The poor choice of Admiral Nebogatov

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The poor choice of Admiral Nebogatov

A truly honest person should prefer to himself - family, family - fatherland, fatherland - humanity.
Jean Leron d'Alembert


If there is among our naval officers who participated in the Russo-Japanese War a man whose ambiguity of actions could compete with the ambiguity of the actions of Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky, then this is certainly Rear Admiral Nebogatov. Any discussion of the events connected with his name that took place in the Sea of ​​Japan on the 14th and especially on the 15th of May 1905 will certainly bring to life their literally polar assessments.



This article presents the quintessences of both points of view with the subsequent attempt to critically analyze the facts underlying each of them.


Career N.I. Nebogatova before the Russo-Japanese War


Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov was born in 1849.

At the age of twenty, he graduated from the Naval College and began his long service on the ships of the Russian Imperial fleet.

In 1882, Lieutenant N. I. Nebogatov was appointed to the post of senior clipper officer "Robber". Two years later, this ship made the transition to the Far East, where it cruised in the vast space between Chukotka and China until 1887. N.I. Nebogatov showed himself excellently during this long and difficult service, for which he was awarded the next rank of captain of the second rank.

In 1888, Nikolai Ivanovich was appointed commander of the gunboat "Thunderstorm", which, after only five months, was replaced by the same type "Grad". The future admiral received the first experience of independent command on these ships, which are already quite old and have increased their combat importance.

Three years later, Nebogatov was appointed commander of the cruiser of the second rank "Cruiser". It is curious that Z. P. Rozhestvensky was the predecessor of Nikolai Ivanovich in this post.

At the end of 1895, N. I. Nebogatov was promoted to the rank of captain of the first rank, after which he was transferred to the headquarters post in the Practical Squadron of the Baltic Sea. But after spending a short time on it, he again received command of a ship - the armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, on which he spent another three years sailing between the Far Eastern ports of Russia, Korea, Japan and China.


In 1901, N. I. Nebogatov, who was in the position of assistant chief of the Training and Artillery Unit of the Baltic Fleet, was promoted to Rear Admiral's rank "for distinction in service." In fact, this wording meant that Nikolai Ivanovich had at least four years of experience in commanding a ship of the first rank and served the required time in the previous rank. That is, on the one hand, N.I. Nebogatov was not marked by any exceptional “distinction” for receiving promotion, and on the other, one could hardly expect outstanding achievements in peacetime, as well as from most other officers.

Since 1903, Rear Admiral Nebogatov served as the head of the Training Division of the Black Sea Fleet, from where he was called to Libau in the fall of 1904 to monitor the preparations for the Third Pacific Squadron.

Appointment to office


Studying the question of the appointment of N. I. Nebogatov to the post of commander of the Separate Squadron of the Third Squadron, the author was confronted with remarkable ambiguity.

Thus, in the testimony of Admiral Nebogatov himself, it was stated that until January 28, 1905, he “did not consider himself the head of this detachment, since Admiral Avelan, the manager of the Naval Ministry, entrusted me only with monitoring the manufacture of this detachment, adding that he was currently electing the chief ... "

At the same time in work Historical the commission was told that the rear admiral was appointed on December 14, 1904, and three days earlier Nebogatov already participated in a meeting chaired by the Admiral, during which, among other things, he reported on his plan for sailing the detachment from Libava to Batavia, reported wishes regarding the manning of ships with coal reserves and discussed other issues that, it would seem, should have little to do with a person who had no intention of leading the outgoing unit.

Navigation of a Separate detachment before joining Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s squadron


Be that as it may, it is reliably known that on the morning of February 3, 1905, a separate detachment left Russia under the flag of Rear Admiral Nebogatov. There were few warships in it: the battleship Nicholas I, three coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Ushakov type, the armored cruiser Vladimir Monomakh, and the Rus cruiser. In addition, the squad included several transports, hospital and sump steamers.

Proceeding through the Baltic and North Seas, as well as the eastern part of the Atlantic, the ships of Admiral Nebogatov passed the Strait of Gibraltar, passed the Mediterranean Sea and reached the shores of the Suez Canal by March 12.


Having successfully overcome this narrowness and made the transition through the Red Sea, they ended up in the Gulf of Aden, where on March 28 the first artillery exercises of the detachment took place.

Shooting was conducted at shields from distances of 40 to 50 cable and their results were not very encouraging: not a single shield was drowned, and there was almost no damage to them.

Such results were, in general, a logical consequence of the fact that the teams of the Separate Detachment were, by definition of Nikolai Ivanovich, "rabble from all crews, ports and fleets ... sick, weak, fined, and even politically restless people ...". Many artillerymen called up from the reserve for the first time saw modern guns and optical sights only on their new ships.

In addition, significant errors were identified that arise when measuring distances to a target using rangefinders installed on ships. By order of the commander, all range finders were reconciled, and additional classes were conducted with the sailors serving them.

The second (and last) firing took place on April 11th. Thanks to the measures taken with respect to rangefinders, as well as additional “theoretical” exercises with commandants, their performance was significantly better: of the five shields launched into the water, two were sunk and two were badly damaged.

In addition to artillery exercises, the admiral paid considerable attention to the classes "in mine, navigational and mechanical specialties." In particular, during these studies, N. I. Nebogatov taught the vessels of his detachment to sail in the wake of a column at night without lights.

Of course, two and a half months, during which the independent sailing of the Separate detachment continued, was not enough time to develop all the necessary skills from the crews of the ships. Admiral Nebogatov himself was fully aware of this, asserting that even "enhanced combat training did not make it possible to prepare a team in combat as required by the combat experience of the enemy." At the same time, if any other naval commander had been in place of Nikolai Ivanovich, he would hardly have done more.

Joining the squadron of Admiral Rozhdestvensky


During almost his entire independent voyage, Rear Admiral Nebogatov did not have accurate information about the plans of Admiral Rozhdestvensky and therefore did not know whether their connections would follow to Vladivostok jointly or separately.

In case the events began to develop according to the second scenario, the commander of the Separate detachment formed the following plan.

“... having entered the Pacific Ocean, south of Formosa, bypassing the eastern side of Japan, keeping at least 200 miles from it, enter the Sea of ​​Okhotsk by one of the passages between the Kuril Islands and further, under the cover of very dense fogs prevailing at this time of year , through the Laperuzov Strait to reach Vladivostok. The detachment had very large coal reserves in transport, favorable weather at that time in the Pacific Ocean, the already established experience of loading coal from transports to the ocean, the possibility of towing small battleships by transport - all these circumstances allowed me to look at this plan for achieving Vladivostok very likely to be executed , especially since I was convinced that the entire Japanese fleet would not decide to cruise at this time in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, due to the danger of swimming in these waters, and in addition, it would need to be protected maritime traffic with Japan's Kwantung Peninsula, this last consideration allowed me to hope for the worst case in the La Perouse Strait meet only part of the Japanese fleet and that do not consist of the best ships.
My repeated sailings in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and my acquaintance with them about the conditions for swimming in these waters gave me hope to safely lead a detachment to Vladivostok ... "


It should be noted that the plan was developed by Rear Admiral Nebogatov together with the officers of his headquarters, who together with him believed it was possible to reach Vladivostok only by following the route indicated above.

However, these ideas did not happen, because on April 26, 1905 a separate detachment met with the Second Squadron and ceased to exist as an independent unit; Rear Admiral Nebogatov at the same time became the junior flagship - the commander of the Third Armored Detachment, which included the battleship Nicholas I and three coastal defense battleships: Ushakov, Senyavin and Apraksin.


In the course of the personal meeting of the admirals Z. P. Rozhestvensky on the same day, he did not show the slightest interest in the thoughts of Nikolai Ivanovich on how best to follow to Vladivostok. This manifested the true democracy of Zinovy ​​Petrovich, because in exactly the same way he treated the thoughts of almost all his subordinates. Urging N.I. Nebogatov to study all previously issued orders on the squadron, Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky finished the half-hour audience and no longer saw his interlocutor for almost three months, until they met in Japanese captivity.

Of course, from the point of view of universal values, it is difficult to understand why Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not consider it necessary to devote at least a couple of hours to depicting N. I. Nebogatov his general vision of the upcoming battle, the tactics that the Russian ships should adhere to, and the role of the detachment Nikolai Ivanovich.

According to the author, there are two reasons for explaining the laconicism of the commander.

First, Zinovy ​​Petrovich had no clearly formulated plan, and he, accordingly, could not tell him.

Secondly, the vessels of Nebogatov seemed to Admiral Rozhdestvensky only as “rot”, weakening, and not strengthening, the squadron, and therefore he apparently considered it inadvisable to spend time discussing how the ships of no military value would operate.

However, it would be unfair to assert that Zinovy ​​Petrovich had forgotten about the existence of the Third Armored Detachment immediately after its accession to the squadron. On the contrary, according to his testimony, “for the thirteen-day voyage, together with the detachment of Rear Admiral Nebogatov, he kept this detachment for 10 days in the squadron’s castle in the front line and, despite continuous persistent demands for all this time, could not get this detachment order close to the ranks. "

It should be noted that being on the Suvorov, which was about four kilometers ahead of Nebogatov’s detachment, Zinovy ​​Petrovich could hardly objectively evaluate the intervals between his ships and the harmony of their evolutions - for this it was more logical to take a position on the beam of the Third detachment but, as we know, the squadron commander did not.

Taking into account the fact that the movement in the front formation for a long time, in principle, is significantly more difficult for connecting ships, than the movement in the wake formation, it is difficult to see in this “teaching” Admiral Rozhdestvensky anything other than the desire to drill out the recently joined detachment and show it to the commander that he should first of all focus on eliminating the shortcomings in the combat training of his ships, and not on elaborating initiatives on the further movement of the squadron.

Way to Tsushima


On May 1, 1905, Russian ships left the Vietnamese bay of Qua Be and headed for the Japanese islands.

Over the next two weeks, their swimming was generally quite calm, but still there were several episodes that deserved attention.

On May 2, rangefinding exercises were held, which showed that the errors in determining distances by the rangefinders of the same ship can reach ten or more cable (1,8 kilometers). In the order for the squadron, Admiral Rozhestvensky stated that "the rangefinder ... on the eve of the battle is in utter negligence" and added to it instructions that should improve the situation. This instruction in general copied the one that had previously been developed by the headquarters of Rear Admiral Nebogatov for his detachment, “but with the addition that destroyed all its significance” (from the testimony of Captain Cross rank II).

On May 10, after a long illness, the commander of the Second Armored Detachment, Rear Admiral D. G. Felkersam, died. Considering that the news of his death could negatively affect the morale of the personnel, Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not announce this event by squadron and did not even consider it necessary to inform the remaining admirals - N. I. Nebogatov and O. A. Enquist . The powers of the commander of the Second Armored Detachment passed to the commander of the battleship "Oslyabya", captain of the first rank V. I. Baer.


On the same day, coastal battleships of Rear Admiral Nebogatov’s detachment received coal from transports. According to the testimony of Nikolai Ivanovich, he believed that it would be enough to take 400 tons per ship, which he informed Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky. Being a very consistent person, in particular, in eradicating the incitement to independence in his subordinates, Zinovy ​​Petrovich replied: “To the chief of the Third armored squad to teach his ships to accept 500 tons of coal.”

On May 12, six transports were separated from the squadron and sent to Wuzung, where they arrived in the evening of the same day. Their appearance in the raid was reported to the Commander of the United Fleet of Japan, Admiral Kheitahiro Togo, on the basis of which he reasonably suggested that the Russian ships would try to pass to the Vladivostok through the Korean Channel.

On May 13, already at a distance of less than one day's transition from the throat of the Korean Strait, Admiral Rozhestvensky decided to conduct educational evolution, the first since the joining of the detachment of N. I. Nebogatov. These evolutions lasted a total of about five hours and passed, “rather sluggish” and “rather unsettled” (from the work of the Historical Commission).

One of the reasons for the "lethargy" of the maneuvers made by the detachments was the complexity and complexity of the flag signals, with the help of which the flagship gave them orders to perform certain actions.

