German command against Soviet intelligence

In the previous part A review of the disappeared infantry units and formations of the enemy, concentrated at the borders of PribOVO and ZAPOVO, was begun. Among the disappeared infantry regiments (pp) and infantry divisions (pd) many had numbers known to our intelligence. For a long time, these formations were located in or near settlements; local residents could talk about them.

It is possible that in crowded places, servicemen of these formations deliberately started talking about their units.
The detection of many settlements, and their identification by numbers could occur by their names, the signs of which were on the shoulder straps of the military. Most likely, this happened on the orders of the German command. To “complicate” the detection of infantry troops by our intelligence, German troops sometimes removed signs and numbers from shoulder straps, but shoulder straps or clutches themselves did not change. In this case, unburned traces from the removed signs were visible on the shoulder straps ...

Part of the “discovered” compounds either did not exist at 22.6.41 or was located far from the places of their discovery by our intelligence. The vicious method of detecting German units was used by analogy: if it was visually detected before the enemy company with insignia of the enemy, then somewhere nearby could be the indicated regiment or one of its battalions. At the same time, many numbers of compounds concentrated at the border were never found ...

A little more about the enemy infantry at the borders of Pribovo and Zapovo

In addition to the frontier, there were six more security divisions (207, 221, 281, 285, 286 and 403) at the borders of PribOVO and ZAPOVO. The numbers of these divisions in intelligence materials (Goals Difference) are absent. With security divisions, the number of infantry formations at the border reached 57. Our intelligence, watching the German troops in May – June of the 1941 year, “learned” the numbers 43-sd, of which coincided with the actual 16 numbers. At first glance: the result is more or less positive.

However, there are suspicious oddities:

- on 22 of June 1941, thirteen of the indicated divisions did not exist (39, 40, 43, 54, 154, 264, 301, 307, 431, 454, 509, 521 and 525);

- The 14 and 16 infantry regiments were reorganized into motorized divisions in the autumn of 1940, and their troops could not walk with insignia of infantry units if such an order was not given to them;

- Five front offices were located in France (205, 208, 212, 216 and 223) and two in Romania (22 and 24);

- 213-I was disbanded 15.3.41, and its regiments were sent to the formation of three security divisions.

It turns out that up to 40% of divisions with known and confirmed numbers could not be near the borders of PribOVO and ZAPOVO! And the intelligence services regularly tracked them ... It is possible that our intelligence officers did not even find all the fictitious formations that the German intelligence services had palmed out to them. It’s just that where some fictitious formations “appeared”, our scouts weren’t there ...

Infantry units and formations against KOVO

At the border of the KOVO zone of responsibility were 21 front, 4 light front and 3 security divisions. Of the 25 divisions whose numbers became known to our intelligence, only nine (32%) were true.

The grouping of the 28 division included the 74 infantry regiment, of which the 14 numbers (19%) were known to the intelligence.

The 1 and 4th mountain rifle divisions concentrated against the KOVO included the 13, 91, 98 and 99 mountain rifle regiments. In RM there is an indication of the number of only one regiment - 136, which was absent in the indicated divisions. Either the intelligence was mistaken, or the extra number “6” appeared on the shoulder straps of the servicemen of the lighted regiment at the present time ...

Of the 25 divisions with numbers known to our intelligence in the KOVO area of ​​responsibility:

- on 22.6.41 there were not ten (39, 156, 193, 237, 249, 308, 365, 372, 379 and 393);

- 86-I PD - was in reserve army group "North";

- 96-I was in the West and 183-I was in the Balkans;

- The 14 and 18 infantry regiments were reorganized into motorized in the autumn of the 1940 and could not bear the insignia of the infantry division.

It turns out that 60% of these divisions could not be near the border of the KOVO, but they were seen ...

Artillery regiments

It is quite difficult to accurately track the change in the number of artillery regiments, since not all of the RM got data on them. You can only conduct a simplified assessment of artillery regiments located in the area of ​​responsibility of PribOVO and ZAPOVO.

In accordance with the summary of the Reconnaissance Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft about enemy grouping in 1.6.41, 56 artillery regiments (excluding anti-aircraft and anti-tank) were found in the territory under consideration. According to RM PribOVO and ZAPOVO, as of June 17-21 and the cards that were presented to you earlier, there are 45 artillery regiments (excluding two regiments in the city of Lodz, information on which is missing after 1 June). Therefore, it can be said that an increase in artillery units of the enemy against the forces of PribOVO and ZAPOVO in June was not detected by intelligence. Even there was a decrease in their number. In the same way, as there was no increase in the number of German divisions at our border in the area of ​​responsibility of the three districts, which we have already considered.

The decrease in the number of artillery regiments should be associated with the movement of artillery to new places of deployment, which were difficult to access for the population and for our sources of information.

Large headquarters of German associations

Consider the information that our intelligence delivered about the headquarters of large formations of German troops: about the command of army groups, about the headquarters of field armies and tank groups. By the presence and location of such headquarters, one can judge the enemy's groupings and his plans. The figure shows generally known information about the headquarters of large associations concentrated near the border by June 22.

The figure shows the numbers of the armies at our border, which passed along the Republic of Moldova during the 1940 - 21.6.41 period.

Of the seven armies available at the border by June 22, in the Republic of Moldova, six were mentioned! Very good result! However, in the Republic of Moldova there is not a single tank group number ... Is this intelligence success or not? Let's look at this issue in more detail.

One of the writers who classifies himself as a historian wrote on the website that the lack of information in the RM about motorized corps and tank groups of the enemy is due to the fact that the leadership of the spacecraft from non-commissioned companies was easier to consider ... The author strongly disagrees! In RM, everything that intelligence managed to find out was given. What associations or headquarters they found out about and wrote about. If the data was not verified, from other sources, then some kind of phrase was added. For example, “data need clarification.” What the scouts did not know about and did not write about!

In January of 1940 of the year, Intelligence No. 1 stated:

... The German army has a division on the western border of 91 ... All of the above divisions are combined into five army groups, the numbering of which, like the numbering of army corps and divisions, has not been established ...

We can say that on the Western front of our intelligence there simply were no sources of information. And it is right! There were no such sources not only on the Western Front, but also in large headquarters in Germany and in the headquarters of associations deployed near our border.

The first alarm bell: the Germans learned to mask the locations and names of their large headquarters. A series of renaming and reorganization with a change in the deployment of headquarters, associations at all levels confused our intelligence. The author claims that the absence in most RMs of data on army groups and tank groups, armies, army and motorized corps is due to the lack of intelligence data on their location and structure.

In the Polish campaign participated: Army Group “South” in the 8, 10, 14 Army and Army Group “North” in the 3 and 4 Army. After the war in Poland, both army groups and four armies (except the 4) changed their names and were moved to the Western Front.

Let us briefly consider the change in the 1939-1941 years of the names of large Wehrmacht associations and their movement. We will only talk about those formations that by the 22 June 1941 of the year will be at our border.

The command of Army Group South was formed in August 1939 and operated in Poland. On October 3 it was renamed the Vostok command and led the troops on the Soviet-German demarcation line. On October 20 there was another change of name to the command of the army group "А"Who participated in the war in the West. Based on the headquarters of Army Group A, the West Command was created. Since 1.4.41, the redeployment of command “A” to the Soviet-German border began. In order to disguise the command of Army Group “A” was called the “headquarters of the Silesia Division”, and on June 22 it was renamed the command of Army Group “South”.

Army Group CommandВ"Was created 12.10.39 g., As a result of renaming of the army group" North "redeployed from Poland to the west. The new command participated in the war in France. Since 16.8.40, the redeployment of the command to Poland began, in which it led the troops on the Soviet-German demarcation line, and 22.6.41 was renamed the command of the Army Group Center.

Army Group CommandС"Was formed in August 1939 of the year and relocated to the Western Front. In November, the 1940 command was relocated to German territory, and from 20.4.41 its transfer to East Prussia began. In a new place, the command received, for the purpose of disguise, the name "headquarters of the East Prussia sector", and on June 22 was renamed the command of the Army Group North.

From the information presented it is clear that from mid-August 1940, the command of Army Group B begins to be relocated to Poland, and the other two commands will only begin to move to our border in April 1941.

4-th Army. Formed in August 1939 year. The fighting in Poland and France. Since 12.9.40, it began its relocation to Poland under the command of Army Group B.

6-th Army. Formed in October 1939 year by renaming the 10 Army. Participation in hostilities in France. Until 17.4.41 is in Normandy. From April 18, it begins its relocation to Poland, and in May of the 1941 of the year it becomes subordinate to Group A

9-th Army. Formed in May 1940 on the basis of the Vostok corps command. Located in the West. Since 18.4.41, its redeployment from Belgium and Northern France to Poland begins, and in May of 1941, it became subordinate to Army Group B.

