Time to collect stones. Five reasons for the failure of the Middle East settlement
Make money. Not friends (an English idiom)
Make money, not friends (English idiom)
Make money, not friends (English idiom)
In 1993, the Israelis and Palestinians signed the first peace agreement in Oslo history like the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Measures. The purpose of this agreement is to defuse the existing conflict and work out steps that should lead to its final peaceful settlement. The subsequent agreement of 1995 confirmed the intentions of both parties and determined the terms for the implementation of the agreements.
It was assumed that already by 1999, all stages of the agreements would be completed, and a new XXI century. Israelis and Palestinians will be met in the world as neighbors. But the long-awaited world turned out to be just an illusion.
For twenty years, the international community has been looking for new initiatives to revive the peace process laid down in the capital of Norway in the 1990-s. For twenty years, Israeli and Palestinian politicians have been winning elections in the “we are them” contrast. As you know, war is a profitable business.
The article discusses the five most fundamental reasons why the world in the format that was defined twenty years ago is unattainable.
Institutional Building of a Palestinian State
The Palestinian National Authority is a "weak", "failed" state. Why can PNA be considered a state? In the 2012, the UN General Assembly recognized Palestine as a state in the status of UN observer, and this resolution was approved by 138 of the 193 states represented in the world organization. From a “legal point of view, the UN does not have the authority to recognize a particular state” [2, p. 14], therefore, the presence of a state in the UN does not matter in order to consider the state recognized. However, if the state has the status of “UN observer states and the right to participate in organizations under the auspices of the UN” [2, p. 15] is a de facto recognition of the legitimacy of a state. The presence or absence of international recognition is not a determinant of the political sovereignty of any state. This fact also does not determine the degree of its stability or sustainability.
What are “weak” states? “Weak” states are an integral element of the organization of the world at the present stage of its development [2, p. 15]. "Weak" states appeared in the 1990-ies. with the collapse of the bipolar world, when the countries that entered the political orbit of the USSR were unable to protect their sovereignty in local conflicts, when the local ruling elites lost the ability to determine the political process within their borders [2, p. 16]. This was also due to the fact that the nature of conflicts acquired the color of civil wars, which meant the appearance of an asymmetric conflict. In the new reality, the role of international law and its real application in these conflicts is often simply absent. Consequently, such states often become targets of hybrid wars, easily manipulate and establish control over them, creating “controlled chaos” in their territory, since these technologies are based on the presence and growth of domestic contradictions. All this leads to a collapse in the development of political institutions, to the degradation of the state.
The fact of the institutional crisis in the PNA is mainly related to the crisis in the PLO structures: a split between the elite of the diaspora and the elite directly “in the territories”; the political crisis of 2007 caused by the elections to the CCD in 2006 and resulting in a “political and territorial division between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; “The destruction of political pluralism in two enclaves and the varying degree of authoritarianism of the ruling movements in each of them” and others [2, p. 277]
The reasons for the deepening political crisis in the PNA were both political factors (the death of Y. Arafat, the degradation of the political institutions of Fatah and the PLO), and economic (the decline in the material and technical base, the closure of enterprises, high unemployment, a decrease in foreign financial aid flows); prolonged armed confrontation with Israel (the al-Aqsa intifada, which was bloody for the Palestinians) and humanitarian disasters (the blockade of the Gaza Strip imposed by Israel and the sanctions against the PNA).
Consequently, one of the side processes of the crisis in question was the emergence of enclaves - the ideal soil for strengthening the positions of radical, extremist and military groups that could become absolutely legitimate power in the lands of the Palestinian National Authority. A vivid example of this is the Hamas movement, which joined the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2006 during legitimate, democratic, and West-sanctioned elections.
It is worth noting that the moral old age of the M. Abbas regime in the West Bank, which led to the marginalization and degradation of the political institutions of the PNA, together with his physical old age, all have a tendency, especially against the backdrop of the increasing role of the ethno-confessional and ethno-political component of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which The West Bank will strengthen the position of those radical groups that have been steadily developing in the Gaza Strip under Hamas as integral actors in the PNA’s political life.
