Rzhev battle. Verdun of the Soviet-German Front
In 1989 — 1990's the feat of our people in the Great Patriotic War was dumped in the mud, tried to deprive of holiness and meaning. Like, "they fought badly," "they filled up with corpses," "they won against the command and the supreme commander." At this time, the "secret" Rzhev battle became one of the main symbols of the low professional level of the Soviet command, the mistakes of Stalin, the huge meaningless losses of the Red Army, etc.
Cinema about how Soviet soldiers were shot for leaflets
By the 75 anniversary of the Great Victory, Russian cinema again tried to give out the corresponding product. In early December 2019, the film "Rzhev" was released. Obviously, the filmmakers tried to combine the incompatible. On the one hand, the Great Patriotic War is again, as in the Union, sacred. In the absence of real victories, people are trying to distract the exploits of their ancestors. At the same time, they are silent that we were defeated in 1991 — 1993. in the cold (third world) war. That in relation to the Russian power and people, the plans that hatched the leaders of the Third Reich were implemented. Great Russia (USSR) was divided, Kiev - the ancient Russian capital, Small and White Russia, the Baltic states, Bessarabia-Moldova, Transcaucasia, Turkestan was taken from us. Russian culture and language, education and science, social infrastructure, and the economy suffered such losses, as if Hitler hordes had gone through Russia several times. The Russian people are rapidly dying out, losing their Russianness, their "I".
On the other hand, it is not customary to praise the socialist system and Stalin. The Soviet Union is still considered, for the most part, by the political elite, liberals and intelligentsia as the “cursed time” when there were repressions, the Gulag, lines and galoshes (V. V. Putin: “The USSR produced nothing but galoshes!”).
Hence the split. The Great Patriotic War can no longer be denigrated, as before. A whole cult of the Great War has been created. Large-scale parades are being held, young people are trying to educate on the examples of war heroes, and films and TV series “about the war” are flowing. True, mostly hack work, there is nothing like Soviet masterpieces. And on the other hand, the Mausoleum during the Victory Parade is bashfully covered with plywood, the country is dominated by a capitalist pro-Western system, hostile to the socialist, popular, in which the people defeated Hitler's "European Union". The Victory Banner is not compatible with “responsible business”, large capital that is engaged in bargaining, deprives the power and people of the future.
Hence films like “Rzhev”. There is a traditional anti-Soviet mythology: “they won against the command,” “they filled up with corpses,” “we fight unprofessionally,” “it used to be better” (in old, tsarist Russia, they say, they fought “wisely”). Specialist officers, political officers are engaged in the struggle with their own soldiers. The soldier who took the German leaflet is ordered to be shot, etc. Although in reality the special forces, counterintelligence made a great contribution to the overall victory, they solved the most important tasks, revealed enemy agents, saboteurs and traitors. Shooting for a leaflet is frank nonsense. But nevertheless, there are positive aspects: our soldiers stand to the death for their homeland; it is shown for what the Soviet people died and made such sacrifices in order to win (the villagers found in the basement of the church killed by the Nazis); there are battle scenes and emotions, etc.
Padded Soviet T-34 tank and English Tanks Valentine, under the guise of one of which is equipped with the position of German soldiers. Rzhev District, 1942
Soviet "Verdun"
The Battle of Rzhev (January 1942 - March 1943), contrary to liberal, anti-Soviet mythology, was not "classified". In reality, the battles in the Rzhev region were not secret, they simply did not attract attention, as in the battle for Moscow, the defense of Leningrad or Stalingrad. In Soviet historiography, the Battle of Rzhev was not considered as one battle, lasting more than a year, but as several different operations. In addition, despite the duration, perseverance and heavy losses, the battles for Rzhev were never of key importance on the Russian front.
The fact was that neither side was able to achieve decisive success here, which could change the situation on the whole front. World War II as a whole was a war of engines, maneuverable, based on tank strikes and quick breakthroughs. And the battle for Rzhev was much like the positional battles of the First World War. No wonder the Germans themselves compared this battle with Verdun in 1916.
One of the participants in the summer battle near Rzhev, the commander of the Hoke battalion from the German 6 infantry division, later recalled these battles:
“This was no longer a war of machine guns and machine guns, hand grenades and pistols, as in winter. It was a Materialschlacht, a battle of the technology of the First World War, a battle in which the attacker tried to destroy the enemy with steel, a shower of steel flying in the air and rushing on tracks, when a person intervened only at the last moment to destroy, in this lunar landscape, that still survived in the meat grinder. "
German skiers under the guise of the tank Pz. Kpfw. II Ausf. F from the 7-th tank division of the Wehrmacht in the region of Rzhev. February 1942
German soldiers jump from the tank Pz. Kpfw. 38 (t) on a forest road in the Rzhev region. Summer 1942
“Gateway to Moscow”
In this case, the Battle of Rzhev, of course, was of strategic importance. German troops captured Rzhev in October 1941. But then it was an ordinary event, another city fell. The fate of Moscow, possibly the whole war, was being decided.