11-th Army. Formed in October 1940 and was subordinate to Army Group C in Germany. Since June 1941, the subordination of Army Group "A". It was deployed in Romania.

12-th Army. Formed in October 1939 year by renaming the 14 Army. From 3.7.40 to 31.12.40, it was in France. In March - May 1941 of the year - in Bulgaria, from 4 of June to 31 of December - in southern Serbia and Albania.

16-th Army. Formed in October 1939 year, by renaming the 3 Army, and sent to the Western Front. Since 18.4.41, its redeployment from the Netherlands to East Prussia begins. Since May 1941 of the year is subordinate to Army Group "C".

17-th Army. Formed in December 1940 year. Since January 1941 of the year it was subordinate to Army Group B on the Soviet-German line of demarcation, and from May it was transferred to the subordination of Army Group A. It was stationed in Poland.

18-th Army. Formed in November 1939 of the year and was subordinate to Army Group B in the West. Until 20.7.40, it was located in Southeastern France in the OKH reserve. On 21 July, its redeployment to the eastern border began. Since May 1941 of the year was subordinate to Army Group "C".

From the data presented it can be seen that at the end of July 1940, the redeployment of the 18 Army to the East began. Following her from 12 September sent to Poland 4-I army. In January 1941, the next 17 Army was sent to Poland.

From April 18, the redeployment of three armies begins at once: the 6, 9, and 16. In June, the last, the 11 Army, arrives. According to German sites, the 12 Army was not in the area of ​​responsibility of our border districts in 1941.

1939-1940 year intelligence reports

In the database of the fund A.N. Yakovlev there are quite a lot of intelligence reports of the 5th Directorate of the Red Army (the future Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft) about the German troops from 1938 until the summer of 1940, but they are somewhat faceless militarily. Similar reports are available in books on military intelligence. They contain a lot of general education information and little information about the troops, their locations and numbers ...

Examples are typical PM: 16.12.39 Summary. or 3.5.40 Summary.. You can not watch them - you will not lose much ...

In the "Brief Overview of the German-Polish War" of the 5th Office of the Red Army in September 1939, German groups, army numbers, and the approximate number of divisions are mentioned, but there is no such an abundance of numbers that will appear much later. In RM, of course, there are numbers, but they are few ...

After the defeat of the Anglo-French troops of 9.7.40, a meeting was held between the deputy chief of the General Staff Smorodinov and the German military attache Kestring. The position of the Chief of the General Staff of Germany was brought up:

... Troops will be transferred to permanent locations in East Prussia, and for the formation of new garrisons in Poland, since in the west they now do not need to hold a lot of troops. In this regard, large troop movements will be made throughout East Prussia and across Poland, literally, "there will be strong troop movements." Given that the transfer of troops always causes undesirable interpretations in the foreign press, the chief of the general staff of the German army instructed him to inform the General Staff of the spacecraft in advance, before the start of military transport ...

In the 20.7.40 Summary, information appears in the usual form (from the point of view of the 1941 year) with a large number of formation numbers. The article summarizes in truncated form. You can familiarize yourself with it in more detail. in the fund database.

... Grouping of German troops on 16.7.40, taking into account the newly arrived units:
In V. Prussia - up to 13 front, of which up to two motorized divisions, a tank brigade, 6 tank battalions and 7 cavalry regiments.
- The corps headquarters are marked in Koenigsberg and Insterburg (numbering not established).
- Headquarters divisions: 21 front to Letzen, 10 front in Suwalki and 161 front to Koenigsberg; unspecified numbering - in Tilsit, in Ragnit, in Insterburg and in Ortelsburg.

- In the area of ​​Danzig, more than an infantry division were established, the headquarters of the 20th AK and the headquarters of the 18 front ...

On the territory of the former Poland, up to 28 front, tank regiment, tank part of undetermined strength and numbering, and 5 regiments. In addition, according to the NKVD, which requires verification, from 1 to 7.7 to 7 traffic arrived in the Warsaw area.

Large headquarters are installed in the following locations:
— eastern group headquarters to Lodz;
— army headquarters: 1 in Warsaw and 4 in Krakow;
— army corps headquarters: XXI to Poznan, III to Lodz, XXXII to Lublin, VII to Krakow and unidentified numbering in Warsaw;
— headquarters of infantry divisions: 42 to Lochow, 182 and 431 to Lodz, 530 to Nebory, 218 to Kloum, 424 to Krakow, 28 to Nowy Sacz, 139 to GD in Gorlice and unidentified numbering: to Bydgoszcz, Pozn, to Torn in Warsaw, in Sieradz, in Radom, in Lublin, in Kielce, in Zamosc, in Rzeszow and Tarnow ...

The Summary contains quite a lot of German formations. Regarding connections with numbers, there is no clarification inscription that the data requires clarification, i.e. All data is confirmed and not in doubt. Let's see what formations the German generals slipped into our intelligence.

The largest headquarters is “eastern group headquarters to Lodz. ” This headquarters is spoken of as of 15.6.40. This fictitious headquarters will be mentioned in the Intelligence Directorates for 31.5.41 and 15.6.41, and is also marked on the map of ZAPOVO headquarters as of 21.6.41 only in the city of Tomashov.

Consider the smaller headquarters: “Army Headquarters: 1 in Warsaw and 4 in Krakow”.

Headquarters of the 1 Army from the fall of the 1939 of the year, he was in western fortified positions in France until the 31.7.44 of the year and could not have been in Poland. Only if he was not portrayed by some unit that actively shone signs on their shoulder straps.

Headquarters of the 4 Army will begin its movement in Poland only in September 1940 years and someone portrays it the same. There is another version: our intelligence knew in advance about the movement of this headquarters ... But it does not stand up to criticism, since all other data is also more misinformation!

The Summary refers to the headquarters of the army corps (AK): "AK headquarters: XXI in Poznan, III in Lodz, XXXII in Lublin, VII in Krakow ..." и “The headquarters of the 20th AK was in Danzig.

3th AK - in Poland in September 1939 of the year, and then went to the West. From the 5 of July 1940 of the year he returns to Poland. PM confirmed.

7th AK - in September 1939 was noted in Poland, and in December of the same year it was already in the city of Trier (Germany). Then it travels to the West and is deployed in Verdun and on the English Channel until January 1941. It can not be celebrated in June - July 1940 of the year in Poland ...

20th AK - formed 17.10.40 g. Comments are not required ...

21th AK - from October 1939 to January 1940 is in Germany. In March, 1940 was reorganized into the “21 group” and sent to Norway. The mummers could portray him in Poznan together with the headquarters of the Eastern Group ...

32th AK - It will be formed only in April 1945 of the year, but for now it exists only in the person of a fictitious formation ...

We have now reached the divisions. 10-I PD noted in Suwalki. However, from December 1939 to May 1940 of the year it is located in the city of Marburg (Germany), and from May 19 it has already been noted in France. In November 1940 of the year, 10-I will return to Germany ...

18-I PD until 23.10.39, it was in Poland, from October 25 in West Germany, from 1.1.40. - The Netherlands, from May to 24 July - in France. Next, she will be reorganized into a motorized division ...

21-I PD noted in the city of Letzen. Again misinformation or mummers. Since January 21, the 1940 Division has been located in Eifel (Germany), in March - Luxembourg, in June - in Germany and Belgium, from July to 12.9.40 - France, and only then will go to East Prussia. But the German generals themselves did not suspect this in June of 1940 ...

161-I PD in January 1940 of the year is in East Prussia, from the 4 of May - in Germany, Luxembourg and on the 8 of July returns to East Prussia. Intelligence could simply miss its loss. Later, she was lucky that she again surfaced in East Prussia.

The remaining headquarters of the divisions with known numbers will be considered in bulk: “The headquarters of the infantry divisions: 42 in Lochow, 182 and 431 in Lodz, 530 in Nebory, 218 in Pulawy, 424 in Kholm, 28 in Krakow, 139 in Nowy Sacz, 2 GSS in Gorlice”.

Infantry divisions with numbers 42, 139, 424, 431 and 530 never existed.

Room "182»For the infantry division will be used only in the 1942 year, and before that, none of the German generals knew whether the division with this number or not ...

218 I was on vacation from July 1940 to January 1941 in Berlin. From January to March, 1941 of the year re-deployed to the division and in April went to Denmark ...

28 I was in France until May 1941, after which it headed east.

The 2 I Mountain Division since March 1940 went to Norway and was there ...

The author tried to show that the mass misinformation of our intelligence and through it the command of the Red Army and the leadership of the Soviet Union already occurred in June - July of the 1940 year and this data was believed ...

Stay with us and we will learn a lot of things that are not customary to talk about and think about ... And it will also be sad: how the German generals led us ...

