We are building a fleet. Expansion zones
You can talk for a long time about what the fleet should do, but another question is equally important - where will the fleet do it. If you look at the fleet as an instrument of foreign policy, then it should do what it is ordered anywhere. It is necessary to provide convoys from the Baltic to Venezuela - it provides, it is necessary to ensure the blockade of the Libyan coast - it provides.
In the end, these local tasks will also come down to the fact that it is first necessary to establish dominance at sea in a given area for the required time, and then use it to solve the following problems - some sort of landing somewhere, for example. But such "expeditionary" actions will have a limited scale. It is easy to imagine a combat mission off the Libyan coast, which can be accomplished by an aircraft carrier (the same Kuznetsov, for example), a dozen frigates and a couple of submarines. But it’s quite difficult to imagine a task against the same enemy that would require collecting four missile cruisers, a BOD and five SSGNs there - the Libyans do not have such forces there, but they will have to fight against NATO in a completely different way. to another.
Therefore, when discussing questions of expeditionary actions, it is worth starting from the fact that some forces, both surface and submarine, the fleet should be able to deploy anywhere, and should be able to protect them from threats such as “breaking a single diesel-electric missile range torpedo salvo ”. Or from air raids, the limit of power of which was shown by the Argentines in the Falklands. In an extreme case, you will have to destroy some of the less powerful ships and old diesel submarines.
This is technically feasible even now and does not require much discussion on the theoretical one. Although I have to work.
Much more important are the fundamental questions - where are those water areas, the need to ensure dominance in which does not depend on current foreign policy? In what zones of the World Ocean should the Russian Navy be ready to seize supremacy in the sea and hold it indefinitely for any policy, for any relations with certain countries? There are answers, and they will be given.
As stated in the article “We are building a fleet. Special Operations: Nuclear Deterrence ", in order to prevent a sudden nuclear strike against the Russian Federation, the combat stability of the strategic nuclear forces must be ensured - first in the form of the establishment by the Navy forces of dominance in the areas through which the SSBN is deployed for combat services in which the combat services themselves are located, and in which protected combat zones are located. In the notorious "bastions." Subsequently, after the possibility of deploying strategic nuclear forces in the ocean is ensured, the Navy will be required to protect some sections of the SSBN deployment routes and “intercept” those anti-submarine forces with which the enemy will try to disrupt the strategic nuclear forces.
In the first case, it will be about absolute domination - no anti-submarine forces (PLC) of the enemy should be able to act in the "Bastions".
In the second case, everything will be somewhat more complicated, and we will talk about actions in areas where the enemy in theory will be able to challenge dominance at sea, but there the Navy’s task is rather to knock down the enemy’s PLC from the track and allow the boat to “get lost”, and Do not keep the given area “locked”. Such operations will be more raids than regular efforts to establish supremacy at sea. But in the "bastions" - a completely different matter. The enemy has already trodden a path there, studied them as a native home, and, taking into account the fact that these areas have a limited area, they will have to defend themselves, defend themselves, and fully control everything.
We look at the map of the "bastions" from the article on nuclear deterrence.
This is the first goal for the fleet. In these zones, it is necessary to ensure supremacy at sea, and absolute, that is, when the deployment of enemy forces in these areas against the will of the Russian Federation, and when the latter is ready to use force, will be impossible in principle.
Now there is no such thing.
What enemy forces threaten the Navy in these areas? First of all, these are submarines. And it is anti-submarine defense that should become the basis for actions to establish and maintain supremacy at sea in these areas. That is, it is important to have, firstly, anti-submarine ships, not necessarily very large and powerful, but necessarily numerous, and secondly, their multi-purpose submarines capable of withstanding foreign, and thirdly, anti-submarine Aviation, not like it is now, but full-fledged, and fourthly, fighter aircraft that can protect anti-submarine aircraft from enemy fighter-interceptors (from aircraft carriers deployed at a distance from the “bastions” of, for example, or bases in neighboring states) and “close the sky” for enemy base patrol aviation (BPA).