This thesis contradicts the position of Israel, which has consistently opposed the participation in the elections of the Palestinian Authority of religious radical parties and movements that do not recognize the Jewish state and all those agreements that are concluded in the framework of a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Oslo format.
Failure to recognize already signed peace agreements in the event of the transfer of key Palestinian National Authority authorities to Hamas and other radical parties (and groups) means the impossibility of any dialogue between the two conflicting parties (Israel and Palestine) within the framework of the above agreements.
The Role of the Arab Countries and the “Arab Spring”
It is necessary to distinguish three main (classical) tracks (by means of which it is possible to influence the Middle East settlement): Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian. In this article, only the Egyptian track will be examined in detail, since even the Jordanian track, like the Egyptian one, is highlighted in [5] in the Declaration of Principles on Temporary Self-Government Measures, however, in 1988, Jordan abandoned its claims to the West Bank, and in 1999. the entire “external” Hamas leadership was expelled from the country, which first moved to Doha and then to Damascus [2, p. 221]. The Syrian track at the moment is not so relevant, in connection with the hostilities that broke out in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, but it is worth noting that through the territory of Syria Iran is assisted by one or another radical Islamist group participating in the “proxy war” with Israel.
Meanwhile, the Cairo track, as EM Primakov emphasized, remains important in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict for several reasons [3, p. 585].
First, Egypt initially played an important role in the creation of Palestinian institutions of power and in the Palestinian national movement. At the present stage, Cairo is a mediator in the negotiations between conflicting groups within the PNA - Fatah and Hamas.
Secondly, the "Arab spring" also affected Egypt, as a result of which it came to power in 2011 – 2012. Muslim Brotherhood came. As a result of the victory of the fundamentalist party in Egypt, the Islamist radicals in the Gaza Strip gained hope to consolidate their power in the enclave and the PNA, and to legitimize their methods of action, such as waging an armed struggle against Israel.
Thirdly, in the short term, Israel will still depend on supplies of Egyptian oil and gas. Consequently, if Islamic fundamentalists come to power in Egypt again, they may impose restrictions on the supply of hydrocarbons needed by Israel. In the past, the Muslim Brothers did this in an attempt to help Hamas achieve equilibrium with Israel in a non-zero sum game (“win-win”).
Fourth, the change of regime in Cairo is dangerous because it will lose real control over the border with the Gaza Strip from the Sinai Peninsula, which will lead to an uncontrolled flow of money and weapons to the Palestinian enclave. In 2011 – 2013 the struggle for power of various power groups in Egypt led to the fact that the terrorist group IS (a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation) was entrenched in the Sinai Peninsula. It is known that the Islamic State considers the destruction of Israel a necessary condition. Thus, Hamas assistance at that point in time increased significantly. Moreover, the fighting cells of Islamic fundamentalists from the Gaza Strip have the opportunity to travel through IS-controlled corridors to third countries to undergo military training there in the camps or to teach military-technical specialties. The members of Hamas and other radical groups can now use the actual combat experience in their confrontation with Israel.
Thus, the events that happened in Egypt (as, incidentally, the likelihood of a similar scenario recurring in the future) are a destabilizing factor. The loss of control by Egypt on the border with the Gaza Strip may lead to Israel "re-occupying the Gaza Strip", which will lead to a large-scale conflict between Hamas and the state of Israel in the Gaza Strip [3, p. 586].
Ethno-territorial, ethno-political and ethno-confessional components of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
The essence of the ethno-territorial conflict is that both Jews and Arabs identify their nationality with the same territory. The dispute between the two peoples, as Vladimir Zhabotinsky pointed out, goes "for a piece of land" [2, p. 112]. The territorial issue is the core of Palestinian nationalism and Jewish Zionism [4, p. 215].
The ethnopolitical component of the conflict lies in the difference between political cultures and political values of Israelis and Palestinians. In this case, the key role is played by the historical memory of peoples, which is built on national grievances.