To be continued

Comments

[polpot]

Thanks for the article, read with great interest, I look forward to continuing.

[yehat]

very interesting. I did not expect our intelligence to see so crookedly.

[sabakina]

Quote: yehat

very interesting. I did not expect our intelligence to see so crookedly.

Seriously? And the fact that our military intelligence can only determine by noise what is happening beyond the Bug? For a non-attack pact was signed ... Remember, the order "not to panic"! We were not in a state of war with Germany, so the data came only from scouts like Richard Sorge. What we "missed" ...

[RuSFr]

At first it was worth thinking before speaking
If our intelligence did not go abroad because of the pact: then where did the many names of units come from and the huge list of settlements where they stood?

[ccsr]

Quote: RuSFr

If our intelligence did not go abroad because of the pact: then where did the many names of units come from and the huge list of settlements where they stood?

Take it easy, amateur - it's not for you to judge how intelligence gathers materials in peacetime, using not only agents of the operational link, but also strategic intelligence agents and radio intelligence. Thanks to radio interception and decryption, it was possible to open encryption, where information about opposing troops was transmitted, as well as knowing the call signs of the radio nodes and their affiliation, it was possible to monitor their movement.
Study the numbering of German army corps, which in 1938 became known to our intelligence:

[AsmyppoL]

Milchakov: “Take it easy, amateur - it's not for you to judge how intelligence gathers materials in peacetime, using not only agents of the operational link, but also strategic intelligence agents and radio intelligence. Thanks to radio interception and decryption, it was possible to open encryption, where information about opposing troops was transmitted, as well as knowing the call signs of the radio nodes and their affiliation, it was possible to monitor their movement.
Study the numbering of the German army corps, which in the 1938 year became known to our intelligence. ”

As usual insults, scan without any analysis. A typical act of a couch expert or a sick person ... Places on the forum what hits the head ... And where is the analysis? He is not ...

Did the command of the six army groups exist? Where were the army corps actually? Why study an incomprehensible scan that is not related to the topic!

What is the topic of the article? The period from the beginning of the war in Poland is considered!
When did the Germans start mass disinformation? Just before the war in Poland! They changed the names of their army groups.

Immediately after the end of the war in Poland, they again changed the names of all army groups and four of the five numbers of field armies. From that time until June, the reconnaissance did not reveal more than one name for the army group, and as we shall see in the future, a significant part of the army designations ...

If intelligence knew everything, then where are the numbers of tank groups, motorized corps, real tank and motorized divisions? Real, not fictitious?

Of course, there can be no intelligible answer from the couch expert, since he has no knowledge other than emotions. Except terribly secret that no one knows ...

Below he again has nonsense about listening and decoding all negotiations, about notching all the headquarters of corps, armies, divisions, and everything! Only no facts. From the word at all. A person does not even suspect how radio intelligence worked. But this question will be examined in one part ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Did the command of the six army groups exist? Where were the army corps actually? Why study an incomprehensible scan that is not related to the topic!

You are lying an amateur - this scan completely refutes your lie that intelligence allegedly did not know the name of the Wehrmacht’s formations and associations, because it follows from the document that the detailed name and composition of the groups were reported to the KA RU since 1936-1938.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Below he again has nonsense about listening and decoding all negotiations, about notching all the headquarters of corps, armies, divisions, and everything! Only no facts. From the word at all. A person does not even suspect how radio intelligence worked. But this question will be examined in one part ...

Again, you're lying, verbiage, because the radio intelligence reported on the location of the radio stations with reference to the area:

[AsmyppoL]

Where are the other data on radio intercepts? Ay did not find! What an incident Milchakov has again.
Rogue however
Look for a reconnaissance report, where it is clear even for first-graders that the data was obtained taking into account intelligence sources and radio interception !!!! Do not know such elementalism ....
The radio interception confirmed only intelligence intelligence and, as it turned out, also screwed up. These headquarters were not there where the summary is. From the word at all!
Even Boltunov’s book did not understand anything. How you got tired, couch expert Milchakov
All knowledge at the first grader level. Go study better, loafer

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Where are the other data on radio intercepts? Ay did not find!

In other reports that were presented daily to the General Staff from the intelligence departments of districts.

Quote: AsmyppoL

The radio interception confirmed only intelligence intelligence and, as it turned out, also screwed up.

You screwed up personally when you undertook to write an article about what you have wild ideas about. And this is understood by those who can evaluate the intelligence materials of those years, at least taking into account their professional military experience.

Quote: AsmyppoL

These headquarters were not there where the summary is.

You’re lying as always - you haven’t yet presented a single fact.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Go study better, loafer

I know that I am stopping you from playing your rubbish to a gullible public, but bear with me - I’ll take you to the table with a face, you will know that lying is not good.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Even Boltunov’s book did not understand anything.

Calm down, verbiage - I'm not citing a text from Boltunov's book, but their other edition by another author. By the way, Boltunov, in his book "The Golden Ear ...", uses the genuine recollections of veterans of radio intelligence, which I have cited here many times, and which came out long before his books. And what you understood there is still a mystery, but you are lying masterfully ...

[ccsr]

Quote: yehat

very interesting. I did not expect our intelligence to see so crookedly.

And the fact that the author is lying and distorting intelligence materials apparently did not occur to you ...

[RuSFr]

I know that Milchakov does not like facts, but talks about everything, like politicians on TV?
Specifically, on the topic points, what we read: where did the author lie?
The topic before the summer of 1940 and the scan of the summer 1941 summary is not an argument, but a challenge from the discussion!
Specifically on points and with facts.
For example, the author lied that the eastern army group existed from .... Until .... Here are the facts ....

Or 1 and 4 armies were in Poland and saw them ..... Just do not write what you saw ....

Also, at least five divisions that they were in Poland and the facts ...

Otherwise, you again, as an expert from the ottoman: I know that it’s not true, but I don’t have facts, but I always tell the truth, and only the author and dumb people minus me
Facts dear and only facts, do not be like a lamb

[ccsr]

Quote: RuSFr

I know that Milchakov does not like facts, but talks about everything, like politicians on TV?

You are lying, verbiage - I spread dozens of scans with intelligence reports, which indicate specifically in which settlement the Wehrmacht units were in June 1941, and how the German group was built up in the spring of 1941. If you are an obvious layman in military affairs, then you don’t understand that any commander of the Red Army from the battalion commander and above understood that the enemy’s group was constantly building up, and knew about whom they would fight against. This is how a military professional works - he is obliged to prepare for war in peacetime in any situation. So the lie that the author and others like him are spreading that the alleged lack of intelligence has led to grave consequences is the paid propaganda of modern perverts of military history.
The fact that military intelligence long before 1941 tracked the preparation of Germany and the Wehrmacht for war is evidenced by materials from 1938-1939. Try to refute them, verbiage ...

[/ Center]

[AsmyppoL]

Milchakov: “The purpose of your articles is a gross propaganda lie that perverts the true state of the extracted intelligence materials, and this is primarily due to your professional illiteracy. This is easy to prove with the simplest examples. For example, you declare "
Eugene: “A part of the“ discovered ”compounds either did not exist at 22.6.41 or was far from the places of their discovery by our intelligence.”

This suggests that you have no idea how the connections are moving in peacetime, when the redeployment occurs not only with time spacing, but also with the spacing of parts of the connection on the ground, primarily associated with the barracks fund and railway infrastructure. and highways.
That is why some units of the formations could be found in the reconnaissance strip of one district, while other formations or headquarters could be located in the reconnaissance strip of another district, or even outside the intelligence area of ​​the districts. This is where some inconsistencies in intelligence materials appear, and additional time is needed to eliminate them.
Moreover, it is indicated that the materials are those requiring verification or are unverified:
Next is a scan summary.

Again insults and no analysis. The laconic conclusions, the confidence in his innocence and does not even check his information at least on Wikipedia ... And where are people always confident in their rightness? right...

This person is simply not inclined to analysis ...

Milchakov talks about unverified datareferred to in the note and in the text after the table.

Thus, in the table on the scan, all the data is verified, since the text about the refinement or about the unverified data does not apply to them.

Especially for his readers, he conducted an unscheduled work on checking the German formations indicated on the scan page. Sorry, the evening is lost ...)))

A significant amount, as you will see, is the result of the misinformation of the German command.

[AsmyppoL]

The headquarters of the army in Bochnia is not known whether the army was there at all. Milchakov does not comment, and we have an examination of the armies yet to come ...
The headquarters of the army corps is the same - Milchakov is silent. The author Eugene has not yet commented. AK we consider later.

The following terms will be used for abbreviation:
- could not - was in another place, will be formed after the outbreak of war or did not exist at all;
- 'could"- the author does not have accurate information about where the military unit was located. We assume that intelligence has discovered the place correctly.

