Military Review

Iranian "umbrella" defense requires urgent updates

Iranian "umbrella" defense requires urgent updates

After the fall of the Libyan regime and the physical destruction of its leader, all the attention of world media, experts and political scientists switched to a new object of Western interests - Iran.

American democracy, having dealt with yet another disagreeable government, continues to realize its growing oil appetites in South-West Asia, aiming at Iran. Painfully tidbit - this Iran! The country produces about 180 million tons of oil per year, more than half of which is exported. About 85% (!) Of foreign exchange earnings in the country's budget is provided through the sale of oil. In terms of proven oil reserves, Iran ranks fourth in the world. The country in terms of daily oil production (about four million barrels per day) is the second after Saudi Arabia among OPEC members.

The United States is actively pushing Israel, concerned about Tehran’s nuclear program, towards war with Iran. According to analysts, Tel Aviv can strike the first blow independently, secretly from Washington.

Iranian radars are easy targets for advanced detection and suppression.

However, the question of exactly when, with what forces a strike on Iran will be dealt, who will be part of the Western coalition, remains open. It is more or less clear only what the strategy of the attackers will be - it has already been well developed during previous conflicts. Obviously, the coalition group will achieve the objectives of the operation with air strikes during an air campaign lasting from several weeks to 2-3's months. Important targets will be hit several times with high precision. weapons. The primary targets for strikes will be plants for the production and processing of nuclear fuel, uranium mines, and facilities for its enrichment. Will get and refineries, other industrial centers.

But initially the problem of suppression (complete destruction) of the air defense system will be solved. The massive use of cruise missiles for various purposes, controlled aviation bombs will disable the command and control system of Iran, practically suppressed the system of reconnaissance and anti-aircraft missile fire. In this case, the task of the attacker will be the destruction in the first two or three days of up to 70-80% of the radar, and in the future - up to 90%. A firearm would also have to suffer a similar fate, but the air defense system will try to avoid such losses. The case will be completed by manned aircraft, which will begin bombing only after the complete suppression of the air defense system. The West protects its professional pilots, and it does not matter that the civilian population of Iran will suffer.

How will Iran respond to aggression? Will it be easy prey? Will the Iranian air defense be able to give a fitting rebuff to the aggressor? Let's try to figure it out.

In general, the Iranian armed forces represent a fairly serious force. They are equipped with modern weapons, staffed with a high level of training. Preparing for war, the country produces itself and purchases modern effective weapons abroad. Tanks, BMP, MLRS, tactical and ballistic missiles, artillery systems, aviation - there is everything for effective combat operations. Iran has rich experience in warfare. In the 80s of the last century (according to historical by standards, most recently - 25-30 years ago) Iran waged a fierce war with its closest neighbor - Iraq. In the war, all available types of weapons were used, including air defense forces and equipment. As part of the air defense groups were locators and fire systems manufactured in different countries, including Soviet ones. Iranian anti-aircraft gunners, along with others, were also trained by Soviet specialists. The defenders of the Iranian sky knew how to fight and did not forget how to do it.

By the way, Soviet specialists simultaneously assisted both parties at war then. The author of these lines happened to be present at the meeting of two schoolmates of the Poltava anti-aircraft school who recalled the lieutenant years and suddenly found out that at the same time they were fighting on different sides of the barricades against each other!


Today, there are more than 3000 fire units of anti-aircraft missile systems and systems, as well as anti-aircraft artillery in the combat strength of Iran’s anti-aircraft defense systems. Moreover, there are combat tools as outdated, but past modernization, and the most modern systems. The variety of types of reconnaissance assets, anti-aircraft weapons, operating on different physical principles, having a wide range of performance characteristics, allows us to build a fairly strong, reliable air defense system if properly used. It was not by chance that several years ago, in one of the interviews, a major Russian military leader, who himself headed a powerful air defense force, gave a very high assessment of the state of the Iranian air defense system, concluding that it was able to withstand an air strike from the United States.

Scheme of building elements of the air defense system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The quantitative and qualitative composition of the forces and means of air defense of Iran determines the principle of building an air defense system. Obviously, the zone-object principle that is most feasible and adequate to the conditions. Today, no country in the world can afford to build an air defense system capable of reliably, without failures in the affected areas, with a high density of impact on the air enemy to protect certain important objects, not to mention protecting the entire territory of the country. The most illustrative example in this sense was the GSVG air defense system in the early 90s of the last century. At that time, it was the most powerful, reliable system that had all the constituent elements: control, reconnaissance of the air enemy and notifications about it, fighter-air cover (IAP) and anti-aircraft missile (artillery) cover (SGAP).

The air defense system of the Islamic Republic has the 4 air defense region, which is very simplified in the diagram. In each area, consisting of air defense groups, there are all the necessary elements, including control systems, intelligence, IAP and SGAP. Strategically important objects in the west of the country, as well as on the coast of the Persian, Hormuz and Oman gulfs, are better protected from air strikes. In these zones, 5-7 air defense groups are being deployed to protect large cities, industrial areas, oil refineries, and nuclear fuel processing centers.

Virtually no anti-aircraft missile (artillery) cover the eastern territory of the country, bordering with Afghanistan and Pakistan, from which will also come the threat of an air attack.


The command and control system of the air defense forces is an integral part of the command and control system of the national armed forces. The SS was built according to the usual classical scheme, which unites the directorates and headquarters of districts, air defense groups, command posts (control posts) of anti-aircraft (artillery), radio engineering units and subdivisions that make up the air defense groups. The communication system is represented by channels of tropospheric, relay, shortwave radio communication. Widely used wired connection.

The data in the open press testifies to the presence in the control system of a number of problems requiring urgent solutions.

First, on the equipment of the CP (PU) there are obsolete automated control systems for the 60-80s of the last century, which are still Soviet, as well as Chinese and American. The equipment has been worn out for a long time, it has served several service lives. The element base has been serving for more than half a century, which, in the context of a shortage of spare parts, and often complete lack of it for a number of component parts, causes a lot of problems with maintaining machinery in good condition. The coefficient of technical readiness of ACS equipment with such terms and conditions of operation will not exceed the level of 0,3-0,4 in any army, even a very patriotic one.

Secondly, the ideology of the principles of solving management tasks implemented in the ACS, built on the ideas and technical capabilities of the last century, does not meet today's increased requirements. The volume of circulating information at all levels of the hierarchy in the control system has increased dramatically, the requirements for efficiency and quality of the tasks to be solved significantly when planning combat operations and especially when repelling air enemy attacks, as well as the level of automation of control processes.

