exactly where to look. Thus, both Italians and Germans copied everything to high.Efficiency of the British air reconnaissance and for a long time did not suspect that their codes were opened
  9. +1
    12 January 2020 10: 59
    The ships were almost identical, with the exception of the "Paul", which was planned as the flagship, because the superstructure had a slightly different shape.
    Who can explain why and why the flagship had a superstructure of a different shape?
    1. +5
      12 January 2020 11: 59
      Quote: dmmyak40
      Who can explain why and why the flagship had a superstructure of a different shape?

      Because the admiral and his retinue require additional premises, therefore "Pola" received additional premises on the bow superstructure
      Comparison of "Fiume" and "Paul"

      hi
      1. +2
        12 January 2020 12: 45
        It turns out that "Paula" was specially designed for the commander of the formation as a flagship? That is, a "member"? And if "Paula" was going to be repaired, what was the admiral doing? Was he waiting? I wonder how! It feels like the pasta wanted to fight in comfort!
        In WWI on the Black Sea Fleet, Kolchak, it seems, had the "George the Victorious" as a staff, and went to sea on the "Maria"?
        1. +13
          12 January 2020 15: 54
          Quote: dmmyak40
          It feels like pasta wanted to fight in comfort!

          Generally speaking, this is the norm. The Germans also had "admiral" battleships in WWI. And comfort has nothing to do with it - the admiral is not only a person, but also his headquarters, they need a place that does not need to be allocated on an ordinary ship
          1. +1
            12 January 2020 20: 04
            The Germans also had "admiral" battleships in WWI.
            What kind? Have limes also had such ships?
            At Jutland, Beatty held the flag on the Lion, like, Jellicoe - on the Iron Duke. These ships were also “admiral's” or was it just the admiral who chose them?
            1. +2
              13 January 2020 10: 01
              If my memory serves me right, there was one admiral in every series of German LCs. For example, among the battleships of the Helgoland type, it was Ostfriesland. And as for the British, I won’t tell you right away.
        2. +2
          12 January 2020 18: 03
          Quote: dmmyak40
          And if "Paula" was going to be repaired, what was the admiral doing?

          Bolzano also had a developed nasal superstructure - it could have been replaced in case of faq wink
        3. +1
          13 January 2020 11: 24
          Quote: dmmyak40
          It turns out that "Paula" was specially designed for the commander of the formation as a flagship? That is, a "member"? And if "Paula" was going to be repaired, what was the admiral doing? Was he waiting? I wonder how! It feels like the pasta wanted to fight in comfort!

          The Italians simply wanted to ensure normal working conditions for the admiral and staff. And not like ours - when on a "parquet cruiser" the admiral and the headquarters are squeezed "over the staff", so that the staff officers occupy the cabins of the command officers (who are compacted "as warrant officers), and even squeeze into combat posts.
    2. Cat
      +1
      12 January 2020 12: 04
      why and why did the flagship have a superstructure of a different shape?

      It can be assumed that to accommodate the headquarters and additional communications equipment. Well, there is still billiards and warm latches. laughing
  10. +4
    12 January 2020 11: 51
    By the way, cunning is not unique to Italians.
    If the VD for armament was still more or less respected by the British - their heavy cruisers of the "London" and "Norfolk" types somehow fit into 10000 tons and had a displacement from 9800 tons to 10400 tons, the Americans - all their pre-war cruisers had from 9000 ("Pensacola" and " Chesters ") to 10000 (" Portlands "and" Astorias "), the French - all their heavy cruisers did not climb beyond 10000 tons of the standard, then the Italians at first in the trinity of" Trento "-" Bolzano "also followed the letter of the law, but realizing that this is a dead-end road, as the author says, "they" cheated "- as a result, they got perfectly protected" Floors "at 11300-11600 tons. But who did not care about the VD, it was the Japanese - their" Mioko "at 13000 tons," Takao "at 13400 tons, "Mogami" in 12400t and my favorite lightweight "Tone" in 11200t standard initially went beyond the scope of the Treaty. But the Japanese received more or less suitable ships to destroy their own kind. Yes, 100mm of side armor is not so hot, but the speed is 33-35 knots and 10 (with the exception of "Tone" and "Tikuma") 8 "main guns with excellent crew training made them terribly beautiful killers. The Germans did not sign the VD and their "Hippers" with an unreliable PTU and 14000 tons of the standard look anachronistic with 80mm side armor with the same standard 32 knots of travel.
    So the really protected "Zaras" are only a consequence of prudence and awareness of the flawed agreements. Another thing is that, as we said earlier, they fell into the wrong hands. lol Had really trained crews, adequate commanders, not Italian artillery and ammunition, radars, this four would have been kings on the Mediterranean among cruisers Yes
    1. Cat
      0
      12 January 2020 12: 55
      Quote: Rurikovich
      But who spit on the VD is the Japanese

      Probably not fools. We realized that the ratio of the tonnage of the main ships of the USA, England and Japan as 5: 5: 3 puts the latter in a very indecent position in a future war.
    2. 0
      13 January 2020 12: 36
      I do not at all welcome the class of Washington heavy cruisers, I will note that the Italians played a pretty fool with the Zara. Previous cruisers had a full length (rounded off) 196 m and a width of 20,6 m. "Zara" - 182 m and 20,6 m. So the cruiser would have been rolled 14 m longer, which would have allowed the transfer of the main armament and armor. a catapult between the chimneys, strengthen the air defense and place the main power plant of about 140 thousand hp. The increase in displacement would be about 1500 T, which corresponds to the standard displacement of 13000 T.
  11. Cat
    0
    12 January 2020 12: 28
    Italians in World War II were beaten by everyone who is not lazy. At the end of the war, even their former allies were Germans. Even Borghese with his X flotilla did not save the situation.
  12. Cat
    +2
    12 January 2020 12: 45
    The trick is not always unpunished and fruitful.

