Is it enough to evaluate modern tanks by firepower, security and mobility?
The tank is a universal combat vehicle of the battlefield and is designed to conduct both independent actions to develop breakthroughs of the enemy’s defense, operations on the operational and strategic environment and the defeat of the enemy’s military groupings and operations in its rear areas, and for use as a means of fire support for infantry, destruction of objects military infrastructure suppression tanks, armored targets, anti-tank weapons and enemy defense units. The fight against tanks and well-fortified long-term enemy reference points is not assigned to tanks, but to anti-tank artillery, MLRS and aviation.
The set of targets for the tank is very wide and for their destruction, a cannon with a wide range of ammunition is used as the main weapon, which basically determines the firepower of the tank. The main characteristics of the tank are firepower, security and mobility, and when creating a machine it is always a search for a compromise between them, since strengthening some of them, as a rule, leads to a decrease in others.
With the development of technology, technology and the experience of using tanks in real military conflicts at the present stage, characterizing a tank with only firepower, security and mobility is no longer enough. One of the significant characteristics is the controllability of the tank as part of the corresponding level of military command.
A tank as an independent combat unit, except in exceptional cases, is practically not used. As a combat unit, it is used in a group of tactical units (platoon, company battalion) or at higher levels of military command, in which the commander of the corresponding tactical level should be integrated. That is, the tank should be able to carry out the assigned task as part of the forces taking part in a specific operation not as a separate unit, but as part of the combat assets of the battlefield, connected together as a whole.
Consider which combination of basic characteristics of the tank may be the most acceptable.
A cannon is used as the main weapon of the tank. For Soviet and Russian tanks - this is an 125-mm gun, for most tanks of the West - an 120-mm. Of course, the natural desire to have a gun with a higher caliber in the tank was carried out in this direction, and work is underway to install 152-mm guns in the tank. How justified is it and how important is it for a tank to increase its firepower due to a more powerful gun caliber?
For the tank gun, four types of ammunition are used: BPS, OFS, KMS and TOURS. Moreover, for each type of ammunition the requirements are fundamentally different. For BPS, the maximum initial velocity of the projectile is required, for OFS, KMS and TURS, the mass of the active substance and the damaging elements in the projectile, that is, the caliber of the gun, is more significant.
The kinetic energy of the projectile is determined by its mass (caliber) and initial velocity, while the second parameter is much more significant, it is calculated based on the square of the speed. That is, to achieve greater efficiency, it is advisable to increase not so much the mass (caliber) as to increase the velocity of the projectile.
Of course, the caliber also affects the speed (more charge mass), but there are other more effective ways to increase the speed (quality and composition of gunpowder, the design of the gun and the projectile, other physical principles of accelerating the projectile in the channel of the gun barrel), which can significantly increase the speed BPS without reducing other basic characteristics of the tank. In addition, armor penetration can also increase due to the use of more advanced core materials of BPS.
Therefore, depending on the tasks that are set before the tank to destroy armored or non-armored targets, a compromise must be sought on ways to increase the firepower of the tank. Today, all types of ammunition for the 125-mm tank gun are quite capable of destroying targets on the battlefield. In addition, the characteristics of ammunition are constantly being improved, the gun is being improved and its muzzle energy is growing, and the firepower of the tank is growing with the existing gun caliber.
Of course, the 152-mm gun is more efficient than the 125-mm, but increasing firepower in this way leads to a significant increase in the reserved volume, mass of the tank, complicating the design of the automatic loader and reducing its reliability, increasing loads on the power plant and chassis. All this leads to a decrease in the mobility of the tank, one of its main characteristics.
For example, during the development of the last Soviet Boxer tank, the installation of an 152-mm gun led to a complication of the design of the automatic loader and a decrease in its reliability, as well as a serious increase in the mass of the tank. It began to exceed 50 tons, and in the design of the chassis and protection had to use titanium, which complicated the process of production of the tank.
In this regard, the increase in the firepower of the tank due to the installation of the 152-mm gun is far from always justified. It is advisable to consider other methods of increasing firepower. For example, in the middle of the 80's in the Instrument Design Bureau, Shipunov showed us the results of work on the Veer R&D system, in which we developed a ground-based anti-tank missile system based on a laser-guided missile and an armor-piercing core accelerated to hypersonic speed. The missile was a “crowbar” with a diameter of approximately 40 mm and a length of about 1,5 meters. A powerful engine was installed in the tail of the rocket, accelerating it to hypersonic speed. This complex did not reach the army at that time, but technologies are developing intensively and at the present level it is possible to realize ideas that could not be completed until then.
