Drone attack. Hussite blow
Expected strike with unexpected consequences
The new attack of the army of the Yemeni national liberation movement Ansar Allah (the Hussites) against Saudi Arabia certainly caused a furor in the world.
Of course, the Hussites used to inflict heavy blows on armless clueless men in military uniforms, calling themselves the armed forces of the countries of the Arab coalition, but since there died either Arabs from the oil monarchies or some Sudanese, or, at best, mercenaries from countries like Australia and Colombia, the "world community" didn't give a damn. And missile strikes at KSA naval bases or military airfields, too. And even blows to Riyadh are not their headache, even if the King of Saudi has a headache that he can lie to his subjects. But blows to the most sacred thing that is in KSA for representatives of the “golden billion” (no, not for Mecca and Medina), namely for the oil industry, that is, affordable for Western consumers, is another matter entirely. Yes, and so successful strikes.
In fact, there was nothing unexpected in the fact that the blows were carried out precisely at the world's largest oil refinery in Abkeyika, 60 kilometers southwest of Dahran and located kilometers 200 southwest of the largest oil field in KSU, Khurais. The fact that it was precisely on them that attacks could be struck was obvious long before the event. So, the Abkeik refinery was not so much involved in the production of petroleum products as in bringing oil from various KSA fields to the Arab-Light grade for sale for export. The Saudis produce about 10-10,5 million barrels per day, exporting about 7, and 5 go through Abkake, more precisely, they passed. And this refinery was featured not only in the reports of various analytical organizations about the possible targets for strikes in KSA, but even in some computer games. Moreover, if somewhere, say, in the GOU of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation there are operational plans, say, for strikes against Saudi Arabia (just in case they should be - for a war with any state), well, or, say, in the Chinese General Staff Abkake definitely appears there. In general, it was obvious, but just not covered. Although formally a cover exists, and is relatively powerful.
Than they beat
What exactly did they beat? For a long time there was no accurate information. At first, an attack was announced about the Hussite strike UAV (UAV), both by the KSA and the Hussites. Such attacks have already been inflicted more than once on KSA, and even on the UAE. And among the used disposable UAV designs, there were previously very long-range ones, in particular, Samad-1 and Samad-3 with a flight range of the order of 1200-1500 km, so that they would have enough range from the attacked objects from Yemen and Iraq, and from Iran (moreover, the distances there are quite comparable, except perhaps closer from Iraq). True, with a solid size and flight range, these disposables have a very weak warhead (warhead) - only 18 kg. Although for a number of oil facilities this would be enough. But it quickly became known that the Khusit cruise missiles (CRs) of the Quds-Xnumx type also took part in the strike - the wreckage of one of the missiles was discovered in the desert. And this missile was not shot down - there were no traces of defeat, perhaps the engine caught fire (which happens in the Iranian KR periodically) or some other malfunction happened.
According to the latest data from the Saudi side, their objects attacked 25 units of weapons - the Kuds-1 KR attacked the Khurais field, in the amount of 7 pieces, of which 4 successfully hit targets, and 3 simply did not reach the targets and fell in the desert. The Saudis initially tried to write them down to their air defense account, but even they didn’t have the audacity to do so - there are no damages to the wreckage, and they don’t have to talk about electronic warfare, it’s tight with them. But the refinery in Abkeyka was attacked by UAVs, with the number of 18 units, and everyone hit their targets, there are neither shot down nor fallen along the road. However, maybe there is, the desert is large, there you can search for years.