    And where does the trick? Simply, contrary to the Duce's imperial ambitions, the Italians were never Romans - and this with a relatively decent fleet and aviation
    1. +1
      12 January 2020 17: 15
      Quote: Gato
      It’s just that, contrary to the Duce’s imperial ambitions, the Italians were never Romans -


      In Italy, they tried to show that they are still worthy of the Romans. That only is widely advertised in 1935 "battaglione di morte", whose pilots swore an oath, in the event of England entering the Italo-Ethiopian war, to ram English ships on their planes loaded with explosives. The truth about such attacks in the Second World War by the Italians, I did not have a chance to read.
      1. 0
        12 January 2020 17: 20
        Quote: 27091965i
        That only is the widely advertised in 1935 "battaglione di morte", the pilots of which gave

        Would not be difficult to share the link?
        1. +1
          12 January 2020 17: 45
          Quote: Liam
          Would not be difficult to share the link?


          THE ITALIAN FLEET Fletcher Pratt. 1939 There were enough references to "battaglione di morte" in Italy in 1935, but do not forget that this is more of a propaganda campaign, I do not think that most of the Italian pilots were ready for such an act. Their motto was "one in a thousand".
          1. +1
            12 January 2020 17: 56
            Quote: 27091965i
            "THE ITALIAN FLEET" Fletcher Pratt. 1939

            This one?
            Murray Fletcher Pratt (April 25, 1897 - June 10, 1956) was an American writer of science fiction, fantasy and history.
            In his bibliography on Wikipedia, such "work does not seem to appear.
            History and Biography Edit
            Naval History Edit
            The Compact History of the United States Navy (1957) OCLC 367782
            Empire and the Sea (1946) with Inga Stephens
            Fighting Ships of the US Navy (1941) illustrated by Jack Coggins
            Fleet Against Japan (1946)
            The Navy has Wings; the United States Naval Aviation (1943)
            The Navy, a History; the Story of a Service in Action (1938)
            The Navy's War (1944)
            Night Work: the Story of Task Force 39 (1946) OCLC 1492544
            Preble's Boys; Commodore Preble and the Birth of American Sea Power (1950) LCCN 50-10765
            Sea Power and Today's War (1939) OCLC 1450484
            Ships, Men - and Bases (1941) with Frank Knox
            A Short History of the Army and Navy (1944)
            Quote: 27091965i
            "battaglione di morte"

            Moreover, this term is grammatically erroneous. It would be correct battaglione of Death.
            This is not to mention the fact that the term battaglione itself is by no means either to aviation or to the fleet.
            Italian sources do not give any results on this term.
            1. +1
              12 January 2020 18: 22
              Quote: Liam
              In his bibliography on Wikipedia, such "work does not seem to appear.


              This work is included in Sea Power and Today's War (1939). All chapters included in this book were also printed separately.

              Moreover, this term is grammatically erroneous. It would be correct battaglione della morte.


              I wrote it as I once found it on a website describing the Italo-Ethiopian war. Not strong in Italian.
              1. +1
                12 January 2020 18: 44
                So let’s leave it to Mr. Fletcher Pratt writer of science fiction, fantasy and history.
                The Italians are not aware of the formation of their own units of kamikaze pilots. The term battaglione della morte in Italian refers to death battalions-punitive detachments.
                1. 0
                  12 January 2020 19: 36
                  Quote: Liam
                  Fletcher Pratt writer of science fiction, fantasy and history.


                  Possible.
                  Propaganda is a tricky thing. Perhaps this battalion existed and the pilots gave interviews, vowed to give their lives. It impresses people. That's just to act as it seems to me, they were not going to. But to raise the spirit and patriotism were quite suitable.
            2. 0
              13 January 2020 18: 02
              Quote: Liam
              Italian sources do not give any results on this term.


              Gaetano Salvemini has a mention, but he uses the term "suicide squadron".

              " According to press reports, a "suicide squadron" of 125 Navy pilots who had vowed to die were poised to strike at the British fleet in the Mediterranean. Each pilot carrying one bomb in his plane had to select an enemy warship and attack it. "1954

              HR Wilson may be added, but it is rather an indirect statement;

              " I believe that some members of the British cabinet were impressed by the ongoing reports from Italy that Mussolini and the Italian people were ready to attack Britain if the league accepted the oil embargo, which was then being discussed. Even those cabinet members who did not believe in this could not guarantee that this was not so.. "1941 official British opinion.