Headquarters 365-th PP - could notbecause division disbanded 1.8.40
461 pp - could.
393 Front Headquarters - could notbecause division disbanded 1.8.40
249 Front Headquarters - could notbecause will be formed only in April 1945 of the year.
38 MP - could notbecause there was no such regiment either in motorized or tank divisions (there were regiments of infantry))

303-th pp - is unknown, but its division headquarters is in East Prussia for hundreds of kilometers. According to the author - could not

466-th pp - could
39 Front Headquarters - could notbecause will be formed only in August 1942
5-th AK - could notbecause since May is located in Gumbinen
178 Front Headquarters - could notbecause such a division did not exist
542-th pp - could notbecause It is deployed in Germany and only in the 1943 year will it be part of the 272

604-th pp - could notbecause never existed.
The headquarters of the 2 AK in Kielce is could notbecause since March 1941, the headquarters of the 2 AK is located in East Prussia at a distance of 427 km from Kielce

111 I, 168 I, 44 I could
571-th pp - could notbecause was part of the 302-th PD (Army Group "D")
662-th pp - could notbecause disbanded along with the 399-th Front 8.8.40g.
6 MD Headquarters - could notbecause such a motorized division did not exist

Headquarters 297-th front - could
524-th pp - could
297-th pp - could notbecause never existed
432-th pp - could
108-th pp - could notbecause will appear only in 1942 year
8-th cavalry regiment - could notbecause such a regiment from the 1940 year and before the war did not exist

20-th AK and 18-th front - could
136th Mountain Rifle Regiment - could notbecause since March 1940 year is in Norway
120-th pp - could notbecause was reorganized into a motorized regiment and was part of the 60 md in Serbia

57-th pp - could
112-th, 325-th and 201-th points - was not in the territory of Poland and East Prussia
Headquarters of 21 AK - could notbecause did not exist during this period
193 Front Headquarters - could notbecause didn't exist
Headquarters 298-th front - could
156 Front Headquarters - could notbecause only 22.11.42 will be generated.

From the materials presented, it can be seen that a similar analysis by divisions and AK could be carried out by anyone. But the sick man, confident in his innocence did not even think to do this)))

It's a pity to get ahead of your posts a little. I’ll try not to do this anymore ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Headquarters 365th pp - could not, because division disbanded 1.8.40

Complete nonsense - the regiment could not be disbanded, but become part of another division, or become separate.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Headquarters 393rd front - could not, because division disbanded 1.8.40

Bullshit - it could be deployed by May 1941 by the second formation. This was practiced not only in the Wehrmacht, but also in the Red Army, because ordinary event in the armed forces.

Quote: AsmyppoL

303-th pp - is unknown, but its division headquarters is in East Prussia for hundreds of kilometers. According to the author - could not

The usual unproven lie of the author - I say there are no facts, but you believe me, because I do not believe intelligence.

Quote: AsmyppoL

The headquarters of the 178th front - could not, because such a division did not exist

Unproven statement.

Quote: AsmyppoL

542nd pp - could not, because It is deployed in Germany and only in 1943 will it be part of the 272nd

Another amateurish conclusion - the regiment could be separate, and not be part of the division in May 1941.

Quote: AsmyppoL

604th pp - could not, because never existed.

The usual unproven lie of the author.

Quote: AsmyppoL

662nd pp - could not, because disbanded along with the 399th pd 8.8.40g.

The usual unproven lie of the author. The decomposition of a compound does not mean the decomposition of parts of this compound that can be transferred to other compounds or become separate.

Quote: AsmyppoL

112-th, 325-th and 201-th points - was not in the territory of Poland and East Prussia
The headquarters of the 21st AK - could not, because did not exist during this period
The headquarters of the 193rd front - could not, because didn't exist

The usual unproven lie of the author, and without reference to sources of information.
Based on all of his "analysis", it can be concluded that the author is not only a layman in military matters, but also that he uses fraudulent manipulations to prove his fabrications. Not a single source of information has yet been given, which means that the author is an ordinary liar.

[AsmyppoL]

again so many letters and not a single fact
definitely a sofa expert
Facts where, wretched?

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Facts where, wretched?

For you, a swindler, I bring scans of bulletins. But you are a swindler from history, you haven’t brought a single document yet. Where are the links to your sources of information?

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The headquarters of the army in Bochnia is not known whether the army was there at all. Milchakov does not comment, but we have an examination of the armies still ahead ...
The headquarters of the army corps - the same thing - Milchakov is silent. The author Eugene has not yet commented.

You are just a miserable swindler, because there are footnotes No. 217 and No. 218 in the body of the summary, which are given in a reliable source on page 659:
217. Requires verification.
218. According to data requiring verification, up to two armored divisions arrived in the Tarnow region.

[AsmyppoL]

And in what place did I write wrong ?? Here is a crook, Milchakov! I wrote that not a word is in the comments of the couch expert himself.
What did you swindle removed my words that I will consider this later?
If you don’t cheat, then you won’t live a day or what?
You understand that June of 1941 of the year is much later than July of 1940 of the year. July 1940 of the year is the end of the period under review in this part! Here is a crook

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I wrote that not a word is in the comments of the couch expert himself.

Why comment on true intelligence - from it, and so everything is clear to military professionals. But you do not belong to them, that’s lying for any reason.

Quote: AsmyppoL

If you don’t cheat, then you won’t live a day or what?
you understand that June 1941 is much later than July 1940. July 1940 is the end of the period under review in this part!

And what, is that all over? Enlighten, as it happens in the armed forces even now:

A year after the military reform of 2008, the Taman division disbanded and the 5th motorized rifle brigade was created on its basis, which inherited the combat banner and awards of the previous unit. The unit was considered experimental and belonged to the Moscow Military District, and its headquarters, better known as military unit 23626, was located in the village of Kalininets. In early May 2013, the Taman Motor Rifle Division was recreated.

So do not speculate only in 1940 - the war began in 1941, and many Wehrmacht structures were restored.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

A significant amount, as you will see, is the result of the misinformation of the German command.

So again they lied, because not a single proof of their words was given.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Again insults and no analysis.

What can you personally analyze if you do not understand what is included in intelligence reports for particular bosses, and what documents are prepared in intelligence structures?
All your "analysis" of intelligence reports is a set of conjectures of an amateur who has no idea about intelligence or what intelligence materials are used for.
Your myth about global misinformation, which supposedly was not recognized by Soviet intelligence, is just another chatter of an amateur, without any supporting documents. You don’t have them, that’s why you wriggle so cheaply when I ask you to bring at least one link to the source of information.

[AsmyppoL]

If I am an amateur, then you are much lower, because even your scans are not able to check. and analysis - this is like higher mathematics - is the destiny of eggheads however, but not milchakov

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

and analysis is like higher mathematics is the lot of eggheads

Yes, I realized for a long time that you are from the eggheads, who did not serve in the army for a day, and building your ideas about it on the basis of comics that he bought as a child.

[AsmyppoL]

Thank you!
I want to clarify that my goal is not to criticize intelligence — it received data from mass disinformation from all circles and Hitler himself and his entourage ... Our intelligence did everything it could at that time and with its capabilities!
I just want to show you what the leadership of the Country and the Army knew in 1940 and in 1941. Their knowledge is their actions on the eve of the war. It seems to me that without analysis of the Republic of Moldova one cannot start criticizing our leaders ....

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I want to clarify that my goal is not to criticize intelligence — it received data from mass disinformation from all circles and Hitler himself and his entourage ... Our intelligence did everything it could at that time and with its capabilities!

The purpose of your articles is a gross propaganda lie that perverts the true state of the extracted intelligence materials, and this is primarily due to your professional illiteracy. This is easy to prove with the simplest examples. For example, you declare:

A part of the “discovered” compounds either did not exist on 22.6.41 or was far from the places of their discovery by our intelligence.

This suggests that you have no idea how the connections are moving in peacetime, when the redeployment occurs not only with time spacing, but also with the spacing of parts of the connection on the ground, primarily associated with the barracks fund and railway infrastructure. and highways.
That is why some units of the formations could be found in the reconnaissance strip of one district, while other formations or headquarters could be located in the reconnaissance strip of another district, or even outside the intelligence area of ​​the districts. This is where some inconsistencies in intelligence materials appear, and additional time is needed to eliminate them.
Moreover, it is indicated that the materials are those requiring verification or are unverified:

[RuSFr]

The purpose of the author, I understand, is to disseminate facts obtained by analyzing information. Everyone read this info to the holes, but there was no analysis ...
Your goal is to litter the topic by way of an empty bazaar! Why?
Everything is simple. Kozinkin, in messages on the topic of an unexpected war in both 2017 and 2018, repeatedly wrote that he has a military consultant Milchakov. That is you.
He published ten books with you without any intelligence analysis. If the analysis of the summaries in the article is true, then you wrote a bunch of military science fiction instead of the truth!
That's the reason for criticizing the author about nothing and bringing a lot of messages with incomprehensible scans! Scans without any text and analysis.
In the previous article, you also brought a scan at the mouth with foam in confirmation that our intelligence even knew the names of German commanders! I went through the link and myself read in my native German that the commander was not the general.
You are lying, Mr. Milchakov. And put unverified material with boorish insults and generalizations!
Or hope that no one will check and that you can throw everything you want like a fraudster. After all, the end justifies the means ?! !!

