Where to put RTOs with Caliber?
Recently, quite a lot of controversial materials have appeared in many media about a whole class of ships. We are talking about small missile ships, or RTOs, armed with "Caliber". The appearance of these ships over the past decade has perhaps become the only ray of light in our dark surface naval kingdom, whose affairs, we admit, are going so-so.
Yes, "Caliber" is a good weapon, and their use on objects in Syria precisely with RTOs made many people scratch their heads in the West. And now, many believe that with the departure of history The RSMD RTO treaties as a class will also have to be a thing of the past.
As unnecessary.
Yes, when this Treaty on the Elimination of Medium and Short Range Missiles (INF Treaty), the main squire of the world, the USSR and the United States, had to part with its ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range from 500 to 5500 kilometers.
And it’s wonderful, in the whole world there are enough weapons in general, so that everything can be smashed to ashes more than once.
But all this concerned, I repeat, ground-based missiles. And the sea remained. As a result, the United States simply began to massively put on all the ships that were suitable for this, the Tomahawks, we had a Grenade, but mostly non-nuclear.
Then they created “Caliber”, but they won’t let the navy lie, they somehow introduced it, with such difficulties that in the 2000 they started talking seriously that “Violinist” (that is, “Caliber”) was not needed. ”
And then, in general, the Caliber carrier ships began to write off one after another. Strange, but it seems that someone generally wanted to complete the task of maximum attenuation fleet.
The fact that the situation in the fleet has stabilized is a merit of no naval command. The merit of export variations of the Novator design bureau on the theme of the same Pomegranate, as a result of which the Club complex appeared. Let not so long-range, but very, very successful in both senses: anti-ship and offensive
However, subsequently, a chain of initially unrelated events occurred that nevertheless caused the appearance of long-range cruise missiles in the arsenal of the fleet, albeit in an extremely irrational way.
The first thing that changed the situation with cruise missiles was the critical situation with financing defense industry enterprises, in which export was the salvation. The response of a separate Novator design bureau to this challenge was the emergence of the Club missile family - Club missiles with a relatively short range, created using the backbone of the non-nuclear Grenade. The missiles turned out successful both in the shock (against the coast), and in the anti-ship variants.
And then our sworn buyers appeared - Indians who not only became interested in missiles, but also ordered a series of Talvar class frigates of the 11356 project, staffed with the Club complex missiles in the 3С-14 vertical launch unit for eight missiles.
It is unpleasant to state, but it was the order for the Indian Navy that actually saved the whole thing.
And then another submarine of the 636 project, armed with the same missiles, went for export.
The situation turned out to be most amusing on the one hand, but ordinary on the other. For us, in principle, it has already become the norm when modern weapons are first exported, and then ... and then there may not be at all. And don’t need to go for examples, here it is, first, and then you can remember the T-90, and the very same Su-57 is ready to shove anyone, if only they would. But not myself.
And then, as always, when the "Caliber" was completed "regardless", for Indian money, suddenly the fleet began to see clearly. Although there are witnesses to a serious “stick” in 2006 at a meeting with the president.
Well then, again, as is customary with us, in a firefight they began to shove "Caliber" onto any ships that could be adapted for this. The whole question is that the ships were minuscule.
So there was a "Dagestan", which began to modernize under the "Caliber" at the same time as completion. Happened. So the 11660 project was “calibrated” in 11661, and the 21630 project in 21631.
And off we go. RTOs are easier to build than frigates and corvettes, since a small missile ship is just a well-fed missile boat.
Therefore, of course, the combat use of RTOs in 2015 was successful and, to put it mildly, did not please anyone in the West.
But let's be fair: the entire missile salvo of the Caspian flotilla is several times smaller than that of any modern destroyer, at least the same Arly Burke. Alas, the fact.
Move on. The project to bring to the “Caliber” RTOs was done “on the knee”, as always, when our president began to speak negatively. The frankly doing nothing for the fleet, the leadership began to urgently get out. Hence the completely inaudible rush, and the military launch, timed to coincide with the birthday ...
What happened in essence, what is an RTO and how useful is it?
The ship is definitely unhurried (25 nodes) and short-range (2500 km at 12 nodes). Seaworthiness exclusively for enclosed areas such as the Caspian or Black Seas. Autonomy - 10 days.
Air defense is very so-so. Frankly weak. With anti-submarine equipment is even worse, but there is a certain reason: who will spend a torpedo on such a target? So, I think that if they understand exactly who is in front of the boat, they will spend it. But "Buyan" is practically nothing to defend.
And to the target designation system there were repeated volleys of criticism.
In general, those who call the XRNM project MRK a floating rocket battery are right. It is so indeed. Another question is that, in the absence of something better, our naval leaders took advantage of these very boats.