              In my opinion, this was still a propaganda step.
              I think if you want you can find more information on this issue.
  13. +10
    12 January 2020 13: 39

    All Zara-class sisterships in the harbor of Naples - from left to right - Zara, Fiume, Pola, Gorizia.
  14. +6
    12 January 2020 14: 17
    June 26, 1944 "Gorizia" was blown up by a British-Italian group of combat swimmers.
    After the war, the corps was lifted and disassembled.
    The attack on the cruiser "Gorizia" was unsuccessful, the ship remained afloat.

    The cruiser "Gorizia" in the harbor of La Spezia. June 1946. The cruiser was not rebuilt to the appearance of severe damage and was dismantled for metal in 1947.
  15. -6
    12 January 2020 15: 51
    good article, thanks to the author! +

    about combat effectiveness. Well, the Italian ships at least took part in a number of campaigns and died, so to speak, "on the field of honor," in an unequal battle with battleships.
    but for example Soviet cruisers ??? for the whole war, even though there were official shots just towards the surface enemy (I just keep quiet about the hits) ??? Even in the direction of at least a torpedo boat? Who did the "legendary" cruiser "Kirov" shoot at ??? somewhere there. Because there was no adjustment, more precisely, there was an imitation of the adjustment, but in fact they hit the squares with barrage fire. Regarding the "shooting" of "Maxim Gorky" in general, there is one vague thing in his memoirs and in research. But in 1945 (!!!) "Prince Eugen" emptied its cellars on the heads of our ground forces without any opposition from the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Well, yes, but in chorus we feel sorry for the great Admiral Kuznetsov, whom "boor and redneck" Zhukov swore in Stalin's waiting room for this very episode, by the way.
    Who did all 5 Black Sea cruisers shoot at ??? 7 seem to be salvoes towards Constanta before the explosion of Moscow. Then "somewhere there" during the defense of Sevastopol. Oh, yes, the Molotov seems to have fired a salvo from the secondary armament (by) at the Italian TC before losing 18 meters of stern. And then, after the loss of 3 EVs from German aviation in the fall of 1943 - through ports, "like a mouse behind a broom," as Oktyabrsky wrote in the preface to the book "Tsushima", describing the "stupid and cowardly tsarist admirals" of Vitgeft, Ukhtomsky, etc. The Germans quietly left the Crimea on BDB and raumbots, with the overall domination of our aviation.
    If the Italian "Trento and Zary" had at least a dozen hits on the surface enemy, then ALL Soviet ships larger than the TFR in BB2 did not have a single one, at least officially confirmed by the enemy
    1. +13
      12 January 2020 16: 14
      Quote: Corrie Sanders
      but for example, Soviet cruisers ???

      The Baltic Fleet has been locked in Leningrad since the beginning of the war. Both banks of the Finnish are in the hands of the enemy! In WWI, the Great and Terrible Fleet of the high seas of the Germans did not dare to pop into the Gulf of Finland. And in 1941, we ourselves were locked in it: a combination of mines, aircraft, coastal batteries - and that's all, you can’t pop out.
      Where did the KBF go? Crawling behind minesweepers in the center of Finland under air strikes? Repeat Tallinn transition only in the opposite direction? We in the base were barely fighting off German aircraft, and then we lost the battleship Marat, and a number of other ships, but what do you suggest? Bring ships to minefields, so that the Germans would be more comfortable drowning them there?
      And for what, let me ask? For the sake of a proud defile on the Baltic Sea? Germans did not hold heavy ships in the Baltic, and the light would have managed to leave before the KBF squadron crawled across Finnish behind the minesweepers. The same applies to transports.
      In general, it is not the sailors' fault that the Germans reached Leningrad. And they came, and in those conditions, trying to get out of the Finnish surface ships was a uniform, and absolutely unnecessary suicide.
      Quote: Corrie Sanders
      But in 1945 (!!!) "Prince Eugen" emptied its cellars on the heads of our ground forces without any opposition from the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

      Corrie, when you write, at least a little think about the subject of discussion?
      It’s a pity that you can’t take and send you there. So that you explain to the same Kuznetsov how to send a battleship and 2 KRL to battle, which for several years (!) Stood without full combat training in the BLOCKED LENINGRAD, in which it is impossible to provide this training in principle.
      1. 0
        13 January 2020 11: 37
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        And for what, let me ask? For the sake of a proud defile on the Baltic Sea? Germans did not hold heavy ships in the Baltic, and the light would have managed to leave before the KBF squadron crawled across Finnish behind the minesweepers.

        By the way, in the fall of 1941, the Germans were keeping heavy ships in the Baltic. Then they formed a squadron led by "Tirpitz" to prevent a possible breakthrough of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet ships into Sweden for internment. In addition to him, the squadron included the BB "Admiral Scheer", KRL "Emden", "Leipzig", "Cologne" and "Nuremberg".
        So the exit of our KRL to the Baltic in the fall of 1941 could end in disastrous condition.
        1. +2
          13 January 2020 18: 00
          Quote: Alexey RA
          By the way, in the fall of 1941, the Germans were just holding heavy ships in the Baltic.

          Yes, but still it was a special case. Then another "main gunboat of the Baltic" came, "Eugen" :))))
          Quote: Alexey RA
          So the exit of our KRL to the Baltic in the fall of 1941 could end in disastrous condition.

          That's for sure.
          1. 0
            13 January 2020 18: 33
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Yes, but still it was a special case.