It should also be noted that in terms of armor penetration the TURS is practically equal to the BPS, and they are not so critical to the caliber of the gun. Moreover, tours with GOS are being developed, working on the principle of "shot-and-forget," which, in terms of the combination of parameters, is much more effective than BPS.
The increase in tank security due to armor protection is also approaching its saturation, while other protection methods, such as dynamic, active, optoelectronic and electronic countermeasures that do not require a serious increase in tank mass, are being intensively developed. New ceramic and polymer materials are also being developed for resistance close to armor.
The development of electromagnetic and electrodynamic protection systems for the tank using an electrical impulse to protect against the cumulative jet and core of the BPS, which were started at the All-Russian Research Institute of Steel at the beginning of the 80's, but then not brought to practical implementation due to the lack of energy storage devices of acceptable dimensions, is also being revived. . The rapid development of technologies for these elements, in all likelihood, will allow in the near future to implement these types of protection on tanks.
Increasing the protection of the tank through the use of classic armor is hardly justified, since it leads to a prohibitive increase in the mass of the tank and the inability to use it not only in combat conditions, but also during transportation due to the lack of necessary transport communications, bridges and overpasses, as well as transportation difficulties by rail.
Apparently, the mass of the tank should be of the order of 50 tons, which allows to ensure a sufficiently high level of its basic characteristics.
The mobility of the tank, determined by the power plant and the caterpillar mover, does not undergo fundamental changes on the new generation of tanks. Nothing new and realizable has been proposed. A power plant based on a diesel engine or gas turbine engine remains unchanged. Their power increases and the elements of the caterpillar undercarriage are improved, which provide good mobility to the tank. Any exotic propulsion devices (walking, crawling, wheeled, etc.) on the tank did not take root.
Nevertheless, you should probably consider a possible combination of caterpillar and screw propellers, the latter was used in the Blue Bird astronaut’s search engine, developed back in the 1966 year and providing the vehicle with very high cross-country and rough terrain. As a result of such experiments, new approaches to the design of the chassis can be proposed that increase the mobility of the tank in difficult terrain.
Within the framework of the modern concept of “network-centric warfare” and network-centric warfare, the tank must be integrated into a unified battle control system, ensuring the integration of all types of troops participating in a particular operation into a single whole. The system should provide coordination and control of motorized rifle, tank, artillery units, helicopters and fire support aircraft, UAVs, air defense systems, and support and repair and evacuation forces. To include the tank in a network-centric system, it must be equipped with the necessary systems.
All combat units taking part in the operation, including tanks, must automatically detect and display cartographic information about their location in real time, about targets discovered and received from higher commanders, and exchange information on the location of combat units via closed communication channels, the technical condition and supply of ammunition, the state of the enemy to the operational depth, discovered independently or by intelligence obtained from ground and air targets and defense units ones of the enemy, determine their coordinates and transmit to the appropriate level of control, as well as form teams on subordinate control objects. Commanders should be able to control the fire and maneuver of the unit in real time, carry out target designation and target allocation in subordinate units and adjust their fire.
All this can be implemented using a digital information management system that combines all the instruments and systems of the tank into a single integrated tank system and all combat units into a single combat control system. Such a network-centric control system allows you to optimize hostilities and in real time to observe, evaluate the situation and manage the implementation of the task for each commander of the appropriate control level. Tanks in the framework of this system receive a fundamentally new control quality and their effectiveness increases dramatically.
In this system, each tank is already equipped with all the necessary elements for remote control and firing from the tank, as well as its use as a remote-controlled robotic tank.
In modern conditions, without the introduction of network-centric systems, the successful conduct of hostilities will be very problematic. Such systems have long been developed and implemented. On tanks of NATO countries, such as Abrams and Leclerc, the second generation of TIUS is already installed, on Russian tanks individual elements of TIUS are used only on the Armata tank.
It is possible to equip the existing generation of Russian tanks with a tank information management system, but only the hull and turret, power plant and weapons will remain from the tank. All equipment, sighting systems and OMS are subject to replacement and installation of a new generation of devices and systems. The components and assemblies of the tank are subject to refinement under the possibility of remote control using electronic systems. In fact, these will be new tanks that can be integrated into the network-centric combat control system.
In this regard, re-equipping the entire army with a new generation of Armata tanks is impractical and unrealistic. There should be a program for deep modernization of the existing generation of tanks that can fit into the network-centric system on a par with the new generation of tanks and ensure their joint effective use in a combat situation.
