Attack on the oil fields of Saudi Arabia. How and why overslept a blow
Why overslept a blow
On counter shock Saudi air defense has once again shown that it is flesh from the flesh of the Saudi armed forces and is not suitable for anything other than parades. According to the Kyrgyz Republic and the UAVL, there was not only no opposition - they were not even detected. Despite the fact that the Saudis have a lot of radar coverage of the air situation on duty and combat modes, and these are quite decent stations, such as the American stationary AN / FPS-117 and their transportable version AN / TPS-77. The KSA Air Force also has AWACS type E-3 "Sentry" aircraft with the number of 5 units and 2 light Swedish aircraft. But, obviously, these machines do not conduct regular patrols, although with such a fleet, keeping the 1 car in the south around the clock around the clock, controlling the approaches to Yemen, and one in the north is quite real. In a warring country - even necessary.
An approximate layout of the means of covering the Abkake object
And near Abkeyk is the city of Dhahran, and there is one of the largest air bases of the KSA Air Force, where 5 fighter squadrons are based at once - but not a single plane took off from there. And if cruise missiles and Drones visited there too - everything could be sad. True, in this case, the Saudis would, as usual, hide the losses, which is difficult to do in the case of the refinery. Not a single missile took off, although Abkaik himself is covered by two firing sections of the Patriot PAC-2 / 3 air defense system, and in the version of the strike echelon route promoted by the Americans, he would have passed through other areas of the Patriots and other air defense systems. It is possible that the Patriot section was the only one - on satellite images, shortly before the impact, one of the positions was empty. However, the "toothlessness" of the "Patriots" in the war with the Houthis manifested itself very clearly, although to a large extent the fault of the unfortunate Saudi anti-aircraft gunners in their cockpits. By the way, recently one of the Western lovers of "Google intelligence" on Google Earth did a little research and found out that over the years of the war in Yemen, the number of deployed positions of the firing sections of the Patriot air defense system in the KSA (formally there are 17 such sections, that is, firing batteries) has decreased almost 1,5 times - either they went out of order for various natural reasons, or they suffered from raids by the Houthi BR and UBPLA, reports of successful attacks of which directly on the Patriots have been received more than once.
Abkeyka’s Objective Air Defense also did nothing. It consisted of a Shahin-2 short-range self-propelled air defense battery - it is a well-known and already very outdated (and not previously considered a masterpiece) Krotal air defense system made in France, but not on a wheelbase, but on tracked BTR M113 chassis and modernized in 1993 and early 2000's. Its target detection range is up to 20 km, the range of destruction is up to 11,8 km with a ceiling of 3 km, the minimum interception height is 50 m (which is very weak, but would be enough for Iranian missiles and devices). It is not known whether the crews carried combat duty at the complex at all and whether they found targets. But they would have plenty of time to fire at low-speed UAVs in case of detection (even taking into account the fact that small targets are detected at a much shorter distance). However, it is possible that the Shahins do not see such goals - there is no information about the EPR of these devices, nor about the minimum resolving power of the air defense radar.
Self-propelled air defense system "Shahin-2" (the number "2" in the name appeared after the modernization of the air defense system in 1993)
In addition, the object was covered by 3-4 batteries of non-self-propelled anti-aircraft 35-mm Skygard-35 installations. The positions southeast and southwest of the object were empty, the remaining batteries, consisting of a pair of paired 35-mm guns under radar control, were deployed. It seems that in the video with the burning facilities of the refinery, shooting was heard as if from a light rifle weapons, and from anti-aircraft guns, but most likely it was the usual shooting for the Arab "Gulf warriors" in the air after a fight and for any reason. It is not known whether the anti-aircraft artillery operation was before the hits and in general - whether they were on duty and their radars and night electronic-optical aiming devices were turned on. But if the entire air defense system of the country (by the Saudis, by the way, the air defense is a separate type of aircraft, as in the USSR and the Russian Federation before 1998, but, as we see, this does not make sense), then there was an alarm signal no one, however, does not remove the blame from the staff.
35-mm paired "Skygard-35" GDF-007 memory in position
Who is to blame and to whom to chop the head
They say that the Saudi command has already found the “switchman” and arrested the officer in charge of Abkeik’s air defense, and he faces an extremely “democratic” execution - public cutting off of his head. Well, not the next prince, the commander of the air defense system, really cut his head!
Of course, the fault of the Saudi mountain warrior is undeniable. Despite the fact that air defense is considered to be an "elite", second only to the Air Force (where almost only princes are in flight) and the national guard (where there are only fellow countrymen of the royal clan), there, like the whole Saudi army, this "valuable" principle is professed services, such as: "at the will of Allah - let him fight for us and protect us." But there are much more unpleasant things for Americans. Once again, the low combat value of the American Patriot and radar systems was demonstrated, and the Americans scantily admit this fact and try to justify themselves, which was not the case before. But the fact that the very organization of air defense, the deployment of funds, the tactics of air defense of the Americans is "lame" - the Americans are not going to recognize. But a considerable part of the Hussites' success in delivering strikes (not only these strikes, but also the previous ones) is ensured by this. Domestic air defense specialists knew this for a very long time, and even the conduct of joint Russian-American computer missile defense exercises at the beginning of the 2000's did not "cure" the Americans from this "disease", although they learned something.
