Military Review

Conarmia actions through the eyes of a Polish officer. July-August 1920 of the year

37
So, the 1 I Cavalry Army made impressive strides (Go west! 1-I Horse in battles in Western Ukraine) But the apogee of successful actions was also the beginning of the decline in the effectiveness of the Conarmia.




Of great interest in this regard is the enemy’s view of the actions of the Horse Army in 1920 on the Polish front of the Civil War. Historical The Bureau of the Polish General Staff issued the 2nd volume of Tactical Lessons from the History of the Polish Wars of 1918-1921. The book under consideration was written by Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff F. A. Artishevsky and gives a description of the battles of the Polish 18th Infantry Division with Budenny's mounted army in the Ostrog - Dubno - Brody area from July 1 to August 6, 1920 - that is, in the most interesting author’s point of view, the period of hostilities that took place on the fields of Volhynia and Podolia from June to November 1920.

According to the testimony of a Polish expert, no one expected such major successes of the cavalry in the fight against infantry, which had modern weapons. At the same time, no one could understand why the Polish command, learning about the breakthrough of several Soviet cavalry divisions behind the rear of the infantry fighting position, ordered its troops to retreat on a wide front.

Zhytomyr breakthrough and measures of the Poles to counter it


As Artishevsky notes, breaking through the front at the junction of the 6 and 2 armies in the area of ​​Squire - Samgorodok, Budenny threw the Polish 13 division into Kazatin and, with the whole mass of his cavalry, moved to Zhitomir and Berdichev. The units of the infantry divisions 1, 3, 6, and also the cavalry brigade of General Savitsky, hastily pulled up and thrown against Budyonny, could not do anything. Seeing the terrible situation created for the Ukrainian front of the Polish army, the commander of the 6 army, General Rommer decided to withdraw the 18 infantry division from his front, despite the fact that the red 14 army was pushing him and threw it through the Starokonstantinov in the direction on Exactly.

On the 2 of July, the vanguard units of the 18th Infantry Division, transferred by rail to Starokonstantinov, moved towards Zaslav.

From this day on, the combat service of this division, exceptional in its difficulty, begins.

The entire 5-week period of continuous battles was formed for the 18-th Infantry Division of three main stages: 1-th - movement for the Budenny Horse Army, which after 12-days of forced march and battles was finally overtaken. But, having entered into close contact with the enemy, the 18-I infantry division was too weak to give a decisive battle to the four horse and two infantry divisions of the enemy, which forced it to go to the 2-th stage - battles that only slowed down the movement of the Reds until fresh forces arrived in such numbers that would create conditions favorable enough for a decisive battle. This waiting period lasted 14 days - and during this time the Polish command pulled in the required number of troops.

A decisive battle near Brody began, lasting 7 days. This was the 3 stage.

The first period of battles from the 3 to the 12 of July, as mentioned above, was the movement of the 18 infantry division behind the Budenny Horse Army with the goal of giving it a decisive battle.

When General Rommer made the decision to remove the 18 infantry division from the Letichevsky division, i.e., on the 29 June, the main forces of the Cavalry Army were in the Kozhets area (Shepetovka - Kozhets - Sluch River). General Rommer believed that he would be able to regroup his army so quickly that already “over Gorynya, starting from Zaslavl”, the 18th Infantry Division would be able to take part “in the general battle against Budyonny”. But only on the 3 of July did General Craiovsky, the head of the 18 division, be replaced on his Letichevsky section with parts of the neighboring 12 division of the infantry.

This delay, in connection with other circumstances, resulted in the fact that "a general battle with the participation of the 18th Infantry Division could not be fought over Gorynya."

The Budennovites crossed the Goryn on the 3 of July near Gosha and Ostrog - and by the time the Polish 18 Division approached Zaslavl, the Reds were already in Rivne, pushing patrols towards Dubno and Klevani.

The decision of General Rommer to remove the 18 infantry division and send it to Goryn was very bold. The weakening of his army, on his own initiative, without an order from the high command, at a time when the enemy was pushing strongly at the army section near Kopai-city, Bar and Senyava, indicates a general understanding by General Rommer of the strategic situation prevailing for the Polish troops on the southern front.