Probably, it is worth recalling that “Buyan” under the project was to be on guard and protect the economic zone. That is, to work in the near sea zone without any long trips there.
The fact that the boat near MZ had to be used as a full-fledged combat missile ship - well, this is purely out of poverty. Converting a patrol boat to a floating battery was successful, but weaknesses remained.
Yes, for launches from the Black or Caspian Sea over the horizon, they are very suitable. But in the Baltic Sea or in the Mediterranean Sea, and even under the conditions of opposition of normal enemy ships - I am afraid that these will be targets.
Not only that, something more or less serious like the German “Saxony” will catch up and smear with a thin layer on the surface of the Baltic Sea.
But we already have these ships, another question, what are the proposals for their further fate in the light of the demise of the INF Treaty.
Cruise missile. A very formidable and useful weapon. And, importantly - not so expensive. It can fly using navigation, skirting terrain and so on. Yes, you can shoot down, especially with modern air defense systems. But modern air defense systems - this is not for everyone. This is about us, USA, Israel.
It is appropriate to recall here that in April of the 2014 of the year during a missile strike on Syria performed by the US Navy, it was demonstrated that the Kyrgyz Republic quite normally gets off.
However, cheapness and quantity are the keys to success. Massed volley of cruise missiles - and hello. Try to neutralize it.
In this regard, everything is very sad. A single salvo of cruise missiles of the entire Black Sea Fleet is less than a missile salvo of one Arly Burke. Alas.
In these conditions, a floating battery is quite a weapon.
However, the performance characteristics of the 21631 missile systems show that this is not even an attempt to re-equip the fleet with anything at all, but rather is simply a substitute for the once-forbidden INF Treaty land launchers.
But the substitute is so-so. It came out a little expensive, since it was no longer a boat, but still not a corvette. If for money - half the corvette of the 20385 project. But here the fault is not of developers, but of foreign policy. All RTOs were designed for German MTU diesels, and due to sanctions, ships had to be redone for Chinese engines. The alteration came out both long and rather expensive.
In general, “Buyan-M” is the first pancake that clearly came out lumpy.
But then went “Karakurt" project 22800. It seems to be working on bugs. “Karakurt” was provided with a high speed (30 knots) and better seaworthiness, they received a target designation complex, and was enhanced by an air defense installation of the “Shell-ME”.
But in fact - it’s the same floating rocket platform, that’s a bit faster. A large surface ship is not an opponent for them, and submarines are still just a deadly enemy.
And the cost of an incomprehensible ship in 10 billion rubles is more than significant. However, “Karakurt” is still more like a tactical strike unit than “Buyan-M”.
And now, when the DRMSD collapsed, there was talk that the RTOs should be put under the knife for their complete uselessness. Say, a floating battery may well be replaced by a ground-based complex. Even figures were cited: the dual-battery division of the OTRK Iskander, into which the Caliber can be loaded, costs about six billion rubles and provides the same eight-missile salvo as the multi-missile system. RTOs cost in the 2017 year nine billion. But RTOs, having fired rockets, must return to base, and the ground launcher is recharged on the spot with the help of TZM.
Theoretically, for six billion you can get not eight, but 16 missiles in a salvo. A lot of people speak in the style of "if." If you design a new installation such as the French HADES, which seems to be indistinguishable from a conventional machine, if that, if ...
But many of those who called for “removing” the RTOs under the knife simply forget that they are looking at the map. And the globe is round ...
You can stumble across the border strip of ground-based OTRK with "Caliber". Absolutely not a question, you can. But you can also track them. And fly a rocket through a continent stuffed with air defense systems and radars. This is if we are talking about the western border.
An RTO floating battery can quite easily launch on the border of the territorial waters of Turkey and Romania, for example, and keep an eye on a vast territory unmatched. Do not forget that there are no more ATS countries, and there are no former Soviet republics in which ground missiles could be located.
Kaliningrad ... Turn a western outpost into a real ground fortress? Well, it’s even easier there: Poland and the Baltic states are nearby. There is where to work in terms of interception. And how will Belarusians look at our rockets at home? I think no need to explain.
So a small rocket battery, capable of approaching 1000 km across the water surface, is not even the most stupid thing even in the light of the cancellation of the INF Treaty, whatever they say.
Another issue is that at the same time as the release of the RTOs, it is necessary to carry out a whole complex of retrofitting the ships with Caliber. It makes sense, this is a real help.
You can also upgrade existing ships (from those that will be smoked for another ten and a half years) and - necessarily - submarines.
Some speakers spoke so fiercely of new generation corvettes and frigates, which must be equipped with Caliber.
I do not want to seem like a pessimist, but we are still building corvettes and (especially) frigates ... how to say this so as not to offend anyone ... not very successfully. But MRK so far we can.
So in our case it’s worth just building what we are able to build. What can take cruise missiles on board and strike if necessary.