In the conditions of short-term attacks of air attack weapons (EAS), the need for operational decision-making to conduct reconnaissance and fire with an extremely acute shortage of available time at PU (KP), the practical absence of modern integrated automatic control systems (CSAU) causes problems of effective use of sufficiently high potential fire capabilities of subordinate SAMs (ZRS). Virtually no elements of support systems for decisions taken at the PU (KP) in the course of the reflection of air strikes in the existing command and control system of Iran’s air defense forces. Meanwhile, in today's conditions of organizing and conducting short-term air combat, a high degree of automation of the processes of collecting, processing, transmitting and exchanging radar information (RI), making decisions to repel impacts and to conduct anti-aircraft missile fire is urgently needed.

Positions of anti-aircraft artillery around the Iranian nuclear center in Natanz.

Thirdly, the mountainous terrain has a significant negative impact on the capabilities of the SS. The deployment of a system of command posts should be carried out at commanding heights with minimal possibilities for selecting positional areas for PU (KP). The shielding effect of mountainous areas significantly reduces the range and reliability of radio, radio relay and tropospheric communication. The change of positional areas during the endangered period, and especially in wartime, will be difficult due to the difficulty of movement in the mountains, difficulties in choosing routes, problems with their engineering equipment, limited maneuver. Obviously, the operational equipment of the areas of the forthcoming hostilities must be carried out even in peacetime, carrying out engineering work, deploying backup communication channels, preparing nomination routes, practicing plans to bring troops into combat readiness, etc.

Finally, it must be clearly understood that the control and reconnaissance systems of the air enemy will be the primary targets of destruction with the onset of hostilities. All positional areas of PU (KP), communications centers, radar positions, peacetime frequencies have long been known to the enemy and are under the gun of his WTO. Under the conditions of intensive fire and electronic countermeasures, centralized management of areas and air defense groups will most likely be lost. Therefore, it is already necessary to work out variants of independent actions of anti-aircraft formations in the event of loss of control at all levels. For this purpose, detailed guidelines for firing and engagement should be worked out for them, providing for various options for reflecting EAS impacts, depending on the air situation.


The enemy air reconnaissance and warning system is represented by several components. An air attack early warning network has been created by means of reconnaissance on air carriers. A network of ground-based radars deployed to radar stations (RLP) has been deployed to receive and issue information on airborne radioactive signals for the system of an SRAP. Posts are deployed along the state border of the country in threatened directions. As part of the RLP there are radars of the old park of foreign production, mainly the USA and Great Britain. Consequently, it is certainly not necessary to count on the secrecy of the frequency range of peacetime and wartime, radar deployment sites. The existing RLP network created a radar field of reconnaissance of air targets at medium and high altitudes, which has a focal character. It is not necessary to speak about a continuous reconnaissance zone, about the multiplicity of overlapping of the detection zones due to the small number of radar stations. All existing radars are based on the principles of active location and are easy prey for modern means of detecting and suppressing electromagnetic energy emitters. For example, such a pride of the Iranian air defense system as the British AR-3D radar, which has a megawatt transmitter, will most likely be put out of action by the very first fire impact on it.

A few years ago, the author of these lines had the opportunity to visit one island state as a consultant, where, during the visit, local military leaders proudly demonstrated the capabilities of a powerful, unparalleled foreign-made radar. The station is deployed on the largest elevation, provides a radio-electronic situation in a radius of about 300 km, inspiring confidence to the air defense officers. However, when there were questions about the noise immunity of the radar, its ability to recognize classes and types of air targets, the use of special modes of operation (including secretive ones), instant electronic frequency tuning, prospects for changing positions, organizing the fight against sabotage groups, etc. ., the enthusiasm of the owners immediately dried up somehow.

An important indicator of the effectiveness of the airspace reconnaissance system (SRVP) is the required carry-over of the radar field. The existing composition of the RLP in the air defense units of Iran, taking into account the reconnaissance capabilities of the radar equipment, is provided with the required offset only at altitudes above 3000 m in certain areas. The low degree of automation of the collection, processing and transfer of radar data in combination with the main (tablet) way of displaying the air situation leads to an unacceptably long delay time for warning of an air enemy reaching 4-6 minutes.

In such conditions, the task of detecting airborne attack systems at low and extremely low altitudes will have to be assigned to reconnaissance systems of anti-aircraft formations, which, in turn, will inevitably lead to the enemy’s premature opening of the air defense system and its suppression.

Hawk air defense missile systems and their upgraded versions of local-made Mersad are the most numerous Iranian air defense systems.

Thus, despite the rather high potential capabilities of enemy air reconnaissance forces and means, a number of problems of a technical and organizational nature are manifested in the air defense system of the Islamic Republic.

First of all, it is necessary to unite the Air Force, Navy, Ground Forces, border units, and civilian air forces in a comprehensive system of intelligence fleet, other departments. Moreover, the association should be implemented on the basis of a modern KSAU model, capable of automated collection, processing (identification) of large-scale radar data, ensuring its quick exchange between sources and consumers in the interests of timely bringing troops ready to repel aggression, as well as to provide accurate coordinates fire defense systems. This should be done as far as possible within the air defense zone and is mandatory for the air defense group, especially in missile-hazardous (threatened) directions. An example of such a KSAU can be a modernized version of the ACS "Polyana-D4M1" available in the air defense of the NE of Russia, which is a complex of automated control systems for military operations of a mixed air defense group. The hardware and software of this KSAU allow the collection, processing of radar information and notification of air and ground conditions; to manage the forces and means of mixed air defense groups; ensure the safety of flights of their aircraft; to develop recommendations for the management of subordinate units and units and to maintain interaction with them through automated target allocation and target designation. The complex is capable of processing and tracking at the same time up to 255 air targets.

Undoubtedly, there is an urgent need to update the radar fleet, equipping it with modern locators operating in different frequency ranges, having in their arsenal a set of special operating modes for use in conditions of intensive electronic countermeasures of the enemy. For the detection of modern EAS, made by technology "Stealth", need locators operating in the meter wave range. In this sense, the Sky-SVU type radar developed in Russia is capable of detecting and tracking airborne targets with EPR near 1 m 2 at altitudes 500 m to 65 km, at altitudes 20000 m - at ranges to 380 km. The deployment time of the radar position is about 20 minutes.