When evaluating tanks according to their main characteristics (firepower, security and mobility) in modern conditions of network-centric warfare, it is necessary to evaluate tanks also from the point of view of their controllability within the framework of a single combat control system and the ability to integrate into such a system.
The set of targets for the tank is very wide and for their destruction, a cannon with a wide range of ammunition is used as the main weapon, which basically determines the firepower of the tank. The main characteristics of the tank are firepower, security and mobility, and when creating a machine it is always a search for a compromise between them, since strengthening some of them, as a rule, leads to a decrease in others.
With the development of technology, technology and the experience of using tanks in real military conflicts at the present stage, characterizing a tank with only firepower, security and mobility is no longer enough. One of the significant characteristics is the controllability of the tank as part of the corresponding level of military command.
A tank as an independent combat unit, except in exceptional cases, is practically not used. As a combat unit, it is used in a group of tactical units (platoon, company battalion) or at higher levels of military command, in which the commander of the corresponding tactical level should be integrated. That is, the tank should be able to carry out the assigned task as part of the forces taking part in a specific operation not as a separate unit, but as part of the combat assets of the battlefield, connected together as a whole.
Consider which combination of basic characteristics of the tank may be the most acceptable.
Firepower
A cannon is used as the main weapon of the tank. For Soviet and Russian tanks - this is an 125-mm gun, for most tanks of the West - an 120-mm. Of course, the natural desire to have a gun with a higher caliber in the tank was carried out in this direction, and work is underway to install 152-mm guns in the tank. How justified is it and how important is it for a tank to increase its firepower due to a more powerful gun caliber?
For the tank gun, four types of ammunition are used: BPS, OFS, KMS and TOURS. Moreover, for each type of ammunition the requirements are fundamentally different. For BPS, the maximum initial velocity of the projectile is required, for OFS, KMS and TURS, the mass of the active substance and the damaging elements in the projectile, that is, the caliber of the gun, is more significant.
The kinetic energy of the projectile is determined by its mass (caliber) and initial velocity, while the second parameter is much more significant, it is calculated based on the square of the speed. That is, to achieve greater efficiency, it is advisable to increase not so much the mass (caliber) as to increase the velocity of the projectile.
Of course, the caliber also affects the speed (more charge mass), but there are other more effective ways to increase the speed (quality and composition of gunpowder, the design of the gun and the projectile, other physical principles of accelerating the projectile in the channel of the gun barrel), which can significantly increase the speed BPS without reducing other basic characteristics of the tank. In addition, armor penetration can also increase due to the use of more advanced core materials of BPS.
Therefore, depending on the tasks that are set before the tank to destroy armored or non-armored targets, a compromise must be sought on ways to increase the firepower of the tank. Today, all types of ammunition for the 125-mm tank gun are quite capable of destroying targets on the battlefield. In addition, the characteristics of ammunition are constantly being improved, the gun is being improved and its muzzle energy is growing, and the firepower of the tank is growing with the existing gun caliber.
Of course, the 152-mm gun is more efficient than the 125-mm, but increasing firepower in this way leads to a significant increase in the reserved volume, mass of the tank, complicating the design of the automatic loader and reducing its reliability, increasing loads on the power plant and chassis. All this leads to a decrease in the mobility of the tank, one of its main characteristics.
For example, during the development of the last Soviet Boxer tank, the installation of an 152-mm gun led to a complication of the design of the automatic loader and a decrease in its reliability, as well as a serious increase in the mass of the tank. It began to exceed 50 tons, and in the design of the chassis and protection had to use titanium, which complicated the process of production of the tank.
In this regard, the increase in the firepower of the tank due to the installation of the 152-mm gun is far from always justified. It is advisable to consider other methods of increasing firepower. For example, in the middle of the 80's in the Instrument Design Bureau, Shipunov showed us the results of work on the Veer R&D system, in which we developed a ground-based anti-tank missile system based on a laser-guided missile and an armor-piercing core accelerated to hypersonic speed. The missile was a “crowbar” with a diameter of approximately 40 mm and a length of about 1,5 meters. A powerful engine was installed in the tail of the rocket, accelerating it to hypersonic speed. This complex did not reach the army at that time, but technologies are developing intensively and at the present level it is possible to realize ideas that could not be completed until then.
It should also be noted that in terms of armor penetration the TURS is practically equal to the BPS, and they are not so critical to the caliber of the gun. Moreover, tours with GOS are being developed, working on the principle of "shot-and-forget," which, in terms of the combination of parameters, is much more effective than BPS.