What if the enemy collects a "fist" from surface ships and tries to neutralize the forces of the Navy? He must be met by our naval base strike aircraft, capable of hitting naval targets, and specially trained and equipped for this, as well as submarines operating from areas closed to the enemy’s BPA. This is the minimum that we must begin to go now. We have everything for this.
A separate topic is mine support, which in those specific conditions will be needed, including, and very far from its bases.
Having achieved the ability to establish supremacy at sea in these limited areas, it will be necessary, relying on the revived forces of the Navy, to take the next step - to provide marine communications critical for the connectivity of the Russian territory, on which we depend to a critical degree (as if residents of distant areas offshore from this thought).
At present, approximately 2,2 million people live in the territories of Russia, which on a significant scale can only be supplied by sea and included in the national and global economy through maritime communications. This is much more than for example in Iceland. In these regions, there are such facilities as Norilsk Nickel, a gas liquefaction plant in Sabetta, a nuclear submarine base in Vilyuchinsk, and ice-free ports rare for Russia.
Among the territories tied to the rest of Russia only through sea communications are Sakhalin Island, the Kuril Ridge, Kamchatka, and Chukotka. Of the significant cities, one can recall, for example, Kaliningrad, Norilsk, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Magadan. The Northern Sea Route and numerous villages on the Siberian rivers, and the coast of the Arctic Ocean are also there. There is also a very large share of domestic GDP, access to the Pacific Ocean, the shelf and fish of the Sea of Okhotsk, the economic significance and condition of Vladivostok, Russia's involvement in the Asia-Pacific region, where the “center” of the world historical process in this century is transferred, and much more.
These communications are critical for the existence of the Russian Federation in its current form and the preservation of its territorial integrity. Thus, the need to dominate them is non-negotiable.
Map.
It is easy to see that the “bastions” are located precisely on these communications, and, accordingly, the tasks of dominance in communications and “bastions” overlap somewhat. It is logical that having secured dominance in the “bastions”, one can use the created forces and accumulated experience for further expansion. Thus, in the second stage of the revival of the Navy as an effective force, it should be able to ensure dominance in the following areas:
The North is the entire NSR up to the Bering Strait plus the “bastion”, through the area of which communication between mainland Russia and our islands in the Arctic Ocean is provided.
The East is the entire coastal zone along the Pacific coast, starting from the Bering Strait, and ending with Primorye, and the waters through which communications connect all these lands. Including the entire Sea of Okhotsk.
Baltic - line Gulf of Finland - Kaliningrad region. Ensuring dominance in the Gulf of Finland and the possibility of a complete blockade of the former Soviet republics of the Baltic States should be guaranteed.
The Black Sea is the entire coastal zone from Abkhazia to the Crimea, including the Sea of Azov and its communications, especially the Novorossiysk - Crimea ports.
Immediately it is worth stipulating that such an expansion of the zone of domination or, in peacetime, control, does not mean at all that it will be necessary to proportionally increase the strength of the Navy. For example, the NSR areas east of the northern "bastion" may well be controlled remotely, using underwater lighting systems, base anti-submarine aviation, literally one or two submarines, a couple of patrol icebreakers, and the same border 97P. Doubling the area to be monitored, in this case, does not even mean close to doubling the fleet forces that are needed for this.
Although the increase in the number of ships in comparison with the first step, of course, will be needed, but not at all gigantic. A certain number of corvettes, an extra regiment or two of anti-submarine aircraft, more intense operation of existing submarines, a willingness to take aviation from other theater of operations to aerodromes - something like this will increase the naval power of the Russian Federation on our communications. But what will have to be built up is reconnaissance equipment, both acoustic and satellite. But without this, in any case, to us in any way.
Thus, having taken those communications, the control of which is vital for us, it is necessary to take the next step - to create an analogue of the ground “near field”, a zone in which, if it comes to military operations, we will have to meet any enemy and in which we will have to fight with him in order to prevent him from our communications.