But when destroyers and frigates begin to descend without problems, then it will be possible to talk about the uselessness of RTOs.
But not before.
Yes, "Caliber" is a good weapon, and their use on objects in Syria precisely with RTOs made many people scratch their heads in the West. And now, many believe that with the departure of history The RSMD RTO treaties as a class will also have to be a thing of the past.
As unnecessary.
Yes, when this Treaty on the Elimination of Medium and Short Range Missiles (INF Treaty), the main squire of the world, the USSR and the United States, had to part with its ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range from 500 to 5500 kilometers.
And it’s wonderful, in the whole world there are enough weapons in general, so that everything can be smashed to ashes more than once.
But all this concerned, I repeat, ground-based missiles. And the sea remained. As a result, the United States simply began to massively put on all the ships that were suitable for this, the Tomahawks, we had a Grenade, but mostly non-nuclear.
Then they created “Caliber”, but they won’t let the navy lie, they somehow introduced it, with such difficulties that in the 2000 they started talking seriously that “Violinist” (that is, “Caliber”) was not needed. ”
And then, in general, the Caliber carrier ships began to write off one after another. Strange, but it seems that someone generally wanted to complete the task of maximum attenuation fleet.
The fact that the situation in the fleet has stabilized is a merit of no naval command. The merit of export variations of the Novator design bureau on the theme of the same Pomegranate, as a result of which the Club complex appeared. Let not so long-range, but very, very successful in both senses: anti-ship and offensive
However, subsequently, a chain of initially unrelated events occurred that nevertheless caused the appearance of long-range cruise missiles in the arsenal of the fleet, albeit in an extremely irrational way.
The first thing that changed the situation with cruise missiles was the critical situation with financing defense industry enterprises, in which export was the salvation. The response of a separate Novator design bureau to this challenge was the emergence of the Club missile family - Club missiles with a relatively short range, created using the backbone of the non-nuclear Grenade. The missiles turned out successful both in the shock (against the coast), and in the anti-ship variants.
And then our sworn buyers appeared - Indians who not only became interested in missiles, but also ordered a series of Talvar class frigates of the 11356 project, staffed with the Club complex missiles in the 3С-14 vertical launch unit for eight missiles.
It is unpleasant to state, but it was the order for the Indian Navy that actually saved the whole thing.
And then another submarine of the 636 project, armed with the same missiles, went for export.
The situation turned out to be most amusing on the one hand, but ordinary on the other. For us, in principle, it has already become the norm when modern weapons are first exported, and then ... and then there may not be at all. And don’t need to go for examples, here it is, first, and then you can remember the T-90, and the very same Su-57 is ready to shove anyone, if only they would. But not myself.
And then, as always, when the "Caliber" was completed "regardless", for Indian money, suddenly the fleet began to see clearly. Although there are witnesses to a serious “stick” in 2006 at a meeting with the president.
Well then, again, as is customary with us, in a firefight they began to shove "Caliber" onto any ships that could be adapted for this. The whole question is that the ships were minuscule.
So there was a "Dagestan", which began to modernize under the "Caliber" at the same time as completion. Happened. So the 11660 project was “calibrated” in 11661, and the 21630 project in 21631.
And off we go. RTOs are easier to build than frigates and corvettes, since a small missile ship is just a well-fed missile boat.
Therefore, of course, the combat use of RTOs in 2015 was successful and, to put it mildly, did not please anyone in the West.
But let's be fair: the entire missile salvo of the Caspian flotilla is several times smaller than that of any modern destroyer, at least the same Arly Burke. Alas, the fact.
Move on. The project to bring to the “Caliber” RTOs was done “on the knee”, as always, when our president began to speak negatively. The frankly doing nothing for the fleet, the leadership began to urgently get out. Hence the completely inaudible rush, and the military launch, timed to coincide with the birthday ...
What happened in essence, what is an RTO and how useful is it?
The ship is definitely unhurried (25 nodes) and short-range (2500 km at 12 nodes). Seaworthiness exclusively for enclosed areas such as the Caspian or Black Seas. Autonomy - 10 days.
Air defense is very so-so. Frankly weak. With anti-submarine equipment is even worse, but there is a certain reason: who will spend a torpedo on such a target? So, I think that if they understand exactly who is in front of the boat, they will spend it. But "Buyan" is practically nothing to defend.
And to the target designation system there were repeated volleys of criticism.
In general, those who call the XRNM project MRK a floating rocket battery are right. It is so indeed. Another question is that, in the absence of something better, our naval leaders took advantage of these very boats.
Probably, it is worth recalling that “Buyan” under the project was to be on guard and protect the economic zone. That is, to work in the near sea zone without any long trips there.
