Will Russia have enough oil products in the event of a major war?
In discussion the previous article about the pyrolysis plant "ECUOT" by Sergey Lavrov some opponents, like a chorus, repeated: "There are good reserves of fuel." This topic seemed interesting to me, there is where to apply my military-economic knowledge, and therefore I decided to write something like a short report on how long our reserves of oil products will last in the event of a major war.
I began my research by finding out what the volume of oil storage facilities in Russia is. I could not get the exact data, but from the published information it follows that in Russia there are oil storage facilities of all types with a total volume of 100 million cubic meters. These data refer to the mid-2000s, but the capacity is probably about this level: new oil storage facilities were built and old ones that were already unusable were dismantled.
These are mainly oil storage facilities that are part of the structure of oil pipelines, large refineries, ports and loading terminals. Oil product storage accounts for 22,5 million cubic meters (data for 2011) of this volume. To convert the volume to weight, a density coefficient of 0,8 is taken, since here all oil products are combined, both lighter gasoline and heavier diesel fuel. So, 22,5 million cubic meters is 18 million tons of oil products.
It is interesting that we managed to find information about oil storage facilities in the army. In an article by retired Major General G. M. Shirshov in the “Military-historical "The magazine" indicates that the army has its own oil depots with a capacity of 5,4 million cubic meters and military warehouses with a capacity of 3,6 million cubic meters, together - 10 million cubic meters or 8 million tons of oil products. This data is from 2011 or a little earlier, and it can be assumed that now the army has approximately the same fuel depots.
As far as one can assume, civilian oil depots and military ones are accounted for separately. If this is the case, then Russia as a whole has oil product storage facilities for 32,5 million cubic meters or 26 million tons.
In addition, there are about 15 thousand more filling stations in Russia. They are very different in their capacity, but if we take their average volume of 50 cubic meters, then they will contain 750 thousand cubic meters or 600 thousand tons of oil products. There is also a kind of stock on wheels, that is, railway tanks loaded with oil and oil products. According to data for 2018, Russian Railways, on average, shipped 763 thousand tons of oil and oil products per day, the turnover of tanks was 9 days, so at any moment about 6,8 million tons of oil and oil products are in tanks on the railways.
And one moment. A significant amount of oil is found in oil pipelines. With an operational length of 71 thousand km, their volume is 109,2 million cubic meters or approximately 96 million tons of oil (the average density of Urals oil is 0,88). This oil will remain inside the pipelines even if they are damaged, and if necessary, it can be partially pumped out and used.
So let's put it all together. For an hour, "H" is in the mined state (million cubic meters / million tons):
Oil Storage - 100 / 80
including oil products - 22,5 / 18
Oil pipelines - 109,2 / 96
Railway tanks - 8,5 / 6,8
Gas Station - 0,75 / 0,6
Army Warehouses - 10 / 8
Total - 228,45 / 191,4
Of this amount of oil and oil products, about 158 million tons are oil, which with simple processing will give about 79 million tons of oil products, and with cracking - about 110 million tons of oil products. Thus, available for an hour "H", that is, the beginning of the war, the reserve for oil products can be estimated at 33,6 million tons of finished oil products ready for use (assume that all containers are filled), and 79-110 million tons , which can be produced from the oil already produced and in the tanks and oil pipelines.
Now consumption. Without estimates of consumption, it is generally impossible to judge whether the reserves are large or small. If there is no data on consumption, then any figures for reserves are fiction, no matter how huge and impressive they may seem. The true picture is given only by comparing stocks with consumption and the calculated period of their expenditure.
In general, our statistics on the consumption of petroleum products is extremely unreliable and official data greatly underestimate the volume of consumption. So, when comparing statistics for the Novgorod region with data obtained from surveys of industrial consumers and gas stations, they showed more than a twofold discrepancy. Statistics gave 64 thousand tons, and polls - 136 thousand tons.
But nevertheless, since this question was of interest to many, pretty good estimates were made. According to the fuel balance of the Center for the Efficient Use of Energy (CENEF) for 2010, we have the following peacetime consumption (in million tons):
Industry - 6,4
Railways - 3,1
Cars - 83,5
Other transport - 10,2
Agriculture - 3,5
Non-Energy Goals - 23,1
Total - 131,6
This structure of final consumption also includes the consumption of oil products in the army, which, according to Deputy Defense Minister, General of the Army Dmitry Bulgakov, amounted to 2 million tons.