So, for example, Rear Admiral N. I. Nebogatov in his testimony reported that “at the same time 5 signals were raised that indicated what to do for each detachment, for example: II detachment to do this, I’m that, III -mu, cruisers, transports, etc .; since all these considerations of the admiral appeared before our eyes for the first time, reading, assimilating and understanding the goals of each movement required a considerable amount of time, and, naturally, sometimes there were misunderstandings that needed to be clarified, and therefore these evolutions were executed very slowly and unsettledly, which , in turn, caused additional instructions of the admiral; in a word, all these evolutions were carried out in such a natural way as any business that is conducted for the first time, without any preliminary preparation ... ”

Zinovy ​​Petrovich was extremely dissatisfied with the maneuvers, in connection with which he even expressed a signal of his dissatisfaction with the Second and Third armored units. However, the commander refrained from commenting in some detail on what their mistakes were and what, in his opinion, was the desired course of action. Therefore, we can confidently say that, if Admiral Rozhestvensky thought about it, repeating exactly the same evolutions the next day, they would have proceeded as "sluggishly" and "out of tune" as the day before.

On the night of May 13-14, a Russian squadron consisting of 12 armored ships, 9 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 4 transports, 2 hospital and 2 auxiliary vessels (a total of 38 vessels) entered the Korea Strait and began to advance to its eastern arm with the goal of passing between Tsushima Island and the west coast of Japan to Vladivostok, to which a little more than 600 miles remained.

Day fight May 14


A whole book can be written about the Tsushima battle. And not even one. And if each of them is based on the testimonies of different participants in the battle, the content of the books will differ significantly. Moreover, it is obvious that the inconsistency of the testimony is mainly due not to the pathological deceitfulness of the people who gave them, but to the fact that in the heat of battle these people could not calmly concentrate on objective observation of the events. The flagstur of the headquarters of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, captain of the second rank V. I. Semenov, wrote about this in his book "Payback":
“... from personal experience I could be convinced (and repeatedly) how deceptive“ memories ”were ... More than once, re-reading my own notes, I ... incriminated myself, found that a very definite idea of ​​the details of this or that moment was obviously created under the influence of ... stories heard subsequently, was in conflict with the recording made "at the time of the commission" ... "


Without claiming to be the ultimate truth, the author of this article invites the reader to familiarize himself with his view of the general course of events on May 14th, as well as how the ships of the Third Armored Detachment acted during and after the battle, and his commander.

At about 7 o’clock in the morning, the cruiser Izumi was seen marching from our ships along a parallel course. It became obvious that the location of the squadron was disclosed, and even the hypothetical possibility to go to Vladivostok without a fight no longer remained.

At 12:05 from the flagship battleship "Suvorov" a signal was made to lie down on the course NO 23º.

At 12:20 - 12:30, realizing the complex tactical plan of Admiral Rozhestvensky, the Russian main forces lined up in two parallel wake columns: four newest battleships - “Suvorov”, “Alexander III”, “Borodino and“ Eagle ”- in the right column and eight other ships - Oslyabya, Sisoy the Great, Navarin, Nakhimov, Nikolay, Senyavin, Apraksin, Ushakov - in the left.

Initially, the distance between the columns was about 8 cable, but then, obviously, due to a slight discrepancy in their courses, it began to increase and, after 45 minutes, probably reached 12-15 cable. Around this time, from the battleship Suvorov, and then from other ships, the main forces of the Japanese were opened, following almost perpendicular to the course of our squadron from the southeast to northwest.

At 13:20, Admiral Rozhestvensky decided to rebuild his ships in one column, for which the ships of the First Armored Detachment headed by him were given a signal to increase their speed to 11 knots and lean to the left.

Assuming that the distance between the columns of his armadillos is 8 cable, Admiral Rozhestvensky, applying the Pythagorean theorem, calculated that by 13:49 the lead ship of the right column - “Suvorov” - should be ahead of the lead ship of the left column - “Oslyabya” - by 10.7 cable which was enough for the rest of the battleships of the First Detachment to take their places between them, given the four two-cable intervals between the matelots and the two cable lengths of the total length of the three hulls of the Borodino-type ships.

However, since the true interval between the wake columns of our ships was significantly greater (12-15 cable ones, as already mentioned), the distance from Suvorov to Oslyabya calculated at the same theorem at 13:49 was not 10.7, but only 8.9-9.5 cable.


Therefore, when the Suvorov embarked on the same course as the Second Armored Troop, the fourth ship of the right column, the Eagle, was only a little ahead of the right traverse of the battleship Oslyabya. The latter, in order to avoid a collision, "almost stalled the car, which instantly caused crowding of the battleships of the Second detachment and the failure of the terminal ones" (from the testimony of the second-rank captain Ivkov, senior officer of the battleship "Sisoy Veliky", rear assault ship "Oslyabya").

Thus, the rebuilding undertaken by Zinovy ​​Petrovich led to the fact that four Borodino-type battleships led the main forces and continued to move at a speed of NO 23º at a speed of 9 knots, and the ships of the Second and Third Squads dragged them away from them and upset their wake.

During the time taken by the evolution described above, the Japanese battleships, having made a series of two left turns “sequentially”, laid down on a course converging with the course of the Russian squadron.


Passing through the point of the last turn, the enemy ships first fired at the battleship Oslyabya, which was the closest, largest and also sedentary target, and then concentrated their fire on the ships of the First armored squad, primarily its flagship, the battleship Suvorov . Using a significant advantage in speed, the Japanese convoy was able to quickly advance and occupy a position relative to the Russian system, which allowed it to “press on the enemy’s head units” (from the report of Admiral Togo), while remaining an extremely inconvenient target for the Second and Third armored detachments, forced to shoot at close to maximum range and not having the ability to fire all overboard.

In this regard, the ships of Admiral Nebogatov were in the worst position, because, firstly, they were farthest from the enemy, and, secondly, because the obsolete guns of the battleship Nicholas I could not shoot at a distance of over 45 cable, from - for which he was able to open fire on the Japanese only five minutes after the start of the battle.

Nevertheless, even at such a disadvantage, the vessels of the Third Armored Detachment were able to achieve a number of hits in the enemy armored cruisers, in particular Asamu and Izumo.

At the end of the first half hour of battle, the battleship Oslyabya, which received critical damage in the bow and had a strong roll to the port side, lost control and rolled out of the wake column of our ships. Twenty minutes later, a badly beaten ship went down.

At 14:26, the flagship battleship Suvorov ceased to obey the helm. Because of this, he began a sharp circulation to the right and, having completed a complete turn, cut through the formation of the Second Armadillo Detachment, passing between the battleships Sisa the Great and Navarin, and the latter had to reduce the course to avoid a collision and describe the coordinate to the right. This led to the fact that the line of our armored ships stretched even further and “upset”. Thus, the assertion that the Third Armored Detachment strongly pulled away from the lead ships (as, for example, Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky and captain of the second rank Semenov spoke in their testimony) is true, but it must be borne in mind that this did not happen at will its commander, and due to objective events that occurred in the initial phase of the battle.

Those who believe that the main reason for the “delay” was N. I. Nebogatov’s personal cowardice, it probably makes sense to recall that Nikolai Ivanovich spent the whole battle on the bridge of the “Nicholas I” sailing under the admiral’s flag, and then looked at the diagram damage to this battleship.

It is doubtful that a cowardly person would have had the courage to spend several hours in one of the most dangerous places on the ship and at the same time, “to set an example of rare courage by personal courage” (from the testimony of the ensign on the sea side, A. N. Shamie).


After the failure of the Suvorov, the squadron was led by Alexander III, but, having held the lead for only fifteen minutes, also left the system, after which Borodino took his place.

By no means diminishing the prowess and dedication of the crew of this ship, we note that over the next four hours, while he was the first in the column of our battleships, all of their evolution was reduced to the indecisive evasion of the Japanese pushing on the head guns and easily predictable attempts to break into northeast during those periods of the battle, when the enemy lost contact with them due to fog and smoke.

Rear Admiral Nebogatov, who had clearly seen Oslyabya’s death and the helpless position of Suvorov, made no attempt to lead the squadron and give its course of action a more focused character, although, according to senior flag officer Lieutenant Sergeyev, he wondered “why are we all spinning in one place and make it easy to shoot ourselves. ”

Oddly enough, from a formal point of view, the passive behavior of Nikolai Ivanovich was quite consistent with the order of the squadron commander No. 243 dated 10.05.1905/XNUMX/XNUMX (... if the Suvorov is damaged and unable to control, the fleet should follow the Alexander, if the Alexander is damaged - for Borodino ...), which incidentally convinces little of his consistent critics who believe that the real naval commander in that situation should not be guided by the letter of a written order, but by the spirit of the unfolding battle, which urged a more active exercise leniyu actions of the Russian ships.


According to the author of this article, Rear Admiral Nebogatov could probably violate the order of Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky, but only if he was sure that the latter would approve such initiative. And this confidence, in turn, could come to him only if their relations as a whole were harmonious and trusting. However, taking into account the number of episodes already mentioned that occurred during the joint voyages of the admirals on the eve of the battle, their relationship could hardly be characterized by such definitions.

Therefore, it is not at all surprising that N. I. Nebogatov chose to refrain from any manifestation of initiative, while the situation generally fit into the framework of the order he had received earlier.

Transfer of command to Rear Admiral Nebogatov. Night from May 14th to May 15th


At about 15 p.m., Admiral Rozhestvensky, wounded in the head and back, left the conning tower of the battleship Suvorov and went to the right middle tower of the six-inch guns, where, according to him, “he lost consciousness, then came to himself, however he was not aware of what was going on time. "

Despite the fact that at that moment the commander of the squadron was obviously no longer able to control the actions of his ships, the officers of his headquarters did not realize this and made no attempt to inform Admiral Nebogatov of the need to take over command.

Between approximately 17 p.m. and 00 p.m., the destroyer Buyniy, which had heavily banked the flagship armadillo, was able to approach, which removed Admiral Rozhestvensky, seven officers and fifteen lower ranks from Suvorov.

Finding themselves in a relatively safe environment at Buiny, the staff officers finally realized that the admiral who was falling into unconsciousness from time to time could not lead the squadron and therefore it was necessary to raise the issue of transferring command.

At the same time, curiously, the captain, who spoke with Zinovy ​​Petrovich, captain of the first rank, Klapier-de-Colong, in his testimony of the Investigative Commission, said that “... the admiral, not being able to continue to command the squadron because of heavy wounds, ordered to signal destroyer "Violent":
“I transfer command to Admiral Nebogatov” ... ”, and at the court hearing on the case of the surrender of the destroyer“ Bedovy ”, he (Kolong) stated that“ ... whether the admiral himself ordered the transfer of command to Admiral Nebogatov, he does not remember well ... ”


Be that as it may, at about 18 p.m. the signal “Admiral transfers command to Admiral Nebogatov” was raised on the mast of the “Buiny”, and it was correctly dismantled and rehearsed by all the ships of the squadron ... except for those that were part of the Third Armored Detachment.

The officers of Nikolai, Apraksin and Senyavin almost unanimously showed that they had not seen the signal of the transfer of command and only heard a voice message from the destroyer Impeccable that the commander ordered to go to Vladivostok.

What exactly they shouted from the “Impeccable”, it is not possible to find out, since this ship died along with all its crew on the night of May 14th to 15th.

As for the undetected flag signals shown by the Riot and other vessels, the testimony of the senior officer of Nicholas I, the captain of the second rank Vedernikov, is quite interesting in this sense: "... the signal was seen on Anadyr -" Is Admiral Nebogatov known " . In view of the proximity in alphabetical order of the word “Known” with the word “Command”, it seems to me that there was no mistake in any letter of the signal ... ” Moreover, according to the report of the Anadyr commander, captain of the second rank Ponomarev, he, of course, “rehearsed a signal raised by one of the destroyers:“ The admiral passes the command to Admiral Nebogatov ... ”

In general, on the one hand, it is difficult to assume that N. I. Nebogatov and other officers of the Third Armored Detachment did not notice the signal about the transfer of command inadvertently. And, on the other hand, if the signal on Nikolai was nevertheless seen and correctly dismantled, it is no less difficult to admit the idea that Nikolai Ivanovich managed to persuade all the people who knew about this (not only officers, but also lower ranks, whom there were several hundred) to hide this information and give very close in meaning false testimony both when answering questions of the Investigative Commission and during court hearings in the case of surrender.