The Saudis assure that all the missiles and devices are of Iranian manufacture, and they, of course, are right here. It is clear that there are no “Hussite" UAVs, just as there are no “Hussite" ballistic missiles (BR), up to medium range (BRRS), or cruise (KR) - there are Iranian missiles based on Chinese, North Korean or our designs , but with glued nameplates and other camouflage methods (or simply repainted and renamed). In Yemen, Iran is waging the exact same “proxy war” as Russia, say, in the Donbas or against Russia, the Americans and other “friends of Syria” fought in Syria. Only the nature of this "proxy war" is different. And, despite the "blockade" of the Navy of the "Arab coalition" of the ports of Yemen, weapons continue to flow into the country, up to OTR, BRMD, BRRS, KR, SAM, ATGM, and UAVs. In part, it arrives by sea, because the sailors of the “coalition” in their professional qualities can fight for the championship, except in the same minor league, in which the legendary “bogeys” of the Navy, who know how to surrender combat boats to helicopters, and who “do not stash the ground.” Part of it, obviously, is smuggling through Oman, which has fenced off neutrality from the Yemen war, and where there is neutrality - there is also smuggling. In general, the position of the Sultanate of Oman seems to be one of the most appropriate.
The Quds-1 KR, according to the Saudis, is a version of the Iranian I-Ali KR, but is more like another KR, Sumar. Both of them are the fruits of copying the oldest version of the Soviet ALCMs with X-55 YaBCH (without M and MS), which in the original had a range of up to 1600km (X-55MS have a range of 3500km, non-nuclear X-555 - more than 2000km). Copy rockets, as you know, were bought by Iranians a long time ago in Ukraine. The range of both versions is about 700km - Iranians are not exactly able to “rip off” even technologies that are very old for Russia, and this is not particularly good for more developed powers. There is also a more perfect version of them, the KR "Hoveise", with a range of 1300km. The Iranians could not copy the P-95-300 engine, which was mounted on the X-55, instead they took the TJ100 engine manufactured by the Czech company PBS Group from Brno (specializing in small turbojet engines and turbojet engines for light aircraft, targets, and even models - there are and engines weighing a couple of kilograms in the line), and arranged for their release. But he has much less traction, instead of 400kg - only 130kg, however, he weighs not 90kg, but 20. And the fuel there is not deciline, which is used on the X-55 and its derivatives.
As for the UAVA, the fragments shown by the Saudis indicate that these disposable devices were already used by the Hussites in Yemen and in their attacks on the KSA, but these are not the Samad-type devices that were used to attack the UAE at the time and some others high-profile stocks. These low-speed propeller-driven UAVs with a deltoid wing in Iran itself were demonstrated as far back as 2014 at an exhibition of weapons designed for the aerospace forces (exactly like that) of the IRGC IRI, and since then have practically not shone in Iran itself. Given the large number of parallel developments by the Iranians, this could indicate that the device received a "resignation", however, this was not the case.
Super Precision Ballad
Many network commentators, especially those who are not versed in the use of high-precision weapons and the fight against them, have now suddenly begun to extol this strike, speaking of "highest precision" and that "no one can." Well, for the United States and Israel (which says a lot about themselves) for some reason these figures make an exception, but not for Russia, because every creak knows that in Russia "missiles do not fall into the cross" (only the Mujahideen do not think so ) Actually, the task of these entities in this case is to once again spit in Russia.
In fact, there is no ultra-high accuracy here. Of the 7 KR, the shortage of 3 missiles in the absence of any counteraction, both electronic warfare and air defense, is a bad result. It’s not even worth talking about the polygon impact conditions - in Russia interference in exercises is usually used, but here they weren’t. Yes, the rest of the missiles hit the targets, but these targets are large-sized, contrasting, and easy to hit the desert terrain. It would have been easier to work out on purpose except on a dried-out salt lake. Already in the oil storage facilities and large oil refineries, even the old Termit RCC successfully hit back in the Indo-Pakistan War 1971. The same thing with drones - large targets, no interference, no contrast, and with known coordinates, and unreinforced, besides exploding from the first hit. Unless the reliability of the devices (if some are not lying undetected in the desert) and the range of their flight inspires respect - here the Iranians should be praised.