Rzhev gained importance after the successful counterattack of the Red Army in December 1941. The Soviet Headquarters, overestimating its successes and underestimating the enemy, planned in the winter of 1942 of the year to carry out a broad strategic offensive with the aim of defeating the German Army Group Center. Part of this attack was the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation (January 8 - April 20 1942 years). The Supreme Command High Command (VGK), in its directive of 7 on January 1942, ordered the cover of the armies of the right wing of the Kalinin Front under the command of I. S. Konev from the area northwest of Rzhev to Sychevka, Vyazma and the left wing of the Western Front under the command of G. K Zhukov from the Kaluga region in the direction of Yukhnov, Vyazi with the simultaneous advance of the remaining armies of the Western Front on Sychevka and Gzhatsk to encircle, dismember and destroy the main forces of Army Group Center in the region of Rzhev, Vyazma, Yukhnov, Gzhatsk.
This was the most successful stage of the battle for Rzhev. Soviet troops were able to push the enemy westward on 80 — 250 km, completed the liberation of the Moscow and Tula regions, recaptured many areas of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions. The result of the operation was the formation of the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge. At the same time, both sides suffered heavy losses during stubborn battles. The German Army Group Center lost about half of its personnel.
Our troops also suffered heavy losses. So the strike forces of the Western Front (33th Army, 1th Guards Cavalry Corps and 4th Airborne Corps) were blocked by the enemy, fought in the encirclement. Acting behind enemy lines, units of the 33 Army in cooperation with cavalry, paratroopers and partisans until the summer of 1942, fought in encirclement, held a large area and diverted significant enemy forces. In the course of heavy fighting, the wounded commander Mikhail Grigoryevich Efremov was killed (he shot himself to avoid being captured). Many parts of the army were able to break through to their own. The troops of the Kalinin Front (the 39 Army and the 11 Army Corps) were partially blocked by the Germans in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky area. In July 1942, the 9 German Army carried out Operation Seidlitz. The 39-I Soviet Army and the 11-I Cavalry Corps were in the "cauldron", were cut into pieces and destroyed. Part of the Soviet troops broke through to their own.
Thus, during the battles - winter - spring of the 1942 of the year, the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge was formed: a bridgehead up to 160 km in depth and up to 200 km on the front. Two large railways ran along the territory of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge: Velikiye Luki - Rzhev and Orsha - Smolensk - Vyazma. The Rzhev direction was one of the key for the Germans. It was located between besieged Leningrad and Moscow. Here the Germans planned to break further east, cut off Leningrad and the north from Moscow, and again attack the Russian capital. Therefore, the Germans called the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge the "gateway to Moscow." And they held onto the bridgehead with all their might. Here, up to 2 / 3, the forces of Army Group Center were concentrated.
All this was well understood in Moscow. Therefore, the Soviet command with such obstinacy tried to "cut off" this ledge. For this, three more offensive operations were carried out: The first Rzhev-Sychev offensive operation (July 31 - October 20 October 1942 years); The second Rzhev-Sychev offensive operation or operation “Mars” (November 25 - December 20 1942 of the year); Rzhev-Vyazemsky offensive operation of troops (March 2 - March 31 1943 years). As a result, the victory remained with us. 3 March 1943 year, our soldiers liberated Rzhev.
Fighting here fiercely, we drew the attention of the enemy forces both from Leningrad and the Volga, where preparations for the general battle had already begun. The more the Germans clung to Rzhev, the illusion of going to Moscow again from here, the more difficult it was for them to conduct offensive operations in other sectors and directions of the front, near Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Therefore, all discussions about the "waste of time and energy", "meat grinder", "wasting ruined Soviet soldiers", is either the stupidity of people who do not understand anything in military affairs, or outright lies and misinformation in order to denigrate the Great War, the Red Army.