The Polish 18 Infantry Division included the 4 Infantry Regiment of a three-battalion composition; each battalion - 3 rifle and 1 machine-gun companies (also in each regiment there was also a machine-gun company); in all four regiments there were 105 officers and 4 thousand soldiers. The regular 18 field artillery regiment consisted of 10 four-gun light batteries (75 mm French guns). Divisional cavalry - squadron of mounted shooters (70 saber). The divisions were assigned two battalions of the 44 regiment from the 13 infantry division, with 600 bayonets per battalion, one battalion of the Podholyansk infantry regiment from the 12 infantry division consisting of 300 people, the Ukrainian semi-battery at 2 The 6th Uhlan Regiment, consisting of 4's squadrons of 40 — 60 horses each and a machine-gun squadron with 4 heavy machine guns.

The cavalry army included 4 cavalry divisions with a total number of up to 20 thousand sabers and 2 infantry divisions (44 and 45 rifle).

The vigorous blow of the 18 Infantry Division against the enemy, which had grouped its forces to attack the left flank of the 6 Army in the area of ​​Medvedovka, Sulzhin, Koskov, temporarily threw these forces northward. The 18-th Infantry Division, following its enemy, crossed Goryn, occupying the area of ​​Belchin - Borisov - Pluzhnoye - Gnoynitsa (west of Zaslavl).

Such a deep separation from the left flank of the 13 infantry division, which occupied the previous positions at Starokonstantinov, and took advantage of the red 45 division - which struck the open flank of the 13 infantry division, and at a critical moment of withdrawal. Due to the fact that the 6 Army, weakened and extended in line, continued to remain in the positions occupied by the 18 Infantry Division during the successful offensive, the gap between the 2 Army and the 6 Army increased even more and the left flank of the 13 Army the division suffered even greater defeats on the 5-6 of July, and the rear was open to raids by the Soviet cavalry, which destroyed many valuable property in Black Island and Proskurov.

From the moment of the occupation of Zaslavl, when it was determined that the main forces of Budenny had already passed Exactly and were moving westward, General Craiowski immediately proceeded to search for these forces. He caught up with them in Ostrog, and attacked - in order to disturb Budyonny and threaten his rear. The movement of the division after the units of the Horse Army then continues in the direction of Dubno. Taking advantage of the fact that, under Rivne, a significant part of the Budyon army was associated with the battle of the 2 Army, which went on the offensive, the 18 Division hastens to occupy Dubno - to close the Dubna breakthrough, which allowed Budyonny to break away from the 2 Army and freely rush to Lviv.

12-th July 18-I division occupied the area of ​​Willow. Being on the 1 of July, at a distance of 80 of kilometers behind the Horse Army, she already ahead of her on the 12 of July and, standing in front of her, got the opportunity to restrain her movement to Lviv until there comes a favorable moment for entering with Budyonny in decisive battle.

As a result of campaigns and battles, the 18 I Infantry Division during the period from 3 to 13 July overtook the Budyonny army and inflicted quite significant losses while the losses of the 18 Infantry Division were very small - but most importantly, that the Polish soldiers were personally convinced of the possibility of fighting the supposedly invincible parts of the Budyonny army and this greatly raised the spirit of the troops.

Lviv or Galicia?


The second period from the 12 to the 26 of July was called the period of inhibition of the actions of the Budyonny army. Although by this time the 2 Army had deployed troops towards Lutsk, nevertheless, there was still a gap of 6 kilometers between this operational association and the left flank of the 60 Army.

Budenny's desire to rush to Lviv was already clearly defined. The road to Lviv through Mlynov - Berestechko - Kamenka was completely open for him.

Conarmia actions through the eyes of a Polish officer. July-August 1920 of the year


The reserves that could be opposed to the Cavalry Army were not only in the commands of the 2 and 6 armies and the Southern Front, but also in the High Command.