            Nevertheless, there was a chance to meet. And the outcome of this meeting would clearly not be in our favor - taking into account the real training of our crews.
            If we have a compound of three EMs and two TFRs at our Red Banner Baltic Fleet, upon meeting with the German floating base TSC and two TSCs in battle, almost lost the "Seven-U" without losses from the enemy ... sad
      2. +1
        13 January 2020 12: 24
        I will intercede for Corrie.
        It was enough just to push the forces you indicated to Helsingfors or Hanko, and OKM would have less ambition to shell the coast. Nevertheless, from the second half of 1944, our aviation dominated the theater of operations, so that cover could be provided.
        And the fact that Kuznetsov during the war brought ships larger than the leader into an unfit state is a very sad fact.
        1. 0
          13 January 2020 18: 15
          Quote: Victor Leningradets
          It was enough just to push the forces you indicated to Helsingfors or Hanko

          By 1944, the "big pots" of the KBF and the Black Sea Fleet were not capable of fighting as ships. The maximum is a floating battery of limited self-propelled nature.
          The first blow was struck by the formation of the "crew marines" (KBF - 1941, Black Sea Fleet - 1942). At the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, when forming naval land units, they even took naval specialists - from towers, radio rooms (they even took submarine crews to naval battalions). In the first wave alone, the same "Oktyabrina" gave 450 people. At the Black Sea Fleet in 1942, more than 500 people joined the Marines from the Parisian. This wave also went through the KR KBF.
          The second blow to the crews was dealt by "Arkhangelsk" and "Murmansk", the crews of which were recruited from the best specialists who remained on the LK and KR.
          According to some reports, the KBF manning crews did not exceed 50% of the staff.
          Quote: Victor Leningradets
          Nevertheless, from the second half of 1944, our aviation dominated the theater of operations, so that cover could be provided.

          The domination of our aviation is best described by Miroslav Morozov - "Wild boar hunting". In short, with a theoretical superiority in forces, the command of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet Air Force was able to allocate only three top masters (whose attack was actually thwarted by German fighters, despite the presence of cover) and three dive bombers for a strike on the Sheer, which pressed our army to the ground. The rest is IL-2.
          Miroslav Morozov sees the main reason for this inability of the command to organize a strike:
          Over the course of the day, it had countless opportunities to organize a strike on a naval force by forces of the 8th air division, which was not used to carry out other tasks (1st military aviation unit, the main forces of the 12th military unit and the 51st military aviation unit), but did not.

          However, in addition to this, there was a more significant reason - the inability of the KBF rear to organize the supply of the Air Force of the fleet. For example, after moving to the Baltic states, the 1st GMTAP was waiting for the rear for almost a month, and after a couple of weeks the only torpedo remained on the entire regiment. However, only the Air Force suffered - the TKA brigade, which participated in the landing on the islands of the Moonsund archipelago, was forced to actually beg for gas from the army (and then, when the remaining fuel was returned, the crews blocked the pipelines in order to keep the NZ).
          Quote: Victor Leningradets
          And the fact that Kuznetsov during the war brought ships larger than the leader into an unfit state is a very sad fact.

          Not Kuznetsov left all shipbuilding and ship repairing capacities at the Black Sea Fleet to the Germans. And Kuznetsov did not leave the only base for the KBF - Kronstadt.
          The fate of the inland sea fleets is decided on land. And the fleet there on secondary roles - the best anti-ship weapon is the infantry occupying a foreign naval base.
        2. 0
          13 January 2020 18: 22
          Quote: Victor Leningradets
          It was enough just to push the forces you indicated to Helsingfors or Hanko, and OKM would have less ambition to shell the coast.

          Yes, how to say? Even theoretically it would have been possible to deliver our ships to Helsingfors only after the Moscow Armistice, and even then not immediately - that is, the heavy ships of the Baltic Fleet could not fend off the shelling of Klaipeda by any means. And then - KRL Germans would not be scared, but they could always get away from LC. This is if the Finns could even agree on our ships in Helsinki.
          Quote: Victor Leningradets
          And the fact that Kuznetsov during the war brought ships larger than the leader into an unfit state is a very sad fact.

          ??? Sorry, I didn’t understand this
          1. 0
            14 January 2020 10: 44
            To begin with, at the end of the war N.G. Kuznetsov was the People’s Commissar of the Navy - therefore, he was responsible for his combat effectiveness and combat effectiveness of the KBF ships in particular. Shipbuilding and mechanical plants capable of carrying out the necessary repairs were located in Leningrad (which they actually did). Lack of personnel - maneuver at the expense of irrelevant ships and fleets. Could not have foreseen the actions of the Prince and the two Pickpockets? - you do not correspond to the position held with Nach. GMSH!
            Okay, let's say they would have taken the Oktyabrina and the KRL to Helsingfors, the OKM would have been forced to withdraw their units in pairs, otherwise there would be a repeat of La Plata. It was here that it was possible to conduct a strategic operation of the Air Force to destroy two enemy missile defense vehicles by air armies. Such an end fully justifies the means.
            If the MRT was able to "leave" the LK, then the operation to support the ground forces was disrupted, which was required. By the way, it is in vain that you neglect the 180-mm caliber KRL. It is quite fatal for the German MRT.
            1. 0
              15 January 2020 18: 52
              Quote: Victor Leningradets
              To begin with, at the end of the war N.G. Kuznetsov was the People’s Commissar of the Navy - therefore, he was responsible for his combat effectiveness and combat effectiveness of the KBF ships in particular.