It is also important to carry out a set of the following measures to ensure the survival of elements of an SRVP: frequent change of position of the radar station, communications equipment; Deploying a system of false positions with imitation of the work of radio-electronic equipment; high-quality engineering equipment positions; widespread use of passive reflector-traps, simulators of thermal radiation; deployment near the RLP fire defense weapons; organization of protection against sabotage groups, etc.

The intelligence system must be supplemented with a network of visual observation posts, which is effective in detecting low-flying targets. A network of POS deployed at dominant heights, equipped with means of visual observation, communication and data transmission, will allow to solve a number of problems of the SSRA.

As is known, any radio-electronic means (RES) with the beginning of work on the air in a short period of time is detected by the enemy, its frequency characteristics are opened with subsequent fire or radio-electronic effects. Therefore, in recent years, passive (non-radiating) location complexes have been actively developed. An example of such a system is the Russian complex of electronic reconnaissance (CRTD), which has good performance indicators - long detection ranges of aerial targets and high accuracy of issuing target coordinates for anti-aircraft complexes (course of the target, removal, flight altitude). In addition, the CRTR is able to determine, with high probability, its belonging, type, class, etc., by the radiation parameters of an aircraft's electronic RES. According to information available in open sources, such a complex in single copies has already been acquired by Iran. With a sufficient number of KRTR samples, the reconnaissance system will be able to covertly provide the air defense system with accurate information about the air attack of the enemy on threatened directions from distances of about 400 km, which will make it possible to promptly alert the troops to repel air strikes and issue accurate targets to the air defense weapons.

Typical structures of Iranian air defense groups.


The anti-aircraft missile (artillery) cover system is represented by air defense groups, which are based on anti-aircraft battalions. Depending on the type of armament, its configuration, the divisions distinguish between anti-aircraft, anti-aircraft, rocket-artillery, or anti-aircraft artillery divisions.

The formation of divisions is based on the principle of mixed acquisition of weapons systems, which provides a number of advantages over homogeneous ones. Mixed air defense groups, equipped with air defense missile systems with different principles of operation, a wide range of frequency characteristics, having different fire capabilities, mutually complement each other, compensating for their weaknesses, provide greater efficiency in repelling EAS attacks.

The group has a radar post, issuing target coordinates to firing equipment, as well as several mixed divisions. As a rule, one of the airfields is armed with long-range air defense systems (such as C-200, C-75), one - medium-range (such as Hawk, "Kvadrat"), zradn with a short-range anti-aircraft complex (like Rapier) and anti-aircraft artillery systems ZU-23-2, ZSU-23-4, C-60, Oerlikon.

Such recruitment ensures the complete autonomy of the combat operations of the air defense groups and allows the creation of a layered system of anti-aircraft missile and anti-aircraft artillery fire. At the same time, the presence of various anti-aircraft weapons in a group makes it possible to create a system of fire, echeloned in depth, height, to ensure the continuity of fire impact on aerial targets as they approach the concealed objects. In addition, with this formation of groups, the mutual protection of air defense systems is best realized, a non-lethal zone of destruction is created with a cover for the “dead” air defense system funnels.

An important characteristic of a fire system is the density of fire effects on an air target using anti-aircraft weapons. In physical terms, this value is close to the number of damaging fire effects. When calculating it, the parameters of the affected area (shelling) ZRK (ZAK), the values ​​of probabilities of hitting various types of targets in certain conditions, temporary indicators of combat work, etc. are taken into account. Parameters of the zones of defeat (shelling) of the main types of ZRK (ZAK) that are contained in air defense groups are presented in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1. Parameters of the affected areas (fire) of the main types of air defense missile systems (ZAK).

Despite the high (as it seems at first glance) fire capabilities of the C-200 air defense missile systems (large values ​​of the far border and the height of the affected area), one should not expect a decisive contribution to the effectiveness of the fight against airborne shock weapons. C-200 - outdated complex with low noise immunity and technical readiness. The ideology of its construction originates in the middle of the last century and does not meet today's requirements. The need for continuous operation of the RES complex with airing, the absence of special covert modes of operation makes it very vulnerable. A very limited number of air defense missiles of this type do not allow to create at least some kind of anti-aircraft rocket fire in threatened areas. Within its zone of destruction, C-200 will conduct air combat without organizing fire engagement, mutual cover, and concentration of fire.

The near border of the C-200 area of ​​magnitude up to 17 km causes the need to organize its self-defense. Similar problems are characteristic of the complex.

C-75, besides, the parameters of its affected area are much inferior to the AMS

C-200. The low maneuverability of both air defense missile systems makes it difficult for them to change their starting positions in combat operations in time. At the 20-25 km range, the ZRAP system is complemented by Hawk and Kvadrat attack zones. These air defense systems are more mobile, maneuverable. With their number in threatened areas to protect important area objects, it is possible to create a system of fire with a multiplicity of overlap up to 2-3 at low and medium altitudes. This will make it possible to concentrate fire on important targets, provide mutual cover, interact when escorting targets, etc.

At low and extremely low altitudes from the 10-12 km ranges, the HQ-7 (FM-80) and the Tor-М1 systems are included in the ZRAP system. In the near zone, objects will be covered with anti-aircraft artillery and MANPADS. At the same time, at low and extremely low altitudes, the density of anti-aircraft fire can approach 4-6, which will allow to achieve the required effectiveness of repelling EAS impacts. In addition, the tasks of directly covering the groups of troops on the battlefield will be performed by numerous units of Strela-2 (3), Igla-1, and other MANPADS, which are located in the regular structures of the ground forces. Unfortunately, all systems in the ZRAP system (except the Tor-М1 air defense system) have an extremely low probability of hitting small-sized low-flying targets: cruise missiles, UAB, UR, UAV, etc. It is extremely difficult for these systems to deal with combat helicopters from - because of their short time in the affected areas (shelling).

An important condition for the effective functioning of the SRAP system is to ensure its survivability in the course of repelling EAS attacks. This is achieved by a periodic change of positions, as well as their immediate change after launching the anti-aircraft missiles (firing anti-aircraft shells), engineering equipment of launching (firing) positions, masking, false positions equipment, imitating the operation of radio-electronic devices at frequencies of the ZRK transmitters (ZRS), using passive corner reflectors and others

Iranian 35-mm Oerlikon.