German soldiers from the 2 Airfield Luftwaffe Division in combat protection in the Rzhev region. One of the soldiers is loading the MG.30 (t) machine gun - the Czechoslovak trophy machine gun CZ-30. 1942 year
German artillery positions southwest of Rzhev. In the center is a direct-mounted 88-mm anti-aircraft gun (8,8 cm FlaK 36 / 37). Winter 1942
German machine gunners who took a position on the embankment during the battle in the Rzhev region. May 1942
The victory of the Germans?
What are the reasons for such a protracted and bloody battle? First, the German high command ordered them to die, cherishing hope until the last return to the operation to capture Moscow. Rzhevsky bridgehead allowed to resume the battle for Moscow. Therefore, 2 / 3 of all the forces of the German Army Group Center were concentrated here. Selected German units were located here, for example, the elite division "Great Germany". German troops were not diluted with the European "international" (Romanians, Italians, Hungarians, etc.). The German general as a whole was better prepared than the Soviet one (quality of governance). The Germans had powerful mobile formations here, plus reserves of the Army Group Center (tank divisions) were located in the area of the ledge. An important factor was the preponderance of the Germans in artillery, especially heavy. In the summer of 1942, the military industry of the USSR did not yet fully recover from the disasters of 1941 and the evacuation. In terms of ammunition, production was still far behind Germany. Two or three flew in response to one heavy shell fired towards the German positions by Soviet artillery. The superiority in fire artillery power allowed the Germans to successfully restrain the onslaught of the Red Army. The Germans created a powerful defense, skillfully used reserves, inflicted strong counterattacks.
The Soviet command for a long time could not create a decisive superiority in forces and means in order to crush the enemy. This allowed the Germans to successfully repel the Soviet offensive. The Red Army suffered greater losses than the enemy. In general, this is a common situation when there is no decisive superiority in forces and means, and the enemy relies on strong defense. So you can recall the defense of Port Arthur, when the Japanese lost a lot more people than the defending Russians; or the first stage of the Winter War, when the Red Army washed itself with blood on the Mannerheim Line. On the whole, the losses in the Battle of Rzhev did not differ too much from the losses of the Soviet troops in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. The science of fighting was bloody. To break the “invincible” Wehrmacht and become the best army of the planet of the Red Army had to pay a high price.
The Battle of Rzhev created the myth of the defeat of the Red Army. Like, the Germans were “filled up with corpses”, and the 9-I German army under the command of Model was not defeated and in winter 1943 successfully left the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge (operation “Buffalo”). This is a clear distortion of the facts. The model is definitely a military talent. However, why did the Germans leave the "Moscow bridgehead"? They were defeated at Stalingrad, the shock 6 army died. The German headquarters had to urgently reduce the front line (from 530 to 200 km), to free parts of the 9 Army and reserves tied up in the central direction and arriving from Europe in order to eliminate the consequences of the Stalingrad catastrophe. The Wehrmacht had no choice but the abandonment of the Rzhevsky bridgehead. On the other hand, the success in Stalingrad was also associated with the battles in the Rzhev region. Powerful connections of the Wehrmacht were connected in the Moscow direction and did not participate in battles in the south.
Thus, the victory was for the Red Army. The enemy’s plans to resume the onslaught against Moscow were frustrated. The losses were high, but to call them meaningless is stupidity or a vile deception. Despite the presence of a “gate to Moscow,” the German command was never able to carry out a new attack on the Soviet capital. So the Germans, with the inactivity of the Red Army in the Moscow direction, could very well in the summer and fall of the 1942 of the year make an attack on Moscow, which could cause dire consequences for us. However, this was simply impossible due to the constant pressure on the enemy of the Red Army. All replenishment and reserves of Army Group Center were burned in the Soviet Verdun. This bloody battle near Rzhev led to the fact that the fate of the war was decided on other sectors of the front. The battle of Stalingrad, which became the first part of a strategic turning point in the war, would not have been possible without the battle for Rzhev. Also, the experience of fighting in the Rzhev region allowed the Soviet command to gain experience in breaking the enemy’s strong defense, tactics and methods of using and interacting artillery, tanks and infantry, tactics of using assault groups were formed.
Red Army under the cover of tanks "Valentine" Mk. II (Valentine Mk. II) go on the attack on the Kalinin front. Rzhev-Sychevsky direction. 1942
Soviet T-60 and KV-1 “Voroshilov” tanks from the 2-th battalion of the 3-th separate guards tank brigade are fighting in the area of Rzhev. May - June 1942
The crew rolls out the 76-mm divisional cannon of the 1939 model of the year (SPM) to the fighting position during the battles of the 178-th rifle division near Rzhev. 1942
The soldiers in a street battle in Rzhev. March 1943 g. Photo source: http://waralbum.ru/
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