The first blow of the 18th Infantry Division occurred in the direction of Dubno on the 13 of July; as a result of this battle, one of the horse divisions was thrown back to the northern shore of Iqua, which undoubtedly affected the fulfillment of the movement plan outlined by Budyonny. Temporarily, the initiative of action passed into the hands of General Craiowski. In this battle a significant role was played located a little south of the mountains. Dubno Fort Zagorce, due to the resistance of which the advance of the Reds in the south direction was difficult. On the 14, 15 and 16 July, this stronghold again perfectly fulfilled its role.

Already on the 14 of July, the initiative for action passed again to Budyonny, which by the evening of that day had occupied Dubno and advanced its units in the direction of Brody.

The actions taken by him indicated that he continued to regard the breakthrough as wide as ever. His 4-I division crossed Ikva, east of Dubno, and already on the 14-th of July occupied Demidovka, taking the direction to Berestechko. Despite such an advantageous position, Budyonny did not use it. If he quickly concentrated his entire army in the area of ​​Dubno and Mlynov, he could have overthrown the units of the 18 division and hit the 13 division located on the flank of the 6 army with an energetic blow. could successfully do what he did from the 26 of June to the 6 of July.

After the occupation of Rivne, on the 14 of July, Budyonny presented two possibilities:

1) “forgetting” about the Polish 2 and 6 armies, the main forces to move directly to Lviv - causing panic in the enemy rear lines;

2) strike with all forces together with the red 14 army on the flank of the 6 army of the Poles, smash it and open the road to Galicia.

Budyonny, however, did not choose for himself any of these possible solutions from the Polish point of view. In the period starting from the 10 of July, he scattered his forces from Rožić to Kremenets and Brod over a space of 100 kilometers, without taking anywhere to take decisive action.

During this period, Soviet infantry and equestrian divisions pursued either parts of the 18 division or the troops of the 2 army, however, always with relatively weak forces, which is why they did not achieve decisive success.

In the period from the 14 to the 26 of July, Budyonny did his best to advance towards Lviv. To this end, he alternately let his divisions pass through the gap between the 2 and 6 armies. At the same time, Budyonny is taking measures to prevent the flanks of the 2 and 6 armies from joining. On July 16, he attacks the 6 infantry division near Dorogostai, then on July 19 the attack 18 infantry division near Horupan, repels the advance of the 3 infantry division in the area of ​​Torgovitsa-Perekale and goes over to the defense on this site; then attacks against the 18 division near Ivashchuki and Brody follow. But the success of all these attacks was expressed only in the capture of a certain space; they did not cause any significant damage to the enemy’s living force. The breakthrough is not closed. Budyonny is successful, moving forward, but the unbroken forces of the Polish 6 and 2 armies constantly delay his march, waiting for the moment to launch an offensive with the help of fresh forces.

The time lost then by Budyonny does not correspond to the results achieved by him.

The stubborn defense by a group of General Craiowski of their positions at Khorupani, despite the withdrawal of units of the Horse Army behind him, then a quick withdrawal from Khorupani, an unexpected transition to the offensive, the defense of Brod, and finally, the prevention of the Transition of the Horse Army through Styr (Lutsk-Berestechko section) the units of the 2 Army that went south along the Styr - this is the main success achieved by the Polish command.

The 18th Infantry Division at 24 on the 19 of July returned to Horzani in the Radziwills, and on the 22 of the day it went on the offensive against Kozin and Dobrovudka. This time the offensive was carried out already at the direction of the headquarters of the Southern Front, but the forces for this operation were still weak.

Budyonny settled down firmly in the Volkovysk-Khotin area and, like his actions near Mlynov, having successively defeated the 13 and 18-th Polish divisions, did not allow their unification for a joint attack.

Following the example of a retreat from Horupani, surrounded by the 18-I division, broke through on the night of the 23-th, leaving for Brody and then on Olesko - Podgorica. At this line, she carried out active defense and turned into counterattacks.