[ccsr]

Quote: RuSFr

Everything is simple. Kozinkin in messages on the topic of an unexpected war in both 2017 and 2018

O. Kozinkin is an independent author, and writes books on his own behalf, and without my or someone else's co-authorship. So if you are unhappy with something in his books, refute, but do not ascribe to me that I am writing him some materials. As for the consultations, we really communicate with him, and I try to explain to him some details that he may not know. But this is not the point - he, unlike you and false authors who write on sites without names like AsmyppoL, does not hide his name or those with whom he communicates, which means that he decently distinguishes from both of you.
This is what distinguishes an honest person who is even mistaken in something from vile people who deliberately distort our military history, who are afraid that other people will know about their tricks and spit in their faces.

Quote: RuSFr

In the previous article, you also brought a scan at the mouth with foam in confirmation that our intelligence even knew the names of German commanders! I went through the link and myself read in my native German that the commander was not the general.

Of course I knew, and constantly reported the names of the commanders - this confirms a large number of reports. But since you are an ordinary layman in military affairs, you do not know that the appointment of commanders can take place during the day, and no one is ever able to instantly track this, because such movements are made in a secret order, and the report must be submitted by a certain date.
By the way, why don’t you give the true name of the German general and the material on the basis of which we can conclude that on May 20 there was another division commander? You are just a rogue in trust, like the author - do not bring a single document, but want someone to believe you. So, verbiage - where are the documents confirming that the commander of the division was another German general since the author successfully faded from the answer to my question. Now will you lie for him?

[ccsr]

Quote: RuSFr

In the previous article, you also brought a scan at the mouth with foam in confirmation that our intelligence even knew the names of German commanders! I went through the link and myself read in my native German that the commander was not the general.
You are lying, Mr. Milchakov.

No, you’re a scorched liar, you’re lying on the forum all the time, and I have proved it repeatedly. To confirm that you are lying, it is enough to study the names of German officers from this ordinary intelligence:

[AsmyppoL]

You probably don’t understand what we are talking about ?! We are talking about regiments, divisions, corps, armies and army groups !!!! Who needs the commander of the 5-1 company ??? That's what this is about! Sources brought the simplest thing that they could hear. but they usually speak at the level of the detachment, platoon, company, they discuss battalion officers !!! Where is the command of the above compounds, associations? Don’t be dumb, milchaks. Give the facts about the commanders from the big headquarters? In that topic, it was a question of command from a regiment-division and higher. No need for a guard battalion ...
Milchakov, it was already on the site military literature with your murderous conclusion: since everyone knew so much about the guard battalion, then intelligence also knew about the rest of the troops. and it was about tank groups and motorized corps! why are you all with this scan, like wandering with an icon? Can't you show anything clever anymore? Wimp

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

You probably don’t understand what we are talking about ?! We are talking about regiments, divisions, corps, armies and army groups !!!! Who needs the commander of the 5-1 company ???

Do not dodge - I deliberately cited a background document for a liar like you who did not believe that our intelligence knew the names of German officers even at the grassroots level.
But this is not the point - tell me honestly, what gives the commander of the Soviet division the knowledge of the name of the German division commander to guide his formation in battle? Can you at least say why you need to know the names of German commanders and what will the commander of a battalion-regiment-division learn from this knowledge?

Where is the command of the above compounds, associations?

I brought you dozens of sheets with scans, where the names of the connection commanders are written. But you, a swindler, lied that the commander of the German division had a different surname, and did not confirm this with anything.

[Plantagenet]

“About how the war went, in the early days we did not know at all. It was impossible to understand anything from the chaotic reports, but people were telling each other crazy news that the Red Army had already entered Poland and East Prussia, that the whole tank corps of the Germans had been crushed, that the command had not specifically reported anything, so that later they would give the people a message about the grandiose victory. And suddenly - like a bolt from the blue: in the morning of July 3, Stalin himself appeared on the radio!

Holding our breath, my mother and I listen: “Brothers and sisters! I appeal to you, my friends! ”We cannot believe our ears: in life we ​​have not heard such words from the leader. But it is he, he is his quiet, hoarse, monotonous voice with a strong accent. And now: "How could it happen that the Red Army surrendered ..." A pause; you can hear his teeth banging on a glass of water.

Instead of “surrendering” to me, “surrendering” is heard, and I stare in horror, looking at my mother: Has the Red Army surrendered? But no, he continues: "... surrendered such vast territories to the enemy." And which territories - only from the words of Stalin and it becomes clear; the scary word “Minsk” sounds. The Germans reached Minsk - and in just ten days! So much for the war on foreign territory ...

I go outside. Stalin's speech is repeated on the radio more and more, and crowds of people are standing still without moving around the loudspeakers. Complete silence, stone faces. The people begin to understand what kind of war this is and what awaits us. ”

Georgy Ilyich Mirsky “Life in three eras”

[yehat]

each data was set to a confidence level.
I think, without analysis in this section, your article looks too divorced from reality.
normal analysis should describe different sections of the data by level of confidence

[ccsr]

Quote: yehat

I think, without analysis in this section, your article looks too divorced from reality.

I completely agree with this assessment. Moreover, the author is clearly illiterate in all military matters, and therefore, to hide this, he puts forward ridiculous versions, and at the same time he can’t even understand that everything that is now in the public domain does not represent 1% of all intelligence materials that were in special services of the USSR on the eve of the war. This is why it resembles three blind men describing an elephant based on a trunk, leg, and tail.

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I want to show you what the leadership of the Country and the Army knew in 1940 and in 1941. Their knowledge is their actions on the eve of the war

well, look at what the SSR leadership did in the pre-war days and there would be no need to guess some anonymous woman - what was there who knew or thought - on that minuscule information that you saw really)))

[demo]

All these data, obtained most likely after the war, are of purely historical interest.
And no more.
But of practical interest may be how to obtain information in those conditions.
There is no Poland on the world map.
There is Germany and there is the USSR.
There is a border.
But Poles live abroad.
Which since 1939 years the citizens of Germany.
With all the ensuing consequences.
But there are no Polish partisans, no resistance.
Polish men are being recruited to the Wehrmacht.
Polish peasants live as they lived.
Who can you rely on under such conditions?
Who can collect and transmit information?
And to whom? THE USSR?
This is a fierce enemy!
This is Russian.
That's the whole deal.
Therefore, our command did not know and did not know who, and where, and how much.
Even while in occupation, the Poles remained true to themselves — the Russians are enemies.
Are Germans friends?
So to demand compensation from today's Germany is the height of cynicism.
Poles! You enthusiastically licked a German boot. However, like half of Europe.

[16329]

The Poles were not citizens of the German Empire, but were residents of the general government (most), also in the territories of Poland included in Germany

[ccsr]

Quote: 16329

The Poles were not citizens of the German Empire, but were residents of the general government (most), also in the territories of Poland included in Germany

In fact, Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russian people still lived there, who for various reasons ended up in Poland after the collapse of the Republic of Ingushetia and the Civil War. Those. if we consider from the point of view of the intelligence base, then in Poland and in addition to the Poles there were citizens who, for various reasons, could conduct reconnaissance in favor of the USSR. The whole question was efficiency - here we were much inferior to German intelligence in the technical equipment of residencies.

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

In addition to the frontier, there were six more security divisions (207, 221, 281, 285, 286 and 403) at the borders of PribOVO and ZAPOVO. The numbers of these divisions are absent in intelligence materials (RM). With security divisions, the number of infantry formations at the border reached 57.

Another fantasy of the author, which once again confirms that he is a complete amateur in military affairs.
Firstly, security divisions guarded prisoners of war from France and other European countries who worked on the construction of defense structures and other infrastructure in the general government (intelligence report No. 10 as of May 15 of ZapOVO). That is why they could not be involved in hostilities, which means that they could not be taken into account as military formations in the General Staff.
Secondly, these divisions do not have heavy weapons, which means throwing them into a breakthrough can only come to amateurs, like the author of the article.
Thirdly, these divisions could not be involved in hostilities, if only because the new prisoners of war that would have appeared after the start of hostilities against the USSR also had to be protected - the Germans had thought through everything beforehand, and they had taken into account the experience of previous companies.
Fourthly, those who had restrictions on military service fell into the security units, and therefore only amateurs who do not know many of the intricacies of the formation of troops can seriously take their combat capabilities.
So the next "run over" of the homebrew military expert turned out to be a soap bubble.