According to Rear Admiral Nebogatov himself, he “about five o’clock in the evening, not seeing the orders of the Squadron Commander, ... decided to take a course of NO 23 °, indicated before the battle and leading to Vladivostok ...” At that time, on his order, the battleship “Nikolai I” began to move forward relative to the wake convoy of Russian ships and after about two hours led it.

At 19:15, the main forces of the Japanese turned away to the east and retreated, providing an opportunity to attack our ships with their destroyers.

Theoretically, the main load on protecting the squadron from mine attacks was to lie with a detachment of cruisers, but he, obeying the order of his commander, Rear Admiral Enquist, left the main forces and, having developed the maximum speed, headed south.

Thus, the Russian battleships were left to their own devices. To increase their chances of survival, Admiral Nebogatov ordered to increase the speed to 12 knots and make a turn to the south-west in order to transfer the attacking destroyers from the right cannonball to the right shell of the system and thereby force them to catch up with their ships, and Do not move towards them.

There is an opinion that before giving such orders, Nikolai Ivanovich had to find out the condition of all the ships under his command (of which, after the deaths of Oslyaby, Alexander, Borodino and Suvorov, eight more remained), and navigate the choice of speed on the most damaged and slowest of them. But he cowardly preferred to move at the highest possible speed for his ship than condemned the battleships that had received the battle to certain death.

This point of view seems erroneous for at least two reasons.

1. Taking into account how much the masts of a number of Russian armadillos ("Eagle", "Sisoy", "Navarina") were severely damaged, it was hardly possible to find out their condition by exchanging flag signals with them. The light signaling was mastered so poorly on the squadron that the ships had difficulty even recognizing each other's callsigns, so there was no need to think about more complex signals.

2. Even if NI Nebogatov could find out the condition of the battleships remaining in service and learn, for example, that the “Admiral Ushakov”, due to a hole in the bow, is not able to develop a move of more than 9 knots, it still shouldn’t cost him to limit the speed of the entire detachment, since in this case it would be much easier to detect both by the destroyers attacking it, and by the main forces of the Japanese (after dawn), which would rather increase rather than reduce losses.

Thus, if anything can be blamed on Rear Admiral Nebogatov, it is that he did not assign any ships any rendezvous point at which they could assemble the next day. However, in practice this would not have changed much, since all the battleships of the Second Detachment, who survived the daytime battle on May 14, were extremely unsuccessful in repelling night attacks: they betrayed their position with the help of searchlights and gunshots, and therefore became light targets for destroyers of the enemy. As a result, the Navarin, Sisoy the Great and Admiral Nakhimov received extensive holes from the torpedoes that hit them and sank, so that none of these ships would have anyway joined N.I. Nebogatov’s detachment in the morning. At the same time, one cannot but pay attention to the fact that the tactics of repelling mine attacks, which led to such tragic consequences, were introduced in agreement with Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky, who paid much attention and time to practicing it during the long parking of the squadron.

The morning of May 15th. Surrender to the Japanese


By dawn on May 15, only five vessels remained in the squad under the command of Rear Admiral Nebogatov: the flagship Nicholas I, coastal defense battleships General Admiral Apraksin and Admiral Senyavin, battleship Orel and the cruiser Emerald ".

At about six in the morning, the detachment was opened by Japanese ships. In fact, at that moment all Russian sailors (and N.I. Nebogatov, of course, was no exception) should have realized that the remains of the squadron could not slip into Vladivostok and that their interception by the main forces of the enemy fleet was only a matter of several hours.

Nevertheless, the detachment commander did not take any measures (apart from a slightly naive attempt to fire at Japanese scouts who, taking advantage of their speed advantage, easily retreated to a safe distance for themselves) and his ships continued to head north-east.

By ten o’clock in the morning, our ships were taken to the “pincers” by more than two dozen enemy ships. When the distance between the Russian and Japanese ships was reduced to 60 cable ships, the enemy armadillos opened fire.

Within a few minutes thereafter, the signals “Surrounded” and “Surrender” were raised on the mast of the flagship “Nicholas I”, which almost immediately rehearsed all the ships of the detachment, except for the cruiser “Emerald”, who managed to escape from the environment and escape from pursuit.


Of course, the very fact of the launching of the St. Andrew’s flag in front of the enemy and not on one, but on several ships of a great power is very painful for any patriotic citizen. But, leaving aside emotions, we will try to figure out whether the decisions made by Admiral Nebogatov were optimal or, with all the wealth of choice, he had better options for action, but did not use them.

To begin with, let's try to answer the question: could our squad, having accepted the battle, inflict at least some significant damage to the enemy? To do this, we will analyze the state in which each of the Russian ships was at the time of delivery, what artillery he kept and how many shells were on it.

The battleship "Nicholas I"


In the battle on May 14, Rear Admiral Nebogatov's flagship received ten hits, including six with shells of 6-12 dm caliber, mostly in the bow, the main caliber tower, the bridge and the front tube. The artillery of the armadillo remained basically in good condition (with the exception of one twelve-inch gun), but since it consisted mainly of obsolete guns that could shoot at a distance of no more than 45 cable, the Nicholas I could not respond to the Japanese fire . There were still enough shells on the ship (about 1/3 of the normal ammunition), but taking into account the fact that he couldn’t reach the enemy, this fact did not matter.

Battleship "Eagle"


According to an eyewitness, warrant officer Chamie, “... the“ Eagle ”was a warehouse of old cast iron, steel and iron, it was all riddled with ...”, which is not surprising, since at least forty large-caliber shells hit this ship on the eve. Its unarmored side was pierced in many places, and although at night the crew of the Eagle managed to close up holes and pump out the water that had accumulated in the lower decks, there was no doubt that with new hits the canvas patches and supports from the boards would not have survived. And this, in turn, would lead to an uncontrolled flow of water into the ship, loss of stability and overkill on the first sharp circulation.

Of the sixteen guns that made up the main armament of the battleship, only six could operate: two twelve-inch (one in each turret) and four six-inch. The situation was further complicated by the fact that only four shells remained in the aft caliber of the main caliber, and it was not possible to deliver shells from the bow tower due to severe damage to the ship's decks.

Battleships of coastal defense "Admiral Senyavin" and "Admiral General Aprakin"


These ships of the same type received virtually no damage in the afternoon battle on May 14th, their artillery remained intact and there were plenty of shells for it. The weak point of these BrBOs was the high wear of gun barrels and, as a result, their low range and high dispersion of shells. In an article by respected Valentin Maltsev, “The battleship Admiral Ushakov in battles,” it is stated that “the accuracy of fire of eleven ten-inch guns firing a total of about five hundred shells ... can be judged by the absence in the main Japanese sources of explicit references to the receipt by Japanese ships of hits of ten-inch shells ... “But the battle on May 14th was conducted at distances substantially shorter than those 60-70 cable ones from which the Japanese squadron began firing on the morning of May 15th. And we have absolutely no reason to believe that at that moment the Senyavin and Apraksin commandos would have shown better results than the day before.

Thus, of the four battleships surrendered to the Japanese by N.I. Nebogatov, three had extremely speculative chances of achieving even one hit in the enemy. So the only conditionally combat-capable ship of the detachment was the Eagle. How much did he already have, according to the words of the battalionist A.S. Novikov, “three hundred holes”, could he hold out under the concentrated fire of the entire Japanese fleet: five minutes, ten? Hardly more. Moreover, it is far from a fact that the gunners of the "Eagle", on which there was not a single operational rangefinder, could have managed to shoot and at least once hit an enemy ship in the allotted short time.

Summing up, we can confidently assert that Rear Admiral Nebogatov’s detachment was not able to inflict any significant damage on the Japanese courts and, from this point of view, the conduct of the battle in this situation was absolutely pointless.

Could Nikolai Ivanovich prevent the capture of his ships, flooding them?

After they were already surrounded - hardly. Indeed, for this it was necessary, firstly, to transfer several hundred people of the crew of each ship to boats (which, for example, did not remain at all on the Eagle), secondly, to prepare the ships for destruction, thirdly, to make explosions of the laid charges (which, given the unsuccessful attempt to detonate the destroyer Buiny, was a completely non-trivial task) and make sure that the damage they inflicted was so significant that the enemy could no longer save the ships. Taking into account the fact that the Japanese destroyers could approach the detachment within 15-20 minutes after raising the white flag, it is absolutely obvious that the time for all these actions of the Russian sailors was completely insufficient.

But, perhaps, Admiral Nebogatov should have taken some action before his detachment ended up in a semicircle of Japanese ships? After all, he had at least four hours at his disposal, sharing the moments of detection by enemy scouts and surrender.

At six in the morning, when the detachment was opened by the enemy, it was located about a hundred kilometers northwest of the nearest point on Honshu Island. It was likely that at that time N. I. Nebogatov made sense to let the Emerald cruiser go on an independent voyage, after transferring the wounded from the Oryol to it, and change course, taking it to the right, so that the detachment continued to move closer to the coast of Japan .

In this case, the battleships of the United Fleet could not meet him on the easily predicted route to Vladivostok, but were forced to start the pursuit, which would give our sailors a head start in a few hours.

In addition, if they were close to the island, Russian ships could take the battle with their pursuers and, after receiving critical damage, either land on the shore or flooded at a small distance from it, hoping that the crew could get to the land by boat or on rowing ships, if you had the opportunity to lower them. In this case, the history of the Russian fleet would be supplemented not with a shameful episode of surrender, but with a glorious page, similar to the one that the cruiser Dmitry Donskoy inscribed on it on the same day.

The case of the surrender of Rear Admiral Nebogatov’s squadron to the Japanese


Why didn’t Nikolai Ivanovich accept the rather obvious decision proposed above? Or any other that would allow not to hand over ships in such an inglorious way?

During the meeting of the naval court, which was considering the case of surrender of the squadron, N. I. Nebogatov explained it captivatingly simply: "... he did not think about it, busy with only one thought: to fulfill the order of Admiral Rozhdestvensky to go to Vladivostok."

It is hard not to see Rear Admiral’s response to this desire to relieve himself of responsibility for what happened and transfer it to the squadron commander, which, of course, could hardly arouse sympathy for him from the judges and the representative of the prosecution, comrade chief naval prosecutor, major general A.I. Vogak.


The latter, in his closing speech, did not fail to draw their attention to the fact that the data provided by Nikolai Ivanovich during the clarification process conflicted both with the testimonies of other eyewitnesses and with his own words spoken at the preliminary investigation.

In particular, before the trial, N. I. Nebogatov said that “the delivery signal concerned exclusively the battleship Nicholas I”, and later stated that “he had handed over the squadron.” Moreover, in response to a request to clarify this discrepancy, he escaped with an indistinct excuse that “gentlemen judges know this better ...”

Or, for example, according to Admiral Nebogatov, he decided to surrender “in a firm mind the need for what he is doing, by no means under the influence of affect”, since he nobly chose to “save 2,000 young lives by giving the old ships to the Japanese,” although according to the testimony of a number of lower ranks of the battleship "Nikolai I", immediately after raising the signal "Surrender", Nikolai Ivanovich cried, said that he would be demoted to sailors, and called the incident a disgrace, realizing that he was not committing beneficence, but a serious crime for which he have to bear from responsibility.

According to A.I. Vogak (which the author of the article also generally shares), by dawn on May 15, N.I. Nebogatov completely lost the ability to intelligently control the actions of his detachment, since, on the one hand, he was severely exhausted by the heavy battle on the eve and sleepless at night, and on the other, he clearly realized that the four ships remaining under his command were in no way capable of turning the tide of the unsuccessful war for Russia, although it was with this purpose that they were sent on a campaign across half the world. And that is why this experienced and certainly competent admiral showed every lack of initiative that could allow his ships to reach Vladivostok, or at least avoid the shame of surrender.

