Aerial battle of the Great War. Wings over East Prussia
We are starting a series of articles "Air battle of the Great War", the subject of which will not be a full review of the state and actions of the Russian military aviation in the First World War, and the most interesting, in our opinion, moments of application of the latter.
But first, we characterize the specifics of the application and tactics of Russian aviation.
The emergence of a new kind of weapon
At the very beginning of the confrontation, the technical capabilities of aircraft and aviation weapons significantly limited the combat capabilities of aviation. At the beginning of the war, aviation was used on the Russian Front mainly for reconnaissance and adjustment of artillery fire.
But after 2 of the year, aviation solves the widest range of combat missions.
Manual on the use of aviation in war (Kiev, 1916.) called its following functions: 1) reconnaissance, surveillance and aerial photography; 2) artillery assistance; 3) fight against enemy aircraft; 4) actions on ground targets; 4) communication; 5) special assignments.
For example, aerial reconnaissance had a particularly big impact on the outcome of ground operations in preparation for the 1916 Southwest Front Offensive. Intelligence aircraft were used centrally, which, in particular, allowed for the first time in stories Russian aviation to take aerial photographs of the fortified positions of the enemy at the front several hundred kilometers (to a considerable depth), providing the troops with photoplans (the latter received officers from the offensive up to the company commanders).
During the offensive, air reconnaissance provided surveillance of both the battlefield and the operational rear lines and maneuvering of the enemy. So, it was she who informed about the preparation of the counterattack of the German troops on the flank of the 8 Army.
Aviation proved to be in the fight against ground targets.
So, 19 — 20 on July 1915 The 31 corps squadron launched the first assault strike in the history of Russian aviation, firing 3 thousand rounds of ammunition and dropping pounds of bombs to 250 — and solving tasks of operational strategic importance. Moreover, a complex reconnaissance and assault task was solved: 1) the front command was warned in time (with photos attached) about the movement on the front of the 3 army of the enemy’s attack group and 2 on the above days, assisting the 3 army in counterattacking the attacker at Wlodawa’s adversary, the air squad thwarted the advance of the Germans, who suffered heavy losses at the ferries across the Western Bug, who ceased forcing and went on the defensive.
The aviation was also effectively supporting the advancing forces during the Offensive of the South-Western Front of 1916 - bombing attacks were made on artillery reserves and firing positions. Groups of up to 20-type aircraft in the Lutsk direction bombed enemy airfields.
In the course of this campaign, an active struggle was waged in the air - and to ensure dominance on the most important combat sites, armies of the South-Western Front were given, merged and used massively fighter squads.
Army fighter units, providing the actions of spotters and scouts, successfully fought with German fighters. The latter, taking advantage of speed superiority, as a rule, escaped from attacks of Russian aircraft by flight. It is worth noting that the struggle for air supremacy on the Austro-German front, actively unfolding in the spring of 1916, escalated in the summer. The German command, counteracting the successful offensive of the South-Western Front, transferred significant aviation forces to the Russian Front. The Germans sought to gain air supremacy - in particular, by transferring selected fighter units armed with high-speed modern fighters from under Verdun to Kovel. Qualitative superiority, as well as the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy, significantly complicated the situation for Russian aviation.
But in July - August 1916 g. Began active combat work 12 Russian fighter squadrons. A special front-line fighter air group also appeared - the 1-I Combat fighter air-group (BAG), which included the 2, 4 and 19 corps squadrons. The group included pilots who had experience in air combat. Having gained air supremacy near Lutsk, the group pilots carried out 14 air battles until mid-August, in which (without loss) they shot down one and damaged several enemy aircraft. And when 13 of September 1916 of 16 of the Austrian biplanes again tried to break through to Lutsk, they were met by 8 crews of the 1 BAG. Despite the double numerical superiority, after a fierce battle, the Austrians were scattered and retreated.
The group coped with its task successfully.
As the front aviation inspector noted, the dashing actions of the air group made the enemy forget about Lutsk [Kulikov V. The beginning of the journey: Russian fighter aircraft in the First World War // Aviamaster. 2002. No. 4. C. 12.].
