Russians have the right not to consider Borodino a defeat
On the position and forces of the parties
Napoleon himself admitted that Borodino did not become for him the same victory as Austerlitz or Yen, Wagram or Friedland. No matter how to translate his famous words from French, for Russians they can only sound like this: “Of the fifty battles I have given, the most valor was shown in the battle of Moscow and the least success was achieved.”
In exactly the same way, no one else, but the great commander himself, admitted that under Borodino "the Russians gained the right to be invincible ..." However, for some reason it is among Russian historians that discussions continue about why we stubbornly do not want to consider the great battle a victory of the enemy.
So, the position chosen by Kutuzov at Borodin was criticized all the way to Leo Tolstoy. However, he, as a combat officer, had every right to do so. Meanwhile, the fact of the left Russian flank, which is practically open for direct impact, does not yet say anything by itself.
After all, the left flank initially covered, to everything else, the Shevardinsky redoubt - an advanced position for which the French had to pay a considerable price. Then, building something more substantial than flushes did not allow time. However, in order to break through the Russian front here, the French, in any case, had to overcome several successive lines, including a deep ravine, a height and the burning village of Semenovskoye.
Another thing is that Kutuzova was actually much more worried about the right flank, and the Russian commander in chief considered the whole power of the corps put up by Napoleon against the positions of the 2 th Western Army a kind of bluff. Perhaps Kutuzov was really mistaken, hoping that Napoleon would operate bypassing his right wing in order to cut off the Russian army’s retreat to Moscow.
But if Napoleon takes such a maneuver already to the left, he can, for starters, hit the flank with the Tuchkov corps. This is a fairly strong connection, which was also supported in the second line by the nearly 10-thousandth Moscow militia, the chief of staff of the Kutuzov army Bennigsen for some reason returned from the ambush, exposing Ponyatovsky’s corps to the Polish Voltigeurs.
Kutuzov hoped to counterattack precisely because of the Kolochi River - on the flank of the French columns bypassing him on the right. This would be in the spirit of the then military art. And in the event of a French strike from the left, three Russian corps were not so difficult to move south, as happened during the battle.
The start of the battle fully confirmed the expectations of the Russian commander in chief - the French stormed Borodino and took the bridge across Kolocha. However, there was no serious development of operations here. Apparently, it was only when it finally became clear where Napoleon was delivering the main blow, and it was decided to march the cavalry of Uvarov and the Cossacks of Platov on the flank of the Napoleonic army.
However, it was still not a position, but the Russian army that occupied it managed to withstand Borodin. She was opposed by about 130 of thousands of selected French and allied forces with 587 guns. Only in the very first years after the war did data appear that Napoleon had much greater forces, almost up to 180 thousand, as under Wagram, but they were not confirmed.
The strength of the Great Army is practically not in doubt by anyone, but the debate about how many Russian soldiers were on the battlefield of Borodino does not stop today. Experts appeared who claimed that there were at least 160 thousands of Russians at the expense of unaccounted for militias and Cossacks.
We won’t talk much about what role such extra tens of thousands could play in the battle, we only note that the number of regular Russian regiments is hardly disputed. So, in the infantry, regular cavalry and artillery on the day of the Battle of Borodino, there were no more than 115 thousand people.
At the same time, the Russians had even more guns than the French - 640, and the superiority in large-caliber guns was especially significant. However, they, unlike the French, were almost unable to freely move around the battlefield. Nearly one and a half hundred reserve cannons and howitzers remained in reserve until the end of the day, incurring losses in the servants, which were constantly attracted to replace the dead comrades.
As we see, it is not necessary to talk about any decisive superiority in the forces of one or another side, although the Russians still could not put as many tried and tested soldiers into battle lines.
What price did Moscow give them
So, according to the results of the 12-hour battle, the French troops still managed to seize the positions of the Russian army in the center and on the left wing. However, this fact alone did not mean victory, especially since after the cessation of hostilities, the French army retreated to its original position.
