The meeting of NATO unmanned aircraft with the "Shell-S1E" shook the air castles of the Pentagon. Surprise from Tula
As shown by a short monitoring of the Russian media space, information about the recent successful interception of reconnaissance and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles MQ-9A "Predator-B" of the US Air Force and MQ-9 "Reaper" of the Italian Air Force via the Pantsir-S1E anti-aircraft missile system over Libya made a real sensation both in the domestic military-analytical blogosphere and in expert communities. There is nothing surprising here, because it was the “brainchild” of Academician Arkady Georgievich Shipunov and specialists from the Tula Design Bureau of Mechanical Engineering JSC that once again made a significant contribution to preserving the prestige of Russian military-industrial enterprises specializing in the development and large-scale production of advanced self-propelled anti-aircraft defense systems .
The unstable work of the defendants of the state recognition system could play a cruel joke with the “Predator” and “Ripper”
Indeed, on the one hand, the export modification of the unique mobile Prakir-S1E mobile air defense system, which is in service with the Libyan National Army (LAA) Khalifa Haftar, once again demonstrated the highest potential to withstand modern unmanned aerial attacks of the NATO Joint Air Force, thereby increasing the level of competitiveness all types of anti-aircraft artillery and anti-aircraft missile systems developed by the Tula KBP.
On the other hand, based on more recent data published a day after the incident, on November 25, The Associated Press, citing a competent source in the LNA command, it can be concluded that the interception of the American and Italian strike and reconnaissance drones was carried out unintentionally; apparently due to the lack of a response from the defendants of the state identification system, which are part of the on-board radio-electronic equipment drones "Predator-M" and "Reaper". After all, it is well known that the Pantsir-M air defense missile systems are equipped with radar interrogators of the Guardian-type state identification system.
The impossibility of identifying drones using the Sentinel complex led to the fact that the Libyan operators of the Shell-S1E mistakenly mistook them for the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone reconnaissance drones, which have a similar airframe layout, silhouette and radar signature and operate on the Libyan theater of operations in order to provide information and fire support to the forces of the so-called Government of National Accord.
The conclusion is as follows: the beginning of the fire work of the Libyan "Shell-S1E" on the drones MQ-9A "Predator-B" and MQ-9A "Reaper" was a complete operational surprise for the operators of the latter. Moreover, in this case, neither the US Armed Forces command in Europe (maintains a neutral position regarding disagreements between the forces of Khalifa Haftar and the forces of the illegitimate Government of National Accord), nor even the Italian Air Force command (demonstrates commitment to the forces of Faiz Sarraj, providing the latter with military-technical support) did not plan to strike at Libyan national army units. Therefore, at the time of the unexpected interception of the MQ-9A “Predator-B” and the MQ-9 “Reaper”, they carried out an ordinary reconnaissance flight without “dangerous maneuvering” and the use of airborne electronic countermeasures, not to mention the use of missile and bomb equipment, which turned the data drones for excellent mid-high and low-speed targets for the Libyan "Shell-S1E."
Missile defense potential of “Shell-S1” meets new challenges
A logical question arises: what could “Shell-S1E” counterpose to the aforementioned shock reconnaissance drones in a duel situation, when the operators of the first would be tasked with incapacitating the Shell-S1E itself and then destroying the objects it covers? To answer this question, it is necessary to delve into the analysis of the technological parameters of radar and optoelectronic guidance systems of the Tula air defense missile system, and then compare them with the characteristics of avionics and ammunition "Traitors" and "Ripers".
First of all, it is worth noting that the airborne radars with AN / APY-8 Lynx II parabolic antenna arrays installed on the Predator-B and Reaper UAVs are capable of detecting and then identifying the Pantsir-S1E air defense missile system removal of 70 and 50 km, respectively, which is facilitated by the hardware-software implementation of the synthesized aperture (SAR) mode with a resolution of “radar image” of the order of 1-2 meters. Therefore, in a combat situation, the MQ-9 "Reaper" and the MQ-9A "Predator-B", even theoretically, cannot erroneously enter the 20-kilometer destruction zone of the 57E6 anti-aircraft guided missiles of the Shell-S1 complex. Meanwhile, approaching the Pantsir-S1E over a distance of more than 25-30 km will not allow drones to use AGM-114C / K / L Hellfire / Longbow anti-tank missiles, whose range barely reaches 8-9 km.
Nevertheless, the multi-purpose JAGM tactical missile, which has already reached the level of operational operational readiness, which is a deeply upgraded (“pumped”) version of the Hellfire missiles, will undergo software and hardware adaptation to the use of most types of manned and unmanned weapons in weapon control systems in the foreseeable future aviation The US Air Force and Navy (including Ripers and Traitors), after which its large-scale production will begin. With more solid and “longer-playing” solid propellant rockets (compared to ordinary Hellfaers), JAGM tactical missiles will theoretically allow the Ripers to launch an Panzer-S1E attack from a distance of 30 km (outside the range of the 57E6 anti-aircraft missiles).
Can one combat vehicle of the standard 96K6 Pantsir-S1 air defense system intercept, for example, 28 JAGM tactical missiles simultaneously launched from the suspension units of two UAVs of the Riper family during an attack on ground targets? Given the fact that the ammunition load of the 57E6 anti-aircraft missiles of one Pantsir-S1E complex is only 12 units, the successful interception of such a number of JAGMs is practically impossible, since the artillery module consists of two paired 30-mm automatic guns 2A38M with one effective target range shooting in 3500 m, will not do much weather in this situation, intercepting no more than two enemy missiles in the terminal section of the trajectory. Another thing is two combat vehicles ZNPK 96K6 "Shell-S1" with a total ammunition load from 24 SAM 576 and target channel in 8 simultaneously fired air targets.
Based on the fact that the average flight speed of American JAGM tactical missiles at the final section of the trajectory is about 400 m / s, and their direction-finding range using the 10ES1-E multispectral optical-electronic complex (one of the main elements of the Shell armor) of the order of 10 — 12 km when using TV / infrared channels, it is not difficult to conclude that in 30 seconds of flight time two “Shell-S1” can deal with more than 75% (21 unit) of JAGM attacking missiles with using only missiles 57E6. The rest of the 25% (8 units) intercepts will come from the 30-mm automatic guns. Two more important factors will facilitate the process of interception.
Firstly, this is the inability of JAGM missiles to carry out high-speed flight with anti-aircraft maneuvers, which will increase the probability of hitting one anti-aircraft missile up to 0,95. Secondly, this is the high average speed of the 57E6 anti-aircraft missiles, reaching up to 4500 km / h, which will make it possible to hit JAGM at a distance of up to 7 km from the position of the anti-aircraft missile system (far from its “dead zone”).
Information