The ending should ...
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  1. Olgovich
    Olgovich 6 October 2019 06: 47
    -3
    Another bloody war in a long chain of similar ones caused by a thief .....
    1. Kronos
      Kronos 6 October 2019 09: 49
      0
      Olgovich as usual at a military post for the defense of the virtual monarchy
      1. Albatroz
        Albatroz 6 October 2019 10: 09
        0
        Well why virtual?
        Very historical Russian statehood of the past.
        Which at one time was denigrated by the Germans and Soviet historians.
        By the way, Olgovich writes, as a rule, sound and fairly accurate comments.
        Especially if you think about it wink
        1. Kronos
          Kronos 6 October 2019 11: 04
          +1
          No, most of his comments are what good white and bad Bolsheviks are.
    2. dvina71
      dvina71 6 October 2019 12: 22
      +7
      Quote: Olgovich
      Another bloody war in a long chain of similar ones caused by a thief ..

      Yeah .. and the Romanov’s house is such a direct peacemaker ... And the question is two .. What is the attitude of the October Revolution to the overthrow of the monarchy?
  2. knn54
    knn54 6 October 2019 08: 17
    +1
    The former officer, Viktor Pogrebov, the chief of staff at Budenny, first of the First Cavalry Division, then in the corps, then in the army, the whole VICTORY 1919. At the beginning of 1920, he was dismissed (?) From his post and the further fate is unknown ...
    1. Hunghuz
      Hunghuz 6 October 2019 08: 53
      +5
      Well, 1 SC did not operate for the entire 19th year (when was it fed?) And moreover, not all of it was successful for the Reds, most likely from October - November.
      Pogrebova most likely destroyed. Then people disappeared undocumented. Even former governors
  3. Albatroz
    Albatroz 6 October 2019 08: 24
    +9
    For the Poles, of course, much remained incomprehensible.
    And the scale and effect of the application of such masses of cavalry
    1. Hunghuz
      Hunghuz 6 October 2019 08: 49
      +14
      But it is worth saying that the Lyashsky infantry sometimes acted quite successfully. Like 18 PD, for example
      1. knn54
        knn54 6 October 2019 09: 07
        -1
        The Poles bypass the fact (there are references from one of the European advisers to Pilsudski) that the 5th (or 6th, I don’t remember) Ukrainian division (from Petliur’s) and the Cossack brigade made a significant contribution to the success of the Poles
        The local population was opposed, well, the guys loved (and Budenny had many former white Cossacks) to organize pogroms ...
        1. Hunghuz
          Hunghuz 6 October 2019 09: 17
          +11
          The Red Cossacks were no better)
          1. Flatter
            Flatter 6 October 2019 10: 57
            +9
            And why should they have been better? The same illiterate mass, torn out of their usual way of life ... And Babel described everything in the Cavalry. This is the strength of the Bolsheviks, that they managed to unite people with the desire for a really better future life and difference, and not for faith, king and fatherland.
        2. Engineer
          Engineer 6 October 2019 12: 05
          +4
          There are not only and not so much Cossacks, although these undoubtedly loved to meditate
          Babel read for a long time, but I remember the abundance of thieves scum in the first horse. I tend to think that they made the main contribution
  4. BAI
    BAI 6 October 2019 10: 16
    0
    On July 12, the 18th division occupied the Verba area. Being July 1 at a distance of 80 kilometers behind the Horse Army, she already ahead of her on July 12 and, standing in front of her,

    How did infantry outrun cavalry? For more details it was necessary to open the question.
    1. Albatroz
      Albatroz 6 October 2019 10: 31
      +10
      How did infantry outrun cavalry? For more details it was necessary to open the question.

