Military Review

We are building a fleet. Special Operations: Nuclear Deterrence

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Speaking about the fact that the main way the fleet solves its tasks is to establish dominance at sea in the designated areas, we should always keep in mind a few exceptions.



The task to which it is necessary to prepare, in order to never fulfill it.


At first glance, landing operations are an obvious exception. They are a logical continuation of the establishment of dominance at sea, and occasionally they can be carried out before reaching it (for example, in Narvik in the 1940 year). A landing operation can serve to establish dominance at sea, for example, if the army can destroy the enemy’s fleet in the base with a land attack. But such an exception does not affect the theory of war at sea. In the end, and for a full-fledged large-scale landing operation, supremacy at sea is necessary, and the amphibious operations themselves are carried out after achieving this very domination, “according to Corbett” - as one of the ways to use this domination. And how many wars are being waged on the seas, so much they end with landings on the coast - from antiquity, if not earlier. Landing operations have never given a new dimension to war at sea in the foreseeable past.

For many centuries fleet there was only one fundamentally new group of problems arising from its fundamentally new property. Tasks requiring at least mention in theoretical constructions. Tasks, the appearance of which finally proved that, in principle, the appearance of a new kind weapons it can bring to life the emergence of a “new dimension” in strategy, its new section, if you like. We are talking about the appearance in service of fleets of submarines armed with ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads and the strategic consequences of this.

The possibility of a nuclear war and its premises


"Hotheads" among the patriotic public, as a rule, do not recall that according to the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, the prevention of nuclear war is one of the main tasks of the armed forces. It is not at all a question of arranging a “doomsday by hand” in response to any attack or during a limited war.

The task of preventing a nuclear war is accomplished by nuclear deterrence of a potential enemy, that is, by creating conditions when (at least theoretically) in case of a sudden nuclear strike against Russia the enemy’s retaliation is inevitable and either counter-attack is launched on its territory (our missiles launched after that how the enemy’s missiles launched, but before they reached the goal), or retaliatory (our missiles launched after the enemy’s missiles struck the territory of the Russian Federation) retaliation strike.

Such measures have proven effective over a long historical period. Today, experts are sounding the alarm - the number of deployed nuclear weapons in Russia is significantly less than in the Soviet period, the missile attack warning system actually came down to the radar (work is underway to restore the satellite components of the SPRN, but so far there are only three satellites in space), which makes the flight the time of the enemy’s missiles from the moment of their detection by the radar, and until the strike on the territory of the Russian Federation, is approximately equal, and for some purposes, less than the time of the transfer of the command to launch missiles through the combat control networks.

So far we are still more or less reliably protected, but further reduction of the nuclear arsenal and improvement of the enemy’s nuclear attack tools will put this security into question. The enemy creates a missile defense system, deploys its elements on surface ships in order to concentrate missile defense systems in predetermined areas near the attacked country, learns to knock down satellites from the ground and surface ships, and few people think about this among non-professionals in our country - actively improves nuclear attack facilities.

In 1997, the United States launched the development of new systems for detonating nuclear warhead detonators of the warhead of the W76 ballistic missile, which, in various modifications, was installed on the Poseidon and Trident SLBMs. In the 2004 year, work went into the pre-production batch production phase; with 2008, shipments of devices to the US Navy began. A little later, the same devices began to receive for their missiles the British Navy.

What is the essence of the innovation?

First, let’s see how the divided head parts of the “ordinary” SLBM “lie” on the target.

We are building a fleet. Special Operations: Nuclear Deterrence

The yellow circles are the places where the warheads were detonated; a gray arc delineates the silo strike area


As you can see, when trying to attack a point target (for example, a silo launcher of ICBMs), near it, 3-5 warheads from 10 are undermined. At the same time, one should not forget about the probable circular deviation, and about the fact that it can lead to such a spread of warheads falling on the target, in which the point target will not be hit at all. For this reason, SLBMs have always been seen as a means of attacking dispersed ground targets, such as cities. This made submarine missiles suitable only for a retaliatory strike (in such exotic and partly ridiculous situations as fighting on the pier - also for retaliatory oncoming ones, if the enemy did not destroy the submarines proactively, with their non-strategic weapons, at the time of launching their missiles).

New detonator initiation devices are changing the way to detonate a warhead.


The affected area is almost the same, but the probability of guaranteed destruction of a point protected target is much higher.


Now all warheads are detonated in the immediate vicinity of the target, and the CVO affects the probability of its destruction much less.

According to the military leaders of the US Navy, the introduction of new missile systems has led to such an improvement in missile accuracy that it is now possible to use them to strike small targets, such as silo launchers.

The same capabilities were received by the British Navy.


War Block W76-1


All this is not very good for us, and that's why.

There are two main scenarios for delivering a massive nuclear strike with strategic nuclear weapons - counter-force and counter-value.

Counterforce strike it is inflicted on the enemy’s strategic weapons and the infrastructure that ensures their use — on missile launchers, command centers, communication centers, and leaders who are able to decide whether to strike (a “decapitating” strike is a kind of counter-force strike). A successful counterforce strike reduces the enemy’s ability to retaliate to at least be tolerant in scale. Ideally, to zero.

Countervalue strike involves the destruction of protected goals - the population, cities, industry, infrastructure, not having military significance, but having economic and social. A counter-value strike is an operation to genocide an adversary’s population.

One of the problems of nuclear war is that missiles carrying nuclear warheads cannot be quickly retargeted. Changing the aiming of a ballistic missile, especially a mine rocket of a new model, is a technically complex and lengthy operation. The defending side needs to proceed from the fact that it will be able to counterattack those goals that the missiles were originally aimed at.

The only means of conducting nuclear war, which in theory can be unlimitedly redirected from one target to another, are bombers, and, in the absence of the technical ability to reload flight missions into cruise missiles placed on board, these will only be bombers with bombs. That led to the active preparation of the US Air Force Strategic Aviation Command (SAC) for the use of free-fall nuclear bombs after the first wave of missile attacks.

Missiles will fly to where they are aimed before the war.

And here the side that is defending meets a dilemma - where to aim their missiles. Should they be aimed at the enemy’s military facilities in advance as part of a counter-force strike? Or immediately on his "values" in the framework of counter-value?

Elementary logic says that the maximum orientation to the counterforce strike for the defending side is meaningless. After all, the enemy, who understands the vulnerability of his ground-based weapons of destruction, either uses them (ICBMs) or at least disperses them (bombers). The US Air Force SAK conducts exercises for the rapid dispersal of bombers on a regular basis, unlike the Russian Air Force. As well as the development of the use of free-falling nuclear bombs in the conditions of the partially surviving enemy air defense.


Emergency rise of bombers and tankers. It is usually executed on alarm from the "readiness number 2" in our terminology. The crews are in the “on-duty” barracks, take command of the aircraft, immediately start the engines and sequentially, machine by car go to the runway. In a real combat situation, they will immediately go on target with nuclear bombs


Other exercises showing exit from the parking lot

In addition, and this is the most important thing - the defending side does not know where the detected launched missiles of the attacking side are directed. What if it’s a counter-value hit right away? It is completely impossible to exclude this, if only because such a strike is technically feasible. There is also a question of the proportionality of retaliation - the losses inflicted on the enemy population in a retaliatory or retaliatory strike cannot be an order of magnitude smaller than their losses. And preferably they should not be smaller at times. And ideally, taking into account the unequal population of the warring parties, inflict comparable demographic damage on the enemy, in percent.

This means that for a party that does not consider the possibility of delivering a first nuclear strike, at least a substantial part of its forces should be aimed at a counter-value strike. This means that giving maximum accuracy to all warhead carriers is a waste of money.

In contrast, for the attacking side, the accuracy of hitting targets is crucial. Critical to her is minimizing her losses. At the same time, she does not have the opportunity to evacuate the population from dangerous places in advance, or to disperse material assets - the opposing side, having discovered this, can simply strike first, regardless of the consequences, and, by and large, will be right from any point of view. Thus, it is critical for the attacker to destroy the maximum number of forces capable of causing damage to it - mine launchers, submarines, bombers, depots with nuclear weapons ready for use (bombs, shells). Otherwise, the attack becomes too expensive, and this price makes sense of a military victory in principle.

To go unpunished, an attacker needs to use every carrier of nuclear charges. The modernization of SLBM warheads includes American SSBNs in the arsenal of means for the first counter-force strike, moreover, this modernization simply does not make sense in any other case. But it is being held. This means that the first counter-force strike is considered by the US authorities as one of the options for action in the short term, and it is for this that the United States is preparing. Otherwise, it must be admitted that the United States consciously throws money away.

It is worth noting that this program started immediately after the “victory” in the presidential election in the Russian Federation of Boris Yeltsin in the 1996 year - when all observers believed that Russia was over and it would not be restored. China as a problem for the United States was not there. And there was an old half-dead enemy, which would be nice to finish off, but who has nuclear weapons. The situation in those years was very favorable to the final solution of the “Russian question”, especially since Russia was willing to reduce nuclear weapons, reducing the number of targets for destruction.

The offensive arms reduction treaties between Russia and the United States and the mutual verification mechanism stipulated in them have led the parties to have the exact coordinates of each silo launcher against each other and periodically check them directly on the covers of the silos. Also limited were the positional areas of the PGRK - mobile ground missile systems of the Strategic Missile Forces of the Russian Armed Forces. Given the defeat of the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation, the communications and command centers of the Strategic Missile Forces and the means of communication with submarines of the Russian Navy, the United States today in theory can expect that they will be able to destroy all silos and most PGRK in the first attack. The massacre of the Russian SSBNs - missile-carrying submarines, will fall on the shoulders of the American submarine, and for the last many years it has been fulfilling this task, moreover, successfully and on a real enemy - on our submarines located on combat patrol routes.

At the same time, the neutralization of combat control networks will not allow surviving PGRK to timely receive a launch command. This will give the United States an opportunity to try to destroy the PGRK that were not destroyed by the missile attack. For this, B-2 bombers previously raised in the air can be used. In other conditions, their inconspicuity would not have helped them avoid the defeat of Russian air defense and fighter aviationbut after a missed massive nuclear strike, the ability of air defense and aviation to bring down all American planes will be a big question. Of fundamental importance for the success of such a plan, if it exists, is the most severe blow to the Russian strategic nuclear forces, which they cannot survive. The inclusion of SSBNs in forces capable of delivering such a strike makes it absolutely real.

That, however, is not all.

PGRK, who left the position area, or disguised in it, still needs to be detected. Currently, Americans are working on ways to detect mobile missile systems. In addition to Russia, China and DPRK have such complexes, and this makes the search for methods of their detection very popular. Being true to themselves, Americans are looking for a cheap, "budget" solution to the problem. At the moment, their task is to “teach” military computers to detect anomalies on satellite photos that may indicate the presence of a masked launcher on the ground. Most likely, they will achieve their goal sooner or later.

So, in the early nineties, they managed to find a way to identify railway missile systems on combat duty. One of the signs of such a complex was the discrepancy between the number of locomotives in the train and its length - if a certain train, when observing from space, “shone” the locomotives as if it were a freight train, and if it was passenger in length, then it should be examined visually in the photo. If by the composition of the wagons it became clear that this is a complex (that is, along with several passenger and freight wagons there are also refrigerators with a short length of the train as a whole and two or more powerful locomotives), then the place where it is located became the object of a nuclear attack . Then, however, they lacked the computing power to cover everything. Now there are enough of them, but camouflaged PGRK is a more difficult target. Until.

Separate mention deserves the development of US MTR US nuclear sabotage. Despite the closed nature of information on this subject, it is known that theoretical research on the combat use of "nuclear backpacks" in the United States does not stop. The satchels themselves, however, have been removed from service and disposed of, which, however, is inaccurate in the first place, and can be quickly corrected in the second. The Americans announced the withdrawal from service of those models that they had previously, nothing more. There is nothing in open sources about works on modern ammunition of this type, but there are a number of episodes with blabbed military men, from which it follows that such possibilities are being discussed.

There is one more argument in favor of the fact that knapsack charges are not completely gone. In the wake of the post-Soviet "detente", the US Congress banned the creation of nuclear weapons with a capacity of less than 5 kilotons. This immediately made impossible the development of "nuclear backpacks." However, in 2004, this ban was lifted by Congress. Some military experts are even considering the possibility of nuclear sabotage against state leaders who will be able to decide on a retaliatory strike and the destruction of communication centers and command posts, which can slow down the passage of missile launch teams in the Strategic Missile Forces. Also, their objects can be, radar SPRN, naval bases of the SSBN. It must be recognized that the deployment and undermining of such charges can indeed "decapitate" Russia and disorganize the combat command network for a time that is enough for ICBMs and submarines. It is impossible to mark such a threat.


Knapsack container for carrying a portable nuclear bomb saboteur paratrooper


And finally, ongoing work to create an American missile defense system. For a long time, American officials claimed that anti-missile defense work was not directed against Russia. After the 2014 year, everything changed, and now no one really hides against which country, ultimately, the American missile defense is being created. And again the question arises - in which case will such a system make sense? Indeed, a priori no missile defense will repulse a massive first or retaliatory strike from Russia.

And if it is a weak retaliatory strike with a few surviving missiles? Then it turns out that the missile defense system is working, and all investments in it are not in vain and justified.

Moreover, for some strange reason, the USA’s technical ability to equip some missiles with a nuclear warhead is ignored, which will increase their effectiveness by an order of magnitude. In addition, some missile defense components themselves can quickly be converted to shock.

All of the above makes us consider nuclear aggression by the United States quite real. At least, preparation for such aggression is the only consistent explanation of why the Americans need such a modernization of the W76-1 warhead fuses and at the same time what they count on in the case of missile defense, which, as it turns out, is still not against Iran.

There is another consideration related to the Royal Navy of Great Britain and their Trident missiles.

Combat patrol areas of British SSBNs are much closer to the Russian Federation than the American patrol areas. They are close enough to launch a salvo of their SLBMs on the so-called “flat” trajectory - an arc with a low apogee, when a rocket rises up to a much lower height than with an energetically advantageous flight to a maximum range.

This method of shooting has a minus - the range decreases and decreases very much. But there is a plus - for a short flight distance, the missile spends significantly less time to overcome the distance. Flight time is reduced, and by a significant amount compared with the "normal", that is, energetically profitable flight at the same distance. Reduction of time can reach 30%. And taking into account the fact that the boats themselves are closer to the target, that is, the distance to it is relatively small, the flight time is even less, and there are risks that with this method of launching an attack on Russia will be delivered before it is possible to give a command to reciprocating. It is not in vain that there is an opinion that, in the “American-British” combination, the latter are responsible precisely for the first strike.

An important factor is the prevailing morality in American society. At first glance, a typical American is a calm, even good-natured and friendly person. As a rule, he does not want his country to intervene in all sorts of wars. Reality is tough and cynical

The first problem is not Americans are the origins of American culture. The American nation began to form during the gigantic military force expansion of the colonists throughout the North American continent, which was accompanied by a mass of fierce clashes and wars, the massive expulsion of Native Americans from their land, and individual acts of genocide. It was during these events that the American archetype, partly culture and epic, was formed.

This birth trauma has led to the fact that the average American does not feel internal protest when his society conducts military captures and massacres somewhere, moreover, sometimes he cannot perceive them otherwise than an act of heroism, because these are its roots and origins. This phenomenon is still waiting for detailed researchers, while it is worth recommending the work of an American sociologist and concurrently executive director of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology John Tyrman, "Death of Others: The Fate of Civilians in the Wars of America" ​​(The Deaths of Others. The Fate of Civilians in America's Wars. John tirman. You will need knowledge of English and a few dollars), or his article "Why do we ignore the civilian population killed in American wars" (Eng.)where this question is considered in more detail and with examples.

The second problem is the so-called "Ideology of American Exclusivity." A very controversial teaching for non-Americans and indisputable for the mass of Americans, upon closer examination, is a completely banal and even boring subspecies of fascism. But the idea of ​​the superiority of Americans over non-Americans, this doctrine drives hard into American heads. Alas, the followers of this quasi-religious teaching are in our country, which is why many problems of the Russian Federation are caused.

The most striking example of how these features of the American mentality are manifested in wars is the Second World War. We used to have a positive attitude towards the Americans in that war, because they were our allies, but in fact their methods of war were much more brutal than those of the Japanese and not much milder than Nazi Germany. Only one example - at the end of the war, in 1945, the United States launched operations to destroy Japanese cities, which were a commonplace burning of thousands of residential neighborhoods in dozens of cities with the population. Several hundred aircraft appeared over the city and bombarded its densely populated areas with a “carpet” of incendiary bombs. There were many such episodes, and, as usual, the Americans were not even puzzled by calculating the losses of the enemy, identifying them today as part of the 240-900 thousand people, almost all civilians.

Studies of American mentality should be left outside the scope of this article; we only indicate the conclusion - a significant proportion of US residents have the idea that their government will attack a country and kill millions of innocent people there does not cause any internal protest. They are indifferent at best. This is true for a hypothetical nuclear war.

But what excites US citizens is their own losses. All American protests against the Iraq war revolve around the dead US soldiers. The fact that they, generally speaking, are aggressors and attacked a country that did not threaten the United States, albeit with an ugly regime in power, is simply not remembered by anyone. The fact that Iraq has turned into a large cemetery is also, in general, not of interest. Similarly, Libya.

It cannot be assumed that the Americans cannot bear military losses - this is not so; they can endure a lot, no matter how much more than we. The question is that they categorically do not want to do this, and today it is precisely potential losses that are an effective deterrent to American aggression. But without this deterrent, they are, in principle, capable of almost everything that, for example, is well remembered in the vicinity of the Vietnamese village of Song Mi.

And it cannot be denied that a certain proportion of US citizens, mainly from the upper layers of American society (but not only) are obsessed with truly pathological hatred towards the Russian Federation, its culture, population, stories, and, in general, dissatisfied with the very fact of our existence.

This resonates with the work of the Western propaganda machine, which has achieved serious success in anti-Russian propaganda, including the “inhumanization” of the Russian population in the eyes of many ordinary people in Western countries.

Thus, the degree of danger from the United States for our country is constantly growing, and the danger in its extreme embodiment is in the form of a threat of a sudden destructive nuclear strike.

Does the US have rational reasons to do this to us if it is possible to do so with impunity or almost with impunity? There is.

Currently, the main concern for American strategists is the issue of subordinating China to America. It is China that Americans see as their main rival in this century. But, the question arises - why is China even able to challenge the United States in any way? After all, China is extremely dependent on imports of raw materials and resources, and in its military power it is not even close to the United States. The Americans can arrange a blockade of China in any convenient way - along the so-called "first and second chain of islands", at the entrance to the Strait of Malacca from the Indian Ocean, and even in the Persian Gulf. And this “Chinese miracle” may well end.

Naturally, this is a kind of extreme, extreme option, the USA just won’t go for it, but they have such an opportunity.

That's just behind China, there is a backup country. A country that simply provides China with land-based communications with which the US cannot do anything outside the scope of the nuclear war scenario. A country that can supply oil, gas, oil products, raw materials, and food to China. Yes, neither our economy nor the capacity of our cross-border communications will be enough to prevent China from feeling the sea blockade. But we will soften it very much to him. And, of course, the factor of military supplies should not be missed. Until Russia is neutralized, China will be able to get weapons from there; let it be in insufficient quantities, but it will be a lot. If the US can neutralize the Russian Federation, then China itself will execute the command “up to the foot” from Washington, even without pressure from the outside. With Russia, he is far less vulnerable.

Russia alone is too weak to claim global hegemony. Russia does not have an ideology attractive to a substantial part of humanity. In this regard, Russia is not in the same “league” of players as the United States. Russia does not have comparable with the Chinese industrial and, more broadly, economic potential. But Russia is that weight on the scales, which may well swing them in one direction or another. Unable to win much herself, she can determine who will do it. And this is a very dangerous moment, he is actually programming a war with that side of the US-Chinese conflict, to which Russia will take an unfriendly position. Given the events in Ukraine and Syria, it is clear that this will not be China. It will be the United States, and it may be tempting for them to remove the “weak link” from the scheme - the Russians. As Napoleon once wanted to do, and how 129 years after Napoleon Hitler tried to do.

But we have nuclear weapons, it’s so simple, in the usual way, to seriously fight Russia, apparently, not to fight, at least not to fight for destruction. But if you catch the Russians by surprise ...

If taken by surprise, the decline of American dominance over humanity will turn into its endless dawn. The dreams of American science fiction writers about a future in which there are no non-English-speaking heroes will come true, the American social model will continue to crush one culture after another, the English language will continue to supplant national languages, and the US government will continue to transform into a world at an accelerated pace. All other possible development paths for humanity will be closed.

Forever.

Denote threat


At the moment, the United States is modernizing nuclear weapons, which gives them the opportunity to dramatically increase the number of forces suitable for delivering a preventive massive nuclear strike, but is useless for carrying out tasks to deter nuclear aggression. At the same time, work is underway to reduce to zero the value of the strategic nuclear forces of the adversaries of the United States - by introducing into the US Armed Forces methods of detecting mobile soil missile systems, deploying anti-ballistic missile defense systems, and removing restrictions on the design of ultra-small nuclear munitions that were in force after the end of the Cold War.

These works also include the forces of the most faithful American ally - Great Britain, which are purely geographically in a position favorable for delivering a sudden nuclear strike against Russia.

All this activity bears clear signs of preparation for the first, unprovoked massive nuclear strike on the Russian Federation, using land and sea-based ballistic missiles.

Such a strike can be delivered only if the attacking party is impunity, and in case of loss of surprise, the attacking party refuses it (see the attitude of the Americans to their losses), which requires appropriate provision of surprise.

It should be especially noted that the moral paradigm prevailing in American society makes such a blow quite normal from an ethical point of view, and for some representatives of American society this is one of the most desirable options for resolving the "Russian question".

At the same time, the elimination of Russia will automatically solve the “Chinese question” for the US, which also gives rational reasons for a sudden nuclear attack. If such an attack were successful, it would be extremely beneficial for the United States of America, since in addition to neutralizing China, it also “freezes” the role of the United States as a world hegemon for an unbelievably long time.

For us, a simple conclusion is important from all of this - the role of nuclear deterrence in ensuring our security is not only decisive - it also grows and grows continuously. The growth of capabilities of our strategic nuclear forces, however, cannot keep up with the growth of their importance for the country.

This mainly concerns the navy.

Nuclear Deterrence and the Navy


In the 2015 year in the USA, the Bear Spear ("Spear for the Bear") command-staff exercises were held. According to the scenario of the exercises, the evil revanchist Russia began to terrorize its neighbors, attack them and deprive of sovereignty, the United States intervened, and the escalation began. During the ongoing escalation, the parties resorted to nuclear weapons, and the United States managed to get ahead of Russia and strike first. The population of Russia during this attack was almost completely destroyed - only at the time of the attack, one hundred million people died. However, Russia retaliated, killing tens of millions of Americans. What allowed Russia to strike back with sufficient strength? The fact that during the first yet non-nuclear battles, the US Navy missed several Russian submarines, the crews of which ultimately retaliated.

The one-goal game did not work, although the American planners provided for everything, and even were able to "neutralize" almost the entire ground nuclear arsenal of the Russian Federation.

This example very eloquently shows what role the navy should play in theory in the system of nuclear deterrence.

With appropriate types of support (anti-submarine, anti-mine, and others), with anti-submarine forces covering the deployment of boats, including aviation, with competent execution of isolation of combat areas (for example, mines), when the crew is ready to withstand enemy submarines and taking into account modern methods search by aircraft for patrol aviation, namely submarines with ballistic missiles become the most reliable means of deterrence.

First and foremost, unlike ground-based strategic nuclear forces, it cannot be quickly hit by strategic weapons, such as ballistic missiles, even if its location is known.

Secondly, it is mobile. The boat, barely creeping around on the 4 nodes, will pass 177 kilometers under water in a day. At the same time, for new submarine missile carriers (for example, Borey), especially low-noise speed can be significantly increased.


PLA pr. 955 "Northwind." Relatively low-noise future


Again, in theory, at this level of mobility, it is very difficult to track. Its coordinates are unknown, as in silos. It can not be calculated by satellite photos, like PGRK. In theory, even if the satellite “catches” the surfaced wake trail or the “Kelvin wedge” or other wave manifestations, based on this information it is impossible to immediately use any weapon against the submarine.

It can be detected from an airplane by wave traces on the surface of the water. But there are some opportunities to avoid this detection method. It can be detected by secondary low-frequency fluctuations in the water column generated by the moving volume of the boat hull. But minimizing size, reducing speed, taking hydrology into account, and choosing the right depths can significantly reduce the likelihood of such a discovery. The boat, the crew of which operates correctly, the design of which meets modern requirements, and the combat campaign is carried out with all types of support, is still rather difficult to be vulnerable.

In conce, even when the enemy’s PLC outfit reaches a range of weapons against a boat, the result, in the correct version, will be a battle, and not an unrequited blow, as is the case with ground-based systems of strategic nuclear forces. And the boat, in theory, can win this battle. Unlike PGRK, which was attacked by an inconspicuous bomber in the electromagnetic chaos of the first hours after the start of a nuclear war, or even fell under the second wave of a nuclear missile attack.

Properly organized strategic nuclear forces force the enemy to reveal their intentions during the deployment of anti-submarine forces and conduct operations to search for submarines, and give time for the deployment of PGRK, eliminating their defeat by the first strike of the enemy.

However, in the case of the Russian Navy, this whole theory diverges significantly from practice.

The Navy has now adopted a system of protected combat zones - areas where all SSBNs should go during the threatened period and where they should be prepared to launch a nuclear strike against the enemy. These areas and the surrounding water areas through which the deployment of submarines is carried out, and in which the Russian anti-submarine forces are operating, with the light hand of NATO were called "Bastion". Russia has two such “bastions”.


"Bastions." Inside them, periodically replaced air defense missile defense systems are protected areas of military operations. Borders artificially “roughened”


The following should be noted.

The fighting inside these areas will be a complex of attempts by the enemy to carry out an operation within the region to destroy the SSBNs using their submarines, relying on their low noise and range of use of weapons, as well as storming the area from the outside by surface and underwater forces and aircraft. Since the task of the fleet forces in these areas will be to ensure the combat stability of submarine forces, it becomes necessary for the fleet to achieve unconditional, complete supremacy at sea in the indicated water areas. It is dominance at sea, and, taking into account the power of the enemy’s basic patrol aircraft, also in the air, that can allow the SSBN to freely leave the bases, go the route to the protected combat area and take a position there, ready to use the main weapons.