[Cartalon]

All of what you said somehow cancels the fact that the security divisions were not detected?

[ccsr]

Quote: Cartalon

All of what you said somehow cancels the fact that the security divisions were not detected?

Of course, because when the leadership of the General Staff sets annual reconnaissance tasks, these divisions are not indicated as a reconnaissance object, which is why they were not included in the text of the documents as MANDATORY for tracking. Although information on such objects is recorded, it is not included in the report materials in order not to overload the report with unnecessary materials.
However, you are apparently the same "specialist" in intelligence, as well as the author, and therefore ask such stupid questions.

[Cartalon]

It’s you who we have a super intelligence officer, a connection is available, but they don’t report about it, yeah, well, why in all Soviet works on the Great Patriotic War, these divisions are necessarily included in the German GA?

[ccsr]

Quote: Cartalon

It’s you who we have a super intelligence specialist, a connection is available, but they don’t report about it, yeah, well, what’s in all Soviet works on the Great Patriotic War,

We also had units of the NKVD, which provided protection for the rear, prisoners of war and prisoners. And only one 70 Army was created on the basis of a draft of the NKVD military personnel, which took part as a combat unit of the Red Army.
You would at least think with your head - who would protect prisoners of war, or protect the rear, if the security units were used for other purposes. Why create them at all - you obviously did not think about this.

[Cartalon]

As a matter of principle, you cannot communicate without rudeness, as I understand it, security divisions were available, intelligence did not find them, and for what they were intended it does not apply to the case, all you write is boorish trolling.

[ccsr]

Quote: Cartalon

As a matter of principle, you cannot communicate without rudeness, as I understand it, security divisions were available, intelligence did not find them, and for what they were intended it does not apply to the case, all you write is boorish trolling.

You can’t do without demonstrating your ignorance, so why when I put it on display, do you consider it rudeness? Frankly, that you are the same amateur as the author of the article, and it will become easier for you.
Regarding your statement that

intelligence did not find them,

, then this is a lie, because if these compounds did not appear in the report, this does not mean that the form for this connection was not kept in the district intelligence department. Amateurs do not know this, which is why they accept on faith all the nonsense that illiterate authors carry.
It was precisely from the knowledge of what they were intended for that they did not fall into intelligence reports, since military use in the army corps was not planned.
By the way, the author did not tell where he found them at all - at least I did not see a single link to the document from him.

[AsmyppoL]

Respected CartalonOf course, Milchakov cannot. age however ... But rudeness is very, very much ...
I completely agree with you! Security divisions (one) were formed from infantry divisions (pd):
207-I, 281-I and 286-I od - from the 207-th front (there was a war in Poland and the West).
221-I, 444-I and 454-I am one of the 221 PD (passed the war in Poland).
213-I, 403-I, 286-I od - from the 213-th front (went through the war in Poland).
Six out of nine odes were formed in Germany (three did not have time to look for information), where the capabilities of Soviet intelligence were very limited. Each of them included a reinforced infantry regiment and an artillery division from the artillery regiment of the disbanded division.
In the same name of the regiment remained "infantry regiment", which was reinforced by divisional units, scattered across divisions.

Those. these were combat units with combat experience. I repeat that each of them included a reinforced full-fledged infantry regiment, and not some guard battalions for the protection of prisoners. How does a divert expert know this? He frantically found something and posted a comment.
You wrote correctly that they were not in intelligence because these divisions were not found.

The German generals considered these divisions to be combat and placed them directly on the border against our troops. After all, our diverts expert probably cannot even understand the cards ...

German generals forgot to find out from our expert from the couch that the security divisions are not intended for war, but for the protection of prisoners ...
And the fact that intelligence did not find them, so she did not find much at the border, unfortunately ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I completely agree with you! Security divisions (od) were formed from infantry divisions (pd):
207-I, 281-I and 286-I od - from the 207-th front (there was a war in Poland and the West).
221-I, 444-I and 454-I am one of the 221 PD (passed the war in Poland).
213-I, 403-I, 286-I od - from the 213-th front (went through the war in Poland).

You’re definitely a swindler - you’ve spread one infantry division into three security divisions, and do you think this is the preservation of combat experience? Do you even have any idea that the divisions had losses both in personnel and in equipment and weapons. That is why you cannot get three full-fledged combat divisions from one combat division — any military professional will confirm this to you.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Six out of nine odes were formed in Germany (three did not have time to look for information), where the capabilities of Soviet intelligence were very limited.

Again lying - it was in Germany that strategic intelligence worked, and there was branched agents, but civilians in the territory of the governor general were not allowed into the deployment zone of troops, which is why it was more difficult to conduct reconnaissance there.

Quote: AsmyppoL

The German generals considered these divisions to be combat and placed them directly on the border against our troops. After all, our diverts expert probably cannot even understand the cards ...

Again lying, verbiage:
Chuev Sergey Gennadevich

Security divisions
The creation of security divisions was caused by the need to protect the rear of the German army from the actions of partisans and paratroopers. The functions and tasks of the security divisions were the same as those of the Soviet rear guard troops.
52nd Security Division. It was created in May 1944 as a result of the reorganization of the 52nd Field Training Division on the Eastern Front. It was disbanded in 1945. The headquarters of the division was used as the fortress commandant of Libau.
201st Security Division. Formed in January 1942 from the personnel of the 201st security team on the Eastern Front. Since the fall of 1944 it was used as an infantry. At the final stage of the war, she was in Courland.
201–204th security brigades were formed in the General Governorate (Poland) as reserve army units, In December 202, the 1941nd security brigade was transferred to the disposal of Army Group South and disbanded in February 1942, the 204th security brigade was disbanded in the General Government in the summer of 1941.
203th security division. Formed in January 1942 from the personnel of the 203rd security brigade. In October 1944, it was transformed into the 203rd Infantry Division (PD).
207th security division. Formed in May 1941 as a result of the reorganization of the 207th Infantry Division. Used on the Eastern Front. In the winter of 1944–1945 disbanded.
213th security division. Formed in May 194] as a result of the reorganization of the 213rd Infantry Division. Acted on the Eastern Front. October 18, 1944 disbanded.
221st Security Division. Formed in May 1941 as a result of the reorganization of the 221st Infantry Division. Acted on the Eastern Front. Disbanded in August 1944
281st Security Division. Formed in May 1941 from parts of the 207th PD. Acted on the Eastern Front. In November 1944, it was transformed into the 281st PD.
.....

Полный текст
https://history.wikireading.ru/102769

[Jager]

During the war, sometimes even "everything that burns" was thrown into battle, including cooks and clerks.

[Nikolaevich I]

Quote: Jager

During the war, sometimes even "everything that burns" was thrown into battle, including cooks and clerks.

What? In the summer of 41, the Germans somewhere in Silesia shouted: "Russian tanks broke through!" ... and threw "cooks and clerks" into battle?

[Jager]

Nevertheless, they shouted this three years later.

[ccsr]

Quote: Jager

During the war, sometimes even "everything that burns" was thrown into battle, including cooks and clerks.

This has nothing to do with intelligence in the pre-war period - the Germans also did not know that we would have pioneer partisans who would become heroes of the war.

[yehat]

Quote: Nikolaevich I

What? In the summer of 41, the Germans somewhere in Silesia shouted: "Russian tanks broke through!" ... and threw "cooks and clerks" into battle?

the Germans, in principle, had a different attitude to the war than ours - it was WORK and they always tried to engage in battle with some meaning. Therefore, it was not easy to throw cooks and clerks under the tanks of practice until the age of 45. Only later was the Volkssturm and other similarly ineffective detachments formed, but firstly, they were not an army, and secondly, their weapons were not frail - both machine guns, and stg-44, and faust patrons. Those. These are by no means military "cooks".
There were episodes of their throwing into the battle to plug the breakthrough points and then the Germans suffered heavy losses - for example, near Rzhev. But these are exactly the episodes and not against the tanks.

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Their knowledge is their actions on the eve of the war

well, analyze the actions AND NOT THE MIZER THAT YOU COULD "ANALYZE")))

SEE WHAT WAS GOING ON IN MAY-JUNE ... And do not guess how an anonymous madam who is there that "THOUGHT" about the German attack)))

[AsmyppoL]

Fooling readers again, Kozinkin ?! Well, right, like a first-grader - I’m lying and no one can notice?
I then watched what was done in May-June! As carefully as you did not think of. On PribOVO and ZAPOVO, so carefully, with the schedules of the arrival of German divisions, with a comparison of intelligence with the deployment of German troops on 1 on June 1941 of the year and on 21 of June. Surprisingly, the data almost matched!