Security
The increase in tank security due to armor protection is also approaching its saturation, while other protection methods, such as dynamic, active, optoelectronic and electronic countermeasures that do not require a serious increase in tank mass, are being intensively developed. New ceramic and polymer materials are also being developed for resistance close to armor.
The development of electromagnetic and electrodynamic protection systems for the tank using an electrical impulse to protect against the cumulative jet and core of the BPS, which were started at the All-Russian Research Institute of Steel at the beginning of the 80's, but then not brought to practical implementation due to the lack of energy storage devices of acceptable dimensions, is also being revived. . The rapid development of technologies for these elements, in all likelihood, will allow in the near future to implement these types of protection on tanks.
Increasing the protection of the tank through the use of classic armor is hardly justified, since it leads to a prohibitive increase in the mass of the tank and the inability to use it not only in combat conditions, but also during transportation due to the lack of necessary transport communications, bridges and overpasses, as well as transportation difficulties by rail.
Apparently, the mass of the tank should be of the order of 50 tons, which allows to ensure a sufficiently high level of its basic characteristics.
Mobility
The mobility of the tank, determined by the power plant and the caterpillar mover, does not undergo fundamental changes on the new generation of tanks. Nothing new and realizable has been proposed. A power plant based on a diesel engine or gas turbine engine remains unchanged. Their power increases and the elements of the caterpillar undercarriage are improved, which provide good mobility to the tank. Any exotic propulsion devices (walking, crawling, wheeled, etc.) on the tank did not take root.
Nevertheless, you should probably consider a possible combination of caterpillar and screw propellers, the latter was used in the Blue Bird astronaut’s search engine, developed back in the 1966 year and providing the vehicle with very high cross-country and rough terrain. As a result of such experiments, new approaches to the design of the chassis can be proposed that increase the mobility of the tank in difficult terrain.
Cosmonaut Search Engine "Blue Bird"
Tank handling
Within the framework of the modern concept of “network-centric warfare” and network-centric warfare, the tank must be integrated into a unified battle control system, ensuring the integration of all types of troops participating in a particular operation into a single whole. The system should provide coordination and control of motorized rifle, tank, artillery units, helicopters and fire support aircraft, UAVs, air defense systems, and support and repair and evacuation forces. To include the tank in a network-centric system, it must be equipped with the necessary systems.
All combat units taking part in the operation, including tanks, must automatically detect and display cartographic information about their location in real time, about targets discovered and received from higher commanders, and exchange information on the location of combat units via closed communication channels, the technical condition and supply of ammunition, the state of the enemy to the operational depth, discovered independently or by intelligence obtained from ground and air targets and defense units ones of the enemy, determine their coordinates and transmit to the appropriate level of control, as well as form teams on subordinate control objects. Commanders should be able to control the fire and maneuver of the unit in real time, carry out target designation and target allocation in subordinate units and adjust their fire.
All this can be implemented using a digital information management system that combines all the instruments and systems of the tank into a single integrated tank system and all combat units into a single combat control system. Such a network-centric control system allows you to optimize hostilities and in real time to observe, evaluate the situation and manage the implementation of the task for each commander of the appropriate control level. Tanks in the framework of this system receive a fundamentally new control quality and their effectiveness increases dramatically.
In this system, each tank is already equipped with all the necessary elements for remote control and firing from the tank, as well as its use as a remote-controlled robotic tank.
In modern conditions, without the introduction of network-centric systems, the successful conduct of hostilities will be very problematic. Such systems have long been developed and implemented. On tanks of NATO countries, such as Abrams and Leclerc, the second generation of TIUS is already installed, on Russian tanks individual elements of TIUS are used only on the Armata tank.
It is possible to equip the existing generation of Russian tanks with a tank information management system, but only the hull and turret, power plant and weapons will remain from the tank. All equipment, sighting systems and OMS are subject to replacement and installation of a new generation of devices and systems. The components and assemblies of the tank are subject to refinement under the possibility of remote control using electronic systems. In fact, these will be new tanks that can be integrated into the network-centric combat control system.
In this regard, re-equipping the entire army with a new generation of Armata tanks is impractical and unrealistic. There should be a program for deep modernization of the existing generation of tanks that can fit into the network-centric system on a par with the new generation of tanks and ensure their joint effective use in a combat situation.
When evaluating tanks according to their main characteristics (firepower, security and mobility) in modern conditions of network-centric warfare, it is necessary to evaluate tanks also from the point of view of their controllability within the framework of a single combat control system and the ability to integrate into such a system.
Information