Thus, the existing quantitative and qualitative composition of air defense forces and weapons may create a fragmentary SCRA system at certain dangerous directions with its separation in depth, altitude, and directions, ensuring the required multiplicity of fire exposure for individual types of airborne explosives. However, the creation of a strong effective scoring system to cover the entire set of important objects, including troops on the battlefield, from strikes technically and informationally superior to the enemy's air is very problematic due to the specified reasons.

A particular weakness of the ZRAP system is its acquisition of obsolete SAMs and ZAK. Technique with a service life of three to four decades predetermines similar problems (as well as with ACS) in maintaining combat readiness at the required level. In the absence of supplies of spare parts, a practically depleted spare parts supply, a “barbarous” method of restoring weapons and military equipment is often used by disassembling combat-ready similar samples.


So, on closer examination of the capabilities of the Iranian air defense system, a host of problems are revealed revealing its current inability to give a proper rebuff to the air enemy. It is necessary to carry out a set of urgent measures for the technical equipment of all components of the air defense system, including the purchase of modern systems of automated control systems, radar, KSAU, electronic warfare, communications, development of its own production of models of weapons and military equipment using modern technologies. The purchase of three dozen Tor-M1 combat vehicles will not solve the problem of re-equipping the Iranian air defense system with new weapons.

To create a deeply echeloned SRAP system with multiple overlap of affected areas, it is necessary to have a combination of anti-aircraft weapons: long range - C-XNUMPPMU (C-300CB), medium-range - Buk-M300 (М1) type, short-range - Tor-like М2 (М1) ”,“ Armor-S ”.

An important direction of strengthening the air defense system could be equipping the Iranian armed forces with EW systems made in Russia. The complex of electronic warfare systems is capable of significantly reducing the capabilities of strike aircraft for searching, detecting and hitting ground targets during the “contactless” impact on the airborne inflow zone; disrupt the onboard equipment of cruise missiles in the GPS satellite navigation system; to distort the readings of the radio-altimeters of strike aviation, cruise missiles and UAVs (which makes it very difficult to fly over the mountainous terrain); lead to failure during the flight of the entire complex of electronic equipment of the aircraft.

The quad ZU-23-2 is designed to combat cruise missiles.

With the available EW facilities, it is possible not only to “blind” the aircraft radar, but to distort the radio-electronic environment, generate false targets, distort the coordinates of true targets, enter coordinate errors, etc.

There is also a lot of developments for the modernization of anti-aircraft artillery, which is very effective in combating low-flying air targets (combat helicopters, attack aircraft, low-speed cruise missiles). The improvement of the antiaircraft defense system is carried out along the lines of increasing the effectiveness of firing, automating the processes of preparing and firing, developing guided ammunition, sensors for undermining a projectile in the target area, and controlling the rate of fire. Work in this direction in Iran is underway.

PS All data on the combat composition of military groups, the quantitative characteristics of the combat capabilities are borrowed from the materials of the open press.
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  1. Yarbay
    Yarbay 13 July 2012 07: 59 New
    *** So, upon closer examination of the capabilities of Iran’s air defense system, a lot of problems are revealed that testify to its current inability to repulse an air adversary. ** - objective opinion!
    *** To create a deeply echeloned ZRAP system with multiple overlapping of the affected areas, it is necessary to have a combination of anti-aircraft weapons: long-range - like S-300PMU (S-300SV), medium-range - like “Buk-M1 (M2)”, short-range - like “Tor-M1 (M2)”, “Shell-S.” *** - good advice, professional!
    Thanks to the author for the article!
    1. Insurgent
      Insurgent 13 July 2012 08: 37 New
      We must also have prepared calculations, because without trained personnel and the S-400 will be useless iron
      1. VAF
        VAF 13 July 2012 10: 41 New
        Quote: Insurgent
        It is necessary to have prepared calculations

        I dare to assure you that the Iranians have learned the lessons learned during the Iran-Iraq war, therefore they take seriously the issues of training and especially the questions of the combat readiness of their air defense forces and means, +!

        S-200VE anti-aircraft missile system

        The largest range of target destruction of all anti-aircraft systems in Iran has the S-200VE Vega-E system, which was delivered from our country in the early 1990s.

        The system includes system-wide tools, a technical division, AKIPS and several firing channels (anti-aircraft missile divisions), each of which consists of a target illumination radar, 6 launchers (launchers), transport-loading vehicles (TZM), etc.

        An analysis of available satellite images in recent years shows that the S-200VE anti-aircraft missile divisions delivered to Iran were dispersed in 5-7 positions, covering the main protected areas of the country.

        Unlike the standard positions of the S-200 divisions, in Iran they usually do not consist of six launchers, but only two PU 5P72VE for one 5N62VE target illumination radar.

        S-200 position near Bandar Abbas in a satellite image of Google Earth

        Launcher 5P72VE ZRS S-200

        These air defense systems were created to deal with bombers, AWACS aircraft, etc. targets and S-200VE and now pose a threat to enemy aircraft, especially Iran in recent years also reported on the implementation of their modernization.

        True, they can be effective only in case of any short-term conflicts with neighbors.
        Otherwise, they will most likely be soon suppressed, since the positions of the S-200 are known, few and very conditionally mobile, since their folding / deployment takes up to a day.

        The launch of the S-200VE air defense missile launcher during the exercises in 2012, after the "optimization" of the system in Iran in 2008.

        Anti-aircraft guided missile V-880E

        Characteristics ^

        Long-range transported anti-aircraft missile system
        Target hit range: from 7 to 240 km.
        The height of the destruction of targets: from 0,3 to 40 km.
        Speed ​​of hit targets: up to 1200 m / s
        Number of channels by target: 1
        The number of channels on the rocket: 2
        Warhead anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM): high-explosive fragmentation, weighing 217 kg.

        SAM missile guidance system: Semi-active homing (missile is independently aimed at the radar signal generated by the SAM radar reflected by the target)
        1. Insurgent
          Insurgent 14 July 2012 08: 35 New
          Much time has already passed and Iraq is a backward country in every war. Previous experience does not help us. An advanced country. And it will be very difficult to resist it. Iran will need the last 300 modifications so that stealth planes do not feel at home
      2. PSih2097
        PSih2097 13 July 2012 20: 28 New
        We must also have prepared calculations, because without trained personnel and the S-400 will be useless iron

        I don’t think that the S-400 is very different from the S-300, but a friend (colonel in the air defense of the Russian Federation’s defense) said bluntly - if you know the computer, you will learn in a couple of weeks, but you’ll just be a user and the warrior can also repair air defense systems , the benefit of block electronics.
        1. Insurgent
          Insurgent 14 July 2012 23: 44 New
          S-300s of the 70s, the development of S-400s of the 90s and you want to say that the difference is minimal.
    2. VAF
      VAF 13 July 2012 10: 21 New
      Quote: Yarbay
      Thanks to the author for the article!