Where is your analysis of such data? Ah, I forgot that Victoria wrote that, in addition to quotes from memoirs, you basically can’t bring anything. Of course, besides lies! For example, Zhukov’s call from Stalin’s office. As usual, without facts .... Dreamer nevertheless. What you won’t do for the sake of buying books ...
About the calls you made up to the directive, too, because there are no facts))) But a wise phrase, read my books, everything is there ....

Obviously you know all this from a crystal ball? Do you communicate with perfumes? Do not fool around with them a lot - you can lose your last mind)))

The minuscule that I analyzed is a huge progress in the analysis of RM. There is nothing like that for 74 of the year! And after all nothing cannot be refuted, offensively yes? Or else it will be later ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The minuscule that I analyzed is a huge progress in the analysis of RM. There is nothing like it in 74 years!

Well, you trepach, even the hell takes from your arrogance. Yes, in one of the Cherepovets schools in Soviet times, there was a bunch of fingerprinted training literature on radio intelligence and the organization of special radio communications, which not only described in detail a huge number of examples of intelligence work during the war years, but also presented authentic materials of those years.
You are just a pygmy who imagines that no one except you knows how to evaluate intelligence, and this is ridiculous.
You don’t even need to refute it - just literate people don’t take you seriously, even if you devote the same visionary to Victoria to your writings. You are simply clowns on the field of military history, and no more ...

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

Typical RMs are examples: Summary from 16.12.39 or Summary from 3.5.40 g. You can not watch them - you won’t lose much ...

The next illiterate lie of the author of the article, because he presented the REVIEW reports, which are compiled for the high command, and do not have the detail that the official documents of the intelligence structures of the People’s Commissariat of Defense carry. This is easy to prove if we compare the materials of district reports that were presented daily in RU and the texts of what the author refers to. The author is unable to understand that large military leaders do not need the details of many intelligence reports, if only because they think in strategic categories rather than operational ones. The author of the article will never explain why Kulik (he gave summaries addressed to Kulik as one of the recipients) this intelligence information:

[AsmyppoL]

I'm doing serious business, not dumb riddles! It would be better to check your information! An adult is the same as a kindergarten, pants on the straps and I’m not responsible for anything ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I'm doing serious business, not dumb riddles! It would be better to check your information!

Because of your ignorance, you did not even understand that this is specialized intelligence information that is presented to a certain circle of officials, and not to the entire top military leadership of the country. So you’ll tell your tales about conducting reconnaissance in the pre-war period in kindergarten - they will believe you there ....

[yehat]

Quote: ccsr

Moreover, the author is clearly illiterate in all military matters.

it just doesn't matter. our intelligence, too, was not only preparing data for the military
here, I would say, the share of amateurism is even useful
more important another - it was necessary to give solid support for conclusions and unconfirmed information for analysis.
I have not seen this division.
YES, and in live reports, it was also "no ice". For example, a pilot flew along the border and said - the Germans are moving towards the border. How many? a lot of! What parts? I don't know, but the dust is visible.
How to analyze such data?

[VS]

Make it simple - take a look at WHAT Stalin did in those days - in preparation for the German attack - and everything will fall into place))) It will become clear - they waited or did not wait)) Otherwise, the anonymous authors stupidly rave about the attack - IT WAS NOT WAITING AND IT HAS UNEXPECTED ))) and refer to a few% of those reports that intelligence reported and on which DECISIONS were made))) And this is stupid nonsense ..

You can read Golikov’s memoirs - they came out years after his death))) he cites data on reports that no one has seen))) And Golikov claims that the General Staff gave all the necessary information on the Germans - both in terms of number and composition of troops and directions and so on)) And in the intelligence of 75% reliability this is already excellent)))

[AsmyppoL]

Again, cheating like a child right ...
You syllable (many have already advised you) read Golikov's memoirs and there is completely misinformation from the bulletins! Read carefully, not what you need
If you believe everything that Golikov writes in his memoirs, then confirm the figure for the total number of German divisions in all of Germany! And oh, how overpriced. Golikov wrote memoirs on intelligence reports, but they are all in the public domain and completely untrue !!!
How many divisions were according to the Intelligence Agency at 1 on June 1941, and how many were there according to the same department on the evening of 22 on June? but it has not changed much! And where did the Germans howl armored ??? If there was no increase in divisions?

And I came across your nonsense last year, when you did not know why the number of divisions in Sandalov’s memoirs is higher than according to intelligence reports! it’s a shame, for ten years, readers have to hang noodles, and not to sort out such a simple question, which is directly stated in the summaries!
a fraudster, I didn’t even read bulletins, but wrote books

[yehat]

The USSR actually was waiting for the attack
during clashes in Mongolia, during the Finnish company, during the annexation in Romania
and a few more times. But the question was on a scale.
Intelligence and the General Staff clearly could not correctly assess the scale and nature of the German offensive.
Even a carefully studied experience in France and Poland did not give full conclusions - only partial ones were made. Also, our fighters completely incorrectly reacted to combat training - they greatly underestimated the necessary level in the 30s. And when in the 38th they saw what the Wehrmacht had turned into, it was too late to tweet - only immediate total mobilization could fix the situation, which they could not do. The technological level of weapons was not correctly taken into account.
The Red Army received very good SVT rifles, the latest tanks and much more, but could not fully use it because of gaps in technological development (2 five-year plans were still too few for this).
In my opinion, the dizziness from success and a number of other social phenomena (for example, the excesses of the Stakhanov movement and collectivization), about which Stalin spoke, were one of the important factors in the defeat of the 41st.

[ccsr]

Quote: yehat

Intelligence and the General Staff clearly could not correctly assess the scale and nature of the German offensive.

I can not argue with this - Hitler did not really devote Stalin to the way he would fight against the USSR. It is hard to imagine how to assess the scale of the war before it began - even Hitler did not assume that its ending would be in 1945, otherwise he would not have started it. So why should our military have known and appreciated at the beginning of 1941 what scale the war will take after June 22, and on whose throne Europe will fight. You can of course dream about what Babu Wang should have asked, but Marxism did not give our intelligence such an opportunity ....

Quote: yehat

In my opinion, the dizziness from success and a number of other social phenomena (for example, the excesses of the Stakhanov movement and collectivization), about which Stalin spoke, were one of the important factors in the defeat of the 41st.

You clearly pulled the Stakhanov movement and collectivization by the ears, but the fact that the general level of technical literacy of the Soviet man was lower than that of the Germans or other Western Europeans is a fact that greatly influenced the training of military personnel. You don’t mention the fact that the German military industry was the most developed in the world, and this explains why at the beginning of the war we lost in the technical equipment of the troops.

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Fooling readers again, Kozinkin ?! Well, right, like a first-grader - I’m lying and no one can notice?
I then watched what was done in May-June! As carefully as you did not think of. On PribOVO and ZAPOVO, so carefully, with the schedules of the arrival of German divisions, with a comparison of intelligence with the deployment of German troops on 1 on June 1941 of the year and on 21 of June. Surprisingly, the data almost matched!

Where is your analysis of such data? Ah, I forgot that Victoria wrote that, in addition to quotes from memoirs, you basically can’t bring anything. Of course, besides lies! For example, Zhukov’s call from Stalin’s office. As usual, without facts .... Dreamer nevertheless. What you won’t do for the sake of buying books ...
About the calls you made up to the directive, too, because there are no facts))) But a wise phrase, read my books, everything is there ....

Obviously you know all this from a crystal ball? Do you communicate with perfumes? Do not fool around with them a lot - you can lose your last mind)))

The minuscule that I analyzed is a huge progress in the analysis of RM. There is nothing like that for 74 of the year! And after all nothing cannot be refuted, offensively yes? Or else it will be later ...

Yes, you will have nothing worthwhile))

1st in Pribovo Is it that they didn’t exactly see the Germans ?? Is it not exactly the number of their divisions that is already determined on June 1? And THIS IS ME AND I SHOW - Surprisingly, the data almost matched! and lo and behold - THEY ARE CONFIRMED subsequently completely practically ...
2nd - your "Victoria" anonymous illiteracy)) And your "analysis" of the egg is not worth a damn, either))) You have not read ANY of my books, but you are talking nonsense from an anonymous one ... that there are only quotations from memoirs and that in the end you if you want to prove something - are you trying to crap intelligence once again?))

SO WHAT DO YOU PROVE THAN WISH ANONYMOUS YOU ARE OUR RESPECTED - AS A RESULT? AGAIN chase nonsense that they did not wait for the attack and did not prepare for it ?? )))

READ the answers of the commanders KOVO and OdVO there that they were warned about the attack on Sunday evenings of the 21st)))

[kloss]

I read them all, but there isn’t what you are indignant about!
Confess - tore off? Or provide evidence that the commander of the OdVO and his chief of staff have disrupted!