If the “Bastions” and communications should ideally be the zone of our absolute dominance at sea, then here you first need to at least come to the challenged, when the enemy can sometimes be there for a short while - but with a high risk to himself. And, subsequently, of course, one must strive to establish the absolute dominance of the sea in these zones.
We look at the map.
As you can see, almost everywhere we are talking about domination at sea in the water areas directly adjacent to the areas in which our communications pass. The exception is the Mediterranean Sea. The reason is simple - it is from there that cruise missiles from ships and submarines can strike at our territory, which means that the ideal of the enemy should be met there. In addition, one of our main historical enemies - Great Britain, there is a vulnerable point that they cannot but defend - Gibraltar. This can be very important within the framework of the previously mentioned scheme of raider actions - the mere fact of the presence of Russian forces in the region will fetter a part of the British Navy forces near Gibraltar, even without conducting hostilities - which means that these forces will not appear, for example, in the Barents Sea ...
At first glance, the idea of keeping the Navy’s formation in the Mediterranean seems “fatal” - the Mediterranean Cold War OPECC would be doomed, what can we say about our time? But the fact is that political circumstances are changing. Firstly, the first and successful steps have been taken to break away Turkey from NATO. If everything goes as it is, then one day the Black Sea will be a safe rear zone, and the transit of ships through the Black Sea Straits will be ensured even during a hypothetical war. And secondly, today, behind the back of the Navy there is a full-fledged naval base in Syria, reinforced by the VKS base - we did not have such trump cards during the Cold War
Western European countries are critically dependent on gas supplies from Russia, and will not support the United States by force. And apart from the hypothetical “big war”, the military presence of the Navy is now a necessary factor in the politics of the region. Whether we like it or not, but in Syria, Russia crossed the Rubicon, and now we can’t leave anywhere — we can only come somewhere. A permanent connection in the Mediterranean, therefore, is necessary from any point of view and in any political situation.
In the future, as opportunities grow (we hope for the best), the Navy will have to make continuous efforts to expand zones where sea supremacy can be established, or at least where we can prevent the enemy from establishing one. In this case, the desired frontier is the Tomahawk cruise missile launch line across our territory. It’s not a fact that it will ever be possible to do it in full (more likely not even than yes), but firstly, it may turn out incompletely, and secondly, at least we will not allow the enemy to act calmly, which itself in itself is very good.
It is worth noting that in some places the ground forces will also have to work, for example, in the event of war, in eastern Norway. As indicated in the article “We are building a fleet. Attacks of the weak, loss of the strong in some ways the army can help. In any case, not only the fleet can cover the army flank, but the army can provide a “friendly shore” to the fleet.
Directions for further “expansion of opportunities” are shown on the map.
The fundamental issue in all this is the need for ships of the ocean zone. Oddly enough, but such a "defensive" nature of naval planning does not preclude military operations in the ocean zone. The first and most important thing is that maneuvering between the theater of operations is not possible other than through the ocean zone, respectively, it is necessary either to fundamentally abandon the transfer of reserves from fleet to fleet, or still have some ships capable of operating in the ocean zone. And these should be strong ships, although there may not be many of them.
Similarly, it is impossible to imagine without such ships any limited operation off the coast of Venezuela or Cuba.
In the event of a major war, without such ships active offensive operations are impeded. And with a dull defense against the strongest enemy, the weak side always loses.
Thus, in general, the defensive and non-expeditionary war-oriented nature of naval construction does not exclude the need to have warships in the ocean zone; moreover, they are still urgently needed, both for local tasks somewhere far away and for defense countries off their shores.
Consecutive actions "from simple to complex" to gain the ability to establish dominance at sea in these areas will be the process during which the fleet regains the required combat readiness and meaningfulness of its military programs - from shipbuilding to capital construction. It is this process that will be the restoration of Russia's sea power in its rational form.