      Dear Alikbek, I agree with you completely, the author is big +!

      It is felt that her specialist in his field wrote, who noted all the positive and negative points in the Iranian air defense system, but didn’t really like that the author for some reason considered the confrontation purely air defense, without taking into account all components of the armed forces of Iran and I believe that this is not very correct, because:
      1. Iran’s availability of combat-ready Navy (ships and submarine fleet), as well as the possibility of closing and blocking water areas washing Iran, impede:
      - carrying out all types of RTR and opening the air defense systems.
      - push the launch lines of the air and sea-based KR.

      2. Iran’s presence of operational, tactical and operational-tactical missiles and the possibility of delivering an air strike against the alliance’s airbases jeopardizes the general implementation of airstrikes (with proper b / D planning).

      Now I will allow myself the courage to express my thoughts on this subject, so as to at least not “brighten up” the gloomy picture described by the author in my article:

      Iran has a sufficiently large number of anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) of American, British, Soviet / Russian and Chinese production, as well as their copies and modifications of its own Iranian production.

      However, a serious problem is the lack of modern air defense systems and especially long-range systems.

      Of course, far from all the positions of air defense systems can be easily found on maps from Google, especially for small systems, and such information is often outdated, since satellite images of many areas have not been updated for years.
      However, this still gives an approximate general idea of ​​the air defense system.

      So :
      - The known active positions of S-200 are highlighted in purple color,
      - Orange - I-Hawk \ Mersad,
      - Red - HQ-2J \ Sayyad,
      - Green - “Square” and “Tor-M1”,
      -Circles around positions - this is the approximate radius of action of these air defense systems,
      - Blue highlighted known individual radar.

      As you can see, the well-known air defense systems are mainly focused on protecting several of the most important cities and facilities, such as the largest cities - Tehran and Isfahan, the main naval base in Bandar Abbas, the uranium enrichment center in Natanz and the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

      And how is it not difficult to notice the map I presented has significant differences from the map that the author presented in his article, maybe because the one I presented is more recent?
      1. Yarbay
        Yarbay 13 July 2012 10: 41 New
        Dear Sergey!!
        1.. About the point one very much doubt it!
        Although you probably have a better understanding and I have never seen you make a mistake in your ratings!
        2. *** Iran has a sufficiently large number of anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) of American, British, Soviet / Russian and Chinese production, as well as their copies and modifications of its own Iranian production. *** - I think enough to cause serious damage to the enemy in the face of NATO, for example, but not enough mine to win and for the enemy to abandon the ideas of armed intervention!
        3. The card surprised, it’s not so bad on it !!
        Do you know if Iran has * chain mail * ??
        1. VAF
          VAF 13 July 2012 14: 35 New
          Quote: Yarbay
          1.. About the point one very much doubt it!

          Dear Alikbek in vain, but let's see ... we will not run into the papavos, +! drinks

          Quote: Yarbay
          but not enough mine for victory and for the enemy to abandon the ideas of armed intervention!

          And in my opinion more than that, especially since almost everything is ours !!!

          Quote: Yarbay
          3. The card surprised, it’s not so bad on it !!

          Because it is more than real and corresponds to 2012.

          Quote: Yarbay
          Do you know if Iran has * chain mail * ??

          How would I say this ... more correct, perhaps .... but ... not quite in the know !!! bully

          And so we continue, and the toy on Farnborough and the F-35th was distracted:

          In service with the air defense units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran are several anti-aircraft missile batteries 9K12E "Square".

          The Kvadrat air defense system is an export modification of the Soviet Cube air defense system.

          Where Iran got them from, I still couldn’t find out exactly one of the most probable assumptions that these were trophies since the Iran-Iraq war, but there are also versions that Iran acquired them in the early 1990s in Romania, Syria, etc.
          It is possible that Iran received part of the complexes as trophies in the war, and then bought it somewhere else.

          The anti-aircraft missile battery of this complex consists of 1 self-propelled reconnaissance and guidance unit, 4 self-propelled launchers with three SAMs on each, as well as transport-loading vehicles.

          These air defense systems were created as a means of military air defense, and these systems actually appear on frames from the IRGC military exercises, but in Iran they are also used to strengthen air defense of the most important objects.

          So with the help of Google Earth in the area of ​​Natanzsky processing plant, you can find three prepared positions with the air defense system "Square".

          The position of the anti-aircraft missile battery SAM "Square" in the area of ​​Natanz

          Self-propelled installation of reconnaissance and guidance 1C91

          2P25 self-propelled launcher with 3M9 missiles

          SURN and SPU together

          Characteristics Cube M3 with 3M9M3 SAM

          Short-range self-propelled anti-aircraft missile system

          Target hit range: from 4 to 25 km.
          The height of the destruction of targets: from 0,02 to 14 km.
          Anti-aircraft guided missile (SAM) warhead: high-explosive fragmentation, 57 kg.
          Speed ​​of hit targets: up to 600 m \ s
          Number of channels by target: 1
          The number of channels on the rocket: 2-3
          SAM missile guidance system: Semi-active homing (missile is independently aimed at the radar signal generated by the SAM radar reflected by the target)
          Collapse / deploy time: 5 minutes

          In 2005, the Granit enterprise of the Almaz-Antey air defense concern officially announced that it had begun work on modernizing the Square air defense system in Iran.
          What exactly was modernized and to what level remained unknown.

          According to some reports, during this modernization, Iranian "Squares" could receive new 9M317E missiles.

          With these missiles, the range of destruction of targets of the Kvadrat air defense system increases to 42 km, the height to 22 km, and the speed of the attacked targets increases to 1200 m / s.
          However, I could not find evidence of the presence of these missiles in Iran, even in photographs of recent years ..

          Launch of the Kvadrat SAM system at the IRGC exercises in eastern Iran in early 2012

    3. PSih2097
      PSih2097 13 July 2012 20: 19 New
      So, upon closer examination of the capabilities of Iran’s air defense system, a lot of problems are revealed.