[kloss]

You are lying to Kozinkin, as always a lie and rudeness. Many more grammatical errors. Someone writes books in your place. Mediocrity one word

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I'm doing serious business, not dumb riddles! It would be better to check your information! An adult is the same as a kindergarten, pants on the straps and I’m not responsible for anything ...

serious and therefore cliche hiding behind ??))

If a person is hiding behind a klikuha then - d ...))) alas, we ALWAYS have cutters or moral shit pouring SSR for some reason) YOU uK, relate to yourself a respected anonymous ??)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Again, cheating like a child right ...
You syllable (many have already advised you) read Golikov's memoirs and there is completely misinformation from the bulletins! Read carefully, not what you need
If you believe everything that Golikov writes in his memoirs, then confirm the figure for the total number of German divisions in all of Germany! And oh, how overpriced. Golikov wrote memoirs on intelligence reports, but they are all in the public domain and completely untrue !!!
How many divisions were according to the Intelligence Agency at 1 on June 1941, and how many were there according to the same department on the evening of 22 on June? but it has not changed much! And where did the Germans howl armored ??? If there was no increase in divisions?

And I came across your nonsense last year, when you did not know why the number of divisions in Sandalov’s memoirs is higher than according to intelligence reports! it’s a shame, for ten years, readers have to hang noodles, and not to sort out such a simple question, which is directly stated in the summaries!
a fraudster, I didn’t even read bulletins, but wrote books

that is, the head of the General Staff Department lied that they EVERYTHING is necessary for the number of German troops, the composition and directions of the blows KNEW ??))))
All that’s left for you is OPEN - to state YOUR last name about it)) how - weakly - to open your name and surname and name Golikov with his memoirs which during his lifetime he was not allowed to publish because they contradicted Zhukov’s false memoirs - LIAR ??))

And since you are still anonymous - WATER))) and from your articles to the point - ZERO will be - wiped out into the void)))
And here are my books in the libraries of military academies including)))

Calm down - on June 1 and June 21, the similarity is because the NUMBER of GERMAN troops has not changed - those that are aimed at the Soviet Socialist Republic according to intelligence))) and if you were smart, you would see that on June 1, data is given FOR DEPTHs over 500 km from the border and on the 21st - THESE troops were already confirmed directly at the border with the Soviet Socialist Republic ...)))
Now it comes to why the data for June 1 and the 21st are similar ??)))
Damn .. and where do such stupidly stupid anonyms come from (((("analyzers" sucks))))

[VS]

Quote: yehat

Intelligence and the General Staff clearly could not correctly assess the scale and nature of the German offensive.

Who told you that?

[VS]

Quote: yehat

Even a carefully studied experience in France and Poland did not give full conclusions - only partial ones were made. Also, our fighters completely incorrectly reacted to combat training - they greatly underestimated the necessary level in the 30s. And when in the 38th they saw what the Wehrmacht had turned into, it was too late to tweet - only immediate total mobilization could fix the situation, which they could not do.

What does mobilization have to do with total?)))

[VS]

Quote: yehat

tinning of success and a number of other social phenomena (for example, the excesses of the Stakhanov movement and collectivization), which Stalin spoke of, were one of the important factors in the defeat of the 41st.

IIIii - and WHO was engaged in this - cap-making in the GSH PLANS?)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

About the calls you made up to the directive, too, because there are no facts))

if you wish Marshal Zakharov or Zhukov — to be called liars ??)) I hope you will open your NAME — before you fart and feel free to blame them for lying ??))

[AsmyppoL]

I call Mr. Kozinkin a liar, because In Zhukov’s memoirs there is not a word about calls to districts from Stalin’s office. There is not a word in the memoirs of Zakharov (from the General Staff) and the commander of the odvo up to 23-00

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I call Mr. Kozinkin a liar, because In Zhukov’s memoirs there is not a word about calls to districts from Stalin’s office.

Where did you find the call from cabinet Stalin?
It was about this text:

As I already said, upon returning from the Kremlin, the People’s Commissar of Defense repeatedly spoke on the HF with the commanders of the districts F. I. Kuznetsov, D. G. Pavlov, M. P. Kirponos and their chiefs of staff, who, except D. G. Pavlov, were at their command posts.

By the way, in Stalin’s reception room and in the Kremlin’s office rooms there were high-frequency apparatuses, so if you wanted, you could also call the districts from them.

[yehat]

Quote: ccsr

Hitler really did not dedicate Stalin

It was obvious to Stalin that there would be a war. He just did not know which coalition would oppose the USSR.
But it turned out almost along the most negative path - the European Union under the third Reich.

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

In the database of the fund A.N. Yakovlev there are quite a lot of intelligence reports of the 5th Directorate of the Red Army (the future Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft) about the German troops from 1938 until the summer of 1940, but they are somewhat faceless militarily. Similar reports are available in books on military intelligence. They contain a lot of general education information and little information about the troops, their locations and numbers ...

The just-declassified documents of the period 1938 and later, which are published on the official website of the Moscow Region, refute this heinous lie. Shaposhnikov’s manuscript report sets out in detail the number of divisions and armaments of our likely opponents, which was obtained precisely by military intelligence at that time. As you can see from the text, the author’s nonsense about the numbers of divisions and regiments that intelligence allegedly didn’t establish, is debunked by a document of a strategic level, where the conversion goes to divisions, and not to Wehrmacht tank groups or their numbers, because it’s more important for strategists to know the total number of troops, than their organizational associations.

II. Armed Forces
The most likely opponents in the West - Germany and Poland in wartime deploy in the 1 line:
Germany - 96 pd, 5 cav. Div., 5 motor divisions., 30 tank. and 3000 aircraft.
Poland - 65 pd, 16 cav. brig., 1450 tanks and wedges, 1650 aircraft.
Total - 161 pd, 13 cav. div., 7250 tanks and wedges, 4650 aircraft.
Of these forces, Germany and Poland will be forced to leave part of the forces on their western borders, and perhaps some of them will be brought into action to fight the Czechoslovak Army.
It can be assumed that up to 26 divisions, 1 cavalry division, 1 motor division will be sent by Germany against the Czechoslovak Army. and at least 800 aircraft. The Germans will leave 10 to 20 infantry divisions on the French border.
Thus, from 96 divisions of divisions up to 36–46 pd will be left by Germany on the western and southern borders and up to 60–65 infantry divisions, 4 cavalry. division., 4 motor divisions, up to 20 tank battalions and up to 2100 aircraft will be sent against our borders.
As for Poland, it is likely that from its 65 infantry divisions up to 5 pd, it will leave against Czechoslovakia, and the remaining forces, i.e. up to 60 infantry divisions, 16 cav. brigades, up to 1300 tanks and wedges and up to 1600 aircraft deployed on our borders.
Thus, the latter should expect the appearance of 120–110 infantry divisions, 12 cavalry. division., 5400 tanks and wedges and 3700 aircraft.
Finland, Estonia and Latvia are deploying 20 infantry divisions, 80 tanks and 436 aircraft.
Romania can deploy up to 35 infantry divisions, 200 tanks and 639 aircraft.

http://pakt1939.mil.ru/

[cavl]

[Author:
Eugene
In the database of the fund A.N. Yakovleva is available quite a lot of intelligence reports of the 5th Directorate of the Red Army (the future Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft) about the German troops from 1938 until the summer of 1940, but they are somewhat faceless militarily. Similar reports are available in books on military intelligence. They contain a lot of general education information and little information about the troops, their locations and numbers ...]

Read carefully!
WRITTEN IN THE DATABASE YAKOVLEV!
BEFORE THE LINK, DEAR, THAT THE TEXT BROUGHT BY YOU HAS BEEN IN THE YAKOVLEV FUND!

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

Read carefully!
WRITTEN IN THE DATABASE YAKOVLEV!

Yakovlev was an ordinary swindler who was recruiting his own kind, and they presented his version, ignoring other documents from the archives of Moscow Region and other archives. You are the last of Yakovlev and you are promoting his view of the history of the USSR.

Quote: cavl

BEFORE THE LINK, DEAR, THAT THE TEXT BROUGHT BY YOU HAS BEEN IN THE YAKOVLEV FUND!

Do not get hysterical, since you have been taken to the table with a face - I warned you that not all documents were declassified, and what is available on the network does not make up 1% of all intelligence materials either. But since you are an ordinary amateur, you do not understand that the Yakovlev Foundation could not objectively evaluate military history, and therefore posted materials that, in their opinion, corresponded to the views of the rogue Yakovlev. And the fact that you do not know other sources, this once again proves that the hat turned out to be not a senile. Burn on, liar and verbiage ....