However, at this point, dilemma number two sets in — the adversary is usually stronger than us. And in fact, guarding the boats locked in the “bastions”, the Navy becomes attached to them, concentrates its forces in a small water area, where they will have to take up battle with the enemy’s superior in numbers and strength. In addition, this approach exposes the coast, making them vulnerable to the enemy. In fact, the “bastionic” approach is somewhat repeating the history of the siege of Port Arthur. There, too, the highly mobile form of forces (fleet) locked itself in a fortress, where it was later destroyed. Here a similar picture, only the scales are different.

And this is without taking into account the terrible state of the Navy regarding the presence of anti-submarine forces.

During the previous analysis of options that a weak fleet can use to defeat a strong, it was shown that the answer to the superiority of the enemy in forces at sea should be superiority in speed. And this is not about racing at the maximum power of the power plant (although this will sometimes be necessary), but about advancing in actions, in imposing the enemy on a pace for which he is not ready for one reason or another.

Although the actions of strategic submarines during nuclear deterrence operations or during an ongoing nuclear war are radically different in nature than the main way to solve problems by the fleet (seizing dominance at sea), the principle itself is true here. The enemy should not have time to react, he should be late.

The grouping strategy in the “bastions” cannot lead to such an effect. The fleet, regardless of what task it performs, is an offensive tool. They cannot be defended, technically impossible, they can only advance, and any defensive task can be effectively solved only by offensive actions. Thus, there is a conceptual error - instead of turning the whole world into an arena for a real or conditional battle with the USA, we ourselves do the enemy a service, gathering in a small area, breaking the defenses of which with the enemy’s superior power is quite possible. We drive ourselves into a corner.

This is especially evident in the example of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. The conditions in it are very favorable for the American submarine that has slipped into it to conduct long and covert surveillance of our strategic submarines. It is difficult to take refuge in it; this is a problematic water area under all conditions. But for some reason it is considered safe.

This state of affairs arose in the mid-eighties, when the United States, sharply, abruptly raising the effectiveness of its anti-submarine forces, were able to demonstrate to the military-political leadership of the USSR the absolute hopelessness of attempts to deploy strategic nuclear forces in the open ocean without adequate support. And there were already problems with security. The answer to this challenge should have been the same revolutionary increase in the secrecy of the submarine forces of the USSR, and their closer interaction with other types of forces, but the USSR could not give such an answer.


Photo of a Soviet atomic submarine in a surface position through the periscope of a nuclear submarine of the US Navy "Haddo." During the Cold War, the US Navy outplayed the Soviet Navy under water. To rout


The technological backwardness of Soviet industry and the lack of imagination among the people who determined the naval strategy ultimately led to the banal flight of the USSR Navy from the battlefield and the departure of submarines into the notorious "bastions", which even during the Cold War were really completely permeable to the enemy.

Thus, the task of the future construction of the strategic nuclear forces will be to expand their presence in the oceans. The exit from the “bastions” and the resumption of an active offensive in spirit strategy is a vital measure to ensure that the strategic nuclear forces in terms of their combat effectiveness do not lag behind the enemy’s growing strike capabilities.

Positive examples were most recently by historical standards. So in the mid-80-ies, a submarine detachment of the 25th Pacific Fleet division carried out a military campaign in the western part of the Pacific Ocean and launched combat patrols near the Galapagos Islands. The detachment was covered by surface ships.

Today, such a change is facing a huge problem.

The fleet is simply not ready to conduct them, neither psychologically, nor financially, nor organizationally. For example, there is not enough aviation to provide such military campaigns, and the one that is substantially outdated. The fleets themselves are subordinate to the military districts, and it will be very difficult to explain to the land general that offshore is more dangerous than somewhere far in the ocean. The command staff of the Navy is already used to doing what it does (although voices demanding to return to the ocean in the fleet are heard, and very high). There are questions about submarines.

Our submarines are truly huge. And this is a vulnerability to radar search by surface wave disturbances and a high level of secondary low-frequency oscillations.

The self-defense means of our submarines are ineffective, on board or not at all, or almost no anti-torpedoes, torpedo weapons are outdated, and in some conditions not applicable.

This is superimposed on the training of the SSBN crews, which for many years have been passively circling in the areas designated for patrol, technically unable to detect the American or British "hunter" attached to them.

Perhaps, having established the interaction between multipurpose submarines and the SSBN, having worked out the tactics of detaching from tracking, exploring in detail the methods of avoiding non-acoustic searches, and avoiding tracking from enemy submarines, one could try to "go beyond" the supposedly safe "bastions" and begin to learn to “get lost” in the ocean, forcing the enemy to spend time, nerves and money on the search for countermeasures.

In the future, it will be necessary to reconsider the approaches to the creation of new boats, so that they correspond to the new offensive strategy and in their design features.
In the meantime, it is critically important to restore the power of anti-submarine forces to values ​​that would establish dominance at sea (and in fact under the sea) in the "bastions". This should be the very first and most important task of the Navy. From this should begin its restoration as an effective fighting force. Both at the stage of the withdrawal of the boat from the base, and at the stage of its transfer to the combat patrol area (and in the future, to the separation area from tracking), the Navy anti-submarine forces should completely exclude the presence of foreign submarines nearby, and together with naval aviation ensure continuous readiness for the destruction of anti-submarines enemy aircraft. Since we want the fleet to fight for supremacy at sea, it is logical to start with the communications used by domestic strategic submarines.

Now there is nothing like that.

It would be logical to see the evolution of the strategic nuclear forces in the form of successively achieving the following stages:

1. The restoration of anti-mine and anti-submarine forces to a level that provides the SSBN with a safe exit from the bases and transfer to the designated combat patrol area. This will require the establishment of supremacy at sea in each of the “bastions,” which in turn will require an increase in the number of anti-submarine surface ships, and modernization of diesel submarines, and the creation of a new anti-submarine aircraft, at least small, and seriously improve the tactical training of commanders and crews ships. Just one performance of this task would be a huge success.

2. Modernization of the SSBN with the elimination of critical shortcomings for their combat capabilities.

3. Beginning of operations to transfer combat patrols to the open ocean.

4. Development of the concept of the submarines of the future, optimized for the new ocean strategy of nuclear deterrence. The beginning of the construction of boats according to a new concept.

5. The final transition to the deployment of strategic nuclear forces in the open ocean.

The latter will not only make deterrence more effective on our part, but, by pulling a significant part of the enemy’s anti-submarine forces to search for SSBNs, will indirectly contribute to the rapid and relatively safe deployment of the remaining fleet forces - which will ultimately help protect the strategic nuclear forces.

Conclusion


Nuclear deterrence, operations to disrupt the enemy’s nuclear deterrence, and to prevent them from nuclear attack, as well as the hypothetical conduct of nuclear war - the first fundamentally new even from a theoretical point of view, the tasks of the fleet, which appeared over many centuries. The advent of ballistic missiles launched from under the water led to the emergence of a “new dimension” in the war at sea, irreducible to the traditional and basic for any normal fleet actions to establish supremacy at sea.

For a long time, submarine missiles were not accurate enough to be used as a means of delivering a first strike. However, starting from 1997 of the year, the US Navy is modernizing its missile arsenal, after which American SLBMs can be used to deliver such a strike.

At the same time, the United States is working on the deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems, lifting the ban on the development and production of ultra-low-power nuclear weapons, including those that can be used for sabotage in the rear of the enemy and equipping the naval forces of their British ally with modernized nuclear missiles.

The US missile defense systems are mounted around the Russian Federation, although in words they have not been directed against it for a long time (now it is argued that elements of missile defense in Japan are directed only against the DPRK).

The only consistent explanation for all these actions is the secretive preparation of the United States for delivering a sudden unprovoked massive nuclear strike against the Russian Federation.

An extremely intensive propaganda campaign is being conducted against the Russian Federation, one of the goals of which is the so-called dehumanization of the enemy.

Ethically, such actions are completely acceptable to most American citizens.

From a rational point of view, the destruction of the Russian Federation will bring the United States a lot of benefits, allowing it to actually colonize the entire planet on its own terms, without encountering any resistance anywhere.

Thus, it must be recognized that the risk of a sudden and unprovoked nuclear attack on the Russian Federation is growing.

Under such conditions, the importance of nuclear deterrence is also growing, and its effectiveness should grow after the threat.

The ground components of the strategic nuclear forces are extremely vulnerable due to their location known to the adversary, the ability to continuously observe them with reconnaissance satellites, the possibility of their destruction by strategic weapons from a long distance, and the very nature of the sudden strike, which may turn out to be faster than passing the command to strike back counter strike.

Under such conditions, the role of the marine component of the strategic nuclear forces is growing, due to the reasons for its difficult tracking and the inability to destroy strategic submarines deployed in the sea.

However, the Navy uses a deployment scheme inadequate to modern threats of the deployment of strategic nuclear forces in the form of their presence in protected areas of military operations - the air defense missile system. This is due to the inability of the Navy to withstand the antisubmarine forces of a potential enemy, which must be overcome.

A transition is necessary to the ocean deployment of strategic nuclear forces, which will prevent the enemy from destroying all strategic nuclear forces with a concentrated submarine attack on an air defense missile system, and will seriously increase the tension of its anti-submarine forces.

To do this, you will have to reconsider not only the usual methods of combat employment of submarines, but also approaches to their design. With the highest possible degree of probability, other submarines than there are now will be required for the “oceanic” nuclear strategic nuclear forces.

In the transition period from “bastion” to “oceanic” deployment, the Navy's NWFM should be able to establish absolute supremacy at sea both in the “bastions” as a whole, and especially in the air defense missile systems inside them.

Otherwise, the population and the leadership of the Russian Federation will have to come to terms with the ever-increasing risk of a nuclear attack, which does not counter this risk by anything truly dangerous.
Author:
Photos used:
Thebulletin.org, Foreignpolicy.com, US Navy, Russian Ministry of Defense, TASS
Articles from this series:
We are building a fleet. Theory and Purpose.
We are building a fleet. consequences of uncomfortable geography
building a fleet. attacks of the weak, loss of the strong
335 comments
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  1. Lexus
    Lexus 7 October 2019 05: 21
    -2
    I would argue about the ZRBD. Without a full-fledged surface fleet and SSNS, the survival rate of SSBNs, even in the conditionally protected waters proposed by the author, tends to zero, it is still necessary to reach them from the bases. It is easier to reanimate "SKIF" and hide it in inland water bodies. Ice is not a hindrance, as far as I remember, there are developments of shaped charge pre-charges for launching not from the ice hole. Regarding the SLCM, it is possible to "roll" containers on "peaceful" barges in the border waters.
    1. Vadmir
      Vadmir 7 October 2019 06: 53
      +1
      It is easier to reanimate "SKIF" and hide it in inland water bodies.
      Yes, an interesting project or a couple of conditional Boreevs (without reactors) for the Caspian Sea to build motivating a threat from Iran.
      1. timokhin-aa
        7 October 2019 08: 17
        +3
        And from there will the missiles reach the target? SLBM is not an ICBM.
        1. NordOst16
          NordOst16 7 October 2019 10: 07
          +2
          In any case, this is still a low-mobility missile system.
          And I would always like to know. Everywhere they write that, for hunting for SSBNs, MAPLs are also used. But the missile carriers themselves are equipped, in theory, with the same HAC as the MAPL, although they are inferior to the multi-purpose vehicles in terms of maneuverability and dimensions. But in theory, in the battle between the multi-purpose submarine and the SSBN, the latter has a chance? Or is it a game of olny gates?
          1. timokhin-aa
            7 October 2019 15: 07
            +4
            But the missile carriers themselves are equipped, in theory, with the same HAC as the MAPL, although they are inferior to the multi-purpose vehicles in terms of maneuverability and dimensions. But in theory, in the battle between the multi-purpose submarine and the SSBN, the latter has a chance? Or is it a game of olny gates?


            There are chances, but it is necessary to prepare for such options both from a technical point of view (AGPD, anti-torpedoes, elimination of noise sources on submarines), and from a tactical point of view (training in combat, including with a tie in the form of a sudden torpedo attack "out of nowhere" , by evading non-acoustic search means, by low-noise maneuvering, etc.), and by operational (interaction with other forces during combat service).
        2. Vadmir
          Vadmir 7 October 2019 16: 17
          +1
          I wrote about "conditional Boreas", something cheap can be developed for the Caspian Sea. You can hide in the Caspian Sea, as in other seas, but without the risk of being tracked by a potential enemy.
          Unlike the Scythians, which can be calculated and hit, the submarine is mobile.
          1. Lexus
            Lexus 7 October 2019 17: 25
            -2
            Unlike the Scythians, which can be calculated and hit, the submarine is mobile.

            And what, in fact, prevents the SKIF watchdog vessel from disguising it as, for example, a typical trawler, several "seiners" with guards. I went out into the area, placed them like mines, carried out a topographic survey and wait for signals from the command and control. According to the schedule, he collected "ammunition" in an armful and moved to another place. You can even use cargo "voyage" barges with "gifts" under the bottom. Received a signal - dropped it - launched it. There are no restrictions on the type of SSBN hull diameter, only the required depth of the launch area.
          2. SovAr238A
            SovAr238A 7 October 2019 22: 13
            +2
            Quote: Vadmir
            I wrote about "conditional Boreas", something cheap can be developed for the Caspian Sea. You can hide in the Caspian Sea, as in other seas, but without the risk of being tracked by a potential enemy.
            Unlike the Scythians, which can be calculated and hit, the submarine is mobile.


            The agreement prohibits the deployment of BR carriers in inland waters.
            We have banned rivers and lakes and the Casp Sea, they have great lakes and rivers
        3. bayard
          bayard 7 October 2019 17: 28
          +4
          Well, depending on what kind of missiles, "Sineva", for example, will fly.
          But to shove this into the lakes, especially into the Caspian (far away and the Caspian in the coastal zone is shallow), of course, is stupid. However, the "Skif" theme does not seem to be dead, but quite the opposite. How else to explain the order of the Ministry of Defense for the production of 200 new Sineva missiles?
          For several years now.
          At first I decided that the Bulava, which did not meet expectations, would be replaced by Borei. But no, Bulava went into service ... On old boats? Also unlikely - the resource of the available missiles will be quite enough until the resource of the old missile carriers is exhausted ...
          But for the Skif program, these missiles are even very suitable.
          And it is not necessary to hide them in inland waters. You can simply be in fairly well controlled.

          But about the entry into the ocean of our SSBNs ... I doubt it. Slipping quietly is almost impossible. Going out into such an oceanic distance without reliable cover for surface forces and aircraft is like death. Moreover, sudden and useless. Carriers are gentle for such missions. Without their fighters, there is nothing to disperse the anti-submarine aircraft of the enemy, there is nothing to conduct reconnaissance of its surface forces. And this does not have to be atomic monsters of 100 kilotons, 45-000 tons of displacement (50-000 MiG-20K \ 24K fighters, 29 helicopter submarines and 35-12 AWACS on an EM catapult) will be quite sufficient gas turbine running. Such will be much cheaper than nuclear, will be built faster, in operation much easier and cheaper, and they can be built in St. Petersburg.
          It is of this type that aircraft carriers will be able to effectively provide cover for the deployment area of ​​submarine missile carriers from enemy submarines and will ensure the combat stability of the fleet forces assigned to support the region’s submarines.
          They will be quite effective on a long voyage, providing combat stability, air defense and anti-aircraft missile forces and submarines deployed to the deployment area in the oceans.

          As an oceanic deployment force, the Borey nuclear submarine would be much more interesting in the version of long-range missile carriers (the same Caliber-M and Zircon) With deployment, for example, in the Caribbean Sea and operational basing / providing / covering with a naval base in Venezuela and Cuba (plans for such bases and the deployment of these particular CD carriers there, as far as I know there are - from open sources).

          But until the Russian Navy has less than a decent amount of modern surface ships, all such conversations are only conceptual, empirical.
          1. Newone
            Newone 7 October 2019 18: 29
            +1
            to the Caspian Sea, it may not be necessary to shove, and to Baikal it is quite possible. And the depths allow both the size of the water area and (what is the main) protection of the water area.
            1. bayard
              bayard 7 October 2019 18: 43
              +2
              Baikal is a crack in the earth's crust, a monstrous depth and a very steep bottom going deep ... not very convenient. It is easier to dig / cut tunnels for earth complexes in the mountains around Lake Baikal. But we have a lot of places for the deployment of "Scythians".
              1. Newone
                Newone 7 October 2019 19: 57
                +2
                Baikal is primarily a water area where you can go down to a depth which makes space-based reconnaissance systems ineffective.
                The depth of the lake in such a location is not a disadvantage but an advantage. it is possible to place submarines of any height, respectively rockets of any size.
                Another thing is that Baikal is a drinking reservoir of humanity.
                1. bayard
                  bayard 7 October 2019 20: 07
                  0
                  Quote: Newone
                  it is possible to place submarines of any height, respectively rockets of any size.

                  And how will you deliver this "submarine" there - to Baikal?
                  And what is the advantage in depth diving?
                  Do you have any idea what the Skif project is?
                  1. Newone
                    Newone 7 October 2019 20: 12
                    0
                    I understand that such a project is Skif
                    and what are its advantages and disadvantages, and you, as I see it, are not very good.
                    Will the shipyard arrange on the shore?
                    And what is the advantage in depth diving?
                    At a depth of 100m the boat is distinguishable by means of visual reconnaissance of the enemy (especially in the infrared range) did not know?
                    1. bayard
                      bayard 7 October 2019 22: 59
                      +1
                      Quote: Newone
                      Will the shipyard arrange on the shore?

                      Not .
                      And not only me - everyone will not be happy.
                      And "Skif" does not need a shipyard - it is a submersible container with a rocket inside the bottom / anchor base. It is going (would be going) at the factory, delivery to the basing site by surface or underwater transport ... But it will not be. "Sineva", as it turned out, is being built to re-equip / re-equip old missile carriers - their missiles are already running out, and the boats are still in service.
                      And yes, ice on Lake Baikal is up to 2 meters (see comments below).
                      The Skif was abandoned.
                      My assumption about the designation of 200 Sineva missiles was wrong.
                      The topic is closed.
                      And Baikal is our most valuable reservoir of fresh water.
                      1. karabass
                        karabass 8 October 2019 20: 43
                        -2
                        Have you already received a call from counterintelligence? Accidentally issued a military secret?
                      2. bayard
                        bayard 8 October 2019 21: 17
                        0
                        Well what are you, Timokhin answered me in a comment, he is in the know.
                      3. Vadim237
                        Vadim237 10 October 2019 17: 49
                        +1
                        They ordered Liner rather than Sineva.
                      4. bayard
                        bayard 10 October 2019 20: 33
                        0
                        Do not shoot the office.
            2. SovAr238A
              SovAr238A 7 October 2019 22: 17
              0
              Quote: Newone
              to the Caspian Sea, it may not be necessary to shove, and to Baikal it is quite possible. And the depths allow both the size of the water area and (what is the main) protection of the water area.

              the thickness of the ice looked at Baikal?
              There from 1 to 2 meters ...
              1. Newone
                Newone 7 October 2019 23: 29
                0
                Ice is not a problem from the word at all.
                Baikal is our most valuable freshwater reservoir
                Yes exactly.
                1. SovAr238A
                  SovAr238A 8 October 2019 07: 28
                  +2
                  Quote: Newone
                  Ice is not a problem from the word at all.

                  What a twist...
                  Cool

                  Then explain to all of us why our submarine bases are not in much more closed places from the adversary, such as Igarka, Dikson, Dudinka, Tiksi, Pevek
                  1. Newone
                    Newone 10 October 2019 22: 26
                    +2
                    Because initially the submarine bases were laid for the fastest possible breakthrough into the world ocean (the missile range did not allow firing from the pier).
          2. timokhin-aa
            7 October 2019 18: 50
            +4
            How else to explain the order of the Ministry of Defense for the production of 200 new Sineva missiles?
            For several years now.
            At first I decided that the Bulava, which did not meet expectations, would be replaced by Borei. But no, Bulava went into service ... On old boats? Also unlikely - the resource of the available missiles will be quite enough until the resource of the old missile carriers is exhausted ...


            Just on old boats. There are already missiles with an expired shelf life full, and firing takes place more or less regularly. SKIF is, firstly, prohibited by those agreements in which the Russian Federation participates, and secondly, it is fraught with the loss of nuclear weapons and their falling into unclear whose hands.

            But about the entry into the ocean of our SSBNs ... I doubt it. Slipping quietly is almost impossible.


            It is possible to come off.

            To go out into such an oceanic distance without reliable cover for surface forces and aircraft is like death. Moreover, sudden and useless. For such missions, aircraft carriers are gentle


            Fill Orion can and frigate. It is possible with Ka-52K. The campaign of the 25 diyasia of the submarine mentioned in the text to the Galapagos Islands was covered precisely by URO ships.

            But until the Russian Navy has less than a decent amount of modern surface ships, all such conversations are only conceptual, empirical.


            By the way, in peacetime, ships need a little.
            1. bayard
              bayard 7 October 2019 19: 25
              +1
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              Just on old boats.

              Well, that means more veterans will serve. Since there are new missiles for them, it means that they are not going to be written off after all the Boreyevs have entered the fleet.
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              It is possible to come off.

              From Elk or "Virginia", perhaps yes, but what if aviation takes the submarine for escort and prompts its hunters? And they will do it. And you can only come off (!) In peacetime. Even in a threatened period, this is already fraught.
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              Fill Orion can and frigate.

              Fill up - yes, drive away - no. In peacetime, the airplane of a probable enemy is not a big deal. And he wakes up to circling the frigate’s head and giving target designation to the ward of the MAPL until it gives way to a successor.
              And in wartime, he (Orion or whatever the Japanese have) and himself can use the Harpoon to sniff ahead and dive under the horizon ...
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              It is possible with the Ka-52K.

              Already more fun, but if:
              - this same Ka-52K is on board the frigate (because the hangar is only for one helicopter (except 1155));
              - if the Ka-52K has a radar capable of guiding / targeting an explosive missile, for example R-77.
              In addition, the Orion helicopter can always evade - advantage in speed. Unless to arrange an ambush for him with guidance from the ship's air defense system ...
              By the way, observation and control of "Orion" can be carried out at a fairly large distance (up to 200 km. If memory serves) - radar control by the ring effect.
              But the frigate is really much better than nothing at all.
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              By the way, in peacetime, ships need a little.

              Yes, they are now not enough for ordinary services ... Well, there will be "Gorshkovs", why not drive? wink
              1. timokhin-aa
                7 October 2019 20: 30
                +1
                From Elk or "Virginia", perhaps yes, but what if aviation takes the submarine for escort and prompts its hunters? And they will do it. And you can only come off (!) In peacetime. Even in a threatened period, this is already fraught.


                It's a matter of planning. The headquarters managing the deployment of SSBNs must "outplay" the enemy.

                That is, for example, frigates are deployed on a line close to the movement of SSBNs in advance, and so that they do not hang around on the route itself and do not loom, but simultaneously with the boat make the transition to the designated area of ​​its protection. Approximate time intervals are calculated when the UAV aircraft in time will be able to go to the search area, under these intervals the boats are guided to the depth in order to avoid "non-tradition", their rendezvous with surface ships, abrupt course changes, etc. The weather forecast is taken into account, which in the same north of the Pacific Ocean it does not always fly. Close to its coastline, fighter aviation forces are allocated to displace UUVs from the search area, a detachment of its ASW aviation forces is allocated to detect foreign submarines, a detachment of NK forces to displace them, etc.

                Then cat and mouse begin.

                Let it be, for example, Kamchatka. Our PLCs carry out a search operation and displace IPLs to a safe distance, the SSBN exits and makes the transition to the fourth Kuril pass, passes it, goes north, when our planes or KPUGs inform us that the IPL enters the fourth pass, the SSBN in the surface jumps out through the first and goes into the ocean, where exactly these frigates, etc.
                KPUG begins to nightmare the IPL, and the first pass is shut up by a pair of corvettes or frigates.

                Here it is - a gap. And bold and arrogant)))

                Well, then also to the designated combat patrol area.

                Even in a threatened period, this is already fraught.


                There is a period of threat = no sudden nuclear strike. A priori. They won’t do that.
                And we can stick mines in our cords, drive the boats over them until the multiplier trips, let the Americans break through the working minefield, what are the problems?
                As an option.

                Fill up - yes, drive away - no. In peacetime, the airplane of a probable enemy is not a big deal.


                But it can be driven away by interference, to be escorted by ship’s air defense systems, put on a cloud of obstacles when approaching, and signal with missiles. In the best traditions.
                And if he is smart enough not to fly over the KUG, but simply direct the SSN from a safe distance, then drive it, lash it with GAS "packages", throw imitators of depth charges - but you have to be ready for this, of course.
                1. bayard
                  bayard 7 October 2019 23: 13
                  +3
                  Fun you all described it, even youth remembered. hi
                  Well, before the delivery of the remaining Boreyev and Ash trees to the fleet, several new frigates 22350 are to be delivered. Then you can play. But we must certainly do something with our submarine aviation, at a quality level. And in quantity.
                2. Polinom
                  Polinom 10 October 2019 10: 19
                  -1
                  Alexander. Good afternoon. I come now occasionally.
                  My comments.
                  SAMB, i.e. PROTECTED .
                  There are no plans for a long time, because there is nothing to protect. There were, at least, plans for deployment (and worked out on exercises). Kronotsky, Ust-Bolsheretsky and Penzhinsky. Two SSBNs each.
                  Moreover, the strength was enough only for the first two. In Penge, the boat is practically itself, well, there is only one TFR. More precisely PSKR 1135P. The depths there are too shallow, and the Los could only get there on the surface. And aviation. Airfield maneuver. From the Drying Mines and from Yelizovo Mi-14. But Chaibukha has long been "Izya everything." There is nothing, no funds, no fuel. Occasionally citizens sit down, so a colleague was there a couple of years ago. In "Power" flies, board in the photo, "Pchelka".
                  Ust-Bolsh and Lenino worked, but there too, everything. Well, Elizovo lives))).
                  For one boat, two MPK 1124, two SKR 1135. "П" shaped barriers of the RSL, aviation, at exit 877 and in straits 877. RTM independently in the strip ..
                  Due to lack of strength, they were withdrawn in two passes. In Kronotsky, then the forces leave and deploy further. The base itself in Petropavlovsk remains with RTOs, RK, one pr. 57 well, and a trifle, minesweepers and PSKR one.
                  Now no one will go anywhere. Ram, put "putinki" with "Orion" and S-130. Networks at the place of the boat. Screws tryndets. They had such an idea during the threatened period.
                  Therefore, in Vilyuchinsk and sit. However, it has been discussed for a long time.


                  1. timokhin-aa
                    10 October 2019 11: 44
                    0
                    I understand, but we are talking about where everything should be brought in the end.