A completely new component of the conflict is ethno-confessional. It arose at the beginning of the 1990's. and is characteristic of both parties to the conflict. On the one hand, the role of organizations and movements based on Islamic fundamentalism has intensified in the PNA (primarily, the strengthening and growth of the positions of Hamas and its affiliated movements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank). On the other hand, in Israeli society, especially among Jewish settlers in the "territories", extreme right-wing religious-nationalist organizations of an anti-Arab orientation began to receive active support.
Palestinian society in the PNA is currently becoming increasingly religious. First, the positions of Islamic fundamentalists in recent years have been strengthened in the MENA region. Secondly, Hamas is growing in popularity in the Palestinian Authority, as the movement implements a more effective patriotic agenda, as opposed to surrendering Fatah and PLO positions.
Moreover, the ethnopsychology of the subjects of the conflict in all three components, as indicated by I. Zvyagelskaya [1, p. 140] and V.A. Korochkina [2, p. 118], lies in the opposition “we are them”, where “they” are carriers of sociocultural and religious signs different from “we”. As a result, the ethno-limited nature of both subjects of the conflict arises, which leads to the fact that none of the parties is ready to "trade" their values.
Consequently, autonomy (for the Palestinians) is only an intermediate stage, since it does not guarantee full ethnic protection to the Palestinian people.
Israeli Settlement Policy
In the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Measures, the issue of settlements is referred to the final peace settlement [6], after a five-year transition period. However, this stage has not yet begun.
Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip (before 2005) and the West Bank are one of the main barriers to establishing long-term peace between the two conflicting parties, since for the Jewish and Palestinian people the process of national construction is based on the sacredness of the place and territory [4, p. 242].
However, even if we ignore such an important factor as the “sacredness” of the land of Judea and Samaria for Jews (ethno-territorial factor), it is extremely problematic to resettle such a large number of settlers from the point of view of the Israeli economy, since approximately 600 now lives in these settlements behind the “green line” thousand Israeli settlers [7] [8]. The territory of Israel is small, especially the territory suitable for living and economic activity. Relocating almost 600 thousand people to the central or northern part of the country is an almost impossible task. Only in Tel Aviv okrug there are about 1,5 million people [9], and Tel Aviv okrug is a continuous urban development (which stretches along the Mediterranean Sea from Hadera to Gedera) - one of the most expensive in the world [10]. What will happen if at least a third of the settlers want to live in the Tel Aviv agglomeration? The state, of course, subsidizes the resettlement of settlers from the West Bank to the territory of "mainland" Israel. However, experience from unilateral demarcation with the Gaza Strip has shown that the allocated funds are not enough to cover the losses of the settlers.
Another question is the moral readiness of various parts and groups of Israeli society for the withdrawal of settlements.
Firstly, it is difficult for settlers to absorb in mainland Israel due to certain economic factors. On the one hand, the state must provide them with jobs, for example, build new production (on such expensive land). On the other hand, agricultural or other business owned by settlers in the “territories” can often bring them much more income.
Secondly, the delimitation for the settlers themselves is a huge stress. Not all resettled Israelis from the Gaza Strip and a number of territories of Samaria, as part of a unilateral demarcation from the PNA in 2005, were able to integrate into the economic and political life of Israel: some of them either left the country or were completely marginalized. As a result, A. Sharon received a split in society, which led to the growth of radical and extremist ideas. The split nearly led to widespread violence (although a number of incidents were [11]) and dangerous unrest in Israel.
The radicalization of Palestinian youth
In 2015, in Israel, against the backdrop of the unresolved final Palestinian-Israeli confrontation, a new round of escalation of the conflict began, which claimed many lives. In most cases, Palestinian radicals attacked Jews on both sides of the "green line" (the so-called Israeli border until 5 on June 1967, when the Six Day War broke out) [12]. Many media in those days dubbed this surge in violence against Jews the “Intifada of knives” or the “Intifada of Jerusalem.” At the same time, social networks became the main source of provocations, and the young Palestinians became the main actors (as, among other things, the instigators of the attacks).