In the zone of our domination fleet the fate of the adversary can only be such
In the end, these local tasks will also come down to the fact that it is first necessary to establish dominance at sea in a given area for the required time, and then use it to solve the following problems - some sort of landing somewhere, for example. But such "expeditionary" actions will have a limited scale. It is easy to imagine a combat mission off the Libyan coast, which can be accomplished by an aircraft carrier (the same Kuznetsov, for example), a dozen frigates and a couple of submarines. But it’s quite difficult to imagine a task against the same enemy that would require collecting four missile cruisers, a BOD and five SSGNs there - the Libyans do not have such forces there, but they will have to fight against NATO in a completely different way. to another.
Therefore, when discussing questions of expeditionary actions, it is worth starting from the fact that some forces, both surface and submarine, the fleet should be able to deploy anywhere, and should be able to protect them from threats such as “breaking a single diesel-electric missile range torpedo salvo ”. Or from air raids, the limit of power of which was shown by the Argentines in the Falklands. In an extreme case, you will have to destroy some of the less powerful ships and old diesel submarines.
This is technically feasible even now and does not require much discussion on the theoretical one. Although I have to work.
Much more important are the fundamental questions - where are those water areas, the need to ensure dominance in which does not depend on current foreign policy? In what zones of the World Ocean should the Russian Navy be ready to seize supremacy in the sea and hold it indefinitely for any policy, for any relations with certain countries? There are answers, and they will be given.
Step 1. Squadron combat service areas
As stated in the article “We are building a fleet. Special Operations: Nuclear Deterrence ", in order to prevent a sudden nuclear strike against the Russian Federation, the combat stability of the strategic nuclear forces must be ensured - first in the form of the establishment by the Navy forces of dominance in the areas through which the SSBN is deployed for combat services in which the combat services themselves are located, and in which protected combat zones are located. In the notorious "bastions." Subsequently, after the possibility of deploying strategic nuclear forces in the ocean is ensured, the Navy will be required to protect some sections of the SSBN deployment routes and “intercept” those anti-submarine forces with which the enemy will try to disrupt the strategic nuclear forces.
In the first case, it will be about absolute domination - no anti-submarine forces (PLC) of the enemy should be able to act in the "Bastions".
In the second case, everything will be somewhat more complicated, and we will talk about actions in areas where the enemy in theory will be able to challenge dominance at sea, but there the Navy’s task is rather to knock down the enemy’s PLC from the track and allow the boat to “get lost”, and Do not keep the given area “locked”. Such operations will be more raids than regular efforts to establish supremacy at sea. But in the "bastions" - a completely different matter. The enemy has already trodden a path there, studied them as a native home, and, taking into account the fact that these areas have a limited area, they will have to defend themselves, defend themselves, and fully control everything.
We look at the map of the "bastions" from the article on nuclear deterrence.
The first and most urgent task is to ensure the deployment of strategic nuclear forces, which means that domination is needed in areas through which the substrates go to the military and the military services themselves
This is the first goal for the fleet. In these zones, it is necessary to ensure supremacy at sea, and absolute, that is, when the deployment of enemy forces in these areas against the will of the Russian Federation, and when the latter is ready to use force, will be impossible in principle.
Now there is no such thing.
What enemy forces threaten the Navy in these areas? First of all, these are submarines. And it is anti-submarine defense that should become the basis for actions to establish and maintain supremacy at sea in these areas. That is, it is important to have, firstly, anti-submarine ships, not necessarily very large and powerful, but necessarily numerous, and secondly, their multi-purpose submarines capable of withstanding foreign, and thirdly, anti-submarine Aviation, not like it is now, but full-fledged, and fourthly, fighter aircraft that can protect anti-submarine aircraft from enemy fighter-interceptors (from aircraft carriers deployed at a distance from the “bastions” of, for example, or bases in neighboring states) and “close the sky” for enemy base patrol aviation (BPA).
What if the enemy collects a "fist" from surface ships and tries to neutralize the forces of the Navy? He must be met by our naval base strike aircraft, capable of hitting naval targets, and specially trained and equipped for this, as well as submarines operating from areas closed to the enemy’s BPA. This is the minimum that we must begin to go now. We have everything for this.
A separate topic is mine support, which in those specific conditions will be needed, including, and very far from its bases.