Is such a threat dangerous for Russia
For some reason, after this blow various sofa clicks also intensified, telling that "such a blow can be inflicted on the oil industry of any state, even Russia." Some even agreed to such drones before the "Kremlin" attacks. Firstly, Russia does not have such a concentration of the oil industry, nor does it have such giant refineries that process 70% of exports and the infrastructure itself is much more distributed and ramified. Secondly, most of our oil industry is located in areas where the non-nuclear Tomahawks (there are no others) will not reach the sea. Not to mention the UAV. Thirdly, if someone thinks that the main areas of production and processing, where they really, and not in someone’s dreams, can be under attack, are not covered by air defense systems, then he is most often mistaken. Not to mention electronic warfare. In addition, the plans provide for the deployment of various jamming and camouflage means in the area of critical industrial facilities, in case of military danger. By themselves, devices of this size and range are quite large and do not represent any difficulty for our air defense systems.
But there’s no need to talk about attacks on the bodies of higher state and military administration - you should not experiment with drones at a number of especially important objects at your own peril and risk. And where it is, nevertheless, perhaps, the situation can instantly change to the opposite, in case of danger. The FSO takes this danger very seriously.
Well and most importantly, such a serious blow to the Russian oil fields can cause a massive crushing response, even a nuclear one. Separate terrorist groups can’t do this, and suicides among states that are really capable of attempting such an attack are not observed. Which, of course, does not say that the danger, say, of UAVs is ignored by us: in recent years, dozens of systems and means for combating drones, based on various principles, have been created, tested, and are accepted for service. And they are actively used in real hostilities, in particular in Syria. The entire “success” of the tactics of using such devices against Russia can be traced in the almost fruitless attacks against Khmeimim and Tartus and a number of other bases of the RF Armed Forces in the SAR. Although for small groups, the danger of such devices is obvious until they have protective equipment. And the danger of terrorist attacks using small drones against civilians in peacetime, of course, is.
Why try to prove Iran’s direct guilt?
It is completely incomprehensible why the Americans are trying to prove that the strike was delivered directly by the Iranians. Are the United States ready to say “A” and say “B,” that is, to act? Unlikely. The Americans already realized that there would be no easy walk with Iran, which both Russian technologies in the field of air defense and electronic warfare gained and purchased, and Chinese. And what kind of walks can be in conflict with the 90 millionth not poorest country with a powerful army and serious missile potential? Various attacks of the Kyrgyz Republic can be delivered - but there will be little sense, and retaliatory strikes can be extremely unpleasant. Iranians will have enough forces and means and the Strait of Hormuz to close tightly with mines, anti-ship missiles, and arrange hunting for enemy ships with their underwater fleet, and missiles to wipe the same Saudis from the face of the Earth, for example. And the missiles of the Iranians are now quite accurate.
Judging by the rhetoric of the United States, declaring vaguely about "readiness to act," and then dissuading them with phrases about "cyber attacks in response," they do not want to act. Perhaps only locally and simultaneously, and so as not to cause Tehran’s harsh reaction. But most likely, we will talk about the next unilateral sanctions, to which Iran is already accustomed.
A much more interesting option for the Americans is when the Saudis themselves will act, possibly with the Allies, and the Americans will "help with intelligence." But this option does not bode well for uncles in clothes made of white fabric. Judging by the fighting efficiency of the armies of the oil monarchies shown in Yemen, the Iranians, for all their shortcomings, will tear them to shreds. Yes and answer options with strokes aviation the targets in Iran can be very expensive for the Saudis, both in the form of aircraft losses, and from retaliatory missile strikes. What can Iran, he has already demonstrated. If it was just a blow from the Iranian "proxy warriors", then what will happen from Iran itself? Are the Saudis ready for such an exacerbation? It’s unlikely without the USA. But soon everything will show.
To sell or not to sell - that is the question
Everyone, obviously, saw our President smiling, saying that we were ready to sell to Saudi Arabia everything necessary to protect against such attacks, and he said this, referring to Iran and Turkey, which, they say, "bought what you need, "in the presence of the leaders of these countries. And they saw their smiles in response. Question: Is it possible for the Saudis to sell all this, is debatable. On the one hand, the danger that export funds specially adapted for KSA will fall into US hands is exaggerated. Export systems are exported, and there are a number of activities stipulated by the contract to protect against such scenarios. So there is almost nothing to fear.
There is another thing to be feared - there are such “good” warriors from the Saudis that even if they sell C-400, Armor-S, radar, electronic warfare equipment and train them in the right tactics, they can still remain at the same level of efficiency without getting close even, say, to the level of personnel of the Syrian air defense systems (according to the opinions of our experts, it’s already quite decent). And spoil the reputation of our systems instead of American ones. On the other hand, sell anything to the Saudis, there will be little sense - this is obvious to experts around the world. At least the war with the Hussites showed what the KSA army actually was. And you can earn considerable money. So the Russian leadership should think hard whether we need it or you won’t earn all the money. And is it worth it to link such a sale to the cessation of aggression in Yemen, say? Moreover, we have enough experience of successful mediation in negotiations - we can help with this.
But will the Saudis themselves buy our systems? Talk about this has been going on for a long time. Something about Tanks, then about the OTRK "Iskander-E", then about the air defense system. Demonstrations, demonstrations, presentations, preliminary negotiations - and again everything calms down. Obviously, the United States has enough influence on the ruling circles of the KSA to force it to buy its own, and at exorbitant prices each time. And there is no reason to think that it will be different this time either.
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