      don't you know such cases in history?
      When the cavalry chases after several hares at once or does not leave the days (like the budenny in these events), the pace is lost. And the infantry at this time is purposeful and moves along a piece of iron or on carts.
      The whole question is strategic determination. I mean, is it dizzy from success and what to do next wink
  5. lucul
    lucul 6 October 2019 11: 17
    +4
    Hmm ...
    The Slavs fought with the Slavs for the fun of the Jews.
  6. Corrie sanders
    Corrie sanders 6 October 2019 16: 44
    -3
    a good topic, but the article is boring and dull, in the spirit of the Military Publishing House of 1973. Without video support, all these enumerations of advances, detours and maneuvers, apart from melancholy and complete misunderstanding of the situation, do not inspire. The situation as a whole is clear - 1 spacecraft together with Yakir's infantry rushing towards Lvov, the Poles as they can fight back, slowly rolling back in a general direction to the west. Everything, nothing is needed. And it is necessary for specific episodes - about battles in horse ranks, about evil surprises of the red cavalry - for example, having made a volley of carbines, the Poles began to approach in blades, but 20-30 meters from Budennovtsy suddenly snatched revolvers and pistols and beat at point-blank range, then the wounded and stunned were chopped down with swords. Similarly, but even more brutal was the unexpected with the carts - the thin lava of the Budennovites, which seemed to have taken on the oncoming wheelhouse, suddenly parted, and a barrage of machine-gun fire fell on the "Polish gentlemen" (the carts galloped in the lava), the survivors were immediately chopped down and finished shooting. Also an unpleasant surprise for the Poles were the Cossack peaks, which Rummel and Osubka had never encountered before, the peak debut took place in Galicia, after which the Polish Army began to urgently create lancers with pikes. By the way, it would be nice to also point out the corporate style of Budyonny - the retreat under the infantry orders of Yakir if the enemy is stronger, Budyonny was by no means a reckless swashbuckler, he always acted only in tandem with the infantry (4A Yakira), cinema bloopers of Soviet times about oncoming cuttings are fantasies of the 70s, with melee weapons they only finished off a wounded or fleeing enemy, and no fencing
    1. Albatroz
      Albatroz 6 October 2019 16: 52
      +11
      Corrie Sanders (Corrie Sanders)
      the article is dull and dull

      absolutely not.
      The situation as a whole is clear - 1 spacecraft together with the Yakira infantry rushing to Lviv, the Poles, as they can, fight back, slowly rolling away in a general direction to the west.

      Again by.
      It is about the Polish officer’s assessment of a completely different situation. The 18th Infantry Division, the backbone of the special group, is holding brakes, gaining time. But the cavalry army is not rushing, but is losing momentum, scattered in space and not knowing where to move.
      That’s why they sowed her.
      No video tracking

      So maybe provide such a video accompaniment once such a nimble?
      In the spirit of 2019? laughing
    2. Yarr_Arr
      Yarr_Arr 6 October 2019 17: 52
      +3
      At the expense of a surprise with peaks for the Poles .... somehow drawn out!
      And then the Poles did not have a lancer, and they did not see the Cossacks as part of the empire.
      Such, here, stupid Poles, did not see the peak
    3. Nagaibak
      Nagaibak 6 October 2019 17: 55
      +3
      Corrie Sanders "Good topic, but boring and dull article."
      So after all, the author did not write an article for the "Pioneer" magazine.))) Not for shkoloty.)))
  7. Kapitan a
    Kapitan a 6 October 2019 19: 28
    +7
    What happened to the man (with Budyonny) fought well, but then suddenly he lost his pace, and so did his infantry catch up?
    1. voyaka uh
      voyaka uh 6 October 2019 22: 07
      -7
      It happened not with Budyonny man, but with his army. Soldiers a few days
      they fought, then rested for a few days: looting and getting drunk.
      The pace was thus lost. This ultimately determined the defeat.
      The cavalry army in the Polish campaign - it finally decayed and lost
      combat readiness. It was disbanded, the most decomposed parts were shot
      before the rest of the system, and formed anew.
      1. Alexander Greene
        Alexander Greene 7 October 2019 00: 25
        +2
        Quote: voyaka uh
        It was disbanded, the most decomposed parts were shot
        before the rest of the system, and formed anew.

        Well, why write nonsense?
        Firstly, the First Cavalry Army was never completely disbanded, its individual units were disbanded

        Secondly, it was later, already on the Wrangel front.