              How to ensure the combat effectiveness of ships in the absence of ship repair facilities? Or should Kuznetsov foresee the advance of the Red Army to the line of the Caucasian ridge and the blockade of Leningrad before the war?
              Quote: Victor Leningradets
              Shipbuilding and mechanical plants capable of carrying out the necessary repairs were located in Leningrad (which they actually did).

              В blockade Leningrad after the evacuation.
              Until October 1941, ship repair of ships from EM and higher still worked somehow. And then the problems began: there were no personnel, hunger, there was practically no electricity. The same damaged EM "Watchdog" was first mothballed for a year, and then equipment was assembled for it throughout the city. EMNIP, a set of PUAO was taken from the school where it was training.
              Quote: Victor Leningradets
              It was then that the Air Force could carry out a strategic operation to destroy two enemy SRTs by the forces of the air armies.

              What air armies? The Air Force does not engage in naval targets due to the complete lack of experience and means of destruction. Is it possible to bomb the bases ...
              And after the navy has assigned the navy to the navy, the navy has no opportunity to establish supplies - for the navy was a priority in the war of supplying and equipping equipment. While the Air Force KBF sat within the Leningrad Region, the supply was at the very least poor. But in the Baltic states big problems have already begun.
              Quote: Victor Leningradets
              Lack of personnel - maneuver at the expense of irrelevant ships and fleets.

              What to do with ships? Two years on foot, under enemy fire, with reduced crews, moreover in a blockaded city. It's like a BF in the 20s after the Ice Campaign.
  16. -2
    12 January 2020 17: 05
    [/ quote] The Baltic Fleet has been locked in Leningrad since the beginning of the war. Both banks of the Finnish are in the hands of the enemy! [Quote]


    Well, yes, smart people in the Russian Empire spoke about the absolute hopelessness of the Baltic Fleet even under Alexander 1. But stupid people in the Russian Empire did not believe in this and continued to pump this trap with battleships and frigates, and then with battleships, cruisers, battleships and (!! !) submarines. And in the end we got the cruiser "Aurora", "Oh apple" and "Chicken king". People from the USSR again went on a rake of stupid people from the Republic of Ingushetia and again relied on the Baltic Fleet as the main fleet. And they got the Tallinn passage, "Aisstoss" with beating of ships frozen into the ice by dive bombers, the death of 90% of KBF submarines on mines with a minimum of results. Later, in the 70s, smart people (Gorshkov, Ustinov) took over in the leadership of the USSR, who put cross on the KBF, leaving it symbolically.
    1. 0
      13 January 2020 00: 06
      About "smart people" during the RI - where besides the Baltic and the Black Sea to keep the fleet of the Russian Empire? Shipyards and heavy metalworking industries were concentrated in St. Petersburg. The non-freezing port of Romanov-na-Murom was founded in 1916. Who will defend the capital of Ingushetia from attacks from the sea? - from the British for example? The Black Sea Fleet was located even more "conveniently" to the Mediterranean Sea through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles ... Before the Second World War, during the Soviet era, the Northern Fleet was just beginning to "give birth" as a "reserve airfield". After WWII, with the beginning of the "full-scale cold world war", there was a need and an OPPORTUNITY to create a "full-blooded" Pacific Fleet and Northern Fleet. During the RI, they wanted to create a Pacific Fleet for this and "squeezed" Port-Arthur in 1898, only the railway was built and regular traffic was established on July 1 (14), 1903, excluding the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Transsib was completed on October 5 (18), 1916. As an option for the "protection" of the Baltic during the RI - to include Denmark in the Russian Empire (for example, to "protect" from Germany ...), but the German fleet is still in the Baltic ...
      1. -2
        13 January 2020 03: 31
        Well, smart people in Ingushetia were able to convince Alexander III to remove the fleet from Kronstadt and the marquis puddle and push it forward into clear water. As a result, by the beginning of the twentieth century, a titanic sea fortress-port was erected in Libau, which was not inferior to the best in Europe. Helsinfors was designated as a reserve base. But the "ideals of October" again returned to the marquis puddle with all that it implies. With Murmansk, everything is clear, but what prevented the exadron of the North Ocean from keeping in Arkhangelsk? The British got in the way. their traditional influence at the Russian court was overwhelming, so they did not allow the creation of naval forces in the North, and Kaiser Wilhelm in every possible way squeezed the Russian fleet to the East
        1. +1
          13 January 2020 11: 41
          Quote: Corrie Sanders
          As a result, by the beginning of the twentieth century a titanic sea fortress-port was erected in Libau, which was not inferior to the best in Europe.

          Yeah ... that's just the fleet did not succeed in using it - neither in the WWII, nor in the WWII. Money was literally thrown into the water.
          Quote: Corrie Sanders
          With Murmansk, everything is clear, but what prevented the keeping of the North Ocean’s squadron in Arkhangelsk?