Now the consumption of petroleum products has grown due to the growing motorization. In 2010, there were 32,6 million cars in Russia, and in 2018 - 51,8 million.If, as can be judged from the data for 2010, each million cars consumed 2,5 million tons of fuel per year, now consumption by road transport should be about 129,5 million tons. Taking into account this amendment, the consumption of petroleum products in 2018 should have amounted to 177,6 million tons.
So, even in peacetime, our daily consumption of petroleum products is 486 thousand tons, and the available stocks of finished petroleum products are enough for 38 days, or for five weeks, and the stock in all gas stations in the country will be enough for cars for two days. Fuel consumption is ensured through constant oil production, transportation, processing, and constant supply of oil products to consumers. The stock of finished petroleum products plays a purely auxiliary role in balancing production and transportation, on the one hand, and consumption, on the other. It takes about three days from the receipt of oil to the refinery to the delivery of gasoline or diesel fuel to the filling station, so intermediate stocks of oil products at wholesale oil depots are necessary.
In the conditions of a major war, in which the enemy will try to do everything missile knock out power generation and oil refining with strikes, the situation will, of course, change radically. Although it is quite difficult to make precise estimates, both due to the obvious lack of data and the difficulty of making a specific assessment of possible damage, we will nevertheless try to estimate what will happen.
I proceed from the worst-case scenario that the enemy managed to disable all 34 large refineries in Russia for a long time. This can be achieved with high precision weapons, and nuclear strikes. High-precision missiles can destroy or severely damage the main distillation columns of factories, after which the plant will not be able to process oil until they are restored or replaced (which is very difficult; a large column is a piece product, its production and installation take a long time). A nuclear strike turns the refinery into a fire and a pile of scrap metal.
There are 34 large refineries in Russia with a total capacity of 284,1 million tons and another 80 mini-refineries with a total capacity of 11,3 million tons. After a massive missile attack, most likely, we will only have the latter, which can produce about 6,7 million tons of oil products per year (with a processing depth of 60%). And there will still be a stock of finished petroleum products of about 33,6 million tons at the start of the war. When consumed at peacetime level, this is a 70 day supply. During this time, mini-refineries will produce about 1,2 million tons of oil products, which increases the stock by another two days of consumption. Frankly, very sparsely.
Wartime consumption should also change dramatically in the direction of reducing insignificant fuel consumption. What can be shortened?
The industry cannot be touched - it is ore and raw materials, without which military production is impossible. Non-energy needs for petroleum products, that is, when they are used in production, also remain. The railways must not be touched either. The current consumption of the railways is 2,5 million tons, but due to the fact that the enemy will also hit the electric power industry, the railways will have to switch from electric traction (86% of the total energy consumption) to diesel and they will put all diesel locomotives on the run. they only exist.
I think that 4 million tons is for the railways. Agriculture must also have fuel - one cannot fight without bread.
That is, road transport, which consumes the most, falls under the reduction. But you can't cut all of it either. It is involved in the transportation and distribution of food and products to the population, and without these transportation, the people will simply starve to death. In the structure of automobile consumption, about 35% is accounted for by diesel fuel, that is, mainly trucks. They will use 45,3 million tons per year.
A significant part of the cargo will be transferred from the railways, which have lost their electricity, to cars. How much is difficult to say. According to my calculations, in order to carry out transportation by cars in the amount of 2393 billion ton-kilometers (this is the share of transportation currently accounted for by electric traction), 34,7 million tons would be required. But export and transit rail cargo will disappear, and domestic traffic accounted for about 40% of the total cargo turnover. 14% is its own diesel traction, and cars can carry another 26% of the turnover. This would require another 10,5 million tons of fuel.
Now for more complex calculations. How much will the army spend in combat conditions? Of course, more than 2 million tons, since combat training is still not a war. But how much exactly? Apparently, we do not have exact calculations. But this can be assessed indirectly, through the consumption of fuel and lubricants of the 40th Army in Afghanistan, which was waging a war. The motorization of the 40th Army was generally about the same as that of the current Russian army. In total, the 110-strong Soviet contingent consumed 10 million tons of fuels and lubricants over the 4 years of the war, that is, about 400 thousand tons per year (the daily supply ranged from 700 to 1500 tons, as follows from the data on the 276th pipeline brigade, in average about 1000 tons per day).