Having achieved the ability to establish supremacy at sea in these limited areas, it will be necessary, relying on the revived forces of the Navy, to take the next step - to provide marine communications critical for the connectivity of the Russian territory, on which we depend to a critical degree (as if residents of distant areas offshore from this thought).
Step 2. Protecting your communications
At present, approximately 2,2 million people live in the territories of Russia, which on a significant scale can only be supplied by sea and included in the national and global economy through maritime communications. This is much more than for example in Iceland. In these regions, there are such facilities as Norilsk Nickel, a gas liquefaction plant in Sabetta, a nuclear submarine base in Vilyuchinsk, and ice-free ports rare for Russia.
Among the territories tied to the rest of Russia only through sea communications are Sakhalin Island, the Kuril Ridge, Kamchatka, and Chukotka. Of the significant cities, one can recall, for example, Kaliningrad, Norilsk, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Magadan. The Northern Sea Route and numerous villages on the Siberian rivers, and the coast of the Arctic Ocean are also there. There is also a very large share of domestic GDP, access to the Pacific Ocean, the shelf and fish of the Sea of Okhotsk, the economic significance and condition of Vladivostok, Russia's involvement in the Asia-Pacific region, where the “center” of the world historical process in this century is transferred, and much more.
These communications are critical for the existence of the Russian Federation in its current form and the preservation of its territorial integrity. Thus, the need to dominate them is non-negotiable.
Map.
Areas through which sea communications vital for Russia pass. The need to ensure absolute dominance of the sea in them is not discussed.
It is easy to see that the “bastions” are located precisely on these communications, and, accordingly, the tasks of dominance in communications and “bastions” overlap somewhat. It is logical that having secured dominance in the “bastions”, one can use the created forces and accumulated experience for further expansion. Thus, in the second stage of the revival of the Navy as an effective force, it should be able to ensure dominance in the following areas:
The North is the entire NSR up to the Bering Strait plus the “bastion”, through the area of which communication between mainland Russia and our islands in the Arctic Ocean is provided.
The East is the entire coastal zone along the Pacific coast, starting from the Bering Strait, and ending with Primorye, and the waters through which communications connect all these lands. Including the entire Sea of Okhotsk.
Baltic - line Gulf of Finland - Kaliningrad region. Ensuring dominance in the Gulf of Finland and the possibility of a complete blockade of the former Soviet republics of the Baltic States should be guaranteed.
The Black Sea is the entire coastal zone from Abkhazia to the Crimea, including the Sea of Azov and its communications, especially the Novorossiysk - Crimea ports.
Immediately it is worth stipulating that such an expansion of the zone of domination or, in peacetime, control, does not mean at all that it will be necessary to proportionally increase the strength of the Navy. For example, the NSR areas east of the northern "bastion" may well be controlled remotely, using underwater lighting systems, base anti-submarine aviation, literally one or two submarines, a couple of patrol icebreakers, and the same border 97P. Doubling the area to be monitored, in this case, does not even mean close to doubling the fleet forces that are needed for this.
Although the increase in the number of ships in comparison with the first step, of course, will be needed, but not at all gigantic. A certain number of corvettes, an extra regiment or two of anti-submarine aircraft, more intense operation of existing submarines, a willingness to take aviation from other theater of operations to aerodromes - something like this will increase the naval power of the Russian Federation on our communications. But what will have to be built up is reconnaissance equipment, both acoustic and satellite. But without this, in any case, to us in any way.
Thus, having taken those communications, the control of which is vital for us, it is necessary to take the next step - to create an analogue of the ground “near field”, a zone in which, if it comes to military operations, we will have to meet any enemy and in which we will have to fight with him in order to prevent him from our communications.
Step 3. Expansion of the zone of domination and expansion
If the “Bastions” and communications should ideally be the zone of our absolute dominance at sea, then here you first need to at least come to the challenged, when the enemy can sometimes be there for a short while - but with a high risk to himself. And, subsequently, of course, one must strive to establish the absolute dominance of the sea in these zones.
We look at the map.