Despite the fact that the motivation of Rear Admiral Nebogatov was well understood from a purely human point of view, it came into clear contradiction both with the concepts of military duty and the honor of the flag, and with the formal provisions of the current edition of the Maritime Charter, which were repeatedly violated during his decision to surrender the battleship Nicholas I. Accordingly, the decision made by the court to convict him was completely fair. And the justification was the mitigation of the punishment prescribed by law (10 years of imprisonment instead of the death penalty), because its main point, even from the point of view of the prosecutor, was "to prevent future shameful surrenders that bring complete demoralization to the fleet," and not as harsh as possible over several officers who, by the will of fate, had to answer for the entire Tsushima disaster, although its true culprits remained unpunished.
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  1. ABM
    +7
    28 December 2019 06: 11
    The logical outcome of the adventure. Surrender is shameful, of course - but saved thousands of lives. Old troughs in exchange for people's lives. He took a shame on himself Nebogatov
    1. -3
      28 December 2019 14: 12
      avm you also wanted to suffocate in a cramped compartment
      1. ABM
        +3
        28 December 2019 18: 23
        It will be necessary - suffocate. I lived my own. Like Nebogatov. I do not think that he saved his life
    2. -1
      28 December 2019 15: 19
      The logical outcome of the adventure.


      This now seems to us an adventure. In a normal situation, one could also lose half of the Japanese fleet having lost their squadron. The outcome of the war would be different.
      1. ABM
        0
        28 December 2019 18: 21
        Parallel reality? Or alternative? Tell us how to make?
        1. +5
          28 December 2019 19: 27
          Parallel reality? Or alternative? Tell us how to make

          Tsushima is an almost unique thing in the history of naval battles. The almost completely destroyed fleet of the state can be said in one battle - you won’t do this even if you specially try. Therefore, ANY other actions would be better.
          The reason for the defeat was the tyrant commander, who completely paralyzed the initiative of his subordinates. Even after the termination of command.
          1. ABM
            +2
            28 December 2019 22: 35
            Strictly :) by the way, I thought a lot about the battle, analyzed the options ... Share your vision - it will be interesting
            1. +6
              28 December 2019 22: 52
              Strictly :) by the way, I thought a lot about the battle, analyzed the options ... Share your vision - it will be interesting.


              Analogue on land. The divisions gave the order to make a march from point A to point B. The division commander (of the leader, which we have a lot of) began to implement the plan and introduced it into the heads of subordinates as the main one, recalling that the enemy might meet on the way. When approaching point B, an enemy met, who began to sausage the vanguard of the division. However, the division did not turn into battle formation, but continued the march, thinning every hour. After losing the command of the divisional commander, regiment, battalion and company commanders, zombified by fear of breaking the order, continued their suicidal campaign, snarling along the road. The scattered surrounded remnants of the division surrendered.
          2. +1
            1 January 2020 22: 26
            Quote: Arzt
            The almost completely destroyed fleet of the state can be said in one battle - you won’t do this even if you specially try.

            Why so?
            It was not difficult to imagine the outcome of Tsushima in advance. Moreover, this result was predicted even before the departure of 2 and 3 TOE by the same captain Klado.
            Antediluvian self-propelled pepelats with little-suitable teams on the one hand and modern armadillos (mostly British) with trained teams on the other. The result was obvious.
            But at the beginning of 20 in Russia and its Navy (and the army too) were led by people unsuitable. They actually considered the Japanese to be speaking macaques (this is a completely official definition of the Japanese in the press of those years). In addition, in the history of MANKIND before the Russo-Japanese War, there were no cases of victory of an Asian country over a European country (such a Russia then positioned itself). Therefore, having gathered all the Russian floating rubbish (and there was almost nothing else in Russia) in a heap, the emperor and admirals absolutely seriously decided to put the Japanese to flight with one look. In approximately the same way as the Spaniards' horses, chained in armor, put Indians to flight.
            But it didn’t work out. But this pile of junk was not able to fight. There was simply nothing.
            But Nebogatov did everything right. He did not even have a hint of a chance. Therefore, he decided not to ruin the lives of sailors. For which he was put in a fortress.
            1. -1
              2 January 2020 19: 12
              Quote: D-ug
              Moreover, this result was predicted even before the departure of 2 and 3 TOE by the same captain Klado.

              Just the opposite. Klado pointed to a very real possibility of defeating the Japanese even with the forces remaining after the 1st TOE was drained. In fact, the RI fleet had at least two-fold superiority over the Japanese. The reason for the defeat is the extremely low level of the senior commanding staff of the empire. Nebogatov clearly earned his death sentence, moreover, like his commander Rozhestvensky. But Nicholas 2 had a sweet habit of rewarding and pardon cowards and traitors ..

              Not that in the Stalinist fleet, even in the British, these two would have been shot without any doubt.
              1. 0
                2 January 2020 19: 24
                Quote: Saxahorse
                a real opportunity to defeat the Japanese even with the forces remaining after the 1st TOE was drained.

                Without Tsesarevich it was impossible.
                However, this was impossible with the Cesarevich.
                Quote: Saxahorse
                In fact, the RI fleet had at least two-fold superiority over the Japanese.

                No need to write what you do not understand.
                Quote: Saxahorse
                Nebogatov clearly earned his death sentence

                Of course, in Russia historically it happened that the one who ditched as many people as possible is the hero. And the one who saved these people in a hopeless situation, he is a villain.
                These manners were well known by Rudnev. Therefore, he imitated the battle of the Varangian before surrendering. And in this situation, he became a hero.
                Tell me, Kacharava, captain of Chelyuskin, is he a hero or a scoundrel when he meets Sheer?
                1. -2
                  2 January 2020 19: 36
                  Quote: D-ug
                  Without Tsesarevich it was impossible.
                  However, this was impossible with the Cesarevich.

                  "Fools are beaten in the altar" (C)
          3. +1
            3 January 2020 10: 07
            I completely agree with you, a vivid example of productivity in working with subordinates was shown by Admiral Makarov, who, giving initiative to subordinates on the ground, achieved significant success in opposing the Japanese naval forces, moving from defense to raids and holding down the forces of the adversary.
      2. +2
        31 December 2019 17: 33
        1.first of all - the failure of reconnaissance: English preparation, copying by yapami - will lead to the FACT AGAINST VL BRITAIN NOT TO Fight - UNDERGROUND (this is also to "We will occupy the Straits ourselves, against the opinion of the allies in 15 g") the balance of forces in the future WWI and after her.
        2. Who decided to go to Korean prol? - the culprit of the defeat
        3. I read that the Trans-Siberian Railway had wooden bridges - for 3 pairs of trains per day, the pass-through ability - Far East was cut off anyway.
        4. everything is empty, only this sky ... (according to LN Tolstoy) - the defeat of the fleet is determined by combat training for, 5-1 g to Tsushima.
        5.-9. etc
    3. -3
      28 December 2019 23: 47
      And forever shame our fleet. Shame from which no longer wash. request And THE CONSEQUENCES WERE BECAUSE - THE SAME DELIVERY OF TWO KEY FORTRESSES IN THE FIRST WORLD WAS THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE SOFTNESS MANIFESTED TO THESE FREAKES.
      If I am not mistaken, the charter of that time provided for only one punishment for such actions of the command - the death penalty. And the fact that it was not applied is a terrible mistake. My opinion is simple. The commanders of the ships and formations that surrendered the ships had to be shot with the deprivation of the nobility and all awards and ranks. All officers should be demoted to rank and file. Sailors - in penalties. So that every soldier and fighter of the army and navy understands that this will not be forgiven. am
      Nebogatov brought shame not on himself. Who remembers him? But he covered the fleet forever. Everyone remembers how our ships surrendered to the Japanese. This is the day of the triumph of Japan and our shame.
      And everyone has an excuse, like a hole in the ass. hi
      1. +1
        29 December 2019 08: 55
        AND THE CONSEQUENCES WERE BECAUSE - THE SAME DELIVERY OF TWO KEY FORTRESSES IN THE FIRST WORLD


        It started earlier. In 1854, when the fleet was flooded in the raid of Sevastopol. After Tsushima, even such actions began to be considered as heroic.
        Some even now think that the Varyag crew heroically died in an unequal battle. Nothing of the kind, they tried to escape, it didn’t work, they flooded the cruiser, sailed on boats to the shore, took the train and drove home. They didn’t even have to defend Port Arthur.
        The decision on the monument in Sevastopol was made 3 months after Tsushima. And now it is a symbol of the city and is even depicted on a 200 ruble banknote, such as fight this way.
        Complete nonsense.
      2. +1
        31 December 2019 17: 36
        My opinion is simple. The commanders of the ships and formations that surrendered the ships had to be shot with the deprivation of the nobility and all awards and ranks. All officers should be demoted to rank and file.
        -FISH ALREADY BROKEN FROM THE HEAD no one has already taken suicidal measures against themselves (nobility)
      3. 0
        2 February 2020 00: 44
        Quote: g1v2
        Nebogatov brought shame not on himself. Who remembers him? But he covered the fleet forever. Everyone remembers how our ships surrendered to the Japanese. This is the day of the triumph of Japan and our shame.
        And everyone has an excuse, like a hole in the ass.

        That is how change is perceived by normal people.
        Saving lives, he could at least flood the ships ...
        And there’s a lottery, they’ll shoot or pick it up ...
        But the moral choice would be our flag, and the disgrace of shooting unarmed would be the Japanese. I do not think Togo would have decided to be shot.
  2. +21
    28 December 2019 06: 18
    It was not Nebogatov who lost the war, he is only a link in a chain of bitter defeats, from the surrendered Port Arthur to the hills of Manzhuria, where General Kuropatkin relied more on prayers and God's help than military art. The destroyer with the symbolic name "Bedovy" surrendered to the Japanese, having on board the wounded Admiral Rozhdestvensky. If Nebogatov wanted to "save 2000 young lives by giving the old ships to the Japanese," then the destroyer took care of the wounded admiral ... In general, it is easy now to talk on the shore, and this is a rhetorical question, but, in any case, IT IS OFFENSE FOR HOLDING. Everyone has a choice of how who will act ... In this connection, for illustration, there is one historical episode.
    On May 11, 1829, the Rafail frigate, under the command of the 2nd rank captain Semyon Stroinikov, suddenly met with a Turkish squadron of 15 ships. An attempt to get away from them failed: the frigate was inferior in speed. Stroynikov, 49, was an experienced naval officer. He understood that he would be threatened in case of the delivery of the ship in such conditions. All the more surprising is his decision, given his former brilliant track record. Stroynikov participated in the war with the Turks 1806-1812. In this war, he successfully commanded the brig "Mercury", captured Turkish transport with a landing, for which he was promoted and the frigate "Rafail" under command ... Stroynikov threw a white flag. The Irony of Fate. Three days later, the Turkish squadron met the lonely cruising brig Mercury. Just five months ago, Stroinikov transferred his command to captain-lieutenant Alexander Kazarsky. The situation was similar - the Turks had a tenfold superiority in armament. Nevertheless, Kazarsky accepted the battle, inflicted serious damage on the Turks, and managed to elude them.
    Stroinikov and other captured Rafail officers were doubly shameful. They watched this battle from the Turkish battleship Real Bay. Before their eyes, the Mercury covered itself with unfading glory and swam to deserved honors and awards. And they - to shame and punishment ...
    1. -14
      28 December 2019 11: 59
      There is nothing shameful in surrendering
      1. -6
        28 December 2019 14: 08
        kronos agree with you it was a necessary measure
      2. +1
        30 December 2019 13: 53
        It seems to me that your statement is not so unambiguous, on the one hand, it can be scary for the ordinary civilian ... only this thing, there were Krasnodar residents, almost children ... they were defending Sevastopol and Kerch, there was Leningrad, there were many others, often like that there were a great many who didn’t come with warriors in the history of our Fatherland ... and they are people too, and they were scared too ... probably everyone chooses for himself where honor and where dishonesty were guided by the admiral, I won’t guess look he took responsibility for surrender.
        1. 0
          30 December 2019 14: 44
          Surrender to the Germans is in 90% of cases it is still dying. Well, I don’t say comparing the usual war before the war for the survival of the whole country
          1. 0
            30 December 2019 16: 15
            Not everything that we "know" really was and not everything that we do not "know" was not ... a fact that took place - soldiers of regular units were moved to camps, partisans were immediately shot, although this is a special case, but it took place .. How does war differ from war if they die on one and the other? If both on one and on the other someone betrays, and someone fulfills their military duty to the end? Was there a war in Afghanistan ... or all those who died there were fools who died in vain?
            1. -1
              30 December 2019 16: 17
              So in Afghanistan, there were Soviet soldiers captured, to the fact that demonizing surrender is not necessary, this does not mean that we must immediately run to surrender instead of fighting
              1. 0
                30 December 2019 16: 33
                I do not consider myself entitled to demonize someone's personal choice. I consider the question of the "value" of my own life to be personal, but for a sovereign person, personal choice ceases to be such. The commander bears responsibility for everything and everyone, and here either the chest in the crosses or the head in the bushes.
        2. 0
          15 January 2020 11: 34
          Quote: Nikolay73
          your statement doesn’t seem so unambiguous, on the one hand, it can be scary for the ordinary civilian ... only this thing, there were Krasnodar residents, almost children ... they were defending Sevastopol and Kerch, there was Leningrad, there were many others, often like that there were a great many who didn’t come with warriors in the history of our Fatherland ... and they are people too, and they were scared too ... probably everyone chooses for himself where honor and where dishonesty were guided by the admiral, I won’t guess look he took responsibility for surrender.