Certainly, one cannot but admit that in the ranks of the Napoleonic troops after Borodin there was no question of a retreat. However, the emperor did not hurry to attack immediately. The losses of his army, perhaps, were still less than that of the Russians, about which a little lower, but also pretty much undermined the combat effectiveness of entire formations. It is believed that the very next morning Napoleon wanted to continue the battle and complete the rout of Kutuzov’s army.
It was the losses, taking into account the possibilities of getting reinforcements, that predetermined how the 1812 company of the year continued subsequently. Numerous skeptics who believe that Kutuzov fought a battle only to please public opinion and the mood of the army are hardly credible. And there is no doubt that he initially did not plan to surrender Moscow after the only battle, albeit so bloody.
Another thing is that Kutuzov did not expect to sit in the old capital, as in an impregnable fortress, realizing that Moscow was completely unprepared for this. Contrary to the optimism and fighting enthusiasm of her governor Rostopchin.
In the documents and memoirs of contemporaries there are many facts confirming that Kutuzov seriously hoped to distract Napoleon from the throne, immediately moving either to St. Petersburg, or to the south or southeast. It is unlikely that the Russian commander at the same time played his next performance in public. But he needed a very short analysis of such prospects in order to come to terms with the fact that he would have to withdraw the army through Moscow.
Speaking of losses, let's start with the French, who at first “prescribed” by domestic historians more than 50 of thousands of dead and wounded. And this seemed quite possible given the fact that Napoleon’s army lost a lot more generals and officers compared to the Russian. 49, including 8 killed, against 28, of which six were killed.
It should be noted that the calculation of the generals inevitably leads to an erroneous assessment of the total losses. The fact is that in the entire Russian army in the battle of Borodino, only 73 generals were involved, while the French only had 70 generals in the cavalry. At the same time, only one general was captured in each of the armies under Borodin - Bonami from the French, and Likhachev from the Russians, both with numerous wounds.
Quickly enough, it became clear that all references to documents with high figures of French losses were so doubtful that it was decided to refer to the combat schedules of units and formations of the Great Army. Before and after the battle at the walls of Moscow. They gave quite reasonable data about the French losses - a little more than 30 thousand people. There were no more 1000 prisoners, and the Russian guns managed to take only 13. Against 15 guns captured by the French, and this is actually quite a good indicator, given that our constantly defended.
The sum within the 30-thousandth losses does not quite correspond to the numerous and completely truthful information that historians have at their disposal regarding the composition of the French army that entered Moscow. Its number only slightly exceeded 100 thousand people, which means that those same marching battalions did not seem to come to Napoleon at all.
But they actually came, though a few days late. Pineau's pristine division from the Italian army of Prince Eugene Beauharnais, and several regiments from the flank guards, which seemed to be somewhat weakened, also pulled themselves up. Yes, Napoleon had to allocate several thousand people to protect communications, reconnaissance and monitoring the army of Kutuzov.
But even in this case, Napoleon had too little strength left to simply admit his losses at Borodino were less than 30 thousand. However, this, like the losses of the Russian army, is a topic for a series of much deeper historical research.
Our task is somewhat more ambitious, but somewhat more modest - to try to argue our thesis that the Russian army near Borodin did not suffer defeat. Here we just note - after a real defeat, even with such losses, so few others retreated so calmly, but at the same time secretly, promptly and orderly.
About Russian losses and ... prospects
It is much more difficult to judge Russian losses. Although, it would seem, very much is known for sure. But by no means everything.
For the Russian army, no one ever called the loss figure below 38,5 thousand people. This is already more than the French minimum. And it hardly makes any sense to prove that our losses were less. It’s a paradox, but under Borodin the well-known principle is that the attacker suffers losses more than the defender, almost did not work. It worked more precisely, but the Russians, after all, too often counterattacked.
In addition, on Borodin's day, a single spirit reigned throughout the army — to stand to death. And they stood, not moving from their place under the crossfire of French artillery, under the blows of iron men from the cavalry corps of Murat. In dense columns, and not always at heights or in shelters.
The French in this regard were much trickier and more entrepreneurial - they were not at all embarrassed to leave the fire. Moreover, this fire from the side of the Napoleonic artillery, actually less numerous than the Russian, was much more intense. There is documented information that our opponents spent near Borodin almost three times as many charges as the Russians.