      You have what kind of problem, the north of Iran is promised to your leadership by the Americans ... You need to be afraid of the IRGC fighters ... IMHO
      The S-200, which is the “Dvina,” has been upgraded to the S-300 PMU (which is sour for the aggressor), and we don’t know what China has set (and he wanted to cheat on all taboos and moratoria).
  2. Fidain
    Fidain 13 July 2012 08: 14 New
    Sudya po karte u Irana seryoznie breshi v vozdushnoi oborone, prosto neobxodimo Iranu shas S-300,400 (vsyo chto smogut kupit) i srazu neskolko devizionov, a to porvut etu oboronu kak <tuzik grelku>.
    1. VAF
      VAF 13 July 2012 10: 56 New
      Quote: Fidain
      Sudya po karte u Irana seryoznie breshi v vozdushnoi oborone

      Look carefully at the map presented by me and you will see that there are fewer gaps, as you put it, and there is overlap almost everywhere, you also do not take into account the positions of the MZA and MANPADS, which the Iranians have quite a lot of! +!

      Anti-aircraft missile system HQ-2J \ Sayyad

      HQ-2 is a modernized version of the S-75 SAM, produced in several versions in the PRC from the late 1960s to the early 1990s.

      According to SIPRI, Iran received 14 HQ-2J complexes in the mid-1980s and early 1990s.
      Most likely, these data are close to the truth, since now satellite images find more than a dozen empty and 7 active positions of HQ-2J air defense batteries, which usually do not differ from the standard ones and consist of 6 launchers, 1 missile guidance station, and transport-loading vehicles etc.

      HQ-2J air defense missile battery position near Tehran

      It is believed that the HQ-2J is a cheaper conventional transportable version of the self-propelled modification of the HQ-2B SAM.
      During their development, the security of the radio channel was increased, the radius of destruction during the explosion of the warhead was increased, the accuracy and reliability of the control system were increased, a new optoelectronic target detection and tracking system was installed, an improved radar station, etc.

      SAM launcher HQ-2J

      HQ-2J air defense missile guidance station

      Characteristics HQ-2J
      Medium-range transported anti-aircraft missile system
      Target hit range: from 7 to 34 km.
      The height of the destruction of targets: from 0,5 to 27 km.
      Missile guidance system: radio command, according to data received from the missile guidance station.

      Since the HQ-2J at the time of purchase was an aging complex, the complexes themselves in Iran obviously decided not to copy, but they began a program to modernize them and localized the production of missiles for them.

      In the late 1990s, Iran introduced new missiles, known as Sayyad-1 and Sayyad-1A, the last of which, according to official data, has an infrared homing system.

      Sayyad 1 (A) SAM warhead: high-explosive fragmentation, weighing 195 kg.
      Maximum speed SAM Sayyad 1 (A): 1200 m / s

      SAM Sayyad-1 at the exhibition of products of the Iranian military-industrial complex in Tehran in 2009

      Sayyad-1 at the armament display for the public

      In the spring of 2011, it was announced that Iran’s air defense units received new Sayyad-2 anti-aircraft missiles, and other parts of the complex were likely to be modernized.

      Unfortunately, no exact specifications about Sayyad-2 were reported.

      In any case, the effectiveness of such systems in the event of a major war is small, because the positions of these air defense systems are small and they can be easily detected, and just folding the HQ-2 battery in one position and deploying it to another will take several hours at best.

      The fact that these air defense systems are still being modernized and remain in operation is a clear consequence of the lack of modern air defense systems and the fear of possible single strikes on covered stationary objects.

      Presumably the launch of the Sayyad-2 anti-aircraft guided missile in April 2011.

  3. Insurgent
    Insurgent 13 July 2012 08: 35 New
    Despite the high (as it seems at first glance) firing capabilities of the S-200 air defense system (large values ​​of the long border and the height of the affected area), a decisive contribution to the effectiveness of the anti-aircraft missile defense should not be expected from this complex. S-200 is an outdated complex with a low level of noise immunity and technical readiness. The ideology of its construction originates in the middle of the last century and does not meet today's requirements. The need for continuous operation of the RES of the complex with broadcasting, the absence of special secretive modes of operation makes it very vulnerable. A very limited number of air defense systems of this type does not allow creating at least some density of anti-aircraft missile fire in threatened directions. Within its area of ​​destruction, the S-200 will conduct an air defense without organizing fire interaction, mutual cover, and concentration of fire. in Belarus, these complexes are on the Tetrahedron they were modernized to a modern level, a zone of defeat of 300 km all kinds of tankers will be a good target
    1. VAF
      VAF 13 July 2012 11: 15 New
      Quote: Insurgent
      Despite the high (as it seems at first glance) firing capabilities of the S-200 air defense system (large values ​​of the distant border and the height of the affected area), one should not expect a decisive contribution to the effectiveness of the anti-aircraft missile defense. S-200 is an outdated complex with a low level of noise immunity and technical readiness.

      I agree, pus with a competent approach and skillful use, this complex can still serve a good service, +!

      Improved Hawk \ Mersad anti-aircraft missile systems

      The main SAM in the Iranian armed forces remain the American MIM-23B Improved Hawk and their Iranian version, released under the name Mersad.

      In the 1970s Iran has purchased more than three dozen batteries of the Improved Hawk (I-Hawk) air defense system, which formed the basis of the Iranian air defense during the Iran-Iraq war.
      The active use of these air defense systems in the war, despite the fact that Iran’s ties with the United States were broken after the revolution, already by the mid-1980s led to the fact that a significant part of the systems had failed, and stocks of anti-aircraft missiles to them were not replenished.
      As a result of the well-known scandalous case of Iran-Contras, Iran was able to get in 1985-86. few rockets and spare parts, but this was still not enough.
      The consequence of these problems was the decision to develop and create their own production of missiles and spare parts for these air defense systems, which ultimately led to the possibility of copying them.