          Lack of squadron icebreakers. Arkhangelsk is a freezing port.
          I felt all the charm of basing the ships on the freezing port of the RIF in the RPE by the example of a wok. smile
  17. +5
    12 January 2020 20: 38
    In fact, the numbers were pretty underestimated. The real standard displacement (it's still how to measure) with cruisers dangled from 11 to 500 tons. And how much was complete, in general no one still knows. The data was classified. But I think that just with full ammunition, all reserves and crew, the ships pulled 11-900 thousand tons easily.

    I don’t know how to remind the authors that all parameters of a ship are determined by standard or normal displacement. Full displacement is his maximum load at which he has not yet drowned. Why moaning about "14-14,5 thousand tons easily" is not clear, with such a load and an armor belt deep in the water and no speed. Fighting is life-threatening. And the indicated 11500 tones fit well into the construction error. Perhaps not accidental, but quite common.

    By the way, I just can't agree with the assessment of the Italians' cruisers as beautiful .. The eyes of the cruiser are his guns! It is no coincidence that they write - looked into the vents .. And here is a terrible construction of the GK called "eyes in a bunch". It is unlikely that any of the authors would choose a bride with such eyes. laughing
    1. +2
      13 January 2020 11: 50
      Quote: Saxahorse
      By the way, I just can't agree with the assessment of the Italians' cruisers as beautiful .. The eyes of the cruiser are his guns! It is no coincidence that they write - looked into the vents .. And here is a terrible construction of the GK called "eyes in a bunch".

      Some of them, the Pomnitsa, switched to individual cradles only on the last pre-war heavy cruiser. Moreover, this somebody even on battleships he put three GK guns in a common cradle. wink
      And nothing - ended the war with an absolute victory at sea.
  18. 0
    13 January 2020 08: 24
    Well, you can resemble and try them in the game, and they are not so hot in the game either.