                    I don’t believe in Shelikhov’s Bay, it’s not an option to drive away the SSBN there.
                    1. Polinom
                      Polinom 10 October 2019 12: 23
                      -1
                      Once it was. And our Mi14 in Chaybuh were then Su-15. There is no need to protect, it is under the periscope. Kill-only aircraft. I went in, the fishermen blocked the aisle with their live and nets. Depths are 50-60 meters.
                      1. timokhin-aa
                        11 October 2019 10: 59
                        0
                        So it can be covered with bombs there. What's the point?
                      2. Polinom
                        Polinom 12 October 2019 11: 52
                        -1
                        Can. But for this, the Su-15 was planted there, and the TFR has its own air defense systems. We got away from the main danger - enemy submarines. Considered as a "budget" option.
                      3. timokhin-aa
                        12 October 2019 19: 34
                        +1
                        It would not work if that happened.

                        Actually, I don’t know what the Navy of the USSR should have done then, with the then technical gap.
                        Now there is a gap too, but at least we understand which one.

                        For me, the only way to make MNNS meaningful is to get away from the air defense system in favor of randomly selected areas in the ocean, with the protection of the surface fleet.

                        Plus, I begin to agree with Klimov, who long ago argued that it is necessary to reduce the number of missiles on the boat, to reduce and reduce its cost, but to build them more. It’s also possible to strain Amers so well, you see, someone will jump out unnoticed to patrol.

                        Well, do not forget that the Chinese are now grazing on the drain from the Kuril Islands, you can somehow take away the IPL probably.
                      4. Polinom
                        Polinom 16 October 2019 10: 07
                        -1
                        Well, "randomly selected")))
                        This does not happen. Significant preparation time and a large number of forces will reduce stealth to zero. Americans can afford, KUG with GPBA, SOSUS, BPA with Aleut or Hawaii and two Virginia for one Ohio. Well, an umbrella from AMG. I am about the randomness of the areas. They have an accident, this is a system. That is the whole ocean.
                      5. timokhin-aa
                        16 October 2019 12: 29
                        0
                        I understand that this is difficult, but I do not believe that it is impossible.
            2. Newone
              Newone 7 October 2019 19: 59
              -3
              secondly, it is fraught with the loss of nuclear weapons and their falling into unclear whose hands.

              In your water area? Rather, seals will be captured at the base.
          3. bar
            bar 7 October 2019 18: 56
            +1
            Whatever the conversation is about, you have it comes down to the traditional "need aircraft carriers." Everything is written correctly, and well substantiated
            it is submarines with ballistic missiles that become the most reliable deterrent.
            1. bayard
              bayard 7 October 2019 19: 52
              +3
              But who is against deterrence using SSBNs, especially the most reliable. It’s just that these SSBNs themselves need to be protected - from multipurpose boats of hunters, from enemy submarines, its surface ships in the end.
              The fleet (as well as the Army and VKS) is a complex. Multi-component. And neglecting one of these components depreciates many others. Therefore, SSBNs are now hiding in protected areas / bastions, because their security and combat stability can be ensured ONLY with the help of basic aviation. And her radius of action (and the reaction time to the threat) are not dimensionless. The problem must be solved somehow. So far they have decided so.
              1. timokhin-aa
                10 October 2019 11: 45
                -1
                This is not a decision, it is an illusion of a decision.
    2. Vadim237
      Vadim237 10 October 2019 17: 46
      0
      The Boreevs have anti-torpedo protection in the form of the Tax Code.
  2. Wildcat
    Wildcat 7 October 2019 06: 23
    +7
    hi
    Interesting article. Given the controversy of some premises, there is most likely a counter-force "solution to the issue" option, given the concept of "escalation for de-escalation."
    It is a pity that for illustrations the author did not use the legendary photo "about a third of nuclear warheads in the Northern Fleet in one place", and did not write that "KOH for the SSBN of the Russian Federation is estimated .... equal to 0, ....... "and" some sources claim that SSBN tracking begins .... "" the separation from tracking seems to be ....... "," there are no forces and means for the "bastion", especially for 2, in the foreseeable future ..... "," the Sochi area is very vulnerable ... "," France is also deploying its SSBNs in .... ".
    The conclusion suggests itself is that PGRK is more secure, with all their drawbacks ....
    1. Vadmir
      Vadmir 7 October 2019 06: 47
      +4
      KOH for the Russian SSBN estimated .... is 0
      Well, still not 0, although you are right, criminally low.
      Sochi area is very vulnerable
      And Moscow, where is the American embassy? Especially on May 9 during the parade, when the entire list of receivers, together with the supreme, together with the Minister of Defense, and the chief of the General Staff, is on one very small patch, here the nuclear bomb is redundant for a decapitation strike.
      1. Wildcat
        Wildcat 7 October 2019 06: 53
        +2
        Quote: Vadmir
        KOH for the Russian SSBN estimated .... is 0
        Well, still not 0, although you are right, criminally low.
        Sochi area is very vulnerable
        And Moscow, where is the American embassy? Especially on May 9 during the parade, when the entire list of receivers, together with the supreme, together with the Minister of Defense, and the chief of the General Staff, is on one very small patch, here the nuclear bomb is redundant for a decapitation strike.

        hi
        Nevertheless, I put the expected value of KOHN / comma / ellipsis, really really do not need to be reduced to zero ....
        09.05/XNUMX. and other holidays are still not as frequent as Sochi .... All the others, except (hopefully) the Supreme, do not inspire hope, at least from the calculation of time.
    2. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2019 08: 18
      +3
      The article is theoretical in nature. In fact, there is no KOH and they are watching us almost 100% of the time.

      It's just about how to get away from it.
      1. Vadmir
        Vadmir 7 October 2019 16: 43
        +4
        The article is theoretical in nature. In fact, there is no KOH and they are watching us almost 100% of the time.
        Based on this, the construction of Boreev is a waste of money. Of course, they need to be built, but only in order to maintain competencies in the field of construction of the SSBN, with an eye to the distant future.
        Now our fleet is completely unsuitable for a big war. Therefore, there is no concept of its application and the admirals do not really know what to do with the existing ships, and hence the lack of a harmonious concept of shipbuilding.
        In my opinion, for the next 15-20 years, it is necessary to abandon the confrontation of the fleet with countries such as the United States and China. Leaving it at the mercy of the ground Strategic Missile Forces. And to start creating a "force projection" fleet on small states, a fleet geared towards local wars. But the fleet is oceanic.
        And only having built such a fleet can, relying on it, start creating a "large fleet".
        I know that many are for the construction of a mosquito fleet, but this is the road to nowhere.
        As stated in the article, the fleet is an offensive weapon, not a defensive one, and it should not be pressed to the shore. But the conduct of offensive operations against the US Navy is a utopia, in order to confront the USA it is necessary to build ships of 30-40 years at a crazy pace, to the detriment of other weapons.
        1. bayard
          bayard 7 October 2019 23: 49
          +1
          Quote: Vadmir
          In my opinion, for the next 15-20 years it is necessary to abandon the confrontation of the fleet with such countries as the United States

          Well, in the article, the author clearly outlined the picture - we don’t choose our fighter, we were chosen. Therefore, the battle (confrontation) will have to take.
          And what you propose regarding the ships of the far zone is already being done - this year 5 new ships were laid. Apparently, at the beginning of next year, two more frigates 22350+ (at 24 UVP) will be laid.
          The bet on corvettes turned out to be erroneous - they come out expensive (at the cost of new Black Sea frigates), not seaworthy (with a displacement of 2500 tons, this is not surprising), and the functions of PLO and escort ships in the coastal zone can be performed by ships and more simply. Therefore, it was decided to modernize the IPC series of the still Soviet-built one - they will cope with this function for now, and there will come something adequate to replace it.
          Now the rate on ships of the distant sea / ocean zone is 22350, 22350M and landing ships.
          1. Vadmir
            Vadmir 8 October 2019 01: 41
            +1
            Well, in the article, the author clearly outlined the picture - we don’t choose our fighter, we were chosen. Therefore, the battle (confrontation) will have to take.
            But the choice of weapons is ours.
            Now the rate on the ships of the distant sea / ocean zone is 22350, 22350M and landing ships
            Now they are building everything in a row and RTOs and patrols of unknown purpose and corvettes, including the expensive and not entirely clear 20386, and frigates. For all this, it is difficult to see the system and how the fleet of the future is seen in large offices.
            1. bayard
              bayard 8 October 2019 11: 11
              +1
              Quote: Vadmir
              But the choice of weapons is ours.

              The main thing is that we have it (a choice in weapons), especially in the surface segment.
              Quote: Vadmir
              Now they are building everything in a row and MRCs and patrols of unclear purpose

              MRK not from a good life, until the Ukrainian events they were not in the armament program ("Buyans" were built for river water areas and, by force, for the Caspian Sea), but when a bummer came with German diesel engines and Nikolaev turbines, it was necessary to revise plans, and in order to be able ( before the import substitution of the power plant) to build at least something, they decided to build "Buyans" and "Karakurt" ... However, the engines also had a problem with them.
              The battle dictates the plan for the battle.
              Quote: Vadmir
              not clear 20386

              Yeah, a very muddy project. It hovered at one time (in the bookmark phase), but then it was laid down, it will probably be an experimental ship for working out electric propulsion. This topic (electric propulsion) is interesting and relevant for PLO ships, and this is the main task for corvettes.
              Quote: Vadmir
              and frigates

              But this is a completely different quadrille. These are ships of the far sea / ocean zone. These are the workhorses of the future fleet.
              22350, 22350+ and 22350M are very successful ships that can fight in any theater of operations, with any enemy. This is the backbone of the future fleet.
              In the plans :
              22350 (16 USKS) - 4 pcs. (1 in the ranks, 1 is completing the tests, 2 in the completion)
              22350+ (24 USKS) - 4 pcs. (2 laid this year, 2 laid at the beginning of the future)
              22350M (48 USKS) - 18 pcs. (Laying the head in a year and a half, will be built at two shipyards at the same time).
              Until the end of the year cr. "Moscow" will return from repair.
              In a year and a half or two, the modernized Admiral Nakhimov will return to service.
              But the basis of the future fleet will be 22350M frigate destroyers.
              It is the laying of the large 22350M series that suggests that a systematic approach to the construction of the fleet still appears.
      2. ccsr
        ccsr 8 October 2019 12: 51
        +2
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        The article is theoretical in nature. In fact, there is no KOH and they are watching us almost 100% of the time.
        It's just about how to get away from it.

        I studied your article, and I had a number of doubts about whether you correctly assess the situation with our strategic nuclear forces and the likely actions of our enemy in the person of the United States. For example, you write:
        the missile attack warning system actually came down to the radar (work is underway to restore the satellite components of the missile defense system, but so far there are only three satellites in space), which makes the flight time of the enemy’s missiles from the moment they detect the radar and until they hit the territory of the Russian Federation approximately equal, and for some goals - less than the time it takes to send a command to launch missiles through combat control networks.

        This is a misconception, if only because strategic intelligence is able, by various signs, even before launching the missiles to determine that preparations have begun for a nuclear strike. As for the three satellites, in my opinion this is quite enough, taking into account the fact that they will be suppressed even before the start of hostilities. So betting on early warning systems in the form of over-the-horizon radars is not only reasonable, but will also provide us with a retaliatory strike if strategic intelligence spills everything in the world.
        You further state that
        As you can see, when trying to attack a point target (for example, a silo launcher of ICBMs), 3-5 combat units out of 10 are blown up near it. You should not forget about the probable circular deviation, and that it can lead to such a spread of those falling on the target war blocks in which a point target will not be hit at all.
        However, our adversary knows very well that we are guaranteed to launch all mine rockets before they are hit, and therefore they are unlikely to consider the object of attack of our silos for their strategic nuclear forces. About forty years ago, they tried to neutralize our silos by the massive use of cruise missiles from submarines, secretly penetrating from under the ice of the Arctic, but this venture failed completely. So it’s not clear why you decided that the missiles from the enemy’s submarines will be sent to our silos - at least nowhere in military analytics is this issue somehow pushed too much. Next you write:
        And we can stick mines in our cords, drive the boats over them until the multiplier trips, let the Americans break through the working minefield, what are the problems?
        As an option.

        I think you are mistaken here - our opponent is unlikely to go to these areas, if only because of the risk of being discovered and destroyed. And the range of use of their rast allows them to launch from other areas, and with a not very large increase in the time of arrival. And the divers will have more chances to survive, they also know about this. There are other controversial points in the article, but in general the article is interesting, many will be interested to read it.
      3. Polinom
        Polinom 10 October 2019 10: 24
        -1
        laughing
        It's not about how to leave, but how to quietly exit.
        Things will not come to leave.
    3. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 7 October 2019 13: 11
      +9
      Quote: Wildcat
      It is a pity that for illustrations the author did not use the legendary photo "about a third of nuclear warheads in the Northern Fleet in one place"

      Third? Five sixth SSBN SF in the base (on 2015 g.):

      As it is easy to see in the pictures, there are five SSBNs at the same time in the Gadzhievo base - four projects 667BDRM (K-51 "Verkhoturye", K-84 "Yekaterinburg", K-18 "Karelia" and K-407 "Novomoskovsk") and a new K- 535 "Yuri Dolgoruky" of project 955 (until now has not started combat duty). Taking into account that the Project 114BDRM SSBN K-667 "Tula" is under mid-life repair at the headquarters of JSC "Ship Repair Center" Zvezdochka "in Severodvinsk, it can be concluded that only one boat was in combat service at the time of this photo session. this division - K-117 "Bryansk" project 667BDRM.
      1. timokhin-aa
        7 October 2019 14: 43
        +5
        Third? Five sixth SSBN SF in the base (on 2015 g.):


        Yuri does not count at that time, so 4 / 5

        There was only one submarine of this division - K-117 "Bryansk" of project 667BDRM.


        That is the actual question - was it tracked or not? If not, then the MSNF - well done.

        But in fact, organizationally squeezing ship repair to normal and raising KOH is the cheapest and budget answer to these problems. Moreover, they wanted to have two crews on the BDRM, then the topic stalled.
        1. Wildcat
          Wildcat 8 October 2019 00: 42
          +5
          hi
          only one submarine of this division - K-117 "Bryansk" of project 667BDRM.
          That is the actual question - was it tracked or not? If not, then the MSNF - well done.

          Let's do a thought experiment. A certain country that knows that 4/5 warheads, which "for it" stand "under one warhead" in Gadzhievo, have, say, 1 combat-ready MAPL. Where will they send her? Answer options:
          record whale voices
          look for atlantis
          search 1/5 warhead
          otherwise.
          We complicate the task: several dozen combat-ready MAPLs, what is more important than monitoring the SSBNs, can they be taken?
          I do not call for letting SSBNs go on their own, just from the initial data of the article, only 1 conclusion can be drawn - SSBNs are the most effective in our situation.
          From the given "we cannot contain 2" bastions "", in the conclusion "so let's leave them and hide in the depths of the World Ocean" it seems to me there is an elegant element of intellectual provocation, which should make the reader independently come to the conclusion "we need at least 1" bastion "to protect and collect all SSBNs for this fleet."
          Regarding the idea "we do not choose our fighter, we were chosen. Therefore, we will have to accept the battle (confrontation)" I would like to note that the status quo suits everyone now (I would not like to get involved in a discussion about how we ended up in such a situation and what will happen farther).
          Strategic nuclear forces are absolutely necessary so that Russia is not accidentally turned into Libya. But there is no doubt that the concept of "escalation for de-escalation", overflights of the White House and the Capitol, as well as IskanderK and other wonderful things will not remain without consequences, and the answer to the question "what to do if the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation, as in the history of Crimea, begin to move on the orders of the Supreme Command" of course will be.
          By the way, this is still the author of the article who did not go through the methodology for calculating warheads and their carriers under the existing START treaties, there would still be equilibrium.
          hi
          1. timokhin-aa
            8 October 2019 11: 12
            0
            You just need to raise the coefficient of operational tension of submarines.
            1. karabass
              karabass 8 October 2019 21: 03
              +1
              Dear Alexander, I repeat that you are a fan of the IMF, and someone from other types of armed forces replied to you in the comments that placing several Yars divisions in the same Kamchatka would be much cheaper and more effective from a military point of view. that you should not compete with the United States where it is a priori stronger, that is, in the navy, to get by with the minimum necessary to help the ground forces for defense and develop instead of the sea, land component of nuclear forces? And forget about the ocean fleet, that is, stretch legs on clothes. Let me remind you that the Soviet Navy without a single shot was defeated by empty store shelves
              1. timokhin-aa
                10 October 2019 11: 27
                0
                We have all real serious threats in the DMZ. Tasks too. And the transition from theater to theater is possible only across the ocean.

                How without a fleet?
                1. karabass
                  karabass 10 October 2019 13: 09
                  +2
                  You have excellent articles and competent, reasoned comments. It’s a pity that all of your defense is reduced to the fleet, but the task of defending the country is solved no worse, and often better than other types of armed forces, in my opinion the main thing now is the welfare of the citizens of the Russian Federation. And then lifting Russia from its knees and returning it to the world stage, the people were brought to poverty.
                  1. timokhin-aa
                    11 October 2019 11: 12
                    0
                    Each type of aircraft has its own tasks. The airborne forces and ground crews are trying to develop in a more or less right direction, with the fleet a disaster.
                    As a result, a hole appears in the defense.

                    The types of aircraft are not interchangeable; the failure of the Navy at 100% will not close either the airborne forces or the army. Partially and ineffectively, sometimes - maybe. Totally not.

                    And they beat in the place where you are weak.
            2. Wildcat
              Wildcat 9 October 2019 01: 49
              +3
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              You just need to raise the coefficient of operational tension of submarines.

              I am afraid that the low KOH is probably a consequence of the understanding that in Gadzhievo, though not safer, it is clearer and more "manageable". If the SSBN is on the DB and we do not know what happened to it, maybe it has already been destroyed and other people's soulless warheads are flying towards us. When and how will SSBNs on the DB receive a command and will they be allowed to shoot?
              And those SSBNs that are at the pier will probably have time to get a command and will shoot back. What they are rich in and happy with, as they say ... So no one will raise KOH, since it’s money, risk even in peacetime (Kursk), and you can bring a good theory to it - they say, we take care of the return volley of the Motherland .. ..
              The very idea of ​​raising a KOH without proper cover, with the concept of "every SSBN for itself" I'm afraid is similar to advice "we cannot ensure the safety of citizens in such and such an area, there are flocks of gopniks and wild dogs, so we advise citizens to walk there, having mastered the techniques self-defense ".
              However, the author of the article, in my opinion, sought to provoke readers to independent reflections, which lead to obvious conclusions. And if the author's task was to draw attention to, to put it mildly, the "imbalance" in the construction of the fleet in attempts to clean up the "parity within the framework of START", then it was a success, bravo!
              hi
            3. Polinom
              Polinom 10 October 2019 10: 31
              -2
              Already posted. For readers I repeat.
              There are answers - why "Ohio" has a high CON. It was also discussed for a long time.


  3. Vadmir
    Vadmir 7 October 2019 06: 35
    +7
    A very good article. I agree with many. But threats to our country exist now, and the measures you proposed are correct, but are still very, very soon achievable.
    After the cancellation of the INF Treaty, one should expect in the very near future the deployment of medium- and shorter-range missiles with scanty flying time. The return deployment of the same missiles will not create sufficient threats to the United States.
    And that means that the cancellation of START-3 with the buildup of ICBMs, as well as warheads, including false ones on existing carriers, can be considered the only adequate answer. And officially declare that the objectives of our missiles are precisely American cities and infrastructure. And then there is a tendency to reduce the power of warheads. And if for a country planning to strike first it is understandable, for Russia this is unacceptable. A potential adversary should know that losses will be catastrophic.
    And despite my love for the fleet, first of all, it is necessary to increase silo launchers of ICBMs on land, as the most suitable for a counter strike (ideally with Sarmat missiles), and only then to deal with SSBNs.
    A transition is necessary to the ocean deployment of strategic nuclear forces, which will prevent the enemy from destroying all strategic nuclear forces with a concentrated submarine attack on an air defense missile system, and will seriously increase the tension of its anti-submarine forces.
    Oh, we would, for starters, forget about the very possibility of combat duty without going to sea, turning the most formidable weapon into suicide bombers.
    The ground components of strategic nuclear forces are extremely vulnerable due to their pre-known location to the adversary.
    Especially strategic aviation, which does not have time to take off and therefore is suitable only for a strike first.
    1. mark1
      mark1 7 October 2019 07: 59
      +3
      Your line of thought matches mine. Taking into account our realities, it will not be soon for the Russian fleet to establish presence in all points of the World Ocean. It is necessary to use the territorial advantage - container CLABs, to revive the "Courier" program, it is not bad for PGRK to use the experience of its Chinese comrades - tunnels. And of course, a purely quantitative build-up. At the same time, to include in the doctrine a "demonstration of determination" - warning air and underwater nuclear explosions.
      1. timokhin-aa
        7 October 2019 08: 22
        +9
        It remains to find money for all this. There are already submarines - "Borei". Anti-submarine aircraft still do, there is no choice. Surface ships will be built in any case, because the current ones will soon rot.

        This is all and must be properly applied. And turning the whole country into North Korea is not an option
        1. mark1
          mark1 7 October 2019 10: 10
          +5
          Quote: timokhin-aa
          It remains to find money for all this. There are already submarines - "Borei".

          Three "Boreas" (the fourth is on the way) and the almost complete absence of support forces ... and what are you going to do with them other than stuffing them into the ZRBD? For everything else again
          Quote: timokhin-aa
          money to find it all.
          ... Those. you need money anyway, but 100 "Couriers" are probably still cheaper than 6 "Boreis", and it is much more difficult to catch them by an order of magnitude (or even 2). But as the saying goes, "the truth is somewhere in the middle ..."
          1. timokhin-aa
            7 October 2019 11: 14
            +2
            Three Boreas (fourth on the way) and almost complete absence of support forces


            It’s the security forces that need to be dealt with closely, especially since if you take a smart approach, then they will turn out to be multi-purpose and many of which are applicable.

            ... Those. money is needed anyway, but 100 "Couriers" are probably still cheaper than 6 "Boreys",


            Firstly, no, and secondly, Boreas already exist.
            1. mark1
              mark1 7 October 2019 13: 36
              +2
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              Firstly no

              Wow ?!
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              secondly - Boreas are already there

              They would be there, but what would they really be, they need 12-18 pieces.
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              That's the security forces and we must deal closely

              Yes, of course, it is necessary, unless someone is against ... This is called the harmonious development of the fleet, and how harmonious we all see it.
              1. timokhin-aa
                7 October 2019 14: 40
                0
                Quote: mark1
                Wow ?!


                Can you imagine what a missile division is? By people, states? 10 regiments + divisional units. And on the abandoned blocks in the case of monoblock ICBMs, this is ONE SUBMARINE.

                Of course, a missile submarine has a missile without an RFG IN and the comparison is a little dishonest, but in the end it’s easier to invest in an RFG IN. To the available rockets.
                1. mark1
                  mark1 7 October 2019 16: 00
                  +2
                  The PGRK missile division for the creation and maintenance will not be more expensive than the creation and maintenance of SSBNs (we will also take into account the BMB), but to argue that it is better, in my silly occupation, you need both, and as a result, money that seems to be gone, but if you need to. However, based on the situation that you described (lack of time, you know), it is more logical to make efforts to accelerate the development of the land mobile component, without stopping paying attention to the naval.
                  1. timokhin-aa
                    7 October 2019 16: 45
                    0
                    SSBN is 50 billion. Some buildings and structures on the Strategic Missile Forces division are pulled by so much. But there is already a naval base.
                    1. mark1
                      mark1 7 October 2019 17: 05
                      0
                      Quote: timokhin-aa
                      50 billion. Some buildings and structures on the Strategic Missile Forces division are pulled by so much.

                      Let me doubt ... in view of the absence of mines and the partial availability of other infrastructure (not in the open field, all the same).
                      Quote: timokhin-aa
                      But there is already a naval base.

                      So then it is, but reconstruction is required for this type of nuclear submarine (you yourself know)
                      1. timokhin-aa
                        7 October 2019 18: 54
                        0
                        Let me doubt ... in view of the absence of mines and the partial availability of other infrastructure


                        I just don’t want to write anything about the same protection of the permanent locations of missile regiments or about the connection there ....))) The price of all this is simply terrible to imagine.

                        Just believe me - there will be a minimum submarine division
                      2. mark1
                        mark1 7 October 2019 18: 57
                        +1
                        I imagine a little ... do not exaggerate ..
                      3. timokhin-aa
                        7 October 2019 20: 33
                        -1
                        Yes, I'm not exaggerating. Shelters for PGRK, the perimeter security system, we will not go into details, the communication system of the division, barracks, canteens, buildings and structures for other purposes, automotive equipment, launchers, etc.
                        To the division.
                        Plus l / s - the crew of the boat is less than one missile regiment.
                      4. Newone
                        Newone 8 October 2019 02: 58
                        +2
                        This is all a penny compared to what is needed for similar protection and defense of submarines. And to compare the cost of the entire complex of forces and assets of the PGRK’s position area with the cost of only a submarine, without taking into account the forces and means of support and protection and defense of the submarines, is archintrong.
                      5. timokhin-aa
                        8 October 2019 11: 11
                        0
                        What is necessary for the protection and defense of submarines must be had even without submarines.
                      6. Newone
                        Newone 10 October 2019 20: 51
                        0
                        This is a false statement.
                      7. timokhin-aa
                        11 October 2019 11: 03
                        -3
                        Minesweepers, anti-submarine aircraft, small anti-submarine ships or corvettes?

                        Don’t be smart, citizen. All these questions were considered decades ago, and partly tested in real wars, your opinion against this background is very valuable, yes.
                      8. Newone
                        Newone 11 October 2019 23: 54
                        +1
                        As well as the system of air defense bases (unexpectedly true), air defense of deployment sites, forces to ensure that enemy aircraft are not allowed to reach deployment sites, piers, floats, support vessels, military camps beyond the Arctic Circle for all of this.
                        You don't get smart citizen
                        You tell yourself this, you are our fur seal by correspondence. Your FAQ from graphomania does not make your opinion more valuable.
                      9. timokhin-aa
                        12 October 2019 19: 29
                        0
                        As well as the system of air defense bases (unexpectedly true), air defense of deployment sites, forces to ensure that enemy aircraft are not allowed to reach deployment sites, piers, floats, support vessels, military camps beyond the Arctic Circle for all of this.


                        And without submarines, all this dramatically becomes unnecessary, right?

                        You tell yourself this, you are our fur seal by correspondence.


                        What for? I do not make mutually exclusive statements in the same thread as you. And you do, and in a pathos form, hence the corresponding attitude towards you and your opinion.
                      10. Newone
                        Newone 13 October 2019 22: 10
                        +1
                        And without submarines, all this dramatically becomes unnecessary, right?