Only in September 1916, pilots of the 1 BAG, having made 88 sorties lasting more than 150 hours, conducted more than 40 air battles - and shot down 3 enemy aircraft, seriously injuring several more. Russian losses - 1 aircraft.
Thus, through the massive use of fighter aircraft in the most important sector of the front, air supremacy was first won.
The fact that the Russian pilots opposed a superior enemy was not an exception, but the rule. So, during the Moonsund operation 1917, the German air group consisting of 102 aircraft opposed only 36 Russian aircraft. The situation was aggravated by the fact that Russian pilots had to act in difficult not only tactical, but also organizational, as well as moral and psychological conditions of the collapse of the army. Nevertheless, they worthily opposed a more powerful enemy. Having lost 10 planes (which almost all were either destroyed before the enemy approached, or captured by German paratroopers), they shot down German cars in 5 air battles.
From the reconnaissance means of the army (the beginning of the war), aviation turns into a branch of the army. Various types of aviation appear (reconnaissance, fighter and bomber). Although a special type of attack aircraft was not created during the war, existing types of aircraft were used for assault operations. Aviation played an important role during the preparation of a breakthrough in positional defense, in correcting artillery fire, and bombed enemy troops, headquarters and supply bases.
Now, after a general review, we will see how Russian aviation acted on the East Prussian theater at the very beginning of the First World War - in August 1914.
Samson Army Aviation in August 14
As you know, by the beginning of the war, the main higher organizational unit of aviation was the aircraft company (including 3 - 5 squadrons of 5 - 6 airplanes in each). In the aviation company, administrative issues were concentrated, as well as technical and economic supply. Squadrons were combat units that solved operational and tactical tasks across the entire spectrum of aviation functions. The technical park was motley (even at the level of one aircraft). By the beginning of the war, there were 6 aircraft carriers (I-Petrograd, II-I Warsaw, III-I Kiev, IV-I Lida, V-I Bronnitsy, VI-I Odessa) and several separate air units (serf and Siberian).
Aircraft detachments were deployed as part of the army deployed with the outbreak of war. So, the aviation group of the 2 Army of the North-Western Front was provided by the I-I (1 Corps air squadron assigned to the 1 Army Corps on Farman XVI aircraft), II (15 corps air squadron assigned to the 15 Army Corps the corps on Newpor IV aircraft and the 23th squadron assigned to the 2th army corps on the Farman XV planes, the 4th (21th squadron assigned to the army headquarters) and the Vth (13th squadron, assigned to the 13th the army corps on Newpor IV aircraft) aircraft - total of 5 squads of 5 aircraft in each.
As we wrote earlier, the 2 Army entered the war with incomplete corps and with a badly organized rear. There was almost no corps cavalry (secondary Cossack units had not arrived yet) - which greatly impeded close military intelligence.
It could be supplemented by aviation intelligence. Moreover, as we noted above, at this stage the reconnaissance function was key for aviation. And at the stage of strategic deployment and the first crucial operations, aerial reconnaissance could play a particularly significant role.
And indeed, during the 4 - 15 period of August, the army squads tried very hard, giving the army and corps commands quite detailed information. A. Chekhutov reports on the most significant milestones in the actions of aviators.
Thus, the 1 air squad made 4 flights only on 4 on August, detecting movements of German troops in the Soldau-Mlawa region. Only during the 15 - 5 period of August did the 7 air squad carry out 6 air reconnaissance, exploring the Neidenburg - Vilenberg - Ortelsburg section. The 13 and 23 air squads, finding out the enemy’s grouping, carried out 5 reconnaissance operations during the 7 - 4 period of August.
German aircraft also acted actively these days, looking closely at the flank corps (especially the 6).
Russian aerial reconnaissance 8 - 9 of August brought the most important information. In particular, the landing of German troops in Allenstein and Hohenstein was discovered - 3 reserve divisions arrived to strengthen the 20 Army Corps.