    1. 0
      14 January 2020 07: 21
      And Gorizia came straight to me :)
  19. 0
    13 January 2020 10: 14
    To all critics of Italian heavy cruisers (certainly not without flaws!) I advise you to compare the number of hits received by Italian heavy cruisers with the number of hits in enemy cruisers. Matapan, of course, does not count.
    Just fights were fought over long distances and did not involve the destruction of the enemy.
    As for the class of heavy cruisers of 10000 tons of standard displacement, it was stillborn from its very appearance, since it excluded the possibility of light armored units participating in decisive artillery combat. As for cruising operations and support of light forces, 12-15 six-inch is much more useful than 8-10 eight-inch.
    In my amateur opinion, the most optimal heavy (or "super-heavy") cruiser is "Alaska", but the speed qualities of these ships leave much to be desired. If it was possible to increase the speed of these ships by a couple of knots, then the Americans would get an ideal heavy cruiser capable of smashing the "Washington" cruisers, supporting the landing forces with fire and, if necessary, fighting battleships at long distances (on retreat, or on the principle " several for one "). At the same time, the total number of such cruisers built instead of the Baltimors would be seven, and taking into account the Alaska and Guam, nine.
    1. 0
      13 January 2020 13: 00
      Do not forget about Algerie i Wichita - these were successful, well-balanced and decently armored ships - especially the first one also with an excellent system of protection against torpedoes
      1. 0
        13 January 2020 13: 51
        Good execution of a worthless plan, alas.
        Set Algerie against Belfast and lose!
        And by versatility and even more so. No, the optimized heir to the linear cruisers with the main caliber of 11 - 12 inches, a standard displacement of the order of 25000 T and a speed of 33 - 34 knots should have become a real heavy cruiser. Board armor - from eight inches at a decisive battle distance, decks - from own caliber to 130 - 150 cab.
        He really could act as a scarecrow against light forces (a battle in Helgoland Bay on 28.08.1914/10000/08.12.1914), against undershots of 31.05.1916 tons each (battle at the Falkland Islands on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX), and, if necessary, wage a fight on the move (Skagerrak XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX g.).
    2. 0
      14 January 2020 07: 24
      I'm afraid you are mistaken. Eight inches is much more useful than six inches, and Alaska, generally speaking, were extremely unsuccessful ships. To raise their speed without a significant increase in displacement is impossible in principle. In addition, large cruisers are too expensive for mass construction, and there must be many cruisers
      1. +1
        14 January 2020 11: 24
        "All that exists - question it." R. Descartes.
        Well, it is generally accepted that "Alaska" and "Guam" are extremely unsuccessful and expensive ships, and you believed it too. For 1945, all US battleships, except for the old chests, are useless and expensive - they have no enemy! And the shore is much better to iron from old dreadnoughts. At the same time (paradox!) “California” is twice as effective as “South Dakota”.
        In fact, in a classic naval battle against Japanese MCTs, it was the "big cruisers" that could confidently act, inflicting fatal damage on the enemy at long and medium distances, while remaining invulnerable. However, the trouble with "Alaska" and "Guam" is the speed of 32 knots against the Japanese 33 -35 knots. By the way, the “Baltimors” with the move is no better. The increase in displacement of the "Alaska" by 3000 tons makes it possible to place a power plant with a capacity of 200 hp, which provides 000 knots. At cost, one "Alaska" is cheaper than two "Baltimors".
        The real rate of fire of the cruising six-inch machines was one and a half times higher than that of the eight-inch machines, and the number of barrels for 10000 T cruisers also differs by one and a half times. And on the effectiveness of six-inch machines against the MRT, exhaustive experimental data were obtained during the battle at La Plata on 13.12.1939/08.04.1940/31.12.1942, the "Weserubung" operation on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX and the "New Year's shame" on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX.
        1. +4
          15 January 2020 23: 24
          Victor, I'm sorry to disappoint you, but the Alaska is really a bad cruiser, and not because someone said something like that. Alaska is a poor cruiser for a variety of reasons.
          As you yourself noted, it is very expensive. Baltimore cost about $ 39,3 million, and Guam (second Alaska) $ 74 million. Thus, Alaska alone cost almost 2 good conventional 203 mm TKR of increased displacement. But, unlike the 2 Baltimore, Alaska could not be in two places at the same time. This is the first, and very serious minus.
          The second minus. The main enemy of the ships at that time was still aviation, and not enemy ships. But the Alaskan air defense system was practically no different from what it was placed on the Baltimore, that is, putting the Alaska aircraft carrier or transport group of ships (vessels) on guard, instead of the Baltimore pair, we double in air defense.
          The third minus. Combat survivability. “Alasok” was useless for the ship of its displacement PTZ - payment for speed. In fact, the protection against torpedoes was not much different from Baltimore. That is, it turned out this way: if Alaska, guarding the convoy, is attacked from the air, then its air defense is twice as bad as 2 Baltimore, and the chances of seizing a torpedo in one attack are probably even greater, because the cruiser is longer and, most likely, less agile . And hitting aviatorpedi almost guaranteed puts Alaska out of action, while the convoy remains unprotected.
          If the convoy is guarded by two Baltimore, then a torpedo hit in one of them weakens the protection of the convoy by half - but not to zero. And the chances of surviving a torpedo strike while maintaining combat capability are in Iowa, but not in Alaska.
          That is, in terms of air defense, 2 Baltimore is noticeably better than Alaska alone.
          Further. You talk about the fight at a long or medium distance with the TKR of Japan and believe that Alaska will have an overwhelming advantage in it - especially if you add speed to it. Alas, everything here is also not as straightforward as we would like.
          Firstly, if Alaska is almost 2 Baltimore in value, then its battle should be considered not against one, but against 2 Japanese TCRs. And here everything is already completely not so clear, because, although at a great distance the citadel and artillery of Alaska is quite well protected, its armored extremities and KDP may well be hit. Of course, 305-mm suitcases are a force, they are capable of causing serious damage to the TKR without even getting into them, and tearing next to them, but 1-2 successful hits of a 203-mm in the nose or stern of Alaska are quite capable of slowing it down, or incapacitate the directors of the OMS and in that case she will not be able to continue an effective battle. And then night will come, and the Japanese TKR will return.
          In a night battle against the Japanese, ships like Alaska had a chance only at the end of the war, when very good fire control radars appeared. But the question is that in this case, Baltimore will cope no worse, or even better. Just because in a night battle not only the weight of an individual shell matters, but also the rate of fire and the number of guns. So, for example, the 152 mm cruiser coped with the Japanese destroyers significantly better than the 203 mm. But the 152 mm cruisers could not really fight with the Japanese TKR over a long distance in the afternoon, so the 203 mm looked like a reasonable compromise. But Alaska, with its 9 * 305 mm in night combat, is far less effective than a pair of Baltimore with 18 203 mm.
          And finally, the operational-tactical issue. Do not forget that, in addition to TKR, the Japanese had 4 battle cruisers of the Congo type, which they actively used for risky operations. So, “Alaska” in terms of armor and weapons is roughly equivalent to “Congo”, a long-distance battle can happen very differently, but ceteris paribus, if Alaska wins, it will obviously suffer heavy damage.
          1. +4
            15 January 2020 23: 27
            On the other hand, for a battleship such as "Iowa", "Congo" is a legitimate game. Booking "Iowa" well protected from 356-mm shells (but not higher), and its 406-mm shells did not leave the Japanese LCR a single chance. At the same time, the cost of battleships of the Iowa type ranged from 100 to 114 million dollars. Accepting an average cost of 107 million dollars, we understand that for the cost of 3 Alaska you can build 2 Iowa and there will still be money!
            In other words, oddly enough, in most combat situations (night fighting, repelling the attacks of destroyers and aircraft), the Baltimore pair has an advantage over Alaska, while the Alaskan advantage over the Baltimore pair in the daytime classic battle, although there is, but not absolutely, a combination of battleships Iowa + TK Baltimore makes Alaska simply not needed for the US Navy.
            I can’t even imagine how in your mind the battle of La Plata and, especially, the Weserubung demonstrated the advantage of 152 mm guns over 203 mm. As for the New Year’s battle, here 2 British cruisers (each of which was inferior in terms of cost to the TKR) were able to achieve surprise in the attack and achieved a “golden hit” - at the time of Hipper’s turn, the shell hit the exposed waterline and damaged the boiler room. The Hipper retreated, although it could well continue the battle. That is, his only serious damage, in essence, is luck, and the retreat is the admiral's decision, and not a necessity.
            The advantage of the 152 mm caliber is night battle, reflection of destroyer attacks. The disadvantage is that there is too much dispersion at distances under 100 cables, that is, in the daytime battle at a long distance of the KRL with 152 mm guns - the victim. It has been proven repeatedly - here you can remember the battle in the Java Sea, and the actions of the English 152-mm cruisers, which at a great distance sharply lost accuracy.
            1. 0
              16 January 2020 13: 09
              Thanks for the informative answer.
              I have never argued that Alaska does not match the defense of a fight with Congo or Repals. But against the Japanese MCTs, it is overbooked. And the fight at medium and long distance was prescribed for her not because of the Japanese eight-inches, but because of their "long spears". Here lies the main trouble of "Alaska" with its parade speed of 31,76 knots at rated power - they simply could not control the distance!
              About air defense and convoys - it is not the business of the KRT to replace the Atlanta and Clevelands, but I agree that 16 - 20 barrels in the Mk-12 installations are necessary for such ships.
              The battle with Japanese cruisers looks exactly as you defined: "two by four". Here the main advantage of "Alaska" over "Takao" is better accuracy, both due to the flatness of the heavier shell, and due to the more stable artillery platform. And ask Exeter about the striking effect, he had the good fortune to get a 300-kg suitcase from La Plata!
              We won't talk about aviation at all - ships against ships or fleet against fleet, and then - "Mariana turkey hunt".
              About a battle with a battleship (two on one) - if "Rodina ordered", otherwise it is dangerous, but not hopeless. Especially against the modernized old people. The distance is long, the armor-piercing shell is dangerous even for the Bismarck. Again, the superiority of fire in rate of fire - for the "Alaska".
              The main thing is to consider the "Alaska" just heavy cruisers, and not "nedolinkers" with all the consequences: there is nothing to be afraid of losing a heavy cruiser! We must fight.
              About eight and six inches, you are right about 100 cabs, although only the Germans fired decently at long distances. But it is worth letting the enemy come closer and everyone - the Khan to the cardboard "Washingtonian" - will be bombarded with shells and finished off with torpedoes.
              And about the "Congo" ... Modernized "not there". Nine long-range ten-inch machines and a 33-knot speed, plus adequate air defense, that was what was needed.
              1. 0
                16 January 2020 15: 51
                I will add that at long distances (the beginning of the battle), a hail of eight-inch shells is impossible due to the difficulties with adjusting the fire and the huge dispersion when firing mounted fire with light shells. By the way, Soviet sailors and shipbuilders did not understand this, who hung the projected battleships with armor all over the side. And the destruction of ships in the style of battle at Guadalcanal and the shooting of the Bismarck are possible only from medium and close distances. So, theoretically, the battle between two "Alaska" and four "Takao" would rather resemble the destruction of the Spee squadron on 08.12.1914/XNUMX/XNUMX. However, most likely the practical Japanese would divide the forces into a "cover" group and a "rescue" group and get off with the loss of two ships of four.
  20. 0
    13 January 2020 10: 48
    At about 22 p.m., the British discovered a cruiser and opened artillery fire at 22 p.m. All three British battleships fired at Zara: Worthspite, Valiant and Barham.
    The British always knew how to shoot. Therefore, after just a few minutes, the 381-mm Zara guns caught in the exact fire burned like a dawn.