                        Unexpectedly for you, but yes. Air defense in the amount that is required to cover the deployment and basing of submarines is not necessary.
                        Bases for submarines are mandatory SEPARATE from the rest of the fleet. Taking into account the vulnerabilities of submarine bases, which need to organize defense in 3 environments (ground, air, underwater, under water) and the possibility of concentration of forces of a likely enemy before impact up to 12 nautical miles, taking into account the climate and operating conditions of the submarine and what needs to be built to make this climate Compensation, deployment of nuclear weapons on land is more profitable. The fact that with humpback was considered by the cost of the launch equipment is the problem of the economists of that time, which sharpened the calculations for the opinion of the authorities.
                        I do not make mutually exclusive statements in the same thread as you.

                        Give an example please :)
                      11. timokhin-aa
                        14 October 2019 21: 24
                        0
                        Unexpectedly for you, but yes. Air defense in the amount that is required to cover the deployment and basing of submarines is not necessary.


                        The air defense covering the places of basing organizationally covers not only the places of basing, and is not part of the Navy at all, but belongs to the armies of the Air Force and Air Defense, and it will never, under any circumstances, turn out to be too much, not much, but not much.

                        Bases for submarines are mandatory SEPARATE from the rest of the fleet.


                        Yes?
                        And what about this then?



                        And with this (look at the right edge of the photo)?



                        I will hint so subtly that submarines need to ensure that surface ships and aircraft exit the bases. Specifically, for the withdrawal of one SSBN — from the BMD brigade, from three SKR / frigates or BOD, a militia mines, a PLO aviation regiment — at the same time. These were Soviet still minimum standards.
                        And if planes can just fly in, then the rest should be "at hand".
                        Amers have the same story - while he was strained with the USSR, from three frigates there were "on insurance" SSBN exit. Sometimes more.

                        And they were based as shown in the photo - through the fence from each other.

                        Taking into account the vulnerabilities of submarine bases that need to organize defense in 3 environments (ground air above water, under water)


                        And doesn’t all need surface ship bases? Well, think a little, well, please.

                        But seriously - where do you get all this from? It really needs to live in some kind of alternative reality. Or wear it in your head, and even one where everything is the other way around in relation to the real world. Where did you get your ideas?
                  2. ccsr
                    ccsr 8 October 2019 13: 19
                    -1
                    Quote: mark1
                    The PGRK missile division for the creation and maintenance will not be more expensive than the creation and maintenance of SSBNs (we will also take into account the BMB), but to argue that it is better, in my silly occupation, you need both, and as a result, money that seems to be gone, but if you need to.

                    Unfortunately, we cannot drive the missile division 1000 miles to New York, which means that without the naval component we can’t do anything if we want to keep the gun at the temple of the Americans.
                    Quote: mark1
                    it is more logical to make efforts to accelerate the development of the land mobile component, without ceasing to pay attention to the naval.
                    Mobility on our territory does not bring us any significant benefit - it is much more important to open in advance the preparation for striking by the enemy, and use all the strategic forces of the strategic nuclear forces to deliver a preemptive strike. This is our main scenario in a future war. And while we adhere to it, the Americans will not dare to attack us because of their own vulnerability to our strategic nuclear forces.
              2. bayard
                bayard 7 October 2019 18: 01
                +2
                Quote: mark1

                They would be there, but what would they really be, they need 12-18 pieces.

                All 8 "Boreys" are either in the ranks, or in completion, so they really already exist - in hardware. Two more "Boreas" were ordered as carriers of KRBD, and 2 more pieces. going to order in the future. So the minimum you are looking for is 12 pieces, all the same will be.
                However, it is desirable to have CRBD carriers at least 6 - 3 each in the fleet (Pacific Fleet, Northern Fleet).
                By the way, being almost 2 times cheaper in comparison with the multipurpose "Ash", "Borei" as carriers of KRBD look much more preferable, and if, in addition to "Caliber" and "Caliber-M", they are equipped with "Zircon", then as a multipurpose one (for striking enemy surface ships and the coast), in some cases it will be able to compete.
                But the lack of anti-torpedoes on the Premier League is a disaster. On surface ships they already exist and it was easier to do. On the submarine, this must be laid during design. It would be good to foresee TA for them in future nuclear submarines, including fodder ones.
                1. timokhin-aa
                  7 October 2019 18: 55
                  +2
                  On the submarine, this must be laid during design.


                  So laid down!

                  That's the problem. Nothing prevents to do everything right.
                  1. bayard
                    bayard 7 October 2019 19: 33
                    0
                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    So laid down!

                    On existing submarines?
                    TA for the "package" anti-torpedo?
                    I have not heard ... Or are you talking about noise simulators?
                    1. Vadim237
                      Vadim237 10 October 2019 18: 00
                      +1
                      If you look carefully at the bow of the boat, you will see there 6 closed flaps for anti-torpedoes.
                      1. bayard
                        bayard 10 October 2019 20: 36
                        +1
                        And I always thought that these were flaps for classic 533 caliber torpedoes ... If I was mistaken, I would be just incredibly glad (this is not a hyperbole).
                      2. Vadim237
                        Vadim237 11 October 2019 00: 20
                        +2
                        No, 533-caliber torpedo tubes are lower - it’s better seen here
                      3. bayard
                        bayard 11 October 2019 00: 24
                        0
                        That is, “Borey” already has it all ... It's good.
                    2. timokhin-aa
                      14 October 2019 20: 31
                      +1
                      On Borey and Ash there is the possibility of using AT "Last".
        2. NordOst16
          NordOst16 7 October 2019 10: 12
          0
          But is there any information on anti-submarine aircraft? I read that they wanted to upgrade some old Soviet-built aircraft (some AN), but is there any information on working on new complexes?
          1. timokhin-aa
            7 October 2019 11: 18
            +4
            There are rumors, such that it would be better not to do anything than this.

            In general - there is nothing encouraging so far.
            1. NordOst16
              NordOst16 7 October 2019 13: 02
              0
              Well, modernization, in theory, is still better than nothing.
            2. bayard
              bayard 7 October 2019 18: 22
              +1
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              There are rumors, such that it would be better not to do anything than this

              Are you talking about IL-114? This is not fit for the coastal zone.
              Tu-214 as a platform ... already unpromising (profitability, range) ... maybe the MS-21 in the future? request
              In the meantime, apparently only hope for the modernization of the IL-38 and Tu-142 ...
              1. timokhin-aa
                7 October 2019 18: 55
                +2
                With the complex that they want to put on the IL-114, it does not fit anywhere.
                1. bayard
                  bayard 7 October 2019 19: 39
                  0
                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  With the complex that they want to put on the IL-114, it does not fit anywhere.

                  Well, why bother torturing a glider?
                  It seems that the rumor went that we still took up the ring effect / remembered. After all, he was previously practiced in pairs of Tu-95 - Tu-142. If you use the range of the Tu-95 radar and supplement it with computing power, everything can work out. Even on such a platform as Il114 - for PLO bases and coastal zones.
                  But for longer patrols and carrying a more or less decent ammunition, a better platform is needed - Tu-214 or MS-21, as an option.
              2. Polinom
                Polinom 10 October 2019 10: 36
                -1
                Engines. And normally 114 will block the IL-38 along the radius. And more is not needed. An unrealizable dream to equalize in "Orion" remained a dream.
                1. bayard
                  bayard 10 October 2019 12: 21
                  +1
                  On the basis of the Tu-214 they make a radio reconnaissance aircraft, even the AWACS aircraft were going to sculpt. If so, then for unification on the glider will go for anti-submarine. The question in avionics for detecting nuclear submarines by the ring effect. Previously, at the Pacific Fleet (at sunset of the Union), the Tu-95 and the Tu-142 pairs (he threw acoustic buoys at the center of the anomaly and tested with a magnetometer) practiced the operation of target pairs for our MAPLs and the adversary’s boat was taken on escort.
                  For a new and upgraded PLO aircraft, a side-view radar is needed with a range of operating frequencies similar to the Tu-95 radar and computing power on board to process received signals from anomalies ... and of course, effective means of destruction and highly sensitive buoys. On the Tu-214 platform, all this can and should be placed. Well, an additional supply of fuel.
                  And remotorization to more efficient engines can be carried out later - when their production in the modification of the required power will be established, during a scheduled repair.
                  The MS-21 as a platform could also be used as a more economical model with a slightly wider fuselage and better weight characteristics of the airframe. But there are two minuses:
                  - it is not yet in mass production, but the lineup for its civilian versions has been painted for many years;
                  - he has a composite wing, which under military operating conditions can be a minus, as less maintainable.
                  1. Polinom
                    Polinom 10 October 2019 13: 04
                    -2
                    after which target designation was given for our MAPL and the adversary’s boat was taken for escort.

                    Can you imagine the process of pointing a submarine on an IPL?
                    And when did they fly from Mongohto with the Tu-95? And in what condition were the Tu-95s from Khorol in the late 80s?
                    I admit you heard something, but exaggerate a little. It seems to me.
                    1. bayard
                      bayard 10 October 2019 20: 47
                      +1
                      To be honest, I'm not a sailor or an aviator. I’m a radar specialist ... old. I heard that the Tu-95 radar was catching this ring effect and I imagine the nature of this phenomenon. I heard, read and understand why this was the case when Tu-95 and Tu-142 were used to emit this effect. It was owls. secret, there was even an attempt on the authors of this program from American saboteurs in Primorye (unsuccessful). It was the Tu-95 radar that caught this (ring) effect, which is why it was paired with the Tu-142 (pure anti-submarine, but without such a radar). Tu-95 detected this effect, and Tu-142 to test the effectiveness of this method threw sonar buoys in the center of this anomaly and recorded the presence of nuclear submarines.
                      This effect was actively studied and algorithms were being prepared, but ... new times came and the program was buried.
                      I will not exaggerate.
                      I voice what is known to all bona fide interested parties.
                      1. Polinom
                        Polinom 12 October 2019 11: 58
                        -2
                        Wrote about it. And not just me. But it is in the north. This was not at the Pacific Fleet.
                      2. bayard
                        bayard 12 October 2019 12: 29
                        +1
                        Quote: Polinom
                        But it is in the north. This was not at the Pacific Fleet.

                        Well, it means a memory error ... although ... in my opinion, the attempt was still in Primorye.
                        It remains a fact that this effect needs to be studied, applied and improved methodology. Experimenting with the radar frequency range, a combination of frequencies, signal processing algorithms ... Even if the result is 50/50, this is much better than what is on our modernized PLO aircraft. The radar method is the detection distance, the breadth of view and the ability to double-check / investigate using other methods - magnetometer, buoys.

                        Otherwise, those who renounce this method will be similar to the North American Indians, who persistently chased with bows and arrows against hard drives and cannons.
                      3. timokhin-aa
                        12 October 2019 19: 37
                        0
                        Otherwise, those who renounce this method will be similar to the North American Indians, who persistently chased with bows and arrows against hard drives and cannons.


                        This is now the case in our case.
                      4. bayard
                        bayard 12 October 2019 22: 37
                        0
                        It’s never too late to repent and correct your ways.
                      5. timokhin-aa
                        13 October 2019 01: 18
                        +1
                        Amen.

                        For which I am writing on the Internet.
                      6. Polinom
                        Polinom 16 October 2019 10: 18
                        0
                        In the period from 1980 to 1991, it was definitely not. Maybe in private, I would know for sure. It is the Tu-95 in conjunction with the Tu-142.
                        And the mood of NSh 310 OPLAP (Tu-142) for non-tradition was negatively charged. However, I already wrote.
                        "" "Chief of Staff 310 PLAP Bezlyudov, Mongohto Tu-142 .: The question, of course, is interesting ... I will answer without details, but intelligibly.
                        The search for IPL by the "Window" method turned out to be what it really was - a common profanation, the basis for admiral's titles and dissertations. Approximately the same as calculating the killer with the help of psychics, although this was done "in all seriousness." It is difficult to catch the IPL. But, in 99% of cases of searching for a boat in a given area, at a given turn, the boat will be caught. In the good old days, the detection of an IPL was widely noted in the regiment, even in the flight canteen there were "Lightnings" that the glorious crews had caught the IPL. Decorated with orders, usually "Red Star". But only commanders. I do not know of a single navigator who has received a government award for detecting the IPL. Gradually, the detection of the IPL turned into a routine, instead of rewards, the crews and the headquarters organizing the search began to receive "in the neck" for incorrect actions in the search for the IPL, despite the fact that the IPL was still found. Now the desire of the crew to catch a boat is characterized by one typical phrase: "On Fridays, boats are not caught. If we catch, we will unsubscribe all weekend."
                        I will comment on Mikhail Vladimirovich a little. He graduated from VVVASH in 1978 with a degree in MRA (Marine Missile Aviation). That is, well, not at all PLOSHNIK. I never flew to search for a boat. Tu-142 simply could not work on the 'Window' theme due to the design of its radar. Therefore, they flew to the Northern Fleet to search for the Tu-95 with an old radar and the Tu-142. His opinion is important. Let's take note ...
              3. Vadim237
                Vadim237 10 October 2019 18: 01
                0
                Hope for the production of A 42 maybe - in 6 years.
                1. timokhin-aa
                  12 October 2019 19: 39
                  +1
                  Vadim, you express such opinions that I am starting to perceive you as a person from some kind of antireality, where positrons are replaced by electrons, good and evil are interchanged, and cause-effect relationships are distorted.

                  Well, what will this A-42 give you? Why is it needed? How does having the ability sometimes and not everywhere to land help to search for submarines?
                  1. Polinom
                    Polinom 16 October 2019 10: 20
                    0
                    Well, people believe, like some in Zircons-Poseidons))) Amen.
                    This does not fix it as "If tomorrow is war, if tomorrow is a campaign ...." until June 22, 1941.
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      16 October 2019 12: 33
                      0
                      Well, Zircon has been sawing for a long time actually, and hypersound is almost continuous from 80's. And there were prototypes of flying hypersonic CRs, it just didn’t work out with the sizes that are called.

                      As a result, they came to Zircon. They promise to launch the submarine next year. Well, wait.

                      I think that this will be an analogue of the American wave rider, but launched on the accelerator up, and diving towards the target with a set of speed. Let’s take a look.
        3. Vadmir
          Vadmir 7 October 2019 17: 05
          +5
          And turning the whole country into North Korea is not an option
          The DPRK has no missiles capable of reaching the United States and inflicting unacceptable damage on them.
          There are already submarines - "Borei". Anti-submarine aircraft still do, there is no choice. Surface ships will be built in any case, because the current ones will soon rot.
          This is true, but in order for the Boreis to be dangerous, they must be at sea and unaccompanied by the United States. And this requires an order of magnitude increase in the number of ASW ships and anti-submarine aircraft. But even in this case, Borei will be able to work only in the "bastions" you criticized. In order for them to go out into the ocean, they need KUG or AUG constantly plowing the ocean, they need anti-submarine helicopter carriers (the US has a lot of Virginias), they need twenty times more MAPLs than they have now.
          Hence your phrase is relevant:
          It remains money to find it all.
          But most importantly, it will require a lot of time - decades of hard work.
    2. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2019 08: 19
      +2
      But threats to our country exist now, and the measures you proposed are correct, but are still very, very soon achievable.


      In general, back in 2017 EMNIP wanted to try the TOF submarine to deploy in the ocean.
      1. NordOst16
        NordOst16 7 October 2019 10: 13
        -1
        Well, I think that dolphins are clearly not suitable for this because the submarines are almost transitional 2-3 generations. Perhaps that’s why they didn’t.
        1. timokhin-aa
          7 October 2019 11: 17
          +2
          The plans were announced about the promised "Borey", not the BDRM
      2. Vadmir
        Vadmir 7 October 2019 17: 08
        +3
        In general, back in 2017 EMNIP wanted to try the TOF submarine to deploy in the ocean.
        You can expand them, but where is the guarantee that without surveillance? A submarine with Virginia on its tail is not a threat.
        1. Polinom
          Polinom 10 October 2019 13: 07
          -2
          So far, everything has been limited to catching up, instead of military services. laughing

    3. CTABEP
      CTABEP 7 October 2019 09: 06
      +4
      We remind you that no limit has been selected for START-3.
    4. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2019 11: 16
      +1
      but achievable still very, very soon.


      Partially reachable very soon, with minimal investment.
    5. mik193
      mik193 7 October 2019 11: 53
      +4
      The combat duty at the base in readiness for firing from the pier did not come from a good life. He himself participated in this in the early nineties. Lack of crew, a slow-moving boat requiring repair - and this is put on combat duty. From the pier can shoot, and already good.
      1. Vadmir
        Vadmir 7 October 2019 17: 12
        +1
        From the pier can shoot, and already good.
        What's good is the target, located a few miles from neutral waters, from where the tomahawk fly for several minutes.
        1. mik193
          mik193 7 October 2019 20: 14
          0
          For the impossibility of the best, they used it so ...
  4. The Sparkle
    The Sparkle 7 October 2019 06: 53
    +3
    Some contradiction in the text of the article about the Sea of ​​Okhotsk:
    "... The conditions in it are very favorable for an American SUBMARINE that has slipped into it to lead a LONG and HIDDEN SURVEILLANCE of our strategic submarines. TO HIDE IN IT IS DIFFICULT, by all conditions it is a problematic water area ..."
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2019 08: 20
      +4
      It’s difficult for us to hide in it, there is such a hydrology that Amer substrates hear us very far. And we often do not have them - they are very quiet.
      1. NordOst16
        NordOst16 7 October 2019 10: 16
        +3
        I wonder if mining straits will help? As the British did at one time, surface ships pass, but the submarines are gone. But the only difference is that you turn off the mines in a narrow fairway (or lower them) at the time of the passage of the submarine and raise it after the passage. And at the time of passage escort ships will actively work with their GAS. Distances there are small and relatively old HACKs will have a high probability to find an enemy submarine
        1. timokhin-aa
          7 October 2019 11: 13
          +6
          Mining will help. But you need to apply it suddenly. Not in peacetime.
          1. NordOst16
            NordOst16 7 October 2019 14: 20
            +1
            And why it is impossible to establish fields and close straits in advance or to establish a minefield in such a way that only surface ships could pass
            1. timokhin-aa
              7 October 2019 14: 36
              +4
              Because the enemy adapts his tactics and will be ready for mines. Now we have one weak chance. Americans have been hosted on our shores for almost 60 years and during this time they have developed patterns in actions.

              There is very little chance to catch them on this. But if you start to shine trumps in advance, then nothing will come of it.
              1. NordOst16
                NordOst16 8 October 2019 07: 23
                0
                It’s interesting, but now the determination of the goals of the submarine’s submarine is automated, or how did hydroacoustics sit in ancient times and listen to the ocean?
                It is a pity that there is no publicly available information on which to install it corresponds to the new HAC installed on ash and bore, in terms of its characteristics that installed on American, French and British nuclear submarines.
                You wrote that our submarines are huge, I have little sense in the effect of the displacement on the visibility of the submarines, but if you look at the dimensions, the Russian and Soviet boats are not much larger than the American ones, then where does such a difference in displacement come from? Do they carry a lot of water with them?
                1. timokhin-aa
                  8 October 2019 11: 10
                  +1
                  It’s interesting, but now the determination of the goals of the submarine’s submarine is automated, or how did hydroacoustics sit in ancient times and listen to the ocean?


                  A computer analysis of the acoustic spectrum has long been underway.

                  It is a pity that there is no publicly available information on which to install it corresponds to the new HAC installed on ash and bore, in terms of its characteristics that installed on American, French and British nuclear submarines.


                  The hydroacoustic equipment itself is more or less standards. The problem is in the periphery.

                  You wrote that our submarines are huge, I have little sense in the effect of the displacement on the visibility of the submarines, but, if you look at the dimensions, the Russian and Soviet boats are not much larger than the American ones


                  A lot more really.
                  1. NordOst16
                    NordOst16 8 October 2019 13: 35
                    0
                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    The hydroacoustic equipment itself is more or less standards. The problem is in the periphery.

                    Those. in electronics and algorithms processing what the equipment was able to catch?

                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    A lot more really.

                    I wonder for what reason such a difference. In theory, it will not be possible to reset everything to a two-case scheme. Probably the capitalists have more compact and efficient equipment.

                    So I read a little about the methods of detecting submarines. And to look at a certain standing wave with a radar, and to scatter networks with hydrophones, and to look for a submarine on the TV track, in general, it seems that either submarines should be reduced to 3-5 thousand tons of displacement (with a decrease in ammunition at almost the same price per boat) , or even abandon them because surface ships, coupled with aircraft carriers, can do much more useful.
                    One gets the feeling that Apple is turning into an expensive club for not very advanced opponents.
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      8 October 2019 15: 25
                      +3
                      Those. in electronics and algorithms processing what the equipment was able to catch?


                      Yes.

                      I wonder for what reason such a difference. In theory, it will not be possible to reset everything to a two-case scheme. Probably the capitalists have more compact and efficient equipment.


                      It’s just that they seriously approach the solution of problems, develop methods, set up experiments, try new things. There is no fiction.

                      For example, they have an acoustic submarine stand - a semi-submerged dock with microphones, they listen to the noise of the boat and eliminate them. They have better metalworking, they balance the details of rotation more precisely and process slip pairs in mechanisms to a better surface finish than we do. They are more consistent in research, for example, before 80's, no one bothered with what shape the submarine's acoustic field had, and they measured it right away as soon as the question of battle under water, etc.
                      We, too, could measure, there was someone and what, but we did not measure.

                      That is, they just WORK BETTER and that’s it. There is no other secret.

                      So I read a little about the methods of detecting submarines. And to look at a certain standing wave with a radar, and to scatter networks with hydrophones, and to look for a submarine on the teal track, in general, it seems that either submarines should be reduced to 3-5 thousand tons of displacement (with a decrease in ammunition at almost the same price per boat) ,


                      With the exception of the price - everything is true, absolutely. The French have already come to this. And the price with this approach can be reduced.

                      One gets the feeling that Apple is turning into an expensive club for not very advanced opponents.


                      the acquisition of radar and anti-aircraft missiles did not lead to the disappearance of aircraft, just aviation has changed. The subflood is now in the same period, that's all. You just need to understand and take this into account.
                      1. NordOst16
                        NordOst16 8 October 2019 17: 38
                        0
                        Hmm, in electronics we won’t catch up with the States or we can have the same computing power of the CIC at larger sizes.

                        Improving production technologies is right, but building new stands to test equipment separately and assembled, and then the entire boat - these operations will require a significant amount of time and money. I can’t even imagine how the Russian Federation with its budget can afford it. It is necessary to completely change the requirements for equipment manufacturers, and the manufacturers themselves must invest a lot in changing technological processes and building new test benches. It turns out that you need to turn everything around. Personally, I can’t believe that we can overcome this.

                        And as for the sizes - it turns out, judging by the example of the Americans and the British, the displacement of the nuclear submarines should be at the level of 7-8 thousand. It seems that we had boats with such a displacement - baracudas like
            2. Polinom
              Polinom 10 October 2019 10: 39
              -2
              That is, to close the international straits by mines? Lovely. belay
      2. mik193
        mik193 7 October 2019 12: 09
        +6
        Good day, Alexander. First of all, thanks for the current article. Let me say a few words about audibility and hydrology. Hydrology works the same way both ways. I took a better position - you can hear further or better hide. But about the noise of our and enemy submarines - this is a really old sore point. And our science and industry play not the last violin in this. Projects are developed and crammed in such that they are beneficial only to production. The modernization of ships that entered service is practically not carried out. Inter-trip repairs - mainly by the crews. How long does it take for the ship to "come to life" after factory repair? And the famous delivery of orders for the New Year so that the plant would receive bonuses? And now a somehow repaired and unmodernized boat goes out to sea and tries to withstand a fairly well modernized enemy. With a logical result.
        1. timokhin-aa
          7 October 2019 12: 19
          +5
          He has taken a better position - you hear further or you hide better.


          There is a nuance.

          Americans, for example, dive into the depths in order to hear what is happening hundreds of kilometers around in some deep-sea slam-shut device. Moreover, since the beginning of the eighties there wasn’t used listening to ranges by acoustics, but analysis of the spectrum, which we came to massively much later.
          And here, not only lower noise level works against us, but also, for example, that their VC works better when performing the task of spectrum analysis.

          That is, the point is not only that they are quieter, but also that they pick up signs of submarine noise and discrete from a greater distance than we do, and with a comparable level of the acoustic equipment itself.

          Plus, they had a better understanding of hydroacoustics in principle - for example, they studied the shape of the acoustic field of a submarine in the first decades after the appearance of the Nautilus. And we are in the eighties.

          They just cook better, that's all. This is how their submarines can be detected with our GAKs. As one hydroacoustician said about Sturgeon - "well-muted RTM." The level was comparable, but where we slapped our ears, they rested and squeezed the maximum out of the technique.

          For the rest I agree, especially on this
          Projects are developed and shoved so that they are beneficial only to production.
          1. mik193
            mik193 7 October 2019 12: 39
            +7
            Yes, I completely agree with you. Just put it rudely enough. Yes, the adversary uses both spectral analysis of noise and search by discrete components. They began to test GAS with GPBA in the beginning of the 70th. And even the zero noise threshold for the calculations was different at first. We counted from the threshold of ear audibility 2x10-5 Pa at 1000 Hz, and the enemy from 1x10-6 Pa. Hence, such a failure in sonar.
            Well, about our HACKs. Modify too. In the mid-90s, they went to the BS with the MGK-100 on board. I think there are no questions.
  5. rocket757
    rocket757 7 October 2019 08: 22
    -1
    What to discuss, you need to know. Who knows, he keeps quiet ... secretly - p.
    Let's discuss assumptions, individual facts, and many speculations.
    What do we get as a result?
  6. tihonmarine
    tihonmarine 7 October 2019 08: 22
    +5
    The article is very competent, thanks to the author. And a lot of concern especially
    The fleet is simply not ready to conduct them, neither psychologically, nor financially, nor organizationally. For example, there is not enough aviation to provide such military campaigns, and the one that is substantially outdated. The fleets themselves are subordinate to the military districts, and it will be very difficult to explain to the land general that offshore is more dangerous than somewhere far in the ocean. The command staff of the Navy is already used to doing what it does (although voices demanding to return to the ocean in the fleet are heard, and very high). There are questions about submarines.
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2019 11: 12
      +2
      And a lot of concern especially


      Therefore, it is written.
  7. Avior
    Avior 7 October 2019 08: 45
    +4
    Under the dominance of the US Navy at sea, it is logical for them to take a first disarming strike, using high-precision medium-range ballistic missiles such as Pershing with tactical nuclear charges, primarily with nuclear submarines. Currently, such weapons are not limited to any contracts. Trump expects to include tactical charges and medium-range missiles in the next nuclear arms limitation treaty after START-3, but the likelihood that this will happen is very low. It is likely that after the Americans are convinced that such an agreement is impossible, they will go about the path that I am describing.
    That is, there should be a low-noise submarine based on Virginia, for example, capable of secretly reaching the Russian coast as close as possible-
    Baltic, Black Sea, North, Okhotsk and so on, and deliver the first disastrous surprise strike on ICBM mines, locations of mobile complexes, bombers, nuclear submarines, nuclear storage facilities, command and control centers and combat control.
    A missile range of 5.5 thousand kilometers is quite enough for this, a lot of such boats are not needed - medium-range missiles in size are noticeably smaller than ICBMs, and they can be placed even on a small nuclear submarine in sufficient quantities, high-precision missiles do not require a large amount of ammunition for point targets.
    Unlike ground-based launchers, preparations for launching missiles with nuclear submarines can be carried out covertly and quickly, the flight time of the SD BR is much less than that of conventional BR submarines.
    And at the same time, to deliver an ultimatum to the enemy - in an attempt to retaliate with the remnants of the nuclear arsenal, strategic forces will strike at cities and people.
    Actually, when the Americans put Pershing, they tried to do something like that.
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2019 11: 12
      +3
      Under the dominance of the US Navy at sea, it is logical for them to take a first disarming strike, using high-precision medium-range ballistic missiles of the Pershing type with tactical nuclear charges, primarily with nuclear submarines.