Thus, if we assume that a 100-strong group with all the military and automotive equipment it needs spends 400 tons per year of wars, we can roughly estimate that an army of a million people with the required equipment will consume 4 million tons. And what will be the size of the army in a big war? In my opinion, in order to fight NATO forces and have a chance of military success, it is necessary to recruit an army of about 4 million people. Total - 16 million tons of oil products consumption by the army.
The government has 50 thousand cars, which, with an average annual consumption of 2,5 tons of fuel per car, gives 125 thousand tons of fuel per year. Finally, some personal vehicles can also remain in use with some fuel consumption. If we assume that only 10% of private cars will receive gasoline, then this is another 8,4 million tons of fuel per year. Other transport, that is, planes and ships, will also use up something, but we can assume that in the amount of about 1 million tons. And another 2 million tons must be delivered to the northern delivery, so that the regions of the Far North do not die out from hunger and cold.
You don't seem to have forgotten anything? Then let us bring together all the consumption of wartime after the mobilization (in million tons):
Industry - 6,4
Railways - 4
Agriculture - 3,5
Non-Energy Goals - 23,1
Trucks - 45,3
Railway cargo by road transport - 10,5
Army - 16
Power - 0,12
Personal vehicles - 8,4
Other transport - 1
Northern delivery - 2
Total - 120,32
And in wartime it turns out pretty well. This is an interesting feature of the military economy, that the army consumes relatively little fuel, and its main consumption occurs in the civilian sector. Even if we reduce something else, the total annual consumption of petroleum products in wartime is unlikely to be reduced by less than 90 million tons. Let's consider it like this. With a level of 120 million tons, daily consumption will be 329 thousand tons, and with a level of 90 million tons - 246 thousand tons.
And one more amendment needed to assess the situation at the start of the war. Since you cannot create a mobilization army of 4 million people in a few days, we will have an available army of about a million people with a consumption of 4 million tons or 10,9 thousand tons per day. The military stock is 8 million tons. The civilian sector without the military, according to the above wartime consumption, consumes 285 thousand tons per day.
So, the military their reserves of fuel and lubricants with an army of one million people will be enough for two years. But do not rush to rejoice. The civilian sector, even if its consumption is reorganized according to the structure of wartime consumption, will exhaust its available reserves of 25,6 million tons in just 9 days. This is without taking into account the inevitable mess, confusion, abuse and embezzlement at the beginning of a war, so to speak, in an exemplary manner. The remaining factories will produce about 165 thousand tons of oil products in nine days, which, if it prolongs the agony, will not be long.
Hence the conclusion: if the enemy brings us large refineries, then Russia will hold out for only a week, and then there will be an economic collapse and defeat due to the complete depletion of the remaining reserves of oil products. An army can try to fight and even defeat someone, but it cannot wage a war with a completely disorganized rear, left with dry tanks.
What is the minimum refining capacity at which Russia can stand on its feet and be able to wage a long war? Based on the above figures, it is not difficult to calculate. With 70% oil refining - 128,5 million tons, with simple processing (distillation without cracking, which yields about 50% of motor fuel from our oil grades) - 180 million tons. These powers must be dispersed and reliably protected from missile attacks. We do not have such military mobilization capacities. Mini-refineries, which can be considered relatively protected, account for only 6% of the required volume.
Even if they were, they would not have enough oil. Production in the European part of Russia, that is, in that part of the country from where oil can be somehow delivered for processing, and then oil products can be delivered to consumers (oil from Western and Eastern Siberia will largely disappear due to the huge distance and transportation difficulties in case of damaged oil pipelines ), is 88,2 million tons per year (44 million tons of oil products with simple processing), of which 71 million tons are in the Volga region (Tatarstan, Bashkiria and the Astrakhan region). And the enemy can capture this region with an offensive from the territory of Ukraine.
In general, we lost the world war, whatever one may say. And "good fuel supplies", which some people see, will not help us in any way. For a big war, and for the stability of the economy from any military attack, a radical restructuring of the entire economy of the country, especially the fuel one, is required.