    ABK was especially impressed by the remark of the battleship commander, a former artilleryman: “Great God! But we hit! ”Immediately after the battle, he ordered that expression be written down in case he needed to wipe his nose at the artillery school of the fleet.
    smile
    In fact, it is very difficult to miss, firing almost direct fire at a “pistol” distance - from “Worspite” to “Fiume”, which was walking next to the “Zara”, there were only 15 cables.
    The Worspite and Valiant simultaneously fired on the Fiume from 15 "guns. The distance to the target was 2900 yards for the Worspite and 4000 yards for the Valiant.
  21. +1
    13 January 2020 10: 58
    Italian architects had their own style.
  22. 0
    13 January 2020 12: 54
    It was believed that booking heavy cruisers of the Zara type was able to withstand armor-piercing 203 mm British shells in the range from 65 to 125 cable (from 12 to 23 km). But the war made some adjustments.


    I absolutely do not understand this sentence. During the war, none of the cruisers received a blow from the British 203 mm cannons, so it is not known whether they were really capable of withstanding armor-piercing 203 mm British shells in the range from 65 to 125 cable. the war did not make even the slightest correction in this matter.
  23. 0
    13 January 2020 17: 22
    for some reason (translated from Italian - by sloppiness)

    And they say that there was order during the Duce. And the trains went on schedule, and the mafia was pressed to the nail.
    1. +1
      13 January 2020 18: 39
      Quote: Narak-zempo
      And they say that there was order during the Duce. And the trains went on schedule, and the mafia was pressed to the nail.

      So ... to the campaign the power of Duce ended in a sea surf. smile
      However, in other states with "order" the naval ones chipped off better than the Italian ones. One "New Year's fight" is worth it - when the Panzershiff, brought directly to the KON (distance of about 30 cables), instead of destroying the "naked" ships (the entire escort drew the "Hipper" - as planned) began to maneuver to provide better visibility - and maneuver to breaking contact with the escort and going straight to his escort. Oh, yes, the Panzershiff did start shooting at KON, but only after the distance increased by one and a half times - and led it so accurately that he never hit. smile

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