      Well, it’s also technically just around the corner, but on the other hand, why bother with a garden if there are SLBMs? They are pragmatic rationalists, the idea of ​​riveting new missiles for a task that can be carried out there may not be supported.

      That is, there should be a low-noise submarine based on Virginia, for example, capable of secretly reaching the Russian coast as close as possible-


      The new "girls" have UVP, nothing "from the base" is needed, you just need a rocket and that's it. But, again, it makes no sense. The same can be done by SLBMs, and even the secrecy of deployment in Ohio is higher, we have felt them by the udders several times in history, there are no portlets, we simply will not hear them. With Viriginias it's more difficult.

      And at the same time, to deliver an ultimatum to the enemy - in an attempt to retaliate with the remnants of the nuclear arsenal, strategic forces will strike at cities and people.
      Actually, when the Americans put Pershing, they tried to do something like that.


      That was "all of them" and before the Pershing.
      1. Vadmir
        Vadmir 7 October 2019 17: 20
        +1
        The same can be done with SLBMs, and even the stealth of deployment in Ohio is higher
        But we must take into account that Ohio, at least for now, falls under START-3 and their number is limited without the possibility of building up.
        1. timokhin-aa
          7 October 2019 18: 58
          +2
          There estimates of losses from a full salvo - 100-130 million people, if a blow to the population. Where else to build them? On peacetime patrols, 4 SSBNs, on 20 missiles, are 80 missiles. The blocks there are 6-10.

          Plus ICBMs.

          Nothing needed at all. Everything is.
          1. Polinom
            Polinom 10 October 2019 10: 58
            0
            Alexander ... Well yo ... am
            How many rockets are on Ohio? And blocks?
            From VIKI- "Due to the restrictions under the START-2 treaty, there are about 400 W87 warheads and 1700 W76 warheads on alert (6-8 warheads per missile). The rest of the W76 warheads have been removed from the missiles and are in storage. "... In 2000, due to the need to extend the service life, the Life Extension Program (LEP) was initiated. Warheads upgraded under this program will receive the designation W76-1, and warheads - Mk-4a. The first batch of W76- 1 / Mk-4a was received by the US Navy in 2009.
            You confuse the concepts of a warhead, a combat unit and a fuse.
            "Warhead W76-2 is a power-reduced version of the W76 warhead, which was produced in the 70-80s of the last century. Therefore, full-scale nuclear tests of the new warhead were not conducted.
            W76-2 will go into service September 2019 years. These warheads will be installed on Trident II (D5) intercontinental strategic ballistic missiles, which are equipped with Ohio-class strategic nuclear submarines.
            W76-2 will be installed on a limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The number of warheads is not disclosed.
            The power of the warhead is about 5-6 kilotons. For comparison: the power of the "mother" W76 warhead is 100 kilotons. The dimensions and weight of the W76-2 are unknown.

            In the photo that you have in the article, not blocks. These are fuses.
            1. timokhin-aa
              10 October 2019 11: 51
              0
              Damn, 24 same)) But it’s even worse.

              START-2 does not work, and START-3 will not be soon, it is necessary to consider to the maximum. Regarding power reduction - also in the vein of the first blow. For containment, a decrease in power is bad; for a first counter-force strike, it is normal; it allows you to win a war at a lower cost if you strike first.
              1. Polinom
                Polinom 10 October 2019 12: 28
                -1
                Then the idea that Americans carry out genocide is untenable.
                Low power means high precision. Disarm. It's just not Balancere the fool is counting how many millions in the USA Poseidon will ditch. And the fact that this nuclear infection will then get everyone, they do not think about it.
                1. Vadim237
                  Vadim237 10 October 2019 18: 19
                  +2
                  Most of this infection will remain where the explosions take place. With a ground explosion of one megaton
                  Two hours after the explosion - the far border of the spread of the zone of extremely dangerous contamination with a width of approx. 10 km along the axis of cloud movement with a wind in the stratosphere of ~ 25-100 km / h. The radiation level at the outer border for 1 hour after the explosion is 8 Gy / h, after 10 hours 0,5 Gy / h; the radiation dose at the outer border during the complete decay in the middle of the zone is 70-100 Gy, at the outer border of 40 Gy - one year after the explosion, the area of ​​the territory in the vicinity of the explosion site, unsuitable for life with a dose of 0,02 Gy per year, 15 km²; the area of ​​the territory dangerous for long-term stay with a dose of 000 Gy per year 1 km² - all this can be multiplied by the entire megatonnage of Russia and the United States and get a general unsuitable zone for life, someone has calculated that the explosion of the entire arsenal of Russia and the United States will release 130 million tons of CO38 - this already says that there will not be any nuclear winter, since carbon dioxide is an excellent "accumulator" of the greenhouse effect.
                  1. ccsr
                    ccsr 10 October 2019 19: 14
                    +1
                    Quote: Vadim237
                    Someone has calculated that the explosion of the entire arsenal of Russia and the United States will release 38 million tons of CO2 - this already says that there will be no nuclear winter, since carbon dioxide is an excellent "accumulator" of the greenhouse effect.

                    This is a dubious statement, if only because it is unrealistic, and most importantly, the secondary consequences of nuclear strikes for the population are not taken into account:
                    it is now known that smoke from Kuwait’s oil fires affected only a weather pattern throughout the Persian Gulf and the surrounding region during periods that fires were burning in 1991, with lower atmospheric smoke winds along the eastern half of the Arabian Peninsula, and such cities, like Dahrane and Riyadh, and countries like Bahrain experienced days with smoke filled with sky and carbon soot rainout / precipitation.
                    Thus, the direct consequence of the arson of sabotage was a sharp regional decline in air quality, causing respiratory problems for many Kuwaiti citizens and in neighboring countries.

                    Translated article:
                    https://ru.qwertyu.wiki/wiki/Kuwaiti_Oil_Fires
                    1. Vadim237
                      Vadim237 11 October 2019 00: 16
                      0
                      I'm talking about atomic explosions, and you're talking about fires in the Persian Gulf.
                      1. ccsr
                        ccsr 11 October 2019 09: 56
                        +1
                        Quote: Vadim237
                        I'm talking about atomic explosions, and you're talking about fires in the Persian Gulf.

                        So nuclear explosions will be accompanied by global fires, which will lead to atmospheric pollution, which means that solar energy will not reach the Earth's surface. Where does the greenhouse effect come from?
                      2. Stils
                        Stils 11 October 2019 11: 15
                        -2
                        Quote: ccsr
                        Quote: Vadim237
                        I'm talking about atomic explosions, and you're talking about fires in the Persian Gulf.

                        So nuclear explosions will be accompanied by global fires, which will lead to atmospheric pollution, which means that solar energy will not reach the Earth's surface. Where does the greenhouse effect come from?

                        The greenhouse effect is a fallacy. Millions of tons of radioactive soot due to fires will get into the atmosphere and spread around the world, some will fall in the form of precipitation, polluting the soil, and some will settle for several years, letting through a minimum of ultraviolet radiation, temperatures will drop, there will be less precipitation, a significant part of the crops will die, it will begin hunger and cold.

                        I also wanted to speak out about the article ....

                        In general, this idea of ​​destroying shpu and pgrk in the form of a lightning-fast global strike with low-power blocks is pure utopia, they are well protected, and of significant power is also utopia due to strong radioactive contamination. The atmosphere is very mobile and is capable of moving radioactive clouds over long distances and contaminating crops, pastures, water bodies, etc. as well as territories making them uninhabitable. Does it make sense for the Americans to shoot themselves in the foot? This is possible only in some special situation, the fall of a large meteorite on the other part of the United States or a coastal zone, for example, a supervolcano eruption, a complete decline and devaluation by orders of magnitude of the dollar, accompanied by an unprecedented collapse of the US economy, and the likelihood of this in the near future from 30 to 60 years-tends to zero. And such a blow is also open to the question "Is it necessary?", Well, only if the enemy's ability to seize their own territories is reduced and this explains a lot. And the fact that they have nuclear weapons sharpened for the offensive can also be explained - they have such a financial opportunity, but we do not have it. Strategic superiority dictates a doctrine to them, for every SPECIAL case they have such a plan, and whether it will be useful or not, no one knows, God forbid, we will not find out.
                      3. ccsr
                        ccsr 11 October 2019 11: 43
                        +1
                        Quote: Stils
                        The greenhouse effect is a fallacy.

                        I agree with this - this is another author who convinced us that there will be a greenhouse effect.
                        Quote: Stils
                        In general, this idea of ​​destroying silos and rockets in the form of a lightning fast global strike by low-power blocks is pure utopia

                        And I agree with this, because such a lightning strike is unlikely to take place with modern weapons and reconnaissance equipment.
                        Quote: Stils
                        Sense of Americans shoot yourself in the foot?

                        As soon as they have the opportunity to repel our retaliatory strike, it is not known what will occur to them. So do not be mistaken about their common sense - for them we are all the same Indians, but with nuclear weapons.
                        Quote: Stils
                        And the fact that they have sharpened nuclear weapons under the offensive can also be explained - they have such a financial opportunity, but we do not have it.

                        And our offensive component prevails over the defensive despite our financial capabilities.
                        Quote: Stils
                        Strategic superiority dictates a doctrine to them, for any SPECIAL case they have such a plan,

                        All strategic plans fly into the basket over time, but the principle of dominance around the world remains the main idea for them, and all military doctrines after 1945 are adapted to it. So the primary idea is not the strategic superiority itself, which they create thanks to their obsession.
                  2. Polinom
                    Polinom 12 October 2019 12: 01
                    -2
                    Well, there were values ​​from 50 to 100. In Poseidon. Explosions in the ocean. I mean that through the currents, the food chains will reach those who launched this "Poseidon".
                2. timokhin-aa
                  11 October 2019 11: 16
                  0
                  And I’m not saying that they are preparing genocide. They are preparing the first blow. Counterforce. If they were preparing genocide, I would not have taken a steam bath.
                  The genocide is being prepared by those who are not going to attack first.

                  Although if you believe what I read, after a successful counterforce strike, the enemy should be forced to obey precisely the threat of genocide in the next blows, but this is another story.
                  1. Stils
                    Stils 11 October 2019 17: 58
                    -2
                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    And I’m not saying that they are preparing genocide. They are preparing the first blow. Counterforce. If they were preparing genocide, I would not have taken a steam bath.
                    The genocide is being prepared by those who are not going to attack first.

                    Although if you believe what I read, after a successful counterforce strike, the enemy should be forced to obey precisely the threat of genocide in the next blows, but this is another story.


                    I am pleased to read your articles, they undoubtedly contain a lot of useful and give answers to many challenges.

                    Here they express the opinion that everything is done for the sake of total dominance in the world.
                    But it’s good to dominate in a clean, rich world, worshiping the golden calf, increasing the consumption-icon of capitalism. And while there is a risk of receiving unacceptable damage in response, which may call into question dominance, no such counter-force strike will follow. And unacceptable damage is not only, and not so much as one or two megatons, leaked to major US cities, as the consequences of a counter-strike - confusion, chaos, soaring energy prices, food and gold, radioactive fallout across Eurasia after strikes on spur and PGRK, loss of sales markets, crop failures, violations of logistics, etc. and in addition, a sharp aggravation of regional conflicts around the world, all this will offset the benefits of the surrender of their positions by the military-political leadership of Russia. Russia is much easier, cheaper and more rational to shatter from the inside out, especially since the elite ... is rotten, rotting inside (s). It is more likely that such a moment will come than when the states can carry out a counterattack with impunity.
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      11 October 2019 19: 20
                      +1
                      Russia is much easier, cheaper and more rational to shatter from the inside out, especially since the elite ... rotten, rotting inside (s)


                      Well, that's what they thought ... and then it raced, what is called. Now here the troops from Syria will be removed. Putin leaked what is called.
                      1. Stils
                        Stils 11 October 2019 20: 08
                        -2
                        Volodin’s quote a couple of years ago is very indicative of the way the elite breathes, so to speak ... There is Putin, there is Russia, there is no Putin, there is no Russia (c) ... remember this phrase
                      2. timokhin-aa
                        11 October 2019 21: 05
                        0
                        Well, there is such a moment, yes. On the other hand, he is hardly all alone. Let's wait.
                  2. Polinom
                    Polinom 12 October 2019 12: 06
                    -2
                    So you write about the conquest of the Wild West, the psychology of Americans, attacks on cities.
                    And I'm talking about the fact that they have reduced power with increasing accuracy.
                    By the way, it is interesting to learn about the conquest of the same Ermak and other Siberia. Russian America and Alaska.
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      12 October 2019 19: 48
                      +1
                      So you write about the conquest of the Wild West, the psychology of Americans, attacks on cities.


                      Yes, but I do not write about the fact that they set themselves the goal of completely destroying all the Japanese. It’s just that their methods of war allow deliberate blows to the peaceful people, and they won’t reflect on this topic.

                      We, with all our cockroaches, have a different attitude to the issue - it’s enough just to voice the possibility of Russia’s first strike against the United States, you’ll hear enough of this about yourself ...

                      Regarding how the Russians fought in Chukotka and Alaska (and, for example, in the Caucasus, there was tin, Shelekhov never dreamed of). We are ashamed of these pages of history, they are proud of them. Everything would be fine, a long time ago, then the times were wild, but this affects decision-making. This is what I wrote about. And not that the Americans are bad. I don’t care whether they are bad or not, I’m interested in whether the moral paradigm that dominates their society can act as a deterrent to them in an attack against us.

                      So far it turns out that en masse this is not a fact, so to speak. Although the nuances were and are, in general, hope for this, in the case of the Americans, is impossible.
      2. Avior
        Avior 7 October 2019 20: 18
        0
        It is a matter of making, for example, a Virginia-based submarine specifically for medium-range missile strikes.
        Medium-range ballistic missiles, in contrast to the SLBMs currently used, have smaller dimensions and much shorter flight times, since the stealth and dimensions of small nuclear submarines will make it possible to approach as close to shore as possible.
        For a sudden strike, this is more convenient than land launchers.
  8. rocket757
    rocket757 7 October 2019 10: 45
    +1
    Today no one has the opportunity to carry out an unrequited blow ....
    It can be assumed that so far, but any opposite side is not waiting for this, but is working so that it has never been realized.
    This is the military aspect of the problem .... the political side, the decision of the ruling to apply such catastrophic methods, it is useless to discuss, because FIG knows what they think. Fortune telling.
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2019 11: 07
      +4
      Today no one has the opportunity to carry out an unrequited blow ....
      It can be assumed that for now,


      UNTIL. The key word is bye.

      but any opposite side does not wait for this yet, but works so that it has never been realized before.


      Well here there are questions. Strategic Rocket Forces is working, yes. But they are limited by what is listed in the article.

      The fleet does not work there and is somehow strange, although there were (and are) admirals who understood what was happening.
      1. rocket757
        rocket757 7 October 2019 11: 21
        0
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        limited to what is listed in the article

        Quote: timokhin-aa
        The fleet is not working there and is somehow strange

        You have to be real in the TOPIC! I do not want to guess, and I must listen to fortune-telling very carefully!
        Experience is of little help to us, the former, because much, if not everything, has changed.
        We simply rely on the sanity of the upper ones and look a little at Old from open sources .... if by profile, as you can evaluate, because the principles have not changed much, but if by, what was taught, then there’s nothing to understand.
        So far, you can understand that nothing fundamentally new has been invented! The improvement of what was not implemented then, for technological reasons ....
        The assurances from above about super-duper achievements, on principles not known / not used until the village, are almost like fairy tales / cartoons. But as soon as we talk, we will discuss.
        1. timokhin-aa
          7 October 2019 11: 26
          +3
          Experience is of little help to us, the former, because much, if not everything, has changed.


          There are things that do not change.

          and a little look at Old from open sources .... if by profile, as you can evaluate, because the principles have not changed much, but if by, what was taught, then there’s nothing to understand.
          So far, you can understand that nothing fundamentally new has been invented!


          And if not a little, but to get deep into the question, then something becomes noticeable, and yes, something new is completely implemented, it’s just basically not with us.
          1. rocket757
            rocket757 7 October 2019 11: 33
            -1
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            And if not a little, but to get deep into the question, then something becomes noticeable

            On open sources, on top, on principles? For the military sphere, this is not enough ... you can easily go to the throne without even making fundamental mistakes.
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            Something new is fully implemented, just basically not with us.

            And what we don’t have, so that it would be completely ... fundamentally new.
            The question is how it is, we don’t, because we can not or did not consider it necessary. There is a difference.
            There is another option ... they didn’t give money for ... we got a little shorter.
    2. tihonmarine
      tihonmarine 7 October 2019 16: 24
      0
      Quote: rocket757
      Today, no one has the opportunity to carry out an unrequited blow ..

      There is an opportunity or not an opportunity, but civilization and humanity will come to an end.
      1. rocket757
        rocket757 7 October 2019 17: 10
        0
        So it’s better not to guess. The boom is hoping for common sense, a sense of self-preservation and to do, reinforce our resolve not only with words, with essential arguments always and in everything.
  9. bk0010
    bk0010 7 October 2019 11: 03
    +3
    START is coming to an end soon, it is necessary to increase the number of charges every 10 times (this will be a third of what was under Brezhnev), make a new mobile complex like Courier, but in order to carry the Vanguard (yes, one-headed) and put them in each ArBr, as well as make refueling tanks, tanks, etc. visually repeating the complex (expensive, but will allow the enemy to powder their brains and will serve as a reserve to maintain the readiness of these complexes). Get upset to keep track. Make heads multi-program so that you can pre-set objects for different scenarios and select them with a flick of the wrist.
    The task of controlling the bastions must be laid ashore: the task has been relevant for a long time, and ships are doing slowly. Expand stationary control networks, hit detectable targets from the shore (there are no funds yet, but I think that it’s real to make a Caliber base) and from air.
  10. Mainbeam
    Mainbeam 7 October 2019 11: 21
    +2
    A good article with interesting non-linear arguments. But a bit with a one-sided bias towards the Navy. It would be interesting to look more fully at the analysis of the theoretical interaction of different branches of the army in support of the Navy. The article has some mention, but not as rich as a review of the autonomous tactics of the Navy. And further...

    PGRK, who left the position area, or disguised in it, still needs to be discovered ... the task is to “teach” military computers to identify anomalies in satellite photos that may indicate the presence of a masked launcher on the ground.

    Recently, an article at VO examined masking methods, including those with inflatable PGRK, indistinguishable from real electronic reconnaissance equipment. Yes, and with simple grids, we can theoretically manually change landscapes systematically, repeatedly, throughout the country so that the likely enemy gets tired of reorienting their missiles.

    lack of imagination in persons determining naval strategy

    Sadness ... When I read such articles at the Military District, I don’t understand by what logic the armed forces of our country are being built. Stupid uncles cannot sit THERE.

    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2019 11: 24
      +2
      indistinguishable from real electronic intelligence.


      Unreal. If the enemy invests in at least software and computing power to analyze satellite intelligence data, then he will not take off. Although some installations will survive the first blow if it comes to that.

      And if they invest in the satellites themselves ...
  11. V1er
    V1er 7 October 2019 11: 41
    +3
    There is another way to destroy Russia without nuclear weapons and casualties, through the Gorbachov region. Betrayal of the elites, servility to the pan and the handing over of the keys to the apartment, as well as the wife, daughter and property. I think that the main blow will be dealt in this direction. Through the Internet. Fooling around the population, all kinds of hidden charismatic agents, traitors, the elite that keeps everything abroad, are the same officials. This is much more dangerous. The only way out is raising the standard of living and patriotism, developing the economy.

    Money is the nerve of war.
    From Latin: Nervus belli pecunia (Nervus Belli Pacunia).
    The expression is based on the line of the ancient Greek poet Bion.

    For war, three things are needed: money, money, and again money.
    According to the Italian author Ludovico Gvicchardini in his essay "Leisure time" (1565), this is how Marshal Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio (1448-1518) answered the question of Louis XII, what preparations are needed to conquer the Duchy of Milan.

    Zbigniew Brzezinki: Whose "elite" is ours or yours?
    1. Mainbeam
      Mainbeam 7 October 2019 11: 51
      +5
      Yes, it seems like already ... Everything has been sold and resold, the state debt has been paid, the assets are merging, the industry is bending, the VAT is rising, medicine and education are in the furnace, as well as agricultural.

      On the one hand, the country no longer belongs to the people. On the other hand, brand new missiles are on alert and squeezed Syria. The question is, for what? Just to sell wood and oil? Somehow stupid.

      1. Vadim237
        Vadim237 10 October 2019 18: 22
        -2
        I don’t know what kind of industry you are bending there, according to the results of last year, the growth of industrial production amounted to 4%, this is likely to be 5%.
        1. Mainbeam
          Mainbeam 10 October 2019 18: 42
          +1
          The numbers are good. But when the bearing plant, metallurgical, automobile closes or contracts, it is not very interesting to look at the numbers. Yes, bakeries and cafes open all over the city. But for industrial production to open (except for plastic windows or the production of artificial stone) I did not hear.

          So it’s better not figures, but concrete examples, preferably in the regions. And I do not know what growth is measured by? Quantity in pieces or turnover in foreign currency? VAT increased by 2% - food prices went up by 15-20%, and this has a positive effect on GDP))) Maybe it is the same with industrial production?

          Sorry if I'm driving a blizzard. Before my eyes, slipways were cut, workshops were converted into shopping centers ... I have not seen or read the reverse process. I agree if you say about "military commissar", but this is more an exception.
          1. Vadim237
            Vadim237 11 October 2019 00: 13
            -1
            You will not hear or see at home - but they open up in Russia every day, the country is huge - engineering products for the past year are almost 8 trillion rubles, this will be more.
    2. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2019 11: 55
      +2
      The mantras of the communists. Russia has long been ruled by a new "non-Marx" class - the bureaucracy. And these people have something to lose. And many oligarchs too.

      The problem is that we, as a society, make a lot of mistakes.
    3. Alien From
      Alien From 17 October 2019 12: 06
      -4
      Not in the eyebrow, but in the eye !!!!!)
  12. Tektor
    Tektor 7 October 2019 12: 27
    +3
    The article is huge +.
    EGSONPO is of critical importance, which should reach the level of initial combat readiness in 2020.
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2019 12: 39
      +3
      Yeah, reach.

      The last "iteration" was plowed by some "fishermen" with trawls to the point of impossibility of restoration.

      Have tried already.
  13. Glory1974
    Glory1974 7 October 2019 12: 33
    +4
    No one will figure out if ten missiles are flying or one hundred and ten. All that is more than one already indicates a volley.
    After the report that a volley was fired at Russia, and a priori it would be no less than 10 missiles, a command is given to retaliate. And everything that is there will fly. Therefore, there will be no limited nuclear war, although it is possible to launch several tactical nuclear strikes in a low-intensity conflict. But launched strategic missiles, regardless of quantity, will definitely lead to mutual destruction.
    Americans know this, not fools. Just everyone is doing his own thing, someone is developing war plans, someone is improving military equipment, and someone is fighting for peace.
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2019 12: 42
      +2
      For this, there are nuclear backpacks, if anything, and people who know how to use them. One or two radars are put out of action, while a message about the attack reaches Moscow, it will be plowed up from a short distance into the opened "window" along the "flat" ones.

      The team passes to the reciprocal counter passes not instantly.

      Britons throw us Tridents faster than twice, if it comes to business.
      1. Vadim237
        Vadim237 10 October 2019 18: 26
        0
        "Nuclear knapsacks" - "How will they get to the territory of Russia, teleport together with knowledgeable people?
        1. timokhin-aa
          11 October 2019 11: 09
          0
          Well, here Polynom hangs out in the comments, he somehow watched the Navy Seals cache in our territory. During service.

          And there is also diplomatic mail, so that Americans do not waste time on screening and customs clearance, even building materials make out as diplomatic mail, according to 50-100 tons of the package, hide it there



          in an insulating container - not a problem even once.

          Even in the USSR, the CIA calmly rolled containers with reconnaissance equipment by rail, and there is no need to talk about "now".
          1. Vadim237
            Vadim237 11 October 2019 16: 07
            0
            In Russia, the FSB is also not blind radioactive materials and their movement is monitored. And given our current relations with the United States, we must think that soon the whole diplomatic post will be whipped.
            1. timokhin-aa
              11 October 2019 19: 16
              +1
              Diplomatic mail will never be stolen. And do not keep track of everything. It’s better not to even try. It is necessary to ensure guaranteed invulnerability of a substantial part of the strategic nuclear forces.

              That’s enough.
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 11 October 2019 20: 26
                0
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                Diplomatic mail will never be stolen. And do not keep track of everything. Better not even try.

                Have you ever seen a bag in your eyes? He has restrictions on the size and weight of the property located in it due to the fact that the diplomatic courier in critical situations must drag it on him. Of course, no one has the right to open a diplomatic post, but our planes crash, diplomatic cars get into accidents, and the human factor cannot be ruled out. So you should not hope that the diplomatic department will take risks in the transportation of radioactive materials by diplomatic couriers.
                1. timokhin-aa
                  11 October 2019 21: 15
                  0
                  This is just an example of one of the options.

                  In an extreme case, it is quite possible to crank if the stakes are high enough.

                  But no ... I repeat, the "seals" quite worked for themselves on the territory of the USSR. Not once.
                  1. ccsr
                    ccsr 12 October 2019 09: 08
                    -1
                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    But no ... I repeat, the "seals" quite worked for themselves on the territory of the USSR. Not once.