The fact that the boat near MZ had to be used as a full-fledged combat missile ship - well, this is purely out of poverty. Converting a patrol boat to a floating battery was successful, but weaknesses remained.
Yes, for launches from the Black or Caspian Sea over the horizon, they are very suitable. But in the Baltic Sea or in the Mediterranean Sea, and even under the conditions of opposition of normal enemy ships - I am afraid that these will be targets.
Not only that, something more or less serious like the German “Saxony” will catch up and smear with a thin layer on the surface of the Baltic Sea.
But we already have these ships, another question, what are the proposals for their further fate in the light of the demise of the INF Treaty.
Cruise missile. A very formidable and useful weapon. And, importantly - not so expensive. It can fly using navigation, skirting terrain and so on. Yes, you can shoot down, especially with modern air defense systems. But modern air defense systems - this is not for everyone. This is about us, USA, Israel.
It is appropriate to recall here that in April of the 2014 of the year during a missile strike on Syria performed by the US Navy, it was demonstrated that the Kyrgyz Republic quite normally gets off.
However, cheapness and quantity are the keys to success. Massed volley of cruise missiles - and hello. Try to neutralize it.
In this regard, everything is very sad. A single salvo of cruise missiles of the entire Black Sea Fleet is less than a missile salvo of one Arly Burke. Alas.
In these conditions, a floating battery is quite a weapon.
However, the performance characteristics of the 21631 missile systems show that this is not even an attempt to re-equip the fleet with anything at all, but rather is simply a substitute for the once-forbidden INF Treaty land launchers.
But the substitute is so-so. It came out a little expensive, since it was no longer a boat, but still not a corvette. If for money - half the corvette of the 20385 project. But here the fault is not of developers, but of foreign policy. All RTOs were designed for German MTU diesels, and due to sanctions, ships had to be redone for Chinese engines. The alteration came out both long and rather expensive.
In general, “Buyan-M” is the first pancake that clearly came out lumpy.
But then went “Karakurt" project 22800. It seems to be working on bugs. “Karakurt” was provided with a high speed (30 knots) and better seaworthiness, they received a target designation complex, and was enhanced by an air defense installation of the “Shell-ME”.
But in fact - it’s the same floating rocket platform, that’s a bit faster. A large surface ship is not an opponent for them, and submarines are still just a deadly enemy.
And the cost of an incomprehensible ship in 10 billion rubles is more than significant. However, “Karakurt” is still more like a tactical strike unit than “Buyan-M”.
And now, when the DRMSD collapsed, there was talk that the RTOs should be put under the knife for their complete uselessness. Say, a floating battery may well be replaced by a ground-based complex. Even figures were cited: the dual-battery division of the OTRK Iskander, into which the Caliber can be loaded, costs about six billion rubles and provides the same eight-missile salvo as the multi-missile system. RTOs cost in the 2017 year nine billion. But RTOs, having fired rockets, must return to base, and the ground launcher is recharged on the spot with the help of TZM.
Theoretically, for six billion you can get not eight, but 16 missiles in a salvo. A lot of people speak in the style of "if." If you design a new installation such as the French HADES, which seems to be indistinguishable from a conventional machine, if that, if ...
But many of those who called for “removing” the RTOs under the knife simply forget that they are looking at the map. And the globe is round ...
You can stumble across the border strip of ground-based OTRK with "Caliber". Absolutely not a question, you can. But you can also track them. And fly a rocket through a continent stuffed with air defense systems and radars. This is if we are talking about the western border.
An RTO floating battery can quite easily launch on the border of the territorial waters of Turkey and Romania, for example, and keep an eye on a vast territory unmatched. Do not forget that there are no more ATS countries, and there are no former Soviet republics in which ground missiles could be located.
Kaliningrad ... Turn a western outpost into a real ground fortress? Well, it’s even easier there: Poland and the Baltic states are nearby. There is where to work in terms of interception. And how will Belarusians look at our rockets at home? I think no need to explain.
So a small rocket battery, capable of approaching 1000 km across the water surface, is not even the most stupid thing even in the light of the cancellation of the INF Treaty, whatever they say.
Another issue is that at the same time as the release of the RTOs, it is necessary to carry out a whole complex of retrofitting the ships with Caliber. It makes sense, this is a real help.
You can also upgrade existing ships (from those that will be smoked for another ten and a half years) and - necessarily - submarines.
Some speakers spoke so fiercely of new generation corvettes and frigates, which must be equipped with Caliber.
I do not want to seem like a pessimist, but we are still building corvettes and (especially) frigates ... how to say this so as not to offend anyone ... not very successfully. But MRK so far we can.
So in our case it’s worth just building what we are able to build. What can take cruise missiles on board and strike if necessary.
But when destroyers and frigates begin to descend without problems, then it will be possible to talk about the uselessness of RTOs.
But not before.
Information