          You can not compare the battles of World War II and Russian-Japanese. With the Germans, the war was fought for the existence of our country, with the Japanese - it is not clear why. Nebogatov did everything right - he saved the lives of the people entrusted to him and led them away from a meaningless massacre. And all this talk about a certain honor of the fleet and flag would make sense if you are fighting for your people and for your land. In the Tsushima Strait, this was not discussed. Outfitted old pelvis and threw people like cattle for slaughter.
          The German sailors also had the mind not to enter the battle with the English fleet in 1918, when the war was already almost lost by Germany. Human life is not a bargaining chip.
      3. 0
        31 December 2019 17: 40
        There is nothing shameful in surrendering
        for a rookie, yes, but for a pro?
        the janitors live on a minimum wage (12 mp) and a pension of 65 liters - but what about the officers of the Navy?
      4. 0
        2 February 2020 00: 46
        Quote: Kronos
        There is nothing shameful in surrendering

        You are not an officer.
        And the oath was not taken.

        Then they are simply illiterate in military matters.
    2. -8
      28 December 2019 14: 10
      admiral nebogatov as naval commander did not lose anything did not participate
    3. +6
      28 December 2019 23: 19
      Quote: Per se.
      FOR THE POWER SORRY. Everyone has a choice of what to do ...

      The military has no choice. Capturing, given the potential for resistance, is a crime. Whatever the predictions, how such resistance can end.
      1. +4
        29 December 2019 12: 09
        Quote: Saxahorse
        The military has no choice.
        There is always a choice, it is clear that the customs and regulations of the navy demanded an unconditional decision - to fight to the last opportunity, but Nebogatov did make his choice. As well as the commander of the cruiser "Emerald", who did not give up. The lagging "Admiral Ushakov" did not give up either, although the Japanese informed him that the flagship had surrendered and offered to also lower the St. Andrew's flag.

        Above Kronos expressed that "There is nothing shameful in surrendering", but this, as you look at, sometimes, indeed, and surrender may even be on honorable terms, but, in any case, this should not be betrayal or cowardice. When purely selfish motives are at the fore, such people will justify not only surrender, but also cannibalism, as with Yuri Shevchuk.
        Human meat tastes sweet.
        The Judas of the besieged winters know this.
        What do you have for breakfast? Jesus again?
        Eat, but know - we will not forgive you!
  3. +15
    28 December 2019 08: 34
    I will begin by thanking the Author for the raised sensitive topic. We will not cease to comprehend and discuss those tragic times for the Russian Navy and Army. I will express a couple of my opinions.
    Somewhat earlier, a number of articles of respected Andrei from Chelyabinsk regarding Z.P. - about the correctness of his chosen tactics, his wise foresight, etc.
    Now here is Nebogatov, who is also practically innocent. So, a victim of circumstances. Let a couple of excerpts from the article:
    That is, on the one hand, N.I. Nebogatov did not mark any exceptional “difference” for receiving promotion, and on the other, one could hardly expect outstanding achievements in peacetime, as well as from most other officers.

    Alas, this is the misfortune of our Armed Forces - that of the Imperial, that of the Soviet, that of the present. Peacetime commanders. Their motivation is categorically different from the motivation and behavior of military commanders, which is fully illustrated by the following quote:
    ... in the testimony of Admiral Nebogatov himself, it was stated that until January 28, 1905, he “did not consider himself the head of this detachment, since Admiral Avelan, the manager of the Maritime Ministry, entrusted me only with monitoring the manufacture of this detachment, adding that he was currently electing the chief ... "

    What is it like?! There is a war going on, someone (who cares?) Will once lead the ships and crews into battle, and I will literally follow the commanding pointer and stand aside as an observer ?! And he observed, apparently somehow not very, once:
    Such results (disgusting results of training shootings) were, in general, a logical consequence of the fact that the teams of the Separate Detachment were, by definition of Nikolai Ivanovich, "rabble from all crews, ports and fleets ... sick, weak, fined and even politically restless people ..." .

    Pardon Mua, weren't you, my dear, earlier instructed to "watch" the preparation of the detachment?
    You can continue to discuss only two (!) Training shootings for the transition, conducting training evolutions the day before the battle (apparently not before), and, finally, the shameful (that way) surrender of the squad ships to the enemy.
    IMHO, almost every military commander that the army, the naval, made his contribution to the course of that war, honed by the habits of the peacetime commander, which, in scalar size and direction, has formed a common vector of defeat. Essen N.O., Makarov S.O., Kondratenko R.I., others are the few who were in their places at that time ...
  4. +5
    28 December 2019 09: 51
    1. The ships of the Nebogatov detachment are the ships of the Training and Artillery Detachment. The detachment, the main purpose of which is to develop skills and artillery shooting.
    2. Nebogatov’s detachment was very well floated, which is confirmed by the fact that in the dark, the detachment could go without problems without unnecessary, unmasking illumination.
    3. If there are questions about the quality of the ammunition of the first and second detachments, the Nebogatov detachment loaded the ammunition later, and there are no questions about the quality of these ammunition.
    4. The deterioration of the guns was definitely present, but allowed the fire to be carried at real battle distances.
    It is worth noting that the cord, which was used in the Japanese fleet, led to the rapid burnout of the trunks, and, accordingly, to a loss of fire accuracy.
    5. The flagship had guns with a projectile mass of 331 and 126 kg, for BBO - 225 kg, Japanese armored cruisers - 97,5 kg and 45 kg. The lifts of the Japanese cruisers were designed for a light "colonial" shell. There were no heavy shells weighing 118 kg on the Japanese. When loading, a lot of manual operations, even the mass of the 6 "projectile turned out to be excessive for the Japanese. When the British created a 140 mm gun for a Greek order, the Japanese switched to a new caliber.
    6. Rozhestvensky planned to cross the strait at night, but due to the alleged problems of the Senyavin CMU it had to be postponed until daylight hours, which had bad consequences.
    7. "Senyavin" with its unsanctioned radio game contributed to the detection of the Russian squadron.
    8. During the battle, Nebogatov’s detachment managed to lag so far behind the first detachments that it did not actually take part in the battle. And this is at the speed of the first detachments of nine knots.
    1. -4
      28 December 2019 14: 07
      Comrade Ignoto, have you ever been interested in the long trunks of this detachment, there’s only trash, and you’ll go without lights
  5. -4
    28 December 2019 10: 59
    Summary: Maritime RI lost to a country that has no experience of war with a modern adversary and only passed from feudalism to industrialization!
    1. +2
      28 December 2019 11: 02
      RI what was the experience of war with a modern adversary? Did I miss something?
      1. -3
        28 December 2019 11: 08
        Was! Crimean War! War with the Turks! School, experience, history have also been present since the time of Peter 1
        1. +6
          28 December 2019 12: 04
          The Crimean War was 50 years before that much has changed since then, the Turks were not a modern adversary. Russia, by the way, also jumped from feudalism at the same time as Japan began after the abolition of serfdom
          1. -4
            28 December 2019 12: 06
            Good! The backward fleet and the army of RI lost to modern and well-equipped Japan! And there is nothing shameful in this since the Japanese have fought for 300 years at sea and on land, and RI has vegetated in feudalism! The Japanese already had experience of war and a glorious history such as: Sinop, Chesma, Crimean War, Poltava and others!
            1. +5
              28 December 2019 12: 09
              I agree that the defeat of Russia's entire fault is nothing to do with the war with the Turks and Swedes in other eras and conditions with other military leaders and kings
              1. -6
                28 December 2019 12: 10
                Despite the fact that the experience of war is being created! Otherwise, it would not have been necessary to study the VM war for battle in the Sinai or elsewhere! No experience, no victory!
                1. +3
                  28 December 2019 12: 12
                  You can still study the tactics and actions of tank units on the example of the Cavalry attacks of the Cossacks or Budyonny
                  1. -7
                    28 December 2019 12: 15
                    As you say, all God's dew! I wrote to you above as you like. Good! The backward fleet and the army of RI lost to modern and well-equipped Japan! And there is nothing shameful in this since the Japanese have fought for 300 years at sea and on land, and RI has vegetated in feudalism! The Japanese already had experience of war and a glorious history such as: Sinop, Chesma, Crimean War, Poltava and others! And you again turn the shameful page of losing RI! What else do you need to show? Incidentally, the failure in the Russo-Japanese led to the fact that in the PM war the RI fleet stood at the wall, they were afraid of a second defeat!
                    1. +4
                      28 December 2019 13: 27
                      What does Poltava have to do with it? Remember Kulikovo Field. And better remember the battle at the Yalu River in 1894. Here is a fresh experience with a modern adversary.
                      1. -5
                        28 December 2019 14: 32
                        Read carefully!
                  2. -8
                    28 December 2019 12: 16
                    Ask to rewrite the story to your scientists! Let the propagandists hook up! And they will tell that there was no loss! But only a respite, and so on and so forth!
                    1. +5
                      28 December 2019 12: 18
                      I wrote that Russia lost out of its own mistakes, mainly people in leadership and backwardness in technology. But the Crimean and Swedish wars have nothing to do with it. Any country has wonderful victories and devastating defeats, and lamentations in the style of how do we have won so many wars before and now lost in no context wars are ridiculous
                      1. -7
                        28 December 2019 12: 26
                        There was no backwardness in technology! The fleet was quite modern, built in the USA and Europe in addition to its shipyards! Any country has victories and defeats, but no one has that!
                      2. +4
                        28 December 2019 12: 45
                        Exactly what was and it grew only by the First World War. The French, for example, completely lost to the Prussians in 1870, having not a bad army. The Poles whose army was considered good were blown away by the Germans in 3 weeks, the French lost in a month, although they held on tightly in World War I and no one shouted about shame
                      3. +2
                        28 December 2019 13: 31
                        For example, the lost battle of Sedan.
                        The losses of the killed French and Germans are equal - 3 thousand each. Then there were already captured French.
                        Compare now the loss in the ships.
                        Tsushima is just a shame.
                      4. +1
                        28 December 2019 13: 32
                        For example Trafalgar or the death of an invincible armada, too, defeats
                      5. +2
                        28 December 2019 13: 34
                        An invincible armada destroyed by the storm. The merit of the British is that they drove the Spaniards. The rest was completed by bad weather.
                      6. 0
                        2 February 2020 00: 53
                        the French lost in a month ... and nobody shouts about shame

                        Well, so they are against the humiliation of father and mother are silent in a rag .... beprincipled cowards ...
                      7. -1
                        28 December 2019 12: 49
                        The exodus of the Jews from Egypt. Will not go?
          2. 0
            31 December 2019 17: 43
            and intelligence? Allied England (Yap teacher)
        2. The comment was deleted.
      2. -1
        28 December 2019 14: 03
        hey latinos is one-eyed and Britain had the experience of World War I battles when one u-9 koknupa three brk has long been known to generals and admirals prepare for past wars and battles and only real combat operations open their eyes
      3. +6
        28 December 2019 14: 51
        And what does combat experience have to do with it? Our "naval commanders" lacked banal common sense.
        They built the squadron's battle formation in such a way that advanced ships went stupidly for slaughter, while the rest hung out on the periphery idle.
        For this it was necessary to issue a Darwin Prize to our admirals.
    2. +1
      28 December 2019 22: 29
      Summary: Maritime RI lost to a country that has no experience of war with a modern adversary and only passed from feudalism to industrialization!