Cash reserves
I began my research by finding out what the volume of oil storage facilities in Russia is. I could not get the exact data, but from the published information it follows that in Russia there are oil storage facilities of all types with a total volume of 100 million cubic meters. These data refer to the mid-2000s, but the capacity is probably about this level: new oil storage facilities were built and old ones that were already unusable were dismantled.
Large oil storage in Perm region
These are mainly oil storage facilities that are part of the structure of oil pipelines, large refineries, ports and loading terminals. Oil product storage accounts for 22,5 million cubic meters (data for 2011) of this volume. To convert the volume to weight, a density coefficient of 0,8 is taken, since here all oil products are combined, both lighter gasoline and heavier diesel fuel. So, 22,5 million cubic meters is 18 million tons of oil products.
It is interesting that we managed to find information about oil storage facilities in the army. In an article by retired Major General G. M. Shirshov in the “Military-historical "The magazine" indicates that the army has its own oil depots with a capacity of 5,4 million cubic meters and military warehouses with a capacity of 3,6 million cubic meters, together - 10 million cubic meters or 8 million tons of oil products. This data is from 2011 or a little earlier, and it can be assumed that now the army has approximately the same fuel depots.
Fuel and lubricants army warehouses are not as grandiose as civilian ones.
As far as one can assume, civilian oil depots and military ones are accounted for separately. If this is the case, then Russia as a whole has oil product storage facilities for 32,5 million cubic meters or 26 million tons.
In addition, there are about 15 thousand more filling stations in Russia. They are very different in their capacity, but if we take their average volume of 50 cubic meters, then they will contain 750 thousand cubic meters or 600 thousand tons of oil products. There is also a kind of stock on wheels, that is, railway tanks loaded with oil and oil products. According to data for 2018, Russian Railways, on average, shipped 763 thousand tons of oil and oil products per day, the turnover of tanks was 9 days, so at any moment about 6,8 million tons of oil and oil products are in tanks on the railways.
Bulk train at the station. At every moment on the railways there are approximately 145 of thousands of tanks loaded with oil and oil products.
And one moment. A significant amount of oil is found in oil pipelines. With an operational length of 71 thousand km, their volume is 109,2 million cubic meters or approximately 96 million tons of oil (the average density of Urals oil is 0,88). This oil will remain inside the pipelines even if they are damaged, and if necessary, it can be partially pumped out and used.
So let's put it all together. For an hour, "H" is in the mined state (million cubic meters / million tons):
Oil Storage - 100 / 80
including oil products - 22,5 / 18
Oil pipelines - 109,2 / 96
Railway tanks - 8,5 / 6,8
Gas Station - 0,75 / 0,6
Army Warehouses - 10 / 8
Total - 228,45 / 191,4
Of this amount of oil and oil products, about 158 million tons are oil, which with simple processing will give about 79 million tons of oil products, and with cracking - about 110 million tons of oil products. Thus, available for an hour "H", that is, the beginning of the war, the reserve for oil products can be estimated at 33,6 million tons of finished oil products ready for use (assume that all containers are filled), and 79-110 million tons , which can be produced from the oil already produced and in the tanks and oil pipelines.
Peace Consumption
Now consumption. Without estimates of consumption, it is generally impossible to judge whether the reserves are large or small. If there is no data on consumption, then any figures for reserves are fiction, no matter how huge and impressive they may seem. The true picture is given only by comparing stocks with consumption and the calculated period of their expenditure.
In general, our statistics on the consumption of petroleum products is extremely unreliable and official data greatly underestimate the volume of consumption. So, when comparing statistics for the Novgorod region with data obtained from surveys of industrial consumers and gas stations, they showed more than a twofold discrepancy. Statistics gave 64 thousand tons, and polls - 136 thousand tons.
But nevertheless, since this question was of interest to many, pretty good estimates were made. According to the fuel balance of the Center for the Efficient Use of Energy (CENEF) for 2010, we have the following peacetime consumption (in million tons):
Industry - 6,4
Railways - 3,1
Cars - 83,5
Other transport - 10,2
Agriculture - 3,5
Non-Energy Goals - 23,1
Total - 131,6
This structure of final consumption also includes the consumption of oil products in the army, which, according to Deputy Defense Minister, General of the Army Dmitry Bulgakov, amounted to 2 million tons.