                    At SPRN radar stations or at the walls of the Kremlin?
          2. ccsr
            ccsr 11 October 2019 17: 19
            +1
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            And there is also diplomatic mail, so that Americans do not waste time on screening and customs clearance, even building materials make out as diplomatic mail, according to 50-100 tons of the package, hide it there

            And there is radiometric control that you pass bypassing ordinary border guards even with diplomatic mail.
            As for cargo containers, they are also checked for radioactivity without even opening.
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            Even in the USSR, the CIA calmly rolled containers with reconnaissance equipment by rail, and there is no need to talk about "now".

            Reconnaissance equipment, as a rule, does not have radioactive materials, even in power sources, if it moves to other countries.
            So you should not come up with situations - wearable backpack charges have very limited use, and even then their use is very difficult in countries with a strict counterintelligence regime in peacetime.
            1. timokhin-aa
              11 October 2019 19: 18
              0
              This only works if the adversary is not trying to hide the fact of the presence of radioactive materials. Any weak radioactive radiation is completely isolated if necessary.
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 11 October 2019 20: 19
                0
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                Any weak radioactive radiation is completely isolated if necessary.

                Of course, there are containers for transporting radioactive materials, but why put all this in the way, if their charge is limited, and in no way can affect the retaliatory strike in the event of such diversion.
                1. timokhin-aa
                  11 October 2019 21: 13
                  -1
                  The steps are one option.
                  3 charge.

                  2 are delivered to the SPRN radar without penetrating the protected area, they simply rush in parked cars at the desired azimuth from the antennas.

                  Another one is also delivered in a car to Moscow at a public event where the President is to speak.

                  Further, the time-controlled demolition and launch of SLBMs from British submarines according to the strategic missile control system along a flat path, at the same time the launch of SLBMs from a reduced distance (not from their combat duty areas, but closer to the territory of the Russian Federation - we still do not have PLO, we don’t even know that they were redeployed) from silos, PGRK, fleet bases with SSBNs, etc.

                  We get the timeline: explosion + 6-7 minutes - a massive nuclear strike on the entire strategic missile forces control system, on the silos located in the European part of Russia, on the long-wave transmitters for communication with the SSBN.

                  Explosion + 15 minutes - a massive blow to all strategic missile forces, air defense, the main bases of the airborne forces.

                  At this point, they will win the HOUR to catch the remaining SSBNs at sea and PGRK on land.

                  The task of naval construction is to make sure that they cannot catch SSBNs before the "Perimeter" is triggered.

                  Then there will be nothing.
                  1. Newone
                    Newone 12 October 2019 00: 27
                    +1
                    A nuclear explosion in the center of Moskea, nuclear explosions in the "desired azimuth" from the antennas of early warning stations (there are more than one station observing the sector) is of course not a reason for making a decision. yeah. + what no space. + reconnaissance complexes.
                    And the launch of the BR along a flat trajectory can be seen quite far, and not only by means of early warning stations.
                    Z.Y. Nuclear cases were still in the 60's. Means of countering such threats were developed at the same time.
                    1. ccsr
                      ccsr 12 October 2019 09: 12
                      0
                      Quote: Newone
                      Z.Y. Nuclear cases were still in the 60's. Means of countering such threats were developed at the same time.

                      That's right, that is why their application carries more problems than real returns. Although in the teams of Special Forces there is a staff unit trained for their use.
                    2. timokhin-aa
                      12 October 2019 19: 54
                      0
                      this is certainly not a reason to make a decision. yeah


                      The killing of the President with a nuclear explosion is of course an occasion for the President to make some decision, yeah.
                      Glad I was not mistaken in you

                      Z.Y. Nuclear cases were still in the 60's. Means of countering such threats were developed at the same time.


                      Yes, but neither then nor now these funds were and are not a reliable guarantee against non-use. If only the Kremlin somewhere. But the whole country cannot be blocked by detectors. And all approaches to important objects on the radius of destruction - too.
                      1. Newone
                        Newone 13 October 2019 22: 48
                        +1
                        Timokhin, you either do not know how and by whom the decision to launch is made or you specifically ignore this information. Destruction of the primary command post (President) - STAFF, the situation prescribed in the instructions. And the rockets will go away in time.
                      2. timokhin-aa
                        14 October 2019 20: 00
                        0
                        The missiles will leave later for the time necessary to transmit information on the battle control networks that the President has been destroyed and launch sanctions from another authorized person. This purely technically cannot be done faster than in a few minutes.

                        When shooting on a flat trajectory from the Norwegian Sea, these few minutes will be enough to cover almost the entire command system. It is only necessary to cut down one or two SPRN radars simultaneously with the President - in the same way.

                        Next we only have the Perimeter, the strategic nuclear forces and individual surviving ground-based missiles, units. So they will need to carry out a blow of retaliation.

                        If there is no NSLF, then even without a missile defense factor this blow may turn out to be too weak.
                  2. ccsr
                    ccsr 12 October 2019 09: 07
                    0
                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    The steps are one option.
                    3 charge.

                    Thank you for your fantasies, but the script is clearly not real.
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      14 October 2019 20: 01
                      0
                      Nice aplomb, I won’t say anything.
                      1. ccsr
                        ccsr 14 October 2019 20: 29
                        -1
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        Nice aplomb, I won’t say anything.

                        The correct conclusion is that you really can’t say anything substantial, and studying your speculations does not bring much joy.
          3. Polinom
            Polinom 12 October 2019 12: 22
            -2
            Well, not a cache, but a bookmark. laughing More precisely, the remains of her.
            And the caches ... The SBU gradually opens the archives.

  14. Alex_59
    Alex_59 7 October 2019 13: 38
    +2
    One of the signs of such a complex was the discrepancy between the number of locomotives in the train and its length - if a certain train, when observing from space, “shone” the locomotives as if it were a freight train, and if it was passenger in length, then it should be examined visually in the photo
    Technically, the problem is solved in an elementary way. Add empty wagons to the number of a typical freight train and that's it. The first Soviet BZHRK had a number of features that are now easily overcome. This is primarily a "heavy rocket" and hence the need to use non-standard locomotives of an atypical quantity for the train, not standard wagons that visually differed from a conventional refrigerator. If the complex is built around a missile weighing not 100 tons, but 50, then all these problems will be removed automatically. Another question is whether there will be attempts to create a BZHRK in our country?
    And the boat, in theory, can win this battle. Unlike PGRK, which was attacked by an inconspicuous bomber in the electromagnetic chaos of the first hours after the start of a nuclear war, or even fell under the second wave of a nuclear missile attack.
    The author greatly underestimates the capabilities of PGRK. For all PGRK no subtle bombers will be enough. Moreover, these bombers will not be enough even for one regiment of the Strategic Missile Forces, provided that competent military men serve in our regiment.
    At the moment, their task is to “teach” military computers to detect anomalies on satellite photos that may indicate the presence of a masked launcher on the ground. Most likely, they will achieve their goal sooner or later.
    Our Strategic Missile Forces can provide American satellites with anomalies in abundance right now. It is enough to drive all the available "escort vehicles" and training simulators of the launcher to the terrain. Plus inflatable models and other equipment. Inflatable is okay, but it is almost impossible to distinguish the "escort car" from the launcher - they are the same, only the MC carries a "tank" instead of a rocket.
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2019 15: 03
      0
      If the complex is built around a rocket weighing not 100 tons, but 50, then all these problems will be removed automatically. Another question is whether there will be attempts to create a BZHRK in our country?


      Is it necessary? The CIA had access to the railway back in the 70's, even containers with reconnaissance equipment on our roads were allowed on our platforms. And you need a lot of money for the new complex.

      It is enough to drive all the available "escort vehicles" and training simulators of the launcher to the terrain. Plus inflatable models and other equipment. Inflatable is okay, but it is almost impossible to distinguish the "escort vehicle" from the launcher - they are the same, only the MC carries a "tank" instead of a rocket.


      This is if there is a threatened period, but then there will be no blow.
      1. Alex_59
        Alex_59 7 October 2019 15: 28
        0
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        And whether it is necessary?
        I don’t know if it is necessary. It’s just that if the party says it is necessary, it is possible to make the BZHRK absolutely secretive without problems.
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        The CIA had access to the railway back in 70's

        The CIA tried to track the BZHRK by undercover methods, it is somehow strange to assert "had access". Any person has access to the railway - there she is, come wherever you want. And attempts to track the BZHRK are known, but this does not mean that they were continuously monitored by the CIA. And the point here is that the BZHRK is not just a ghost train lonely plowing the vastness of the country, it was invisibly accompanied by certain employees and they did it in such a way that you simply cannot approach the train like a regular train.
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        This is if there is a threatened period, but then there will be no blow.

        No. PGRK carry out combat duty outside the PPD in peacetime, regardless of whether the period is threatened or not threatened. And the engineering support of such a duty is carried out just as continuously. Another question is whether they are on duty constantly in peacetime outside the PDA? The media regularly get data that seems to be on duty, here you have to take a word. Actually, everything here is the same as the SSBNs - it is important that they do not stand against the wall in peacetime, but are on the database in the sea, at least part of their strength. PGRK should be on duty the same way.
        1. timokhin-aa
          7 October 2019 15: 30
          0
          The CIA tried to track the BZHRK by undercover methods, it is somehow strange to assert "had access".


          This was a remark outside the context of the BZHRK. They just calmly used the railway for reconnaissance operations.

          No. PGRK carry out combat duty outside the PAP in peacetime, regardless of whether the period is threatened or not threatened. And the engineering support of such a duty is carried out just as continuously. Another question is whether they are on duty constantly in peacetime outside the PDA?


          As far as I understand, after the strategic offensive arms they were cut into areas of limited area that they do not leave.
          1. Alex_59
            Alex_59 7 October 2019 15: 47
            +2
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            As far as I understand, after the strategic offensive arms they were cut into areas of limited area that they do not leave.

            START-1 and -2 restricted the PGRK duty areas, in START-3 this point was removed, the PGRK duty areas are unlimited. Unless of course the media do not lie, because I did not read the original contract laughing
            However, according to START-1 / 2, no one controlled where and how PGRK were on duty, and it was impossible to track them remotely. And now it’s not possible, even if you attract all the commercial satellites photo intelligence. In the parking lot, as I said, they are heavily camouflaged and hide behind false positions, and on the march it is useless to shoot at them, if only for luck hammering around the area where he is traveling in the hope that some BB accidentally falls nearby.
            1. timokhin-aa
              7 October 2019 15: 55
              +1
              However, according to START-1 / 2, no one controlled where and how PGRK were on duty, and it was impossible to track them remotely.


              But I remember the Iraqi bunker, discovered in the footsteps of trucks in the sand. Then two Tomahawks were sent there, the first brought out the armored gate, the second flew inside and exploded. Found from a commercial satellite, by the way.

              The signs of such a huge car - to wander off. And for striking at them with a missed first strike, it is possible to use bombers as well, the air defense will still not really work.
              1. Alex_59
                Alex_59 7 October 2019 16: 00
                +1
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                But I remember the Iraqi bunker, discovered in the footsteps of trucks in the sand.

                Ruled out. No trace. Do not ask how this can be, just take a word. This is all a bit of a secret topic, I do not want to paint details. As well as gas pollution, smokes, noises and so on. There is nothing. Just a quiet Ural taiga ... wink
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                The signs of such a huge car - to wander off.

                I guarantee that if you go to pick mushrooms, you will pass by a position of five meters and you will not see anything. But you’ll be on the spot yourself, until you retire to the forest away from the protected area. wink
                1. timokhin-aa
                  7 October 2019 16: 56
                  +1
                  Yes, I went to all kinds of positions.

                  The fact that walking near the position area is better not to roam is understandable, but we are not talking about that.

                  There was such a container infrared reconnaissance station in the USSR Air Force, I don’t remember the name, they used it in Afghanistan with the Su-17. Allowed in a hot Afghan climate to detect the trail of a car passing on the ground. Even an hour later. In 1988 year.

                  There will be signs, do not hesitate, and they are already learning to filter out among different "noise".
                  1. Alex_59
                    Alex_59 7 October 2019 19: 23
                    +8
                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    There was such a container infrared reconnaissance station in the USSR Air Force, I don’t remember the name, they used it in Afghanistan with the Su-17.
                    Was, I know. Su-17MP worked with it, one of the first reconnaissance and strike aircraft systems.
                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    There will be signs, do not hesitate, and they are already learning to filter out among different "noise".

                    Again, I don’t see any fundamental problems to spoil the picture to potential friends. Let go around the district dozens of MAZs. Let them track their infrared traces in the area and try to understand where the real PU is and where the false cars are. Their analysts can be entertained without much effort. And the time of flight of the satellites is known in advance, so that you can manage to hide the true tracks long before the arrival of the next device. Here you can bicker for a long time, the point is not that. My main idea is that it is GUARANTEED to establish the coordinates of the PGRK for an attack in the coming years will be impossible. And for the preemptive strike, which underlies the American strategy, it is GUARANTEED to detect PGRK. PGRC masking tools preclude this possibility. No analyst at the CIA can give 100% a guarantee that he will be able to report the exact location of our PGRK before the strike.
                    And I don’t know who is minus me here, but all that I wrote is true. PGRK also know how to sweep tracks, there is a special machine for this and a whole bunch of all kinds of aggregates. In the engineering support of the march they are used.
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      7 October 2019 20: 37
                      0
                      . And for the preemptive strike, which underlies the American strategy, it is GUARANTEED to detect PGRK.


                      No, we need to cut the connection, this gives a very big head start on the search for PGRK, right down to the air.
                  2. Newone
                    Newone 7 October 2019 19: 32
                    +1
                    There will be signs and there will be methods for identifying them, and there will be techniques and methods to combat the identification of signs.
                    The problem with mobile complexes is the same as in the states before. The complex’s division also needs a closed equipped area. And in this area, the survivability of complexes is an order of magnitude higher than on submarines. And taking into account the problems of our fleet by 3 orders of magnitude.
                2. SovAr238A
                  SovAr238A 7 October 2019 22: 49
                  0
                  Quote: Alex_59
                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  But I remember the Iraqi bunker, discovered in the footsteps of trucks in the sand.

                  Ruled out. No trace. Do not ask how this can be, just take a word. This is all a bit of a secret topic, I do not want to paint details. As well as gas pollution, smokes, noises and so on. There is nothing. Just a quiet Ural taiga ... wink
                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  The signs of such a huge car - to wander off.

                  I guarantee that if you go to pick mushrooms, you will pass by a position of five meters and you will not see anything. But you’ll be on the spot yourself, until you retire to the forest away from the protected area. wink


                  But over the past 30 years, computer and signal microprocessor technology and the accompanying algorithms have reached unprecedented qualitative indicators.
                  Now you can easily be entangled in a network of small seismic, acoustic, magnetometric sensors - half the taiga in the pressed areas - and they will each control for several years the area in 200-300 meters, incl. and deeper ...
                  And if necessary, through the coordinated sap blasting of some of them, you can make a high-quality sounding of the earth ... so 800 meters deep and get a spatial picture ...
                  it is already a reality.
                  1. ccsr
                    ccsr 8 October 2019 13: 29
                    +2
                    Quote: SovAr238A
                    Now you can easily be entangled in a network of small seismic, acoustic, magnetometric sensors - half the taiga in the pressed areas - and they will each control for several years the area in 200-300 meters, incl. and deeper ...
                    And if necessary, through the coordinated sap blasting of some of them, you can make a high-quality sounding of the earth ... so 800 meters deep and get a spatial picture ...
                    it is already a reality.

                    It is very interesting to read, but you forgot to highlight one question - how to provide electricity for at least 2-3 months of continuous operation. This is where you always have to start ...
                  2. Alex_59
                    Alex_59 8 October 2019 14: 34
                    +1
                    Quote: SovAr238A
                    Now you can easily be entangled in a network of small seismic, acoustic, magnetometric sensors - half the taiga in the pressed areas - and they will each control for several years the area in 200-300 meters, incl. and deeper ...

                    If you think that the enemy will be able to deploy such sensor networks in our position areas, then I think this is a big problem.
                    Firstly, they were given the opportunity to walk through these forests and arrange dozens (hundreds?) Of sensors. Secondly, such sensors can easily be clogged with noise from pokatushek false technology. Thirdly, the sensors must transmit something somewhere, and in On-line mode. I poorly imagine a disguised sensor capable of transmitting something from the forest via a radio channel hundreds of kilometers away. This should not be a small unit with a developed antenna above the tree crowns, a powerful transmitter and an appropriate battery. If it is supposed to pull a communication cable from each sensor, then their hidden placement becomes completely unrealistic. If, however, the range of information transmission by radio is reduced to acceptable (by the mass-dimensional parameters of the sensor) values, then somewhere somewhere in the forest there should be a point for receiving information and its further relaying - and this is at least something the size of a GAS -66 - who gives such an enemy radio station freely is in the positional area of ​​the PGRK - it is not clear.
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 7 October 2019 17: 10
          0
          Quote: Alex_59
          The CIA tried to track the BZHRK by undercover methods, it is somehow strange to assert "had access". Any person has access to the railway - there she is, come wherever you want.

          With a railway ambush in another - all trains on it are monitored by the automated control system. Access to which allows you to find and track any composition. It is almost impossible to organize the movement of a ghost train along the railway - and it will still "glow" in the ACS.
          In short, the BZHRK at the current Russian Railways is like PGRK patrolling exclusively on the Moscow Ring Road. Or SSBNs, walking exclusively in the surface position with the included AIS.
          1. timokhin-aa
            7 October 2019 18: 59
            0
            Good comment.

            I think, therefore, after weighing everything, the topic did not come to life, although there were a lot of conversations.
          2. Alex_59
            Alex_59 7 October 2019 19: 08
            +1
            Quote: Alexey RA
            In short, the BZHRK at the current Russian Railways is like PGRK patrolling exclusively on the Moscow Ring Road

            At the present, probably yes. In Soviet times, there was no such problem for obvious reasons. Although, in principle, if desired, it can also be masked in the ACS. I do not see any fundamental obstacles. It’s necessary - they would. Question is it necessary? I am not sure that the BZHRK should be revived. But for other reasons.
            1. SovAr238A
              SovAr238A 7 October 2019 22: 51
              +1
              Quote: Alex_59
              Quote: Alexey RA
              In short, the BZHRK at the current Russian Railways is like PGRK patrolling exclusively on the Moscow Ring Road

              At the present, probably yes. In Soviet times, there was no such problem for obvious reasons. Although, in principle, if desired, it can also be masked in the ACS. I do not see any fundamental obstacles. It’s necessary - they would. Question is it necessary? I am not sure that the BZHRK should be revived. But for other reasons.


              there were always letters - and they were tracked simply because. that they were lettering.

              Letters also tracked on call to security - certain people.
              If certain people appeared in the railway zone - then wait for the letter ...
              Direct and indirect signs.
              1. Alex_59
                Alex_59 8 October 2019 07: 04
                0
                Quote: SovAr238A
                there were always letters - and they were tracked simply because. that they were lettering.

                Well, give the BZHRK a number in the ACS of some Adler-Chelyabler. Or local cargo, Nizhny Tagil - Kungur. What is the problem? Let him drip on the sly, letting the ambulances pass. And assign the letter expected by the enemy to the top ten leftist squads.
                Quote: SovAr238A
                Letters also tracked on call to security - certain people.
                Not a problem either. What is the "security call" in civilian networks for BZHRK? In theory, this should be inside the military, or even the FSB / KGB, or who is there fighting saboteurs and spies with us? Observation is our everything. And to the "Nizhny-Tagil - Kungur" train set guys with machine guns in the form of "Spetsvyazi" - they bring platinum from Tagil to the Kungursk machine plant, so you cannot approach the train. May be? Quite!
          3. Newone
            Newone 7 October 2019 19: 35
            +4
            Conventional masking events with renames solve this problem. And the ACS rail does not control the movement of the train in real time with an accuracy of a meter.
      2. Polinom
        Polinom 10 October 2019 12: 37
        -2
        Alexander, nuclear packs were on both sides. At the Aviaforum sits Replacement (Dima Lyuty) Classmate in Ryazan with Shamanov. Only the companies are different, he is a GRU officer, 6 companies, the first release for the GRU. They, too, were prepared for this in the 80s. And the uniform was the American army and wore it, got used to it. In threat. period there and the laying of these satchels in European cities. He wrote about it somehow.
        In the photo of last year's school anniversary with the Shaman.
      3. Newone
        Newone 10 October 2019 22: 44
        +1
        They allowed in transit in sealed containers along the trans-Siberian railway. Caught them on the second such premise. And they began to wind noodles on the ears.
    2. Cyril G ...
      Cyril G ... 9 October 2019 20: 39
      +1
      The author greatly underestimates the capabilities of PGRK.

      - Of course, a real description of the combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces will interfere with fantasies about naval strategic nuclear forces, which in fact are not a pillar of our security. and the sawn leg ....
      1. max702
        max702 14 October 2019 12: 39
        0
        Quote: Cyril G ...
        The author greatly underestimates the capabilities of PGRK.

        - Of course, a real description of the combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces will interfere with fantasies about naval strategic nuclear forces, which in fact are not a pillar of our security. and the sawn leg ....

        Well you are so straight from the trump card then ..
        1. timokhin-aa
          14 October 2019 20: 28
          +1
          To disperse the Navy nafig this is one of the ideas of captain Cobra))))

          But nothing will come of the border guards.
  15. g1v2
    g1v2 7 October 2019 19: 34
    +4
    If we cannot close the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, then why do we need so many strategists? request Not so many deep-sea passages lead to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk so that they cannot be blocked by buoys, dapels and corvettes. The new base on the Matua will greatly simplify patrolling. Placing detection tools between the islands is also not such a difficult task. Again, the Yankees will have to break into the Sea of ​​Okhotsk before the start of the active phase of the war, which means for us this will be a signal of the beginning of the war and a trigger for launching a preventive strike.
    As for mobile ground systems. Their patrol zones are inland. What other bombers will break into such a distance there? And what will our air defense systems do? Voronezh will see the approach of enemy aircraft at a great distance. Enough to have time to respond to the videoconferencing, and disperse the mobile launchers.
    In the Barents Sea, of course, everything is sad and the mattresses are known like the back of your hand. However, building up the number of deaths, corvettes and placement of detection tools in the form of at least the same acoustic buoys is a completely solvable task. A certain number of strategists will obviously be destroyed and this is bad, since there are a lot of warheads on them. But certainly not all.
    In general, both Bastions can be closed successfully and relatively inexpensively. But what in our triad needs more - ground mine or mobile missiles, bombers or submarines - is a question. I’m not a fan of a large number of SSBNs at all, because they require too much diversion of forces to protect them, and the death of each submarine is minus 16 missiles. Again, we have a serious need for mapples and increasing the order for them instead of increasing the order for Boreas may be appropriate.
    1. Nehist
      Nehist 8 October 2019 02: 17
      -2
      The base on Matua is a cut and without a good waste of money. It would be better to restore Crater
      1. timokhin-aa
        8 October 2019 11: 16
        0
        There will be no excess in the form of a backup airfield. It is only necessary without fanaticism. That Crater is yes. A good place.
        1. Polinom
          Polinom 10 October 2019 12: 48
          -2
          Not everything fits the wind rose. You can’t approach from any direction. Many remained of the Japanese, and stripes and caponiers under the guns and fortifications. Reestablish. But why? What is there to protect besides fish and crab?


          1. timokhin-aa
            11 October 2019 11: 14
            0
            YES, just do not let anyone land there and use the airfield against us. Plus an alternate aerodrome for your anti-submarine aviation colleagues. By the way, the bands there are built taking into account the wind roses, most of the year you can take off, just in different directions all the time.
            1. Polinom
              Polinom 12 October 2019 12: 38
              -2
              They have enough aircraft carriers. Horns and legs have already remained from those airfields on the islands. Well, it will crash, beat the engines. Have you seen how on the aircraft carrier or on the "Kuza" or at the airfield, before the flights, people pass the runway in a chain and collect pebbles?
              On the operating speaker, the strip is monitored, cleaned, the joints are poured. Especially for fighters, despite their grilles and gills.

              1. timokhin-aa
                12 October 2019 19: 57
                0
                Enough aircraft carriers.


                Who is it for them? There is the Air Force, and there is the Navy. They have little understanding, even in wars, to take at least the Agreement between the army and the Air Force, that the army will not buy airplanes, and the Air Force will not get into this with attack helicopters.

                The air force needs airfields, there are no aircraft carriers there.

                From those airfields on the islands there are already horns and legs left.


                Matua rebuild.
    2. ser56
      ser56 8 October 2019 14: 18
      +1
      Quote: g1v2
      Again, we have a serious need for mapples and increasing the order for them instead of increasing the order for Boreas may be appropriate.

      namely, to set offensive tasks for the fleet - let them look for our nuclear submarines across the ocean, and do not reduce the actions of the Russian Navy to defense off their shores ...
    3. Vadim237
      Vadim237 10 October 2019 18: 30
      0
      In case of passions - they will block it with mines, Russia has a lot of different and different ones.
      1. Polinom
        Polinom 12 October 2019 12: 43
        -2
        Yes, where many?
        Maybe since the Second World War, but I doubt it. MS tends to decompose.
        There were less than 50 units per regiment. What is available. Maybe in warehouses where it was.
        Although sailors need to know more, for anti-submarine aviation, mine-laying is not the main task.
  16. Newone
    Newone 7 October 2019 19: 47
    0
    The article is robust and covers the real and primary tasks of the fleet, and not the games in the world of worships, as the previous ones.
    Nevertheless, I would like to add that the modern "bastions" of the fleet are the result of the drying up of the zone of control of the Soviet fleet as a result of Gorbachev's reforms, the collapse of the USSR and subsequent actions of the Russian governments to "optimize costs." And these bastions were needed, since the appearance of the Tomahawk CD required control of the "bastion" zones to prevent an unexpected massive and imperceptible strike by these cruise missiles. And the anti-submarine forces were not enough.
    The task of repulsing the mass strike of the Kyrgyz Republic from the fleet’s agenda has not yet been removed.
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2019 20: 39
      0
      The previous ones are very real, like this one. They began to creep into the bastions under Andropov.
      1. Newone
        Newone 7 October 2019 23: 36
        0
        So the Tomahawks appeared among the Americans just under Andropov. The Soviet Union tried to build a defense system against the system of attack by opponents under construction.
        1. timokhin-aa
          8 October 2019 11: 15
          0
          They are exactly what APPEARED. Before the threat requiring a change in strategy there was still very far away. The US Navy drove us to the Bastions.
          1. Newone
            Newone 8 October 2019 23: 03
            0
            The Soviet Union tried to build a defense system against the system of attack by opponents under construction.
      2. ser56
        ser56 8 October 2019 14: 20
        +1
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        They began to creep into the bastions under Andropov.

        because the untwisted colossus of the construction of the SSBN and the SSBNC could not be stopped - someone would have to answer for spending crazy money without any benefit ... request
        1. timokhin-aa
          8 October 2019 15: 28
          -1
          This is not entirely true. Americans have invested simply insane funds in countermeasures. Where would they go if we didn’t submarine? But the execution turned out to be not very, but just not in the case of the TRPKSN - the claims to these ships are unfair.