      Small Britain was preparing Japan for war, she handed over the technology of manufacturing ships to them and trained them.
      All this is a superbly planned advance special operation. Up to the point that mediators were previously appointed to command. If Alexander 3 were still alive, Yapov would have expected a rout.
      Nicholas 2 was not able to rule the state - which he proved ....
  6. +6
    28 December 2019 11: 26
    Captivity is a very filthy and shameful thing and the fact that someone survived there was just an accident, since the Japanese part of the crew of the cruiser Novik that surrendered to Sakhalin was just beheaded, or stabbed with bayonets, saving even ammunition ... Only those who chose to fight and survived to fight their way with their fights ... Some of them died in battle, some survived, making their way to their own, but it is better to die in battle than in captivity, like a ram in a slaughterhouse ...
  7. 0
    28 December 2019 11: 58
    One thing is the death of ships in battle, where there is nothing shameful! A completely different scenario - when the ships raise the white flag and surrender! Do not hand over your ships to Nebogatov, there would not be such an obvious Tsushima shame.
    1. -8
      28 December 2019 12: 07
      It is shameful that RI lost both at sea and on land to an enemy who had no experience in such a war! So also the mass surrender of soldiers and sailors!
      1. 0
        28 December 2019 13: 36
        Russia also did not have experience in such a war. Preparing for the war of 1878. The Japanese had a fresh experience of 1894.
        1. -3
          28 December 2019 14: 33
          Well, of course I forgot! Everything that does not concern Russia has no analogues and is justified! Thanks, otherwise I forgot!
      2. +4
        28 December 2019 17: 38
        Just Japan had such an experience. See Sino-Japanese War.
    2. -1
      28 December 2019 12: 13
      And what is shameful in captivity if the enemy is not a beast like the Nazis, the surrender of a common occurrence in war
    3. +2
      28 December 2019 13: 52
      damn yuri you personally would like to sink on old troughs despite the fact that not one of your shells would have reached the target at all, this rabble was in force even to the brk kamimura detachment without involving armadillos of that
  8. +9
    28 December 2019 12: 05
    Nebogatov had to decide. Or the ships that seemed to be under his command can fight and, therefore, we must go and fight. Or take it for granted that it is impossible to fight, a breakthrough to Vladivostok is impossible, and then leave for a neutral port, as Enquist did. Thus, it was possible to save both "young lives" and "old ships" while avoiding the shame of surrender.
    1. +8
      28 December 2019 12: 16
      I specifically tried to cover the episode with the transfer of command in the most detailed way in the article. If Nebogatov really believed that he was only following Rozhdestvensky’s order to go to Vladivostok, he had no option to go to the neutral port.
      1. +3
        28 December 2019 14: 01
        Very good article, I read hard. It can be seen that the author made an effort to thoughtfully analyze documents and memoirs. Ivan, I bow! hi
        “Save 2,000 young lives by surrendering old ships to the Japanese”

        if we remove unnecessary emotions, I would venture to say - it was so. Colleagues, this is not about patriotism. These ships would actually lose their combat role immediately after the Russo-Japanese War. No, they could be used, but in the era of dreadnoughts and superdreadnoughts, old battleships had nothing to do in squadron battle. The exception is the WWII Black Sea campaigns, when five Russian battleships fought one battle cruiser Goeben, otherwise none of them had a chance not to win - there would be no survival ... request
        1. 0
          28 December 2019 14: 26
          Kohanku ships of the 3rd squadron lost their combat value 10 years before these events, and a comparison of quite modern guns of the battleships of the John the Chrysostom type with the 283mm gebenic does not go in relation to 1905
          1. +3
            28 December 2019 17: 22
            Quote: Ryaruav
            Kohanka ships 3 squadrons lost their combat value 10 years before these events

            Strictly speaking, ten years before these events, BBOs of the Ushakov type were still under construction, and the Apraksin was still on the slipway. But, yes, they did not represent a combat value (why is another question), which is why the ZPR did not include them in the WTO.
          2. The comment was deleted.
          3. +2
            29 December 2019 00: 35
            Quote: Ryaruav
            ships of the 3rd squadron lost their combat value 10 years before these events

            come on. The mound of 15-17 years would have come in handy by the way. Or are you supposed to stand up against the battleships? they would find their niche
      2. ABM
        0
        1 January 2020 16: 17
        There are no neutral ports nearby: on the one hand occupied Korea, on the other - Japan. Ahead is Vlad. Only if back to the Yellow Sea
    2. +3
      28 December 2019 13: 43
      Greetings, Ivan.
      I believe Nebogatov hoped that the Japanese would lick their wounds and would not pursue.
      But the wounds were small and Nebogatov realized that he had no chance. Between heroic death and shame, Nebogatov chose shame.
      1. -1
        28 December 2019 16: 13
        Between stupid death and saving lives Nebogatov made the right choice
        1. +3
          28 December 2019 18: 59
          People have lived their lives and died long ago. And the shame remained with Russia forever.
          And the heroic deed of Shipka remained with Russia forever. And there, people did not spare their lives.
          1. -2
            28 December 2019 19: 00
            Shame on a mediocre battle, yes, but captivity is not a shame. Where did it just go about the shame of captivity?
            1. +3
              28 December 2019 19: 02
              If this is not a shame for you, then I would not risk going to battle next to you.
              I'm not talking about intelligence. Even in the adjacent trench to sit dumb.
              1. -1
                28 December 2019 19: 05
                At all times, people have been captured this is part of the war. And according to your needs, as in cranberry films, all former prisoners of war are shot or sent to camps. Shame on being taken prisoner by someone who does not comply with the norms about prisoners and losing to a worthy opponent is not shameful
                1. +3
                  28 December 2019 22: 30
                  The Criminal Code of the RSFSR of October 27, 1960 (Criminal Code of the RSFSR)

                  Article 263. Unauthorized abandonment of the battlefield or refusal to use weapons

                  Unauthorized abandonment of the battlefield during a battle or refusal to use weapons during a battle is punishable by death or imprisonment for a term of fifteen years.
                  Section 264. Voluntary Surrender

                  Voluntary surrender by cowardice or cowardice - shall be punishable by death or imprisonment for a term of fifteen years.
  9. -2
    28 December 2019 13: 47
    surprisingly, at first I was thinking about our Chelyabinsk naval commander, but in fact it’s Christmas as the commander of the zero formation and that the poor on the remaining troughs should have drowned the last sailors, by the way, the fleet needed a lot of examples that weren’t needed when I die, but I don’t have any frankness about not accepting the battles of our armed ships on in the north in 1942 with destroyers and a sheer it’s not an example because they didn’t offer to surrender and indeed you can’t compare people with their psychology there were completely different people personally I think that the admiral nebogatov did the right thing to the Japanese 90% got the scrap in contrast to the Port Arthur squadron
  10. +1
    28 December 2019 13: 56
    the main culprit of the tragedy is the system of personnel attitudes when the ability to think is not the main thing is not true reminds our reality only our tsushima is still ahead if the general course is not radically changed
    1. +8
      28 December 2019 14: 11
      Quote: Ryaruav
      only our tsushima is yet to come

      Now Admiral Nebogatov would have just handed over the squadron to the Japanese and left, accompanied by the best escort girls to his grandchildren, to villas on the Cote d'Azur, Sardinia, Italian Riviera and other points.
      1. Alf
        +6
        28 December 2019 18: 24
        Quote: Aristarkh Lyudvigovich
        Quote: Ryaruav
        only our tsushima is yet to come

        Now Admiral Nebogatov would have just handed over the squadron to the Japanese and left, accompanied by the best escort girls to his grandchildren, to villas on the Cote d'Azur, Sardinia, Italian Riviera and other points.

        And Mr. Peskov would have presented it as a victory.
      2. -6
        28 December 2019 19: 27
        hey comrade you damn at least once went to sea? champion you horseradish jacket know about a roll of 60 degrees
  11. +4
    28 December 2019 14: 04
    One more shame, one less. The same cruiser "Varyag" was so successfully put out of action that on 08.08.1905 it was successfully raised and under tugboats left for Japan. Rudnev did not have enough intelligence to explode boilers, stern-tube shafts, tool machines. But his intelligence and diplomacy was enough to intern the team at foreign hospitals in Chemulpo.
    1. ABM
      -2
      28 December 2019 18: 10
      In the neutral port it was not kosher to tear, there are a dozen foreign ships nearby
      1. Alf
        +4
        28 December 2019 18: 26
        Quote: ABM
        In the neutral port it was not kosher to tear, there are a dozen foreign ships nearby

        Well, judging by how foreign ships helped maintain Korea’s neutrality, it was possible to flood in the fairway, a minor dirty trick, but nice.
        1. ABM
          -1
          28 December 2019 22: 20
          Why's that? Korea is a non-state, the ships of all the leading countries are serious nonsense.
    2. +3
      29 December 2019 00: 42
      just 1,5 years ... in the war, the enemy could not use. unlike non-wealthy ships. 1 you would like aggravation with other countries due to the explosion in the raid 2 Rudnev did not pavel the globe: the stars did not open the future for him. But if Russia even won the war?
  12. +1
    28 December 2019 14: 04
    Since Nebogatov formally violated the Maritime Charter, he should have been shot (despite all the events preceding the violation).

    Refusal to shoot Nebogatov, Rozhenstvensky and others led the domestic Navy to the situation in which he is still.
    1. -2
      28 December 2019 14: 18
      Andrew, you at least think those after the inaction of Rozhdestvensky and the catastrophe that you our mad "brave" would do it if you are slapped to the fleet there will be no damage
      1. +6
        28 December 2019 16: 23
        Tighten and write a coherent text laughing
    2. -3
      28 December 2019 16: 15
      Maritime charter forbids surrender? What cannibal wrote it?
      1. -7
        28 December 2019 17: 55
        I’m for charter, and I’m just an ordinary I think in the hours I’ll make all civilians cuckuin fate so I appeal to people of 1960’s model like you our great and unbeatable Putin dondolo all Russia softly shuffled and we celebrate New Year and Gref and his ilk like siluanov I am funny ongi rams and all
  13. +1
    28 December 2019 18: 25
    A moot point. It is not for us to judge, but there is the concept of honor.
    1. ABM
      -5
      28 December 2019 22: 28
      You do not understand the essence! Nebogatov surrendered, disgraced his honor, in order to save his sailors. Absolutely unacceptable situation for the Stalinists and the current idiots - but the only correct one! They would roll out our hour grabs without harm to themselves
  14. +3
    28 December 2019 20: 32
    Thanks so much for the article. For interesting comments.
    Unpleasant topic. Yes, very, but it is necessary to raise. We must remember everything.
    They are all worthy of glory. They defended their homeland. Unlike us. They gave the country to the capitalists without a fight. What color did the rag there replace the banner of victory !? White ...
    Spotted itself at a time when the red banner was fighting ...
    - For one beaten they give two unbeaten ..
    I read / read about Russian-Japanese. It would be very interesting to read articles about land battles of that time. You have to write and write about this war, there were so many things there .. Such experience, such decisions, and so on, all unreasonably remained in the shadow of the first world, civil, and subsequent ones ..
    Thank you very much author, straight your heart beat your lines ...
    1. -2
      28 December 2019 22: 32
      In the Russian Japanese War, there was no more talk of a war for the colonies. And in fact there was nothing outstanding there was a whole series of defeats
  15. +2
    28 December 2019 21: 17
    For just one Tsushima all living officials who are negotiating the surrender of the Kuril Islands must be sent to Kolyma.
  16. +3
    28 December 2019 22: 55
    You read it all, and terrible horror encompasses.
    Sea battles gentlemen are a terrible horror. From which to escape is Miracle equal! Has anyone tried to participate there?
    Go out into the icy sea, where there will be no salvation either way, not otherwise ...
    They beat you with suitcases, you scream in the heat ... Then you realize that you don’t have a hand, and you are trying to charge it! ..
    That's horrible!
    How people love to destroy themselves. And hurt yourself .. Unbearable pain and ...
  17. +2
    28 December 2019 23: 33
    The only thing that can be said to justify Nebogatov - Christmas was even worse.