        Thirdly. there is no secret that subversive work was carried out against the Cavalry Army. Under the guise of volunteers, provocateurs were sent to her ranks, who were tasked with provoking pogroms of the local population, robbery, involving as many fighters from among the illiterate, politically backward as possible, thereby forcing the command to apply repressive measures to the guilty, to cause bitterness of the fighters against commanders.

        The provocateurs hoped that the decline in discipline in the red forces, the participation of fighters in the robberies, and looting would undermine the population’s faith in the Red Army. Whiteguard agents dressed in the Red Army uniform spread rumors of mass pogroms, robberies, and atrocities in order to discredit the Conarmia.

        There were certain cases, of course, but commanders, commissars, and communists did everything possible to suppress them. From the standpoint of his petty-bourgeois lies, Babel has blown up certain negative episodes to the system, but it is wrong to blame the whole Conarmia.

        After the defeat of the Denins, a lot of former White Guards, White Cossacks, White bandits and the like elements joined the Polish company before the Polish company, it is not possible to quickly establish discipline and make them conscious fighters for Soviet power, it is a long and painstaking work.
        1. Albatroz
          Albatroz 7 October 2019 08: 24
          +6
          The main reason that the 1st spacecraft hesitated in the second half of July was that Budenny's eyes widened, after entering the operational space there were several attractive goals that he wanted to eat all at once.
          In short, he was an excellent tactician and short-term operator.
          But not a long-term operator, much less a strategist.
          Plus miscalculations of the higher command
  8. Alexander Greene
    Alexander Greene 7 October 2019 23: 30
    +2
    Quote: Albatroz
    The main reason that the 1st spacecraft hesitated in the second half of July was that Budenny's eyes widened, after entering the operational space there were several attractive goals that he wanted to eat all at once.

    First, to say that "... Budyonny's eyes fled ..." is somehow inappropriate.
    Secondly, the front command set him goals.

    Quote: Albatroz

    In short, he was an excellent tactician and short-term operator.
    But not a long-term operator, much less a strategist.

    I wouldn’t talk like that, Budyonny had strategic thinking and one can say his keen sense. This was even noted by German generals when Budyonny commanded the South-Western direction during the Great Patriotic War.
    1. Albatroz
      Albatroz 8 October 2019 05: 50
      +4
      Budyonny's eyes ran up ... ", somehow inappropriate.

      Why, if these are the facts
      After the occupation of Rivne, on the 14 of July, Budyonny presented two possibilities:
      1) “forgetting” about the Polish 2 and 6 armies, the main forces to move directly to Lviv - causing panic in the enemy rear lines;
      2) strike with all forces together with the red 14 army on the flank of the 6 army of the Poles, smash it and open the road to Galicia.
      Budyonny, however, did not choose for himself any of these possible solutions from the Polish point of view. In the period starting from the 10 of July, he scattered his forces from Rožić to Kremenets and Brod over a space of 100 kilometers, without taking anywhere to take decisive action.

      this is first
      Secondly, the front command set him goals.

      During the period of deep separation from the main forces of the front, the degree of its autonomy was very great. In general, the cavalry chief during the raid is guided in many respects by his instincts and reasons, rather than obsolete or delayed (communication is fragmentary and unreliable) directives of the higher command. What Mammoths, what Budyonny.
      Budenny had strategic thinking and one can say his heightened feeling. This was even noted by German generals when Budyonny commanded the South-Western direction during the Great Patriotic War.

      Probably grown up since then, but the assessment of his command at that time is also a controversial issue, don’t you?
      1. Alexander Greene
        Alexander Greene 8 October 2019 22: 41
        0
        Quote: Albatroz
        Budyonny, however, did not choose for himself any of these possible solutions from the Polish point of view. In the period starting from the 10 of July, he scattered his forces from Rožić to Kremenets and Brod over a space of 100 kilometers, without taking anywhere to take decisive action.


        Sorry, but this is someone's biased riveting on Budyonny. When the Southwestern Front received a directive of July 11, 1920, to promote the advance of the Western Front on Brest, the First Horse had just left heavy fighting near Rivne, and it needed rest to restore its combat effectiveness.