          There is an excellent article by Klimov on the topic:

          https://topwar.ru/155667-javljaetsja-li-proekt-941-akula-gordostju-otechestvennogo-podvodnogo-korablestroenija-otvet-bezuslovno-da.html
          1. ser56
            ser56 8 October 2019 15: 45
            +1
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            Where would they go if we didn’t submarine?

            I am more worried about our money - the construction of the same 941 project cost terrible money, if we take into account the modernization of factories along the entire chain, missile bases, etc. .... and the profit is ridiculous - another 667 ensured the balance ....
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            There is an excellent article by Klimov on the topic:

            Soviet means better ... he could not get up and look at the project from the strategic point of view - what changed the construction of sharks? Nothing, but they dragged him into an unnecessary race ... request
            1. timokhin-aa
              8 October 2019 16: 01
              0
              This is not about the Shark, it's about the rocket - he writes everything correctly, no one knew what the 667BDRM and the rocket would be for her, it’s convenient to say from the position of afterglow, but who then had it?
              1. ser56
                ser56 8 October 2019 16: 14
                0
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                This is not a Shark, this is a rocket

                I remember the unforgettable Raikin: I sewed buttons - are there any complaints? request
                it is a weapon system. it makes no sense to select one element from it ....
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                from the perspective of afterlife it’s convenient to say

                where does the aftertaste come from? This Ustinov was selling R-39, Makeyevtsy were doing R-29RM request
                Didn’t read Sea strategic missile systems, M. Military Parade, 2011, ISBN 5-902975-25-0? wink
            2. Cyril G ...
              Cyril G ... 9 October 2019 20: 41
              0
              That's right, 941 projects are stupidly squandered money
    2. Vadim237
      Vadim237 10 October 2019 18: 32
      0
      For the Bastions and not only, they make the new Onyx M - the declared firing range is 800 kilometers.
  17. faterdom
    faterdom 7 October 2019 20: 16
    +1
    There is still unreached (???) environment - space. And the Americans, at least, will deploy not only intelligence, but also strike systems there. And we, respectively, too. And China.
    So there will be deterrence again for the next 50 years. Great Britain, I hope it will not survive intact, for internal reasons. Or maybe the USA too.
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2019 22: 07
      -1
      In space, any object is larger than the nut on the 10 - at a glance. Orbits are forever predictable and without monstrous energy expenditures can only rise and fall. Not an option.
      1. Newone
        Newone 7 October 2019 23: 44
        +1
        Your statement is false.
        What really limits the deployment of nuclear weapons in space is the maintenance of warheads.
        1. timokhin-aa
          8 October 2019 11: 14
          0
          All orbital objects over 5 cm in diameter are cataloged. And how long. Do not hide in space.

          You may be surprised, but there are people who are developing a theory of war in space. Only truly - with energetically possible orbits, the effect of radiation cooling on the luminosity and visibility of the cosmos. ship, etc.

          A stone flower does not come out there, so to speak. Do not hide in space.
        2. ccsr
          ccsr 8 October 2019 13: 31
          +1
          Quote: Newone
          What really limits the deployment of nuclear weapons in space is the maintenance of warheads.

          Absolutely right. And this is not a solvable problem at the current level of development of equipment and weapons.
          1. Vadim237
            Vadim237 10 October 2019 18: 36
            0
            X 37B will be able to provide service for warheads - flew with them for a year - two and returned to base - and no one will know about it.
            1. ccsr
              ccsr 10 October 2019 19: 02
              +1
              Quote: Vadim237
              X 37B will be able to provide service for warheads - flew with them for a year - two and returned to base - and no one will know about it.

              Who told you that you need to service warheads once a year or two? But this is not even the point, but the fact that the costs of lifting and lowering and the likelihood of an accident are so great that those who will develop this system will need enormous expenses for creating safe operation. It turns out that no gain will appear, taking into account the fact that even low-orbit satellites have a circulation period of 1,5-2 hours. During this time, the United States may disappear as a state ...
              1. Vadim237
                Vadim237 11 October 2019 00: 08
                0
                A 100 million launch is not that expensive once every two years.
                1. ccsr
                  ccsr 11 October 2019 09: 54
                  +1
                  Quote: Vadim237
                  A 100 million launch is not that expensive once every two years.

                  The point is not even the cost, but the fact that complex armaments must be serviced, and in orbit this cannot be done. Moreover, in our duty strategic nuclear forces, the presence of a person is necessary when making a decision, in order to eliminate technical errors. Who will make a decision in orbit if there is a malfunction of the spacecraft, or the enemy decides to disable it by selecting teams? The story of Cosmos-954 is still not fully understood, as far as I know.
                  1. Vadim237
                    Vadim237 11 October 2019 16: 09
                    0
                    So the space bomber is waiting in the future. with people on board.
                    1. ccsr
                      ccsr 11 October 2019 17: 10
                      +1
                      Quote: Vadim237
                      So the space bomber is waiting in the future. with people on board.

                      No, military space trends are just different in that they use as little people in orbit as possible, except for research purposes - this is too expensive a pleasure. We have already burned ourselves with "Diamonds", so the topic is closed for many years to come.
  18. Old26
    Old26 7 October 2019 20: 21
    +4
    Quote: Alex_59
    START-1 and -2 limited the PGRK duty areas, in START-3 this point was removed, the PGRK duty areas are not limited. Unless of course the media do not lie, because I did not read the original contract laughing

    Do not lie. Clause on restriction in START-3 agreement removed
  19. Petrol cutter
    Petrol cutter 7 October 2019 20: 31
    0
    After reading the article, I fell into despondency and * Martian depression * gentlemen. I do not know what to do. Looks like we all die. And quit smoking on the balcony, in the light of the voiced situation, has no practical meaning.
  20. Comrade Kim
    Comrade Kim 7 October 2019 20: 36
    -1
    Quote: MainBeam
    On the one hand, the country no longer belongs to the people. On the other hand, brand new missiles are on alert and Syria was squeezed out. The question is, for what? Just to sell wood and oil? Somehow stupid


    Forgot about Crimea!
    The same question often arose.
    Probably, two factors do not yet give them a final prostrate before the Western curators.

    1. As in the proverb about the lion and the herd of sheep, who will need them if sent here will rule
    from behind the hill Gauleiters.
    2.All the same, we have not yet completed the tidy fuss between the security forces and financial tycoons.
    The siloviki (may God grant them health) have not yet lost ground.
    But they must be alert, otherwise it will be like in Iraq or Libya when corrupt generals surrendered the country for imaginary
    guarantees, real money, and "liberation" of the oppressed people of Iraq / Libya from the tyrant Hussein / Gaddafi.

    And then, in the conditions of total impoverishment of the population, it remains only to try to stretch the country by restoring the defense industry of our country.

    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2019 22: 08
      0
      In Iraq, everything was not quite the way you imagine.
  21. illi
    illi 7 October 2019 20: 51
    +4
    The first promise. That we are being bombed with impunity by atomic weapons is rather false. So from the point of view of logic, you can no longer read further.
    These fantasies are based on the fact that all strategic nuclear forces except the fleet are useless and will be destroyed in the dry. Since, from the point of view of the author, they are easily tracked by enemy intelligence. And consequently, the Americans do not take them into account and only five heels of the SSBN are saving us so far. And consequently, from the point of view of the author, it is necessary to work hard to build an ocean fleet and arrange duty on the oceans.
    I am also for everything good and against everything bad. However, I objectively understand that even the USSR could not compete with the USA in the ocean (the author himself wrote about this). And it will simply finish off today's Russia economically in the first place (and there is no need for any atomic bombs). And secondly, you can of course every year put up new mock-ups of aircraft carriers, but objectively this task is now technologically beyond the reach of Russia.
    And about the fact that our boats are tracked in the ocean much better than any BZHRK, has long been an open secret. And if you compare the cost of the same missile train and submarine, then everything is in no way in favor of the boats.
    Well, to disguise a hundred other mobile missile launchers in our vast expanses, the task is completely solved. Plus, when developing a new generation of BZHRK, he will most likely get rid of the shortcomings indicated by you and will be completely invisible.
    1. Petrol cutter
      Petrol cutter 7 October 2019 21: 02
      +1
      * The first promise. That we are being bombed with impunity by atomic weapons is rather false. So from the point of view of logic, you can no longer read further. *
      Immediately visited such thoughts buddy. Nevertheless, I made an effort on myself and forced myself to read all the way. In order to already drink the whole cup of hopelessness to the bottom.
      Further on your text, there is simply no reason to disagree. yes
  22. faterdom
    faterdom 7 October 2019 22: 48
    0
    Quote: timokhin-aa
    In space, any object is larger than the nut on the 10 - at a glance. Orbits are forever predictable and without monstrous energy expenditures can only rise and fall. Not an option.

    But there are pluses: from there the shortest and inevitable impact path. And you can start even without a torch - go kill!
    And considering how we detected the Chelyabinsk meteorite "in a timely manner", the analogy is somehow lame about "in full view". For example, you have millions of microorganisms in the palm of your hand. And how easy is it for you to find what you need, and how long can you watch it?
    1. SVD68
      SVD68 8 October 2019 19: 14
      0
      But there are pluses: from there the shortest and inevitable impact path.

      This is good for a first disarming strike. But for the reciprocal and reciprocal counter chances are reduced. Since a short trajectory will be not only for a strike from space, but also for a strike against space vehicles.
  23. SVD68
    SVD68 8 October 2019 08: 04
    +1
    In this part, there was a departure from the principles set forth in the first part.
    Of course, the main objective of submarines with SLBMs does not apply to war at sea and does not fall under these principles. But ensuring such an activity is still falling! Any activity at sea without supremacy at sea is highly risky. And under the rule of the enemy, it’s fundamentally dubious. This also applies to combat patrol of submarines with SLBMs. The idea of ​​hiding in the vast expanses of the oceans with the government of the enemy there is a mirage, just like a cruising war.
    Protected areas of hostilities are precisely the areas where our supremacy at sea was to ensure, where, in accordance with this, successful operations by the enemy would be isolated cases. And isolated cases with the available forces of that time did not solve anything.
    Now it cannot be said that we are able to ensure our supremacy at sea, even within the borders of the Soviet air defense missile systems. At least in the Arctic Ocean. For this, we not only lack the strength of the struggle for supremacy at sea, but also the strategic nuclear forces themselves — even the individual successes of the enemy are able to completely neutralize them.
    It seems to me that the only way is to create an air defense missile system in the Okhotsk Sea region on new principles.
    Or refuse the marine component of the strategic nuclear forces.
    1. timokhin-aa
      8 October 2019 11: 21
      0
      But ensuring such an activity is still falling! Any activity at sea without supremacy at sea is highly risky. And under the rule of the enemy, it’s fundamentally doubtful. This also applies to combat patrol of submarines with SLBMs. The idea of ​​hiding in the vast expanses of the oceans with the government of the enemy there is a mirage, just like a cruising war.


      It hits yes. But - not in the entire world ocean. And in the designated area. If it is far enough from the United States (see the example of the Galapagos Islands), then it becomes real. Ships do not care where to drive "Virginia" - at the Kuril Islands or at the equator, but at the equator it has to cut days. And you can even try to intercept it. And there she is in the same position as we are, without advantages - there is no support, the area has not been studied.

      In fact, KUG of four frigates and a floating base at such a distance can only be gored by AUG. In general, the scope for games is rather big. The main thing is to be away from their hydrophones.

      In addition, there is a logical trap - we need the Nuclear Forces Nuclear Forces so that there is no war, and in full growth we will have to keep it during the war. But if it did not begin with a sudden nuclear strike, then the role of the strategic nuclear forces is reduced, because there are weeks to disperse and mask the PGRK.
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 9 October 2019 12: 03
        +2
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        The main thing is to be away from their hydrophones.

        It's not even that, but much more serious. The most important drawback of submarines is that in peacetime they have limited communication sessions, which means they may not receive it at the right time and be destroyed before the start of hostilities. That is why, until we technically solve the problem of controlling the SSBNs located at a depth not far from the coast of continental America, without throwing out communication buoys, until then priority will be given to the strategic missile forces nuclear weapons, which are controlled without any broadcasting at all. This gives us the opportunity to secretly give the command to deliver a preemptive strike, and is the key to the fact that the Americans are afraid to provoke us.
        1. Polinom
          Polinom 10 October 2019 11: 07
          -2
          All this was decided in the late 80s.
          Take an interest in communication options at the SSBN.
          Sorry, the topic is so hackneyed, too lazy to spank on the clave. smile
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 10 October 2019 11: 44
            +1
            Quote: Polinom
            All this was decided in the late 80s.

            As far as I know, this problem has not been solved so far, and there is no continuous two-way communication channel with submarines, and only after sub-floating it is possible to establish communication. Can you tell me how this was decided?
            1. Polinom
              Polinom 10 October 2019 12: 54
              -2
              Balancer (airbase) has a section about SSBNs. I wrote there. And the submariners commented. And Mina and Ilya. Everything was decided. ADD. Two stations now, Mongohto-Tu-142. The antenna is kilometer long. The first options back in the 70s "Yes-No". Then it's better. Lourdes also had a station at Cam Ranh.
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 10 October 2019 13: 08
                +1
                Quote: Polinom
                The Balancer (air base) has a section about the SSBN.

                I know the forum of the late Karshiev - there is a wag of dofig, and some give out wishful thinking. Do you seriously believe that a submarine can also operate in this range from under water? How do you make sure they accept the order correctly?
                Quote: Polinom
                Two stations now, Mongohto-Tu-142. Kilometer antenna.

                And the Americans are so stupid that they do not know how to suppress the transmission of these stations off their shores?
                Quote: Polinom
                At Lourdes, there was also a station in Camrani.

                They have not been around for a long time, so this is not an argument. Yes, and there were re-reception stations - do you think that we can entrust the reliability of managing submarine strategic nuclear forces to foreign territories? This is generally unacceptable, despite the presence of our databases.
                So the question of a reliable two-way communication channel for controlling submarines has not been resolved, and, as I understand it, remains at the level of Soviet communication systems, including combined HF and satellite communications systems.
                1. Polinom
                  Polinom 12 October 2019 13: 07
                  -2
                  It is technically impossible to suppress.
                  Constantly in touch is unrealistic and not necessary. Change options and sessions (time).
                  An antenna or a paravana is enough to receive "Yes-No". This is for an immediate appointment.
                  Chatterboxes are everywhere, but there are sane and served. It’s not difficult to distinguish, a couple of conversations and everything is clear.
                  There are plenty of open sources. Offhand a few in my archive. SECRET !!!
                  we can trust the reliability of the management of submarine strategic nuclear forces to foreign territories
                  These are transponders KP GSh. laughing Nuclear weapons were entrusted to Cuba, and normal. And communication is impossible? tongue
                  He knew everything that he knew(C).




                  1. ccsr
                    ccsr 12 October 2019 18: 03
                    0
                    Quote: Polinom
                    Constantly in touch is unrealistic and not necessary.

                    This is a fallacy, because it is for the strategic nuclear forces that the most important condition is permanent bilateral communication channels. Troops of the Strategic Missile Forces and patrolling long-range aircraft are constantly provided with this. In order to ensure this with submarines, they definitely need sub-floating to the periscope depth - this is obviously based on the figure 93 given by you. And it will take time and most importantly immediately unmasks the location of the submarine. At the same time, such a maneuver by several boats will reveal our plan, which in itself will frustrate all our plans for a sudden strike.
                    Quote: Polinom
                    An antenna or a paravana is enough to receive "Yes-No". This is for an immediate appointment.

                    How long will it take, if the submarine is at a depth of 250-300 meters, to ascend, throw the buoy and only then establish a two-way communication channel to report that they have received a "Yes-No" signal? I think a few minutes at least, and the blowing of the tanks is always an unmasking sign. In the event of a surprise attack by the enemy, we have only 5-7 minutes and no more to make a decision, give an order and make sure that all strategic nuclear forces have complied with it. In general, the option that our submarines by the time they surface will themselves be under enemy attack is not only real, but the saddest thing is that this is quite realizable at the present stage of the development of weapons, which will lead to the loss of a large part of the country's nuclear missile potential. This forces us to maintain the nuclear triad, and there is no getting away from it.
                    Quote: Polinom
                    There are plenty of open sources. Offhand a few in my archive. SECRET !!!

                    The materials of Fesenko that you cited refer only to research works, and this is far from the communication system for submarines adopted for service. So the first material does not prove anything, but the last figure just showed that it is impossible to do without sub-floating.
                    Quote: Polinom
                    Nuclear weapons were trusted in Cuba, and normal.

                    This is an obvious fiction - no one trusted Cuba with anything, and now the use of Cuban territory for the management of submarines is not provided.
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      12 October 2019 20: 00
                      0
                      Long waves pass through the water column, this is the basics.
                      1. ccsr
                        ccsr 12 October 2019 21: 21
                        -1
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        Long waves pass through the water column, this is the basics.

                        And how does the submarine commander report that he received a combat control signal at a depth of 250-300 meters and began to execute it? Maybe the boat has already died, and we still believe that it will strike back.
                      2. timokhin-aa
                        13 October 2019 01: 04
                        0
                        At the appointed time, it will float to send a report.
                      3. ccsr
                        ccsr 13 October 2019 09: 59
                        +1
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        At the appointed time, it will float to send a report.

                        By the appointed time for sub-flooding, everything can already be destroyed during the exchange of nuclear strikes by the strategic nuclear forces, and there will be no one to report. Well, then why do we need all the ammunition of such a submarine if we cannot GUARANTEED deliver a preemptive strike against the enemy until he himself inflicts such a strike? Did you think about this before you paint pictures of future naval battles?
                      4. timokhin-aa
                        13 October 2019 10: 50
                        0
                        Do not confuse deterrence with a preemptive strike. Proactive and off the pier can be applied. There, all planning will be different from the word "in general"
                      5. ccsr
                        ccsr 13 October 2019 15: 33
                        +2
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        You do not confuse deterrence with a preemptive strike.

                        Yes, I don’t seem to confuse it, because "containment" is from the area of ​​political chatter, and "preemptive strike" is more related to real operational planning. So, as they say, you need to be able to separate flies from cutlets ...
                        By the way, if we mainly focus on striking from the pier, then the very essence of the underwater platform for us loses meaning - the land will be much cheaper than the sea.
                      6. timokhin-aa
                        13 October 2019 21: 58
                        0
                        Yes, I don’t seem to confuse, because "containment" is from the field of political chatter


                        No, that’s why you are still alive. And it, by the way, is provided by solving very specific operational and tactical tasks.

                        By the way, if we mainly focus on striking from the pier, the very essence of the underwater platform for us loses meaning


                        You don't need to be guided, but there will be such an opportunity in an emergency (and getting information about the enemy's aggression upcoming "the other day" is an emergency).
                      7. ccsr
                        ccsr 14 October 2019 11: 01
                        0
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        No, that’s why you are still alive. And it, by the way, is provided by solving very specific operational and tactical tasks.

                        There is no need for so much pathos - I myself took part in solving strategic and operational tasks, and there the word "containment" is somehow not mentioned in the planning documents for specific combat missions.
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        but the possibility is in an emergency

                        It’s good that there is such an opportunity, but in fact it just shouldn’t be at all, because we are spending tremendous amounts of money to launch nuclear charges not from the pier, but next to the enemy’s territory. That is why a nuclear submarine fleet exists and will develop, in contrast to the surface component.
                      8. timokhin-aa
                        14 October 2019 20: 05
                        0
                        Not a courier who accidentally participated?

                        Sorry, but it’s not like something more serious.
                      9. ccsr
                        ccsr 14 October 2019 20: 25
                        0
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        Not a courier who accidentally participated?

                        The couriers do not have the right to get acquainted with the documents - I hope this was explained to you at least in the service? Or have you never seen them in your eyes?
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        Sorry, but it’s not like something more serious.

                        Your fantasies are generally on the verge of common sense - that's why you have to comment on them so that ignorant people do not take everything for the truth.
                    2. Polinom
                      Polinom 16 October 2019 10: 25
                      0
                      If you all know why ask me?
                      1. ccsr
                        ccsr 16 October 2019 11: 41
                        0
                        Quote: Polinom
                        If you all know why ask me?

                        I’m not so much asking you how much I refute your statements, because ignorant people can take your word for it, so you have to explain where the truth is and where the fiction.
        2. timokhin-aa
          10 October 2019 11: 29
          0
          from therefore until we technically solve the problem of managing SSBNs located at a depth not far from the coast of continental America


          Why would she be there?

          and is the key to the fact that the Americans are afraid to provoke us.


          Have you tried to scare the Americans?
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 10 October 2019 11: 50
            +2
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            Why would she be there?

            At least in order to justify the funds spent on their development and maintenance that we are forced to do to reduce the flight time to the continental United States. Otherwise, we could do well with the Strategic Missile Forces based on our territory - it would be much cheaper.
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            Have you tried to scare the Americans?

            They have long been scared - since the reign of Nixon, who came to the USSR to discuss nuclear deterrence with Brezhnev. Now they certainly have a little less fear, but they always remember that they can turn into nuclear dust even from what we have left.
            1. Polinom
              Polinom 10 October 2019 12: 56
              -2
              And who was bald by the tongue, "We will bury you." ? Yes, and about heaven, too, went well.
              Of course scared.
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 10 October 2019 13: 20
                +2
                Quote: Polinom
                And who pulled the bald man, "We will bury you." ?

                In fact, under Khrushchev, we could not "bury" them - such an opportunity appeared only under Brezhnev, or rather by the end of the sixties, and even then we were much inferior to them at that time. It was then that they began to fuss, and not from the promises of N.S. Khrushchev, which looked more like propaganda.

                Quote: Polinom
                And about paradise, too, passed normally.

                Yes, we knew this in the 70-80s, only they were silent about it at all levels. And the fact that they would be destroyed, they knew better than us - all the same, for all our gouging, the Strategic Rocket Forces were always on the alert and needed only an order, and it would be executed without any co-operation.
                Quote: Polinom
                Of course scared.

                They must always be in this state together with the Chinese - this is the guarantee that Russian civilization will not disappear from the planet. And Putin correctly reminded them of hell - I think this is a reference point for our worldview.
              2. Vadim237
                Vadim237 10 October 2019 18: 43
                0
                Let’s bury you lightly - 1700 warheads are serious, and another 800 strategic cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. Soon to this arsenal and infantry ballistic missiles with ground-based cruise missiles will be added. And next year, by 25 and START 3, it will cease to exist, and there you can do as many ICBMs and warheads as there is enough money.
            2. timokhin-aa
              13 October 2019 01: 17
              0
              At least in order to justify the funds spent on their development and maintenance that we are forced to do to reduce the flight time to the continental United States.


              We do not need to think about this, but that retaliation remains inevitable. Flight time should be reduced only for attack.

              They have long been scared - since the reign of Nixon, who came to the USSR to discuss nuclear deterrence with Brezhnev.


              That's just the result of this fright was the elimination of a frightening opponent.

              With amers, it’s either to sit and not twitch or to kill them right away. Because if they get scared, then they themselves will kill you on occasion.
              We don’t need to scare them - we need to calmly and without pathos show the hopelessness of the idea of ​​the first strike. And we do not plan to deliver the first strike ourselves. According to our actions, they should see it.

              Or plan it yourself and execute it. For which not only the necessary forces and means are not available, there is also no understanding of what they should be in order to work effectively.

              Other options do not work with the USA.
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 13 October 2019 10: 12
                -1
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                Flight time should be reduced only for attack.

                But do you think that we will play the spools when the enemy’s actions for delivering a nuclear strike on us are revealed? The preemptive strike is precisely our main principle of military doctrine since the last century, although this was not reported anywhere in the media.
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                And the fact that we ourselves do not plan to strike the first blow.

                Who told you this? Putin kind of said that we are ready to use a preemptive strike using nuclear weapons - or maybe I misheard?
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                Other options do not work with the USA.

                There are no options with the United States at all - only guaranteed destruction has stopped them so far. But times are changing, they are seeking to reduce the total number of nuclear weapons in our country, and nevertheless they are developing their missile defense systems much more actively. And this only testifies to the fact that as soon as they reach the destruction of our warheads acceptable to them, they will immediately put forward ultimatums to us in many areas of our activity.
                That is why Putin has relied on new nuclear weapons systems that will allow us to push the Americans' dreams for many decades into the future.
                1. timokhin-aa
                  13 October 2019 10: 49
                  0
                  If these very signs are discovered, then there will be a completely different logic of events than some secretive rapprochements - if only because there will be no time.

                  This is another question at all.
  24. Old26
    Old26 8 October 2019 13: 23
    +3
    Quote: Vadmir
    After the cancellation of the INF Treaty, one should expect in the very near future the deployment of medium- and shorter-range missiles with scanty flying time. The return deployment of the same missiles will not create sufficient threats to the United States.
    And that means that the cancellation of START-3 with the buildup of ICBMs, as well as warheads, including false ones on existing carriers, can be considered the only adequate answer.

    The withdrawal from START-3 will primarily hit us ourselves. We will hardly be able to increase the number of ICBMs much. At present, the annual production of ICBMs is about 20-25 pieces. About the same number of SLBMs. Plus 2 Iskander brigade kits. And all in one plant.
    Our adversary can simply "load" his Minuteman-3 ICBMs up to 3 BB. And this is at least 900 BB. "Load" your "Tridents" from 4 BB, which is now up to 8-14 blocks. That's 50 + 2300 = 2350. In total, only on ICBMs + SLBMs, the Americans will be able to additionally deploy 2350 + 900 = 3250 BB.

    What can we do?
    ICBM. Removable "Topol" and 78 "Topol-M" - monoblock. "Voivode" is written off. Remains about 120-150 Yars. With what BO they are now on the database - must be considered. In any case, even if they now have 4 instead of 2BB, then we can "load" 300 blocks.

    SLBM.
    1 old boat of project 667BDR with 3 BB. You can't "load" anything on it.
    6 boats of the BDRM project. They had 4 BB for all contracts. Even if all these boats are re-equipped instead of the "Sineva" SLBM "Liner" with the ability to carry 10 BB, this will give an "increase" of 576 BB
    3 boats of the Borey project. Even if they have BP not 6, but 3 BB, this will give an increase from 144 to 192 BB.
    In total, we get an "appendage" for ICBMs + SLBMs in 1020-1068 BB

    The difference is palpable, you do not find. If the START-3 treaty expires, then we will receive an additional 1020-1068 on missiles, and the Americans 3250. That is, almost three times as much. And this is not counting their strategists.
    As a result, 6 we will face a choice - WHAT TO DO... Should we slow down the re-equipment of the Strategic Missile Forces and the Fleet with new missiles and start making MRBMs, or “one teaspoon of an hour” to release MRBMs and continue at the same rate the release of ICBMs and SLBMs?