The enemy did not doze off either. During this period, he carried out 15 air reconnaissance, and without any difficulty he was able to detect the advance of the Russian units - since they absolutely did not take measures to disguise and marched in the afternoon.
Russian pilots did not slow down.
So, on the 10th of August, the 1th corps air squad conducted 3 reconnaissance (Mlawa - Soldau - Gilgenburg region), 15th corps air squad - 2 reconnaissance (Neidenburg - Hilgenburg - Hohenstein region), 13th corps air squad - 2 reconnaissance ( Wilenberg - Jedabno - Allenstein) and 23-th corps squadron - 1 reconnaissance (Ortelsburg - Passenheim - Bischofsburg). Aviators of the 2 Army discovered movement of units, artillery movements, landing of troops on railway platforms, bivouacs and convoys.
Reconnaissance on the 10 of August was especially important, having discovered the concentration of large enemy forces against the left flank (Lautenburg region) and the center (Hilgenburg region) of the 1 army corps. The enemy, having conceived the encirclement of the core of the 2 Army, began to concentrate forces on sections of its flank formations.
But…
The reports of the pilots caused skepticism and the irony of the command, which did not believe the information of air intelligence. Indeed, where can the Germans get such a large number of troops, which was reported by air intelligence, if it was believed that the main forces of the German 8 Army are concentrated on the front of the 1 Army, and against the 2 Army the Germans have only up to two corps?
Stretched out on the 100-kilometer front, putting its flank corps in an isolated position, the Samson army continued to move forward. The operational association was waiting for victory at Orlau-Frankenau, Mühlen-Waplitz and Allenstein, but its central group was increasingly entering the mousetrap, while the inactive flank corps practically did not take part in the operation.
During the 11 - 12 period of August, army aviation reported the concentration of German troops on the flanks of the 2 Army - in the areas of Uzdau - Soldau and Bischofsburg. The encirclement of the core of the 2 Army was preceded by operations against its flank corps - the 1 and 6 Army. So, the pilots recorded the movement of the 2 divisions at Uzdau and the 1 divisions (parts of the German 17 Army Corps) to Bischofsburg.
Information did not work. Moreover, the observer pilot transmitted information to the 6 Commander personally and on receipt. General from infantry A. A. Blagoveshchensky doubted and did not trust. Komkor preferred to fulfill the task set by the Nashtarm (on the movement of the corps to Allenstein), than put his rear under attack from a suitable German group.
Aerial reconnaissance 13 - 14 on August revealed increased enemy operational activity - both on the flanks and in the center of the army. The Germans were tightening the bag. During the battle in the boiler, aircraft of the 13 and 15 corps were used inappropriately, and indeed during this period, an example of how to handle communications was given by the 2 commander himself, who voluntarily deprived himself of communication with the front command and left for the troops .
As a result of the death of a part of the central group of the 2 Army 16 - 18 in August in the boiler, its aviation was also seriously affected. The 13 corps squadron fell into the hands of the enemy. Half of the planes from the 15 corps squadron (the remaining machines managed to fly away) and all the technical equipment also fell into the hands of the enemy.
The squadrons attached to the buildings that didn’t fall into the boiler partially lost their planes and technical property - with the hasty departure of their formations. As a result, it took time to bring them into a combat-ready state.
After analyzing the work of aviation during the offensive of the 2 Army, we see that it completely coped with the assigned tasks - and through a series of reconnaissance it provided the command with almost exhaustive material for the successful conduct of the operation. If the command had confidence in aviation intelligence data (it is worth noting that there was no experience with the use of such data as the culture of processing air intelligence data), the result of the operation could be different. And the fact that the offensive of the 2 Army ended in grave failure was not the fault of aviation.
It was possible to avoid the encirclement, because the command was timely notified of the accumulation of large enemy forces against the flanking corps. If it treated the reports of the pilots with great confidence and took the necessary measures in a timely manner, we can safely say that the catastrophe of the 2 Army could have been avoided.
To be continued ...
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