Now the consumption of petroleum products has grown due to the growing motorization. In 2010, there were 32,6 million cars in Russia, and in 2018 - 51,8 million.If, as can be judged from the data for 2010, each million cars consumed 2,5 million tons of fuel per year, now consumption by road transport should be about 129,5 million tons. Taking into account this amendment, the consumption of petroleum products in 2018 should have amounted to 177,6 million tons.
So, even in peacetime, our daily consumption of petroleum products is 486 thousand tons, and the available stocks of finished petroleum products are enough for 38 days, or for five weeks, and the stock in all gas stations in the country will be enough for cars for two days. Fuel consumption is ensured through constant oil production, transportation, processing, and constant supply of oil products to consumers. The stock of finished petroleum products plays a purely auxiliary role in balancing production and transportation, on the one hand, and consumption, on the other. It takes about three days from the receipt of oil to the refinery to the delivery of gasoline or diesel fuel to the filling station, so intermediate stocks of oil products at wholesale oil depots are necessary.
Supplies - for a week of war
In the conditions of a major war, in which the enemy will try to do everything missile knock out power generation and oil refining with strikes, the situation will, of course, change radically. Although it is quite difficult to make precise estimates, both due to the obvious lack of data and the difficulty of making a specific assessment of possible damage, we will nevertheless try to estimate what will happen.
I proceed from the worst-case scenario that the enemy managed to disable all 34 large refineries in Russia for a long time. This can be achieved with high precision weapons, and nuclear strikes. High-precision missiles can destroy or severely damage the main distillation columns of factories, after which the plant will not be able to process oil until they are restored or replaced (which is very difficult; a large column is a piece product, its production and installation take a long time). A nuclear strike turns the refinery into a fire and a pile of scrap metal.
Oil refineries already burn quite well, even without missiles and nuclear explosions. The photo shows the fire of a tar visbreaking unit at the Saratov Oil Refinery in October 2012, after which the plant did not work for four days, and the installation, which was not the most important, was excluded from the production cycle. The cause of the fire is a malfunction of the drain valve.
There are 34 large refineries in Russia with a total capacity of 284,1 million tons and another 80 mini-refineries with a total capacity of 11,3 million tons. After a massive missile attack, most likely, we will only have the latter, which can produce about 6,7 million tons of oil products per year (with a processing depth of 60%). And there will still be a stock of finished petroleum products of about 33,6 million tons at the start of the war. When consumed at peacetime level, this is a 70 day supply. During this time, mini-refineries will produce about 1,2 million tons of oil products, which increases the stock by another two days of consumption. Frankly, very sparsely.
Wartime consumption should also change dramatically in the direction of reducing insignificant fuel consumption. What can be shortened?
The industry cannot be touched - it is ore and raw materials, without which military production is impossible. Non-energy needs for petroleum products, that is, when they are used in production, also remain. The railways must not be touched either. The current consumption of the railways is 2,5 million tons, but due to the fact that the enemy will also hit the electric power industry, the railways will have to switch from electric traction (86% of the total energy consumption) to diesel and they will put all diesel locomotives on the run. they only exist.
Diesel traction. Quite often used in oil transportation.
I think that 4 million tons is for the railways. Agriculture must also have fuel - one cannot fight without bread.
That is, road transport, which consumes the most, falls under the reduction. But you can't cut all of it either. It is involved in the transportation and distribution of food and products to the population, and without these transportation, the people will simply starve to death. In the structure of automobile consumption, about 35% is accounted for by diesel fuel, that is, mainly trucks. They will use 45,3 million tons per year.
A significant part of the cargo will be transferred from the railways, which have lost their electricity, to cars. How much is difficult to say. According to my calculations, in order to carry out transportation by cars in the amount of 2393 billion ton-kilometers (this is the share of transportation currently accounted for by electric traction), 34,7 million tons would be required. But export and transit rail cargo will disappear, and domestic traffic accounted for about 40% of the total cargo turnover. 14% is its own diesel traction, and cars can carry another 26% of the turnover. This would require another 10,5 million tons of fuel.
Now for more complex calculations. How much will the army spend in combat conditions? Of course, more than 2 million tons, since combat training is still not a war. But how much exactly? Apparently, we do not have exact calculations. But this can be assessed indirectly, through the consumption of fuel and lubricants of the 40th Army in Afghanistan, which was waging a war. The motorization of the 40th Army was generally about the same as that of the current Russian army. In total, the 110-strong Soviet contingent consumed 10 million tons of fuels and lubricants over the 4 years of the war, that is, about 400 thousand tons per year (the daily supply ranged from 700 to 1500 tons, as follows from the data on the 276th pipeline brigade, in average about 1000 tons per day).