True, the range has its own questions. It has not yet been established whether it is true that both the Kyrgyz Republic and the UAV flew from Yemen. More precisely, the Hussites and Iranians say so. The Iranians also add that the Hussites had the right to such a blow, in response to the barbaric bombing of Yemeni cities and the aggression of the Saudis - and I completely agree with this thesis. And even the attacks on Riyadh have every right. But to hit the pocket is much more sensitive.
By the consequences of the blow, you can notice the following. The facilities, especially the refineries, have suffered severe damage that can be repaired within a few weeks or months. But the Saudis already claim that they "restored production to the previous level." Most likely, there is a manipulation. KSA, under pressure from the United States, which does not need an explosive increase in oil prices (but to restore the profitability of the shale industry, growth is nevertheless needed), could compensate for the losses from its oil reserves, as well as by connecting some reserve capacities. But the fact that a considerable part of the attacked structures are unlikely to be quickly put into operation is obvious.
Where did it come from? Open question
Saudis and Americans are eager to prove that the strike was delivered from Iran itself. The Saudis also do not want to admit that the group on the border with Yemen successfully overslept the blow. But the evidence is still tight. The fact that strikes were made in Abkeyka, judging by the points of impact, on the east side, does not mean that the striking weapons came from there either - a maneuver behind the radio horizon in front of the target is quite possible if there was enough fuel. At first they assured that the Kyrgyz Republic could not fly from Yemen, saying that they would not have enough range. But no one knows whether the “Hussite” Kyrgyz Republic has such a range now, or is it somewhat larger, especially since it is possible to facilitate warheads.
Then there were allegations that the strike train had flown in from southern Iraq, where the Iranians have great influence through their people in the government and through Shiite militia, where there are enough instructors from the Kudes forces of the IRGC, under the command of the well-known Suleimani. But the Americans really do not want to admit this, because it shows once again that their whole gimmick with the aggression and occupation of Iraq and the war was there so that the US enemy would rule everything there. It is clear that knowledgeable people already know this, but Trump's Twitter readers are not one of them, and they don’t need to know that. Harmful to rating. The Saudis also don’t need this - are they fighting Iraq now? In general, now they are trying to compose a version, in comparison with which the legendary "magic bullet" that killed John Kennedy will seem a saint in truth history. Like, a blow was struck from a base in southern Iran near the Strait of Hormuz, and striking means flew all over the south of Iran, then Kuwait, and then over the KSA coast from the east to the targets. Immediately questions arise without answers. For example - why such difficulties? One could find a base closer to the border with Kuwait and Iraq, or even strike from Iraq (since the version with Yemen is denied by the Saudis) - why substitute your country? Why was it impossible to fly over the Persian Gulf and pass through the hostile KSA Qatar or the UAE? It's so shorter! Why fly over the coast of KSA, densely enough poked with radar and air defense systems? And why didn’t anyone detect any targets in Kuwait, and there are not only local warriors (as worthless as the Saudis), but also Americans themselves, where they have a large military base? It turns out that the American means of detection and air defense are unsuitable not only in the hands of stupid and lazy local warriors in free white clothes (out of service), but also in the hands of American "supermen" (in the liberal paradigm)?
And the Americans do not have any evidence of their route - they did not photograph anything and did not detect anything. They only report about some "suspicious activity" before the strike on that very Iranian base. Or maybe it was the activity of reconnaissance unmanned aviation VKSK IRG?
By the way, the fact that the Americans "overslept" the action also speaks very well of what the recent "insiders" from the "US intelligence" on CNBC television stand about the tests of the Russian CR with the Burevestnik nuclear-powered engine. The Americans don’t and cannot have neither satellite data on those tests (they are carried out during the “window” for enemy reconnaissance satellites, this is an obligatory rule), nor data from radars in Norway - it is over-the-horizon and does not see low-flying targets at such a huge distance. Like agents, most likely not, and even if it were, shining it in order to write an article about how “nothing flies at the Russians” is not stupidity, but insanity. And nobody will do that.
To be continued ...
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