    By the way, Russian shooting tables from the time of the REV were up to 42 kbl. It is unlikely that Nebogatov could conduct exercises with shooting at 40-50 kbl. Usually shot at 3-5 kbl. on the exercises.
    1. +4
      29 December 2019 00: 59
      The distance was indicated according to the work of the Historical Commission (Volume 6, p. 280).
      You probably wanted 35 cable to write? 5 cable - this is less than 1 km, even for field artillery frivolous range for exercises.
      1. +2
        29 December 2019 17: 42
        Quote: Ivanchester
        You probably wanted 35 cable to write? 5 cable - this is less than 1 km, even for field artillery frivolous range for exercises.

        I am amazed myself, but just such numbers came across. At the exercises 3-5 kbl, the battle was expected to be conducted at 10-15 kbl. Regulatory documents of that time, somehow regulating the order of artillery preparation, unfortunately did not come across. R. Melnikov wrote that the first firing at a distance of more than 40 kbl, in order to develop recommendations, were entrusted to the battleship Slava in 1908. Then we found out that the shooting tables also need to be clarified. There are curves.

        On the other hand, without optical sights and 1 km is not so small. They say that the Japanese also took care of long-distance shooting only after the battle in the Yellow Sea, before that they considered 3-4 km as the battle distance.
        1. +1
          29 December 2019 22: 52
          The topic is interesting, so I’ll add a little about distances.

          The Historical Commission knew how to write dimly. I reread this page about the teachings of Nebogatov. From the description it follows that the ships had to go to the target in the bearing formation. It can be understood that 50 kb is not a shooting distance, but the distance from which the exercises began. Moreover, they were allocated only 4 pieces of 6 "and 2 pieces of 9" shells. A little earlier, there are descriptions of shooting from training guns on the way to Djibouti. There, the shooting distance is indicated exactly - 9 cables.

          I recalled that the description of the firing with the indication of the distances was in Melnikov’s book about Rurik:
          Annually, the ship performed the following types of practice firing: auxiliary (stem), preparatory (first and second), combat ("roughly-combat"), counter-course (counter-course), from boats and boats. Auxiliary (barrel) firing served to develop and maintain the skills of aiming and aiming from guns. Large-caliber guns were fired with small-caliber projectiles (5 rounds for shooting) from training barrels, from other guns - bullets, from the barrels of Berdan rifles (10 rounds for shooting). The distance when firing (at a shield in the form of an armadillo measuring 4,5x1,8 m) with bullets is 1-4 kb., With shells — 4-10 kb. With these firings (three daytime and one night), the annual course of combat training began,

          The distance for all three types of firing is the same 4-10 kbl.

          Well, about 5 cable I remembered from an article by Andrey from Chelyabinsk :)
          Surprisingly, until 1901, almost the entire Royal Navy, and until 1905 a significant part of it, conducted training firing at a fixed distance of 1000 yards. This is 914,4 meters, or nearly 5 (FIVE) cable.

          "https://topwar.ru/134752-artilleriyskiy-vinegret-ili-sostoyanie-morskoy-artillerii-britanii-v-nachale-hh-veka.html"
          1. +2
            29 December 2019 23: 36
            In my opinion, in the work of the Historical Commission, the shooting episode is described quite clearly. On the next page (281) it says that with 50 kb the shields were poorly distinguishable in optical sights, but at 40 firing it became quite aimed. The height of the shield is indicated 25 feet (i.e. more than 8 meters), which differs significantly from the size of the shield for stem firing from your message.
            It also says on page 288 that the second firing was conducted at a distance of 32-58 kbl.
            Apparently, the experience of the July 28 battle was taken into account not only by the Japanese, but also ours.
            1. +2
              29 December 2019 23: 56
              Quote: Ivanchester
              It also says on page 288 that the second firing was conducted at a distance of 32-58 kbl.

              No, not really. smile On page 288 it is written that the distance to the shields varied from 32 to 58 cable ones. The fact that they fired precisely from 58 kbl is not said, there is more that the same Emperor Nicholas I had a maximum range of 49 kbl. He couldn’t shoot at 58.

              But you are right that Nebogatov seems to have really tried to shoot from long distances for that time, and 4-10 kbl was not limited. drinks
          2. +1
            2 January 2020 14: 04
            Quote: Saxahorse
            Surprisingly, until 1901, almost the entire Royal Navy, and until 1905 a significant part of it, conducted training firing at a fixed distance of 1000 yards. This is 914,4 meters, or nearly 5 (FIVE) cable.


            Comments on this article provided other information and

            ... So, summarizing the information / remarks 27091965i and the Town Hall, the British have been training in shooting practice of 5000-7500 yards since 1898, and the conclusion of the article highlighted by the author "... well, it turns out that in the Royal Navy even in 1907 , two years after the Russo-Japanese War, did someone still manage to train gunners in 1000 yards?! ... "turns out to be untenable?
            The mistress of the seas was still hers, the sensation did not happen ...
  18. +5
    29 December 2019 01: 25
    Guilty of all the tragedy of Tsushima Zinovy ​​Rozhestvensky, this is unequivocal. It is hard to find what mistakes he did not make.
    Nebogatov is guilty only of the fact that he had an admiral's rank, with an unclear moment of transfer-non-transfer (?) Of command over the remaining forces, and of a non-heroic character (there were options here how a different person would act in his place both in the first and on the second day of the battle). A typical admiral from the bureaucracy, convenient in peacetime, and this one in battle. Without denying personal courage, there is no understanding of the moment of decision making and responsibility, the ability to take reasonable risks.
  19. +4
    29 December 2019 05: 10
    There were still enough shells on the ship (about 1/3 of the normal ammunition)

    Dear Ivan, here are the official data on the remnants of ammunition on the battleships of the Nebogatov detachment.

    Could Nikolai Ivanovich prevent the capture of his ships, flooding them? After they were already surrounded - hardly. Indeed, for this it was necessary, firstly, to transfer several hundred people of the crew of each ship to boats
    On the valiant "Rurik", opening the Kingstones, no one thought about boats or saving lives.
    Rear Admiral Nebogatov’s detachment was not able to inflict any significant damage on the Japanese courts and, from this point of view, conducting a battle in the current situation was absolutely pointless
    Recall Admiral Spee, on two armored cruisers who took battle with two battle cruisers. He had no chances, and he was well aware of this.
    German ships perished, but the flags, like the Rurik, were not lowered, making history and becoming an example for subsequent generations of sailors.
    1. +2
      29 December 2019 11: 02
      Better yet, remember the British, who at sea preferred to fight at any power ratio not in their favor.
      It is funny, but even from the point of view of such an informal discipline as astrology, Great Britain and Japan are sea powers, since their totem animals are Rat and Monkey. And Russia is a land power. Her totem animal is the Horse.
    2. +2
      29 December 2019 11: 28
      here are the official ammunition balance data

      Thanks for the details.
      It turns out that, although the total number of shells was still significant, there were almost no remaining high-explosive shells for large-caliber guns.
      He had no chances

      The ships of Spee had no chance to defeat the British, but they could inflict damage on them. But the remnants of our squadron on the morning of May 15th could hardly have been marked by hits in the Japanese. And in this, in my opinion, there is a significant difference.
    3. 0
      29 December 2019 13: 59
      Dear Valentin (if I remember your name correctly) That Rurik that the Spee ships had the opportunity to hit the enemy’s ships because the range of the guns was comparable. Nebogatovskie ships simply did not have such an opportunity, this is the first. And the second is a list of Japanese ships that Nebogatov met
      Squadron battleship of the 1st class "Mikasa"
      Sikishima class 1 squadron battleship,
      Fuji Class 1 squadron battleship
      squadron battleship class 1 "Asahi"
      class 1 cruiser (armored) Kasuga
      class 1 cruiser (armored) Nissin
      memo (mine cruiser) "Tatsuta"
      class 1 cruiser (armored) Izumo
      class 1 cruiser (armored) Azuma
      class 1 cruiser (armored) Tokiva
      class 1 cruiser (armored) Yakumo
      class 1 cruiser (armored) Asama
      class 1 cruiser (armored) Ivate
      class 2 cruiser (armored) Naniva
      class 2 cruiser (armored) Takachiho
      class 2 cruiser (armored) Tsushima
      class 2 cruiser (armored) Itsukushima
      class ship of the 2nd class "Chin-Yen"
      class 2 cruiser (armored) Matsushima
      class 2 cruiser (armored) "Hashidate"
      advice note "Yayeyama"
      In your opinion, how long would his ships last? By the way, you yourself gave a table of the projectile consumption. Long-range reef shells are not effective and there are no HE shells. At close range, the Japanese simply would not let them go.
      1. 0
        29 December 2019 18: 33
        Quote: Nehist
        In your opinion, how long would his ships last?

        Suggest a French approach? We went out into the field, counted the enemy and immediately bayonets in the ground and legs up?

        Quote: Nehist
        At close range, the Japanese simply would not let them go.

        The advantage of the Japanese in the range is paid too much attention. And just as an excuse. The Japanese could really shoot further, but at distances of more than 50 kbl. accuracy tended to zero. More precisely, in fact, about 1-1.5% per 10 km. The Japanese would involuntarily have to get closer or they would be left without shells.
        1. 0
          30 December 2019 00: 01
          We look at the table of the remnants of shells. Nebogatov had BB shells with an effective firing range of no more than 15 cable, at long range they were only capable of scratching the paint of Japanese EDB and BKr
      2. +3
        30 December 2019 03: 25
        Dear Alexander,
        Quote: Nehist
        What Rurik that Spee ships had the opportunity to flush into enemy ships because the range of the guns was comparable. Nebogatovskie ships simply did not have such an opportunity, this is the first.

        "Eagle" had the full opportunity to open fire, since it was something and from what to shoot.
        According to the “Weapons and Ammunition Evaluation Sheets on the Iwami Ship,” published in the Top Secret Maritime War of the Sea 37-38 of Meiji, the Japanese removed from the Eagle 188 shells of the main caliber.
        Quote: Nehist
        In your opinion, how long would his ships last?

        As much as fate would have let go.
        "Admiral Ushakov" in a desperate situation fought to the last opportunity with two armored cruisers. After all possibilities for resistance were exhausted, the kingstones were opened on the battleship.
        What prevented Nebogatov from acting in this way?
        1. 0
          30 December 2019 05: 58
          As far as I remember, not one of Ushakov's shells reached the Japanese cruisers. Of the 188 GK shells, only 4 shells were in the aft turret, as a result Oryol after 10 minutes remains with one gun 12 "given that he was beaten to amazement he would not have lasted long. History has no concomitant inclination. But one question always interested me. namely damage to ships in the battles of the Yellow Sea and Tsushima, strikingly different results
          1. +1
            30 December 2019 14: 14
            The point is not whether the shells of "Ushakov" reached the Japanese or did not reach, but because the people there showed courage and firmness of spirit in a hopeless situation.
            Therefore, they are set an example a hundred years later, and they spit on Nebogatov. He willingly received an admiral's salary, and when it came time to pay the bills, he simply raised his hands in front of the enemy. If everyone had done this to the Great Patriotic War, you and I would not have been in the world.