In the case of a hypothetical war, the enemy must be kept in these areas or generally outside of them. But no closer
As you can see, almost everywhere we are talking about domination at sea in the water areas directly adjacent to the areas in which our communications pass. The exception is the Mediterranean Sea. The reason is simple - it is from there that cruise missiles from ships and submarines can strike at our territory, which means that the ideal of the enemy should be met there. In addition, one of our main historical enemies - Great Britain, there is a vulnerable point that they cannot but defend - Gibraltar. This can be very important within the framework of the previously mentioned scheme of raider actions - the mere fact of the presence of Russian forces in the region will fetter a part of the British Navy forces near Gibraltar, even without conducting hostilities - which means that these forces will not appear, for example, in the Barents Sea ...
At first glance, the idea of keeping the Navy’s formation in the Mediterranean seems “fatal” - the Mediterranean Cold War OPECC would be doomed, what can we say about our time? But the fact is that political circumstances are changing. Firstly, the first and successful steps have been taken to break away Turkey from NATO. If everything goes as it is, then one day the Black Sea will be a safe rear zone, and the transit of ships through the Black Sea Straits will be ensured even during a hypothetical war. And secondly, today, behind the back of the Navy there is a full-fledged naval base in Syria, reinforced by the VKS base - we did not have such trump cards during the Cold War
Bone Throat USA - Navy Tartus
Western European countries are critically dependent on gas supplies from Russia, and will not support the United States by force. And apart from the hypothetical “big war”, the military presence of the Navy is now a necessary factor in the politics of the region. Whether we like it or not, but in Syria, Russia crossed the Rubicon, and now we can’t leave anywhere — we can only come somewhere. A permanent connection in the Mediterranean, therefore, is necessary from any point of view and in any political situation.
In the future, as opportunities grow (we hope for the best), the Navy will have to make continuous efforts to expand zones where sea supremacy can be established, or at least where we can prevent the enemy from establishing one. In this case, the desired frontier is the Tomahawk cruise missile launch line across our territory. It’s not a fact that it will ever be possible to do it in full (more likely not even than yes), but firstly, it may turn out incompletely, and secondly, at least we will not allow the enemy to act calmly, which itself in itself is very good.
It is worth noting that in some places the ground forces will also have to work, for example, in the event of war, in eastern Norway. As indicated in the article “We are building a fleet. Attacks of the weak, loss of the strong in some ways the army can help. In any case, not only the fleet can cover the army flank, but the army can provide a “friendly shore” to the fleet.
Directions for further “expansion of opportunities” are shown on the map.
Green lines are the front of further "expansion of opportunities." Arrows (where visible) - such directions
The fundamental question
The fundamental issue in all this is the need for ships of the ocean zone. Oddly enough, but such a "defensive" nature of naval planning does not preclude military operations in the ocean zone. The first and most important thing is that maneuvering between the theater of operations is not possible other than through the ocean zone, respectively, it is necessary either to fundamentally abandon the transfer of reserves from fleet to fleet, or still have some ships capable of operating in the ocean zone. And these should be strong ships, although there may not be many of them.
Similarly, it is impossible to imagine without such ships any limited operation off the coast of Venezuela or Cuba.
In the event of a major war, without such ships active offensive operations are impeded. And with a dull defense against the strongest enemy, the weak side always loses.
Thus, in general, the defensive and non-expeditionary war-oriented nature of naval construction does not exclude the need to have warships in the ocean zone; moreover, they are still urgently needed, both for local tasks somewhere far away and for defense countries off their shores.
Consecutive actions "from simple to complex" to gain the ability to establish dominance at sea in these areas will be the process during which the fleet regains the required combat readiness and meaningfulness of its military programs - from shipbuilding to capital construction. It is this process that will be the restoration of Russia's sea power in its rational form.
- Alexander Timokhin
- Tom Freeman, Newizv.ru
- We are building a fleet. Theory and Purpose
We are building a fleet. The consequences of inconvenient geography
We are building a fleet. Attacks of the weak, loss of the strong
We are building a fleet. Special Operations: Nuclear Deterrence
Information