        The Konarmeys stood in front of a strong Polish group in the Dubno-Brody-Kremenets region, but Konarmia was not able to attack, so Budyonny made the only right decision: to protect his front line with small groups and in the event of an enemy attack. Therefore, he put up screening and horse reconnaissance on the alleged areas of the offensive of the Polish army.

        Quote: Albatroz
        assessment of his command at that time is also a controversial issue, don’t you?


        No, I don’t find it. Budyonny, commanding the South-West direction, acted competently and decisively in the summer of 1941, the Opponent never managed to squeeze his troops in a vice and destroy them, this was also noted by German generals.

        Budyonny also foresaw the danger threatening the Kiev fortified area, and proposed timely measures. but then politics intervened, they did not listen to Budenny and removed him from command. The result, you know, is the rout of the entire front.
        1. Albatroz
          Albatroz 9 October 2019 08: 01
          +4
          but the Konarmia was not able to attack, so Budyonny made the only right decision: to guard the line of his front in small groups and in the event of an enemy advance to repulse him. Therefore, he put up screening and horse reconnaissance on the alleged areas of the offensive of the Polish army.

          let us leave this as an illustration of my words about inaction at this stage of Budyonny. Under a plausible pretext)
          Before that, it was the speed that saved him, and no attention was paid to the "superior enemy forces".
          And suddenly...
          to push back...
          horse intelligence ...
          terms that cover what I wrote above
          Budyonny, commanding the South-Western direction, in the summer of 1941 acted competently and decisively

          not only in the summer, and not only competently and decisively)
          It’s not worth idealizing anyone. The same Brusilov, for example, how many serious mistakes he made. But walks in the halo of the great commander
          1. Alexander Greene
            Alexander Greene 9 October 2019 19: 29
            +1
            Quote: Albatroz
            let us leave this as an illustration of my words about inaction at this stage of Budyonny. Under a plausible pretext)
            Before that, it was the speed that saved him, and no attention was paid to the "superior enemy forces".
            And suddenly...
            to push back...
            horse intelligence ...
            terms that cover what I wrote above


            No, this cannot serve as an illustration of your voluntarism. I hope you still understand that Konarmia, which has just emerged from heavy bloody battles in the Rivne region, has suffered heavy losses, cannot fight at speed.

            The condition of the troops was very difficult: the extreme fatigue of the Konarmaites, the exhaustion of horses, the absence of ammunition. How to attack a superior enemy with such an army?

            Coming in such a state is a crime. Therefore, the task of the set up barriers, patrols and reconnaissance was: in case of the enemy’s offensive, to warn the main forces so that they could prepare to repulse.
            1. Albatroz
              Albatroz 9 October 2019 20: 31
              +7
              you don't seem to understand what you're talking about request
              Naturally, the state of the troops worsens over the course of the fighting.
              Only the Cavalry Army was not led back - it went into a deeper raid. And once it has gone, it must act actively.
              The problem is different - Budyonny just lost time and exchanged for several goals. He did not stand still, trembling with fatigue, as you outlined, but Crawl. That's the problem
              1. Alexander Greene
                Alexander Greene 10 October 2019 20: 50
                0
                Quote: Albatroz
                you don't seem to understand what you're talking about

                I don’t know where you get your discoveries from. From all memoirs and historical essays, it is known that on July 11, when the First Horse Horse just left the fighting in Rivne, the South-Western Front received a directive to facilitate the advance of the Western Front on Brest.
                But the condition of the Konarmia troops after heavy fighting in the Rovno region was very difficult, as I already wrote, the losses, the fatigue of the Konarma soldiers, the fatigue of horses, how to attack with such an army?
                The immediate involvement of the army in active operations threatened with grave consequences for both the army and the front. ” And the Command of the Southwestern Front, realizing this, asked the commander in chief to allow her to give a respite and then attack on Lviv. Commander-in-chief approved it. What raid are you talking about?
                1. Albatroz
                  Albatroz 10 October 2019 20: 56
                  +4
                  These are not discoveries, but facts.
                  Immediate involvement of the army in active operations threatened with grave consequences for both the army and the front

                  she was involved for a long time and did not leave this operation.
                  On July 11, the Cavalry Army operated where, on the front or in the depths of the Polish front. Do not tell me?)
                  1. Alexander Greene
                    Alexander Greene 11 October 2019 00: 36
                    0
                    Quote: Albatroz
                    she was involved for a long time and did not leave this operation.
                    On July 11, the Cavalry Army operated where, on the front or in the depths of the Polish front. Do not prompt