            About supposedly four shells in the aft tower of the "Eagle" we know from Kostenko’s memoirs.
            But is it possible to trust these data after it became known from a Japanese document that Kostenko more than three times underestimated the remainder of 12 '' shells?

            Yes, I was also very interested and interested in the issue of combat damage to ships, primarily during the Russo-Japanese War.
            But you need to study this issue thoughtfully and with someone with a cold head.
            1. +2
              30 December 2019 23: 59

              About supposedly four shells in the aft tower of the "Eagle" we know from Kostenko’s memoirs.

              The same data are also contained in the testimony of the senior officer of the "Eagle", the captain of the second rank, Swede. Here is a fragment of them:
              At 12 in. relays and drives have been fixed to the aft tower - the tower’s electric action. The left gun could shoot only 30 cables., Since the pressed part of the armor in the embrasure of the turret of this gun, which prevented the gun from giving an elevation angle, it was not possible to cut down. Only 2 HE and 2 armor-piercing shells remained in this tower.
              1. +2
                31 December 2019 03: 28
                Quote: Ivanchester
                The same information is also contained in the testimony of the senior officer of the "Eagle", the captain of the second rank of Swede.

                Kostenko in his book simply repeated what the Swede said.
                Quote: Ivanchester
                The same data are also contained in the testimony of the senior officer of the "Eagle", the captain of the second rank, Swede. Here is a fragment of them:
                At 12 in. aft tower ... there were only 2 HE shells and 2 armor-piercing shells.

                In the tower itself - it’s quite possible, but where is the data on the cellars?

                The Swede circumvented this issue, so let's, colleague, figure it out for yourself.
                a) The standard ammunition load of 12 '' guns of the "Eagle" consisted of 240 shells, i.e. 60 shells per barrel, or 120 shells per tower.
                b) During the Tsushima battle "Eagle" released fifty 305 mm (two armor-piercing and 48 high-explosive) shells, more two Segmented was released during the repulsion of mine attacks.
                c) The remainder of 12 '' is 188 shells (240-50-2 = 188). The Japanese unloaded them from the battleship and counted them. Thanks to this, we now know how many "Eagle" actually fired shells of the main caliber.
                c) Even if we assume the impossible - only the aft tower fired - there remained on the morning of May 15 70 shells (120-50 = 70).
                d) Let's say the Swede told the truth, and there really were 4 shells in the aft tower. In this case, another 68 shells were in the cellars (70-2 = 68).
                d) Regarding the fact that only two main-caliber guns could shoot, we note that the Japanese had similar cases on armadillos, but no one there surrendered to the Russians, but didn’t even leave the battle.
                An example is the Mikasa with one operational 12 '' gun in the battle at Cape Shantung.
                1. +1
                  31 December 2019 18: 29
                  Quote: Comrade
                  In the tower itself - it’s quite possible, but where is the data on the cellars?

                  I agree with you! Shells clearly remained. And besides, the reference to the inability to move shells from the bow to the stern tower is also exaggerated. A 331 kg shell is certainly heavy, but not so much so that 6-8 people do not drag it a hundred meters on a stretcher for example.
                  1. +1
                    1 January 2020 22: 12
                    A 331 kg shell is certainly heavy, but not so much so that 6-8 people do not drag it a hundred meters on a stretcher for example.

                    According to V.P. Kostenko, due to holes from shells and piles of various debris, communication between the parts of the ship was extremely difficult. That is, to lift a shell into the bow tower (which was also not easy, because the electric elevator was out of order), pull it out, load it onto a stretcher (trolley) and carry (roll) along the upper deck to the aft tower, most likely physically impossible.
                    1. 0
                      2 January 2020 19: 01
                      Quote: Ivanchester
                      and to convey (roll) the upper deck to the aft tower was most likely physically impossible.

                      Let me doubt such a categorical conclusion. There was experience in his youth in taking out the Soviet still EC 1040 computer (analogous to IBM s \ 360) from the sixth floor of the institute along narrow and winding stairs and corridors. And she had one central processor weighed 700 kg .. Of course, they did not criticize us childishly, but they pulled them out. laughing

                      I see no reason to consider it impossible to do the same on Orel. Only 100 meters and all night at their disposal. If they wanted to would drag.
                2. +1
                  1 January 2020 21: 48
                  In the tower itself - it’s quite possible, but where is the data on the cellars?

                  As for the cellars, there is the following information in the testimony of the "Eagle" undertaking, Lieutenant Shamshev:
                  In the aft 12 "cellar, 1 high-explosive shell remained, and in the bow a little more.

                  It contradicts your information about 50 shells fired during the daytime battle, as according to the GUKiS, 144 high-explosive shells were loaded on the Oryol (I believe that 72 were loaded into the cellars of each tower). Accordingly, only the aft tower used at least 69 of them.
                  In what source can one read about shells unloaded from the Eagle by the Japanese?
  20. Eug
    +2
    30 December 2019 21: 41
    The triumph of bureaucracy and irresponsibility, a disdain for engineering and technological progress, theft and grabbing at all levels - this is, as I see it, a "recipe" for the defeat of the Republic of Ingushetia in the war with the Japanese in general and Tsushima in particular. For some reason, the feeling of déjà vu does not leave ...
  21. 0
    1 January 2020 11: 29
    Why were all these difficulties?
    It was necessary to conduct an analysis of the correlation of forces between the Russian squadron and the Japanese directly in Kronstadt \ Libave.
    Take into account that the Russian admirals did not know how to command squadrons, the commanders of the ships did not know how to maneuver, the officers didn’t know how to shoot (under Tsushima no Japanese ship received serious damage) and use rangefinders and other equipment, sailors are scum who DON’T know how to do anything.
    So, in order to avoid the cost of moving the squadron around half the world and save several thousand young lives, then surrender the fleet to the Japanese directly in the Baltic.
    In ports and bases.
    Cheap and cheerful.
    True, given that all this illiterate shobla lived and flourished at the expense of a poor Russian peasant, it would be fairer to bring all this shobla, beginning with Rozhdestvensky and ending with the last fireman, into a ravine near the port and shoot from machine guns.
    About heroism - no need.
    There was no heroism there.
    Only WILD unprofessionalism at ALL levels, poh..izm and the desire to cover his ass.
    1. ABM
      0
      1 January 2020 16: 35
      Sent to help the First Pacific Squadron, which is fully operational. They were just going for a long time
    2. +2
      1 January 2020 19: 20
      The balance of power was normal.
      As part of our squadron:
      Four armadillos of a modern type. Krupp's armor. Full belt on the waterline. All artillery of the main and medium caliber is modern, protected by armor. Construction overload of about 680 tons. It was possible to get rid of part of this overload (remove the watercraft, dismantle additional thermal insulation of residential premises), all the more it was possible to get rid of operational overload, thereby unloading the ships as much as possible, increasing their speed.
      One modern battleship with lightweight artillery. Garvey armor, not full belt, main caliber - 10 "," heavy "shell, 225 kg.
      One battleship of an obsolete type, but with modern artillery. The belt is not full. The main caliber is similar to modern battleships.
      One battleship of an outdated type, with outdated artillery. The belt is not full. The main battery turrets are not balanced. 12 "barrel length 35 calibers. The firing range allows you to reach the enemy.
      Shell weight 331 kg.
      One battleship of an outdated type, with outdated artillery. The belt is full. 12 "barrel length of 30 calibers. The firing range allows you to reach the enemy.
      One obsolete armored cruiser with obsolete artillery. The belt is full. Firing range allows you to reach the enemy.
      Three battleships of coastal defense. The belt is not complete. Main caliber - modern 10 "guns," heavy "shell, 225 kg.
      As part of the Japanese squadron:
      One armadillo of a modern type. Armor Kruppovskaya ..
      Two armadillos of a modern type. Armor GARVEEVSKAYA.
      One obsolete battleship. The belt is not full. Artillery of the main caliber in obsolete installations. Medium-caliber artillery is partially protected by armor (four out of ten guns).
      Actual speed is 15 knots.
      Two armored cruisers of the "Garibaldi" class. Full belt. For two: one 10 "gun, projectile weight 200 kg., And six 8" caliber guns. The projectile is "light", "colonial", weighing 97,5 kg.
      Actual speed is 17 knots.
      Six Asama-class armored cruisers, four subtypes. Armament is similar to "Garibaldians". shells of the "colonial" type.
      The first English pair is booked with extremely poor quality Harvey armor. The actual speed is 18 knots.
      The second English couple is booked with Krupovskaya armor. Actual speed is 18 knots.
      German-built cruiser. Krupp's armor. Real speed: long 16 knots.
      French-built cruiser. Armor Kruppovskaya. Real speed: long 15 knots.
      Asama-class cruisers are a highly publicized but extremely unsuccessful project. Their real speed not only did not allow them to be used as a "flying unit", but also to get away from modern battleships.
      Armament is not allowed to fight with modern armadillos. And the reservation of the first pair did not allow to resist the fire effects of even outdated ships.
      The introduction of water tube boilers in the English fleet as well as in other fleets was difficult.
      Cord of charges led to the rapid burnout of trunks.
      The very design of the guns led to their rupture. The British faced these even before the REV.
      The mass of the 6 "projectile for the Japanese, with their body weight, on average, less by 10-20 kg, was excessive, which led to rapid fatigue and a decrease in the rate of fire.
  22. 0
    1 January 2020 20: 27
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    Nebogatov had to decide. Or the ships that seemed to be under his command can fight and, therefore, we must go and fight. Or take it for granted that it is impossible to fight, a breakthrough to Vladivostok is impossible, and then leave for a neutral port, as Enquist did. Thus, it was possible to save both "young lives" and "old ships" while avoiding the shame of surrender.

    Nebogatov did not expect the betrayal of the escaped Enquist and the loss of ships from torpedo attacks. In fact, his squadron became 2 times weaker during the night. And when it dawned, it was too late to replay on departure to neutral ports.
  23. 0
    2 January 2020 13: 34
    Management and communication, this is the main problem. Sense of guns if it does not work properly
  24. +1
    2 January 2020 14: 31
    In fact, Nebogatov had no choice - he had to fight and the verdict in court in the form of execution was proof of that. Should have been, based on legal norms, not to mention moral and ethical. The justifications for the correctness of the surrender can be given as much as you like, this does not change the essence, if he - Nebogatov - recognized himself as an officer, brought up and educated himself on the examples of self-sacrifice in the name of the Motherland, Fatherland - had to fight, in any conditions.
  25. 0
    13 January 2020 20: 21
    Kazarsky would have acted differently!
    .
  26. 0
    18 January 2020 12: 07
    In my personal opinion, the main fault lies directly with Nicholas 2 and those who made the decision to send the second Pacific Ocean squadron, to pick it up and prepare for the campaign. And then again, to the Admiral Rozhdestvensky and then downward. And instead of judging the admirals , counter-admirals and other squadron officers, it was necessary to convict Nicholas, ministers and others.
  27. 0
    12 March 2020 07: 55
    Quote: Saxahorse
    Quote: D-ug
    Moreover, this result was predicted even before the departure of 2 and 3 TOE by the same captain Klado.

    Just the opposite. Klado pointed to a very real possibility of defeating the Japanese even with the forces remaining after the 1st TOE was drained. In fact, the RI fleet had at least two-fold superiority over the Japanese. The reason for the defeat is the extremely low level of the senior commanding staff of the empire. Nebogatov clearly earned his death sentence, moreover, like his commander Rozhestvensky. But Nicholas 2 had a sweet habit of rewarding and pardon cowards and traitors ..

    Not that in the Stalinist fleet, even in the British, these two would have been shot without any doubt.

    Two-time advantage in large-caliber guns. But if you look at these guns, they are, to put it mildly, not very

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