The social media intifada is essentially a phenomenon not controlled by the Fatah Palestinian leaders (in the Western press you can find such terms [13] as “leaderless” / “leaderless Palestinian youth”). Of course, the role of radical Islamist movements and the role of Hamas in the incitement and calls to kill Jews published on social networks cannot be denied, but they are only a catalyst.
The driving force behind this phenomenon is Palestinian youth - one that is a contemporary of extremely unsuccessful attempts at a peaceful settlement within the framework of the process laid down by the Oslo 1993 and 1995 Agreements. and violent acts by both Palestinian radical militias and Israeli military and Jewish extremists living in settlements in the West Bank. These young people do not believe the Palestinian leaders who signed the peace agreements (but at the same time they fall under the ideological influence of the radicals): high youth unemployment, poor education and lack of leisure are not what they expected from the world with Israel.
This situation is an extremely dangerous trend, as today's youth leaders in Palestine, posting photographs and videos of attacks on social networks calling for violence against Jews, tomorrow (or once) will become the official leaders of the Palestinian people who will have to sit at the negotiating table. But will they sit down? ..
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The ongoing violence and the above-mentioned aspects of the problems make a peaceful settlement within the framework of the Oslo process impossible. However, there are chances to achieve peace, albeit within the framework of a new format.
First, Palestinian society must overcome the internal political crisis caused by the degradation and marginalization of its political institutions. For this, the leaders of the PLO and Fatah need to recognize the growing role of Hamas in the political life of autonomy and integrate the movement into government bodies. Secondly, it is important to develop an adequate system for the election of representatives of the Palestinian people in the political institutions of the PNA. They should include both the part of Palestinian society that lives in the territory controlled by Israel and the one that lives in the diaspora. Moreover, a greater number of seats should be provided to representatives of Palestinians living directly in the territory controlled by the PNA. Thirdly, the number of Palestinian institutions and their functions should be put in order and limited in their number in order to more effectively represent one, common foreign policy line of the state. Fourth, Hamas and Fatah must control the radical and extremist cells affiliated with them, whose activities often lead to disruption of negotiations and worsen the political image of the PNA on the world stage.
Considering the role of international mediators in the peace process, it should be noted that it was not successful. On the one hand, bilateral contradictions negatively affect the consolidation of intermediaries. On the other hand, the political situation in the cosponsoring countries themselves, as a result of which the political regime of each country pursues its own interests. Moreover, the international community needs to closely monitor the spending of funds allocated by the PNA through numerous assistance programs.
Israel must also develop a coherent policy with the PNA so that it does not depend on the electoral cycle. To do this, consolidate the factions in the Knesset, which at this stage seems to be a difficult task. The confrontation within the right-wing camp and the opposition of the Likud party to the left camp, resulting in criminal trials of the current Prime Minister B. Netanyahu, do not allow this.
In order for a final peace settlement to take place, time is needed. However, the temporary component also plays against this thesis - it only exacerbates interethnic contradictions.
Bibliographic Description
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[3] Primakov E. M. Russia in the modern world. Past, Present, Future / Evgeni Primakov. - M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2018. - 607 sec.
[4] Yiftachel, O. Territory as the Kernel of the Nation: Space, Time and Nationalism in Israel / Palestine, Geopolitics, 7 (2). 2002. pp. 215 – 248. DOI: 10.1080 / 714000930
[5] Declaration of Principles on Temporary Self-Government Measures [Oslo Accords]. Article XII, Appendix II (4).
[6] Declaration of Principles on Temporary Self-Government Measures [Oslo Accords]. Article V (1,3).
[7] Ferziger, J. Israeli Settlements // Bloomberg.
[8] Settlements // The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem).
[9] ISRAEL: Tel Aviv District // City Population.
[10] Schindler, M. Tel Aviv Now Ninth Most Expensive City in the World // The Jerusalem Post.
[11] Chernin V. (Velvl). Essay on the history of Jewish terror in Eretz Yisrael // Institute of the Middle East.
[12] Tsarev M. Intifada of social networks: a new stage in the bloody conflict? // Military Review.
[13] Rudoren, J. Leaderless Palestinian Youth, Inspired by Social Media, Drive Rise in Violence in Israel // The New York Times.
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