                    The konarmia army, for the period described on the Polish front, was continuously fighting for more than 40 days without respite, with poor supplies of food, shells, horses, fodder, without human replenishment. Only near Dubno she waged continuous heavy fighting for five days without sleep and rest, so there were cases that the Konarmeyans on tired and hungry horses simply could not catch up with the quickly retreating Poles. And you, without delving into the situation, accuse Konarmia of not acting actively.

                    Prettiness is only on paper - the whole Konarmia is power, but in fact, if you look at the numbers, you can see that, in only three brigades of the 14th Division of Parkhomenko, which had 1500 sabers back in May, there were barely 500 sabers by this time , and instead of a full-fledged division, in essence, Parkhomenko led one tired and exhausted brigade. So stop repeating someone’s idle thoughts.
                    1. Albatroz
                      Albatroz 11 October 2019 06: 11
                      +3
                      Everything you wrote is understandable. This is also in the article. And far from a discovery.
                      the question is different.
                      as with my question: On July 11, did the Cavalry Army operate where, on the front or in the back of the Polish front? To understand the absurdity of your phrase
                      when the First Horse just left the fighting in Rivne
                      let's try to answer this question
                      1. Alexander Greene
                        Alexander Greene 11 October 2019 20: 01
                        0
                        Quote: Albatroz
                        To understand the absurdity of your phrase
                        when the First Horse just left the fighting in Rivne
                        let's try to answer this question


                        Will you find fault with my phrases?

                        Firstly, I do not see any absurdity in it - the Konarmeys took Exactly, the Poles retreated, the battles ended, the First Horse set another task that it was not able to carry out, because there was a great decline in personnel and horses, the fatigue of Konarmeys and horses. What's so ridiculous?

                        Secondly, I am not interested in discussing phrases. I have given you the real reasons why there was a delay in the advance of the Horse Army, you ignore them.

                        Therefore, I'm sorry, I have nothing more to discuss with you. You do not have enough objectivity to evaluate the actions of the Cavalry Army, to write that Budyonny's eyes widened, and because of this he did not continue the offensive. This is not even a fact - but stupidity.
                      2. Albatroz
                        Albatroz 11 October 2019 20: 05
                        +3
                        This is not to find fault with phrases.
                        This is a matter of principle. The answer to it indicates knowledge or ignorance of your environment. It is one thing when the spacecraft is pulled to the rear from the front to recover from a linear front. And another thing when it is in the enemy rear, and is obliged to act actively. And it will act - but to Lviv.
                        So don’t bother, it’s very important: tell me - on July 11, the Mounted Army operated where, describe the operational situation. Pliz)
                    2. andrew42
                      andrew42 29 November 2019 10: 48
                      +1
                      A very apt remark about the real number of combat-ready "sabers" in 1KA after Exactly and beyond. The fact that the Polish command, without any hesitation, threw the reinforced 18th division (in size one and a half divisions) in pursuit of the "whole" Cavalry Army, suggests that the actual strength of the 1KA at that time was no more than 2 times more, than the pursuers. Plus, the technical equipment of the 18th Polish division, guns, an exorbitant saturation with machine guns, constant ammunition. The Poles had no doubt that they would not be crushed. even if Budyonny piled up with the entire mass of 1KA, and Budyonny, realizing this, did not climb the machine guns. As a result, we have a purely Lyash boast: "one Polish division" stopped the red "cavalry army". Poles are worthy warriors, but they do not know the measures in bragging. Even the restraint of Artishevsky is surprising.
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