      I-Hawk air defense systems during the Iran-Iraq war, in the foreground one of the M192 launchers with three MIM-23B SAMs, in the background are the pulsed target radar AN / MPQ-50 and the target radar AN / MPQ-46

      Transport and loading vehicle M-501E3 and SAM MIM-23B SAM I-Hawk

      I-Hawk anti-aircraft guided missile launch

      One of the oldest Iranian experiments on installing I-Hawk air defense system elements on self-propelled platforms

      Characteristics SAM "Advanced Hawk"

      Medium-range towed anti-aircraft missile system

      Target hit range: from 1 to 40 km.
      The height of the destruction of targets: from 0,06 to 18 km.
      Anti-aircraft guided missile (SAM) warhead: high-explosive fragmentation, 74 kg.
      Maximum SAM speed: 2,5M (approximately 850 m / s)
      SAM missile guidance system: Semi-active homing (missile is independently aimed at the radar signal generated by the SAM radar reflected by the target)

      The result of lengthy work on copying and upgrading elements of the Advanced Hawk air defense system was the development and start of production of its modernized version - the Iranian air defense system known as Mersad.

      One of the most noticeable differences was the emergence of an optoelectronic detection and tracking system.

      SAM Mersad: In the foreground radar target designation at low altitudes, in the background radar illumination and guidance with an optical-electronic sight.

      SAM Mersad: Pulse radar target designation at medium and high altitudes

      SAM Mersad: PU with Shahin missiles

      SAM Mersad: Inside the control center

      "Shahin" and "Shalamcha".
      The main difference between the Shahin missile launcher is a longer range than conventional missiles, although it is not known how much it is.

      About Shahin missiles became known three years ago, from the characteristics it was reported that its range is "more than 40 km"

      In autumn 2011, it became known that new missiles called Shalamcheh were delivered for the Mersad air defense system, its characteristics approximately correspond to those of standard MIM-23B \ C missiles, only the speed is slightly higher (= 2,7M).

      The main difference between Shalamcheh missiles and previous Iranian missiles for the I-Hawk \ Mersad air defense system seems to be the new GOS, which is consistent with the words of the Iranian Minister of Defense, who stated that the new missile has high ability to detect and intercept targets and is resistant to electronic warfare.

      Radar GSN missile Shalamcheh

      The total number of batteries of these air defense systems available to Iran now is difficult to estimate, taking into account, on the one hand, losses during the war years, etc., and on the other hand, the presence of our own production.

      At least 23 active positions of the Advanced Hawk / Mersad air defense system, usually consisting of a battery (two platoons of 3 launchers) or one platoon of 3 launchers, are also found on satellite images of Google Earth in Iran in Iran. There is also a significant number of empty positions.

      However, they can be much larger, the elements of the complexes are not very large in size and they are easier to mask and more difficult to detect than the S-200 or HQ-2.

      Not for nothing that the name of the Iranian version of the air defense system is "Mersad", in translation it means "Ambush."

      The position of the anti-aircraft missile battery of the I-Hawk or Mersad air defense system in two platoons of 3 launchers near Bushehr

      Another indisputable advantage of the "Hawk" \ "Mersad" air defense system is their greater mobility than the previous air defense systems, which were discussed here.

      So the deployment time of the Hawk battery from the traveling position to the combat one is 45 minutes, and the coagulation time is 30 minutes, which is several times less than the previous air defense systems that were discussed here.

      Yes, and the complexes themselves, although not self-propelled, but they can be easily towed to another place.

      Thus, coupled with the modernization of systems and the presence of a large number of complexes, this allows Iran to continue to rely on the Hawk \ Mersad air defense system as the basis for air defense in the absence of more modern air defense systems of this class.
  4. Sars
    Sars 13 July 2012 08: 47 New
    Let's throw off the Iranians on the S-400!
    1. sovereign2704
      sovereign2704 13 July 2012 09: 23 New
      how much have you already handed over? laughing
  5. Tirpitz
    Tirpitz 13 July 2012 09: 40 New
    I recently wrote here that during an attack, Iran will go blind during the first hours of the war, and here is an article about it. anti-aircraft artillery do not fight much.
    1. VAF
      VAF 13 July 2012 14: 41 New
      Quote: Tirpitz
      I recently wrote here that during an attack, Iran will go blind during the first hours of the war,

      Well, this is you dear sighted, +!

      Tor-M1 anti-aircraft missile system

      At the moment, the most modern air defense systems of the Iranian armed yachts are the Russian Tor-M1 air defense systems.
      Under a 2005 contract, Russia delivered 29 Tor-M1 short-range air defense systems to Iran, which became part of the KSIR air defense units.
      The main unit of the complex is a combat vehicle, which combines a launcher with ammunition in 8 missiles, a target and guidance detection station, a television optical sight, etc.

      Thus, a combat vehicle, even alone, is capable of conducting hostilities.
      The structure of the anti-aircraft missile battery includes four combat vehicles, a unified battery command post and technical support and maintenance facilities.
      It is often mentioned that part of the complexes acquired by Iran are wheeled "Tor-M1T" in a car with a trailer.
      Perhaps it is, but in all the videos and photographs I watched of the Iranian Tori that I watched, I could not find any such cars.

      Fighting vehicle 9A331-1 SAM "Tor-M1"

      The launch of the 9M331 missile launcher "Tor-M1" during exercises in eastern Iran at the beginning of 2012

      As in the case of the Kvadrat air defense system, part of the Tor-M1 complexes is aimed at protecting the Natanz concentrator, near which in satellite images you can find 5 prepared positions for the Tor-M1 air defense system.

      The position of the air defense system "Tor-M1" near Natanz


      Short-range self-propelled anti-aircraft missile system

      Range of defeat: from 1 to 12 km.
      The height of the lesion: from 0,01 to 10 km.
      Anti-aircraft guided missile (SAM) warhead: high-explosive fragmentation, 14,85 kg.
      Speed ​​of hit targets: up to 700 m \ s
      Number of Target Channels: 2
      SAM system: radio command, according to data received from the combat vehicle.
      Coagulation / deployment time: 3 minutes