Thus, if we assume that a 100-strong group with all the military and automotive equipment it needs spends 400 tons per year of wars, we can roughly estimate that an army of a million people with the required equipment will consume 4 million tons. And what will be the size of the army in a big war? In my opinion, in order to fight NATO forces and have a chance of military success, it is necessary to recruit an army of about 4 million people. Total - 16 million tons of oil products consumption by the army.
The government has 50 thousand cars, which, with an average annual consumption of 2,5 tons of fuel per car, gives 125 thousand tons of fuel per year. Finally, some personal vehicles can also remain in use with some fuel consumption. If we assume that only 10% of private cars will receive gasoline, then this is another 8,4 million tons of fuel per year. Other transport, that is, planes and ships, will also use up something, but we can assume that in the amount of about 1 million tons. And another 2 million tons must be delivered to the northern delivery, so that the regions of the Far North do not die out from hunger and cold.
You don't seem to have forgotten anything? Then let us bring together all the consumption of wartime after the mobilization (in million tons):
Industry - 6,4
Railways - 4
Agriculture - 3,5
Non-Energy Goals - 23,1
Trucks - 45,3
Railway cargo by road transport - 10,5
Army - 16
Power - 0,12
Personal vehicles - 8,4
Other transport - 1
Northern delivery - 2
Total - 120,32
And in wartime it turns out pretty well. This is an interesting feature of the military economy, that the army consumes relatively little fuel, and its main consumption occurs in the civilian sector. Even if we reduce something else, the total annual consumption of petroleum products in wartime is unlikely to be reduced by less than 90 million tons. Let's consider it like this. With a level of 120 million tons, daily consumption will be 329 thousand tons, and with a level of 90 million tons - 246 thousand tons.
And one more amendment needed to assess the situation at the start of the war. Since you cannot create a mobilization army of 4 million people in a few days, we will have an available army of about a million people with a consumption of 4 million tons or 10,9 thousand tons per day. The military stock is 8 million tons. The civilian sector without the military, according to the above wartime consumption, consumes 285 thousand tons per day.
So, the military their reserves of fuel and lubricants with an army of one million people will be enough for two years. But do not rush to rejoice. The civilian sector, even if its consumption is reorganized according to the structure of wartime consumption, will exhaust its available reserves of 25,6 million tons in just 9 days. This is without taking into account the inevitable mess, confusion, abuse and embezzlement at the beginning of a war, so to speak, in an exemplary manner. The remaining factories will produce about 165 thousand tons of oil products in nine days, which, if it prolongs the agony, will not be long.
Hence the conclusion: if the enemy brings us large refineries, then Russia will hold out for only a week, and then there will be an economic collapse and defeat due to the complete depletion of the remaining reserves of oil products. An army can try to fight and even defeat someone, but it cannot wage a war with a completely disorganized rear, left with dry tanks.
What is the minimum refining capacity at which Russia can stand on its feet and be able to wage a long war? Based on the above figures, it is not difficult to calculate. With 70% oil refining - 128,5 million tons, with simple processing (distillation without cracking, which yields about 50% of motor fuel from our oil grades) - 180 million tons. These powers must be dispersed and reliably protected from missile attacks. We do not have such military mobilization capacities. Mini-refineries, which can be considered relatively protected, account for only 6% of the required volume.
Even if they were, they would not have enough oil. Production in the European part of Russia, that is, in that part of the country from where oil can be somehow delivered for processing, and then oil products can be delivered to consumers (oil from Western and Eastern Siberia will largely disappear due to the huge distance and transportation difficulties in case of damaged oil pipelines ), is 88,2 million tons per year (44 million tons of oil products with simple processing), of which 71 million tons are in the Volga region (Tatarstan, Bashkiria and the Astrakhan region). And the enemy can capture this region with an offensive from the territory of Ukraine.
In general, we lost the world war, whatever one may say. And "good fuel supplies", which some people see, will not help us in any way. For a big war, and for the stability of the economy from any military attack, a radical restructuring of the entire economy of the country, especially the fuel one, is required.
Information