    Quote: Vadmir
    And officially declare that the objectives of our missiles are precisely American cities and infrastructure.

    Why do that? In the sense of officially declaring? To just "shake the air"?
    Since the 60s, the Americans, knowing that the accuracy of our missiles is lower than theirs, were well aware that the Russians would not shoot at empty mines in the event of a preemptive US strike on the USSR and would not shoot at mines even in in the event that a preemptive strike is made by the Soviet Union (Russia), since the degree of readiness for launch, both here and there, is such that the missiles will leave the mines before the Russian missiles reach them. Therefore, the targets have always been million-plus cities, industrial centers and infrastructure (transport hubs, power plants and airfields (airbases) and large ports (naval bases). Why shout about it at all crossroads. They already know this, and we, having done Such a statement in the eyes of everyone, we will be “barbarians” who will fire at peaceful cities and objects. They will do the same, but silently, and we will “blow the trumpet.” Why?

    Quote: Vadmir
    And despite my love for the fleet, first of all, it is necessary to increase silo launchers of ICBMs on land, as the most suitable for a counter strike (ideally with Sarmat missiles), and only then to deal with SSBNs.

    How? New mines, or rather their creation is prohibited when HZ. We will start building new mines, and they will too. We can only modernize the existing ones (for the same "Sarmat"). There are also not very many of them (for which a rather small amount of modernization is required). About fifty.
    And the whole point is that SSBNs are being built at the very least, but when the "Sarmat" will appear - this is unknown ...

    Quote: mark1
    Those. you need money anyway, but 100 "Couriers" are probably still cheaper than 6 "Boreis", and it is much more difficult to catch them by an order of magnitude (or even 2). But as the saying goes, "the truth is somewhere in the middle ..."

    Well, 4 out of 8 "Boreys" in fact already exist, but the number of "Couriers" is zero. Moreover, they still need to be done, tested, deployed. And this is in from 2 to 4 divisions, with all the infrastructure, both purely military (PPD, patrol routes, PBSP) and civil (residential towns for officers, infrastructure facilities - kindergartens, schools, hospitals) Plus roads.

    Quote: Vadmir
    The DPRK has no missiles capable of reaching the United States and inflicting unacceptable damage on them.

    Your proposal should be divided into two.
    First, "the DPRK has no missiles capable of reaching the United States, and second," inflict an unacceptable training on them. "
    According to the first - purely theoretically, North Korea has such missiles, although it must be said honestly, there is no guarantee that they will fly, because there were no launches to the maximum range. That is, theoretically, there is
    According to the second - DPRK missiles are not capable of causing such damage to the United States due to
    1. Their small numbers
    2. The lack of powerful warhead megaton class
    3. Lack of HRM
    4. Lack of guarantees that MS will not burn in the atmosphere, as entry conditions during their test launches and real ones will be different
    1. timokhin-aa
      8 October 2019 15: 10
      0
      As a result, 6 we will face a choice - WHAT TO DO. Should we slow down the re-equipment of the Strategic Missile Forces and the Fleet with new missiles and start making MRBMs, or “one teaspoon of an hour” to release MRBMs and continue at the same rate the release of ICBMs and SLBMs?


      And you yourself have written what to do - to raise the number of BBs within the framework of "budgetary" events. And stop there. What is the point of increasing the nuclear arsenal beyond the sufficient level? The budget is not rubber.
  25. ser56
    ser56 8 October 2019 14: 15
    +1
    It is curious, but the author deliberately simplifies the situation ... I hope not intentionally:
    1) "even when the enemy's PLC outfit reaches the range of using weapons against the boat, the result, in the correct version, will be a battle, and not an unanswered strike,"
    a) and who said that areas of the location of ground mines or bases of mobile complexes cannot be covered by a missile defense system? I note that the task of covering mines is greatly simplified - there is no need to search for enemy warheads, they will fly ... bully
    b) The SSBN during the battle with the PLC will not be able to fulfill the main thing - to launch rockets ... and the meaning of this battle?
    2) "to establish supremacy at sea (and, in fact, under the sea) in the" bastions. "This should be the very first and most important task of the Navy."
    a) This task is difficult to accomplish in peacetime, especially if the enemy is preparing for the first strike ... but you can’t drown him outside territorial waters request
    b) The specified task turns the forces of the fleet into the defenders, in other words, the enemy fulfills his main task - removes the danger of the Russian fleet for himself ... request
    3) "Beginning of operations to transfer combat patrols to the open ocean."
    for this it is necessary to build an ocean fleet covering the SSBN — does the author want to ruin the Russian Federation?
    Suddenly, a completely different conclusion follows from the author’s constructions - in order to maintain the fleet’s strike potential, the protection of the SSBN must be removed from it, i.e. need to refuse from this type of weapon carriers - it has exhausted itself ... request And for a long time - as soon as their range of missiles became intercontinental - with 667 RBD feel
    The existing SSBNs should be used to misinform the enemy and divert his resources ... feel

    As for the other provisions of the author, he does not take them critically, like the US Senate of his favorite contractors: bully
    1) "New detonator initiation devices" - this makes them vulnerable if the location is determined by some physical factors (optics, radar, etc.), that is, electronic warfare or aerosol camouflage ... cheap and cheerful ... hi
    2) "One of the signs of such a complex was the discrepancy between the number of locomotives on the train and its length" - this is a camouflage error, easily solved at a modern level - Bulava weighs 37 tons and can easily enter a 40-foot container ... request By the way, it is easy to make entrances to mountain shelters from the tunnels of the Transsib or BAM ... feel
    3) "to identify anomalies on satellite photos that may indicate the presence of a camouflaged launcher on the ground." it's generally super laughing We mask inflatable layouts with thermal and radar simulators - let them play in a sea battle ... soldier
    1. timokhin-aa
      8 October 2019 15: 17
      0
      a) and who said that areas of the location of ground mines or bases of mobile complexes cannot be covered by a missile defense system? I note that the task of covering mines is greatly simplified - there is no need to search for enemy warheads, they will fly ...


      At least in general terms, can you imagine the cost of such a holiday? The ballistic target is not a plane, just take a C-400 regiment to the Strategic Missile Forces regiment (and even this will break the budget).

      2) "to establish supremacy at sea (and, in fact, under the sea) in the" bastions. "This should be the very first and most important task of the Navy."
      a) This task is difficult to accomplish in peacetime, especially if the enemy is preparing for the first strike ... but you can’t drown him outside territorial waters


      But it can be very cool to drive.

      3) "Beginning of operations to transfer combat patrols to the open ocean."
      for this it is necessary to build an ocean fleet covering the SSBN — does the author want to ruin the Russian Federation?


      No. This fleet will in no way be neither large nor expensive. Just put yourself in the place of amers and plan the destruction of the KUG from four to five frigates at the equator. It turns out that AUG should be driven there if you want probability = 0,99 and reasonable losses.

      As for the other provisions of the author, he does not take them critically, like the US Senate of his favorite contractors: bully
      1) "New detonator initiation devices" - this makes them vulnerable if the location is determined by some physical factors (optics, radar, etc.), that is, electronic warfare or aerosol camouflage ... cheap and cheerful.


      Do not consider the enemy an idiot.
      1. ser56
        ser56 8 October 2019 15: 56
        0
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        At least in general terms, can you imagine the cost of such a holiday?

        quite!
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        this is not a plane, just take the S-400 regiment to the Strategic Missile Forces regiment (and even this will tear the budget)

        1) for you, so the positions of our Strategic Rocket Forces are not covered from the air? feel
        2) compare the cost of 2 regiments of the Strategic Missile Forces and the regiment S-400 with the cost of 955 .... then we will be silent and compare the costs of operation, taking into account the cost of construction and maintenance of the SSBN bases, nuclear submarines and security forces, and again the S-400 for their protection. .... You are not doing self-propelling?hi
        3) it is the mines that need to be protected by simpler systems - the distances are small - the warhead must be destroyed within 1 km ...
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        But it can be very cool to drive.

        and provoke a war? hi
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Just put yourself in the place of amers and plan the destruction of the KUG from four to five frigates at the equator

        1) in other words, do you propose opening a positional area? bully They will send Virginia and she’ll be tailing for the SSBN ... and for her cover they will send EM ... Will you start the war?
        2) 4-5 frigates are 2 billion greens + content ... request you are generous for folk money ... feel
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Do not consider the enemy an idiot.

        readers too ... to operate a controlled detonator you need to solve exactly those problems that were solved for the avant-garde - an analysis of the terrain in hypersound .... request
        1. timokhin-aa
          10 October 2019 11: 41
          0
          1) for you, so the positions of our Strategic Rocket Forces are not covered from the air?


          There are no anti-aircraft parts in the taxiway. As a rule, they are located in the depths of military districts, and rely on anti-aircraft units of military districts. The Strategic Missile Forces have no defense against a preemptive strike, after it is delivered, the air defense can be written off.

          1) in other words, do you propose opening a position area? bully They will send Virginia and she will go tail for the SSBN ... and for her cover they will send EM ... Will you start the war?


          Well, in real life, from the fact that VIZami threw the boat over, no war began. Americans constantly imitated our torpedo attacks and now they imitate, with the launch of practical torpedoes or noise simulators, we nightmare them with depth bombs, just put them by so as not to damage the hull. These are ordinary realities. Just chasing a boat on a frigate by flipping it with HACK parcels is a disruption for them, they will try to tear themselves away, become deaf, and miss the SSBN

          This has all been done already. I’m not writing from scratch.

          readers too ... to operate a controlled detonator you need to solve exactly those problems that were solved for the avant-garde - an analysis of the terrain in hypersound ....


          No, BB is a ballistic non-maneuvering target, as their bus spread out, so they fall, and undermining there is to measure the height. Look at the second picture, there is an oval, this is an analog of the dispersion ellipse, only at the time of the first measurement by blocks of their height in flight.
    2. Vadim237
      Vadim237 10 October 2019 18: 49
      0
      You can buy 100 divisions of Prometeyev - it will be excellent protection against future infantry and infantry ballistic missiles and ICBM warheads, with reference to over-the-horizon radar systems of anti-aircraft missile systems in a single missile defense system.
    3. The comment was deleted.
    4. Stils
      Stils 10 October 2019 23: 01
      -2
      Quote: ser56
      Curiously, the author deliberately simplifies the situation ...
      a) and who said that areas of the location of ground mines or bases of mobile complexes cannot be covered by a missile defense system? I note that the task of covering mines is greatly simplified - there is no need to search for enemy warheads, they will fly ... bully

      I misunderstood something ... but what's the point of covering silos with a missile defense system? For what purpose?  laughing
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 11 October 2019 10: 02
        +1
        Quote: Stils
        .and what is the point silo cover system missile defense? For what purpose? 

        Nothing. Some far-sighted man launched this bike a long time ago, and ignorant people still buy it.
  26. Old26
    Old26 8 October 2019 15: 06
    +2
    Quote: ser56
    2) "One of the signs of such a complex was the discrepancy between the number of locomotives in the train and its length" - this is a camouflage error, it is easily solved at a modern level - Bulava weighs 37t and can easily enter a 40ft container ... request By the way, from the Transsib or BAM tunnels it is easy make entrances to mountain shelters ...

    The number of locomotives is not a camouflage error, and not the weakness of locomotives, as is sometimes claimed. The number of locomotives was incorporated in the TTT so that the train could be disbanded at the semi-station (at the field starting position), the command and residential modules left, and the launch modules should be separated to a sufficient distance. As a result, instead of one, four goals
    Although the "Bulava" is included in size, but the "Yars" is more suitable in terms of its performance characteristics
    1. illi
      illi 8 October 2019 15: 40
      +1
      Here I also once counted 63 freight cars, which were pulled by one locomotive. Had a thought on the BZHRK two locomotives, obviously the mass is no heavier than the freight train. But he didn’t voice it, not the railwayman, they’ll laugh.
      Well, as a retaliatory strike force, the BZHRK is the best option for Russia. Not for nothing that the Americans felled him with all their might, it’s bad that we don’t have them.
      1. Vadim237
        Vadim237 10 October 2019 18: 51
        0
        The time of the BZHRK has passed; they will not be engaged in it anymore.
    2. ser56
      ser56 8 October 2019 16: 03
      0
      Quote: Old26
      Although the "Bulava" is included in size, but the "Yars" is more suitable in terms of its performance characteristics

      I agree, but these are the details ... In addition, the production of the Mace is already there and it's silly to close it ... request
      Quote: Old26
      was laid in TTT

      They didn’t think about secrecy ... and so there is a container platform train for 40 ... there are 9 containers with clubs, a couple - a control point, still residential modules for security, well, and empty ... the necessary containers can be made with noticeable armor - there is a supply of mass - 40 tons against the usual mass of cargo in a car - 70 tons ...
  27. Old26
    Old26 8 October 2019 15: 51
    +2
    Quote: timokhin-aa
    As a result, 6 we will face a choice - WHAT TO DO. Should we slow down the re-equipment of the Strategic Missile Forces and the Fleet with new missiles and start making MRBMs, or “one teaspoon of an hour” to release MRBMs and continue at the same rate the release of ICBMs and SLBMs?


    And you yourself have written what to do - to raise the number of BBs within the framework of "budgetary" events. And stop there. What is the point of increasing the nuclear arsenal beyond the sufficient level? The budget is not rubber.

    Alexander! Here they suggest some put an end to START-3. You can put it. But after removing the ceilings on the BB, we will find ourselves in the situation that I described. The Americans will be able, with the help of the return potential, to increase their number of missile warheads by about 3200, while we are 1020-1068
    Okay, we’ll stop, but our opponent? Will he stop?

    Quote: illi
    Here I also once counted 63 freight cars, which were pulled by one locomotive. Had a thought on the BZHRK two locomotives, obviously the mass is no heavier than the freight train. But he didn’t voice it, not the railwayman, they’ll laugh.
    Well, as a retaliatory strike force, the BZHRK is the best option for Russia. Not for nothing that the Americans felled him with all their might, it’s bad that we don’t have them.

    At BZHRK actually three locomotive
    1. timokhin-aa
      10 October 2019 11: 31
      0
      The Americans will be able, with the help of the return potential, to increase their number of missile warheads by about 3200, while we are 1020-1068
      Okay, we’ll stop, but our opponent? Will he stop?


      We need to maintain an SUFFICIENT level. Do not compete with amers.
  28. Old26
    Old26 8 October 2019 19: 45
    +1
    Quote: ser56
    I agree, but these are the details ... In addition, the production of the Mace is already there and it's silly to close it ...

    And no one is going to close it. In fact, only 3 Borey-class ships are currently in service. Another one is on the way. 4 more are under construction. Since the Bulava was put into service not so long ago, there is an option that the second and third ammunition load was unlikely to be made. Most likely missiles for the first ammunition load and tests. So they will release it for a few more years. And then what will replace the "Bulava"

    Quote: ser56
    They didn’t think about secrecy ... and so there is a container platform train for 40 ... there are 9 containers with clubs, a couple - a control point, still residential modules for security, well, and empty ... the necessary containers can be made with noticeable armor - there is a supply of mass - 40 tons against the usual mass of cargo in a car - 70 tons ...

    Constructors can be understood. At the time when the BZHRK was created, the satellites did not have such a high resolution. A short composition is not uncommon. True with one locomotive. Apparently the calculation was based on this. . If he moved through a densely populated area - it would be immediately spotted. And since these trains were moving mainly on deserted terrain, you never know what was moving there. Maybe there is a complicated road profile ...
    Nobody knows how many wagons there should have been in "Barguzin" and how many locomotives. But since it was moved at least to 2027, it will most likely never be built. Not profitable from an economic point of view
  29. Leha667
    Leha667 8 October 2019 22: 22
    0
    Great article! Needed!
    1. timokhin-aa
      10 October 2019 11: 30
      +1
      Thank you, I am very glad to receive such a review from those who serve in the subfloor.
  30. Old26
    Old26 8 October 2019 23: 57
    +2
    Quote: SovAr238A
    The agreement prohibits the deployment of BR carriers in inland waters.
    We have banned rivers and lakes and the Casp Sea, they have great lakes and rivers

    It does not prohibit. It is forbidden to base on any watercraft that are not ballistic missile submarines with a range of more than 650 km. Less is possible. But the point?
  31. ufpb
    ufpb 9 October 2019 09: 38
    -1
    The article was placed in the wrong section. Her place in the section is Analytics.
  32. Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 10 October 2019 01: 20
    0
    a very important topic and a very deep analysis, in addition to the objective and difficult to implement difficulties, there are obvious organizational blunders of the General Staff of the Navy, caused by inertness, the desire of admiral’s towns and amenities for personnel at the expense of state security. It is necessary considering the development of missile weapons and aviation, given the strategic importance of nuclear submarines. Create six fleets.
    Two fleets of the third rank (Baltic and Caspian) Composition 4 Buyan M, landing ships, marines, naval aviation and smaller ones.
    Two fleets of the second rank (the Black Sea and Okhotsk-Japanese (Soviet harbor)), the composition of the Black Sea Fleet = Savvy, Inquisitive, Tatarstan Dagestan, all Buyan-M not involved in the fleets of the third rank, Sovetskaya Gavan = 6 guards, karakurt, in both fleets Diesel-electric submarines, landing ships, marines and naval aviation, small ships. The task is total control of the Black, Okhotsk and parts of the Sea of ​​Japan, coast protection.
    Fleets of the third and second rank are subordinate to the commander of the land districts. Two ocean fleets subordinate to the Strategic Missile Forces, Northern and Kamchatsky, in their composition all the cash and ships under construction are larger than the corvette, corvettes, diesel-electric submarines, nuclear submarines. The task is to safely exit and return the submarine to the ocean.
  33. Polinom
    Polinom 10 October 2019 12: 03
    -2
    "readiness number 2" in our terminology.
    Flight crew in equipment and with helmets removed near the aircraft, or in places indicated by the commander.
    EW weapons and equipment are suspended, fuses are not screwed.
    Bomb landing in readiness for landing.
    Landing equipment or cargo on airplanes.
    KP in the workplace.
    The controls are proven and ready to go.
  34. Polinom
    Polinom 10 October 2019 12: 10
    -2
    This program started immediately after Boris Yeltsin's “victory” in the presidential election in the Russian Federation in 1996, when all observers believed that Russia would be over and it would not be restored.
    In my opinion, it will not "not recover", and does not perceive the United States as a target country for a nuclear strike.
  35. Polinom
    Polinom 10 October 2019 12: 18
    -4
    According to the scenario of the exercises, the evil revanchist Russia began to terrorize its neighbors, attack them and deprive their sovereignty,
    And what's wrong with the script? Let’s ask Georgians and Ukrainians. am
    1. Newone
      Newone 11 October 2019 00: 26
      +1
      Ask the Nazi regimes?
      The Georgians themselves attacked the peacekeepers, whom they themselves asked to enter. Without declaring war, ultimatums on withdrawal, etc.
      Russia is not at war with Ukraine. The fact that a large half of its population has been declared by the current political label of Ukraine as invaders and second-class people, and those who did not agree to kill were not a war with the Russian Federation.
      1. Polinom
        Polinom 12 October 2019 13: 12
        -4
        Well you brainwashed. Chegozh Nazis in the EU and NATO are pulled and visa-free discharged to almost two hundred countries, and spiritual Russia is being stolen by the whole world.
        The name of the country is capitalized. laughing
        1. Newone
          Newone 13 October 2019 23: 20
          +1
          Nazis in the EU and NATO

          How Ukraine is "pulled" into the EU is perfectly visible - kicks from the doorstep. Or is there a quote for you?
          In NATO, Ukraine is pulled to confront Russia, and it is sometimes pulled, but it does not want to be accepted. We would like to accept it.
          spiritual Russia crumpling the whole world
          The USA and its satellites are far from the whole world. Even Israel has not imposed sanctions. About China, India and others in general there is no question.
          So propaganda, it is in Ukraine ..
          Out of respect for the great Ukrainians, together with the Russians, who built a single country, in the fragments of which we live, I will write the name of Ukraine with a capital letter. Now it is a territory of Ukraine with external control from Washington (which the actions of Biden and Poroshenko openly demonstrated) and moral monsters in the government, power structures and a large part of society.
  36. Vadim237
    Vadim237 10 October 2019 20: 02
    0
    It must be assumed that our engineers and scientists already have samples of the same fuses for American warheads, just as there are already systems to counter their work - something like EW Mercury - is only much more powerful and modern. At the time of separation of warheads - the destruction of one of them and the destruction of the entire bus. And the first disarming strike failed, like everyone else.
    1. timokhin-aa
      12 October 2019 20: 01
      0
      Pink ponies will be sent into space, they hooves on the "bus" - and hello.
      1. Newone
        Newone 13 October 2019 23: 22
        0
        Or the warhead will not work due to the lack of a plant for updating charge materials :)
        1. timokhin-aa
          14 October 2019 20: 03
          0
          And you can still throw caps.

          By the way, in the multi-purpose Poseidon there can be a cap-gun as a payload. How do you like the idea?
  37. sharpMouse
    sharpMouse 14 October 2019 01: 21
    0
    The article is interesting and in some places very reasonable, but there are a number of questions:

    1. What happens if the SSBNs are spotted in the ocean? The American submarine will simply fall on its tail, constantly pinging. Yes, it will also be detected, so what? We will also be able to gouge her with pings, but this will not help stop the persecution.

    2. The ocean fleet did not even pull the USSR. It is certainly good and useful, but how is it supposed to build and pay for it?

    3. The threat of an explosion in Moscow near the Kremlin, in theory, is stopped by one (!) Officer located somewhere in Siberia (but not near the ShPU area), and who has the right to decide on retaliation. Is not it?

    4. Is it logical to eliminate problems in other strategic nuclear forces?

    For example, to create a second missile defense area in the area of ​​mine installations (as it is now the first over Moscow, that is, with missile defense with a nuclear warhead). This, after all, should decently secure the mine installations from a preventive strike. Moreover, the Americans have withdrawn from the ABM treaty.

    Or it’s corny to make hundreds of mobile launchers with fake missiles, and put there conditionally conscripted drivers. I do not think that several hundred chassis will be much more expensive than even one SSBN.

    Relatively recently, they refused to sell railway complexes. Despite the fact that the rocket is now much lighter and even special vehicles are not required. Why? I suspect that just current funds are enough.
    1. timokhin-aa
      14 October 2019 20: 26
      0
      1. What happens if the SSBNs are spotted in the ocean? The American submarine will simply fall on its tail, constantly pinging. Yes, it will also be detected, so what? We will also be able to gouge her with pings, but this will not help stop the persecution.


      They do not ping, and we have not pinged for at least twenty years. To open up is to expose yourself to the recording of an acoustic portrait. When it is fully recorded, a normal GAC will "take" a spoon from a great distance - sometimes hundreds of kilometers. Therefore, when the PLA is "exposed", they are detached from the tracking and then secretly try to restore contact.

      Will the SSBN detect in the ocean? Well, maybe. But with the support of surface ships and anti-submarine aircraft (only normal, and not the same as now), the American submarine will not be able to complete the task while maintaining stealth, which creates the prerequisite for the SSBN to leave tracking.

      2. The ocean fleet did not even pull the USSR. It is certainly good and useful, but how is it supposed to build and pay for it?


      Well, the USSR poured more resources into the Navy than the United States, we do not need to repeat such exploits.

      3. The threat of an explosion in Moscow near the Kremlin, in theory, is stopped by one (!) Officer located somewhere in Siberia (but not near the ShPU area), and who has the right to decide on retaliation. Is not it?


      Like, but what will strike back if the enemy covers all silos and even half of the PGRK? What remains is MSND, right? And in order to prevent them from working out (with proper provision for their actions), it is necessary to increase the outfit of PLC in the sea. And this is a reconnaissance sign that automatically leads to increased combat readiness, etc.

      4. Is it logical to eliminate problems in other strategic nuclear forces?


      There are not so many of them.
  38. Sckepsis
    Sckepsis 16 October 2019 07: 12
    0
    The author selectively provides facts in order not to get to the bottom of the truth, but to substantiate his point of view. So for example: talking a lot about the increased accuracy of the W76, he does not mention a sharp reduction in its power, hardly capable of hitting the mine. In previous articles, the author argued that even a ship group cannot be found by any satellite constellation, and now it means that the Topol is only a matter of time. The author is silent about the "dead hand", although even the hypothetical possibility of such a system to work can sharply cool the ardor. There are no comments at all about the possibilities and desires in Britain's nuclear war. Well, the author's reasoning about the American mentality is generally five plus.
  39. Alien From
    Alien From 16 October 2019 21: 51
    -5
    Respect to the author !!!
  40. 3danimal
    3danimal 26 October 2019 18: 45
    +1
    “And the old half-dead enemy, which would be nice to finish off”
    The author has enough emotions and ideology in reasoning. What does it mean to finish? For what purpose? Risking your citizens?
    Forgets the important point: what the poor (budget size) “seems” to us as huge expenses (in comparison with our capabilities), the rich “to them” is just a planned update.
    An example is the JSF program: the F-35s are going to upgrade about 2000 aircraft in the Air Force, KMP and Navy. Do you need to update equipment? It is necessary. It’s just that someone has money for the Porsche, and someone will continue to drive Logan after a major overhaul (such an analogy).
    The second point: after Yeltsin’s victory in the 96th (not of the Reds or RNE-shnikov), it was just “them” who could relax and deal with other problems.
    There was a war with Japan in the USA, the latter was defeated, a new government was brought to power, only the defensive orientation of the army and the course towards internal development were established. And where is Japan now? - 3 economies in the world. By peaceful development they have achieved more (safe for themselves) than before - militaristic.
    Probably, "they" expected that the Russian Federation would follow a similar path, IMHO.
  41. 3danimal
    3danimal 26 October 2019 18: 52
    +1
    “The modernization of SLBM warheads includes American SSBNs in the arsenal of means for the first counter-force strike, moreover, this modernization simply does not make sense in any other case. But it is being held. So, the first counter-force strike is considered by the US authorities as one of the options for action in the short term, and it is for this that the United States is preparing. ”
    Saying “far-fetched” will not be enough. Ears remained in the hands)
    There is such a process - modernization. Old weapons, systems become obsolete, and new ones almost always have the best features.
    Therefore, any modernization of the armed forces (SNF) is preparation for war)
    Mirror: Russia is modernizing its strategic nuclear forces, therefore, it is going to attack the United States, and the first, otherwise it cannot be.
  42. G. Georgiev
    G. Georgiev 15 November 2019 10: 22
    0
    Dont worry. Everything will end in 30 minutes in complete chaos. No strategy will work due to many unpredictable factors and system failure.