      Although Tor-M1 is without a doubt the best SAMs in Iran and has very high mobility, noise immunity, etc., we must not forget that these are still short-range systems with short range targets and incapable of attacking targets at high altitudes.
  6. Ragnarov
    Ragnarov 13 July 2012 10: 04 New
    No one will tell: Russia joined the Iranian imbargo? In terms of refusing to supply defensive weapons?
    1. Rikoshet
      Rikoshet 13 July 2012 14: 03 New
      Russia is always ready to betray anyone, and to join any embargo, so don’t feed it with bread
      1. alexdol
        alexdol 13 July 2012 22: 10 New
        Rikoshet (1) AU Russia is always ready to betray anyone ...
        Russia has never betrayed anyone, and what you are talking about refers exclusively to the "pro-Jewish" authorities, to this fifth column! For the same reason, there is a "slip" with the adoption of decisions on the supply of weapons and eternal look to the west! It is enough to take a closer look at what the so-called Russian government is and at once everything will be clear. The same thing is observed in Ukraine - more than 50 percent of the Verkhovna Rada - the "Jews"! Let us ask a simple question - whose is the Supreme Council? I have already written several times, as soon as in RUSSIA there is a genuine RUSSIAN authority all these questions will disappear, and everything will fall into place! Hurry this would happen !!!
    2. Andrey77
      Andrey77 17 July 2012 13: 56 New
      I have not heard about the embargo, but Iran is not my ally! The Yankees will bomb him - rightly so. I am Orthodox, therefore I approve of the crusade against Iran. God is with us!
      1. Alexander Romanov
        Alexander Romanov 17 July 2012 14: 22 New
        Quote: Andrey77
        but Iran is not my ally! The Yankees will bomb him - rightly so. I am Orthodox, therefore I approve of the crusade against Iran. God with us!

        Not one Orthodox will not participate in the Crusades! And especially to approve it. Behind every bombing are the lives of innocent people.
        Quote: Andrey77
        God with us!
        It was written on the buckles of Hitler’s soldiers. You are as Orthodox as the NATO peacekeeper. Bold minus !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
  7. UzRus
    UzRus 13 July 2012 10: 26 New
    Yes, the passivity of the Iranian leadership regarding modernization of its air defense is somewhat incomprehensible. After all, you can see with the naked eye how the USA and Israel behave and what they say in relation to Iran. One gets the impression that the Iranians either do not know about the state of air defense, or have believed in their invulnerability. And judging by the article - serious problems.
    PS And in the first photo, doesn’t Thor shoot by accident?
  8. gregor6549
    gregor6549 13 July 2012 11: 58 New
    The first picture is really Thor.

    As for the American air defense systems that Iran has, they usually export to such countries as Iran their systems with built-in "sleeping bugs" that "wake up" at the most interesting moment, regardless of the desire of the buyer.
    In addition, who but the Americans should know how to suppress their own systems.
    The same applies to systems supplied by other NATO countries.
    As for systems such as Tor, their damage zone is relatively small and the presence of missiles and targeting radars on the launcher makes this launcher a very tasty morsel for anti-radar missiles. (please do not mention the flicker mode and other ancient things. In Vietnam, they still worked somehow, but not now).
    ACS of air defense allowing minimizing the operating time of these radars and independent from the "foreign bugs" apparently also does not take place. Shilka-type shooters remain with their "eyes" pointing if this eye is not knocked out before ...
    So it turns out that there are a lot of “shooters” and there can be little sense from them. If at all there will be any sense.

    As for the deliveries of С400 to Iran, the idea is certainly interesting, but they are good if they work in the system (which is not there)

    Moreover, then Russia would not have to fight with its own С400. After all, the Persians, declaring their determination to fight “insidious Zionism,” also look at the tidbits of the Caspian and because of old grievances they have a grudge against Russia. Not so long ago I spoke with an Iranian doctor of those sciences who lives and works in Australia, but regularly visits his relatives in Iran. This doctor of technical sciences there was a very clear opinion that Iran, together with Turkey, could cause serious troubles to Russia and other former owls to the southern republics. And although many Iranians do not like this prospect, they cannot do anything. Everything is under the control of the ayatollah, including Ahmidejan himself.
  9. Yarbay
    Yarbay 13 July 2012 12: 27 New
    *** Everything is under the control of the ayatollah, including Ahmidejan himself *** - the ayatollahs are also different and there is a difference of opinion between them!
    Everything is not as easy as you think!
    1. VAF
      VAF 13 July 2012 14: 55 New
      Quote: Yarbay
      Everything is not as easy as you think!

      Dear Alikbek, I will continue with you, +!

      Anti-aircraft missile system FM-80 \ Shahab Thaqeb
      The FM-80 is an export version of the Chinese short-range air defense system HQ-7, first introduced for export in 1989.
      Iran must have acquired the FM-80 PU in the 1990s, and in the early 2000s it became known that the Iranian military-industrial complex began for them the production of missiles, called Shahab Thaqeb.
      A launcher with 4 missiles in transport and launch containers (TPK) is placed on a two-towed towed trailer, together with a mono-impulse target and target tracking radar and an optoelectronic module with a television target tracking system, an infrared direction finder for automatic tracking of missiles, etc.

      In Iran, FM-80 launchers are used together with the Skyguard fire control system, and this complex can also include 35 mm twin launchers.
      PU SAM FM-80 without TPK and power supply on a truck

      SAM Shahab Thaqeb

      Features FM-80

      Short-range towed anti-aircraft missile system

      Target hit range: from 0,5 to 12 km.
      The height of the destruction of targets: from 0,03 to 5 km.
      Anti-aircraft guided missile (SAM) warhead: high-explosive fragmentation, 13 kg.
      Speed ​​of hit targets: up to 440 m \ s
      Number of channels by target: 1
      The number of channels on the rocket: 2
      SAM system: Radio command, according to data received from the launcher

      In 2010, successful trials of the FM-80 upgraded in Iran were reported.

      Launch of Shahab Thaqeb missiles with the upgraded FM-80 in 2010

      Upgraded FM-80, an unknown new module can be seen to the right of the radar

      Rapier anti-aircraft missile system

      A number of British short-range "Rapier" short-range air defense systems, remaining from the few dozen that were purchased in the early 1970s, still remain in service with the Iranian army.

      A launcher with 4 missiles is mounted on a towed semi-trailer along with a target detection radar.
      Separately, a control panel with an optical tracking device and an infrared direction finder tracking missiles is taken out.

      To make the complex an all-weather air defense system, a target tracking radar DN 181 "Blindfire" is attached.

      Rapier air defense launcher and power source in the background

      PU Rapier air defense system with 4 missiles and target tracking radar DN 181 "Blindfire

      Rapier air defense systems are often installed in positions along with 35 mm air defense

      In Iran, at one time experimented with the creation of a self-propelled installation with a Rapier air defense system

      Well and also a huge number of man-portable air defense systems Misagh-1 \ Misagh-2 and Strela-3

  10. Don
    Don 26 July 2012 11: 46 New
    Good article. Immediately visible article written by a specialist. The only thing that is not clear why the author did not remember for the Shell-C1 ?! Iran also has them in service, unfortunately in small numbers.