Nowadays, a number of publications have published evidence that the Russian army could lose up to 60 thousand people. Among other things, the basis of such calculations are some handwritten lists of militias before and after the battle, unthinkable losses among the Cossacks of Platov, and other dubious data. Meanwhile, the overstatement of Russian losses is directly related to the overstatement of Kutuzov’s army.
Ascribing to it tens of thousands of militias and thousands of Cossacks over and over again, researchers of this kind are mistaken in the main - the Russians had not yet forgotten how to win in Suvorov - not by number, but by skill. But with the skill of the same Cossacks and militias, everything was, frankly, not too good. And in a regular battle, there was not so much benefit from them as from experienced soldiers.
That's why they were taken to the Main Army only in coordinated units and formations, like the same Moscow militia, which got into the second line behind the Tuchkov corps. By the way, doing such dubious calculations, it’s just right to record in the Great Army all the observers and marketeers accompanying it. Not to mention the doctors and cooks.
What remains in reserve?
The French did not force the Russians not only to escape, as it was near Austerlitz and Friedland, but even to any significant departure. And certainly there was no trace of persecution by the French.
They like to remind the Russians that Napoleon near Borodin never put his guard into action, but, contrary to the legend, the Russian guard also remained almost untouched by the evening of August 26 (September 7). Three regiments of the Life Guards, brilliantly repulsing the numerous attacks of the French heavy cavalry - Lithuanian, Izmailovsky and Finland quite calmly, not at all under the pressure of the enemy, took their positions in the second line, leaving the first behind the corpses of Osterman and Dohturov moved from the right wing.
Losses in the composition of these Russian guard regiments, according to documents, were significant, but there was no question of loss of combat effectiveness. Meanwhile, in the corps of Davout, Ney and Junot, as well as in the Italian army of Prince Eugene, a number of regiments had to be reduced to battalions by the evening of 26 August. Otherwise, the shock columns would be so small that they would not have survived the first attack if the battle resumed.
Well, as for the Preobrazhensky and Semenov guards regiments, they limited their participation in the battle to the fact that after the loss of flushes and the Kurgan battery, they supported the line of new army positions, which, after retreating a kilometer and a half, no more, was already almost in perfect order. The main thing is that she was ready to continue the battle.
As a result, the Russians could still oppose the 18-thousandth French guard with about 8-9 thousand of their chosen troops. In addition, Kutuzov still counted on the fact that the reinforcements promised by the Moscow governor Rostopchin would arrive in time for the Borodino field. Incidentally, Rostopchin claimed that they should include not only warriors, but also several thousand soldiers from regular regiments.
But perhaps the most important advantage that the Russians retained at the end of the battle was the advantage in artillery, especially with regard to ammunition. In addition, almost 150 Russian guns from the reserve saved their servants without significant losses, although several thousand gunners still had to go to the forefront to help comrades.
Napoleon had almost all of the artillery, with the exception of the guards, already in business, and the issue of the presence of nuclei, buckshot, bombs and especially gunpowder was extremely acute. It is hardly necessary to be surprised that the Russians won the evening artillery duel quite clearly, in fact, not allowing the French to take their starting positions for the attack the next day.
Talking that the French did not want to spend the night among the corpses is not the best justification for their departure to their original positions. Of course, there was some certainty in this that the Russians did not have the strength to attack, but the Napoleonic troops themselves were no longer too eager for battle.
Napoleon very much hoped that the march battalions would be pulled up to him the very next day, but they were late for a number of reasons. Among them, perhaps the most important, were the actions of the first Russian partisan detachments.
There is quite a lot of evidence, especially from the French side, that the French commander in fact experienced considerable relief when he learned that the Russians left their new positions in the early morning of 27 on August. It was this fact, and then the abandonment of Moscow, that seemed to convince Napoleon himself that his troops still won under Borodin, or, in the French manner, in the battle on the Moscow River.
Let not defeat, but, as they say, on points. We will remain in our opinion: the Russians under Borodin did not lose even on points. Moscow had to retreat and leave not at all because of defeat, but for completely different reasons.
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